Article.1157.

1. San Francisco Inn, hereto represented by its authorized representative,

Leodino M. Carandang Vs. San Pablo City Water District, represented by its
General Manager Roger F. Borja and the SPCWD Investigating Board, G.R. No.
204639. February 15, 2017

FACTS: The petitioner [SFI] is a hotel business establishment situated at Brgy.

San Francisco Calihan, San Pablo City. In 1996, petitioner caused the
construction of two (2) deep-well pumps for the use of its business. The
respondent [SPCWD] is a local water utility and its operation is under the
National Water Resources Board, formerly Council (NWRB), which is the national
agency vested with authority to control and regulate the utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and operation of water resources. In 1977, the
respondent [SPCWD] promulgated the Rules Governing Groundwater Pumping
and Spring Development Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the San Pablo City
Water District.

On September 11, 1998, petitioner [SFI] filed an application for water permit with
the NWRB and so the respondent sent the petitioner a copy of a draft
Memorandum of Agreement, regarding the proposed imposition of production
assessment fee.

ISSUE: Whether SPCWD has a right to impose production assessment in the

clear absence of any findings/proof to support compliance that SFI' s use of
ground water is injuring or reducing SPCWD's financial condition and impairing
its ground water source, pursuant to Section 39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of the
Rules.

RULING: No. A MOA or contract between the water district entity and the deep
well operator/user is not required under the law and the Rules.

However, when a MOA is voluntarily agreed upon and executed, the

obligation to pay production assessment fees on the part of the deep well
operator/user and the right of the water district entity to collect the fees arise
from contract.
The parties are, therefore, legally bound to comply with their respective
prestations. Unlike a MOA, which creates contractual obligations, faithful
compliance with the requirements of Section 39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of the
Rules creates binding obligations arising from law.

Thus, in the absence of the requisite board resolution, SPCWD cannot

legally impose any production assessment fees upon SFI.

2. GREAT ASIAN SALES CENTER CORPORATION and TAN CHONG LIN,

petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANCASIA FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 105774. April 25, 2002]

Great Asian is engaged in the business of buying and selling general

merchandise, in particular household appliances. On March 17, 1981, the board
of directors of Great Asian approved a resolution authorizing its Treasurer and
General Manager, Arsenio, to secure a loan from Bancasia. The board resolution
also authorized Arsenio to sign all papers, documents or promissory notes
necessary to secure the loan. On February 10, 1982, the board of directors of
Great Asian approved a second resolution authorizing Great Asian to secure a
discounting line with Bancasia in an amount not exceeding P2.0 million. The
second board resolution also designated Arsenio as the authorized signatory to
sign all instruments, documents and checks necessary to secure the discounting
line. Great Asian, through its Treasurer and General Manager Arsenio, signed
four (4) Deeds of Assignment of Receivables assigning to Bancasia fifteen (15)
postdated checks. Nine of the checks were payable to Great Asian, three were
payable to "New Asian Emp.", and the last three were payable to cash. Various
customers of Great Asian issued these postdated checks in payment for
appliances and other merchandise. Out of the 15 post-dated checks, all of which
were dishonored.

ISSUE: W/N Great Asian is under obligation to pay Bancasia the full value of the
checks.

Ruling: Yes. Great Asian’s four contracts assigning its fifteen postdated checks
to Bancasia expressly stipulate the suspensive condition that in the event the
drawers of the checks fail to pay, Great Asian itself will pay Bancasia.

Since the common condition in the contracts had transpired, an obligation on

the part of Great Asian arose from the four contracts, and that obligation is to
pay Bancasia the full value of the checks, including the stipulated penalty and
attorney’s fees.

Article1158.

3. Pelayo v. Lauron 12 Phil. 453 (BAR)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during

the child delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and
equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants
refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed
that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum
of P500.00 and costs. The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff,
contending that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the child-
birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband independently
and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house of
the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for
the medical assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:

No. According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157),
obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts
and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in
the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones. The rendering of
medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations
to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the
law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical
assistance rendered to the defendant’s daughter-in-law must be couched on the
husband. In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in
the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is especially
established by the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.

4. Canonizado v. Benitez,, L-49315, L-60966, Feb. 20, 1984

FACTS:

On January 12, 1982, the petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion to
require the respondent to pay current support beginning February, 1978 in favor
of Christina, daughter of petitioner and respondent. On March 1, 1982, the
respondent filed an opposition to said motion on the ground that his obligation
to support has terminated. Subsequently, the respondent filed a motion to
terminate support. On July 5, 1982, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus
with preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the respondent judge be
ordered to act on petitioner's motion for current support.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is obliged to make payment of current

support.

Ruling: No.

Article 303 of the New Civil Code provides:

"Art. 303. The obligation to give support shall also cease:

xxx

xxx

(3) When the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has
obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer
needs the allowance for his subsistence;"

xxx

xxx

When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support stops since the
recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It does not mean, however, that the
obligation to give or the right to ask for support also ceases permanently because
the lack of a need for it may only be temporary. In other words, the above
circumstances do not affect the right to support between spouses but only the
action to make it demandable, such right being born from the law and created
as such by the marriage tie. It subsists throughout the period that the marriage
subsists.

In the instant petition the respondent can rightfully file a motion to oppose the
payment of current support or to terminate the demandability of the same for
the time being, since he alleges and it appears undisputed that herein petitioner
became a member of the bar sometime in 1967 and has long been in the employ
of the Central Bank of the Philippines, even before she became a lawyer. The
matter of determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to support up to the
present is subject to the presentation of evidence both by the petitioner and the
respondent and is for the lower court to decide.

Art.1159.
5. Hilltop Market Fish Vendors' Assoction, Inc. Vs. Hon. BraulioYaranon, City
Mayor, Baguio City, Hon. GaloWeygan, City Councilor and Chairman Anti-Vice
Coordinating Task Force, and the City Government of Baguio G.R. No. 188057.
July 12, 2017

ISSUES:

1. W/N there is a perfected contract of lease;

2. W/N the period of lease as provided in the contract has began?

RULING:

1. Yes. In a contract of lease, one of the parties binds himself to give to another
the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may
be definite or indefinite. Being a consensual contract, a lease is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing and the cause or
consideration which are to constitute the contract. Thereafter, the lessor is
obliged to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition
as to render it fit for the use intended, and the lessee is obliged to use the thing
leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated or that
which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased.

In a contract of lease, the cause or essential purpose is the use and enjoyment
of the thing. The thing or subject matter of the contract in this case was clearly
identified and agreed upon as the lot where the building would be constructed
by Hilltop. The consideration were the annual lease rental and the ownership of
the building upon the termination of the lease period. Considering that Hilltop
and the City of Baguio agreed upon the essential elements of the contract, the
contract of lease had been perfected.

2. Yes. Since Hilltop exercised its right as lessee based on the contract of lease
and the law, it has no basis in claiming that the contract of lease did not
commence.
Contrary to Hilltop's contention, the issuance of the Certificate was not a
suspensive condition which determines the perfection of the contract or its
effectivity. The contract of lease specifically provides that: "x x x the annual lease
rental shall be P25,000 payable within the first 30 days of each and every
year; the first payment to commence immediately upon issuance by the
City Engineer's Office of the Certificate of full occupancy of the entire
building to be constructed thereon x x x."[26] Clearly, the issuance of the
Certificate is only a condition that will make Hilltop start paying the annual lease
rental to the City of Baguio. Because the Certificate was not issued, the payment
of annual lease rental did not commence. A contract constitutes the law between
the parties and they are, therefore, bound by its stipulations. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

Hilltop failed to distinguish between a condition imposed upon the perfection of

the contract and a condition imposed on the performance of an obligation.
Failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, while
the failure to comply with the second condition only gives the other party the
option either to refuse to proceed or to waive the condition. In this case, the
condition, which is the issuance of the Certificate, was imposed only for the
obligation to pay the rent to commence. Payment of the price, or the rent, in this
case, goes into the performance of the contract and has nothing to do with the
perfection of the contract.

6. GREAT ASIAN SALES CENTER CORPORATION and TAN CHONG LIN,

petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANCASIA FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 105774. April 25, 2002]

SAME FACTS: EXCEPT THAT: On March 4, 1981, Tan Chong Lin signed a
Surety Agreement in favor of Bancasia to guarantee, solidarily, the debts of Great
Asian to Bancasia. On January 29, 1982, Tan Chong Lin signed a
Comprehensive and Continuing Surety Agreement in favor of Bancasia to
guarantee, solidarily, the debts of Great Asian to Bancasia. Thus, Tan Chong Lin
signed two surety agreements ("Surety Agreements" for brevity) in favor of
Bancasia.

ISSUE: W/N Bancasia and Tang Chon Lin should be held liable under the Civil
Code.
RULING: YES.

 Great Asian’s four contracts assigning its fifteen postdated checks to Bancasia
expressly stipulate the suspensive condition that in the event the drawers of
the checks fail to pay, Great Asian itself will pay Bancasia
 The stipulations in the Surety Agreements undeniably mandate the solidary
liability of Tan Chong Lin with Great Asian
 Moreover, the stipulations in the Surety Agreements are sufficiently broad,
expressly encompassing "all the notes, drafts, bills of exchange, overdraft and
other obligations of every kind which the PRINCIPAL may now or may hereafter
owe the Creditor"
7. San Francisco Inn, hereto represented by its authorized representative,
Leodino M. Carandang Vs. San Pablo City Water District, represented by its
General Manager Roger F. Borja and the SPCWD Investigating Board, G.R.
No. 204639. February 15, 2017

SAME AS NUMBER 1

8. ROLANDO M. MENDIOLA, Petitioner, vs. COMMERZ TRADING INT'L.,

INC., Respondent.,, G.R. No. 200895, July 31, 2013

FACTS: Genicon, Inc. (Genicon) is a foreign corporation based in Florida, United

States of America, which designs, produces, and distributes "patented surgical
instrumentation focused exclusively on laparoscopic surgery. Petitioner, a
physician by profession, entered into a contract with Genicon to be its exclusive
distributor of Genicon laparoscopic instruments in the Philippines, as evidenced
by a Distribution Agreement. Petitioner, in turn, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with respondent to facilitate the marketing and sale of Genicon
laparoscopic instruments in the Philippines. Under the MOA, respondent would
be compensated for P100,000.00.
Petitioner ordered laparoscopic instrument from Genicon and shipped the
medical equipment to Pampanga Medical Specialist Hospital, Inc. (PMSHI) which
purchase a Genicon laparoscopic instrument for Two Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00).

From the total amount of P2,600,000.00 paid by PMSHI to respondent, the

latter deducted P100,000.00 as respondent's compensation for its services
pursuant to the MOA. Respondent remitted to petitioner P2,430,000.00 only,
instead of P2,500,000.00.

Despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to remit the

remaining balance of P70,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of the
laparoscopic instrument. Consequently, petitioner filed a collection suit against
respondent. In its Answer, respondent countered that petitioner had no cause of
action because it did not owe petitioner any amount. Respondent claimed that
the unremitted amount of P70,000.00 represented a portion of the
P267,857.14 Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) which was erroneously and
inadvertently credited or remitted by respondent to petitioner's account.

ISSUES: Whether respondent has the right to retain the balance of the proceeds
of the sale in the amount of P70,000.00.

RULING: No.

There is no dispute that the P70,000.00 respondent withheld from petitioner

formed part of the proceeds of the sale of the Genicon laparoscopic instrument.

Respondent, however, claims that the P70,000.00 represents a portion of the

total VAT due from the Genicon transaction which is allegedly petitioner's
obligation under paragraph V of the MOA which states: "All taxes/expenses and
expenses related to Genicon transactions shall be the responsibility of
[petitioner].
Basic is the principle that a contract is the law between the parties, and its
stipulations are binding on them, unless the contract is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.

Indeed, paragraph V of the MOA obligates petitioner to pay the taxes due from
the sale of the Genicon laparoscopic instrument. Petitioner admits that he is the
one "responsible in the payment of the EVAT and not the respondent, who merely
acted as the marketer of the Genicon laparoscopic instrument. Hence, as
between petitioner and respondent, petitioner bears the burden for the payment
of VAT.

Article1160.

Article1161.
9. G.R. No. 224583, February 01, 2017, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. MICHAEL PALANAY Y MINISTER, Accused-

On the evening of August 30, 2010, AAA was sleeping in her room when
she was suddenly awakened by someone removing her short pants and panty.
She awoke to find accused Palanay, her uncle and brother of her mother, lying
beside her and removing his own short pants. Thereafter, he kissed AAA's lips,
touched her breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his
bestial desires, Palanay slept by AAA's side. By early morning, AAA went to the
house of her elder sister, BBB, and narrated her tragic experience.

The TRC finds accused [Palanay] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape which imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
further adjudged to pay "AAA" civil indemnity in the sum of Seventy Five
(P75,000.00) Pesos without need of proof and moral damages in the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos only. The CA affirmed the RTC's Decision in toto.

ISSUE: The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is whether the prosecution
has proven the guilt of Palanay for the rape of AAA beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: YES.

The Court affirms the conviction of Palanay for rape under Article 266-A qualified
by relationship in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, which respectively
provide:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived or reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;chanrobleslaw

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. xxx (Emphasis
supplied)

xxxx

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

Hence, in a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove all the
elements thereof, which are: (1) sexual congress (2) with a woman; (3) done by
force, threat, or intimidation without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen
years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

In the present case, all the foregoing elements of qualified rape are present.

--------------WALA KO'Y IDEA KUNG ASA DIRI ANI NGA CASE ANG NAAY
RELEVANCE SA 1161; I THINK ANG PINAKADUOL LANG KAY NAAY
RELEVANCE SA CIVIL CODE KAY ANG INDEMNITY-------HENCE;

To conform to Our pronouncement in People v. Jugueta, the civil indemnity and

moral damages awarded must be increased from Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), respectively, to One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) each. We further order the payment of
exemplary damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in
accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, in view of the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, as well as Palanay's moral corruption, perversity,
and wickedness in ravishing his own niece. The imposition of exemplary
damages is further warranted to deter others from committing similar acts or for
correction for the public good. Finally, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.
10. Heirs of Ramon C. Gaite, et al. vs. The Plaza, Inc. and FGU Insurance
Corporation G.R. No. 177685. January 26, 2011

FACTS:

On July 16, 1980, The Plaza, Inc. (The Plaza), a corporation engaged in the
restaurant business, through its President, Jose C. Reyes, entered into a
contract with Rhogen Builders (Rhogen), represented by Ramon C. Gaite, for the
construction of a restaurant building in Greenbelt, Makati, Metro Manila for the
price of P7,600,000. On July 28, 1980, The Plaza paid P1,155,000 down payment
to Gaite and soon after Rhogen commenced construction of the restaurant
building. 2 Months later, Engineer Angelito Z. Gonzales, the Acting Building
Official of the Municipality of Makati,ordered Gaite to cease and desist from
continuing with the construction of the building for violation of The National
Building Code. The Plaza’s Project Manager Architect Roberto evaluated the
Progress Billing and Tayzon stated that actual jobsite assessment showed that
the finished works fall short of Rhogen’s claimed percentage of accomplishment
and Rhogen was entitled to only P32,684.16 and not P260,649.91 being
demanded by Rhogen. On the same day, Gaite notified Reyes that he is
suspending all construction works until Reyesand the Project Manager cooperate
to resolve the issue he had raised to address the problem.

Gaite informed The Plaza that he is terminating their contract based on the
Contractor’s Right to Stop Work or Terminate Contracts as provided for in the
General Conditions of the Contract and demanded the payment of P63,058.50
representing the work that has already been completed by Rhogen. Reyes also
informed Gaite that The Plaza will continue the completion of the structure
utilizing the services of a competent contractor but will charge Rhogen for
liquidated damages as stipulated in Article VIII of the Contract The Plaza filed a
civil case for breach of contract, sum of money and damages against Gaite and
FGU in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. The RTC Makati rendered its
decision granting in favor of the Plaza against Gaite. The Court of Appeals
affirmed such decision with modification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Rhogen had factual or legal basis to terminate the General
Construction Contract pursuant to Article 1191 of the NCC.

HELD:

NO. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in
which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation
of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed
simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of the other. Respondent The Plaza predicated its action
on Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which provides for the remedy of rescission or
more properly resolution, a principal action based on breach of faith by the other
party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the
provision is the obligors failure to comply with an existing obligation. Thus, the
power to rescind is given only to the injured party. The injured party is the party
who has faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is ready and willing to perform his
obligation.

The construction contract between Rhogen and The Plaza provides for reciprocal
obligations whereby the latter’s obligation to pay the contract price or progress
billing is conditioned on the former’s specified performance. Pursuant to its
contractual obligation, The Plaza furnished materials and paid the agreed down
payment. Rhogen, having breached the contractual obligation it had expressly
assumed specifically to comply with all laws was already at fault. Respondent
The Plaza, on the other hand, was justified in withholding payment on Rhogen’s
first progress billing. Upon the facts duly established, Rhogen committed a
serious breach of its contract with The Plaza, which justified the latter
in terminating the contract. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
damages. Petition DENIED