51. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH v. HON. RENATO C.

CORONA
G.R. No. 131457 August 19, 1999

FACTS:

On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a “win-win” Resolution which
reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996
Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DAR’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OP’s act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the “win-win” Resolution of November 7, 1997 is
not void since “it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,” hence, the “March 29, 1996 decision…could not
as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification”. They further explained that the DAR’s
failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was “excusable”.

ISSUE:

1. Was the OP’s modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives?
2. Whether the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
3. Whether the respondent’s have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.

HELD:

1. No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or
substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to
rest. Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that
“all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies.” While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy
administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was ‘never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.’ A liberal interpretation &
application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances.
2. No.Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
‘decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall…become final after the lapse of
15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx’ unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period. The respondent’s explanation that the DAR’s office procedure ‘made it impossible…to
file its Motion for Reconsideration on time’ since the said decision had to be referred to its
different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong
with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or
regulation. The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the
internal office procedure of an administrative body.
3. No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body,
court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in
Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy
can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These
grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical
nature. When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights
were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision. In
the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et
al., “just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.”
 52. VICTORINO TORRES vs. LEON VENTURA
G.R. No. 86044 July 2, 1990
187 SCRA 96
FACTS:

Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in the
Florencio Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when Presidential Decree
No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the aforementioned piece of land and was
automatically deemed owner of the property. Under Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of
those lands within the coverage of the law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.

Two years later or in 1980, petitioner offered to pay the loaned amount but private respondent
asked for an extension of one more year to continue cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits. Because
of this, the money being offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for other purposes. In 1981,
though petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could not do so that he lacked the necessary
funds. It was only in 1985 when petitioner was able to save enough money to make another offer but this
time private respondent categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land. Hence, petitioner
filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he
mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to redeem it. On the scheduled date
of hearing, private respondent failed to appear.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the petitioner is favorable by the court to have the rights over the land.

HELD:

This would be in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed by private respondent that petitioner
was in fact the tiller of the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated in 1972. As a
consequence of the law, petitioner was granted the right to possess and enjoy the property for himself.

In its decision, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner having found his version more
convincing than that of private respondent whose evasive attitude did not go unnoticed therein. The trial
court further ruled that the transfer of property from petitioner to private respondent is null and void for
being violative of Presidential Decree No. 27.

In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the contract, being void ab initio, must be given no effect
at all. The parties in this case are to be placed in status quo which was the condition prevailing prior to
the execution of the void contract. The rights and interests covered by the Certificate of Land Transfer are
beyond the commerce of man.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 15482 is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela in Civil Case No. Br. XIX-167 is
hereby ordered REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
 53. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 103125, 1993
FACTS:

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed
a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural
crops and a housing project for provincial government employees

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the
Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for the damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief
from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a
motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated
that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by
the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings
until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD:

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc.,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.
 54. LILIA Y. GONZALES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 106028 May 9, 2001
174 SCRA 398
FACTS:

This is a petition for review on under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26891which dismissed the petition for Certiorari and
prohibition with temporary restraining order. The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders dated November 27 , 1990 and April 22, 1991
from the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), signed by the respondent DAR
Regional Director Antonio S. Maraya, and issued pursuant to the operation land transfer program of the
government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. Petitioner was directed to surrender the titles to her
land and to submit the other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said
bank was ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for the two
parcels of land. On December 20, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul the said
two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the
petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final
survey plans and the valuation of her land. After requiring the respondents to file their Comment, the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and dismissing the
petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals also held
that Certiorari cannot be used by the petitioners as a substitute for appeal of the assailed issuances.

ISSUE:

Is the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in dismissing the petition for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies?

HELD:

Hence, the proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a
reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive
adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these
administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may
likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not
be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet another
forum available--the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land
valuation or determination of just compensation.

SECTION 1. “Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction’’. The Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under ‘’Republic Act No.6657’’, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228
and 129-A,Republic Act No.3844 as a mended by Republic Act No.6389, ‘’Presidential Decree No.27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations’’.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the cases involving the valuation
of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
Land Bank. Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in
law and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule
that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
 55. LOPE MACHETE et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON
G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995
250 SCRA 176
FACTS:

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back
rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete,
Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando
Ombahin, Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The
complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's
landholdings under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of
their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay
their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back
rentals and damages.

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian
relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an
agricultural leasehold contract, hence; the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its execution
and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 6657 and other
pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation
of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the
trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court erred in its decision.

HELD:

Yes.

Section 17 of E.O. 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance
with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created
the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case
.At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as
this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo vs. Court of Appeals, the resolution by the DAR is to the
best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the
proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in
a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
 56. NINA M. QUISMUNDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991
201 SCRA 609

FACTS:

On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the
trial court of Angeles City praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to
a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should allegedly govern the
relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try the case at bar?

HELD:

Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests
in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as follows: SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial
Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
 57. MODESTO T. UALAT VS. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS
A.M. No. MTJ-91-588 December 6, 1996

FACTS:

Complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land consisting of

4.7 hectares owned by Leonardo Coma. Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he is Sabio's
caretaker. It appears from the two complaints that on August 6, 1990, complainant Sabio filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for Recovery of Possession 2
against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio. On August 30, 1990, the
landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with respondent's Sala. On July
23, 1990, 3 the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as
the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed. On November 5, 1990,
however, respondent Judge rendered a decision 4 in favor of the landowner ordering the complainants,
among others, to vacate the property.

ISSUE:

Was respondent Judge correct in deciding the case for illegal detainer despite the fact that the case was
originally filed with the DARAB? Otherwise stated, the issue is whether respondent judge properly
comported himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before him.

HELD:

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In the proceedings before respondent
judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been
sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our
agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving
agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property.

Respondent judge is hereby FOUND LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law and is hereby imposed a
fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).Respondent is further ADMONISHED that
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 58. REMIGIO ISIDRO vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD
GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991
FACTS:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5
hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private
respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy
portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's)
income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition
that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any
rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer
demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of
said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4120.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction on the instant case?

HELD:

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between
the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing
tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988).

The fact remains that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by
the petitioner. And in the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is
properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129
 59. TEOFILA DE LUNA v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97788 May 11, 1993
FACTS:

Petitioner Teofila de Luna had been in peaceful and continuous possession of four (4) hectares of land
located at Barangay Masinao, Sta. Maria, Laguna. Petitioner and her father, Martin de Luna, had worked
for many years on this and as agricultural tenants thereof.

After the demise of petitioner’s father, she continued to cultivate the subject parcels of land.
Petitioner’s name appears in the master list of agricultural tenants in the Province of Laguna issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") as a full-fledged tenant of landholder Atty. Francisco Redor.

On 21 May 1986, petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against her two (2) brothers, private respondents
Casiano and Flaviano de Luna, who allegedly had turned petitioner out of her possession of the parcels of
land through stealth. The complaint for forcible entry was filed with the MCTC of Mabitac, Sta. Maria,
Laguna and there docketed as Civil Case No. 245.

The complaint was initially dismissed by the MCTC on 30 September 1986 on the basis that the case
fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
316 in relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 583. However, after considering an Omnibus
Motion of petitioner, the MCTC set aside its earlier order and instead referred the case to the DAR.

After the referral to the DAR and acting upon the certification issued by DAR that the case was proper
for trial in the municipal court, the MCTC proceeded to hear the complaint for ejectment. In due course,
the MCTC rendered a decision requiring private respondents to vacate the premises and to pay petitioner.

Dissatisfied, respondent de Luna brothers appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the issue of
jurisdiction of the MCTC over the dispute.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents may be deemed as “third persons” under Section 21 of RA 1199 thereby
bringing the dispute within the ambit of authority of the RTC as an agrarian court.

HELD:

The 'third party' mentioned in the said sec. 21 of RA 1199 should be construed to mean a person
who is neither landholder nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the landholder.
For instance, a sheriff enforcing an execution sale against the landholder; or a purchaser or transferee of
the land, or a mere dummy of the landowner
 60. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 122256 October 30, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed
to farmer-beneficiaries. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings
("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated . Private respondent rejected the government's
offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price. The
matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, sustained the initial
valuation made by the LBP. Private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per
hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have
appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's
Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that,
in violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after
notice of the decision of the PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending
that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, an appeal from the
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to
the RTC.

HELD:

Any effort to transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 of
RA 6657 and therefore would be void.
 61. AGAPITO ROM VS. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC.
GR No. 169331 September 5, 2011

FACTS:

On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in
Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting
portions of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP,
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as DAR
ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98.

Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural
land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the
effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as
part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution
No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already
classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was
approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-
II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights
of bona fide occupants.

To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and
attempted to obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the
subject parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as
regards the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on September 28, 2001 a
Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAD) of Batangas.

In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application. From this Order, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order dated
December 12, 2003.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. In a Decision dated April 29,
2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that
petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Even if
the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same as
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed Orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation.

HELD:

Respondent's application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance

compensation or by petitioners' waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land
whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this
requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990. Records show that upon being
required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of
bona fide occupants after an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it was not
accompanied by the same,58 respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement. It offered to
pay petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners also
refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a Petition to fix disturbance
compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1) Certification dated
September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there
was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation between the
parties; and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the PARAD on
September 28, 2001.59 To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular
requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such
payment later proved to be of no consequence since the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR was
nevertheless made subject to the condition of payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In
fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance
compensation must be submitted to the DAR.
 62. FRANCISCO SORIANO AND DALISAY SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR 184282 April 11, 2012
FACTS:

Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo,
Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by
TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was covered by
TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the
government pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the
value of the subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter
before the DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation. On September
30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBP‘s preliminary determination. Notices of the
decisions were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the
RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition
arguing that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule
XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and
declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as
mandated by the Civil Code."

The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR lodged a
petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA
granted the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the
purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said re-filed Petition.
Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be
granted.

Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.
Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In
case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the
provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be,
depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree
to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is
the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it,
the private respondent‘s case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court
to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest
original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer
such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to
do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
 63. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. RENATO L. MATEO
G.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011
FACTS:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land with an area of 6.693 square meters. More
or less, located in barrio pulang lupa, Las Pinas City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the
respondent’s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Lara, the property passed on to his children, and a
grandson. The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full exclusive ownership to one of the surviving and
who was the mother of herein respondent.

Thereafter, with the agreement of the Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was
executed in favor of daughter Laura, who applied for land registration. After the application was granted,
Original Certificate of title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.

In due course, the property now covered by OCT No.6386 was used as collateral to secure a
succession of loans. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of
the property after failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China
Bank. Petitioner CDC and the China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of
the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose.

In the Meanwhile, Felicidad died intestate. CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the
MTC of Las Pinas City against the respondent’s siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein,
the defendants maintained that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was
classified as agricultural; that the Jurisdiction Belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they have been in continuous and open possession of the land even
before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of land; and that CDC’s
title was invalid, considering that the land have been registered before its being declared alienable. MTC
ruled in favor of CC. On appeal, RTC resolved against CDC but CA found favor in it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title of Laura over the Subject land is indefeasible

HELD:

There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has
already been placed under the Torrens system of land Registration. The Government is required under the
Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person
named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens Certificate and to
dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner
full peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily
disposed of any right over the covered land.

The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name
of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China
Bank. In all time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transaction causing various
transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name
of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is
unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Laura’s
name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time
through this case. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC have commenced the
ejectment case against his own siblings.
 64. RENE ANTONIO vs. GREGORIO MANAHAN
G.R. No. 176091 August 24, 2011
FACTS:

Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I,
San Mateo, Rizal with an aggregate area of 30906 square meters and registered in the name of the private
respondent Manahan under Original Certificate of Title #s. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal Province Registry.

Manahan and Antonio entered into a leasehold agreement whereby the latter undertook to
cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay,
each weighing 44 kilos.

Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Council (MARO) against Antonio,
for such violations of the leasehold agreement as non-payment /remittance of the stipulated rentals
despite demands.

Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint, Antonio averred, among others, that he
remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan refused to accept the
same.

Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of Manahan. On appeal, DARAB ordered

respondent to respect tenant’s peaceful possession and cultivation of said land. However, DARAB
subsequently set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARAD’s decision. CA likewise upheld the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from his peaceful possession and cultivation of
the disputed land.

HELD:

An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject
matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to
security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided
by the law. In recognition and protection of the tenant’s right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is
upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession.

The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to
be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record shows
that Antonio’s failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease
rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate. The
foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the court found Antonio’s dispossession, however, still
warranted by his repeated violations of the term
 65. JUAN GALOPE VS. CRESENCIA BUGARIN
G.R. No. 185669 February 1, 2012
FACTS:

Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms
the land. Parties respective contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to
petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant,
and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent
cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from
P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.

Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before
the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing
in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. It was also claimed that
petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.

After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner
is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled
that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land.
Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARAB’s ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the
elements of consent and sharing are not present; that respondent’s act of lending her land without
consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no receipts prove petitioner’s payment of
rentals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:

The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in
ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.

The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent’s act of allowing the petitioner
to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy
agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written
contract alone. Section 5of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. 82

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the
landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm
land.They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The
purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner
pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent’s motion to supervise harvesting and
threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly,
petitioner’s personal cultivation of the landis conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact
that they share in the harvest.
 66. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FEDERICO SUNTAY
G.R. No. 157903 December 14, 2011
FACTS:

Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total
area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911
hectares of Suntay’s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare,
for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68.Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was assigned to RARAD
Miñas.

After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas rendered a decision fixing the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for reconsideration,
but RARAD Miñas denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court,
impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation for
the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the
ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11,
Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank
appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No.
157903)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition for the determination of just
compensation.

HELD:

The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that
what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide
this question.

Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition. It bears stressing that the petition is
not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just
compensation for respondent’s expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction.

The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as
summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking
under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land
Bank’s determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent
to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of
the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of
the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In
determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17
of R.A. No. 6657.
 67. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FEDERICO SUNTAY
G.R. No. 161796 February 8, 2012
FACTS:

At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or
less, which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry.

On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide expanse
from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite
purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be”.

In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla
property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification; copy furnished the Agrarian Reform
Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to
occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the
OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case.

Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the
subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No. 7924
canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

HELD:

The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public
ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions of
RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the period
material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation 1637. It
ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS
Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance.

Before Proclamation 1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property.
In a very real sense, the "private rights" belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmer-
beneficiaries were deemed owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21, 1972 under
PD 27 and subsequently deemed full owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the
township reservation established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed
ownership rights" bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of looking at the
situation is that these farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla and eventual
transferee Araneta.

Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall ‘cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.’ As to what constitutes ‘agricultural land,’
it is referred to as ‘land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.’ The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. ‘Agricultural lands’ are only those lands which are ‘arable and suitable
agricultural lands’ and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.’ "Indeed, lands not
devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR.
 68. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEVERINO LISTANA
G.R. No. 168105 July 27, 2011
FACTS:

Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian,

Casiguran, Sorsogon, which was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent
rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent wrote LBP requesting the release of payment of
the cash portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has with an equivalent valuation of P5,607,874.69."
Consequently, a Deed of Transfer was executed by respondent over the said portion of his landholding in
consideration of payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting of cash
(P1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (P2,747,858.60). DAR Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision
P10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. Almost a year later, petitioner filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation. Petitioner argued that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s (PARAD’s) valuation is
unacceptable. The trial court issued the order dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one
year from receipt of the copy of the PARAD‘s decision. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed petitioner‘s
appeal from the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) dismissal of its petition for judicial determination of just
compensation for failure to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules and "its loss of appellate
recourse cannot be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just compensation which
is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day period or more than 100 days after the PARAD rendered its
valuation in a summary administrative proceeding.

HELD:

While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the
agrarian reform adjudicator‘s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day
period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator‘s decision will attain finality. This rule is not
only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily,
a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land
valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as
to the true value of his property. Although the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now
appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57
authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation.
However, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of the petition before the SAC more than
100 days after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the PARAD‘s decision fixing the just
compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its tardiness and
neglect, and simply reiterated the great prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous
inclusion in the PARAD‘s valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the government.
 69. LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ vs. TERESITA V.
SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011
FACTS:

On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the
Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador and that petitioners acquired possession of
the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest, and that despite several verbal and
written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. Petitioners interposed the
defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the
subject land with the consent and permission of respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino
and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural
production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship
between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. On September 10, 2003, the MTC
promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties,
and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu. On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision
remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists
between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary
hearing was served by the parties‘ submission of their respective position papers and other supporting
evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated
September 10, 2003. Respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, respondent filed a
Petition for review with the CA. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It
ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that
respondent or her predecessors-in- interest consented to the tenancy relationship. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners-defendants are not tenants of the subject land.

HELD:

No. Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy
exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. As correctly found by the CA, the
element of consent is lacking. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the
landowner; independent evidence is necessary. Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing
of harvest. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by
substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. In the instant case, petitioners failed to
prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.
No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondent‘s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of
the amount of damages due respondent is proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
August 24, 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA are
AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to
determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of
petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land, with utmost dispatch consistent with the
above disquisition.
 70. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000
FACTS:

The petitioner in this case owns four parcels of land located in Tagum, Davao which were taken
by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by
respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property which
was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao. However, the petition was dismissed on
the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of
the DARAB. Petitioner also contended that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just
compensation for the taking of lands under CARP because such jurisdiction is vested in the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just
compensation

HELD:

No.

To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof, Rule XIII, Section
11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

"Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. —

The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration."

As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that
the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the
Courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given
to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed
into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative
law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the
question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final
and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are
the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. 92

Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the
case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
 71. GERARDO RUPA SR. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MAGIN
SALIPOT
G.R. No. 80129 January 25, 2000
FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Rupa Sr. filed an action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot
claiming that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and
Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now, sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also,
that he is the overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However, without any
prior written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in
January 1981. Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he
sought assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned property
and even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court.

However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on
the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of
redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no clear and
convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound
by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Mariano Luzong filed
six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he was the overseer and administrator of the
five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses. Thus, negating his claim of tenancy. The CA therefore
affirmed on appeal the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land

HELD:

A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable
in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to
exist, it is necessary that:

1.......The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.......The subject is agricultural land;

3.......There is consent;

4.......The purpose is agricultural production;

5.......There is personal cultivation; and

6.......There is sharing of harvests

In the case at bar, the fact that RUPA has been planting coconut seedlings and minor crops in the
vacant portions of the subject land as well as cleaning and gathering coconuts to process them into copra
is borne out by the records. Further indicating the tenancy relationship between the landlord and RUPA
is their agreement to share 50/50. The sharing arrangement taken together with other factors
characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of RUPA that
indeed, he is a tenant, source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension,
disbarment,4 or other disciplinary action.5 Respondent's acts are clearly in violation of his solemn oath
as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.
 72. RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO vs .ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
Adm. Case No. 3808 February 2, 2000
FACTS:

This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyer’s professional
responsibility. Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Antipolo,
Rizal. In 1991, he conducted dialogues with squatters — among them respondent — living on said land
and offered to relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and they filed a
complaint against complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
claiming that they are tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected.

The squatters — again including respondent — also filed a case against complainant before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time,
they claimed to be owners, not mere tenants, of the land. They traced their alleged ownership to an old
Spanish title.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping violating his professional
responsibility as a lawyer

HELD:

Yes. Respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.2 He was, indeed, less than sincere in
asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. What
made matters worse was his participation in bringing such claims to court, knowing them to be
contradictory and therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totally false. In this he is guilty of
consenting to if not actual commission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and
to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oath is
a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment,4 or other
disciplinary action.5 Respondent's acts are clearly in violation of his solemn oath as a lawyer that this
Court will not tolerate.
 73. EUDOSIA DAEZ et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000
FACTS:

Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the
application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's
total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T.
Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an
Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings
were that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs)
were issued to the respondents.

Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied
the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual tillage or direct
management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on
appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the
reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the fact
that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and executor.

HELD:

It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one
and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent
institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia
Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the
same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. The right of retention is a
constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate
the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the
landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return
it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.

The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may
be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area
 74. BAYANI BAUTISTA vs. PATRICIA ARANETA
G.R. No. 135829 February 22, 2000
FACTS:

In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of
land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly,
were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to
vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments
against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the
case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged
to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for
the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-
dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall under CARL
because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the presence of
the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the
premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not
push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The PARAD
ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB
affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence,
this Appeal. Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio
Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to
Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner likewise relies on the
certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding

HELD:

The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because
they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they
only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he
became a tenant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural
leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled
that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is
either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and
not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. . . . To
rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the
prejudice of the true and lawful landholder."

Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding
of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner
in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings
especially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.
 75. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000
FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by
the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public
auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by
his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private respondent Exequiel
Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period.

On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing
private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless". The
Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the
mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. Then on
April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an
apparent attempt to redeem his land. The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed
on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and
interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season". On May 7, 1992
private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Saleand Document, Redemption with
Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan
and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the
resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the DARAB, a motion to
withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and intervenor was allowed to withdraw
P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with intervenor Antonio being recognized as the
duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the
instant petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts.

HELD:

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:

(d)Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether

leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator
and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
 Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the
ownership of the subject property. In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of
Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is
limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and
disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws.
Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance
of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place. The issue of who can harvest the mangoes
and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is
dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can
stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the
gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already
been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership
 76. GAVINO CORPUZ vs. SPOUSES GERONIMO GROSPE AND HILARIA GROSPE
G.R. No. 135297 June 8, 2000
FACTS:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012)
with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by a
certain Florentino Chioco. On January 20, 1982, petitioner mortgaged the subject land in favor of Virginia
de Leon to pay for his wife's hospitalization. Upon the expiration of the contract, petitioner again
mortgaged the property to herein respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four
years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The parties even
executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the respondents to use
and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery
of possession with the DARAB in Cabanatuan City against the respondents averring that the latter
entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed the palay
planted on the land. Respondents in their answer claimed that the petitioner himself allowed them to take
over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of
paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over the
landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and
claimed that he and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.

The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang
Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27
recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most qualified
farmer(s)-beneficiaries". The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petitioners ‘appeal and subsequent reconsideration
thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the waiver executed by the petitioner null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws.

2. Whether or not the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary.

HELD:

1. YES.

The court have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by
a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to
the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the
government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. In Torres v. Ventura, the
Court clearly held:

". . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and
enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted
by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer
except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.

. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular
[No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:

“Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries
of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their farms/home lots to
 other persons or have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null and void."'

2. NO.
The court ruled that abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to
renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that
intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with
the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have
been abandoned. In this case, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the private
respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom,
we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon. His
surrender of possession did not amount to abandonment because there was an obligation on the
part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
However, the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under
the present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his
rights under the agrarian laws.

3. YES.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not
be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with
the provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 also provides that
"[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . . . shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) voluntary surrender of
the landholding by the agricultural lessee . . . ."

In this case, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another
private person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the
private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws.
Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court
approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. Petitioner's
voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the
government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the
reallocation of farm holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan
shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who
shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-
farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic
organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of
agrarian reform.
 77. JAIME P. CORPIN vs. AMOR S. VIVAR AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137350 June 19, 2000
FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan
covered by TCT No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private respondent Amor S.
Vivar is in possession of said parcel of land. Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private
respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision
ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's
lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals. The latter upheld the Regional
Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties.

HELD:

YES.

In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan
circuit trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the
case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendant's Answer and
should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following:
(1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2)
Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza
dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may
present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private respondent to
his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not previously presented to the
municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.

The records of the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court and hear the issue of
jurisdiction.
 78. KOOPERATIBA NG SANDIGAN NG MAGSASAKANG PILIPINO, INC. VS.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, ET AL.
G.R. No. 139051 June 26, 2000
FACTS:

The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella
granting the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu,
Batangas into residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In essence, the Order stated
that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any
tenant-tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law. Fifteen (15)
occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a forty-four (44)
hectare portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to such, former President
Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975 declaring the Municipalities of
Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones more suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial and urban uses. In December 1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders
and presidential proclamation, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of
Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their
objections to these Santiago notices. Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who
succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon,
Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones. On May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a
Petition with the DARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the
Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was
contrary to the Leong Order of January 22, 1991. Petitioner KSMP filed a complaint-in-intervention on the
aforementioned case. This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB.
The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene and is a proper party-in-interest in the subject
controversy.

HELD:

The Supreme Court find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost
considering that the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no
more case to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed
pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition
yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is
untenable. A perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the private
respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final
disturbance compensation to the legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however,
puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does not
have any jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no personality to file the instant
petition to intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even
recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR, "members of
petitioner are merely holding on to expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that the
land is still capable." The fact, however, remains that the land in question has already been excluded from
the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which
had long become final and executory.
 79. REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Gr. No. 108941 July 6, 2000
FACTS:

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-
fact, having power of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered
into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a term of one year. On
December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with aterm of one year. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give
any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or share harvest. On February 15, 1988, the
Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of
leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, and the
trial court ruled i favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas

HELD:

The elements of the tenancy relationship are:

(1) There are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

(3) there is sharing of harvests.

Candelaria and the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as land
owner never gave her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees
of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
 80. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE CORP.
GR. No. 152640 June 15, 2006
FACTS:

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeks the nullification of the Order of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting PHILCOMSAT's application for the exemption of its 700
hectare land being subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The controversy involves a
parcel of land owned situated within the area which had been declared a security zone under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848.

A Notice of coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the
land in question shall be place under CARP compulsory acquisition scheme PHILCOMSAT sought an
exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage insisting that the land will be utilize for the
expansion of its operations. Respondent's application was rejected by the Sec. Garilao citing the reason
among others that the term "security zone" is not embraced within the definition of lands used for
national defense under Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D.
No. 1845, as amended by P.D. no. 1848, can be subjected to CARP

HELD:

NO.

The SC agree with the CA when it stated that the subject property is clearly within the scope of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security zone.
The very purpose by which P.D. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three kilometers
surrounding the satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and insure the safety
and interrupted operation of the modern media of international communications in the said property, as
indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to subject said security zone to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very purpose by which P.D. 1845, as
revised by P.D. 1848 was decreed. These laws have never been repealed. P.D. 1848 is also specific in that
occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona fide tenants, require a prior written permission
or authority from the Ministry of the National Defense, now Department of National Defense. It is
therefore the Department of National Defense which will determine [x x x] who can occupy the subject
property, and not the Department of the Agrarian Reform.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 81. ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE VS. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
GR. No. 159089 May 3, 2006
FACTS:

On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for
Islanders Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation. Almost three years after, petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman
Manuel K. Asta filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint
with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract, were not authorized by it.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction.

On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's fees. The DARAB decided the
case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding. The RTC then
issued its decision of October 18, 1999 dismissing the case. Finding the relationship between the parties
to be agricultural leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Hence, the appellate court rules that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner.
Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the parties this case
does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD:

Yes.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through Executive Order 129-A the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and
authorized it to assume the powers and function of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases.

In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is thus
correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural
leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of the agrarian
disputes. An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangement-- whether
leasehold, tenancy, and stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to agriculture. The assailed Joint
Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships
or arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and
investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas. Jurisdiction over the present
controversy lies with the DARAB.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

 82. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. BERNARDO V. SALUDANES
GR No. 146581 December 13 2005
FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from twenty – one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6,
1999 by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner and the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) was impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land
forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein
respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to
sell these parcels of land to the government.

The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commissioners to
receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial,
the Special Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the Commissioners. On
February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the
just compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these
above – captioned docketed agrarian cases.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court.
The LBP filed with the same court a Notice of Appeal. A few days after, the DAR also filed its Notice of
Appeal. Both notices of appeal was denied by the SAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari is exempted from the operation of Section
4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity.

HELD:

We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides;

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day period shall be
counted notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi –
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
recognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15
days.
 83. HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ vs. HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ
G.R. No. 162890 November 22 2005
FACTS:

Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian Dela Cruz,
herein petitioner, who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778 with an area of
3.362 hectares, subsequently, In September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold the said to Julian
Dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell.

On September 27, 1960, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his
favor as the qualified tenant of the landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the
amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and made payments to
the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora
Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.

In May 1980, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document, with the consent of her children,
sold the land in favor of Alberto, who took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of
10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the
property with the DAR.

On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over the property in
favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0-
3035 over the landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz. The title contained an annotation prohibiting the
beneficiary from selling or transferring the landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance, except
to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750,
and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz.

On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving
the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julian’s CLT and declared that
whatever rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under
the Agreement to sell were forfeited.

After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision dated July 9, 1997. It
declared that the petitioners were the rightful allocates of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel
CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was
ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the
said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners.

Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD on June 19,
2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred
or waived except through hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with agrarian reform
laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her children by Julian, who
were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in executing the private document, Leonora failed to
comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8.

In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the
petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there
was no tenancy relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful ownership over
the landholding.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the DAR adjudication board has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the CLOA awarded to Alberto Cruz may be cancelled.

HELD:

1. The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and
tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative
implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural
tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.

The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the
court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on
the face of the complaint or petition.

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories
set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be
determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the
nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. If the issues between the
parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a
court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible
to direct and collateral attacks.

2. In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the
exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The
approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and
the recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over
whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also had the authority
to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders, circulars
and memoranda. The resolution of such issues by the DAR Secretary will entail the application
and implementation of agrarian reform laws, inclusive of P.D. No. 946 as well as the
implementing orders, circulars and rules and regulations issued by the DAR, and other agrarian
reform laws, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978 as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988, and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of
1980 will apply.
 84. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. VS.
SECRETARY OF DAR
G.R. No. 183409 June 18 2010
FACTS:

Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private
corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land
and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply,
and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and
development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly
appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, and then
subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled
Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses,
amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e.,
DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended
DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The
aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses or to another agricultural use, thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily
suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.

Petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65] of
Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that
have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner, there is
nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR
the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its
conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing projects, which,
in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE:

Whether the DAR Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion by
issuing and enforcing DAR AO # 01-02, as amended which regulate reclassified lands as some provisions
of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the
exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made
any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions.

Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefore is
to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It
is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and
illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid
administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of
certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
 85. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. DELIA T. SUTTON et al
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On
October 26, 1987, pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent made
a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988 took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.

In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw
their VOS as their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.

DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the following retention
limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21
heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operation of the CARL.

DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No.
9. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.

On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It
ruled that DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines
to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.

ISSUE:

Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?

HELD:

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been granted
by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. They may be
properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave
abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the
authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of
their regulations.

In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural
activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the
business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the
Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that
respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It
must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress

without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the
other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after
the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the
CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms “agricultural activity” and
“commercial farming” by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

86. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. ROBERTO J. CUENCA

 GR No. 154112 September 23, 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City
and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and sent a
NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under the compulsory
coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private
respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of
Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding
is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced
and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405
amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then
President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross
violation of PD 399.

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of
the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was
mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue
writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.

HELD:

Yes.

A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed
for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to
the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety
of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments. The main subject matter
raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation. Note that no
amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the
courts function of determining just compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage
constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then,
the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial
jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of
appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
87. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
GR No. 140847 September 23, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a

body corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made
by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining
that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of
twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was
cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It
argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general
law, or by the latter's general repealing clause.

The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order held that P.D. No. 27 was
a special law, as it applied only to particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and
corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides no exemptions based
on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. The Order of the 91 | P a g e DAR Secretary
was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals which the latter, the Court of
Appeals and hereby, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It sustained the position
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 was expressly repealed
not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands
to qualified beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did not fall among the
exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657. The appellate court brought into play the
aims of land reform, affirming as it did "the need to distribute and create an economic equilibrium among
the inhabitants of this land, most especially those with less privilege in life, our peasant farmer.

Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner filed Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not provision in Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to
the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of
agrarian reform laws as regards said properties.

HELD:

Under Section 4 of the CARL, place under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed in
Section 10 thereof. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts the
lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ultimately, the
result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless, both the DAR Secretary and
the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed the decisive legal dimension of the
case.  Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It
has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary
kind of expropriation.
 88. JOSE LUIS ROS, ET. AL VS DAR
GR No. 132477 August 31, 2005
FACTS:

The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of Dar
Region 7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by petitioners, owners/ developers of several
parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No.
101 passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands.
Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995. Because of such
disapproval, petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it
is DAR which has jurisdiction citing section 20 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the same and the Court of
Appeals ordered the Public respondent to file their comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from
Public respondents, one from DAR provincial Office and another form the office of the solicitor general,
were submitted, to which petitioners filed their consolidated reply. Petitioners claim that local grants have
the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section
20 of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local
government is one which has already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has
been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its
authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective, that if the
land sought to be classified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation
from DAR is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against
the DAR?

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the
Local Government Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA no 6657. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform, more specifically, in the DARAB.
 89. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD
GR No. 127198 May 16, 2005
FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter
as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform
program.

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination
of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by
the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the
DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the
registered tenants of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the just compensation that was provided was proper.

HELD:

Landbank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October
21, 1972, the time of effectively of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In office of the
President, Malacanang Manila vs CA, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. In this case,
the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors’ value and the
volume and value of its produce. This court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED, Costs against petitioner.
 90. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142359 May 25, 2004

FACTS:

Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
49363,which set aside and reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board(DARAB) and reinstated the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD)
of Trece Martirez City, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for Peaceful
Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI).

ISSUE:

Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

HELD:

The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657,
agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as
industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all
private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. In executing the said deeds,
the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they
have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. DAR has jurisdiction over all
controversies involving the implementation of agrarian reform program.
 91. VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO, et al.
G.R. No. 168164 July 5, 2010
FACTS:

A Complaint was filed by Vicente before the regional office of DARAB in Region III averring that he
is a tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation of a land owned by respondent and has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango
trees which were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and
establish his home within the premises. However, respondents denied having instituted any tenant on
their property. They stressed that Vicente is not a tenant but only a mere regular farm worker of the
respondent for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. The decision of PARAD was rendered in
favor of Vicente which was then affirmed by the DARAB. Respondents filed a Petition for Review to the CA
contending, among others, that Vicente was hired as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their
relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share in
the harvest. Furthermore, respondents insisted that the agreed engagement of services of Vicente for the
specific purpose of spraying the mango trees was made upon the intercession of the MARO, who
emphasized that the same would not ripen into tenancy relationship. CA rendered a Decision in favor of
the respondents. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).

ISSUE:

Whether the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that Vicente is a bona fide tenant is supported by
substantial evidence.

HELD:

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as
a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the
land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure.[24] For tenancy relationship to exist, the following
essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests
between the parties.[25] All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.[26] The SC affirm the findings of the CA
that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring petitioner Vicente Adriano not a tenant of the respondents and thus not entitled to security of
tenure under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is AFFIRMED
 92. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD
G.R. No. 175200 May 4, 2010
FACTS:

Respondent Mateo Villaruz, Sr. (Villaruz) was asked to work as a tenant of an Estate’s seven-
hectare rice field in order to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It had a house
constructed on the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and son-in-law to serve as co-tenants. As it
later turned out, the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank, resulting in its foreclosure when the loan could
not be paid. Petitioner National Housing Authority (NHA) bought the lot. Later that year, the Department
of Public Works and Highways constructed roads and bridges that passed through a portion of the lot. As
a result, some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent Villaruz to demand payment
of their value. When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz filed an action for damages and
disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA and the Estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
who as well dismissed the same. Later on, respondent Villaruz filed a complaint with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking recognition as tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted and
praying that his possession of its three-hectare portion be maintained. After hearing, the PARAD ruled in
Villaruz’s favor with respect to such portion provided he paid 25% of his net harvest to petitioner NHA
until a fixed rental could be set. But he could not be declared owner of the lot since it had ceased to be
private agricultural land, having been bought by the government. Petitioner NHA then appealed the
PARAD decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the
same. Undaunted, the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered a decision, affirming
the questioned decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. Hence, the present petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its resettlement and
housing efforts is beyond the scope of agrarian laws.

HELD:

YES. This Court ruled that P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that petitioner NHA
acquired for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took
effect or afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers "lands or property
acquired x x x or to be acquired" by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land
petitioner NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be
made.

In addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall not be liable for disturbance
compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation, the
exemption assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing program. If the
exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only to untenanted lands, then such
exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity.

Thus, petitioner NHA is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to respondent Villaruz even
if he was the tenant of Lot 916. The NHA’s purchase of Lot 916 for development and resettlement
transformed the property by operation of law from agricultural to residential.
 93. HEIRS OF LORENZO and CARMEN VIDAD and AGVID CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC., vs. LBP
G.R. No. 166461 April 30, 2010
FACTS:

A parcel of land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA)
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Of the entire area, the government only
acquired 490.3436 hectares. LBP who has the primary responsibility to determine the valuation and
compensation for all lands LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436
hectares. The owners rejected the valuation and filed Petition for Review to Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) who dismissed said petition. As second petition for review asking for
re-evaluation was filed to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who issued to LBP and
Order re-compute the value of the land. LBP revalued the land atP4,158,947.13 for 402.3835 hectares
andP1,467,776.34 for 43.8540 hectares. Still, such was rejected by the petitioners. Case was then
instituted before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of
determining the just compensation for their land. In a decision dated 29 March 2000, the RARAD fixed
the just compensation for the land at P32,965,408.46. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof.
LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied by RARAD. Thus, filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Petitioners moved to dismiss LBPs
petition on the ground of res judicata. SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone, fixing the
just compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of the land. Petitioners filed an appeal to
the CA questioning the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the
RARAD has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the SAC can assume jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation filed by
respondent after the RARAD had rendered its decision of 29 March 2000 and a writ of execution is issued

HELD:

The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, commences with LBP
determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR makes
an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657.
In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with
the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court for final determination of just compensation. Contrary to petitioners argument, the
PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases.
The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature.

WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The Court of Appeals is directed to conclude the proceedings
and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within forty-five (45) days
from notice of this Decision. The Court of Appeals is further directed to raffle this case immediately upon
receipt of this Decision.
 94. PVB VS. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 173085 January 19, 2011
FACTS:

In late 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government

corporation, filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court 1 and it is these that are the
concern of the present petition.

The defendants in Branch 58 cases were respondents Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo,
Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro,
Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. They were the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they
acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Another defendant was Land
Bank of the Philippines, the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition.
The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.

On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that it
adopted in similar cases with the other branches. PVB alleged that the covered properties actually
belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB
had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction in 1982. Unfortunately, the
bank had been unable to consolidate ownership in its name.

But, in its order of August 18, 2004, Branch 58 denied PVB's motion for intervention on the
ground that the intervention amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation
cases and that the intervention would delay the proceedings in the cases before it.

PVB filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to
file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 26, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also denied in a resolution dated June 2, 2006 5
PVB's motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 3, 2006 Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it,
granting the expropriation of the subject properties. The court noted the uncertainty as to the ownership
of such properties but took no action to grant BCDA's prayer in its complaint that it determine the
question of ownership of the same pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases
before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

HELD:

NO.The Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2006
and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144. PVB's point regarding the authority of the
court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands
involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reason,(1)
At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who
held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC
Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of
its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it.

Actually, PVB's remedy was to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the
expropriation deposited with that branch in the meantime, pending adjudication of the issues of
ownership of the expropriated lands by the DARAB. Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment
to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. There
is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be
made by another tribunal.
 95. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-
BUSINESS CORP.
G.R. No. 179071 January 10, 2011
FACTS:

On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice
of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently
placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).

On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao
Oriental, and an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from
CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land
are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for
grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18
heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). That the
presence of livestock have already existed in the area prior to the Supreme Court decision on LUZ FARMS
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were surprised however, why the management of the corporation did
not apply for Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when the two years reglamentary period which
the landowner was given the chance to file their application pursuant to R.A. 6657, implementing
Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989.

However, with regards to what venture comes first, coconut or livestocks, majority of the
farmworkers including the overseer affirmed that the coconut trees and livestocks were simultaneously
and all of these were inherited by his (applicant) parent. In addition, the financial statement showed 80%
of its annual income is derived from the livestocks and only 20% from the coconut industry.

On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner
through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-
Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that
they needed the additional area for its livestock business.

The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997
denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly
shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its
application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for
exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.

In the assailed Decision dated 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC
Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and T-
12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the "Lopez lands") from coverage of the CARL. However, it
upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for
exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T-12635) in Barrio Limot (the
"Limot lands"). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP T-16356).

The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated 08 June 2007.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's
livestock business.

HELD:

The Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business
Corp. are dismissed, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby
affirmed. On the other hand, the Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock
and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL, while, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually
and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL.

In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and
rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.

In any case, SNLABC admits that the title to the Limot lands has already been transferred to the
Republic and subsequently awarded to SNLABC's farm workers. This fact only demonstrates that the land
is indeed being used for agricultural activities and not for livestock grazing.

The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the Limot lands
were not being used for livestock grazing and, thus, do not qualify for exemption from CARP coverage.
SNLABC's belated filing of the application for exemption of the Limot lands was a ruse to increase its
retention of its landholdings and an attempt to "save" these from compulsory acquisition.
 96. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC vs. DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
GR 149548 December 14, 2010
FACTS:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987,
th e Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before
the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, Roxas & Co. filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 Roxas &
Co., through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.

As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN
CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which
declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending
application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three Haciendas including CLOA No. 6654
which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas
& Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6,
Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential
before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

ISSUE:

Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

RULING:

PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including
Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities
as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, converted
their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain
areas in the sector comprising the three Municipalities that have potential tourism value" and mandated
the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its
purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those
potential tourism areas are. In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, the Court made it clear that the
"power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law lies with the Department of
Agrarian Reform, not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by
Order, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically
reclassify all the lands in the affected municipalities from their original uses. A proclamation that merely
recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone
clearly does not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural
purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall
already be used for purposes other than agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a
reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or
peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in
the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers
vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government. There being no
reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming took effect before June 15,
1988,could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP
coveraged. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within
the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere
reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since
there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.
 97. JOSE MENDOZA v. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO
G.R. No. 165676 November 22, 2010

FACTS:
On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible
entry.

The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in
Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime
in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth,
and without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands, respondent Narciso
refused to vacate the subject property.

On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his
brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs agricultural lessee and he merely helped the
latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.

After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.
Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC issued an order on
October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings.

On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant.

The PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, PARAD
ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as
actual damages.

Not satisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case
should have been dismissed because the MTCs referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316.

The DARAB held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently
alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTCs referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision. The
CA found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material allegations of the
complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the
subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB. Thus, the CA set
aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

The core issue is whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his
answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have
the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the
ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately
referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, which
required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary
determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by
Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.
 The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we
lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to
resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of
administrative agencies.
 98. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, et. Al. vs DAR
GR 159674 June 30, 2006
FACTS:

Hacienda Maria Inc. herein private respondent requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefore,
HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and
approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) covering the
entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed
with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of
277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or
corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefore. RARAD rendered a
decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA,
the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of
one year from their registration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Emancipation Patents (EPs) have become indefeasible one year after their issuance

HELD:

After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding
certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential
Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection
accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.
Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor
can it be decreed to another person.
99. NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., vs. Secretary of DAR and
LBP
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
FACTS:

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as
qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners questioned P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contended that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure
to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section
25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. In considering the
rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property
rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places
the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the argument that EO No. 228, now EO No. 229, should be invalidated because it did not
provide for retention limits is tenable

HELD:

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4
of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section
6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own
or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.
 100. PLANTER’S COMMITTEE, INC., ET AL., VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL (PARC)
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
FACTS:

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-
members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative
power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be
annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP

HELD:

Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing
that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
101. INOCENTES PABICO vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
FACTS:

The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988".

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. The petitioner protested the erroneous
inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders
rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly affected the transfer of his land to the
private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation

HELD:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain
but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full, and ample.

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in this petition contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of
private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its
beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the following
conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than
a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must
be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
 102. ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD VS. FERNANDO MARIANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 179643 June 3, 2013
FACTS:

Ernesto Natividad purchased a 66,997 lot from Esperanza Yuson at a public auction in 1988. The
lot was, however, covered by a lease tenancy agreement under RA 6657 (CARL) between Yuzon and the
respondents Fernando and Andres Mariano and Dorotea Garcia.

In 1998, Natividad filed with the PARAD a petition for ejectment and payment of back lease
rentals against Mariano, et al. Natividad alleged that despite repeated verbal demands said tenants failed
to pay him rentals. This prompted him to orally demand that they vacate the lot – and eventually his
petition for ejectment.

When Mariano, et al failed to answer the summons and did not rebut Natividad’s petition, PARAD
decided the case ex parte and granted the petition for ejectment and ordered payment of back rentals in
favor of Natividad.

The first petition for reconsideration filed by the respondents is on the ground of excusable
negligence – for inexperience and lack of knowledge of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB implementing
rules and regulations. In their second petition, filed by the DAR Agrarian Legal Assistance, the
respondents added as justification their lack of sufficient financial means. Both petitions were denied by
PARAD in view that they filed beyond the prescribed reglementary period and the decision has become
final and executory.

The case was raised to the DARAB, which reversed the decision of PARAD, and ordered Natividad
to maintain the respondents’ peaceful possession of the property. DARAB’s decision was later on affirmed
by the Court of Appeals…; Hence, this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the amended petition

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals; finding that:

1. For the broader interest of justice and equity, despite the Doctrine of Immutability of
Final Judgments (by PARAD), appellate courts did not err in re-opening, and ruling on
the merits of the case;

2. Review of the DAR implementing rules revealed that the petition of the respondents
were well within the prescribed reglementery period;

3. Natividad did not show evidence to prove he demanded from respondents’ payment of
lease rentals since 1988 when he acquired the land; demand was considered made only
in 1998 upon his petition;

4. The alleged non-payment of lease rentals did not last for two (2) years; thus ejection is
NOT YET DUE as required by the statute;

5. Natividad’s prolonged inaction in making his demand led the respondents to consider
Corazon and Laureano – Yuson’s representatives – to still be the authorized payees of the
lease.
 103. DAR vs. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & Devt. Corp.,
G.R. No. 173386 February 11, 2014
FACTS:

Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc.,
Isabel Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle Farms, Inc.,
Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo
(hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners of a
parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895
hectares - about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657
between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.

On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for Declaration of
Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order3against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR,
and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 04-02-V.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the regional trial court may exercise jurisdiction if the case also assails the
constitutionality of administrative orders, regulations and other related issuances implementing Republic
Act No. 6657

HELD:

The Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case. The Court stated in Cuenca that "in case of
doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies, 'even if the question[s] involved [are] also
judicial in character."' In the instant case, however, there is hardly any doubt that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Consequently, it did not have authority to perform any of
the following: order the admission of the amended petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al., decide the amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent prohibitory
injunction. In any case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the express prohibitory
provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all
trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657.
 104. DAR V. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC.
G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013
FACTS:

The case stems from the petition docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0403-0009-02, filed with the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the respondents of several
parcels of land.

The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without
DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657(R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Allegedly, the PARO came to know of the transactions only
after he had received a directive from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to investigate the matter, following
the latter's receipt of a letter-request from persons who claimed to be the tenant-farmers of the properties'
previous owners.

The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the matter involves an
administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, not the DARAB. They also sought the petition's dismissal on the grounds of prescription, litis
pendentia,res judicata and forum shopping.

On October 16, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Virgilio M. Sorita (PA Sorita) issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The DAR's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the filing of an appeal with the
DARAB. The DARAB granted the appeal.

Contrary to the findings of PA Sorita, the DARAB ruled that: first, the failure of the parties to the
sale to obtain the required clearance indicates that their transactions were fraudulent; second, the PARO
had the personality to file the petition even in the absence of the Solicitor General's assistance, citing
Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2001 (Circular No. 2), and the policy of DAR to "acquire and
distribute all lands covered by RA 6657[,] including those subject of illegal transfers . . .";and third, the
DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case, since its jurisdiction under Circular No. 2 covers the
cancellation of deeds of conveyance and corresponding transfer certificates of title over agricultural lands.

The denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration led to the filing of a petition with the
CA. The CA rendered the assailed Decision. The CA emphasized that the DARAB's jurisdiction over the
dispute should be determined by the allegations made in the petition. Since the action was essentially for
the nullification of the subject properties' sale, it did not involve an agrarian suit that is within the
DARAB's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction

HELD:

The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases under E.O. No. 229and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was organized under the Office of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is
only consistent with the extent of DAR's quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229.

Not every sale or transfer of agricultural land would warrant DARAB's exercise of its jurisdiction.
The law is specific that the property must be shown to be under the coverage of agrarian reform laws. As
the CA correctly ruled: It is easily discernable . . . that the cause of action of the [DAR] sufficiently
established a suit for the declaration of the sale of the subject landholdings null and void (in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989). Obviously, it does not involve an agrarian suit, hence, does
not fall under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. It must be emphasized that, "(t)here must be a tenancy
relationship between the party litigants for the DARAB to validly take cognizance of a controversy.

Our finding on the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction over the PARO's petition renders it needless for
the Court to discuss the other issues that are raised in the petition. In any case, the Court finds it worthy
to discuss that the original petition remains dismissible on the merits.

Even during the proceedings before the PARAD, the respondents have raised the pendency with
the Regional Trial Court of Bin, Laguna of Civil Case No. B-5862, an appeal from the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Santa Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No. 2478.

The records indicate that when the matter was elevated to the CA via the petition docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 68110, the appellate court declared the subject properties to have long been reclassified from
"agricultural" to "industrial".

The court ruled that there is no record of tenancy or written agricultural leasehold contract with
respect to the subject lands, nor are the same covered by Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27.
Thus, for being industrial in nature, the subject lands are outside the ambit of existing agricultural
tenancy laws.

The Housing Land Use Regulatory Board has affirmed through a Certification dated May 22, 1991
that the zoning ordinance referred to was approved on December 2, 1981. Thus, the respondents correctly
argued that since the subject properties were already classified as "industrial" long before the effectivity of
the CARL, their sale could not have been covered by the CARP and the requirement for a clearance. The
petition is DISMISSED.
 105. REPUBLIC vs. SALVADOR LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., et al
(GR No. 178895 – January 10, 2011)

FACTS:

Respondent Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC)’s four parcels of land were placed
under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Respondent sought exemption
contending that the lands were devoted for livestock which is outside the coverage CARL. Upon
Inspection, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) found that only two parcels of land, which were
known as Lopez Land, were exempted since it is used for grazing. Accordingly, it was sufficiently
established by testimonies of the people thereabouts and despite the presence of coconut trees on the
exempted parcels of land, it is still used primarily for raising livestock. The other two parcels of land,
which were known as Limot Land, were used both for coconut and rubber plantations and, therefore, is
covered by the CARL. Respondent appealed before the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture which
ruled that the four parcels of land were subject to the CARL. Respondent, then, appealed to the Court of
Appeals which later affirmed the findings of the MARO. Hence, both the DAR and respondent SNLABC
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Limot land are under the coverage of CARL

HELD:

YES.

The Limot Land are under the coverage of CARL since it is the actual usage of the land and not its
classification which determines its eligibility for CARL. In Limot land, it is not enough that such land are
only used as seasonal extensions of grazing land. It is land actually devoted to coconut and rubber.
Hence, it cannot be exempted.
 106. HACIENDA LUISITA INC. vs. PARC
GR No. 171101 November 22, 2011

FACTS:

The petition filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) was dismissed which unanimously
voted by the Supreme Court en banc. The court affirmed with modifications the resolutions made by
respondent Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking petitioner’s Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order absolute land
distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and
which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose
the actual land distribution. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting,
their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over
their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.

SSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO.

Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT unconstitutional. The Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 since it was not raised at the earliest opportunity. The issue has
been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.
It was clarified that in its decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, but found that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality.
 107. HEIRS OF CANDIDO DEL ROSARIO and HEIRS OF GIL DEL ROSARIO vs.
MONICA DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 181548 June 20, 2012

FACTS:
A parcel of land was formerly tenanted by the spouses Jose Del Rosario and Florentina De
Guzman who had three children, namely Monica, Candido and Gil Del Rosario. After the spouses Del
Rosario died, Monica and Gil agreed that the latter would facilitate the application for an Emancipation
Patent in the name of the former in exchange that one-third of the said land will be ceded to Gil. Upon the
issuance of Emancipation Patent No. 00733146 to respondent Monica, petitioners Candido and Gil
claimed that Monica refused to cede to Gil the one-third portion of the subject land pursuant to their
agreement despite repeated demands. Petitioners, then, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a complaint against Monica for amendment and partition of the subject land.
Monica contended that their father entrusted to her the cultivation of the subject land, that she was the
one listed in the files of the DAR as the tenant-beneficiary of the subject land and that she was the one
who was paying the amortizations over the same. PARAD, then, ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent
appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which reversed the decision.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for revie with the Court of Appeals alleging that the DARAB
erred in ruling that they and Monica are not co-owners of the subject land. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ complaint for amendment and partition is under the jurisdiction of the
PARAD and the DARAB.

HELD:

NO.

Petitioners’ complaint for amendment and partition is beyond the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
the DARAB. The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is limited only to all agrarian disputes and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP. In the said case, the complaint essentially
sought the enforcement of the agreement entered into by and between Gil and Monica and the recovery of
petitioners’ purported hereditary share over the subject land. Absolutely, the said complaint for
amendment and partition does not involve any agrarian dispute, nor does it involve any incident arising
from the implementation of agrarian laws.
108. ROSITA A. MONTANEZ vs PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR
(PARAD)
G.R. No. 183142 September 17, 2009
FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregated land area of 35.5998
hectares, both located at Negros occidental. In October, 1999, the DRA caused the publication of notice of
land coverage for Negros Occidental, and later, the DAR notified petitioner that her property, to the extent
of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and offered to compensate her the amount of
P5,592,301.62 based on the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), subject to price
adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, LBP issued in her
favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in bonds, corresponding to the amount afore stated.

DAR secured form Negros occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioner’s titles and issuance,
in lieu thereof, titles in the name of the Republic. Later on, the same day, CLOAs were issued. Evidently,
such notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregated land area stated in the CLOAs being larger
than what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAS emanate. In an event, said CLOAs were registered
in the name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries.

Petitioner forthwith filed a petition for DARAB for the annulment/cancellation of titles in view of
the CLOAs, on the ground of irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was
denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to CA via petition for certiorari under section 54, RA 6657.
Public respondents sought the dismissal on this recourse, on the ground on non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to rectification of technical error
referred to above, but the DAR is the proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

HELD:

The petitioner failed to observe the said doctrine.

For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies available to the petitioner are
clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedures, Under Section 1.6, Rule II, “the adjudicator shall
have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate…cases…involving the correction,
…cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuance of CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land
Registration authority.” According to the succeeding Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy
from an adverse final resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal to the
DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of an appeal fee,
and from the decision of the DARAB proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV.

Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly within its sound discretion
when it denied, in its amended decision, petitioner’s petition for certiorari to nullify the PARAD’s decision.
Under the grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB rules of procedure, PARAD’s decision was
appealable to the DARAB proper. The CA’s appellate task comes later-to review the case disposition of the
DARAB when properly challenge.
 109. AGUSTIN RIVERA vs NEMESIO DAVID
G.R. No. 157307 February 27, 2006
FACTS:

Respondent Nemesio David, with the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David, owned in common
five hectares of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47588-R in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.

Petitioner Agustin Rivera occupied 1.8 hectares of the land. Through counsel, the David’s
demanded that petitioner vacate the property. Rivera refused and instituted a complaint with an
application for injunction to maintain peaceful possession before the PARAB.

In his Complaint, Rivera averred that he was a duly instituted tenant. To support his averment,
he submitted a certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office together with the affidavits of two
neighbors.

Respondent David denied that Rivera was his family’s tenant. According to respondent, Rivera
had been squatting on the property since 1965 and had put up, without the Davids consent, a hollow
blocks business and also a piggery in the property. David sought the dismissal of the case before the
PARAB alleging that the PARAB lacked jurisdiction, considering that the property was not an agricultural
land and the case involved the issue of ownership.

The PARAB required the parties to file their position papers. In his position paper, Rivera averred
that he occupied the land, at first, as a tenant; then, as an owner in 1957. He alleged that the land
became his own as disturbance compensation. He prayed that he be declared as a qualified beneficiary of
the agrarian reform program and he be awarded three hectares as mandated by law.

Initially, the PARAB held that David was guilty of laches or estoppel since he and his
predecessors-in-interest had allowed petitioner to retain the property. Further, the PARAB said it had
more reasons to believe that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had given the land to the petitioner as
the latter had long occupied the property and developed it. It rendered judgment maintaining petitioner
Rivera in peaceful possession of the property without prejudice to his claim as qualified beneficiary of the
agrarian reform program.

On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the PARABs finding of estoppel and added that the action to
recover the property was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Respondent David elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the petition is GRANTED, and
the challenged decisions of both the PARAB and the DARAB are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, including
the writs of execution issued by the PARAB, and another is rendered DISMISSING the respondent Agustin
Rivera’s complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that the PARAB and the DARAB have no jurisdiction
over Rivera’s complaint

HELD:

The court of appeals erred in finding that the PARAB and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over
Rivera’s complaint.

We note that because of petitioner Rivera’s death, his heirs are now substituted as petitioners. At
any rate, petitioner had insisted that the DAR had jurisdiction over the case for he had sufficiently
established before the PARAB and the DARAB that he was a tenant of respondent’s predecessor-in-
interest. He asserted that as tenant of respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, his tenancy was intimately
related to the issue of ownership and thus his case fell under the jurisdiction of the DAR.

Petitioner further contended that even though the tenancy relation no longer existed at the time
the complaint was filed, the DAR had not been deprived of its jurisdiction since under Section 1(e), Rule II
of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it has jurisdiction over cases involving the alienation of agricultural
lands covered by the agrarian reform program. He added that the definition of agrarian dispute under
Rep. Act No. 6657 included any controversy relating to compensation of land acquired under the Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants, and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries.

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Agustin Rivera’s complaint,
not because the DAR had no jurisdiction over the case but because his complaint lacks merit.
 110. EL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM
BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE (DEARBC) VS. JESUS SANGUNAY AND SONNY
LABUNOS
G.R. No. 180013 January 31, 2011
FACTS:

The property subject of this case is a portion of an entire landholding located in Sankanan,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, with an area of 1,861,922 square meters, more or less, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. AO-3 [Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)].The said landholding was
awarded to DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Subsequently, DEARBC leased a substantial portion of the land to Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657 through a Growers Contract dated February 21,
1989.

On July 7, 1998, DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance
with Damages with the DARAB Region 10 Office against several respondents, among whom were Jesus
Sangunay and Sonny Labunos.

On December 11, 1990, the Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that the
respondents failed to present proof of ownership over the subject portions of the landholding. According
to the Adjudicator, their bare allegation of possession, even prior to the award of the land to DEARBC, did
not suffice as proof of ownership.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the DARAB Central Office before which Sangunay
filed his position paper. He claimed that the subject property was located along the Maninit River and was
an accrual deposit. He inherited the land from his father in 1948 and had since been in open, public,
adverse, peaceful, actual, physical, and continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner. In
sum, Sangunay asserted that, as a qualified farmer-beneficiary, he was entitled to security of tenure
under the agrarian reform law and, at any rate; he had already acquired the land by prescription.

In its May 12, 2006 Decision, the DARAB dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that
the issue of ownership of the subject land classifies the controversy as a regular case falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts and not as an agrarian dispute.

In its Resolution dated June 27, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities in
its verification, certification and attachments. So, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there existed an agrarian disputes between the parties

HELD:

Clearly, no agrarian dispute exists between the parties. The absence of tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, cannot be overlooked. In this case, no juridical tie
of landownership and tenancy was alleged between DEARBC and Sangunay or Labunos, which would so
categorize the controversy as an agrarian dispute. In fact, the respondents were contending for the
ownership of the same parcels of land.

This set of facts clearly comprises an action for recovery of possession. The claim of being farmer-
beneficiaries with right of retention will not divest the regular courts of jurisdiction, since the pleas of the
defendant in a case are immaterial.

Although the complaint filed by DEARBC was similarly denominated as one for recovery of
possession, it utterly lacks allegations to persuade the Court into ruling that the issue encompasses an
agrarian dispute.

DEARBCs argument that this case partakes of either a boundary dispute, correction of a CLOA,
and ouster of an interloper or intruder, as found under Section 1, Rule 11 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, is unavailing. Nowhere in the complaint was the correction or cancellation of the CLOA prayed
for, much less mentioned. DEARBC merely asserted its sole ownership of the awarded land and no
boundary dispute was even hinted at.
 111. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS REPRESENTED BY HIS
WIDOW, ARSENIA GARCIA VDA. DE SANTOS VS. CA
G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000
FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by
the MTC of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September
20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow, Arsenia
Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the
reglementary period. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a petition for injunction and damages with an
application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from
gathering mango fruits. The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of DARAB issued an order allowing
the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the
Adjudication Board. On April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for consignation before the RTC
of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one
Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that he is
affected in his rights and interest as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this
season. On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for annulment/cancellation of Sale and
Document, Redemption with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Herman Rey Santos,
the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing
on Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue.

On July 8, 1992, intervener filed with DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervener’s deposited share.
The motion was granted and intervener was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00
harvest proceeds with the intervener Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land.
The CA affirmed these orders of the DARAB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PARAD/ DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question
of ownership is pending resolution with the RTC?

HELD:

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the
DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private
respondent’s petition for injunction in the first place. The issue on who can harvest the mangoes and
when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. In as much as the
DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the
motion for intervention loses the leg on which it stand. The issue, after all can be resolved by the trial
court, which has the jurisdiction over the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with
it, considering that an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership
 112. EDGARDO SANTOS VS LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 137431 September 7, 2000
FACTS:

Petitioners Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206. On August 12,
1997, the Regional Trial Court sitting as an Agrarian Court fixed the amount of P49,241,876.00 as the
just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands owned by the petitioner with areas of
36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares, respectively. The properties were taken by the government pursuant to
the Land Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27. A preliminary valuation in the
amount of P3,543,070.66 has been previously released by the Land Bank to the petitioner in cash and
bonds. Hence, the balance of P45,698,805.34 was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657. The Land Bank released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash, Land
Bank No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P4,128,024.81 to the petitioner and P948,857.52 to the Clerk of
Court as commission fees. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the
Regional Trial Court praying that payment of the compensation be in the proportion of P8,629,179.36 in
bonds and P32,499,745 in cash. Before the motion could be resolved, petitioner moved to withdraw the
same and instead filed a motion for the release of the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified
check, claiming that payment of the P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank bonds was not acceptable. Land Bank
opposed the motion contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied.

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the
balance of P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank moved
for reconsideration. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion to hold the Land Bank in contempt for its
refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check. Respondent Regional
Court was presided over by a new judge who resolved the two motions in an Order dated April 24, 1998.
The new judge further ruled that by implication, both the Order dated March 20, 1997and the Order
dated December 22, 1997 should be deemed reconsidered. The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998
Order of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the basis of the determination of how much should be paid in cash and how much should
be paid in bonds. And in relation thereto, whether the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Villegas-Llaguno was
proper?

HELD:

The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which
had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision.
Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment. It is clear from the August
12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid in the manner provided by RA 6657." Pursuant
to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds.

Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its
compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an
agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an
undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible
with such judgment. Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in
conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire adjudged
amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty
under Rule 39.
 113. JOSE LUIS ROS, ET AL VS. DAR
G.R. No. 132477 August 31, 2005
FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban,
Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municiapl Council of Balamban, Cebu,
these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. On April 3, 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved
Balamban’s land use plan and adopted Balamban’s Municipal Ordninance No. 101. Petitioners secured
all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications for the development of the subject
lands, as an industrial park. Petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter from Mr. Jose Llanes ,
Director of the DAR Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the
conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from developing
such lands. Petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for injunction with application for
TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petioners then a filed
a petition for Review on Certiorari with TRO and WPI. This court RTC referred the petition to the CA.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution but the same was denied. The CA affirmed
the order of dismissal issued by the RTC and the motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DAR has the authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agriculture lands to
industrial uses.

HELD:

YES.

It is being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR. The authority of
the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses
has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that
nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657. Section 5 (i) of E.O. No. 129-A, series of 1987, vests in DAR, exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and
other land uses. If the lad sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from DAR is necessary in order for the reclassification
to become effective as such case would not fall within the DAR’s conversion authority. Wherefore, the
petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC of Toledo City is
affirmed.
114. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA)
vs. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
FACTS:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,"
which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural
Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the
following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural
activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural
use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial,
or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988
pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be
converted to such uses.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e.,
DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further
amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith.
The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, which seek to regulate reclassified lands is in
violation of Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657.

HELD:

The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of
Sec. 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the
LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious. In Department of
Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, the DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for
under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial
or industrial purposes. Any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial
property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by
the DAR.

Hence, the petition is dismissed

 115. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC. vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164195 February 6, 2007
FACTS:

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five
parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province. On 12 October 1995, AFC and
HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government. After the initial processing at
the DAR of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately a
notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed
at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI’s properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.
Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for
the properties.

On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years from
the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the
land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC and
HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court),
which were subsequently consolidated. The Special Agrarian Court determined judiciously and fixed the
just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs.

LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 mainly on the ground that the trial
court based its valuation on the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the
lands involved are agricultural. In an Order dated 5 December 2001, the trial court modified its decision.
LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December 2001. The same was given due course in the Order of the
RTC dated 15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting
execution pending appeal. This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 12 February 2003. LBP
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February
2003 orders of the trial court.

Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004. Hence this
appeal has reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial courts valuation of the subject landholdings has incorporated irrelevant or
immaterial factors and forgot that the lands involved are agricultural in nature.

HELD:

The plaintiffs’ properties are agricultural; however, it is simply beyond dispute that in going about
the task of appraising real properties, "all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
Record shows that all weather-roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, and
among numerous other improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly, but substantial
amounts investments have been infused. To exclude these permanent improvements in rendering its
valuation of said properties would certainly be less than fair. The Supreme Court affirmed the just
compensation awarded by the trial court.
 116. ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO and
NORBERTO R. SUSANO
G.R. No. 179024 May 30, 2011
FACTS:

Pastor M. Samson owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Pastor was approached by his friend Macario Susano (Macario) who asked for permission to occupy a
portion of the lot to build a house for his family. Since Pastor was godfather to one of Macario’s children,
Pastor acceded to Macario’s request. Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of the lot and
devoted the rest of the land to palay cultivation. Macario’s wife, Mercedes R. Susano, and their son,
Norberto R. Susano, insist that while no agricultural leasehold contract was executed by Pastor and
Macario, Macario religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was
reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of palay per agricultural year. In 1973, Pastor subdivided the lot
into three portions. In separate instances, portions of these lots were subsequently sold without Macario’s
knowledge. On November 1990, Macario received a letter from Pastor’s lawyer demanding that he vacate
the property within twenty (20) days. Aggrieved, Macario filed a complaint against Pastor before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Valenzuela. On February 9, 1993, Macario died and was
succeeded by respondents in the possession and cultivation of the subject landholding. The respondents
maintained that they are the predecessor-in-interest of Macario, who is a bona fide agricultural tenant;
hence, they are entitled to the rights of pre-emption and redemption. And having validly exercised their
right of redemption through the deposit of the redemption price with the DAR, they are allegedly now the
owners of the subject land. That they have such right of redemption is likewise due to the fact that the
subject land is covered by the OLT Program.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lot in this instant case was subject to the OLT program.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the subject land cannot be subject to the OLT program of P.D. No.
27 for two reasons: first, the subject land is less than seven hectares; and second, respondents failed to
show that Pastor owned other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban land from which he
derived adequate income, as required by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474.

Moreover, the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners"
dated July 10, 1975 is explicit: “Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be
covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas
shall be leasehold xxx”