CASES ON PROPERTY FOR FINALS for a period of one year, renewable from year to year.
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
WEEK I
82. REPUBLIC V CASTELVI
[58 scra 336; L-20620; August 15, 1974] Constitutional Law| Eminent Domain| Elements
of Taking of Property| Just Compensation
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.
Citation:
FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by the respondent Castellvi has been rented and occupied by the
Philippine Air Force of the AFP in 1947. The petitioner, in behalf of the AFP, refused to
extend the lease, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to
continue leasing the property and, demanded that the property be vacated. Hence,
the petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment for just compensation, the petitioner argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced in 1947 and not when the proceedings begun
in 1959.
Respondent maintains that the subject land was not taken when the petitioner commenced
to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property
under the power of eminent domain is lacking, to wit:
1. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and
2. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947, when the petitioner has
entered and occupied the property as lessee, or the filing on 1959.
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced
in 1959.
A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of
eminent domain:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. By virtue of the lease agreement the
Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. The word
“momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be
construed to mean “a limited period”—not indefinite or permanent. The lease contract was
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lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.The the
Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted
to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The entry of the Republic into the property
and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial
enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals.
Thus, the Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
83. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the
total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial
park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since
the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of
the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery
to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real
property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit,
then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the
state.
OR use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such
FACTS: terms and conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
*Quezon City Ordinance No. 6118 entitled “Ordinance Regulating the Establishment,
Maintenance and operation of Private Issue:
Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground,.” was passed. Specifically, this ordinance Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.
requires every cemetery in Quezon to donate at least 6% of their total area for the burial of
paupers. Held:
*To enforce the ordinance, those cemetery which failed to donate 6% of the total area where No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government
prohibited to further sell any lots thereof. Himlayang Pilipino went to court. offices to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
Petitioner’s Argument:
*Taking Himlayang Pilipino’s Property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power, for When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that
public use intended for the burial of paupers. their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.
*Judge Ericta: In police power, the purpose of the taking not be for public use but is urgently
needed to be destroyed to promote the general welfare. The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
ISSUE: plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by
Whether or not the taking of 6% of the total area of cemeteries constitutes valid exercise of the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long
police power? time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to
HELD: the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it
No, In police power, the properly to be taken must be destroyed and not to be devoted for is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
public use. What is actually doing
by the petitioner is the taking of property for public use, hence there must be just To uphold PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public.
compensation. The ordinance of taking a private property to benefit the paupers. . OR
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested
84. Republic v PLDT 26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just
Facts: Compensation)
PLDT and RCA Communications Inc (which is not a party to this case but has contractual FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right
relations with e parties) entered into an agreement where telephone messages, coming from of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government
the US and received by RCA's domestic station could automatically be transferred to the lines Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make
of PLDT and vice versa. use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be
compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone
renting the trunk lines of PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of System can be a valid object for expropriation.
the many rules prohibits the use of the service for his private use. HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may
require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government
Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and
telephone service where the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through
by the RCA's station to and from local residents. expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

PLDT complained that the Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not 85. CHURCHILL & TAIT v. RAFFERTY G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915
only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. FACTS:
PLDT gave a notice that if violations were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections - Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from the
which PLDT did. road and strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising
matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.” However,
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the
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defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue, decided to remove the billboards after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls.
Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to remove after due
investigation, any billboard exposed to the public view if it decides that it is offensive to the
sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards
mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."
The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies
from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax
mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1,
1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the
plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?
HELD:
YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be suppressed by
the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated
by the police power of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and safety.
Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic
condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included
within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the
police power of the State.
Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.
Held:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any
of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property
would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper
consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed
by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may
be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for
the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community,
which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good
3
of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed
limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised
from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than
to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."
86. Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
Facts: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed
of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular
traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42
which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the
National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT
circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular
52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other
personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule
of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In
accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of
model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify
MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a “Manifestation and Urgent
Motion”, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February
1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a “Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition” praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever
remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975
model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly
made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case
could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the present Petition was instituted.
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the petition; without costs.
1. Procedural and Substantive Due Process; Statutory Construction: “May”
PD 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards,
classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree
provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers. Leeway
was accorded the Board giving it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information
or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority.
2. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to issuance of Circulars not violative of
procedural due process
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of
procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of
liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or
ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
(Central Bank vs. Cloribel and Banco Filipino)
3. Adoption of a reasonable standard; Requirement of due process met
It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its
road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be
adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years
supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They
are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in
three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
4. Equal Protection of the Law; Substantial distinction; Rationale of initial
implementation in Metro Manila
Equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry.
It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of
the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by
legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded
the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
The Circular was enforced initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in said metropolis,
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant
4
use (common knowledge). Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city,
a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly
be successfully claimed. The implementation of the Circular outside Metro Manila was also
envisioned in MC 77-42 as its provision provides that “for an orderly implementation of this
Memorandum Circular, the rules … shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its
implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board.”
Further, the implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the
BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
5. Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may
also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
87. THE ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,vs. THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, ET AL. , defendants-appellants.
Juan de Leon, Quirico Abeto, and Crecenciano Lozano, for appellants.
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
Facts: According to the pleadings, the plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant,
constructed an ice and cold storage
plant in the city of Iloilo. Sometime after the plant had been completed and was in operation,
nearby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very
injurious to their health and comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to
investigate and report upon the matters contained in said complaints. The committee
reported that the complaints were well-founded.
Upon receipt of this resolution and order, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of
First Instance to enjoin the defendant from carrying into effect the said resolution. “That the
defendants intend and threaten to require compliance with said resolution administratively
and without the intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing and suspension
of operations of the plaintiff’s machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the
plaintiff not proceed with the elevation of the smokestacks to one hundred feet, which the
plaintiff maintains it is not obliged to do and will not do.”
Issue: The issue in this case, according to the pleadings, relates to the power of the municipal
council to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance as operated, and the method of
abating it.
Doctrine and Held: Nuisances have been divided into two classes: Nuisances per se, and
nuisances per accidens. To the first belong those which are unquestionably and under all
circumstances nuisances, such as gambling houses, houses of ill fame, etc.
The number of such nuisances is necessarily limited, and by far the greater number of
nuisances are such because of particular facts and circumstances surrounding the otherwise
harmless cause of the nuisance. For this reason, it will readily be seen that whether a
particular thing is a nuisance is generally a question of fact, to be determined in the first
instance before the term nuisance can be applied to it. “ I repeat that the question of nuisance
can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone,
and that the resolutions of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters,
cannot, to any degree, control such decision.”
But the mere declaration by the city council of Milwaukee that a certain structure was an
encroachment or obstruction did not make structure was an encroachment or obstruction did
not make it so, nor could such declaration make it a nuisance unless it in fact had that
character. It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal corporation,
without any general laws either of the city or of the State, within which a given structure can
be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by
any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself.
In our opinion this ordinance cannot be sustained as a legitimate exercise of municipal power.
The character of the city confers upon it the power to prevent and restrain nuisances, and to
“declare what shall constitute a nuisance;” but this does not authorize it to declare a
particular use of property a nuisance, unless such use comes within the common law or
statutory idea of a nuisance.
It is clear that municipal councils have, under the code, the power to declare and abate
nuisances, but it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation, or use is not such.
These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is
a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If
it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined
by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing
before a judicial tribunal.
88. Monteverde v. Generoso
52 Phil 123; 29 September 1928; Malcolm, J
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao
Facts:
Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao. He possesses a Torrens title,
obtained in 1921. The parcel of land is bounded by the Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek
is a branch of the river and runs through the Monteverde land.
For fishpond purposes, Monteverde constructed 2 dams across the Agdao River and 5 dams
across the Tambongon Creek. The 2 dams across the Agdao River were destroyed by order
of the district engineer of Davao. The provincial governor also threatened to destroy the other
dams in the creek.
5
The motive behind the destruction was to safeguard the public health. To prevent the
contemplated action with reference to the dams in the Tambongon Creek, Monteverde
sought in CFI of Davao an injunction to restrain the respondents from destroying the dams.
Monteverde was unsuccessful in the lower court, hence this appeal.
Issue:
1. Is a provincial governor, district engineer, or a district health officer authorized to destroy
private
property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily without any judicial proceedings
whatsoever under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance?
Held:
1. No.
Ratio:
It should be added that the fishponds were constructed in 1921 and 1922, and did not exist
as a result of a concession in Spanish times. The Tambongon Creek is navigable and as such
is of public ownership. The reason for the contemplated action by the governor and the legal
authority on which he relied are apparent in the letter sent by the governor to Monteverde.
(Gist of letter: We have received complaints about you closing branches of the river and creek
for fishpond purposes without prior authorization from authorities, obstructing water flow
and causing development of stagnant water which becomes breeding ground of mosquitos.
For public sanitation and by virtue of section 24 of Water Law, you are ordered to remove
the dams. Comply promptly or the district engineer will be ordered to effect the work.)
Admin Code grants the municipal council the power by ordinance or resolution to declare,
prevent, and abate nuisances. Water Law Sec 24, on the other hand, says any person may
construct on his property ponds for bathing, commercial or recreative purposes with notice
to the governor. The governor will have the power to suspend work if after consultation with
experts, it appears the construction will be prejudicial to public interests. Private party may
appeal to the government.
There are 2 classes of nuisances. Nuisances per se and nuisances per accidens. The first, since
they affect the immediate safety of persons and property, may be summarily abated under
the law of necessity. But if the nuisance is nuisance per accidens, even the municipal
authorities would not have the right to declare the abatement of a particular thing or an act
as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be doing or maintaining the
same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing or act does in fact constitute a nuisance. (Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage v. Municipal
Council of Iloilo)
It is obvious that a dam or fishery constructed in navigable waters is not a nuisance per se.
But if it impairs the health or depreciates property, it can be found to be a nuisance. The
public health may be conserved but conserved only in the legal manner. Due process must
be observed before a private citizen’s property may be interfered with.
The US case of Lawton v. Steele makes a good point. it is not easy to draw the line where
property illegally used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial proceedings are
necessary for its condemnation. If the property were of great value, it would be putting a
dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to permit him to sell or destroy it as public
nuisance, and the owner would have good reason to complain of such act, as depriving him
of his property without due process of law. But where the property is of a trifling value, and
its destruction is necessary to effect the object of a certain statute, we think it is within the
power of the Legislature to order its summary abatement. Like cards of chips in a gambling
room for it would be belittling to the dignity of the judiciary to require such destruction to be
preceded by a solemn condemnation in a court of justice.
In contrast with Lawton v. Steele, (1) there is no law authorizing the summary abatement of
nuisances by the governor and (2) the dams are not of trifling value.
Decision of CFI denying injunction is REVERSED.
Dispositive:
CFI decision denying the petition for injunction is REVERSED. Injunction granted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
One who maintains on his estate or premises an attractive nuisance without exercising due
case to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. (Jarco Marketing Corp. v. CA, 117 SCAD 818, 321 SCRA 375 (1991), Paras, p. 741)
BASIS FOR THE LIABILITY
The attractiveness is an invitation to children. Safeguards to prevent danger must therefore
be set up.
ELEMENTS OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
1. It must be attractive
2. Dangerous to children of tender years.
SWIMMING POOL
A swimming pool or water tank is not an attractive nuisance, for while it is attractive, it is
merely an imitation of the work of nature. Hence, if small children are drowned in an
attractive water tank of another, the owner is not liable even if there be no guards in the
premises (Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, L‐3422 Jun. 13, 1952).
Exception: Swimming pool with dangerous slides
The doctrine of attractive nuisance does not generally apply to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial other than the mere
water and its location.
89. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v BALANDAN, et al.
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g.
water tanks) as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location.
FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of
their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks
filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made
because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also
the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his
6
friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While
bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver,
having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the
parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?
RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive
nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural,
in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.
90. SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO
FACTS :
This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the
City Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the
demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila
inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the subject
parcels of land initially entirely without consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land
with the agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to
vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the occupied
streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue
of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health
Officer, not in the
City Engineer.
ISSUES: Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the
abatement of the nuisance?
HELD: There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694, classifying as a nuisance the
obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a
community or neighborhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se,
obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized
by statute or ordinance. Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the
abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila,
such duty, among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision
not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions prevail
over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to
be taken by respondent.
91. VELASCO v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
FACTS:
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained
the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of
10-20 meters away from appellant’s house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides
along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously as a wali wall) on the
boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by
transformers (probably decepticons). Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which
has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several
witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a
sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in Velaso’s property was
measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity
levels of residences.
ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?
HELD: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable
nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical
machinery and appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume.
It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor
are the witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions.
Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average
residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable
since they actually treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused
appellant loss of sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution.
Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated,
the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55.
The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either
to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.
92. LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES vs. THE CITY
MAYOR OF BAGUIO, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, THE MARKET SUPERINTENDENT
AND THE CITY TREASURER
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
Appeal from the decision of the CFI Baguio
Makalintal, J.:
7
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods.
When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city
might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another
temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a
temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior
permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff
sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon
failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and
the police then demolished the shack.
ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers
are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.
RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up
the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its
location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it
constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall
be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged
nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there
no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found
that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not
summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction
was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.
93. Jose 'Pepito' Timoner vs. People of the Philippines and The Honorable Court of
Appeals, IV Division (G.R. No. L-62050, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 830)
FACTS:
Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He ordered the demolition
of the stalls in Maharlika Highway, even showing himself up in those stalls during the
demolition, after these establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal
Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon,
the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The
complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se.
Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
ISSUE:
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute
a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water;
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community
or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one
that is not included in the foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and
had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop
as a nuisance per-se. Thus:
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality
or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a
sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of
the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred
therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is
claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants'
makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act
which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people
in general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by
the invasion of its rights — the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come
within its sphere.
94. ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v CA [GR No. 95279 (July 25, 1991)]
Quick facts: Quonset used for copra storage demolished by virtue of Ordinance No.147
which states that structures that do not conform to the Zoning regulations should be
relocated and failure to do so would entail condemnation or removal at owner’s expense.
Nature: Petition to review the judgment of the CA.
8
Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
• A Quonset in Basilan – constructed in 1944 by the American Liberation Forces; purchased
by Gregoria Francisco (died in 1976) in 1946; stands on land owned by the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) – was ordered demolished by the Municipal Mayor, Valencia.
• Proc. No. 83 issued by Pres. Quirino declared land for the exclusive use of port facilities.
• January 10, 1989: PPA issued to Tan Gin San, the husband of deceased Francisco, a permit
to occupy the building for a year, until December 31, 1989.
• May 8L Mayor notified Tan Gin San by mail to relocate or remove his Quonset by virtue of
Zoning Ord. 147 stressing the “clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary
surroundings along Strong Boulevard.”
• May 19, another notice was sent. May 24: demolition was ordered by Mayor.
• Petitioner filed with RTC suit for a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and damages.
• RTC: denied writ, upheld power of Mayor to order demolition without judicial authority
• Sept. 6: Quonset was completely demolished
• CA (1st decision): reversed TC; Quonset not a nuisance per se; Mayor needed judicial
decision
• CA (2nd decision): reversed itself; deficiency (lack of judicial declaration) cured when
petitioner filed the petition for prohibition and was heard on oral argument.
Issue: WON Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of
petitioner’s Quonset building.
Held/Ratio:
NO. There is no doubt that the Quonset is a non-conforming structure as per the
Municipal Ordinance; and that in the event that an immediate relocation of the building
cannot be accomplished, section 16 of the Ordinance provides that “… the non-conforming
use may be condemned or removed at the owner’s expense.”
a. This provision does not empower the Municipal Mayor to order a summary
removal of the structure. If it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention to the
requirements of due process.
b. Violation of the ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of
extra-judicial remedies. The Local Government Code imposes upon the Mayor the duty “to
cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances.”
a) Only applies to nuisance per se – affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde
v Generoso).
b) Storage of copra in the Quonset is a legitimate business, cannot be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community.
c) If it is a nuisance per accidens, it must be proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose.
d) Sanguniaang Bayan cannot DECLARE a particular thing as a nuisance per se – can
ONLY BE adjudged by judicial determination.

95. TAMIN VS. CA- Abatement of Public Nuisance
FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the
ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land
located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under
PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject
to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and
the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land
despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a
municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue
because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.
ISSUE:Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public
nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
Held:Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that
“Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or
anything else which: … hinders or impairs the use of the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is
either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be equal.”
Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:
1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance
2. civil action
3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file
a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under
the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before
summarily abate a public nuisance.
Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of
demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to
eject the private respondent.
9
WEEK 2
96. Cid vs. Javier
G.R. L-14116, June 30, 1960
FACTS: Respondents own a building with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, owned by
the petitioners. Allegedly, in 1913 or 1914, before the New Civil Code took effect, the
predecessors-in interest of the petitioner were verbally prohibited by the respondent to
obstruct view and light. When the Court of Appeals adjudicated the case, it found out that
the two estates are covered by Original Certificates of Title, both issued by the Register of
Deeds. The court further observed that in both of the title, any annotation does not appear in
respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20)
years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of
registration.
ISSUE: Whether the owners of a building standing on their lot with windows overlooking
the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view
arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, to petitioner's predecessor-
in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.
RULING: Inasmuch as the alleged prohibition having been avowedly made in1913 or 1914,
before the present Civil Code took effect, the applicable legal provision is Article 538 of the
Spanish Civil Code which provides that negative easements are acquired, from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the
servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement.
The law requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical expression, for
emphasis, the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but a formal act. The phrase "formal
act" would require not merely any writing, but one executed in due form and/or with
solemnity. That this is the intendment of the law although not expressed in exact language is
the reason for the clarification made in Article 621 of the new Civil Code which specifically
requires the prohibition to be in "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public".
Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They constitute a
limitation of the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can be
acquired only by title and by prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result of
some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By the same token,
negative easements cannot be acquired by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that
the prohibition (the equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public."
Conceding arguendo that such an easement has been acquired by prescription which,
counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, it had
been cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens
System without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title,
pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration
Act.
97. MARCELO FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.TIMOTEO PAEZ and RICARDO
JABSON, defendants-appellees.
Gregorio Perfecto for appellant.
Prudencio A. Remigio for appellee Paez.
No appearance for other appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:p
In the complaint the plaintiff claims a right of way, upon payment of indemnity, across
defendant Paez's land; that the latter recognize the plaintiff's ownership of a piece of land of
23.46 square meters, that he vacate it, and that the defendant indemnify him for the damages
arising from said occupation.
Defendant Paez answered with a general denial and set up the special defense of prescription.
Defendant Jabson, in turn, also answered with a general denial, and by way of special defense
denied that the plaintiff has any right of way over his land, because outside of it there is
another possible way to the street, which is shorter and less prejudicial.
After the judicial commissioner appointed for the purpose had taken the evidence and
inspected the land, the Court of First Instance of Manila decided the case as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the complaint is dismissed with respect to the first
cause of action. It is held that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the piece of land mentioned
in the second cause of action, with an area of 23.46 square meters and included within lot No.
13, block No. 2718 of the certificate of title issued in his favor, and he is entitled to the
ownership of the small house built of strong materials by defendant Paez thereon, upon
payment of its value, or to compel the defendant to purchase said land at twenty pesos (P20)
per square meter. Should the plaintiff choose the first alternative, he shall pay the price to be
agreed upon by and between himself and said defendant, and in default thereof, the value to
be later determined by the court after hearing the evidence that might be presented in
connection therewith. Defendant Paez shall pay the costs of this action. So ordered. (Pages 40
and 41, bill of exceptions.)
The plaintiff appealed from this judgment, and makes the following assignments of error:
1. In holding that the plaintiff's action to enforce his right of way over defendant Paez's land
is barred by the statute of limitations.
2. In not holding that the action to enforce a right of way is imprescriptible.
3. In denying the relief sought in the complaint, respecting the right of way through Timoteo
Paez's land.
The question raised in this appeal, then, is whether the plaintiff's right of way over defendant
Paez's land has prescribed or is imprescriptible.
The trial court held the plaintiff's right to have been barred on the following grounds:
It has been proved that the parcels of land now belonging to defendant Ricardo Jabson
originally belonged to a certain Paulino Castañeda y Francisco, married to Teodora del
Mundo, who, on December 20, 1908 obtained decree No. 3138 in proceeding No. 4865, and
subsequently, certificate of title No. 1449. On October 20, 1909, the parcel of land thus held
10
by Paulino Castañeda y Francisco was subdivided by the latter into two parts, one containing
193.66 square meters, situated in the inner portion of the space between Padre Rada and Ilaya
Streets, and the other containing 173.71 square meters, conterminous with said streets. The
first of these parcels, that is, the interior portion, after successive transfers became the
property of the plaintiff herein, and the second portion, after several transfers, also, became
the property of defendant Jabson. Therefore, from October 20, 1909, when the property was
subdivided into the two aforesaid portions, there arose the right of the original owners of the
interior parcel to claim a right of way over the adjacent land which was then the land abutting
upon P. Rada and Ilaya Streets, through which was the nearest and shortest way to said
streets. Notwithstanding the fact that from that date said right arose, none of the previous
owners exercised said right until the plaintiff attempted to enforce it through the complaint
filed on September 1, 1927, that is, after almost eighteen years had elapsed.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the action to recover ownership or
possession of real property, or an interest therein, may only be exercised within ten years
after the cause of said action arises. Applying this legal provision to the facts established in
this case, it is evident that the plaintiff cannot obtain the relief he seeks in his complaint
because his action is barred by the statute of limitations, inasmuch as neither he nor his
predecessors demanded the right of way within said limitations. (Pages 36, 37, and 38, bill of
exceptions.)
The facts related by the court below are based upon the result of these proceedings. But we
should not lose sight of the fact that although it is true that easements are extinguished by
non-user for twenty years (article 546, No. 1, Civil Code), nevertheless, the case at bar does
not deal with an easement which has been used, while the legal provisio cited is only
applicable to easements which being in use are later abandoned. Here is what Manresa says
on this point:
Prescription affects all easements lawfully arisen although they may not have been used.
Nevertheless, the second paragraph of article 546, number 2, refers to an easement in use, for
one cannot discontinue using what one has never used, and there can be no act, at least in all
the cases, adverse to an inchoate easement. (4 Commentaries on the Civil Code, fourth
edition, page 662.) And in speaking of legal easements, such as the one in question, the same
author observes.
(c) Others, finally, may be extinguished by non-user, but only with respect to the actual form
or manner in which they had been exercised, and the right or the power to claim the exercise
of legal easement does not prescribe, as occurs especially in the case of the right of way and
easement of aqueduct. (Emphasis ours.) (Ditto, pages 662 and 663).
The appellee also cites in support of his appeal No. 5 of said article 546 which refers to
extinction of easements by waiver. It should be noted that in the case of intermittent
easements, such as the right of way, the waiver must be, if not formal and solemn, at least
such as may be obviously gathered from positive acts, and the mere refraining from claiming
the right is not, to our mind, sufficient for the purpose. This seems to be the drift of the
following commentaries made by Manresa:
There has also been some discussion as to whether the waiver should be express or implied.
It may be that the act of walling up a window by the owner of the dominant estate is a plain
act of implied waiver, and yet, this act does not of itself extinguish the easement, but only
serves to mark the beginning of the prescription. In intermittent easements (like the one in
question) the mere fact of leaving them seems to indicate a waiver, and yet, it is not sufficient
to extinguish them. It seems then that as a general rule, an express waiver should be required,
but without prejudice to having the courts decide in exceptional cases that there is an evident
waiver, inferred from acts which reveal it beyond all doubt. (Ibid., pages 667, 668.) (Emphasis
ours.)
The mere fact that the plaintiff and his predecessors refrained from claiming the easement,
without any positive act to imply a real waiver, does not, in our opinion, bring the case within
the provision of the aforesaid article 546, No. 5, of the Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that such a right of way, provided by the law for the benefit of private
individuals, may be waived, for Manresa so declares:
Legal easements established in the interest of private individuals may be waived, but not so
those of public utility. (Opus, volume and edition as aforecited, page 668.)
But the court holds, for the reasons stated above, that said article 546, No. 5, Civil Code, is
not applicable to the instant case, with reference to waiver, nor is No. 2 of the same article,
regarding non-user; and therefore, the plaintiff's right of way cannot be deemed
extinguished.
The judgment appealed from is modified and it is held that, upon payment of the proper
indemnity, the plaintiff is entitled to a right of way through the shortest and least prejudicial
portion of the servient estate, from plaintiff's lot designated No. 3, in the plan Exhibit A,
through defendant Timoteo Paez's lot No. 12 according to said plan, to P. Rada Street, as
provided in articles 564, 565 and concordant articles of the Civil Code.
Without express pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
98. benedicto v. ca
PDF
99. [ G.R. No. 7386, March 30, 1912 ]
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,
VS. PEDRO P. ROXAS, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
TRENT, J.:
This appeal involves only a right of way claimed by the appellant Pedro P. Roxas, the owner
of the dominant estate, across parcel L, the property of the appellee, to Calle Tejeron, a
distance of about 100 meters. The servient estate is bounded on the north by an estero; on the
west by the dominant estate; on the southwest by Calle Tejeron; and on the west by lands of
Francisco Managan. The eastern line, which joins the dominant estate, is 265 meters long. The
appellant claims a right of way starting across parcel L at a point 198 meters from the
southern extremity of this line. During the trial of this case in the court below the parties
entered into the following agreement:
11
"It is admitted as a question of fact that the road between the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati
and Calle Tejeron, which, according to the witness Leopoldo Areopaguita, was formerly a
meter and a half or two meters wide, although at present it has a greater width, has been
used from time immemorial by the tenants of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati for the
passage of carts entering and leaving the Hacienda."
In addition to the admitted facts as above set forth, the testimony shows that the road in
question is now some 4 meters wide; that since time out of mind there has existed upon lot L
near the middle, and also very near this rpad, a small church; that the faithful use said road
in going to this place of worship and that said road is not only used by the tenants of the
appellant but also' by the people living in the sitio of Suavoy.
It is admitted by both parties that the tenants of the dominant estate have used the road in
question since time immemorial for carts, both for entering and leaving the hacienda. It is
also an established fact that the said hacienda (the dominant estate) is partly bounded on the
south by Calle Tejeron. The point where it js claimed that this right of way starts across lot L
is only 198.25 meters from the said street. So the claim of the appellant cannot be that the
right of way exists by necessity growing out of the . peculiar location of his property, but
simply that it arises by prescription, founded alone upon immemorial use by his tenants.
The result is that the road which the appellant seeks to have declared a right of way for the
benefit of his hacienda has been used for a great number of years by the members of the
appellee's church to go to and from the ermita, and also by the appellant's tenants, and by
other people. And furthermore, while it is true that the appellant's tenants have used this
road for carts as above stated, yet it has not been shown that such use was absolutely
necessary in order to cultivate the dominant estate, but, on the contrary, it clearly appears
that the said tenants crossed lot L merely on account of convenience, as they could have
reached the public highway by going in other directions, especially south, only 198 meters.
Therefore, the admitted and established facts show (1) that the use of the road by the tenants
of the appellant in this manner and under these circumstances has not been such as to create
an easement by prescription or in any other manner; and (2) that the use of said road by all
has been by permission or tolerance of the appellee.
Where a tract of land, as in the case at bar, attached to a public meeting house such as the
ermitais designedly left open and uninclosed for the convenience of the members or
worshippers of that church, the mere passage of persons over it in common with those for
whose, use it was appropriated is to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license,
arid not adverse. Such a use is not inconsistent with the only use which the proprietor
thought fit to make of the land, and until the appellee thinks proper to inclose it, such use is
not adverse and will not preclude it from enclosing the land when other views of its interests
render it proper to do so. And though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open
land more frequently than another, yet the same rule will apply unless there be some decisive
act indicating a separate and exclusive use under a claim of right A different doctrine would
have a tendency to destroy all neighborhood accommodations in the way of travel; for if it
were once understood that a man, by allowing his neighbor to pass through his farm without
objection over the pass-way which he used himself, would thereby, after the lapse of time,
confer a right on such neighbor to require the pass-way to be kept open for his benefit and
enjoyment, a prohibition against all such travel would immediately ensue. And again, it must
be remembered that a right of way, like the one sought to be established in the case at bar, is
a charge imposed upon real property for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different
owner. Such a right of way is a privilege or advantage in land existing distinct from the
ownership of the soil; and because it is a permanent interest in another's land with a right to
enter at all times and enjoy it, it can only be founded upon an agreement or upon prescription.
And when the latter is relied upon in those cases where the right of way is not essential for
the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate, the proof showing adverse use which is an
affirmative claim must be sufficiently strong and convincing to overcome the presumption
of permissive use or license, as such a right of way is never implied because it is convenient.
For these reasons, the judgment appealed from denying the appellant's claim to a right of
way across lot L is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Carson, J., concurs.
Johnson and Moreland, JJ.,concur in the result.
________________________________________
CONCURRING
TORRES, J.:
I think that the decision should be affirmed in so far as it orders the registration of the land,
but with express recognition of the right of way or road across the land, to this extent
reversing the portion overruling the objection.
100.Eduardo Cuaycong vs Ramona Benedicto
Civil Law – Law on Property – Easement – Right of Way – Public Highway
FACTS
Ramona Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Two roads pass through the said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and the Nanca-
Victorias Road. For forty years, the owners of the nearby hacienda, Eduardo Cuaycong et al,
had been using the said roads to transport their products.
But in 1911, Benedicto decided to close the roads and began asking for toll fees for wagons
passing through their hacienda. In 1912, Cuaycong et al sued Benedicto. Cuaycong claimed
that they have a right of way over the said Nanca-Victorias Road considering that they have
been using it since time immemorial.
The lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-Toreno Road for the other parties
were in default, but the lower court declared that Cuaycong et al do have a right of way over
the Nanca-Victorias Road. Benedicto appealed. Cuaycong then averred that the road is a
public highway.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuaycong et al were able to establish their right over the Nanca-
Victorias Road.
12
HELD: No. The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public highway. First it was shown that in the
Torrens title held by Benedicto, there was no encumbrance attached to the hacienda, that it is
nowhere nearby a road nor does it border a road.
Second, the road was not maintained by the local government. Its upkeep was solely
supported by the road users for their benefits, convenience and interest. There was no
adverse possession by the government.
Third, there was no evidence which shows that the land is of the nature of a public highway.
It was shown that the road was in existence since 1885, but it was not shown as a public
highway, in fact, the other evidence shown pertain to Dacuman-Toreno Road.
Fourth, the road was closed in 1911; it was only in 1912 that Cuaycong et al filed their suit.
Neither did Cuaycong et al acquire a right of private easement. The lower court ruled that
Cuaycong et al and their predecessors in interest had been using the said road since time
immemorial yet they only showed evidence that it was in use in 1885 but no other evidence
to show a further time of usage was ever shown to prove their claim.
101. VALDERAMA V. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CENTRAL
48 PHIL 492
FACTS:
Case regarding the milling contracts and use of the railroad in going to the sugar central
HELD:
1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar company for the
construction of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the
mill, it is contrary to the nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the
servient estates can be transported on said railroad, because it is a well-settled rule that things
serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by easement. That an easement being
established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of the servient estates cannot limit its
use to the transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to that effect.
2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons carrying
goods pertaining to persons who aren’t wners of the servient estates and at all time the person
entitled o the easement may please, for in such case the easement ontinues to be the same.
What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a
larger area of land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area
occupied not by causing wagons to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects
being transported.
FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with
Miguel Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300
tons for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners
who in turn would furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates
for 30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were
acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et.
al, made other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co.,
Inc. The hacienda owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling
as required by its capacity, so the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various
hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file
a complaint against North Negros.
The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding
that North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the
transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar
cane from the hacienda owners’ lands
HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the
North Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their
properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could
permit the transportation of sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their
intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement was established for the benefit of all
producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the
corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced
by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is
nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.
Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is
prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should
occupy a greater area or deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not
happen in this case when the North Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the
servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same area and the encumbrance is still the
same regardless of the number of times it passes through the estates.
Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if
the owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still
has the right to the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be
limited to the canes produced by the owners has no basis.
102. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO vs. SERAFIN HIDALGO
13
G.R. No. L-42334 October 31, 1936
Facts: North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) is the owner of a site known as the “mill site.” It is
where its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers
are located. It also owns the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda “Begoña.” Across
its properties NNSC constructed a road connecting the “mill site” with the provincial
highway. Through this road it allowed vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15
for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it.
Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned “mill site” of the NNSC is the hacienda of
Luciano Aguirre, known as Hacienda “Sañgay,” where the Hidalgo has a billiard hall and a
tuba saloon. Like other people in and about the place, Hidalgo used to pass through the said
road of the NNSC because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda “Sañgay”. Later
on, by order of the NNSC , every time that the Hidalgo passed driving his automobile with a
cargo of tuba plaintiff ,the gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him from passing through
said road. Hidalgo in such cases merely deviated from said road and continued on his way
to Hacienda “Sañgay” across the fields of Hacienda “Begoña,” likewise belonging to the
NNSC.
Issue: Whether or not NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from passing the property.
Ruling: NO.
We, therefore, have the case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a
community. Civil Code articles 531 and 594 read:
ART. 531. Easements may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons or of a
community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 594. The owner of an estate may burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and
in such manner and form as he may consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law
or public order.
As may be seen from the language of article 594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner
is given ample liberty to establish them: “as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form
as he may consider desirable.” The plaintiff “considered it desirable” to open this road to the
public in general, without imposing any condition save the payment of a fifteen-centavo toll
by motor vehicles, and it may not now go back on this and deny the existence of an
easement.Voluntary easements under article 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute
the act of the owner. If he exacts any condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for
the use of the easement, any person who is willing to pay it may make use of the easement.
If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, it may be stated that a contract exits
from the time all those who desire to make use of the easement are disposed to pay the
required indemnity.The plaintiff contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature
and can only be acquired by virtue of a title under article 539. The defendant, however, does
not lay claim to it by prescription. The title in this case consists in the fact that the plaintiff
has offered the use of this road to the general public upon payment of a certain sum as
passage fee in case of motor vehicles.
The cases of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil., 450), and Cuaycong
vs. Benedicto (37 Phil., 781), are not controlling, as there the attempt was to establish that the
right to an easement of way had been acquired by prescription. Here defendant’s contention
is, that while the road in question remains open to the public, he has a right to its use upon
paying the passage fees required by the plaintiff. Indeed the latter may close it at its pleasure,
as no period has been fixed when the easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the
road is thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously exclude the defendant from its use.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s evidence discloses the existence of a forcible right of way in favor of
the owner and occupants of the Hacienda “Sañgay” under the Civil Code, article 564,
because, according to said evidence, those living in Hacienda “Sañgay” have no access to the
provincial road except thru the road in question.
103. ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and
the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-5872 November 29, 1954
Cornelio R. Magsarili for petitioners.
De los Santos and De los Santos for respondents.
Alfonso S. Borja, as amicus curiae.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, petition this Court for a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (in its case No. 6677-R), declaring the respondent Crisostomo R.
Bernardo entitled to preference under Commonwealth acts Nos. 20 and 539, in the acquisition
of lot No. 462-A of the "Capellania de Concepcion", also known as lot No. 4, block No. 26, of
the Tambobong Estate plan, located in Malabon, Rizal, and having an area of 208 square
meters.
It is uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased
from Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in
Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act
authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder
should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or
occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress
Administration for the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al .,
contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12,
1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to
preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the
latter upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
14
The decision of the Court of Appeals expressly finds that:
. . . It has been incontestably proven that the disputed lot had been held under lease by
appellee's deceased parents and later by him (appellee) continuously from 1912 to 1947. The
appellee's predecessors paid the rentals due on the said lot from the commencement of their
leasehold rights up to 1936, when Teodora Santos died. The appellee continued paying the
rents on the same lot from 1936 to December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired the
entire Capellania de Concepcion estate. Since 1912 the values of the leasee hold right of
appellee amounts to about P4,000.00.
The alleged preferential right of the appellant to the purchase of the disputed lot, which was
also the main basis of the decision of the Rural Progress Administration, is their claim of
actual occupation of the lot for many years before the acquisition of the Concepcion estate by
the Government. The appellants' witness, Otilia Santos, however, said that the late Romulo
Bernardo had allowed his uncle, appellant Enrique Bernardo, to stay in the premises since
the year 1918. (petitioner's Brief, pp. 72-73).
The Court of Appeals also found that the house standing on the lot had been since July 13,
1944, sold by petitioner Enrique Bernardo to the respondent, who thereby became its owner;
that because of family relationship[, the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises sue
to the tolerance of, and out of charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo)
and his deceased parents who were the rightful lessees of the lot in question."
The Court of Appeals likewise found and declared in its decision Bernardo required the
petitioner to vacate the premises. Finally, we understand that in Case No. 6734-R, the Court
of Appeals declared valid the sale of the house on the lot in question made in 1944 by
petitioner Enrique Bernardo in favor of the respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo, and that the
aforesaid judgment is now final.
There are thus before us, disputing the right of preference to the acquisition of the lot, the
respondent who is the owner of the house standing on said lot since 1944, and has held the
land in lawful tenancy since 1912, paying rents and taxes thereon; and the petitioner, who
was allowed by respondent, out of the deference and charity, to gratuitously occupy the lot
and live therein since 1918. Upon the facts on record, we are of the opinion that petitioner
does not come under the description "bona fide tenant or occupant" employed in the statute
(C.A. 539).
The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one
who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl.
220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is
ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it"
(Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889,
art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies
in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to over each another. The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard:
for the precarious nature of his occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to
protect and restore that possession to its real and legitimate holders upon demand, could
never be hidden the Tambobong Estate, petitioner had already parted with the house that
was his remaining link with the occupancy of the lot; and since 1945, even before the
Government's purchase, he had been required to vacate. Thus bereft of all stable interest in
the land, petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn respondent's past deferential regard to his own
advantage, and to exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense for the purpose of
ousting his benefactors and wiping out the investment that the latter, and their predecessors
in interest, had established and preserved charged for the lot in question. That the law, in
preferring "bona fide occupants," intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair
dealing may well be doubted.
The petitioners seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the policy of the government, ever
since the start of the American sovereignty, had been to acquire the landed estates for the
benefit of their "actual occupants," as allegedly exemplified in Acts 1170 and 1933 (friar
Lands' Acts), and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539 (Homesite Acts); that the
words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual"
occupants. Two powerful REASONS nullify this contention. The first is that section 7 of Act
1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and
occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the
Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide
occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts
should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social
readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim
to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and
character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining
their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to
cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust.
That the underlying motive behind the Homesite Acts is the desire that "the heads of the
families concerned be given opportunity to become the owners of their homes and residential
lots in which they and their forbears have been raised and born" (Messages of the President,
Vol. 4, pp. 288-290), favors the respondents rather than the petitioner, for it is an inalterable
fact on record that the rentals and taxes on the lot in question were always paid by the parents
of respondent Crisostomo Bernardo and continued by the latter upon his parents' death, to
the exclusion of herein respondent.
As pointed out by the decision under review, had not the respondents taken and maintained
sincere and affirmative steps to own their lands through a continuous and faithful payment
of their obligations, the chances are that the petitioner would have been long ago speedily
ejected from the premises of the former landowners. To which may be added that at present,
15
not being the lessee of the lot, nor the owner of the house standing thereon, the petitioner's
interest in this particular lot appears to be a purely speculative one.
We therefore rule that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate
by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its
lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant"
entitled to its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539. Whether or not
the situation would be different if the occupant were sublessee of the lot, need not be decided
in this case, the issue not being involved.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority solely because of the peculiar facts of this case; but I am of the
opinion that, between a bona fide occupant and a tenant or lessee, the spirit of the law is to
prefer the former especially if the latter has already a piece of his own.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
On December 12, 1947, the herein respondent Crisostomo S. Bernardo filed an application
with the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of lot No. 462-A of the "Capellania
de Concepcion", now lot No. 4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, situated in
Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, and containing an area of 208 square meters. The herein
petitioners, Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, also applied for the purchase of the
same lot. The basis of both applications is Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 539. In its decision dated January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress
Administration awarded the lot to the petitioners, and on July 9, 1948 the corresponding deed
was executed in their favor.
On July 26, 1948, res Bernardo filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
the petitioners and the Rural Progress Administration, praying that the decision of the Rural
Progress Administration, as well as the corresponding sale in favor of the petitioner be
declared null and void; that respondent Bernardo be declared entitled to purchase the lot in
question; that petitioners be order to vacate the and surrender the possession thereof; and
that the petitioners be sentenced to pay respondent Bernardo, by way of damages, the sum
of P20.00 per month from February 1, 1945 until its surrender to said respondent. After
hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on February 15, 1950 a decision in favor
of respondent Bernardo, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the decision of the Rural Progress Administration dated January 12,
1948, as well as the sale of the lot in question by said Rural Progress Administration to
defendants Bernardo null and void and of no effect; ordering said defendant Rural Progress
Administration to sell the lot in question to the plaintiff who is the bona fide tenant of the lot
in dispute and the owner of the house standing thereon; ordering the defendants Bernardo
to vacate the lot in question and to pay to the plaintiff damages in the sum of P20.00 per
month, representing the reasonable rental value for their illegal use and occupation of said
lot, from February 1, 1945 until the said lot is vacated by defendant Bernardo; and sentencing
all defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
From this decision the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on April 17, 1952,
affirmed the decision of the court of origin in toto, with costs against the petitioners. The
latter have elevated the case before us on certiorari.
The facts relied upon by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the COurt of Appeals are to
the effect that the deceased parents of the respondent Bernardo and later said respondent
himself had been the lessee of the lot from 1912 to 1947; that respondent's predecessors paid
its rental up to 19336 when his mother Teodora Santos died; that from 1936 respondent
Bernardo in turn paid the rentals up December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired the
entire "Capellania de Concepcion" estate; that he owns the house standing on the lot; that
while the petitioners actually occupied said lot since 1918, their occupancy was by mere
tolerance of and out of charity from respondent Bernardo and his deceased parents; that the
petitioners were required by respondent Bernardo to vacate the premises on February 1, 1945,
or two years before the acquisition of the "Capellania de Concepcion" estate by the
Government.
Upon the other hand, the petitioners' preferential right to acquire the lot is premised on their
actual occupancy since 1918.
Commonwealth Act No. 20, enacted on July 11, 1936, in section 1, provided that "the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to order the institution of expropriation
proceeding or to enter into negotiations for the purpose of acquiring portions of large landed
estate which are now used as home sites and reselling them at costs to their bona fide
occupants." It will be noted that, under this provision, portions of large landed estates used
as homesites would be expropriated or acquired by the Government for resale to their bona
fide occupants. Commonwealth Act No. 539, enacted on May 26, 1940, and amending
Commonwealth Act No. 20, provides that "the President of the Philippines is authorized to
acquire private lands or any subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at
reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or
occupants or to a private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are
qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines." This latter provision differs from
16
Commonwealth Act No. 20 in the sense that private lands are to be acquired or expropriated
for subdivision into lots or small farms for resale to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to
a private individuals who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines, the
important change being, for the purposes of this opinion , that resale now be made to "bona
fide tenants or occupants."
The theory of the trial court and the Court of Appeals is that, as respondent Bernardo was
admittedly the lessee of the lot in question, he should enjoy priority. It was reasoned out that
said respondent having been paid, by his predecessors and himself, the rentals for the land
from 1912 to 1917, and owning the house now standing on the lot is a "tenant" within the
purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539; that the petitioners could have stayed in the
premises since 1918, without being ejected by the original owners of the "Capellania de
Concepcion" estate, if respondent Bernardo and his predecessors had not paid said rentals.
We are of the opinion that the law in this case has been misapplied. To determine the real
purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 20 and Commonwealth Act No. 539, we have only to
recall that as early as April 26, 1904, Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the "Friar Lands Act,"
was approved providing that the actual settlers and occupants of lands acquired by the
Government had preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings. This
was followed on July 11, 1936, by Commonwealth Act No. 20, authorizing the resale of
homesites to their bona fide occupants. This trend was adopted in Commonwealth Act No.
260, approved on April 18, 1938, and Commonwealth Act No. 378, approved on August 23,
1938, which also expressly referred to bona fide occupants. The purpose of Act No. 1120,
known as the "Friar Lands Act" had already been explained by this court in the case of Jocson
vs. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; 378-379; as follows:
Acts 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special
privileges under the laws of the United States and various states of the Union. The statutes
of the United States as well as of the various states of the Union contain provisions for the
granting and protection of homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of
the Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach financial
misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence. Furthermore, the
state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and
reduced to pauperism. (Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee,
70 Am. Dec., 1982; Richardson vs. Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.)
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state
is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment
of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public
affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his
own home, with a sense of its protection and durability. (Wapples on Homestead and
Exceptions, p. 3.)
This objective is readily embedded in Commonwealth Act No. 20 which speaks of bona fide
occupants; and we cannot suppose that, presumably aware of legislative antecedents our
lawmakers ever intended to depart from such purpose in enacting Commonwealth Act No.
539. Indeed, The rural Progress Administration in its resolution No. 32, dated August 7, 1949,
(according to the petitioners, should be 1939) resolved "that it is the sense of this Board that
the words "bona fide occupants, as used in Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended, applies
to the person actually occupying any given lot, irrespective, of any former lease contract with
the previous owners of the homesite." It is significant that this construction was given by the
very agency called upon to implement the law. But the Court of Appeals argued that said
resolution should be construed in connection with paragraph 3 of resolution No. 252 dated
March 11, 1949, which reads in part as follows:
Resolved, to adopt as tentative rules covering the disposition of lot in the Tambobong Estate,
Malabon, Rizal, the following:
(1) To award to the lessees the lots under their possession if they have houses thereon
and the area thereof does not exceed 1,000 square meters. The RPA, however, reserves the
right to take away from said lessees any portion in excess of 1,000 square meters.
(2) That lots with houses even though surrounded by fence be declared vacant.
(3) That sublessees who have been occupying lots for at least five years be considered as
bona fide occupants and as such with preferential right to purchase said lots if they possess
no other in the same estate.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that paragraph 3 of resolution No. 252 requires bona
fide actual occupation on the part of the sublessees for at least five years prior to the
acquisition by the Government of the lot to be resold; and as the petitioners were required by
respondent Bernardo to vacate the premises on February 1, 1945 they could not be considered
as having occupied the lot bona fide for at least five years prior to December 31, 1947 when
the "Capellania de Concepcion" estate was purchased by the Government. This construction
is untenable since paragraph 3 of the resolution No. 252 does not say that the bona fide
possession for five years should be counted in relation or prior to the date of acquisition by
the Government. Said resolution, it may fairly be supposed, contemplates possession from
the time the sublessee actually occupies. In the present case it is admitted that the petitioners
have held possession since 1918.
In this connection it may not be amiss to make reference to Republic Act No. 1162 which, in
its section 5, provides, among other things, that "from the approval of this Act, until the
expropriation herein provided, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted
against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas herein authorized to be
appropriated if he pays his current rentals." Of course, said Act was approved in 1954, or
after the purchase by the Government of the "Capellania de Concepcion" estate, but it is
17
obvious therefrom that the policy of the Government is to protect the actual occupants as
much as possible, with the view to enabling them to acquire homesites. By analogy, we may
consider the efforts of respondent Bernardo to oust the petitioners in 1945, as being of no
decisive consideration.
We are also inclined to the view that the term "tenant" was added by Commonwealth Act
No. 539, not for the purpose of giving such tenant any preference over an occupant, but
merely to expand the scope of the law by allowing resale to persons other than a bona fide
occupant; and this is clear from the use of the alternative conjunction "or" between the words
"tenant" and "occupants" in Commonwealth Act No. 539. If the intention were otherwise, the
law would have expressly provided in the order in which they are enumerated. This was
exactly done in Republic Act No. 1162 which provides, in its section 3, that "the landed estates
or haciendas expropriated by virtue of this Act shall be subdivided into small lots, none of
which shall exceed one hundred and fifty square meters in the area, to be sold at costs to the
tenants or occupants of said lots, and to other individuals, in the order mentioned." In essence
and effect, Commonwealth Act No. 539 may be said to vest a certain degree of discretion in
the agency authorized to carry out the law, to determine who is better qualified and should
be preferred to a given lot. In the case before us, the Rural Progress Administration, after
proper investigation, awarded the lot to the petitioners and, in our opinion, this exercise of
discretion and judgment should not be interfered with in the absence of gross abuse.
We are not ready to state that the Rural Progress Administration had abused its discretion,
because the petitioners have lived on the lot since 1918 and they are conceded more indigent
than respondent Bernardo, coupled with the fact that the latter allegedly owns another
property as his homesite. It is immaterial whether the petitioners have occupied the lot in
question by mere tolerance and out of charity of respondent Bernardo, since this would not
detract from the bona fide character of petitioners' possession which is all that is required by
the law. In our opinion, the petitioners have occupied the land with as much good faith as a
sublessee actually paying rentals; so much so that the former owners of the land never
attempted to oust them; and they cannot be charged with either ingratitude or unfair dealing
and dishonesty towards respondent Bernardo, for they merely accepted the benefit intended
to be conferred in Commonwealth Act No. 539. The petitioners do not deny having been the
subject of respondent's benevolence to another question which he may ventilate.
The relation of the parties herein which naturally gave way to petitioners continued
possession of the lot in question, and the manner the petitioners acquired possession, are
contained in the following passage from the brief for the defendant-appellant in CA-G.R. No.
6734-R, Crisostomo Bernardo vs. Enrique Bernardo, in which the ownership of the house
standing on the lot was litigated and decided in favor of respondent Bernardo:
The plaintiff-appellee Crisostomo S. Bernardo and the defendant-appellant Enrique Bernardo
are blood relatives. It appears that the grandmother of the plaintiff-appellee, one by the name
of either Aniceta or Severina Bernardo, is the sister of the defendant-appellant Enrique
Bernardo. At one time, (the exact time could no longer remembered) the parents of Aniceta
or Severina Bernardo and Enrique Bernardo, occupied the lot subject of the land case. There
was a time however, when their parents died, the grandmother of the plaintiff-appellee,
together with his parents(plaintiff-appellee's) left the premises, while the defendant-
appellant Enrique Bernardo was left behind on the said lot. As the years went on the
defendant-appellant erected a new house on the lot the one now in question, and continued
to live therein up to the present time with his children, who are the other defendants-
appellants in the land case. (Please refer to defendants-appellants' brief in the land case and
the documents or exhibits therein mentioned, pages 3-5. Supra, pp. 4-5.)
At any rate, from a technical point of view, the term "tenant" as used in Commonwealth Act
No. 539 may be considered as referring only to a lessee who is in actual possession, thereby
preventing one with wealth from acquiring lots for business purposes. Suppose a lessee of 25
lots in a big hacienda sublets the same to 25 actual occupants. In case the Government should
expropriate the hacienda for resale in lots to "tenants or occupants," can it be seriously
contended that the lessee is to be preferred to the actual occupants? An affirmative answer
will be revolting to our sense of proportion; and yet that is the effect of the majority decision.
SEC. 27.Necessity of Entry by Lessee. — Upon the execution of a lease, naming a present
term, the lessee has a right of entry and of possession, but it seems well settled that he is not
a tenant until he enters. To create the relation of landlord and tenant, there must be an entry
by the lessee under the lease, or holding of the possession of the premises by the lessee that
will be referable to the lease as his authority. There is also authority to the effect that a lessee
does not have an estate until he enters, and that under the common law, no estate for years
could be created by a lease or other common law, no estate for years could be created by a
lease or other common law conveyance, without an actual entry made by the person to whom
the land was granted. . . . (32 Am. Jur., p. 50.).
The fact that respondent Bernardo had allowed the petitioners to occupy the lot since 1918 is
positive evidence that said respondent has no need thereof; and it cannot be gainsaid that
Commonwealth Act Nos. 20 and 539 are obviously intended, as heretofore already noted, to
provide the actual occupants with a piece of land which they may call their own. Certainly
the Government would have no reason to worry about those who were or are already home
and landowners, much less to encourage "absentee" lessees. Commonwealth Act No. 539 was
conceived to solved a social problem, not merely as a direct or indirect means of allowing
accumulation of land holdings. Indeed, in Republic Act No. 267, which authorizes
municipalities to expropriate lands for sale in lots, preference being given to Filipino bona
fide occupants and to Filipino veterans, their widows, and their children, the policy of the
Government was more or less announced that "no such lot shall be sold to any person who
already owns a residential lot, and any sale made to such person shall be void."
The petitioners have called attention to the fact that respondent Bernardo paid the rentals
from July, 140 to December 31, 1947, only on April 2, 1947, when steps were already being
18
taken by the Government to acquire the Tambobong Estate for resale to tenants or occupants.
This fact may not of course affect the status of respondent Bernardo as a lessee, but in way
justifies further the finding of the Rural Progress Administration that the petitioners should
be preferred in the resale of the lot in question.
Another circumstance that influenced the COurt of Appeals in affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is that the house standing on the lot belongs to respondent
Bernardo. Apart from the fact the said house assessed at P640, Philippine currency, was sold
by the petitioners to respondent Bernardo in 1944 for P1,050 in Japanese military notes (or
less than P100, Philippine currency) and the petitioners remained in possession, we do not
think that respondent's ownership can affect the status of the petitioners as bona fide
occupants for the purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 539. The same considerations
mentioned with respect to the possession of the land are applicable.
Accordingly, we vote to reserve the appealed judgment and to affirm the decision of the Rural
Progress Administration dated January 21, 1948, and the sale of the land in question to the
petitioners.
Pablo, J., concurs.
104. FRANCISCO V. IAC- Easement of Way
An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not
be due to his own acts.
FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-
owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by
which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and
another undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the
remaining portion, also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would
be retained by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.
The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dila’s
lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and
thus effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children
of Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Francisco’s land but negotiations failed. Francisco's
proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos,
as was supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dila’s
lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby
closing the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished
was to have a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more
convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit,
if necessary, to get what he wanted.]
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his
lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him
asserting his right to a legal easement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land
belonging to Francisco
HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act
isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not
himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had
actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an
easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult
or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be
traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in
an alternative location.
105. COSTABELLA CORP. VS. CA- Easement Right of Way
The convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of
way but rather, it should satisfy all four requisites (emphasis on 1st requisite- it should be
merely for convenience but it must be due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have
an adequate outlet to a public highway.
FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner’s property. As
a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private
respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter’s property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and
19
local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also
claim that the have acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-
opening of the “ancient road right of way” (what they called the supposed easement in this
case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in
interest’s act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating
the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the
form of a passageway, on the petitioner’s property?
RULING:
1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.
2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet
from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that
there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor
of the private respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of
the dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must
be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such
easement. Also, the private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the
petitioners. The SC also clarified that “least prejudicial” prevails over “shortest distance” (so
shortest distance isn’t necessarily the best choice.)
106. ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way
An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access
to a public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which
requires payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the
damages caused.
FACTS:
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by
the servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river
and the Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.
Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at
no particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but
provided a roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion
started his plant nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more
difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion
bought an owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass
through the roadpath so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell
to him 1 ½ meters of their property to add to the existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.
Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of
easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed
the complaint for there is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was
affirmed by the CA thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of
right-of-way
RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be
demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if
there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar,
although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must
literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods.
When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over
adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed
as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant
estate. Art. 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which
is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate …” To grant the additional easement of right
of way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land
occupied plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.
107 SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO.- Easement and Servitudes
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if they
are possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or
mortgaged separately.
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Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
(Merger, which presupposes ownership, is not possible.)
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in the
vicinity of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior
owner. In the deed of sale between Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved
as an easement of way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title stating among other
things "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall
be placed thereon; and (7) that the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed
shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage
purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof”
The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates)
made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until
sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates
that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private
respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has
been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon
the purchase of the property from its former owner.
CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not
impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title
to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.
Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong
and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any
event, the intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the
sale.
[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in question,
which it granted subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged
separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both
1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley was not
included in the sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement. As a
mere right of way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley
–– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise
put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude,
the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private
respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full
ownership of both estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In
a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Thus, merger could not have been possible.
108. QUIMEN V. CA- Easement
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will
not be the shortest.
FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in
Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of
Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the
extreme left of the road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina
Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s
adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public
road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way
on her adjoining property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter.
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public
highway a portion of anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the
21
use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located
directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store
of one brother, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence.
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia’s property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s
property facing the public highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending
inward by 1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in order to
reach the municipal road. The way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in
the middle.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right
of way through the brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting
through Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was
more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of
the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least
prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacia’s property.
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s property.
The court, however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad
faith when she resisted the claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite
the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She denies ever
promising Yolonda a right of way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of
way she provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the
dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling
reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots
suitable for the purpose.
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the
public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage
as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree,
and considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a
substantial earning from it.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial
to the parties
HELD: YES to both
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a
person or class of persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is surrounded
by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner
of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private
respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she
offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and
petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the
least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection
report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that “[t]he said
properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros
were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an
easement of right of way to the public highway.
> Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s property and held that there
existed an available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of
way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an
opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the
public highway.
CA’s finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right
of Anastacia’s property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying
the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the
records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of
way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut
down, the second alternative should be preferred.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.”

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

TC’s findings:

22

WEEK 3
109. LAO V. HEIRS OF ALBURO
PDF
110. CORTES vs. YU-TIBO- Easement of Light and View
FACTS:
Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiff’s wife has certain
windows on her property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the
plaintiffs hasn’t done any formal act prohibiting the owner of the house of the adjacent house
prohibiting them to make any improvements. Plaintiff claims that period of prescription
started when those windows were made and acknowledge by the owner of the adjacent lot.
Defendant however claims that there should be a formal act prohibiting them from doing a
certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?
RULING: NO.
GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall
a window or opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a
prescriptive title without the necessity of any active opposition because it always
presupposes the express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies
a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.
EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a
prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed
window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article
528, windows with "similar projections" include sheds.
The exception applies in this case because
1) what is concerned is a party wall;
2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes'
window (Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).
23
111. FABIE V. LICHAUCO
PDF
112. SAENZ V. FIGUERAS HERMANOS
G.R. L-No. 2085 August 10, 1909
TIBURCIO SAENZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FIGUERAS HERMANOS, defendant-appellee.
Antonio V. Herrero for appellant.
Espiridion Guanco for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that the plaintiff and the defendant own adjoining lots within the
municipality of Iloilo; that the defendant had constructed or was constructing a house of
strong materials upon its lot; that the line of the said house on the side toward the lot
belonging to the plaintiff was less than two meters from dividing line of the two lots; that the
said house was of two stories; that on the side of the house toward the lot of the plaintiff, the
defendant in the first story had placed three windows and in the second story had placed five
windows, each looking directly upon the lot of the plaintiff; and that the defendant had not
obtained the permission of the plaintiff to place the said windows and balconies in the
manner above indicated.
The defendant filed a general and a special denial. In its special denial the defendant alleged
that its house was being constructed in accordance with the law and customs of the place.
After the hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause, the lower court made
the following findings of fact:
The plaintiff's lot is now vacant but he intends to build a house thereon for business purposes,
and with that end in view has already deposited some lumber in said lot. The defendants
have constructed a two-story house on their lot, using the ground floor for stores, and the
upper floor as a dwelling. They have erected said house at a distance of 71 centimeters from
the dividing line at the front part, and at a distance of 70 centimeters at the rear. The house
of the defendants is being put to the use for which it was built. The defendants have opened
three windows on the ground floor of their house, in the part that overlooks the lot of the
plaintiff, each window being 1 meter and 20 centimeters wide and 2 meters high; on the upper
floor they have opened 5 windows, each 2 meters and 11 centimeters high and 1 meter and
60 centimeters wide; they have also constructed a balcony at the front part of the house above
the ground floor, opening directly upon the lot of the plaintiff, and another balcony at the
rear part of the house, which up to the present time opens directly upon the plaintiff's lot,
although the defendants state that, according to the plan, said part is to be closed with boards.
All of said windows are required for the proper lighting and ventilation of said house, and
for the circulation of air therein. The house of the defendants is 23 meters long and built
almost parallel to the dividing line between the plaintiff's lot and that of the defendants. All
of said windows and balconies are at a distance of less than one meter from the dividing line
of the plaintiff's lot and that of the defendants, and are looking directly over the same.
The plaintiff claims that, under articles 581 and 582 of the Civil Code, the defendant is
prohibited from constructing his house and opening the windows and balconies looking
directly upon his property in the manner above described, and prays that the court issue an
order directing the defendant to close said windows and that the said defendant be
prohibited perpetually from constructing openings in its house except in conformity with
said articles of the Civil Code.
The lower court, after a full consideration of the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause and after making the above findings of fact, concluded his sentence in the following
language:
In view of the circumstances mentioned above, and although I find that the windows of the
house come within the prohibition contained in article 582 of the Civil Code, I am of the
opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the judgment asked for, or for any other judgment
in his favor. Therefore, it is ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant for
the recovery of the costs herein. — (Signed) Henry C. Bates, judge of the Ninth Judicial
District.
From this sentence the plaintiff appealed.
No motion was made for a new trial in the court below. The plaintiff excepted only to the
judgment of the lower court, basing his objection upon the ground that the sentence of the
lower court was contrary to the provisions of said article 582, and in this court insists that he
has a right under said provisions of the Civil Code to have said windows closed and to have
the defendant prohibited from making openings in the side of the house overlooking his yard
except those openings provided for under said article.
Article 581 of the Civil Code is as follows:
ART. 581. The owner of a wall which is not a party wall, adjoining another's estate, may make
in it windows or openings to admit light, at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately
under the ceiling, of the dimensions of thirty centimeters square, and, in any case, with an
iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen.
24
However, the owner of the house or estate adjoining the wall in which the openings are made
may close them, if he acquires the part ownership of the wall and should there be no
agreement to the contrary.
He may also obstruct them by building on his land or raising a wall adjacent to that having
such opening or window.
Article 582 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ART. 582. Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over
the estate of the neighbor, can not be made if there is not a distance of, at least, two meters
between the wall in which they are built and said estate.
Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless there is a distance
of sixty centimeters.
The foregoing provisions of the Civil Code enumerate the conditions under which an
adjoining lot owner may enjoy the easement of light and view. These provisions are positive
and persons attempting to exercise easement of light and view upon property of adjoining
landowners are governed by its provisions. Said article 582 absolutely prohibits the
construction of windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting
over adjoining property, unless there is a distance of at least 2 meters between the wall in
which they are built and the adjoining property. The evidence adduced during the trial in the
court below was not brought here. Therefore, we are governed as to the facts by the findings
of the lower court. The lower court found that the distance between the wall of the house of
the defendant and the dividing line between the two lots was only 71 centimeters. The
defendant, therefore, has violated the provisions of said article 582 by building in his house
nearer the line of the property of the plaintiff than a distance of 2 meters.
Said article 581 provides the character of windows or openings in a wall adjoining the
property of another when such wall is constructed nearer the dividing line of the two
properties than 2 meters. In the present case the defendant constructed his house so that the
wall looking upon the property of the plaintiff was less than 2 meters from the dividing line.
He can, therefore, only construct such windows as are provided for in said article 581.
The lower court bases his conclusions largely upon the fact that the plaintiff had stood by
and permitted the defendant to construct, or partially construct, his house without having
made any objections, as well as the further fact that the plaintiff had received no damages
whatever except purely sentimental damages. The first ground would seem to imply that the
lower court was of the opinion that the plaintiff was estopped from insisting upon his rights
under the law, he having permitted the defendant to partially construct the house in the
manner above described. There is nothing in the decision of the lower court which shows
that the plaintiff at any time before the commencement of the present action knew that the
house of the defendant was being constructed in violation of the provisions of said above-
quoted articles. It was the duty of the defendant to construct his house in accordance with
the provisions of the law. The plaintiff was not obliged to stand by for the purpose of seeing
that the defendant had not violated the law. There are many cases where the doctrine of
estopped may be invoked against one who claims a right where he has stood by and either
expressly or tacitly given his consent to a violation of his right by another. This doctrine,
however, can not be invoked where the law imposes an express duty upon the other person
and prohibits him from the exercise of certain acts in a certain way. The defendant only can
blame himself for not constructing his house in the manner provided for by law under the
facts in the present case. (See decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 6, 1892; 4 Manresa,
734, 735, 736-739; 9 Alcubilla, 541.)
Under all of the facts and the law presented in the present case, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the defendant is not entitled to the easement of light and view which the windows
and openings, which he was made in the house in question, give him, and, because of the fact
that he has constructed his houses nearer than 2 meters to the dividing line between his
property and the property of the plaintiff, he is only entitled to the easement of light and view
provided for in said article 581 above quoted. Therefore, let a judgment be entered reversing
the judgment of the lower court with costs, and directing the defendants, within a period of
thirty days from the receipt of the notice of this decision, to close the said openings and
windows, in the said house, looking directly upon the property of the plaintiff. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
113. Amor v. Florentino
74 Phil. 404
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the
house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse
to Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey
structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window
of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a
negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any height that
would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death
of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied
HELD:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art.
624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by
25
two different persons and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not
revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription.
Art. 624 is acquisition by title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of
the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so
the law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amor’s
supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact,
had been established by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the
window.
114. Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
108 Phil. 888
Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one
person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed
on the first estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time
of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors,
windows which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of
sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement
between the two estates is established as a title.
FACTS:
The late Francisco Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several
lots. One lot was sold to Guillermo Tengtio, who sold to Vicente Uy Veza. Another lot with
a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was
sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for a
permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Tan Yanon opposed the
application for it would block his window and impair his right of light and view. Both the
provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building
permit to Gargantos. Tan Yanon then filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from
constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the
view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not
less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant,
and to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding
building permit to defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against
the property of petitioner Gargantos. -- YES

HELD:
Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who
introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house constructed on the first
estate extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale
of the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows
which serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that
the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between
the two estates is established as a title.
115. TAÑEDO v BERNAD- Extinguishment of Easement
An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different
persons is not a ground for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing it.
FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He
constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house,
bodega and a septic tank for common use of the occupants of the two lots.
Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Tañedo (pet). He also agreed that
should be decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Tañedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to
Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the
septic tank. He also asked Tañnedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot B.
Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted
that he had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses
Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC
dismissed the complaint and the cross claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the
land and its subsequent sale to different owners.
RULING: NO.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is
continued by operation of law as provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or
extinguishment was provided in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of
26
the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot
impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.
116. CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs, vs.THE CITY OF
MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants. G.R. No. L-3144
November 19, 1907
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, for plaintiffs.
Modesto Reyes, for defendants.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The defendants' demurred to the amended complaint having been overruled, an answer was
presented, and the trial of the case proceeded with.
Briefly, the subject of this action may be stated as follows:
1. That on the 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the
Escolta, district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal
of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of 23.50 meters, the total area of the ground being
658.19 square meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G. Dieck, the defendant herein, for
a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall
of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land
belongs exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the
plaintiff to build the terrace.
2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the
30th of said month and year, and it also was denied.
3. That, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied
is because "the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without
any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of
the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the
plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes
as the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said
strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly
and peacefully during more than seventy years."
4. That the strip in question was occupied by a two-storey building constructed more than
seventy years ago.
It appears from the evidence:

First. That the plaintiff's ownership of the whole ground and of the strip in question is beyond
all doubt, both by reason of her title thereto and the entry thereof in the registry of property,
and by the acknowledgment thereof made by the city itself when obtaining by means of
condemnation proceedings a portion of the same property adjoining the public road.
Second. That as a matter of fact, the license which the plaintiff, using her right of ownership,
requested for the construction of a terrace on the strip of 3 meters adjoining the canal of San
Jacinto or Sibacon, was denied; both parties agreeing that the denial was due to the intent to
reserve the said strip for the establishment of a public easement, although the opposing
witnesses did not agree as to the special easement intended to be established.
Third. That it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not been
expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter
offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.
Fourth. That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the
said strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter
for shipwrecked persons and for fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips
along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing through the
canal; that a building line has been established by the Municipal Board along the Sibacon
Creek leaving a strip of 3 meters within which, according to ordinances, no constructions
would be permitted; that such is the purpose and the intent on which the existing ordinances
are based. But John Tuther, the secretary of the Municipal Board, declares that, when
Ordinance No. 78 was under discussion, he does not recall having heard any of the members
of the board make reference to a towpath nor did he ever hear anything said with reference
to the purpose to which the strip of 3 meters mentioned in Ordinance No. 78 was to be
devoted, though he believes that, by thus leaving a strip of 3 meters, it would be easier to
prevent collisions; that it would facilitate navigation, and that it had never been the intention
of the Board to indemnify the owners of such strips of 3 meters by reason of the use which
parties landing thereon may make of the same.
Fifth. That, as stated in the brief of the defendants, "the intention of the Municipal Board,
when denying the permit asked for by the plaintiff, has never been to establish any way
whatever along the Sibacon Creek so that said plaintiff could, if she chose to, close her
property with walls or the like perpendicularly to said creek, that is, over the two lines
perpendicular to said creek, provided she does not close or build over the 3-meter space
running along the creek," which space is subject, as stated in the evidence submitted by the
defendants, to the "easement of public use for the general interest of navigation, flotation,
fishing, and salvage," citing the Law of Waters and the Civil Code.
Sixth. And that the result is, according to No. 19 of the statement of facts of the complaint,
"that the plaintiff shall only be able to use said strip in the same manner and for the same
27
purposes as the general public, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of
said strip of the ground which the plaintiff and the former owners of the same have enjoyed
as such owners quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years."
What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy,
use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time
when they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants
prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance
of their own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters and of
the Civil Code in force.
In the decision entered by this court on the 5th of May, 1906, regarding the demurrer, the
following was set forth:
The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866,
is developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of
which the easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for
flotation, by article 162; for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them
the owner of the riverside property supports the easement "upon being previously
indemnified for loss and damage." (Folio 41.)
Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of
navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted;
therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the right of the owner of the property bordering
upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the public right; on the contrary he should
only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general interest, but not without
prior, or subsequently indemnity. (Folio 43.)
If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal
— let us grant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority — and
that under the name of a public wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a
towpath, which is the smallest, it must be remembered that the law does not grant it along
navigable canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the establishment thereof must be preceded by
the corresponding indemnity. (Arts. 154 and 157.)
The matter at issue herein being the enforcement of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code,
it is not out of place nor untimely, even now, to point out the administrative law which ought
to have been applied had this act of the city of Manila been carried out by the late
ayuntamiento during the former sovereignty; an administrative law which, owing to its
having been so often repeated, is now raised to the rank of an incontrovertible principle of
law on the matter.
The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of new easements upon
private property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven
usurpation exists. (Decision of January 23, 1866.) lawphil.net
Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an easement upon private property; therefore,
any order thus given can not be held to have been issued in the exercise of their lawful
powers. (Decision of July 28, 1866.)
Administrative action for the recovery of a public easement which has been usurped by a
constructive work of private ownership can only be taken when such usurpation is of recent
date and easily proven.
When real rights are concerned an ayuntamiento may prosecute such actions as it may
consider itself entitled to, for the possession or ownership in accordance with law. (Decision
of October 26, 1866.)
This doctrine will be found far more vigorous at present upon reference to the principles of
the law now in force.
According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one shall be deprived of his property, except
by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper
indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually
restore possession to the injured party.
Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the
Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; and the due process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is,
according to the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicial authority. The refusal to
grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of
property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without previously indemnifying him
therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law.1awphil.net
And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object
thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to
prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use
which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property
condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant
by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no
other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary
restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is
invested. The question involved here is not the actual establishment of an easement which
might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is
beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection
28
with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real
rights which are attached to the right of ownership.
When . . . any corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he
is entitled and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, and the court, on trial, finds the allegations of the complaint to be true, it
may, if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law,
render a judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant, commanding him,
immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec 222.)
Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as
city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue a license in
favor of the plaintiff herein, Doña Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as
aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification as per Exhibit A, the said defendants
to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur
117. LUNOD V. MENESES
PDF
118. SALAZAR V. GUTIERREZ
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119. RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement and Servitude
The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct
and a dam on the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto
upon the plaintiff by virtue of prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a
corresponding servitude.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water
brought from a river through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This
was by virtue of an easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty
years. On the land of the defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face
which was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or
less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.
One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the
drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam
was destroyed the plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because
of the escape of the water resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise
his crop. Defendants claim that the plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by the
aqueduct of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in May). It was also alleged that
the plaintiff suffered no damage by the destruction of the dam, because all the lands of
plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of water from the aqueduct are of the class known
as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or September), and the destruction of the dam in
May and the consequent failure of water in the aqueduct at that period did not, and could
not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper cultivation of his lands.
Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish the existence of the
servitude in the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for
the maintenance of the aqueduct and dam in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.
HELD:
Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants were
outrightly disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact.
However, the Court ruled that there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct
and the dam had been in existence for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had
exercised its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the plaintiff since his
(plaintiff's) land is situated higher than defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants had
the right to open the gates of the dam to prevent destructive overflow upon their land, this
does not give them the right to stop the flow of water altogether.
29
WEEK 4
120. Mateo Cariño vs The Insular Government (March 1907)
8 Phil. 150 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Ancestral Domain – Ancestral Land Claim
Political Law – Regalian Doctrine
In February 1904, Mateo Cariño filed a claim before the Court of Land Registration praying
that he be granted title over a 40 hectare land in the then town of Baguio, Province of Benguet.
The government filed its opposition as it averred that Cariño or his predecessors in interest
did not continuously, exclusively, and adversely possessed the said parcel of land. Cariño
interposed that he and his ancestors had been in possession over said parcel of land since
time immemorial. And that in 1901, Cariño filed a claim under the mortgage law over said
parcel of land.
The government maintained that whatever right Cariño and his predecessors had over the
said parcel of land, the same had already prescribed by reason of their failure to register their
title during the Spanish Era. Under Spanish Law (specifically, a decree issued in 1880), a land
privately held, if not registered, shall revert back to the public (regalian doctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Cariño’s claim must be granted.
HELD: No. Cariño was not able to support his claim. As a rule, a parcel of land, being of
common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to
perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the
possession of the same pass from the State.
The parcel of land being contested here was not part of the lands disposed off during the
Spanish Era. The last disposition made by the Spanish government was in 1894. The lands
disposed in 1894 did not include the land being claimed by Cariño hence, said land is
presumed to belong to the State.
It is true that the American Government (which was then ruling the Philippines at the time
of this case) provided that prescription may favor a land claimant but only in instances where
the Spanish Government has allowed the claimant to cultivate an unappropriated land. There
was no showing that Cariño or his predecessors in interest were allowed to cultivate said
land (title of egresion or title of composicion). In short, Cariño or his predecessors in interest
failed to show that they were able to comply with the legal requisites for them to acquire title.
His claim of title under the mortgage law is only possessory. He must wait for twenty years
to lapse before such can ripen to ownership.

122. ATOK BIG WEDGE MINIG V. IAC
Facts:
Subject Land-41,296 square meterssituated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon, Benguet.
Parties:
A. ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY (claiming that the said parcel of land is a
mineral land.)
B. TUKTUKAN SAINGAN (claiming that the said parcel of land is agricultural.)
Contentions:
Atok- they contended that the said parcel of land was being registered in the office of
Mining Recorder in 1921 and 1931 pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. It is about sixteen years
before TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for taxation purposes and thirty four (34)
years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in 1965. They also
showed the payment of annual assessment fees for the said land since 1931.
Tuktukan- who was 70 years old at the time he testified shows that he acquired the land
from his father-in-law, Dongail, when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old;
that at the time of his acquisition, it was planted with camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee
and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present; that he has been
paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never
disturbed in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, applicant [Tuktukan] submitted
tax declarations x x x both dated March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for
urban land and improvement therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the said parcel of land is a mineral land or an agricultural land.
History of mining Act
1. Spanish Mining Law of 1867
2. Philippine Bill Of 1902 (American time) when the subject land had been registered
3. Commonwealth Act No. 137 (under the1935 Constitution)
4. Executive Order 141 (Pres. Marcos 1968)
5. President Decree No. 1214 (1977)
All of the mining acts have a common provision which is the annual performance of labor
or undertaking of improvements on the mine.
Held:
The SC ruled in favor of the Tuktukan in the reasons that:
A. Tuktukan have proven that he had in possession of the said land in a concept of an
owner, continuously, open and uninterruptedfor a period of more than 30 years.
B. He had improve almost 90% of the said parcel of land.
C. He had paid tax declaration of the said land since 1948 up to present.
30
It is evident that Atok had registered the land prior than Tuktukan but still the SC ruled in
favor ofTuktukan for the reasons:
A. Payment of annual assessment fee is not enough proof. There must be an annual
performance of labor or undertaking of improvements in the mine.
B. When an ocular survey was made, it was evident that there was No improvements being
made in the said land and there is any sign of mining had happened in the land. Hence, the
petition is DENIED.
123. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
124. NPC Vs. Ibrahim
Facts:

Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del Norte.
In 1978, NAPOCOR took possession of the sub-terrain area of the land and constructed
underground tunnels on the said property.
The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao
and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus projects.
In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim) requested Marawi City Water District for
a permit to construct or install a motorized deep well on the parcel of land but it was rejected
on the grounds that the construction would cause danger to lives and property by reason of
the presence of the underground tunnels.
Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages and to vacate the sub-terrain portion of
the land.
Issue: WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the land.
If yes, are they entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim.
The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner of a
parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. xxx
Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
Therefore, Ibrahim owns the property as well as the sub-terrain area of the land where the
underground tunnels were constructed.
On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be paid
a just compensation.
Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep wells but was
prevented from doing so by the authorities because of the construction of the tunnels
underneath the surface of the land.
Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have
excavated the same for the construction of the deep wells. It has been shown that the
underground tunnels have deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and
considerably reduced its value.
It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the
property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This
31
is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of their property except
by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
125. San Lorenzo Development Corp. vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 124242 Jan. 21, 2005
Facts:
On Aug. 20, 1986, Spouses Miguel Lu and Pacita Zavalla purportedly sold two parcels of land
torespondent Pablo Babasanta at P15/sq.meter. Downpayment worth P50,000 was made by
Babasanta as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu. Babasanta paid a
total of P200,000.In May 1989, Babasanta, in a letter, demanded the execution of a final deed
of sale in his favor, and has informed the spouses through he same letter that he received info
that the spouses has sold the same parcels of land to another without his knowledge and
consent.Pacita Lu responded through a letter that though she agreed to sell, when the balance
became dueand when she refused the price reduction he requested, Babasanta backed out of
the sale and claimed that she returned the sum of P50,000 to Babasanta through Eugenio
Oya.Babasanta then filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Spouses Lu claiming that the lands had been sold to him. Spouses Lu in their answer
claimed that Pacita had originally obtained loans from Babasanta and had transformed the
loan intoa contract to sell without Miguel Lu’s knowledge and consent. They further claim
that Babasanta failed to pay the balance despite repeated demands, and when Babasanta’s
request for price reduction was denied, that he rescinded the contract.San Lorenzo
Development Corp filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that it has legal interest in the
subject because the subject lands were sold to it, with the Spouses Lu executing in its favoran
Option ti Buy, and subsequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale after paying P632,320. The
certificates if title were then delivered to SLDC by the spouses.The RTC upheld the sale of
the property to SLDC and ordered the Spouses Lu to pay Babasanta P200,000 with legal
interest plus P50,000.Babasanta and the Spouses Lu appealed said decisionThe CA reversed
the lower court’s decision, and declared that the sale between Babasanta and the spouses Lu
was valid.
Issues:
Whether or not there was delivery in the contract of sale between Babasanta and the Spouses
Lu?
Whether or not Babasanta acquired ownership over the land?
Held:
1. No. 2 modes of delivery: (1) “Actual delivery which consists in placing the thing sold in
the control and possession of the vendee”, and (2) “Legal or constructive delivery which
maybe had through any of the following ways: the execution of a public instrument
evidencing the sale; symbolical tradition such as the delivery of the keys of the place where
the movable sold is being kept; traditio longa manu or by mere consent or agreement if the
movable sold cannot yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of the sale;
traditio brevi manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the sale; and
traditio constitutum possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the property in
a different capacity.”There was neither Actual nor constructive delivery. Babasanta did not
take possession at any time after the perfection of the sale in his favor or exercised acts of
dominion over it despite his assertions that he was the rightful owner of the lands, thus no
actual delivery. The agreement was also not embodied in a public instrument, nor in any
other manner provided for in order to have constructive delivery.
3. No. Ownership is only transferred to the vendee upon its delivery to said
vendee.“even on the assumption that the perfected contract between the parties was
a sale, ownership could not have passed to Babasanta in the absence of delivery, since
in a contract of sale ownership is transferred to the vendee only upon the delivery of
the thing sold.”“Sale is not a mode but merely a title. A mode is the legal means by
which dominion or ownership is created, transferred or destroyed, but title is only
the legal basis by which to affect dominion or ownership. Contracts only constitute
titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition
is the mode of accomplishing the same. Therefore, sale by itself does not transfer or
affect ownership; the most that sale does is to create the obligation to transfer
ownership. It is tradition or delivery, as a consequence of sale, that actually transfers
ownership.”
126. EQUATORIAL V. MAYFAIR- Sale of Land
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is
nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at Claro M.
Recto Avenue, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.
On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20
years. The lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey building
with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which respondent used as Maxim Theater.
Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo for
another portion of the latter’s property this time, a part of the second floor of the two-storey
building, and two store spaces on the ground floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another
movie house known as Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of
20 years.
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject
properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties
32
were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers,
without their first being offered to Mayfair.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and
Equatorial.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning the CA decision.
What happened is that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and
asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for 11 million bucks.
Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less
847grand withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for
Execution, Equatorial demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable compensation for
the Mayfair’s continued use of the subject premises after its lease contracts expired.
Remember that Mayfair was still occupying the premises during all this hullabaloo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the
fruits and rentals.
HELD:NO.
Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was failure
to deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even
rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time of the
perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the
owner of the property during that period.
We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, “one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.”
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of
the thing to him “in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.”
This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. There is delivery
if and when the thing sold “is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.”
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It
is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery of property or title, and transfer
of control or custody to the buyer.
Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.
127. UNION MOTOR CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JARDINE-MANILA
FINANCE, SPOUSES BERNAL
FACTS
On Sep. 14, 1979, respondent Sps. Bernal purchased from Union Motor Corporation (UMC)
1 Cimarron Jeepney for P37,758 to be paid in installments. For this, Sps. Bernal executed a
promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage in favor of UMC. Meanwhile, UMC entered
into a contract of assignment of the promissory note and chattel mortgage with respondent
Jardine-Manila Finance (JMF). Through Sosmeña, an agent of UMC, the Sps. Bernal would
pay the amount of the promissory note to JMF being the assignee of UMC. To effectuate the
sale as well as the assignment, Sps. Bernal were required to sign a notice of assignment, a
deed of assignment, a sales invoice, a registration certificate, an affidavit, and a disclosure
statement. The ps. Bernal were obliged to sign for the reason that, according to Sosmeña, it
was requirement of UMC and JMCF for the Sps. Bernal to accomplish all documents in order
to have their application approved. Upon the Sps. Bernal’s tender of downpayment of
P10,037, and UMC’s acceptance of the same, UMC approved the sale. Although the Sps.
Bernal have not yet physically possessed the vehicle, Sosmeña required them to sign the
receipt as a condition for the delivery of the vehicle. Sps. Bernal continued paying the
installments even if the vehicle remained undelivered inasmuch as JMF promised to deliver.
Sps. Bernal paid a total of P7,507 before they discontinued paying on account of non-delivery
of the vehicle. According to Sps. Bernal, the reason why the vehicle was not delivered was
due to the fact that Sosmeña allegedly took the vehicle in his personal capacity. On Sep. 11,
1981, JMF filed a complaint for a sum of money against Sps. Bernal before the CFI Manila.
The case was later transferred to RTC Makati, the complaint was amended to include UMC
as alternative defendant, the reason that if Sps. Bernal’s reason for non-payment was UMC’s
failure to deliver, UMC should pay. Sps. Bernal filed an answer with cross-claim against
UMC and counterclaim against JMF.
RTC:
(1) JNF to pay Sps. Bernal P7,507 plus legal interest
(2) UMC to pay Sps. Bernal the downpayment of P10,037 plus interest
(3) UMC to pay JNF P23,238 plus interest and attorney’s fees
33
(4) UMC to pay Sps. Bernal 20,000 as moral damages, 10,000 as atty.’s fee
CA:
Affirmed the RTC’s decision
ISSUE
WON there has been a delivery, physical or constructive, of the vehicle
HELD –
NO Sps. Bernal did not come into possession of the vehicle that was supposed to be delivered
to them by UMC. The registration certificate, receipt and sales invoice that they signed were
explained during the hearing. According to testimonial evidence, the said documents were
signed as a part of the processing and for the approval of their application to buy the vehicle.
Without such signed documents, no sale, much less delivery, of the vehicle could be made.
The documents were not therefore an acknowledgement of the physical acquisition of the
vehicle but merely a requirement of UMC so that the vehicle would be delivered to them.
The SC has held that the issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership to
the buyer; an invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and
cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale.
The registration certificate signed does not conclusively prove that constructive delivery was
made or that ownership has been transferred to Sps.Bernal. Like the receipt and the invoice,
the signing of the registration certificate was qualified by the fact that it was a requirement
for the sale to be approved. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery,
actual or constructive, should be couple with the intention of the delivering the thing.
Without such intention, there is no delivery. The critical factor in the different modes of
effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to
deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee.
In Addision vs. Felix, the SC held that in order that symbolic delivery may produce the effect
of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had control over the thing sold, that, at
the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer
ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in the vendee’s control.
When there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient. But if, despite the execution of instrument, the purchaser cannot have
the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through
another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition
of another will, then fiction yields to reality –the delivery has not been effected.
Here, the act of signing the registration certificate was not intended to transfer ownership of
the vehicle as UMC still needed the same for the approval of the financing contract with JMF.
Inasmuch as there was neither physical nor constructive delivery of a determinate thing, the
thing sold remained at the selle r’s risk.
UMC should therefore bear the loss of the vehicle after Sosmeña allegedly stole the same.
UMC’s reliance on the Chattel Mortgage Contract does not help its assertion that ownership
has been transferred since there was neither delivery nor transfer of possession.
Consequently, this contract has no legal effect inasmuch as the Sps. Bernal are not the
absolute owners thereof, ownership of the mortgagor being an essential requirement of a
valid mortgage contract.
Lastly, Sps. Bernal presented sufficient evidence to prove that Sosmeña took delivery and
possession of the vehicle in his personal capacity as shown by a document on which he
personally acknowledged the receipt of the registration certificate from JMF. Also, it was
proven that Sps. Bernal went several times to UMC to demand the vehicle.
DISPOSITIVE: CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, moral damages is deleted.
128. LEONARDO OSORIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.TOMASA OSORIO, administratrix of
the estate of Petrona Reyes, and THE YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendants-
appellants. G.R. No. L-16544 March 30, 1921
Fernandez and Ansaldo for appellants.
Carlos Ledesma for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the
dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the inventory of the properties of
the deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose estate is administered by the defendant. The
facts of this case are:
D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for the
exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of the one-third of the company's
capital. This capital amounted to P500,000, of which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged
to D. Antonio Osorio. Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa
Osorio, then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition, and
said administratix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs, among the
properties which belonged to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part
in the "share of the estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over
P166,666.66, which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime.
The project of partition was approved on May 10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, which had cognizance of the testamentary and
administration proceedings of the state of the deceased Osorio.
34
On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also
deceased, executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor
of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-half of her share in the one-
third part which belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a
donation which was duly accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said
document with the plaintiff. On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of D. Antonio Osorio
was not yet distributed among his heirs, and the donor Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct
the error in said document, wherein it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part
of her conjugal property, when the partition was yet being effected, executed another
document dated July 3, 1915, maintaining said donation in effect in the sense that she ceded
and donated to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, for the same reasons stated in the document of
February 28, 1914, al interest or participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.,
which was adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, which
division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May 10, 1915.
After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate, Ynchausti &
Co. purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio
as having an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer.
It was agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow
of Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti
Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum
was deposited with the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had
arisen between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the
plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is
the owner of said shares and of their value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand
contends that said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs
of Da. Petrona Reyes. Such as the facts which gave rise to this litigation.
The trial court rendered judgment in the case, declaring that the 610 shares of stock in dispute
and their dividends belong to the plaintiff, and ordered the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio,
administratrix of the estate of Da. Petrona Reyes, to exclude them from the inventory and her
accounts, and the other defendant "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." to inscribe them in the
name of the plaintiff D. Leonardo Osorio, delivering to him the dividends corresponding
thereto, and denied the counterclaim for the sum of P45,000, on the ground that said sum
represents the dividends corresponding to the P94,000 adjudicated to Da. Petrona Reyes, in
the partition of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, and donated by her to the defendant in the
counterclaim.
The case having been appealed to this court, counsel for the defendant and appellant, in
summing up their arguments in support of the errors assigned in their brief, maintain the
two following propositions:
1. The donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was of no value and effect;
and
2. That, supposing said donation valid, the 610 shares of stock, the value of which is P61,000,
cannot be considered as included among them.
The document of donation dated February 28, 1914, attacked by the appellant, is as follows:
Know all me by these presents: That I, Petrona Reyes, of age, widow of D. Antonio Osorio
and resident of the Province of Cavite, Philippine Islands, being in possession of all my
senses, freely and voluntarily state:
1. That my husband, the deceased D. Antonio Osorio, was a shareholder to the extent of one-
third in the joint account association "Ynchausti & Co." of this place, which is engaged in the
business of buying vessels and in the exploitation of six steam vessels acquired from the
Compañia Maritima, the article of association of said joint account association having been
executed in the city of Manila on July 3, 1906, before the notary public D. Florencio Gonzales
Diez.
2. That upon the death of my husband D. Antonio Osorio and upon the partition of his estate,
there was adjudicated to me as conjugal property, one-half of said one-third part in the
business referred to, the other half thereof going to our four surviving children, such being
the present condition of our interest in said company.
3. That in consideration of the continuous services and attention received by me from my son
D. Leonardo Osorio, of age, married and a resident of Cavite also, and because of the affection
he has always shown and still shows me, as well as because of the number of children that
he has, I make a free and expressed donation to my said son D. Leonardo Osorio of all my
interest and participation in said company "Ynchausti and Co." which is neither transferred
nor burdened in any manner whatever.
4. I also declare that the present donation does not in any way prejudice the right which may
accrue to my other children with respect to inheriting my property and that therefore I can
effect this donation, with all liberty, as I reserve for myself what is sufficient for me to live on
in the manner which corresponds to my social position and needs.
5. In turn, I, Leonardo Osorio, of age, married and a resident of the Province of Cavite, state
my conformity and acceptance of said donation which my dear mother makes to me, for
which I am greatly thankful to her.
In witness whereof we sign the present document in triplicate at Manila, Philippine Islands,
this twenty-eighth day of February, nineteen hundred and fourteen.
35
(Sgd.) PETRONA REYES.
LEONARDO OSORIO.
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) EUSEBIO ALBA.
SALVADOR BARRIOS.
Acknowledged before the notary public D. Florencio Gonzales Diez on February 28, 1914.
The document rectifying the ratifying the preceding is literally as follows:
Know all men by these presents: That I, Petrona Reyes, of age, widow of D. Antonio Osorio
and resident of the Province of Cavite, Philippine Islands, being in the full possession of my
senses, freely and voluntarily declare:
1. That on February 28, 1914, before the notary public of Manila, D. Florencio Gonzales Diez,
I executed a document of donation in favor of my son D. Leonardo Osorio, of one-half of the
one-third part which my deceased husband had in certain shipping business of the
association "Ynchausti & Co."
2. That in said document I stated, through error, that said half of one-third part of the business
referred to was adjudicated to me as my part of the conjugal property in the partition of the
properties left by my deceased husband, when the truth was that said partition had not yet
been put in proper form or finished.
3. That in order to correct said error, I so state, declaring however in any event that I make
said donation subsisting in the sense that I cede and donate to my side son D. Leonardo
Osorio, in consideration of the same causes mentioned in said document of February 28, 1914,
all interest or share in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. which was adjudicated to
me in the partition of the estate of my deceased husband, and approved by the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, on May 10, 1915.
In witness whereof I sign the present document in triplicate of Cavite on July 3, 1915.
(Sgd. by):
PETRONA REYES.
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) CARLOS LEDESMA.
ISAURO GABALDON.
In support of the first proposition, the appellant invokes as the legal provision violated,
article 635 of the Civil Code, which says:
A donation can not include future property.
By future property is understood that of which the donor can not dispose at the time of
making the donation.
Commenting on article 635 of the Civil Code, Manresa says, among other things:
To close these fundamental ideas which the spirit of articles 634 and 635 develops we must
fix our attention to the definition which the Code gives of future properties. They are those
of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of making the donation. This definition in
reality includes all properties which belong to others at the time of the donation, although
they may or may not later belong to the donor, thus connecting two ideas which, although
lacking apparently in relation, are merged in reality in the subject which we examine and
which gives assurance to their application. Article 635 refers to the properties of third persons
but it may be said that id does so in relation to a time to come; there can be properties which
may latter belong to the donor; but these properties cannot be donated, because they are not
at present his properties, because he cannot dispose of them at the moment of making the
donation. The usufructuary for life or for a determined number of years of a vineyard may
donate said usufruct to the whole extent that it belongs to him but never the property itself.
The bare owner of said vineyard may donate his right of course; but he may also donate the
usufruct which corresponds to the time that it will go back to him, because the case refers to
a vested right of which he may dispose at the time of the donation.
It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on
February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio,
which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right
to all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co.
Carefully examining said article 635 of the Civil Code, in relation to the worthy opinion of
the commentator Manresa, we believe that the future properties, the donation of which is
prohibited by said article, are those belonging to other, which, as such, cannot be the object
of the disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance as those of the case
at bar, cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs who through a
fiction of law continue the personality of the owner. Nor do they have the character of future
property because the died before 1912, his heirs acquired a right to succeed him from the
moment of his death, because of the principle announced in article 657 and applied by article
661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
36
his death. More of less time may elapse before the heirs enter into the possession of the
hereditary property, but this is not an obstacle, for the acquisition of said property retroacts
in any event to the moment of death, according to article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is
acquired although subject to the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.
Furthermore the Civil Code does not prohibit absolutely that future inheritance should be
the object of agreement, for there are certain cases (arts. 177, 827, 831, and 1331) in which
agreements may be made as to them, beside that indicated in article 1271, and it may be
deduced that an inheritance already existing, which is no longer future from the moment of
death of the predecessor, may legally be the object of contract. A donation being of a
contractual nature, inasmuch as for its efficacy the concurrence of two wills is required, that
of the donor and the donee, we believe that which may be the object of contract may also be
the object of a donation. Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis dispositio. We conclude that
the donor Da. Petrona Reyes, on February 28, 1912, and could legally dispose of her right
through an act of liberality, as she had done.
With respect to the point that Da. Petrona Reyes did not have in 1914 any right to all or part
of the share of her deceased husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti and Co., it must
be observed that in the project of partition of the property of D. Antonio Osorio the following
appears:
The widow of the testator, Maria Petrona Reyes, her children Feliza, Tomasa, and Leonardo
and her granddaugther Soledad Encarnacion Osorio y San Agustin are at present all living
and are the only heirs of the deceased.
The testator declares that all property left by him was acquired during his marriage with
Petrona Reyes.
The testator institutes as his only and universal heirs his said children and granddaugther,
designates the parts which each of them must receive as legitime, betterment, and legacy,
leaves to the disposition of his widow and amount equivalent to that set aside by him in
payment of one-half part of the conjugal property and orders that the remainder should be
equally distributed among his heirs.
We do not have before us the will of D. Antonio Osorio but supposing that he had left no
property but the share which he had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., can it be
denied that the donor by law had the right to half of said share as her part of the conjugal
property? Clearly not. The defendant in her answer says:
That Da. Maria Petrona Reyes did not donate to the plaintiff more that her share in the
shipping business of the firm Ynchausti & Co. which was adjudicated to her in the partition
of the property of D. Antonio Osorio and that said share amounts to P94,000.
This admission of the defendant is conclusive, and makes it unnecessary for us to enter into
another discussion in order to deduce that Da. Petrona Reyes had in 1914 a right to a certain
part of the interest of the deceased Osorio in the shipping business of the firm Ynchausti &
Co., and could donate it, as she did, to her son D. Leonardo Osorio.
The allegation that the document of July 3, 1915, is void, because it does not show the
acceptance of the donee, is of no importance, because of the conclusion we have reached in
discussing the document of donation of February 28, 1914. In the second document, the donor
only tried to correct what she believed to be an error in the first, wherein it is stated that in
the partition of the property of her husband there was adjudicated to her the part of the
interest in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. which she donated to her son Leonardo,
when in fact said partition was yet pending. After its approval by the Court of First Instance
of Cavite, the donor executed the document of 1915, ratifying and correcting the document
of donation. She did not make a new donation. She executed a personal act which did not
require the concurrence of the donee. It is the duty of the donee, in order that the donation
may produce legal effect, to accept to the donation and notify the donor thereof. The
acceptance is necessary because nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will. And
all this was complied with in the document of 1914. The wills of the donor and of the donee
having concurred, the donation, as a mode of transferring ownership, becomes perfect,
according to article 623 of the Civil Code.
We will not pass to the second proposition of the appellant, that is, that the 610 shares, which
are the subject matter of the suit, cannot be considered as included in the donation made by
Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff, supposing that said donation was valied. The
reasons alleged by the appellant are: (1) That the steam vessel Governor Forbes was
purchased after the death of D. Antonio Osorio, with money borrowed and furnished by the
heirs individually and not by the estate, and (2) that the plaintiff appellee has recognized that
the capital used in the steamer Forbes is distinct from the money used in the purchase of
other vessels in which the deceased Osorio had an interest.
The question whether the streamer Governor Forbes was or was not purchased with money
furnished by Ynchausti and the heirs of Osorio, indepedently of that former partnership in
which the deceased Osorio had an interest, is one of the fact and must be resolved in view of
the evidence adduced at the trial.
D. Julio Gonzales, secretary and accountant of the firm Ynchausti, witness for the defendant,
states that the Forbes was purchased with money which the shipping business of Unchaisti
& Co. had. The appellant herself admits that his vessel took part in the general shipping
business of Ynchausti & Co. for no new partnership was constituted for the purchase thereof,
and, after its acquisition the Ynchausti firm accounted to the estate of D. Antonio Osorio for
the profits obtained and the dividends to be distributed and no separate account was made
of the earnings of the vessel, but only a general account, including the profits obtained in the
shipping business, in which the Governor Forbes was but one of several vessels. D. Joaquin
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Elizalde, manager of the firm Ynchausti & Co., by agreement of the parties and with the
approval of the court, made a deposition before the notary public D. Florencio Gonzales Diez,
stating that when the steamer Forbes was acquired in 1912, the Ynchausti firm did not bring
in any new capital, but obtained money for its purchase by mortgaging the vessel itself and
other vesseles of the company; and that the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio did not bring in any
new capital for the purchase of the vessel, but signed jointly with Ynchausti & Co. with the
others, except Da. Soledad Osorio, the guaranty which the bank required.
In our opinion the evidence shows conclusively that the vessel Governor Forbes forms part
of the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. in which D. Antonio Osorio and his estate had
an interest. It is no argument against this conclusion that the heirs of Osorio signed with
Ynchausti & Co. the guaranty required by the bank where the money used in the purchase
of the Forbes was taken: (1) Because the guaranty is for the purpose only for securing the
payment of the amount indebted and not for excluding the estate of Osorio from the result
of that banking operation; (2) because, besides said guaranty, the other vessels of the joint
account association of Osorio and Ynchausti & Co. were mortgage; (3) because no new
partnership was formed between Ynchausti & Co. and the heirs of Osorio for the purchase of
the vessel Forbes; and (4) because, when Unchausti & Co. agreed with the heirs of Osorio in
that his share in the steamer Forbes was P108,333.33, this sum was distributed among said
heirs, including Da. Soledad Osorio who did not sign the guaranty, the accruing to each P11,
833.33 and to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes P61,000, which is the object of this suit.
All of the above shows that the estate of Osorio had a one-third part of the steamer Forbes
represented by the capital which was distributed among the heirs, there accruing to the
widow, by agreement of the interested parties, the sum of P61,000. And this sum being part
of the one-half of one-third of the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., which one-half part
accrued to the widow in the distribution of the properties of Osorio; and the widow Da.
Petrona Reyes having disposed of this half, donating it to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, it
clearly results, in our opinion, that the sum of 61,000, or the corresponding shares of the new
corporation "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." are included in said donation, and therefore
belong to the plaintiff-appellee.
The other reason alleged by the appellant in support of her contention is that the plaintiff has
recognized in his letter addressed to the defendant corporation, and inserted in the answer
presented by the latter that the Forbes was acquired with money different from that of the
joint account association theretofore mentioned. We have carefully read the letter in question
and what appears is that said plaintiff agreed that the P61,000 should be deposited with
Ynchausti & Co., as trustee, to be distributed with its accumulated dividends, when the
question between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes had already been terminated, that is to say,
according to the result of the present suit. There is nothing in said letter which indicates how
the Governor Forbes was acquired.
With respect to the counterclaim of P45,609,91, we are of the opinion that the evidence
justifies the conclusion of the trial court that they are the profits or dividends accruing to the
P94,000, which were adjudicated to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes in the distribution of the
estate of the deceased Osorio and which were donated by her to the plaintiff, and as such
profits they belong to the latter, upon the principle of law that ownership of property gives
right by accession to all that it produces, or is united or incorporated thereto, naturally or
artificially. (Art. 353 of the Civil Code.)
In view of what has been said, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
129. Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the
following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical
college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall
be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.
However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment
of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions.
The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated
property with another land owned by the latter.
Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of
petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions?
YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO
HELD:
1)Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the
event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the
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condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment
with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked &
all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail
of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no
more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a
mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation
up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation
as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it
is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all
purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the
heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
2)Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature &
circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration
thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the
court has fixed the period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However, this
general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of circumstances
existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no
need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would
serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him,
the obligee may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of
compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree recission.
130. DE LUNA VS. JUDGE ABRIGO- ONEROUS DONATION
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms
and conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically
revert to the donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna
“revived” the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following
terms and conditions:

1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from
the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a
Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint
with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated.
The Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied
with the conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete
construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years).
The heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation
of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement of a written contract)
RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are
governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general
rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in
Article 733 thereof which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation. However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific
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provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on
contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.
131. VDA DE TUPAS V RTC No. L-55800 | October 3, 1986 | Narvasa Provision
Article 900, NCC:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half.
Art. 1061, NCC:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Facts
August 20, 1978: Husband of petitioner Partenza Lucerna, Epifanio Tupas, died and left
Partenza as his only surviving compulsory heir
o Left a will dated May 18, 1976
The will listed 3 lots of the Sagay Cadastre (Negros Occidental) as his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these were no longer owned by him.
o Previously donated them a year before (August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation,
Inc, which had thereafter obtained a title on the lots
Petitioner claims that the donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance so
she filed asuit against Tupas Foundation in the CFI to have the donation declared inofficious
TC: Dismissed the complaint
Arguments
Petitioner: Petitioner Respondent (RTC) The donation left her little inheritance therefore it
should be declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime. Donation should be
reducible by one-half or such proportion as may be justified. The reduction should be
restored and reconveyed to her. Relied on Art 900 and Art 1061
Respondent: Art 900 is not applicable because the properties were no longer part of Tupas’
hereditary estate at the time of his death.
Since Tupas Foundation was a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation intervivos
made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art 1061.
Issue:
WN the donation is inofficious and can be reduced– YES
Ratio
A person’s prerogative to make donation is subject to certain limitations
 I.E. Art 752, CC: He cannot give by donation more than he can give by will.
o If he did so, what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed
inofficious and the donation is reducible to the excess (though without prejudice to its taking
effect in the donor’s lifetime or the donee’s appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art
771))
Claim of inofficious – claim that donor gave more than what was within his power to give
o Such a donation is also collationable
Collationable – value is imputed into the hereditary estate od the donor at the time of his
death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the
freely disposable portion of the estate
Although the language of Art 1061 seems to limit the collation only to compulsory heirs,
the established rule in Liguez v CA held that it also applies to donations to strangers.
Therefore, Tupas Foundation cannot assert that the donated property no longer formed
part of Tupas’ estate at the time of his death to prevent its being brought to collation
Collation contemplated and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos
ITC: The donation is collationable and made to a stranger. Since it is made to a stranger, it
should be chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor’s estate, to be reduced
insofar as inofficious (i.e. exceeds said portion and impairs legitime ofcompulsory heirs)
To find out WN its inofficious, recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil
Code (Art 908-910)
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in question must be measured
O If value doesn’t exceed the difference, then it must be allowed to stand
not impaired. Onappeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable
not an express prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are: Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)Art.
1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and
that it merely described the donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable
does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under the
provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent
donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s
intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption should be
applied.-MJ

O If it does, it’s innoficious as to the excess and must be reduced

If any excess is shown, it shall be reverted to the petitioner

Ruling:
Judgment REVERSED and petitioner entitled to so much of the donated property in question
as may be found in excess of the freely, disposable portion of the estate, REMAND to the TC

132. Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)

Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate.
When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and
filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on theground that certain properties
donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of
Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of
Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of
Donation “sa pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC
interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were

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