Carino V CHR

Facts: 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) decided to
undertake a "mass concerted actions" as a call for the government to negotiate the
granting of their demands. The teachers were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal. But the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. Thus, the CHR
complainants were administratively charged and were also preventively suspended for
ninety days and temporarily replaced. Later on, Cariño rendered a decision dismissing
said teachers. Some teachers filed a petition for certiorari with the trial court, and later on
to the Supreme Court. The respondent teachers complained to the Commission on Human
Rights. CHR sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance. Cariño filed a
motion to dismiss the case. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to
dismiss, The Court rendered a decision for the certiorari that it was lawful for Cariño to
issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively
suspend them. Then, CHR denied Cariño's motion to dismiss and ruled that the teachers
"were denied due process of law. Hence, this petition. The Commission on Human Rights
has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution and
made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case on the merits.

Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that
may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have. 

Villaluz v Zaldivar

Facts: Villaluz was nominated as chief of the Motor Vehicles Office. Then Villaluz took his
oath of office. In a letter, Roces, as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government of
the House of Representatives, informed the President of the findings made by his
Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by
Villaluz in the Motor Vehicles Office. Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner as
well as the complete revamp of the office. Later on, rhe then Executive Secretary Castillo
suspended petitioner, having thereupon created an investigating committee with the only
purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner, and to undertake the investigation
a prosecution panel was created and later on submitted its report to the President who
thereafter issued an Administrative Order decreeing the removal from office of petitioner;
that as a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as
acting administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed
the instant petition before this Court. Villaluz claims that the administrative proceedings
conducted was illegal because the charges preferred against him by Congressman Roces
were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260.

Ruling: Said proceedings having been commenced against petitioner upon the authority of
the Chief Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive
Order No. 370, series of 1941 which states that Administrative proceedings may be
commenced a government officer or employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office
concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under
oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the
complainant, the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take
action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant.
Villaluz, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and is such he can only be investigated and removed from
office after due hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint"

Ruiz v Drilon G.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992

Facts: President Corazon Aquino issued and order dismissing Eliseo Ruiz for cause from
his office as President of the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). Ruiz’s motions for
reconsiderations were denied. Ruiz filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals which sought to annul President
Aquino's order appointing a new CLSU President, as well as DECS Undersecretary Marina
Pangan's order directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The
Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. Eight days later, Ruiz filed with
the Supreme Court the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO
for the purpose of annulling, his dismissal, alleging that he was not informed of the findings
of the investigation conducted against him, well as of the orders of the Executive Secretary
denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. The Court did not issue the TRO
prayed for by petitioner. This petition made no mention of the petition with the Court of
Appeals. Later on, Ruiz disclosed to the Court the other judicial proceedings which he had
commenced in the CA. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit and finding the same to be a case of forum shopping. Petitioner
sought review of this decision with the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only
to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. There is no doubt that he
has been accorded his rights. The order made certain findings of fact on the basis of which
petitioner was removed from office. Those findings included the facts that petitioner
terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses,
undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without
the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; Ruiz directed the purchase at
uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm
owned by him; Ruiz executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor
of a company where he was holding a directorship; and he collected financial contributions
from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. These acts
constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the
public service. 

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

Facts: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said
Treaty. Later on, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S a request for the extradition of Mark Jiminez to the United States. Pending
evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to
Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S
Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall
have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request stating
that the Evaluation of the documents is not a preliminary investigation. They merely
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available. It is only after
the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition. Then, Jimenez filed with the RTC a
petition against petitioner for mandamus which the RTC directed the DOJ to maintain
status quo. Thus, Secretary of Justice filed a petition in the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is
to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented
to it, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. In the absence of a law
or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due
process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due
process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. The Court also
ruled that in a summary proceedings, although summary dismissals may be effected
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process
still operate. Private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute
or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the
organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the
deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised. Wherefore, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Pefianco V moral G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000

Facts: former DECS Secretary, Gloria, filed a complaint against respondent Moral, then
Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged
respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the
National Library which were under her control and supervision and keeping in her
possession, without legal authority and justification, some 41 items of historical documents
which were missing from the vaults of the National Library. Hearings on the complaint were
conducted then, Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the
administrative offenses and she was ordered dismissed from the government service with
prejudice to reinstatement. Respondent did not appeal the judgment. respondent filed a
Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report but it was denied.
Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action, but the
trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which the
appellate court sustaining the trial court. Thus, a petition in the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the
DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful
purpose to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. The Court held that a respondent in an
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of
any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled
only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accorded these rights. The Petition is Granted. 

Camara V municipal court of city and country of San francisco June 5, 1967 387 U.S. 523

Facts: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San
Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine
annual inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code. The inspector was
informed that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The
inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because
residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant
did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. The inspector
attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days later, and
again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons
ordering him to appear at the district attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a
few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were
again refused because they did not have a search warrant. A complaint was then filed
against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he
filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section “does not violate
Fourth Amendment rights because it ‘is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially
civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection
which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.’ ”

Ruling: In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such
searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the
reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless
searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing
inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to
obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained, and thus appellant was
unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the
inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord,
through the building's manager, but appellee does not contend that such consent was
sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant's premises. Assuming the facts to be as the
parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.

Salazar v achacoso G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

Facts: Rosalie Tesoro filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
charging petitioner Salazar for illegal recruitment. Having ascertained that the petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued
an order for the Closure of Salazar’s recruitment agency and the seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment. Later on, petitioner requested that the personal properties seized at her
residence be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Before POEA could answer, petitioner filed a petition
with the supreme Court.

Ruling: Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose
of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the
Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers. Later on, Mr. Marcos, promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well
which is now Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. Under the new Constitution, it is
only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Thus, the Secretary of Labor,
not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c),
of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We have held that a warrant
must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

Catura V CIR G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971

Facts: A complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, of
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, was filed alleging
that during the tenure of their office, petitioners were responsible for "unauthorized
disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various occasions demanding from
them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the
book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to
inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply.
Demands for the documents were subsequently made but again there was no response,
thus compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly
issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any
success. Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador ordered to require and direct petitioners to
deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's documents related to the
finances of the said labor union. There was a motion for reconsideration by Catura and
Salvador on the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which
moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. The order was
sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. Hence the petition to
the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court
concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with
internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate to
substantiate alleged violations may be found in the Industrial Peace Act. All that the
challenged order did was to require petitioners to "deliver and deposit" with respondent
Court all of its documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition. It cannot be
said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. The authority to
investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted
contrary to law. The power to investigate requires an inquiry into existing facts and
conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid
character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law.
It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to
assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of
union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the
means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the
power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners
entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made.

Evangelista v Jarencio G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

Facts: The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 and vested in the Agency
all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Later on, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to be and appear as witness. Instead of
obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed with the Court of First Instance a Petition for
prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
and assailed its legality which the Trial Court granted. The petitioners elevated the case to
the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5
which empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to
the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." To hold that the
subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions
would therefore imperil or inactivate the Agency in its investigatory functions.
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and
even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. The
purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge. It is
enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the
proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. The
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or
controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law
is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. Nothing then
appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico
Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the
Agency to issue. 

Office of the Court Administrator v Canque A.M. No. P-04-1830 June 4, 2009

Facts: Marissa Y. Ypanto filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque asked
from her the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos in exchange for the release of Jovencio
Patoc, and the dismissal of his criminal cases in court. The NBI operatives conducted an
entrapment operation wherein they arrested Canque after she received the amount of
P40,000.00. Thereafter, Informations for direct bribery and violation of Sec. 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in the Regional Trial Court. Also, auditors
from Cebu City, conducted the periodic audit on the cash and accounts of accountable
officers and found that Canque had a cash shortage. A letter of demand was sent to her to
produce the missing funds and to submit a written explanation. The Investigating Judge
found respondent Canque guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of
dismissal, with forfeiture of all her benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the
government service. the OCA recommended that the Investigation Report of Investigating
Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint be investigated anew upon finding that
Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel during the
investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process. Respondent
failed to comment. the Office of the Court Administrator found Canque liable for gross
neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal
from the service.

Ruling: The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings.
Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. A formal or trial-type hearing is not required. In the case at bar, despite
respondents protestations, the records readily show that she was afforded the opportunity
to present her side as she was directed to file her comment on the complaint. She was
notified of the hearing and was in fact present during the entire proceedings. As to the
issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent has failed to submit evidence in support of
her bare claims.

Carmelo v Ramos G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962

Facts: The Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate
the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits
Division of this Office." and named petitioner Carmelo as chairman of said committee. It
appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it in
connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on
whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear. Petitioner filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. The trial court
dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees
created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under
oath. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court about contempt applies only to
inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against
administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly
considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court agrees that the Mayor of
Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials and employees appointed by him
to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials of
employees may be justly and fairly exercised. But The Court do not agree that a
delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take
testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory
process of subpoena. Thus, in denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of
the Mayor of Manila, cannot delegate or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take
testimony, and to issue subpoenas.

Masangcay v COMELEC G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962

Facts: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was charged before the Commission on
Election with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and sample
ballots in violation of the instructions of said Commission inasmuch as he opened said
boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial
auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and
the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The
Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty
as charged. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence. Masangcay filed
a petition for review with the Supreme Court raising as main issue the constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well
as its members the power to punish acts of contempt, for it infringes the principle
underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our
constitutional form of government.

Ruling: When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power
to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The resolutions
which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt
was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or
ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution
of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact,
Masangcay was the one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution
of election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three boxes
containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in violation of the
instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the
presence of the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the
authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens'
Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and
procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for
contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its
decision is null and void.

Bedol v comelec G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009

Facts: National and Local elections were held. Bedol discharged his official functions to
canvass the Certificates of Canvass. Canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance
and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections
in his area. The Commission created the Task Force Maguindanao, tasked to conduct an
investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass in Maguindanao.
Bedol appeared before the Task Force and explained that the election paraphernalia, while
in his custody and possession, were stolen. But no written report was ever filed with the
Commission regarding the alleged loss. Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next
scheduled investigative proceedings, but Bedol failed to appear. Later on, Bedol came out
on national newspapers posted a challenge to file a case against him for the alleged
cheating. The COMELEC issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against
petitioner. Bedol was arrested on the basis of an Order of Arrest by the COMELEC after
petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings. Petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the
absence of a complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private party and that the
COMELEC was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner
argued that the COMELEC could not punish him for contempt. Cemelec found Bedol guilty
and denied reconsideration. Hence, Bedol filed a petition in the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-
judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings
and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the
opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. To withhold from the
COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose
of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear
during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents
which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to
attend the Task Force hearings.

Gaoiran v Alcala G.R. No. 150178. November 26, 2004

Facts: A complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner Gaoiran. Respondent
Castillejo charged Gaoiran with mauling him while he was performing his duties therein.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge
and Order of Preventive Suspension. The petitioner did not submit his counter-affidavit or
answer to the charges against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC a petition to restrain the
enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. Considering that the Gaoiran had
already served the suspension, the case was dismissed for being moot and academic. The
petitioner sought reconsideration contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath
and that he was not informed nor apprised of the complaint against him before. Thereafter,
the administrative complain was dismissed on the ground that the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo was not under oath. However, respondent Alcala, issued another
Resolution finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom. The petitioner then filed with the
RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged that respondent Alcala
committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the petitioner from the service
despite the fact that the administrative complaint against him had already been dismissed.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC. Aggrieved, Gaoiran filed a petition in the Supreme Court

Ruling: While the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not concededly verified,
appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner,
as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be
considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through
the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also
even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of the
Code of Ethical Conduct. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is
given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. After all, in
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.

Ang Tibay v CIR G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

Facts: Toribio Teodoro's claim there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc. But
National Labor Union avers that it is false and unsupported by the records and the
supposed lack of leather materials was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
National Labor Union also avers that the Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice
for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood. Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of Toribio Teodoro. Now
respondent National Labor Union prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court and is more an administrative
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling
the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. The fact, however,
that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements.

KMU v. Garcia

Facts: Then Secretary of DOTC, Orbos, issued a Memorandum Circular to then LTFRB
Chairman, Fernando, allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates above
and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. Fernando told Orbos that the
implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," and should be further
studied and evaluated. Then, Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines
(PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase which that LTFRB granted. Later on,
then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Prado issued a
Department Order defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services.
PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus
operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a
fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. KMU filed a petition before the
LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. The LTFRB issued one of the
assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari. KMU claims that the authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set
a fare range over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for
the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix
and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators.

Ruling: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise
vested with the same power. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative
agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. However,
nowhere under the provision of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike,
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount
to an undue delegation of legislative authority. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A
further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation
of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. (The policy of
allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result
not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding
public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day,
every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it
"necessary" to do so.)

PASEI v Torres G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

Facts: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino

housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Torres issued Department Order
No. 16, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
"Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took
over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA issued
Memorandum Circular No. 30, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. The POEA Administrator
also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, on the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for Hong Kong. Later on, PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul
the DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation alleging that the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars and that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are
contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive.

Ruling: Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities. The assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers
for overseas employment. The same fall within the "administrative and policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to
"restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police
power. Said Administrative Order merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's
business operations till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the
protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still
deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other
classes of Filipino workers for other countries. They are reasonable, valid and justified
under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment
business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest. The questioned circulars
are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government.

Santiago v COMELEC G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

Facts: Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative. Delfin alleged that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the
country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories. Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC
issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, and the notice of
hearing and setting the case for hearing. Later on, the petitioners herein filed a special civil
action for prohibition arguing that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.

Ruling: The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Empowering the
COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority which is a delegation to
administrative bodies. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and fixes a standard to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.

US v Ang Tang Ho G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Facts: The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose,” The Governor-General
issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Later on, a complaint
was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and from which he appealed
to the Supreme Court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53
to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in
imposing the sentence.

Ruling: The question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. The
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Legislature has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General
to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in
the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the
legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it
does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations
to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define
crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a
crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

Ynot v IAC G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation of EO 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond. After considering the merits
of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule
on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court, hence he filed a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court. Ynot alleges that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries.

Ruling: It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless. Only the officers alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation
of legislative powers. There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the Court declares Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.

DAR v Sutton G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

Facts: Respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their landholdings to petitioner DAR to
avail of certain incentives under the law. Later on, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry
and swine. Later on the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR was promulgated by the
Court that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their Voluntary offer to sell as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
Respondent’s land was inspected and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage
of the CARL. DAR issued an order, which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be
excluded from the coverage of the CARL. After which, the DAR Secretary issued an Order
partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration and contend that their
entire landholding should be exempted.

Ruling: The Court finds that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The order sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.
However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court
clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial
activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Solicitor General V MMA G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991

Facts: the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.” Later on, the
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations
was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission and
was permitted only in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was
there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was
not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by
the Commission. Later on, Private petitioners complained to the court about the
confiscation of their driver’s license of traffic enforcers and the police. One of the
petitioners also complained of the confiscation of his license plate. The Metropolitan
Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant
to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. The Authority argued that there was no conflict
between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and
not supplant the latter. the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.

Ruling: The measures under consideration do not conform to existing law which is
necessary to be considered a valid municipal ordinance. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such
sanctions. The decree prohibits the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed
by it to be imposed by the Commission. And Section 5 expressly provides that "in case of
traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated.” There is no statutory
authority for the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence,
regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue
only of the delegated legislative powers.

BOIE-Takeda v Dela Serna G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993

Facts: A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner Boie-Takeda

Chemicals, Inc. by Labor and Development Officer Ramos. Finding that Boie-Takeda had
not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in the
computation of their 13th month pay, Ramos served a Notice of Inspection Results
requiring Boie-Takeda to effect restitution or correction of "the underpayment of 13th
month pay. Boie-Takeda contested the Results, contending "that the commission paid to
medical representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13th month pay
which is not part of the REGULAR salary.” But the Regional Director decided against Boie-
Takeda which was later on affirmed by the Labor Secretary.

Ruling: In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus

commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the "basic salary" for this is what the
employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra efforts
exerted in consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as such, additional
pay, which this Court has made clear do not form part of the "basic salary.” In including
commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section
5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly
expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that
implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to
implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry
into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress. 

United BFHA v BF Homes G.R. No. 124873. July 14, 1999

Facts: When Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of BFHI, he entered into
an agreement with the two major homeowners associations, the BFPHAI and the CBFHAI,
for the setting up of an integrated security program. UBFHAI was created and registered
with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and recognized as the sole
representative of all the homeowners association inside the subdivision. Based on BFHIs
title to the main roads, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the
subdivision. UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction against respondent BFHI. In substance, petitioner UBFHAI alleged that the
committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous
receiver. Then, BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from
proceeding with the case. The HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo. Then
the Court of Appeals granted BFHIs petition for prohibition. Hence, UBFHA filed a petition
with the Supreme Court on the ground that HIGC has no jurisdiction to decide on the case.

Ruling: The HIGC cannot claim original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for
mandamus under the two other types of disputes enumerated in Presidential Decree 902-
A and in the revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of the
homeowners association nor it is one between any and/or all of the members and the
associations of which they are members. The parties are the homeowners association and
the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the corporations committee of receivers.
To reiterate, the HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The
law confined this authority to controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate
relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between any and/or all
of them and the association of which they are members; and (3) insofar as it concerns its
right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state. None of the
parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it
shall be removed.

Lupangco v CA G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy which states that
no examinee shall attend any review class or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the resolution and to declare the
same unconstitution. PRC filed a motion to dismiss on on the ground that the lower court
had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. The lower
court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. But the Court of Appeals found that the lower court lacks jurisdiction.
petitioners filed a petition with the Supreme Court.

Ruling: In administrative law, administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they
must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it
also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking
all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in
their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth.

People V Que Po Lay G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954

Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. Que Po Lay who was in
possession of foreign exchange failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its
agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and
that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the
Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General
answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require
the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law
in order to have force and effect.

Ruling: Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the
fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being
issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect
of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Tanada v Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

Ruling: The clear object of publication is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such
as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 

People v Maceren G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

Facts: Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in Laguna with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the
five accused resorted to electro fishing. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court
quashed the complaint. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize
because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in
section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
affirmed the order of dismissal. The prosecution Appealed to the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries.

Ruling: the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic
Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In
other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are
devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it
his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.

US v Panlilio G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914

Facts: All of the carabaos belonging to Panlilio, having been exposed to the dangerous
and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were duly quarantined in a corral in
Pampanga. Then, Adriano Panlilio illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so
to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and
ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and
conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his
servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one
place to another for the purpose of working them.” The defendant demurred to this
information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. The
demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty. The
contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial
do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.

Ruling: It is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and
proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No.
1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It
alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had
ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine
had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that
the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture,
duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the
ordinary work of his plantation. The Court consider these acts a plain violation of the article
of the Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged
a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a
violation of an article of the Penal Code. The Court would not permit an accused to be
convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change
from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the
defendant a different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required
under Act No. 1760 include those required under article 581. The accused could have
defended himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation
of article 581.

People v. Santos G.R. No. L-44291 August 15, 1936

Facts: Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate motor
launches and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the
Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
The case was called for trial for the arraignment, counsel for Santos stated that in view of
the ruling laid down by the court, holding that the penalty applicable is under section 83 of
Act No. 4003 which falls within the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court he
requests that the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Cavite which
conducted the preliminary investigation, so that the latter may try it, being within its original
jurisdiction. The lower court ruled that it being alleged in the information that the infraction
was committed within the waters of the Island of Corregidor, the competent justice of the
peace court is that of Corregidor, not Cavite. Thus the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Act No. 4003 contains no provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from
fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities concerned. The only authority granted to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such
instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary
and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings
arising under such provisions; and Act No. 4003 contains no provisions similar to the
conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in
question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the
matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively
reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National
Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of
the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also
an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional
clause is null and void and without effect. The Court ruled that the conditional clause of
section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative
power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.

SEC v LPG refillers G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,
overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as
possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. LPG Refillers Association asked the DOE to set aside the
Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit.
LPG refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court. The trial court
nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.
The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each
violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law. The trial court denied for lack
of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force
of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself. The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. The
Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be
perpetrated. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of
the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. And
the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary
penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of
P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty
for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the
refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary
penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid
statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a
per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33
prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting task force v CA G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

Facts: State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force, issued search warrants against the Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.
and many others. Shortly thereafter, the private respondent went to the Regional Trial
Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. The
Trial Court ruled that the search warrants were null and void. The appelate court held that
the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants as null and void. Upon
reconsideration by Karamfil exports, the appelate court reversed its decision. Thus,
petitioner files a petition with the Supreme Court.

Ruling: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making.” It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims
and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper
reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was
not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions. As the President's arm called upon to
combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it
is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing
more. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers. A prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case.
Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and
his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind
and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, unconstitutional.

cojuangco v pcgg G.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons
involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. The Solicitor General filed two criminal
complaints with respondent PCGG. At the scheduled preliminary investigation petitioner
appeared through counsel. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG and a
motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit
PCGG. Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motion. Cojuangco filed in the Supreme Court
petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction. He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the
complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process
and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such
preliminary investigation.

Ruling: According to Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2
of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to investigate and
prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and
associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to
the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate
extended to the PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus,
the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14
whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct
such preliminary investigation and to prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan. The
power of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the aforementioned types of
cases has been recognized by this Court. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating
officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than
that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer,
strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi judicial officer.

Santiago Jr. v Bautista G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

Facts: Santiago, Sr. alleges that his son is scheduled to graduate with the honor rank of
third place, that the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor” composed of the
school teachers, have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities by
intentionally pulling his rank down so that he can only be third place while Socorro Medina
and Patricia Liñgat would rise above him through questionable circumstances
accompanied by bad faith of the teachers. Petitioner personally appealed the matter to the
School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said
officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to
higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the
circumstances. They prayed the court to set aside the final list of honor students and to
enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the
said honor pupils in the graduation exercises. The injunction prayed for was denied by the
lower court. The graduation exercises was held with the same honor list. Respondents
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the question had already become
academic which was granted. Thus, Santiago appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling: The so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the
performance of its assigned task. Before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or
quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights
of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties. However, there is nothing on record about
any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of
their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with
judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, the Court has not even been appraised by
appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted
thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

Smart Communications v NTC G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003

Facts:Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The NTC issued a Memorandum
to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to
minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. Petitioners
filed against NTC an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 alleging that the NTC has
no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to
the Department of Trade and Industry; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of due process; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the
Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies which was denied. The
decision was later on reversed by the Court of appeal, hence, petitioners appealed to the
supreme Court.

Ruling: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Even assuming that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners
sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation
stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were
able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their
respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes
for the billing circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters
asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These
letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the
second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This
was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous
letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

Guerzon v ca G.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988

Facts: Petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which
was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract
denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's
properties, facilities and equipment for a period of five years. Petitioner likewise executed
with the same Corporation a "Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of
respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the leased service station. Later on,
Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer's Sales Contract. SHELL wrote
Guerzon to inform him of the decision not to extend the Dealer's Sales Contract,
demanding the surrender of the station premises and all company owned equipment to the
respondent's representative. BEU issued an order directing Guerzon to vacate the
premises. Later on, SHELL was able to secure possession of the gasoline station.
Guerzon filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for certiorari, injunction and
damages to annul the disputed order of BEU but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioner appealed in the Court of Appeals who, in turn, dismissed the petition.

Ruling: Jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil
courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in
P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has
been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and
those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. That issuing the order to vacate
was the most effective way of stopping any illegal trading in petroleum products is no
excuse for a deviation from this rule. Moreover the text of the assailed order was issued in
connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent Shell and
petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization has no power to decide contractual
disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express
provision of law granting to it such power. As stated in the law, in connection with the
exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving
violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit
issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations.

Antipolo realty v nha G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

Facts: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over a Lot from Antipolo Realty Corporation.
Hernando transferred his rights over the lot to Virgilio Yuson in which Yuson assumed the
performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract. However, for failure of
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter. Later on, Antipolo Realty sent a notice to
Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been
completed, and requesting resumption of payment. In a second letter, Antipolo Realty
reiterated its request but Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty
responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment
payments previously made by Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty
before the NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied by the NHA
and ordered the reinstatement of the contract to sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint was
lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the
interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell but was denied. Hence, Antipolo
Realty seeks recourse with the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and
functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because
the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion
recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In
general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency
may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. Having failed to comply with its
contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within
the specified period, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the
installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. In view of
petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with
the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an installment
payments made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment
of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations
to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior
installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.

Bantolino vs. Coca Cola G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003

Facts: The complainants averred that they were employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.
They further maintained that when Coca Cola replaced them and prevented them from
entering the company premises, they were deemed to have been illegally dismissed. Coca
Cola filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, there
being no employer-employee relationship, and those Lipercon Services, Peoples
Specialist Services, and Interim Services, were the real employers of the
complainants. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision and ruled in favor of the
complainants. The NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter. Coca-Cola Bottlers
appealed to the Court of Appeals which agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some
of the complainants should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate
court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision
however, complainants Ladica, Queling and Nieto were declared regular employees since
they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination. Hence, this petition.
Ruling: The Court held that the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants
were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence
are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. It was not necessary for
the complainants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse
party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary
nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application
of the technical rules of evidence. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Under
the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as
the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents
and their affidavits.

First Lepanto v CA G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994

Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate
of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
"ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider
the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed
a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. First
Lepanto filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition on the ground that respondent court has no
appellate jurisdiction over the BOI Case the same being exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, but it
was denied. Thus, First Lepanto filed a petition with the Supreme Court.

Ruling: Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals.
Evident in the provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a uniform
procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by
Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution
cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible. Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in
what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional
rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.
226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of
the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to
the Court of Appeals.

Villa V. Lazaro

Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor by the City
Engineer. As the funeral parlor was nearing completion, a suit for injunction was brought
against Villa by Dr. Jesus Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital because of
alleged violation of the Zoning Ordinance. Judgment on the merits was rendered
dismissing the complaint. Villa then resumed construction of her building and completed it.
Veneracion did not appeal from the judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he
brought the matter up with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Two months
after the rendition of the judgment, Villa received a telegram from Commissioner of the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission requiring a transmittal of proof of locational
clearance. And there were subsequent demands for the same. In response, Villa furnished
the Commission by registered mail with copies, variously, of official documents certifying to
her compliance with the pertinent locational, zoning and land use requirements and plans.
Villa received an Order of Commissioner Dizon imposing on her a fine of P10, 000.00 and
requiring her to cease operations until further orders from his office. The order made no
mention of the documents she had transmitted by registered mail or to her telegrams on
the matter. Commissioner Dizon denied the reconsideration prayed for by Villa. Villa then
sought to take an appeal to the Office of the President which was also denied. Villa filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the resolution deprived her of due process of
law. But it was denied.

Ruling: Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations
and trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and
(d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected. And, it
being clear that some, at least, of those essential elements did not obtain or were not
present in the proceedings complained of, any judgment rendered, or order issued, therein
was null and void, could never become final, and could be attacked in any appropriate
proceeding. The Petition is granted.

Paterok v Bureau of Customs

Facts: The petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two containers, one with
two used automobiles. The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs and
later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The petitioner received a notice of hearing from the legal
officer of the Manila International Container Port; Bureau of Customs informing the former
that seizure proceeding was being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73. While the said case was pending, the petitioner received, a letter
informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been
rendered by the District Collector of Customs. The petitioner had not been informed that a
separate seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes Benz in question. The petitioner
later found out that, a Notice of Hearing set concerning the said Mercedes Benz, which
was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port Area. The petitioner
filed a motion for new trial but was denied, invoking the failure of the petitioner to appear in
the said hearing despite the posting of the notice on the bulletin board. Subsequently, the
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Department of Finance, which petition the latter
referred to the public respondent. The decision was affirmed. Hence, the petition to the
Supreme Court.

Ruling: The Court ruled that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public
respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is
known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and
procedural due process. The facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have been
unknown. The petitioner had previous transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in fact,
the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household goods and the
Bourgetti car to the former at her address. If only the public respondents had exercised
some reasonable diligence to ascertain from their own records the identity and address of
the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of the property in question, the necessary
information could have been easily obtained which would have assured the sending of the
notice of hearing properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have been afforded the
opportunity to be heard and to present her defense which is the essence of procedural due
process. But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.
Lumiqued v Exevea

Facts: 3 complaints were filed with the Board of Discipline of the DAR against Arsenio
Lumiqued. Lumiqued alleged that the cases were filed against him to extort money.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to enable him to employ
the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen. The investigating committee
rendered a report finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. Later on,
President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O. No. 52, finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty, and dismissing him from the service but found that the charges of oppression
and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not
satisfactorily established. Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging that
he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. Later on, before his
motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. And Secretary Quisumbing denied the second
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.

Ruling: Petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have

competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the
committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filed against him. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. An actual hearing
is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied
due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqued's
appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

Casimiro V Tandog

Facts: Casimiro was appointed Municipal Assessor. Later on, Administrative Officer
Andres, submitted a report which spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations
in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner's
brother Ulysses Cawaling and another Tax Declarations in the name of Antipas San
Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioner's brother-in-law Marcelo
Molina. Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued an Order placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension. 3 days later, Tandog directed Casimero to answer
the charge of irregularities in her office. Casimero denied the alleged irregularities. Tandog
extended petitioner's preventive suspension to give him more time to verify and collate
evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. After a series of hearings, the committee
recommended petitioner's separation from service. Casimero appealed to the CSC, which
affirmed Tandog’s order of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but was
denied. Petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently affirmed
the CSC decision. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner appeals
to the supreme Court alleging that she was not afforded procedural and substantive due
process when she was terminated from her employment.

Ruling: In administrative proceedings procedural due process simply means the

opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. In administrative
proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required. Mere allegation is not equivalent to
proof. Thus, in the case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members
of the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In
addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is
required to establish bias. The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In
effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails. Neither are we
persuaded by petitioner's argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the complainants
were never presented for cross examination. In administrative proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be
fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

Lozano v De Los Santos

Facts: Upon the request of the Sangguniang Bayan petitioner and private respondent
agreed to consolidate their respective associations and form the Unified Mabalacat-
Angeles Jeepney Operators' and Drivers' Association, Inc. Petitioner and private
respondent also agreed to elect one set of officers; both Lozano and Anda ran for
president; petitioner won; private respondent protested and, alleging fraud, refused to
recognize the results of the election; private respondent also refused to abide by their
agreement and continued collecting the dues from the members of his association despite
several demands to desist. Petitioner was thus constrained to file the complaint to restrain
private respondent from collecting the dues and to order him to pay damages. Anda
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction was lodged
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The MCTC denied the motion and denied
reconsideration. Anda filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court. The trial
court found the dispute to be intracorporate, hence, subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC,
and ordered the MCTC to dismiss Civil Case. Lozano filed a petition in the Supreme Court
that SEC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Ruling: The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the light of its nature and
function under the law. The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of
intracorporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members, or
associates. The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be
intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation, partnership or association or
deal with the internal affairs of the corporation, partnership or association. There is no
intracorporate nor partnership relation between petitioner and private respondent. The
controversy between them arose out of their plan to consolidate their respective jeepney
drivers' and operators' associations into a single common association. This unified
association was, however, still a proposal. It had not been approved by the SEC, neither
had its officers and members submitted their articles of consolidation in accordance with
Sections 78 and 79 of the Corporation Code. The dispute between petitioner and private
respondent is between members of separate and distinct associations. The SEC therefore
has no jurisdiction over the complaint.

Globe telecommunications v NTC

Facts: Smart filed a Complaint with NTC, praying for the immediate interconnection of
Smart's and Globe's GSM networks. The Complaint arose from the inability of the two to
effect interconnection. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused
to grant Smart's request for the interconnection of SMS. Globe filed its Answer with Motion
to dismiss the ground that the Complaint was premature. NTC issued an Order wherein
NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of "value-added service" or
"enhanced-service", the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 59. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have
been providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section 420 (f) of MC No.
8-9-95. Yet, NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist
Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS
within thirty (30) days, subject to the payment of fine. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit
NTC from taking any further action in the case alleging that the Order is a patent nullity as
it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was
sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process. But the decision
of the NTC was affirmed. Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to
reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTC's finding that Globe lacked the
authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine.

Ruling: NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the
assailed Order. First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither
does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. Second. Globe and
Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of
VAS and the prior approval. The opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the
administrative process, as decisions must be rendered on the evidence presented, either
in the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. If
no evidence is procured pertinent to a particular issue, any eventual resolution of that
issue on substantive grounds despite the absence of evidence is flawed. Third. The
imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The assailed Order violates due
process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being
unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a
corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would
have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.
Villaflor v ca

Facts: Parcels of agricultural lands were sold to Villaflor on different dates. Villaflor leased
to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of land for a period of five (5) years at a rental of
P200.00 per annum. Villaflor claimed having discovered that after the execution of the
lease agreement, Nasipit Lumber 'in bad faith surreptitiously grabbed and occupied a big
portion of plaintiff's property. Villaflor filed a Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands,
Manila, 'to purchase tract of public lands. The Report by the public land inspector contains
an Indorsement of recommending the rejection of the Sales Application of Villaflor for
having leased the property to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights
thereto. Then, petitioner entered into a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights in favor of
Nasipit in consideration of P5,000 which was granted by the Director of lands. Villaflor filed
a protesst with the Bureau of Lands, protesting the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber,
claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00. The Director of Lands, however,
found that petitioner was paid the stipulated amount. The same was affirmed by the
Minister of Natural Resources. Petitioner filed a complaint which the trial court dismissed,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, recourse to the Supreme Court,
assailing the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to acquire
public lands.

Ruling: The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this
case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification
of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to
determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, it
behooves the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to
proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency. Petitioner
initiated his action with a protest before the Bureau of Lands and followed it through in the
Ministry of Natural Resources and thereafter in the Office of the President. Consistent with
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the trial and the appellate courts had reason to rely on
the findings of these specialized administrative bodies.
Commissioner v Navarro

Facts: Commissioner of Customs sought to nullify and set aside in order of Judge Pedro
C. Navarro, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents
Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits,
restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods.
Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by Central Bank as
prohibited importation or importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture
proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioners pointed out how violative was the assumption of
jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture
proceeding which a matter was falling within the exclusive competence of the customs
authorities.

Ruling: This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action
for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the
Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive
jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a
court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.
Centeno v Centeno

Facts: Respondent is the owner of two (2) parcels of Riceland. A complaint was filed by
herein respondent Centeno with the DARAB for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and Damages."
Respondent alleged that, despite the decision of the DAR recognizing her ownership over
Lot Nos. 111 and 122, as affirmed by the Office of the President, herein petitioners
Cipriano Centeno, Leonila Calonzo and Ramona Adriano have interfered with and
prevented respondent from exercising acts of possession over the landholdings earlier
adjudicated to her and kept on harassing, molesting and disturbing her peaceful
possession as well as the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, to her great damage and
prejudice. She prayed that petitioners be restrained from committing acts tending to
deprive respondent of her possession, and that they be ordered to vacate the premises.
Petitioner insisted that they are better entitled to the possession of the lots in dispute,
having been allegedly in long possession thereof, with their houses thereon and averred
that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action and for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the DARAB over the case.

Ruling: The instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case for
cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor of herein respondent, the Court ruled that
the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As aptly stated by the Court of
Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A 6657, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is
that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Nuesa v CA

Facts: The Secretary of DAR issued an Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two
(2) parcels of agricultural land under certain conditions. After twenty-one years, private
respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the DAR for the purchase of
said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the order. Restituto
Rivera filed a letter of protest against Verdillo claiming that contrary to the manifestation of
private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been
cultivating the same. Rivera filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that
of Verdillo. After investigation Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, ordered the
cancellation of the Order of Award in favor of Verdillo. Verdillo filed a petition with the
Provincial Adjudication Board for annulment of said order. Rivera filed a motion to dismiss
the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from the order of the Regional Director. The DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss and reversed the order of
the Regional Director. The said decision was affirmed by the DAR Appellate Adjudication
Board and later on by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review.

Ruling: petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the
ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition in the
first place. findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts, 30 care should be taken that administrative actions are not done
without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency.
In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had
overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between
petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932
and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining
DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess
of its jurisdiction. 

Regional Director v CA G.R. No. 110193 January 27, 1994

Facts: Private respondents held a mass action to demand the release of their salaries by
the Department of Budget. A return-to-work order was promptly issued by Regional
Director Teofilo Gomez of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, with a warning
that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their classes within twenty-four
hours, administrative charges would be filed. Since the order was not heeded,
administrative complaints against the teachers concerned were thereupon filed. The
teachers were each given five days from receipt of said complaints within which to submit
their respective answers and supporting documents. Prior to the start of the hearings by
the DECS Investigating Team, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint. The trial court denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, holding that the
complaint stated a cause of action and that the court had jurisdiction thereover. The pre-
trail, however, was pre-empted by the petitioners when they filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus but it was referred to the Court of
Appeals. The CA denied the petition, hence this petition.

Ruling: There being no dispute that the root of the cases filed before the court a quo deals
on the performance of official functions by the DECS officials, there cannot be a full
determination on whether the actions taken by them have been proper or improper, or
whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith, pending a full hearing that would give
all the parties a chance to ventilate their respective claims. The court cases and the
administrative matters being closely interrelated, if not interlinked, it behooves the court, in
the interest of good order and conformably with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to
suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative
charges.

Laguna Catv v maraan G.R. No. 139492. November 19, 2002

Facts: Private respondents filed with the DOLE Regional Office, separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits against Laguna
CATV Network. DOLE Region IV found that Laguna CATV violated the laws on payment of
wages and other benefits. Thereupon, Laguna CATV was requested to correct its
violations but the latter refused. Thereafter, Director Maraan issued an Order dated
directing Laguna CATV to pay the concerned employees the sum of P261,009.19 Pesos.
Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration. Maraan issued a writ of execution.
Laguna CATV filed a motion to quash, alleging that the writ was premature because
Laguna CATVs motion for reconsideration of the Order has not yet been resolved. Maraan
issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution. Instead of appealing to
the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review. Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal
to the Secretary of Labor would be an exercise in futility considering that the said appeal
will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be disapproved. Court of Appeals
denied the motion for extension and dismissing the case stating that it failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Ruling: If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial
power can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency
an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to the court. Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative process
by appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor. Petitioner fails to show that
the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Its contention that an appeal to the
Secretary of Labor would be futile as it will surely be disapproved, is purely conjectural and
definitely misplaced.

Corpus v. Cuaderno, G.R. No. L-17860 March 30, 1962

Facts: Marino Corpus was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor. He
was charged with an administrative case by several co-employees with dishonesty,
incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming
a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank resulting in
his suspension by the Monetary Board. The committee recommended petitioner’s
reinstatement. However, the Monetary Board, adopted a resolution saying that all involve
fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover the Monetary Board finds that the
continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to
the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, considers Corpus, resigned as of the
date of his suspension. Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but
the Monetary Board denied it, after which he filed an action with the Court of First Instance
of Manila. After several hearings, the court dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or the
Civil Service Commission. However, it is the Courts opinion that a report to these
administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in
this case. (1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at
bar. (2) An appeal to the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of
supererogation, requiring the presentation of practically the same witnesses and
documents produced in the investigation conducted at the instance of the Monetary Board.
Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central Bank provides for its own power
relative to the investigation, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the Commissioner
of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and voluntary. On the other hand,
the doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing
an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that
the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy
has not been exhausted

Madrigal v. Lecaroz, G.R. No. L-46218 October 23, 1990

Facts: Gov. Lecaroz, et. Al., abolished Joventino Madrigal’s position as a permanent
construction capataz in the office of the provincial Engineer from the annual Roads
Bridges Fund Budget due to the poor financial condition of the province and appearing that
his position was not essential. Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission where it
was held that the removal of Madrigal from service was illegal. Madrigal then sent a letter
to the Provincial Board for the implementation of the CSC resolution but the Board refused
to execute arguing that the position was already abolished and instead ordered the
appropriation of back salaries. Madrigal then filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
praying for the relief of mandamus and damages against respondents for the restoration of
his abolished position, reinstatement and payment of back salaries plus damages. CFI
dismissed the case on the ground of laches. The case was filed only after 4 years and 20
days because, petitioner availed of remedies in the CSC first.

Ruling: A petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be
filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. And the 1
year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. The
recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case
where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of
law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues
with finality. In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or
not the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.

Cabada v. Alunan, G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996

Facts: A complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and
Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights by Mario Valdez.
The complaint was referred to the PNP-RECOM 8 which filed an administrative charge of
Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision finding the petitioners
guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Petitioner
Cabada stated in his Appeal filed with the DILG that he in fact filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however,
failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be
treated as an appeal to the RAB. The RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director.
It denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision. Petitioners filed with the
Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their Appeal and
Petition for Review. NAPOLCOM, denied due course to the petitioners appeal and petition
for review for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the instant petition.

Ruling: The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. The Court would have
sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or
dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De
Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would
have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the
Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-42380 June 22, 1990

Facts: Datiles and Company has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement. Petitioner then
filed for an injunction case against Jesus Deypalubos and Daniel Cabdieza since the latter
refused to vacate part of leased area. Deypalubos made a formal protest to the Bureau of
Fisheries over 49 hectares which he was occupying. The court resolved in favor Datiles
which restored his possession and occupation of said area which became final and
executory. A memorandum was issued for Regional Director Guieb to make a formal
investigation not touched upon in civil case. Petitioners filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against Guieb since the investigation contains the same issues raised in civil
case 1389. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, grounded on failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies, which Judge Sucaldito granted.

Ruling: It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an executive officer, the
petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies. It follows therefore that there has to
be some sort of a decision, order or act, more or less final in character, that is ripe for
review and properly the subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body or officer, for
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to operate. In the present case,
however, there is no administrative order or act as above described, that can be appealed
from. The respondent Regional Director has not rendered any decision, or made any final
finding of any sort, and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to
be the very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must
be exhausted, although available, cannot be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping
public respondent Guieb's investigation but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner's recourse to the respondent court for relief by way of a
petition for prohibition was proper.

NFA v. CA, G.R. Nos. 115121-25. February 9, 1996

Facts: NFA conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of its
facilities. Among those awarded were the private respondents. When David became the
new Administrator of NFA, he caused the review of all security contracts and created a
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). When the time of the bidding came,
some bids were disqualified for failure to comply with documentary requirements including
those of respondents. Respondents, Lanting Security and Watchman Agency filed
complaints with the RTC to restrain the Administrator from proceeding with the public
bidding. During the pendency of writ of preliminary injunction, David terminated the
contracts of security agencies and engaged the services of seven new agencies.
Respondents filed another complaint to restrain NFA from terminating their services. The
lower court ruled in favor of respondents. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the NFA
contends that respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and hence, their
complaint is premature.

Ruling: The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It
is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents contracts
were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely
five days after their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder,
submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that
contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board
or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to
court to stop the implementation of these negotiated security contracts.

Gravador v. Mamigo, G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

Facts: Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School when he
was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr. of his separation
from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
He was advised of his separation from the service effective immediately unless he can
show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that he is below sixty-five
years of age today. The petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his
forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but
December 11, 1901. The petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendents of Schools,
reiterating his claim. Then he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in
the Court of First Instance. The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on
December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme
Court. It was argued that the petitioner's action was prematurely brought because he had
not availed of all administrative remedies.

Ruling: The argument is without merit. Suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must
be brought within one year. Before filing this case, the petitioner waited for eight months
for the school officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more would
obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was filed, he had only
four months left within which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner nor form
of assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming. The
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its
observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.

Almine v. CA, G.R. No. 80719 September 26, 1989

Facts: Almine filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof
from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. After
due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report for
the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of private respondent who appears to
be petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take necessary
action petitioner reiterated her application alleging that her tenant failed and refused to
deliver here landowner’s share up to the time of the filing of the said application. Petitioner
appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. Private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal however, Minister of Agrarian Relation denied petitioner’s application.

Ruling: Questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his
landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister of Agrarian Reform whose decision
may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations.
These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional
Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said
decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian
Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

Smart Communications v. NTC, G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations
on the billing of telecommunications services. Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom)
and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs
to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines. Globe Telecom Inc. and Smart
Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-
intervention. This was granted by the trial court. The trial court issued a TRO enjoining
NTC from implementing the Memorandum Circulars. NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the
ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss is denied for lack of merit. NTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was later
on denied by the trial court. The CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

Ruling: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in
this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement.
Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum
Circular, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines.
They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and
submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was issued, petitioners
wrote successive letters asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called
Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until NTC issued the second assailed
Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by
petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus
prompting them to seek judicial relief.

UP Board of Regents v. Rasul, G.R. No. 91551 August 16, 1991

Facts: Dr. Felipe Estrella was appointed as the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) in August of 1989 and should serve as such until 1992. However, in 1987 UP
President Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents recommending the
reorganization of key positions in UP Manila. This was approved by the Board. Among the
key position which would be affected was that of Dr. Estrella wherein his position was
abolished and in its stead UP PGH Medical Director was to be effected. The new director
would come be nominated by the Nominating Committee. Dr. Estrella, filed a case
immediately before the court without appealing to the Board of Regents to prevent his
removal arguing that this go against his security of tenure.

Ruling: Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies, The Court held that this case has special circumstances that made it fall under
the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr.
Estrella was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must have believed
that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he
goes to the courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the
implementation of the proposed reorganization.

Arrow Transportation Corp. v. BOT, G.R. No. L-39655 March 21, 1975

Facts: Petitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic corporations.
Petitioner is a holder of a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a public utility bus.
Private respondent applied for the issuance of a CPC to operate a similar service. Without
the required publication, public respondent Board granted a provisional permit to operate.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and cancellation of the provisional permit. Before
resolution of the motion, petitioner filed for herein petition arguing that there must be
publication before a provisional permit can be issued, with reference made to PD 101,
which authorized the Board to grant provisional permits when warranted.

Ruling: The question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial determination was
likewise argued by the parties. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto,
an objection grounded on prematurity can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner
would stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due process ousted
respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the premises. The Court
was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the
importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the
matter settled. As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101, it is the policy of the State to
improve the deplorable condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing
public motor vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine
operators, as well as update the standard of those carrying such business, making it
"imperative to provide, among other urgently needed measures, more expeditious
methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of operation of public
utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this country.

Tan v. Veteran’s Backpay Commission, G.R. No. L-12944 March 30, 1959

Facts: Petitioner as widow of recognized deceased veteran, filed an application for back
pay. The Secretary and Chief of Office Staff the Veterans Back Pay Commission sent a
letter to General Vicente Lopez of the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines
apprising the latter that the Commission has reaffirmed its solution granting the back pay
to alien members; the AFP certified that deceased veteran has rendered service as a
recognized guerrilla. That after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous stands
and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay. That the respondent Veterans Back Pay
Commission made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein petitioner denying her
request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to backpay. That upon refusal of the
Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this Honorable
Court by way of mandamus. The trial court ordered respondent Commission to give due
course to the claim of Tan to the backpay to which her deceased husband was entitled as
member of a duly recognized guerrilla organization. Against the decision, the respondent
instituted this appeal and it further contended by the Commission that Tan should have first
exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines,
and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court.

Ruling: The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on exhaustion of

administrative remdies, considering that in its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to
abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive
Department, the Commission declared that The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of
Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office
seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse, thereby leading
the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by
the Commission.