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Meaning, truth, and information: prolegomena to a theory

John M. Budd,
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Received 19 October 2009
Revised 26 March 2010
Accepted 30 March 2010
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Journal of Documentation
Vol. 67 No. 1, 2011
pp. 56-74
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0022-0418
DOI 10.1108/00220411111105452
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0022-0418.htm
Meaning, truth, and information:
prolegomena to a theory
John M. Budd
School of Information Science & Learning Technologies, University of Missouri,
Columbia, Missouri, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the relationships between meaning and truth as they may
contribute to a constitutive definition of information. The thesis is primarily that “information” cannot
be defined unless within the context of meaning and truth, and that any theory based on, or related to,
information is not possible without the foundational definition.
Design/methodology/approach – A review of related literatures and an arrangement of
frameworks forms the design of this conceptual proposal.
Findings – While other definitions of information have been presented, the present one integrates
meaning and truth in ways that others do not. The thoroughgoing semantic examination provides a
starting-point for a much deeper analysis of the integral role that language plays in the formation of
any theory related to information. Truth tends not to be spoken of a great deal in information science;
the definitional positioning of truth adds to a more complete definition and basis for theory.
Originality/value – This paper proposes a new definitional and theoretical construct for
information.
Keywords Information science, Information theory, Semantics
Paper type Conceptual paper
Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein’s (2009) recent book, On Rumors, should be read
carefully by everyone who is interested in information studies in any way. The book’s
importance lies, not in the narrowness of the phenomena of rumors, but in Sunstein’s
expansion of what rumors are and how they manifest themselves. His analysis
demonstrates that people form beliefs in a number of ways, many of which we can call
“testimonial,” in the sense that an individual may hear someone else make a claim and
then believe the claim on the basis of factors that are extra-veridical and beyond the
realm of evidence. The people who start rumors can do so for any of several reasons,
but none of the reasons necessarily have anything to do with communicating
meaningful and true assertions. Sunstein (2009) writes, “Far from being the best test of
truth, the marketplace [of ideas] can ensure that many people accept falsehoods, or that
they take mere fragments of lives, or small events, as representative of some alarming
whole” (Sunstein, 2009, p. 10). Such a view of the marketplace of ideas is in opposition
to the classical liberal one, but his observation of psychology is more accurate than the
ideal in describing belief formation.
Philosophers have been grappling with the matter of truth (and its nature and even
its existence) for well over two millennia. Linguists, anthropologists, philosophers, and
others have been examining meaning for almost as long. What does information have
to do with meaning and truth, though? This is not a question that is frequently asked in
information studies (IS), but there many reasons why it should be. The question can be
rephrased for the present investigative purposes: Are meaning and truth necessary for
 information to exist? The rephrasing asks whether something can be called Meaning, truth,
“information” if it is not meaningful in some specifiable way and does not entail some and information
truth conditions. The meaning of “meaning” has received more attention in IS. Carol
Kuhlthau’s work may be most recognizable. In her writings on seeking meaning she,
more or less, adopts an individualized conception of meaning; that is, meaning is to be
found by a particular information seeker and is connected to that person’s purpose for
searching. Her program of meaning is essentially procedural; each seeker is to progress 57
through a series of steps designed to optimize the location of meaningful things and to
understand what has been found (Kuhlthau, 2004). Brenda Dervin is also well known
for her emphasis on users’ or seekers’ experiences as they try to make sense of what
they find. Hers is also a more individualized conception, based on the combined
cognitive, affective, cultural, and social elements that influence how individuals seek,
find, and interpret content. Thornley and Gibb (2009) take the tack that meaning has a
social context: “Meaning is a rule based process: generally words relate to objects and
we agree on this because there are conventions in place which keep our use of words
consistent” (Thornley and Gibb, 2009, p. 138). They conclude that there are differences
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between the philosophical conception of meaning and the use of meaning in

information retrieval; among other things, the information systems that are employed
entail tension between responding to queries in ways that are meaningful to the
inquirer and the objective (explicit or not) of changing the knowledge state of the user.
Yair Neuman (2006) adopts a similarly contextual stance in attempting to demonstrate
meaning that is interpretable in any given sign. For Neuman, meaning is “the system’s
specific response to a signal, and meaning-making [is] the process that yields the
system’s specific response to an indeterminate signal” [emphasis in original] (Neuman,
2006, p. 1,438).
Over the years inquiry in IS has addressed many aspects of information, and of
course there are numerous aspects to address. It has to be admitted that the
examination of the truth and meaning – on their own and in combination with other
phenomena – is daunting. The relationship between truth/meaning and information
can be broached in a number of ways: must information be true for it to have an
informing quality; is information a phenomenon that is separate from truth; does the
truth of any potentially informing “thing” depend on certain structural elements; can
one be examined without some admission of the existence of the other; does
information have to have inherent meaning, or can it include interpretable meaning?
This list does not exhaust the possible questions that can be asked, but they illustrate a
bit of the variety – substantive and empirical – that exists. There is also the corollary
that is mentioned above: what IS can contribute to any answers to the questions. In this
paper examination is limited to formal communicative structures; the limitation means
that less formal communication, including conversation, is not dealt with here. Formal
communication is intentional in some particular way (which will be explored) and
relies on rhetoric as defined specifically (which will also be explored). The intention of
this paper is to be exploratory; hence it will be wide-ranging in scope and necessarily
introductory in many respects. An aim is to guide conversation about the nature of
information along paths that include consideration of meaning and truth. Breadth is a
goal, so depth has to be sacrificed to some extent. At this point no answers are
suggested; some initial exploration is needed. Blackburn (1984, p. 3) offers a model on
which the analysis here can be based. He includes theories of meaning, knowledge, and
 JDOC truth in a complex relationship embodied in speakers, psychology, and metaphysics.
Language and meaning are not related in a simple fashion and the attainment of
67,1 meaning (the work of semantics) requires effort.

What is information?
A reader from within or without IS would reasonably respond to the initial challenge of
58 examining truth’s relation to information by stating that definitions of both are
required before anyone can proceed. We can begin with “information.” Enormous
volumes of work have been devoted to the definitions; only brief summaries will be
offered here. One definition was stated some years ago by Bateson (1980): “information
is any difference that makes a difference” (p. 41). While it is difficult to dispute what
Bateson says, it is also difficult to situate his statement in a theoretical and practical
way. By way of contrast, a familiar and frequently cited description of information’s
characteristics is that offered by Buckland (1991):
.
Information-as-process: When someone is informed, what they know is changed
...
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.
Information-as-knowledge: “Information is also used to denote that which is
perceived in “information-as-process” . . .
. Information-as-thing: The term “information” is also used attributively for
objects, such as data and documents, that are referred to as information because
they are regarded as being informative . . . (Buckland, 1991, p. 351).

Even though Buckland claims that there is a related progression among the three ideas
of information, there are ineluctable distinctions among them as well. Process is not the
same as knowledge, which is not the same as thing. Moreover, “process,” “knowledge,”
and “thing” are themselves defined in particular ways that may be imposed upon
information, but not in specifically referential ways (that is, in ways that specifically
denote meaningful signs).
Rowley (1998) has reviewed a number of definitions of information and included
many of them in her article. The definitions vary considerably; Kaye (1995) says “it is a
central and defining characteristic of all life forms, manifested in genetic transfer, in
stimulus response mechanisms, in the communication of signals and messages and, in
the case of humans, in the intelligent acquisition of understanding and wisdom” (Kaye,
1995, p. 37). Kaye is speaking of multiple processes, even when he limits his scope to
humans. Communication is one kind of intentional act that is quite complicated in its
own right (and is not limited to humans). Communication is also multifaceted in that it
might be linguistic or might employ some other symbolic system; also, some people
could be recipients of one linguistic message while others are not. Acquisition of
communication depends on many variables as well, which could be visual, auditory,
tactile, and other physical means, and also can depend on cognitive abilities.
“Intelligent acquisition” is a problematic qualifier, since the intelligence can depend
upon the intentionality of the sender of the message. Understanding might likewise
depend on a sender’s intention. Wisdom is usually defined as action that is taken on the
basis of knowledge (including judgment). At the end of the day, Kaye does not
effectively define information.
Brookes (1974) places information in a structural equation: DI þ ðSÞ ¼ ðS þ DSÞ,
where S is a knowledge structure that is modified by an information input DI to lead to
 a completely new and different knowledge structure (S þ DS). Inherent in the equation Meaning, truth,
is the conception of knowledge as a physical construct (or something that can be and information
defined, if not measured, if physical terms). If it is to be a workable equation, then
knowledge should have an assignable value, as should information. In reality,
information is not defined in the equation, except insofar as it has some effect on a
knowledge structure. Brookes does not directly address the implications of his
equation, implications, which some philosophers would connect with truth in some 59
way. The connection depends on what knowledge is. If one were to accept a traditional
and widely used definition of knowledge as justified true belief, then information
would have to have some particular qualities. The implications must be addressed, and
they will be later in this paper.
Eaton and Bawden (1991), separating their ideas from those of others, attempt to
dissociate information from physical things:
.
The value of information is not readily quantifiable – value depends on content
and use.
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.
Consumption of information – information is not lost when it is given to others.
.
Dynamics of information – information is a dynamic force for change in the
systems within which it operates and must be viewed within an organization as a
formative organizational entity, rather than as an accumulated stockpile of facts.

Their first point is indisputable, but in bringing up “value” they introduce another
conception of information – it has some axiological quality. The value, according to
Eaton and Bawden, is individualistic; it is determined and determinable only by the
individual users and the individual instances of use. By extension, information has no
inherent value; its value exists only in application. The second point certainly depends
on some definition of information that some might dispute. In corporate operations, for
example, proprietary documents, processes, or inventions can indeed lose value if
others have access to them. So, if information includes those kinds (types) of things,
then giving specific items (tokens) to others can reduce the value of information. The
third point is similar to Brookes’s equation; information effects change of some
identifiable kind. Moreover, the third point is a specifically realist position (which does
not, by its realist nature, altogether negate it); information is constitutive in some way
of an entity like an organization.
Rowley (1998) concludes with a somewhat limited answer of her own to the
question: “individuals are concerned with the role that information can play in a
process such as decision making, learning or innovation whereas information
professionals and information systems designers, the professionals concerned with
information, need to be able to impose structure on information to gather it into their
systems and need therefore to treat information as an object and to create a systems
view of information” (Rowley, 1998, p. 252). The “value” of information is an individual
determination; what has value for one person may not have value for another.
Information, according to such a conception, is as variable as the population. Also, her
definition has some similarities to the third point of Eaton and Bawden. Information
has a structural (if not constitutive, then regulative) relation to those who use it;
information (and this may, deliberately or not on Rowley’s part) is related to its
linguistic root, and gives shape to those who are affected by it.
 JDOC Losee (1997), in attempting an ambitious task, offers what he calls a “discipline
67,1 independent definition of information” (Losee, 1997, p. 254). The conclusion he reaches
is that “information may be understood as the value attached or instantiated to a
characteristic or variable returned by a function or produced by a process” (Losee,
1997, p. 267). He emphasizes the process element and claims that the outcome is
secondary to the means by which the value is attached to or instantiated in the
60 variable. For him, then, truth is not pertinent to a conception of information. A lie is
itself information about the process that produced it. Falsity obtains only insofar as we
are unaware of the complete process that eventually led to the utterance that could be
said to be a lie. A problem with Losee’s definition is a conflation of separate entities and
the confusion of genera and species. There may be a genus we can call
“communication,” of which “lie” is a species. The process by which the lie can to be
uttered is a different species. For one thing, the processes that result in lies can entail
distinct intentions; those intentions define their own processes, but a single utterance
could be made as a result of the different intentions. Further, lies are distinct from
errors, although Losee treats them together. In short, his definition is attempting to
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capture more than it possibly can.

It may be conceivable that the various definitions could be seen, as Rowley does, as
richness and breadth, rather than untidiness. On the other hand, it is difficult to
conceive, not only of information theory, but any theoretical framework in which
“information” plays a role, without a definition of information. More recently Capurro
and Hjørland (2002) and Cornelius (2002) have examined the difficulties that past
definitions have created for theory construction. The definitions of information can
include the ways information is disseminated, for one thing. For another thing, work
outside of information science should be considered for its potential use in IS. Bates
(2006) has sought to identify information as an agglomeration of matter and energy,
and claims that it can be encoded or embodied. Bawden (2007) also investigates
information as embodied, as a self-organizing complex physically present entity. A
theory of information seeking, information retrieval, or information behavior is
meaningless without a definition that can limit what “information” is and articulate
what it is not. If information is a thing, then information seeking entails looking for
physical entities. The entities may, or may not, have semantic meaning for the seeker.
If information is a process, then information seeking is ongoing and may, or may not,
be a task that has a completion. If information behavior is a response to a stimulus,
then anything at all that generates a response is information. Even psychologists who
adhere to early twentieth century behaviorism would distinguish among kinds of
stimuli. In short, the definitions fail to establish parameters that enable inquiring and
praxis.

Reference and its relation to meaning

Many analytic philosophers connect meaning and truth; in one sense there cannot be
truth unless there is meaning. A truthful sentence is also a meaningful sentence.
Davidson (1984), in his early writings, criticized this kind of connection: “any meaning
of a sentence is what it refers to, all sentences alike in truth value must be synonymous
– an intolerable result” (Davidson, 1984, p. 19). Davidson’s conclusion is questionable,
since truth value need not be based on precisely the same reference (reference here
being taken to mean in the very limited sense a correspondence to a state of affairs that
 exists in the world). Davidson does introduce the idea of reference; a word or term Meaning, truth,
refers to something real (if “real” is taken to include abstract ideas, such as 2 þ 2 ¼ 4, and information
as well as physical things). We can, of course (I say “of course” here because there is too
little philosophical dispute on this matter to address) refer to physical things. If a friend
tells you, “I am travelling to Denver next week,” you could ask if she means Denver,
Colorado. In some similar ways a person may instruct you to put the book on that table,
and point to a table; the reference is clear. Education contains instruction by means of 61
reference, such as, “George Washington was the first President of the United States.”
The Pythagorean Theorem is also a reference for a 2 þ b2 ¼ c 2 .
Reference is indeed a very important concept for IS in two distinct ways. The aspect
of structure requires that there be classifications (or more broadly, categorizations) that
both point seekers to items that are “about” particular topics, and group items together
that are “about” the same or very similar topics. The categorical necessity has been
applied at least as far back in time as Alexandria. The second way that reference is
employed is discursive. Searchers ask questions based on their knowledge of topics as
well as their awareness of categories. In both uses reference is, at least to an extent,
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problematic, even as it is necessary. One connection of these two ways that reference is
used share the goal of meaningful communication: in the first instance that goal is
often addressed through systemic mechanisms; in the second it can be queries of a
system (which is not genuinely discursive) or human, usually dyadic, communication.
At this point considerable care must be taken to avoid oversimplifying the use of
reference in IS. Reference can be a necessary component of seeking and retrieving, of
assessing accuracy and meaning, and of evaluating truth, but a seeker has quite an
intellectual and cognitive burden to reach the point where reference is comprehensible.
An implication of the onus placed on seekers is the need for an ability to apply
practical logic in ways that enable the individual to make distinctions and groupings,
to separate and to draw together. Another implication is that seekers have to be
sensitive to context, since language (as numerous philosophers and linguists have
shown) entails a variability and a multiplicity at times. When seekers are exploring
possible answers to questions, they usually want tenable answers to the questions they
have. An aid to seekers is an understanding – not necessarily explicit – of some
features of language. Two of the features are extension and intension. Palmer (1981), in
his introduction to semantics, says “the extension of an expression is the set of entities
which that expression denotes, while intension is whatever it is that defines that set.
Thus, the extension of cow is the set of all cows in the world, but its intension is the
property that is described as bovine” [emphasis in original] (Palmer, 1981, pp. 190-91).
The extension-intension difference is somewhat similar to the IS notions of
categorization in general (specifying the categories that would be used in a system)
and the items that could be fitted into any one of the categories that are employed.

Meaning
Reference is an essential element of meaning, but it is not the only one. As is the case
with information, there are technical aspects of meaning, and a number of analytical
philosophers and linguists have tried to come to terms with these aspects. In the
technical sense, semantics (the study of meaning) is itself multifaceted; there is
philosophical semantics, psychological semantics, anthropological semantics, logical
semantics, linguistic semantics, and other forms (see Lyons, 1995, p. 6). Semantics, as
 JDOC can be shown from the variety of its species, is sensitive to context (and so is connected
67,1 to information and other factors of language, such as indexicality). [Indexicality is a
concept usually limited to propositional statements that are typified by the use of
personal pronouns, active verbs, and spatial or temporal indicators. An example would
be, “I will give you a gift tomorrow.” Since indexicality is much more limited than
reference, it will not be discussed further here.] Context is commonly examined in
62 terms either of sentences or longer utterances. Sentences, according to some theorists,
can be analytic, synthetic, or unclassifiable. A received view of the difference between
the types suggests that examples of analytic and synthetic sentences abound.
Something like, “Two halves make a whole” is taken to be an example of an analytic
sentence. In other words, analytic sentences are basically redundant. Synthetic
sentences, on the other hand, indicate states of affairs, experiences, or data. The
sentence, “The oven is on” communicates something particular about the state of the
oven. Quine (1953) is skeptical of the distinction, though. For example, Quine raises the
question of the meaning of such terms as “half” and “whole” and claims that those and
other words or terms do not stand entirely on their own, but depend on connected
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bodies of knowledge for their meaning. The distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements (which was vital to logical empiricism) is, according to Quine, illusory and
an oversimplification of language and meaning. Austin (1979) enters the fray and
demonstrates that some sentences simply cannot be classified as analytic or synthetic,
further challenging the distinction.
Predelli (2004) begins with semantics and then emphasizes the communicative
version over the logical and linguistic ones. IS would do well to follow Predelli’s lead,
which is not to say that logic and reason should in any way be abandoned. The
challenge that is set forth is how to follow Predelli; in what ways are contexts manifest
in formal communication. As was stated at the outset, formal communication is
intentional, but the intentionality is not monolithic. Some kinds of intentional
communication are epistemic in nature; they are intended to make knowledge claims or
question existing claims according to the content of the claims themselves (or both).
Speakers in any formal communicative structure tend to apply rules and norms so that
understanding is possible. The norms include grammatical, semantic, and syntactic
ones, but also embrace argument. In conversation (informal communication) it may be
preferable or desirable to tell a lie; one may avoid the truth if it may cause someone
harm, for example. In formal conversation, such as research or scholarship, the norms
obtain. The need for norms includes a prescriptive element, such as those detailed by
Hattiangadi (2006). A prescriptive norm or rule carries not only the conditions for the
possibility of communication, but also the necessity or obligation for communicative
efficacy. In other words, the prescription says not only “can,” but “ought.” To reiterate,
the normative requirement for formal communication need not always apply to
informal communication.
Searle (2002) provides guidance for us in comprehending meaning by which
intentionality, and the relationships between speakers and hearers of formal
communication operate. There is no simple and mechanistic computational process
that exhibits a purely objective ontology. Searle (2002) presents an example: “The
intrinsic intentionality of the agent is doing all the work. To see this point notice that
the psychological explanation of my doing long division is not the algorithm, but my
mastery of the algorithm and my intentionally going through the steps of the
 algorithm” [emphasis in original] (Searle, 2002, p. 123). In formal communication, Meaning, truth,
meaning (mutual understanding on the parts of speakers and hearers) depends on
assertion (and the clarity of the assertion) of the intentionality that underlies the
and information
processes and products that lead to what is communicated. Following Searle, there is a
substantial burden on the speaker to ensure that the communicative action expresses
the intentionality.
Meaning, as I am applying it to IS here, depends also on rhetoric. Rhetoric itself has 63
a long history and many, sometimes conflicting, definitions. Persuasiveness tends to be
a common element of all conceptions, but as Booth (2004) observes, at some point in
time, “The key topic, inventio (the discovery of solid argument), was shoved down the
ladder, while elocutio (style, eloquence) climbed to the top rung” (Booth, 2004, p. 6). We
have an opportunity now to lift inventio to its rightful status. There is a very good
reason for rhetoric, especially sound argument, to be a component of meaning as it is
being discussed in the present context – it entails speakers and hearers and the
complex interactions between them. Booth maintains that the subversion of meaning
by speakers (deceptions, misdirection, incompleteness, etc) is an ethical violation of the
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ideal of rhetoric. Booth (2004) himself provides the most succinct summary of his
position regarding rhetoric’s relation to meaning (the position that I am adopting here):
Any nation is in trouble if its citizens are not trained for critical response to the flood of
misinformation poured over them daily. A citizenry not habituated to thoughtful argument
about public affairs, but rather trained to “believe everything supporting my side” and
“disbelieve everything supporting the bad side,” is no longer citizenry but a house of gullibles
(Booth, 2004, p. 89).
The foregoing only scratches the tip of an enormous iceberg. Semantics is a vast field,
and a thoroughgoing definition of information, aimed at opening up possibilities for
theory, would have to embrace many more of the elements of meaning that language
allows and presents. Further exploration could proceed from, for example, careful
reading of Steven Pinker’s work, especially The Stuff of Thought (Pinker, 2007). The
structure of, among other things, factive and locative verbs indicate the ways that
humans intend to indicate truth or truth claims and meaning through language.
Further work in the investigation of meaning, truth, and information could use Pinker’s
work as a starting point.

Truth
With the background provided thus far the matter of truth can be addressed (and this
is a daunting task). In keeping with what has gone before, truth also has its technical
and less technical conceptions. The technical treatment that has been most influential
is the one proposed by Tarski (1944). His focus is on semantics, and truth is a matter of
making statements that assert no more than what can be shown to exist. The example
he used has been referred to by many subsequent authors: “A sentence is true if it
designates an existing state of affairs” (Tarski, 1944, p. 343). He adds, “The sentence
‘snow is white’ is true if, and only if, snow is white” (Tarski, 1944, p. 343). This kind of
example has been called “disquotational,” which simply means the ability to remove
the quotation marks. If we were only to speak of very specific states of affairs, then
Tarski’s (1944) claim is not problematic: “we can prove with [the help of his definition]
the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle, which are so characteristic of the
Aristotelian conception of truth; i.e. we can show that one and only one of any two
 JDOC contradictory sentences is true” (Tarski, 1944, p. 354). Remove these limitations and the
67,1 discernment of truth claims and truth conditions is much more difficult. Tarski’s work
is not only discussed extensively, but is defended frequently (see, for example, Jennings
(1987)), but it far too limiting for useful application to formal communication of the sort
IS is concerned with.
It is time (and probably past time) to accept that any theory of human nature, action,
64 or being that seeks to eliminate all other alternatives will run up against a wall. The
practice of communication demonstrates the dilemma. For the most part, speakers of a
language can make themselves understood by speakers of the same language.
Conversation is the most obvious example; one person can agree to meet another
person at a particular time and place because the two share, referentially, the meaning
of the place and time. It is even possible, if one person does not know the spatial
reference, to use other referential points and tools (including such things as maps) to
reach referential understanding. A purpose of schooling is to create a more extensive
referential connection. A student in, say, a chemistry class can learn about reactions
and potential volatility and so have an understanding of the reality of chemical
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reactions. Is this example proof of a correspondence theory of truth? No, but it is

evidence that some aspects of existence do entail correspondence (not merely the
linguistic correspondence of the sort, “Combining chemicals A, B, and C, with catalyst
D results in an explosion,” but the actual explosion that occurs when the chemicals and
the catalyst are combined).
A corollary question has to be asked: does the efficacy of some occurrences of
correspondence preclude the efficacy of other theories of truth? The example of the
incommensurability of the person who believes in the biblical account of the earth’s age
and the physicist’s account of the earth’s age suggests that additional theoretical
concepts are needed. Another way of examining truth is by means of coherence theory.
A simplistic distinction can be made between correspondence and coherence theories –
the former is more ontological and the latter is more epistemological. Of course,
however, a correspondence theory has to address what and how we know about reality,
and a coherence theory cannot completely ignore what could be conceived as real.
There are some strengths of coherence, as one might expect, but it concentrates on
some few elements of propositions and truth. Regarding the epistemological character
of coherence, attention is focused on the character of justification. A version of the
character is stated by Schmitt (1995): “A subject S is justified in believing that p just in
case , p . belongs to a set of propositions belief in which is coherent for S” (Schmitt,
1995, p. 107). The justification component places a burden on any coherentist truth
claims, a burden that extends beyond mere internal consistency; the burden adds rigor
to coherence theory. As is the case with all theories of truth, there are objections to the
coherence theory (and the objections cannot be ignored). Schmitt (1995) relates some of
the objections, including that a subject could provide justification that a particular
belief is false. Following that justification, subsequent beliefs would be judged false.
Another difficulty with coherence is that, when a seeming coherent set of properties is
articulated, the search for alternatives, (which also may be coherent, but may refute the
original set of coherent propositions) tend to cease. In short, coherence can be a helpful
mechanism to seek truth, but it is insufficient.
Pragmatists have also addressed truth; a challenge for the interpreter (and this should
not be surprising) is that pragmatists are not of one mind regarding truth. James (1997)
 takes for granted that there are phenomena that exist independent of our perceptions and Meaning, truth,
judgment. According to James, “All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that and information
truths should have practical consequences” (James, 1997, p. 52). He further states,
anticipating the realism that has been articulated more recently, “That reality is
‘independent’ means that there is something in every experience that escapes our
arbitrary control” (James, 1997, p. 69). While James emphasizes the practical in the
evaluation of what is true, he does not eliminate the epistemological component, which, 65
according to him, affirms practicality. James’s position is decidedly different from that of
neopragmatists of more recent times. The work of several individuals could be noted
here, but it is probably most useful to draw from Rorty, since his writings have been very
influential. Departing from James, Rorty (1979) claims:
We understand knowledge best when we understand the social justification of belief, and this
have no need to view it as accuracy of representations. Instead of seeking “vertical”
relationship between language, or ourselves as language users, and the world, we must
concentrate upon “horizontal” or inferential processes, whereby we advance and accept
reasons from each other. Justification becomes a “social phenomenon” rather than a
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transaction between a “knowing subject” and “reality” (Rorty, 1979, p. 9).

For Rorty there is little or no difference between homo sapiens, homo faber, or homo
lingua. The crux of the matter for truth, knowledge, and philosophy in general is that
what works, what enables people to achieve goals, is all that matters.
If we liberate ourselves from the notion that truth is limited to the meaning of words
used in sentences, other possibilities arise. Of course the meanings of the words cannot
be abandoned or ignored, but there can be more to truth than semantics. Dummett
(2004) says that our options when it comes to building a theory of truth and meaning
are either justificationist or pragmatist (Dummett, 2004, p. 41). The pragmatic quality
of a claim rests on the consequences it has for the speaker and the hearer. It is difficult
to argue that some consequentialist component should not be part of a theory of truth;
human action is evaluated according to outcomes. For Rorty (see 1998) and others,
justification rests solely on the practical outcomes the result from a claim or statement;
justificationism is a limited exercise that emphasizes certain kinds of benefits. Bernard
Williams (2002) disagrees with Rorty, noting that there are processes of reasoning (a
different kind of justification) that should be used to assess truth conditions; preference
or the limitation of particular instances cannot suffice for evaluation. What the
disagreement between Rorty and Williams demonstrates that Dummett’s “either/or”
condition does not make logical or practical sense. What is occurring is the staking out
of territories that can have inherently artificial boundaries. It may seem that I am being
overly dismissive of Rorty and his neopragmatism. In fact, his work is too vast to
address in detail here, so focus on some few of his ideas is necessary. Since he (see,
Rorty, 1998) rejects the notion that philosophy has any fixed goal, he is at odds with
many people, including linguists, authors, sociologists, etc. I do not mean to imply that
he does not have adherents; it is simply that there is limited space here to address his
arguments fully. His specific definitions of truth and truth claims, though, should be
abandoned in favor of more integrated ones.

Meaning, truth, and information

Having made what might be seen as a controversial claim (the liberation of the notion
of truth from meanings of words in sentences), it is my responsibility to defend it. The
 JDOC defense is the first step towards a new theory of information. The defense is not an
67,1 attack on philosophers of the past, but rather is an explicit recognition that the
limitations some have placed on what truth can be are indefensible. Davidson (1996), in
suggesting that truth, while a useful concept, is undefinable, hedges by adding, “We
are interested in the concept of truth only because there are actual objects and states of
the world to which to apply it: utterances, states of belief, inscriptions. If we did not
66 understand what it was for such entities to be true, we would not be able to
characterize the contents of such states, objects, and entities” (Davidson, 1996, p. 276).
The “only” in Davidson’s assessment establishes, he believes, the deflationary
limitation on truth – the limitation that Tarski wrote of, that truth is nothing more
than the meaning of words in a sentence. The contents of states, though, are more than
the meanings of words, so some pragmatism is inescapable.
If pragmatism is not entirely eliminated, where can we turn? One option is the
extensive work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas’s interests are sweeping, but they
address directly some matters that are vital to the present discussion. Habermas’s
work offers an option because his analysis takes a middle ground between the strict
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propositional semantics of Tarski and the fluid linguistic turn that Rorty represents.
The question that Habermas struggles with is the very one that IS must address in
order to engage in inquiry and education for many professions: What constitutes the
basis for shared understanding of our world and our means of communicating so as to
enhance the shared understanding? I will hasten to state here that shared
understanding does not necessitate complete agreement. As Habermas (2003) states,
“The lifeworld comprises different types of rule-governed action. Discourses and
speech acts can be differentiated by whether language is being used essentially to
communicate or to represent” (Habermas, 2003, p. 13). The distinctions carry
ramifications for what IS studies and practices; inquiring into the representational and
communicative aspects of the lifeworld accentuate the efficacy of IS.
As we have seen (and this is why I have gone into such detail in presenting
background on meaning and truth), propositional and assertoric statements have been
the foci of linguists’ and philosophers’ attention. I will state again that I do not intend to
demean or diminish that work; it has clarified many complex concepts. For example,
Sperber and Wilson (1988) help us comprehend some cognitive aspects of relevance:
Relevance to an individual (comparative)
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the contextual
effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large.
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the effort
required to process it optimally is small [emphasis in original] (Sperber and Wilson, 1988,
p. 145).
But it also betrays a tendency among specialists to narrow their gaze to parts and, in
doing so, obscure visions of wholes. Thinkers such as Habermas (1998) are able to
present more panoramic visions, one expression of which is:
The telos of reaching understanding inherent in the structures of languages compels the
communicative actors to alter their perspective; this shift in perspective finds expression in
the necessity of going from the objectivating attitude of the success-oriented actor, who seeks
to effect something in the world, to the performative attitude of a speaker, who seeks to reach
understanding with a second person about something [emphasis in original] (p. 300).
 The understanding that can result from communicative action has a direct relation to Meaning, truth,
what is information (and, probably just as important, what information is not). If and information
everything is taken to be information, as many of the definitions mentioned at the
outset of this paper aver, then there is no definition of information, and there can be no
theory of information.
In some ways, a theory may be most straightforwardly developed by some
processes of elimination. In this regard I am in disagreement with Buckland (1991), 67
who mentions that there is nothing that cannot be considered information (or at least
informative). He hedges by claiming that information is situational, but there are
serious problems with that claim. Information, in a non-technical and non-specialist
usage, does not include lies (even though Buckland dismisses the argument against
lies). The intention to deceive is also the intention not to inform or, stated differently, it
is the intention to misinform in the sense of distorting the shape of what a cognizer
receives. This particular limitation is clearly articulated by Dretske (1981); as he says,
“What information a signal carries is what it is capable of ‘telling’ us, telling us truly,
about another state of affairs . . . Is everything I say to you is false, then I have given
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you no information” [emphasis in original] (Dretske, 1981, p. 44). The intention of the
speaker or writer who lies is the obstruction of knowledge growth in two ways. First,
the speaker intends to misshape the understanding of the hearer so that something,
some cognitive and intellective potential, is omitted or prevented. Second, the speaker
may intend to misdirect the hearer so that a different and false cognitive structure is
built. In the second instance there may be a purpose on the part of the speaker to assert
some illocutionary or perlocutionary forces that direct hearers to actions that are
desired by the speaker.
To anticipate a possible objection here, one might argue that deception is still an act
of informing in that it does intentionally transmit meaning from speaker to hearer. The
meaning understood by the hearer is that which the speaker wanted to be understood.
The problem – and it is a fatal problem – with that objection is that the speaker knows
that the propositional content, and also the content that is not communicated, is not
meaning in the communicative or discourse ethical sense that Habermas argues for, or
the rational sense that Toulmin (2001) insists on. The hearer cannot infer a full
meaning of an utterance or, more importantly, an argument on the basis of deceptive
communication. In other words, understanding is not possible in instances of deception
(except in cases where the hearer possesses sufficient knowledge independent of what
the speaker says, to identify statements as deceptive). A species of generic deception is
ideology. Of course “ideology” is defined in a particular way here. Instead of being the
examination of the origins and persistence of ideas, ideology here is synonymous with
dissimulation. Thompson (1990) suggests a particularly pointed conception of ideology
that is appropriate for use here: “ideology is a system of representations which serves
to sustain existing relations of class domination by orienting individuals towards the
past rather than the future, or towards images and ideals which conceal class relations
and detract from the collective pursuit of social change” (Thompson, 1990, p. 41). I
would broaden his conception by avoiding the limitations of class and including any
efforts at domination accomplished through misinformative means that conceal,
detract, and distort.
Another genus of misinformation is censorship. Censorship is certainly not
necessarily unrelated to ideology, but it can have separate and different purposes.
 JDOC Censorship exists, not just in the popular realm (manifest by the actions of states
67,1 directed at people or by groups directed at other groups), but also in the specialized and
disciplinary realms. Bourdieu (1991) expresses the manifestation of the latter type
eloquently:
This structural censorship is exercised through the medium of the sanctions of the field,
functioning as a market on which prices of different kinds of expression are formed; it is
68 imposed on all producers of symbolic goods, including the authorized spokesperson, whose
authoritative discourse is more subject to the norms of official propriety than any other, and it
condemns the occupants of dominated positions either to silence or to shocking
outspokenness (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 138).
Censorship is, most frequently, the omission of the potentially meaningful. It silences
utterances and arguments, once again with the aim of limiting knowledge claims and
knowledge growth. It prevents the kind of cognitive and intellective shaping that
information can provide by freely opening discourse to the exploration of meaning.
The place of truth remains to be examined. The philosophical and linguistic debates
surrounding truth have been presented here, as have those on meaning, in order to
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demarcate some existing boundaries. Some of those boundaries will now have to be
transcended and transgressed. The definition of truth employed here is connected in
many ways to that of meaning, especially insofar as any utterance or argument, to be
evaluated for its potential truth, must first be meaningful. The examination begins
with a fundamental question, stated by Blackburn (2005): “But why should I respect
and tolerate another point of view simply on the grounds that someone else holds it?”
[emphasis in original] (Blackburn, 2005, p. 64). The short answer is that there is no
reasonable positive answer to the question. In other words, there should be reasons and
evidence for holding those beliefs (in the strict sense). At this point I want to
distinguish among some kinds of truth claims. With regard to some kinds of claims,
representation is indeed an important factor. For one thing, people must comprehend a
vocabulary so that (for example) if a scientific theory is propounded, other scientists
can apply tests in the same ways so as to measure the success or failure of the theory.
The particular matter of representation and science can be dealt with rather
expeditiously (extreme relativists aside). As Blackburn (2005) says, “Nevertheless, by
following the scientific method, we get things that work: theories that deliver results,
technologies that enable us to do things. No other method does as much, and this gives
us every reason to pursue it and admire it” (Blackburn, 2005, p. 195). Disagreement
with Blackburn would require denying the entirety of scientific progress. That said, a
theory of information has to account for the specific instances of claims made by people
like scientists. The theory of information I propose here depends on reasoned
conditions which includes any theoretical, methodological, or resultant claims that can
be taken seriously and evaluated by fellow scientists as truth claims.
Truth entails more than the natural sciences, though. In the further development of
a theory of information I will readily and enthusiastically accept Lynch’s (2004)
warning: “The idea that the value of pursuing the truth rests on the possibility of
certainty is simply a myth . . . Certainty is the privilege of the fanatic. The most
dangerous man is he who is certain, absolutely sure, that his way is the right way”
(Lynch, 2004, pp. 27, 29). When certainty as an absolute is eliminated, what is
information (in the context of truth) becomes an answerable question. The uncertainty
that is a part of much of the human world and human action does not eliminate the
 possibility of truth but it does introduce some (not absolute) contingency. That is, Meaning, truth,
uncertainty affects truth claims in particular ways. A claim is possible only in the and information
context of what can be knowable. So, the inclusion of the possibilities of what can be
known can prevent what is false. The claim, utterance, or argument carries the
intention of finding something truthful. It is, then, information. Lynch (2004) observes
that the act of making a mistake and correcting it is an admission that there is some
element of objectivity (again, not absolute) about a claim or argument (p. 43). Lynch’s 69
observation emphasizes a process of articulation, assessment, and correction. The
process, as Prado (2006) might call it, is tacit-realist. It is not strongly representational,
but it does admit that something about the world in which we live is real and can, to
some extent, be known. The tentative results of the process are what we can claim to be
true, in the concomitantly tacit manner.
Recently Labaree and Scimeca (2008) have attempted to broach the topic of truth in
information studies. They admit, “The concept of truth remains largely undefined in
the field of library and information science. As a consequence, analysis is
predominantly considered only within a certain context related to interpreting
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truthfulness in practice, understanding truth as it is applied to existing philosophical

theories or implied in philosophical discussions about knowledge creation, knowledge
organization, and ideas about reality” (Labaree and Scimeca, 2008, pp. 48-49). They
present, not only the most thorough review to date of the treatment of truth in IS, but
also raise concerns related to the various ways that truth might be conceived, and how
those variations carry import for IS. Their conclusion is that the most effective
response to the question of truth in IS is the adoption of a particular historicist position
(one that does not argue for laws of prediction, but that situates beliefs in social and
intellectual milieux). “The historicist is not concerned with the objective truth of
[correspondence or coherence theories] but rather with the ways in which they became
part of . . . the social theory of reality” (Labaree and Scimeca, 2008, p. 63).

What is information?
Ultimately, we come back to the concern that began this paper – arriving at a workable
definition of information. I will not endeavor here to offer legitimacy to the question,
“what is information;” the definitional necessity is something I will assume, for the
time being, to be a given. The first step towards the definition is the acceptance that
anything that would be called information is communicative. In contrast to any
conception that information is a thing, or is an object that does not require a
communicant, information inherently includes an exchange. The communicative
element extends Prado’s idea of the tacit-realist stance regarding truth. Exchanges
require real languages, signs, and/or symbols for their existence. There is an aspect of
communication, and communicative action in particular, that renders it integral to a
definition that is useful – it is purposeful. The act of communicating entails an
intentional purpose, a use of language that is deliberate. This element of a definition of
information connects human intentionality to the construction of informative
utterances, claims, and arguments. Habermas, though, admits that communicative
action can still enable a critique of meaning, so the communicative element is
necessary, but is, without examination, by no means sufficient. As Habermas (1998)
says, “whether or not an utterance fulfills its representational function is measured
against truth conditions; however, the fulfillment of the expressive and the interactive
 JDOC functions is also measured against conditions that are analogous to truth” [emphasis in
67,1 original] (Habermas, 1998, p. 295). The principal points intended here can now be made
explicit:
Definition: Information is meaningful communicative action that aims at truth claims and
conditions.

70 Statement of Theory: Information is comprised of those communicative actions (and only

those communicative actions) that can be evaluated by a population – defined as the intended
or potential hearers of the communication – as meaningful. Meaning is not limited to pure
semantics, but includes context and history within evaluation. Further, information is true in
that there is warrant for the communicative action, that this action includes no deliberate
deception or omission, has inherent evaluative components, provides evidentiary
justification, and is fundamental to ethics.
The theoretical statement does not imply simplicity or ease of identification of
informative communication. The evaluation is a complex logical, linguistic ethical,
axiological, and cognitive task that is central to IS. It is a task that is subject to
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dialectical investigation. While there is not sufficient space to describe the dialect in
full, a presentation provided by Bhaskar (1993) helps illustrate the forces at work (see
Figure 1).
The communicative act is intentional; there is some purpose that lies behind the act
and it is a manifestation of the will, desire, hope, etc. of the actor. It is in the
intentionality, especially as the intentionality is a component of dialogue that explicitly
accepts the existence of self and other within the speaker-hearer interaction, that there
is a quest for understanding. While ideas of meaning can be critiqued, the existence of
meaning, as potential, is stable. What I mean by this is that the possibility exists to
convey meaning and for meaning to be inferred. This admission does not include any
assertion that meaning is universal or unambiguous. Meaning requires cognitive and
linguistic effort. It also requires a phenomenological element. The kind of intentionality
included in phenomenology (especially phenomenology as articulated by Husserl early
in the twentieth century) is an assessment of perception, not merely what can be seen,
heard, touched, etc, but also what can be known. Husserl is concerned with relation of
information to knowledge. Husserl (1962) writes, “The acts of cognition which underlie
our experiencing underlies the Real in individual form, posit it as having
spatio-temporal form, as something existing in this time-spot, having this particular
duration of its own and a real content” (Husserl, 1962, p. 46). Husserl acknowledges

Figure 1.
 that perceptions and interpretations can differ, but the object, as it exists, is not Meaning, truth,
completely different from the object as it is perceived. For a more complete description and information
of phenomenology and IS, see Budd (2005).
In short, information as phenomenological manifestation cannot and does not
eliminate truth. A theory of information, first embracing meaning as an essential
element, must then likewise embrace truth. There are some quite particular ways in
which the embrace should exist. First, truth is not naı̈vely objectivist and is not entirely 71
subjectivist. Truth is a matter of reason, and reason has to accept contextuality and
historicity, especially with regard to human thought and action. Toulmin (2001)
provides the most cogent prescription for IS (and all professionals as they practice): the
acts, the practices in which professionals engage are subsumed within, not abstracted
from, the situatedness of the engagement (Toulmin, 2001, p. 61). Those who would
study information must begin with the understanding that information is a particular
product of human invention. “Information” is not itself a discipline, but it is a definable
outcome of human action; moreover, it is an outcome that is unlike many other
instances of human action, including action that entails communication, speech, and
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signs. Truth is one of the elements that sets information apart from other outcomes.
The matter of truth is something that Goldman (1999) clarifies: “The primary
purpose of asking a question is to learn the answer, the true answer, from the
respondent . . . An enormous portion of our truth seeking, however, is either directly or
indirectly social. It is directly social when one verbally requests information from
others, or consults written texts” (Goldman, 1999, pp. 3, 4). Goldman’s observation fits
well with what information is and what it means to study it. The legitimacy of the
question of what information is can be resolved. To paraphrase Lynch (2004), “What is
information” is not the same kind of question as “What is gold.” Neither the question
nor the answer to the information question has a single, universal character, even
though it can be answered. What information is can only be answered in terms of what
communicative action, as phenomenological act, has meaning and truth for speakers
and hearers. Information is something unlike anything else; it should be studied for
what it is. It has limitations that must be recognized and must not be confused with
other things. The challenge of studying information in the terms suggested here is a
large one, but it should be attempted.

A kind of summary
The definition and theory proposed here can be used to direct work in IS. An example
of the application is limited here to information retrieval. An individual asserts a query
(the beginning of most human-related communicative interactions), which includes a
finite set of elements. Most of the elements are unknown by the individual, but reside
within some frames of known and potentially knowable bits. If the individual is
seeking information as it is defined here, a search can be constructed that can
(emphasis on can, which does not necessarily mean will) result in a set of items that are
meaningful and true. That is, the items can be evaluated for meaning and truth. The
individual, following the theoretical principles as stated above, has criteria to use in
evaluating meaning and truth. Each item retrieved can be evaluated in such a way.
That said, the individual is not likely to intuit the assessment mechanisms. In other
words, the definition I suggest is usable only inasmuch as it is used by information
seekers. The use can certainly be taught, and can be taught at early stages of schooling.
 JDOC The use also is not necessarily limited to information retrieval (although that is the
67,1 example here), but also to evaluation of any communication.
Other theorists posit ideal retrieval models, or models of behavior. Belkin’s (1981)
notion of anomalous states of knowledge includes linguistic and cognitive components
that exist at different levels for individuals; instead, though, there are potential
mechanisms of human action that can be applied to the assessment of meaning and
72 truth. The ability to put theory to use also transcends Belkin’s notion of “anomaly.”
The individual, as just been stated, may indeed be attempting to retrieve something
formally, but may also hear/see communicative acts or have communicative acts
presented to them. Wilson (2005) presents a model of information seeking. Again, it
begins with an intentional act, but the evaluation of information need not have such a
beginning. Wilson (2005) says that behavior “can be seen as goal-determined behavior
and that the concept of problem solving provides a framework that can help to explain,
for example, multiple search episodes, as the information seeker moves through the
problem solving stages of problem recognition, problem identification, problem
resolution, and solution statement” [emphasis in original] (He, 2005, p. 35). The
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problem-based approach does not address, or assist with, the assessment of

communicative acts that may constitute information.
When people attempt to retrieve information, they usually do intend to gain access
to meaningful and true communicative acts. There are times, however, when people
would prefer to have beliefs, preconceptions, or even prejudices affirmed by
communicative acts. Those people will undoubtedly be able to retrieve those kinds of
acts. That retrieval fits with theories that include those of Belkin, Wilson, and others.
The retrieval does not fit the theory proposed here. There are people who do search for
untrue communicative acts, but they are not searching for information. What those
people may accept and use will not withstand the criterial scrutiny that defines
information. The difference is far from trivial and is essential to, among other thing,
evaluation of the contents of texts, works, and documents, education at all levels, and
services of libraries and other information agencies. We can revisit Sunstein’s (2009)
investigation of rumors and their spread. Those kinds of communicative acts are not
information; among the tasks for IS is to comprehend how to inquire into what is and is
not information. All of what is said here is, of course, subject to the judgment of the
professional and scholarly community. Confirmation, correction, and dispute will be
necessary for any progress to occur.

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Corresponding author
John M. Budd can be contacted at: buddj@missouri.edu

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