Evid COMPILED-Group2

Contributor: Santos, Jay Mark A.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (u)
That a writing is truly dated;
1|Page
Soriano v. Ancheta
G.R. No. 57589. March 18, 1985
LANDMARK CASE
SYNOPSIS:
EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; WRITING IS DATED;

PRESUMPTION NOT REBUTTED IN CASE AT BAR. — Memorandum was ante-
dated and was prepared subsequent to the filing of the petition so as to divest this Court
of its acquired jurisdiction is unsupported by any evidence. Against it is the presumption
that writing is truly dated. (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 [u].) The petitioners assert
that if the memorandum had existed as early as May 22, 1980, Commissioner Ancheta
should have mentioned it in his letters to them both dated April, 1981. The answer to
this assertion is that Commissioner Ancheta had no duty to inform the petitioners about
the existence of the memorandum.
FACTS:
Petitioners Rafael B. Garcia was Supervising Revenue Examiner III and Amado
G. Soriano was Supervising Revenue Examiner II when they were purged from the
government service in 1975. They filed petitions for reinstatement with the Appeals
Committee which was created in the Office of the President but the committee was
unable to act on their petitions because of time constraints. Garcia and Soriano later
revived their petitions with the Office of the President and in a decision dated May 19,
1979, rendered by Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave granted their
reinstatement provided that if the same are still vacant, and if not then to equivalent
positions in that Bureau.
Messrs. Soriano and Garcia wrote two letters dated May 13, 1980, and January
31, 1981, to Commissioner Ruben B. Ancheta. In both letters they requested
reinstatement as directed in the decision in their favor. However, Commissioner
Ancheta denied the petition which prompted the filing of the instant petition on August
4, 1981, for mandamus and other relief.
The petitioners sought reconsideration which was granted by setting aside the
resolution of October 12, 1981. At the same time the petition was given due course.
Ancheta filed a petition contending that it was ante-dated and was prepared
subsequent to the filing of the petition so as to divest this Court of its acquired
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
2|Page
Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome
the disputable presumption that writing is truly dated. (Par. U, Section 3, Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence)
RULING:
NO, PRESUMPTION THAT A WRITING IS TRULY DATED PREVAILS.
This contention is unsupported by any evidence. Against it is the presumption

that writing is truly dated. (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 [u].) The petitioners assert
that if the memorandum had existed as early as May 22, 1980, Commissioner Ancheta
should have mentioned it in his letters to them both dated April, 1981. The answer to
this assertion is that Commissioner Ancheta had no duty to inform the petitioners about
the existence of the memorandum.’
We are satisfied that the Clave decision in favor of the petitioners had been
revoked by the memorandum and since there is no showing that the President has
signed an order reinstating them; the respondent has no ministerial duty to reinstate
them. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
3|Page
In favor of the plaintiff:
Mosquerra v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission
G.R. No. L-45833. June 20, 1988.
SYNOPSIS:
The presumption that a writing is truly dated prevails in this case. The court find no
merit in the respondents’ contention that the claim for review in the decision of the
Workmen Compensation was prescribed since they it is clear, however, that the decision
in question is dated 30 December 1976 so that it could not have been served upon and
received by petitioner’s counsel on 23 March 1976, some eight (8) months before it was
promulgated. It is true that in a Manifestation filed with the Court on 15 April 1976,
counsel for the respondent company stated that the decision in question was rendered
on 30 December 1975. But, this mere manifestation is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the writing (decision) was truly dated.
FACTS:
Roman Mosquerra, is a former employee of the respondent, He started to work

with the respondent in 1947 and his work was to plow, plant and weed sugarcane in
fields. While he was at work in the field, he felt acute stomach pains. Upon examination
by the company physician, Dr. Zoilo Bunye, he was found to be suffering from peptic
ulcers, for which medicines were prescribed to relieve the pains. In December 1966,
however, he was retired from the service upon recommendation of the company
physician due to the persistence of the ailment. But, he continued to receive medical
treatment from Dr. Eusebio Panganiban in Calamba, Laguna, who opined that the
petitioner’s work had contributed to the development or aggravation of the disease.
On 31 March 1975, the petitioner filed a claim against the respondent employer
before the Workmen’s Compensation Unit in San Pablo City, seeking benefits under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, due to disability resulting from peptic ulcers which
he claimed to have incurred in the course of his employment or was aggravated by the
nature of his employment which was granted. The respondent company opposed the
claim mainly on grounds of prescription, no knowledge of the illness and payment of
retirement benefits.
The decision of Workmen’s compensation Unit is in favor of Ramon Mosquerra.
The respondent company appealed. Acting on the appeal, the Workmen’s

Compensation Commission reversed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Unit and absolved the respondent company from liability.
4|Page
The petitioner now seeks a review of the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. He claims that the Commission seriously erred in
dismissing his claim. The court finds merit in the petition.
However it is claimed by the respondent company that the decision of the

Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which is sought to be reviewed, is already final
and can no longer be reviewed. Counsel for the respondent company alleges that Mr.
Feliciano Reyes, counsel for the petitioner, received a copy of the decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission on 23 March 1976 so that it was already final
when the petitioner filed on 18 March 1977 his petition before the Court for an
extension of time within which to file a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the respondent is enough to overcome

RULING:
NO, Presumption prevails in this case.
The court find no merit in the respondents’ contention that the claim had already
prescribed since the petitioner was taken ill sometime in October, 1960 and filed his
claim only on 31 March 1975. The determining point of the accrual of the cause of
action is the time the employee becomes disabled or incapacitated to do his regular
work because that is the time when the benevolent mantle of the law commences to
cover him.
It is clear, however, that the decision in question is dated 30 December 1976 so

that it could not have been served upon and received by petitioner’s counsel on 23
March 1976, some eight (8) months before it was promulgated. It is true that in a
Manifestation filed with the Court on 15 April 1976, counsel for the respondent
company stated that the decision in question was rendered on 30 December 1975. But,
this mere manifestation is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the writing
(decision) was truly dated. And the date on said decision is 30 December 1976.
5|Page
In favor of the defendant:
Citibank v. Sabeniano
G.R. No. 156132
SYNOPSIS:
The evidence presented by the Citibank is not enough to debunk the presumption that writing is truly
dated. The Citibank submitted a photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge before the RTC was undated
while the respondent on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge, certified
by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979 despite that respondent
presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of the country on the said date and
could not have signed the pledge.
Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but could not provide
an explanation as to how and why the said date was written on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified
that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by respondent personally before him, he could not give the
exact date when the said signing took place. Hence the Court shall abide by the
presumption that the written document is truly dated.
FACTS:
This case started when Modesta R. Sabeniano a client of both petitioners

Citibank and FNCB Finance filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioners as she
claims to have substantial deposits and money market placements with the petitioners
and other investment companies, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited
automatically and directly to her account with Citibank. Sabeniano alleged that Citibank
et al refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements
despite her repeated demands, thus, the civil case for Accounting, Sum of Money and
Damages.
Citibank et al admitted that Sabeniano had deposits and money market

placements with them, including dollar accounts in other Citibank branches. However,
they also alleged that respondent later obtained several loans from Citibank, executed
through Promissory Notes and secured by a pledge on her dollar accounts, and a deed
of assignment against her MMPS with FNCB Finance.
Petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of
Pledge was actually executed.
6|Page
ISSUE:

RULING:
NO, the evidence presented by the Citibank is not enough to debunk the said
presumption.
The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank

before the RTC was undated. It presented only a photocopy of the pledge because it
already forwarded the original copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it requested for
the remittance of respondents dollar accounts pursuant thereto.
Respondent, on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of
Pledge, certified by an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September
1979. However, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of
the country on the said date and could not have signed the pledge.
Petitioner Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before 24 September
1979, but could not provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written
on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was signed by
respondent personally before him, he could not give the exact date when the said
signing took place. It is important to note that the copy of the Declaration of Pledge
submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified by an officer of Citibank-Geneva,
which had possession of the original copy of the pledge. It is dated 24 September 1979.
Hence the Court shall abide by the presumption that the written
document is truly dated. Since it is undeniable that respondent was out of the country
on 24 September 1979, and then she could not have executed the pledge on the said
date.
7|Page
Contributor: Santos, Jay Mark A.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (v)
That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the
mail;
8|Page
Landmark Case
Protector's Services, Inc v. CA
[G.R. No. 118176. April 12, 2000]
SYNOPSIS:
The disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular
course of mail still holds in this case. The petitioner claims that it only receives 2 assessments
out 3 assessments for tax deficiency issued by the BIR. The Supreme Court held that
the 1985 assessment which petitioner denied as having been received was negated when
the respondent introduced documentary evidence showing that it was mailed by
registered mail. It was further buttressed by the testimony of witness Mr. Arnold C.
Larroza, Chief Administrative Branch Mailing Section, Rev. Region No. 4B-1, Quezon
City that the 1983, 1984 and 1985 assessments were placed in one envelope when it was
mailed by registered mail. Presumably, it was received in the regular course of the mail.
... The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was properly
addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved,
the presumption is that the letter was received by the addressee as soon as it could have
been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mails. Such being the case, this
Court cannot be made to believe that the 1985 assessment which incidentally has a
substantially greater amount involved was not received by the petitioner
FACTS:
Petitioner was assessed for deficiency percentage taxes including surcharges,

penalties and interests thereon for the year 1983, 1984 and 1985. Respondent
Commissioner sent by registered mail, demand letters for payment of the aforesaid
assessments. However, petitioner alleged that on December 10, 1987, it only received
Demand Letter for the years 1983 and 1984, respectively. It denied receiving any notice
of deficiency percentage tax for the year 1985.
Petitioner sent a protest letter dated January 02, 1988, to the BIR regarding the
1983 and 1984 assessments. Without formally acting on the petitioner's protest, the BIR
sent a follow-up letter dated July 12, 1988, ordering the settlement of taxes based on its
computation. The total unsettled tax amounted to two million, eight hundred fifty-one
thousand, eight hundred five pesos and sixteen centavos (P2,851,805.16).
July 22, 1988, petitioner filed its second protest on the 1983 and 1984 percentage
taxes, and included, for the first time, its protest against the 1985 assessment contending
that the 1985 assessment is already prescribed since the said demand was never received
by the petitioner.
9|Page
ISSUE:

the disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of mail (par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
RULING:
NO, the assessment letter may be presumed to have been received by petitioner.
The Supreme Court held that the 1985 assessment which petitioner denied as
having been received was negated when the respondent introduced documentary
evidence showing that it was mailed by registered mail. It was further buttressed by the
testimony of witness Mr. Arnold C. Larroza, Chief Administrative Branch Mailing
Section, Rev. Region No. 4B-1, Quezon City that the 1983, 1984 and 1985 assessments
were placed in one envelope when it was mailed by registered mail. Presumably, it was
received in the regular course of the mail. ... The facts to be proved to raise this
presumption are (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b)
that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the presumption is that the letter was
received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mails. Such being the case, this Court cannot be made to believe
that the 1985 assessment which incidentally has a substantially greater amount involved
was not received by the petitioner. Hence, the same assessment is also considered final
and unappealable for failure of the petitioner to protest the same within the
reglementary period provided by law.
10 | P a g e
In favor of the plaintiff
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES INC. v. CIR
G. R. No. 157064
SYNOPSIS:
When a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course
of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion,
and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
In this case petitioner denies receiving the assessment notice, and the respondent was unable to present
substantial evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or sent by the respondent before the BIRs right
to assess had prescribed and that said notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent presented
the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt
number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified
that she made the entries therein were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the
fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. The petitioner presented evidence
which is sufficient to debunk the said presumption.
FACTS:
Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a
corporation engaged in the trading of securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its
Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax in the amount
of P826,698.31.
This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649

dated 1 February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through
registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner denies receiving the formal
assessment notice.
On 17 March 1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to
enforce collection of the deficiency income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a
formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy,
requesting for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter dated 30 April
1998 from the respondent denying the protest with finality.
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. After due notice
and hearing, the CTA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on 17 May 2000. The
CTA ruled on the primary issue of prescription and found it unnecessary to decide the
issues on the validity and propriety of the assessment. It maintained that while a mailed letter
is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption. It
11 | P a g e
reasoned that the direct denial of the petitioner shifts the burden of proof to the
respondent that the mailed letter was actually received by the petitioner. The CTA
found the BIR records submitted by the respondent immaterial, self-serving, and
therefore insufficient to prove that the assessment notice was mailed and duly received
by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome the
disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular
course of mail (par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
RULING:
YES, the Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a
presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was
received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this
presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and
(b) that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the
ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject
to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the
party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received
by the addressee.
In the present case, petitioner denies receiving the assessment notice, and the
respondent was unable to present substantial evidence that such notice was, indeed,
mailed or sent by the respondent before the BIRs right to assess had prescribed and
that said notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent presented the BIR
record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry
receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records custodian,
Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries therein were not based on her
personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic
notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did
not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to
submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the
rule against hearsay evidence.
12 | P a g e
In favor of the defendant
Lapulapu Foundation Vs Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004
SYNOPSIS:
The disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of
mail still holds in this case. The denial of petitioner Tan as to the signature in the receipt of the demand
letter is self-serving since he cannot provide any evidence to support its claim. Further such denial cannot
prevail over the registry return cards which constitute documentary evidence and which enjoy the
presumption that absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the letter duly directed
and mailed was received in the regular course of business.
FACTS:
This case stemmed when petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu
Foundation,Inc., obtained four loans from Allied Banking Corporation covered by four
promissory notes in the amounts of P100, 000 each. When the entire obligation became
due, it was not paid despite demands by the bank. The Bank filed with the RTC a
complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and
solidarily, of the sum representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty
charges, attorney’s fees and costs
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring

indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by
petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and it never
authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note
thus it never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. The petitioner Foundation then
interposed a cross-claim against petitioner Tan alleging that he, having exceeded his
authority, should be solely liable for said loans, and a counterclaim against the
respondent Bank for damages and attorney’s fees.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the
respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans
were to be paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the
Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by
promissory notes which were automatically renewable every year at an amount
including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was able to pay the same
from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor the Allied Banking Corporation and
Requiring the Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and solidarily
litigation expenses of P1, 000.00 plus costs of the suit.
13 | P a g e
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo
by deleting the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being
without basis.
Further, the CA found that there are two (2) demand letters on different dates
was made by the respondent Bank, asking settlement of the obligation were sent and
was received by the petitioners as shown by the registry return cards presented during
trial in the court a quo.
However it was denied by the petitioner and did not recognize the signatures
thereon.
ISSUE:

the disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of mail (par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
RULING:
NO, the presumption still holds.
There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the
petitioners insist that the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny
receipt of the respondent Banks demand letters. When presented the registry return
cards during the trial, petitioner Tan claimed that he did not recognize the signatures
thereon. The petitioner’s allegation and denial are self-serving. They cannot prevail over
the registry return cards which constitute documentary evidence and which enjoy the
presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, these were
regularly issued by the postal officials in the performance of their official duty and that
they acted in good faith. Further, as the CA correctly opined, mails are presumed to
have been properly delivered and received by the addressee in the regular course of the
mail. As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses on the registry return
cards were wrong. It is the petitioner’s burden to overcome the presumptions by
sufficient evidence, and other than their barefaced denial, the petitioners failed to
support their claim that they did not receive the demand letters; therefore, no prior
demand was made on them by the respondent Bank.
14 | P a g e
Contributor: Santos, Princess Cherry S.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (w)
That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-
five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the
circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before
marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided
in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
15 | P a g e
LANDMARK CASE
Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS,

petitioner-appellant
G.R. No. L-1780, August 31, 1948
SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing
that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard
any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead. The Court ruled
that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead as he is unheard from in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only is subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final.
FACTS:
Consuelo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolai Szatraw, a Polish Citizen. They were
married in Manila on November 1936 and had a child named Alexis Szatraw. They lived
together from the time they were married until February 1940 when Nicolai, on the
pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the conjugal abode carrying
the child along with him and never returned. She made inquiries from her husband's
friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai
and that according to the information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived
from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found. Efforts
made to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain. She has not
heard of any news from his husband and her child and his husband’s absence is for
more than 7 years. Consuelo filed a petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai
Szatraw and prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority
over her child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved. Consuelo
and her husband did not acquire any property during their marriage and that his life was
not insured. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is not for the
settlement of the estate of the absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing
the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is dead, does not create a
right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The
petitioner has appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death of a person who is unheard

from in seven years is necessary.
16 | P a g e
RULING:
No. A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had

been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death
of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.
If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been
heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of
the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is
still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The
Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it
does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had
acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by
the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person
is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in
an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for
decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding,
the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action
or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for
the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact,
for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The
petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation,
because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It
is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or
upon which a competent court has to pass.
17 | P a g e
Victory Shipping Lines, Inc. V. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.
G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Pedro Icong, an employee
on board a vessel which was caught on fire, jumped and not been heard from. The
Court ruled that the fate of vessel is known not where the vessel was merely lost or
missing, the disputable presumption of death does not arise and the fact of death, mist
instead be established by preponderance of evidence.
FACTS:
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner Victory

Shipping Lines, Inc, was sleeping on board the latter’s vessel, M/V Miss Leyte, when it
caught fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and has not been
heard of. Pedro Icong was unmarried and his father Juan Icong was his partial
dependent. On April 30, 1954, the Juan Icong filed with the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and petitioner a notice of claim for death compensation. The petitioner
reported the matter to the Commission only on August 17, 1954. The Commission
rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus
P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal fee. The petitioner appealed and
contends that the Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was not applied in
determining whether or not Pedro Icong should be considered dead; That Section 49
of Republic Act No. 772, providing for the right of the employer to notice and hearing
of the claim against him, was disregarded; That Pedro Icong should have been held
guilty of notorious negligence in jumping overboard.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule on presumption of death applies
RULING:
No. The Court agrees with the Commission’s conclusion in not applying the rule
on presumption of death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by
petitioner, laborer Pedro Icong was reported as the only casualty, and in transmitting
said report, petitioner's counsel had implicitly admitted the fact of Pedro Icong's death.
18 | P a g e
In the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, it stated
that Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death
of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein the vessel
cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace
of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word “lost” used in referring to a vessel must be
given the same meaning as “missing” employed in connection with an aeroplane, the
person taking both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the
same sentence.
In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of
petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had
been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact
that when petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then
had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not
apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of
death. Also, the Court ruled the act of Pedro Icong in jumping overboard upon waking
up and finding the vessel on fire is not constitutive of gross negligence.
19 | P a g e
People v. Roluna
G.R. No. 101797, March 24, 1994
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case involving eight (8) persons who were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder. Only the appellant was arrested, tried and convicted. Accused
Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions were carrying short firearms.
Moronia was seen with his hands tied at his back. However, the circumstances
presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold accused-appellant
responsible for the death of Moronia. There being no evidence to the contrary, the
disputable presumption under Section 3 (w)(3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would
apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia. Whether
accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter. The
Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it should be
further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was last seen shall be
responsible for the subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The
conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot
be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution.
FACTS:
An information charged eight (8) person with the crime of Kidnapping with
Murder before the RTC Leyte. Only the appellant was arrested, tried and convicted.
The other seven (7) accused remain at large. The prosecution presented two (2)
witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and Buenaventura Nogalada, both were residents
of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.
Sombilon testified that he was on his way to attend to the pasture of his carabao
when he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken captive
by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons.
Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions were carrying short
firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw accused Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of
Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on his way.
With the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful
day.
Buenaventura Nogalada corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon.

He testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his
farm was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. He saw Moronia walking along a
20 | P a g e
human trail in Barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his back.
Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons
whom he did not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos
Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place.
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from.
Roluna denied and claimed that on May 24, 1984, he and his wife went to her
wife’s grandmother, Iluminada, who was bedridden and seriously ill in Barangay
Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) weeks.
After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in barangay
Amguhan. His testimony was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna
and his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroño. Accused Roluna charged
that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him,
testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He
claimed that he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their
barangay. Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge against him and had an
altercation during a volleyball game held during the barangay fiesta.
The Trial Court finds accused Abundio Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the circumstances proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish

the death of Anatalio Moronia.
RULING:
Yes. Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen
on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed
men undoubtedly shows that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact
that Moronia has been absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of this
case (or a total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
consonance with Section 3 (w) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4) years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough

to hold accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia. The prosecution
witnesses testified that they merely saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the
hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico and was
never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever established that
21 | P a g e
any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him.
Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed
accused so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-
appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-
appellant and his group for abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be
sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder. There being no
evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 3 (w) (3), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive
death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia
is a different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption
of death, it should be further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was
last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of
the latter.
22 | P a g e
Republic v. Narceda
GR No. 182760, April 10, 2013
SYNOPSIS:
The present case is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Respondent filed
before RTC, a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or
absence of his wife Marina for his desire to remarry. RTC granted respondent’s Petition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioner, because it lacked jurisdiction
to decide the matter. It held that the Decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda was immediately final and executory, because
by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.
FACTS:
Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. Sometime in 1994, Marina

went to Singapore and never returned. There was never any communication between
them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left,
one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him
that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean
husband. Robert filed before RTC, a Petition for a judicial declaration of the
presumptive death and/or absence of his wife Marina for his desire to remarry. RTC
granted respondent’s Petition declaring the presumptive death of Marina Narceda for
all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131, Sec. 3 (w-4), Rules of
Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the foregoing Decision
to the Court of Appeals. According to petitioner, respondent failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a well-
founded belief that she was dead. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Contending that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code. Article 247 of the Family Code
provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be
immediately final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent was able to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse is dead.
23 | P a g e
RULING:
Yes. The Court in this case agreed with the CA when pointed out that it lacked
jurisdiction in the resolution of the petition. The resolution of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural rules
to be followed are those enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code. Articles 238, 247,
and 253. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari
continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the
RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's contention that
respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead
may no longer be entertained by this Court. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda is declared final and executory.
24 | P a g e
Tadeo-Matias v. Republic
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
SYNOPSIS:
This is an appeal assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting the
petition for certiorari of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Wifredo N. Matias to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
RTC granted the petition however, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The
petition was denied because while the husband disappeared in 1979, the petition was
filed and this was decided only this year and that the petition is not one intended for
remarriage. It was intended to claim the benefits as the spouse of the husband who is a
member of the Philippine Constabulary who disappeared in 1979. Article 41 does not
apply. There is no need for declaration of presumptive death under Articles 390 and
391.
FACTS:
Wifredo is a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,

Pampanga since August 24, 1967. On January 7, 1968, Petitioner Estrellita Tadco-
Matias married Wilfredo and put up their conjugal home at Tarlac City. Wilfredo
continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. He never
came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made
contact or communicated with the petitioner nor to his relatives. The National Police
Commission issued the service record of Wilfredo that he was already declared missing
since 1979. Petitioner constantly pestered the Philippine Constabulary for any news
regarding her beloved husband Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary had no
answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all
they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army. After
more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully
belong to her in order to survive. One of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits
is for a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable
Court. Petitioner filed before the RTC of Tarlac City, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias to claim for the benefit under
P.D. No. 1638 as amended. The OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein
respondent Republic of the Philippines. RTC granted the petition and declared
Wilfredo N. Matias absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines for purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former
25 | P a g e
military officer. The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via petition
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition
of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether judicial declaration of presumptive death of a person is a requirement

in claiming death benefits of a member of a Philippine Constabulary
RULING:
No. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is
not an action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows
that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Here, petitioner was
forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo
as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed not for any other purpose but
solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. Given that her petition
for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage,
petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Verily, the RTC's use of Article
41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading
and grossly improper. A court action to declare a person presumptively dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. It must be stressed that
the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by
operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions
mentioned in the said articles are established. Hence, requiring the claimant to further
secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing
soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter. In order
to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO
or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any evidence which shows
that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the
evidence referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
26 | P a g e
Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
SYNOPSIS:
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of his wife, Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family
Code. Nolasco obtained another contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents.
Nolasco was informed that Parker left and he claimed to have searched his wife in
Antique and England but to no avail. He have no knowledge of her family background
and did not report the disappearance to authorities. His petition was granted by both
the lower and appellate courts. The Court ruled that Respondent failed to establish that
he had the well-founded belief required by law that his wife was already dead. The Court
considers respondent’s investigation is too sketchy and finds his claim that Parker
declined to give any information as to her personal background too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to find her.
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar
in England. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique after his seaman's contract expired. Gregorio Nolasco
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique. Thereafter, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter

from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son and that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
He claims that he made efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England but it was fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse to the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned
to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news
of Janet Monica. He lack knowledge as to her family background since his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. Further,
the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance were not reported to the Philippine
government authorities. Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique, a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking
Article 41 of the Family Code praying that respondent's wife be declared presumptively
dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. The Republic
opposed and argued that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent
27 | P a g e
spouse was already dead, and Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the
same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
The trial court granted Nolasco's declaring Janet Monica Parker Nolasco as
presumptively dead, without prejudice to her reappearance. The Republic appealed to
the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form
a belief that his absent spouse had already died. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether Janet may be presumed dead.
RULING:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is
dead. The following are the four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in

his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
28 | P a g e
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost
these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime
in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San
Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring

about her parents and their place of residence. Also, respondent failed to explain why
he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure
and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief
that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required
by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court
order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
29 | P a g e
Contributor: Valderama, Sharmaine Devie
Rule 131 Sec. 3(x):
That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable
to the law or fact.
30 | P a g e
Landmark Case
United States v. Ah Chong
15 Phil 188 19 March 1910
Carson, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a criminal case for murder against Ah Chong, a cook who believed that
his life was in danger and that he had been acting in self-defense. The main issue in
contention is, had the facts he believed to be true really were true, his acts would have
been justified.
FACTS:
Defendant Ah Chong worked as a cook at Fort McKinley at the same place as

Pascual Gualberto, who is now deceased as he was killed by Ah Chong. Ah Chong had
killed Pascual upon the belief that Pascual was a robber or a thief when he tried to
forcefully enter the room, even in spite of the warning from Ah Chong that he will kill
whoever it was who was trying to enter. Ah Chong had wildly struck his knife, which
he had kept under his pillow, when the chair blocking the door hit him right on the
knee. After the confusion had passed, he found out that it was Pascual who was trying
to enter the room. He secured bandaged to bind the wounds but Pascual later
succumbed to the injuries.
Prior to this incident, there had been several robberies in Fort McKinley, one of
which took place in a house in which Ah Chong was employed as a cook. He then
alleged that he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ah Chong may be found guilty.
RULING:
No. Ah Chong acted on the belief that he was in danger. By reason of a mistake
of facts, he did an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the
time. The belief ingrained in him was that he was acting within the bounds of the law,
as he believed himself to be acting in self-defense; no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense as the facts are limited to the
testimony of the accused himself. The accused must be given the benefit of the doubt
as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there
can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by
the record may be taken to be substantially correct. As such, the prosecution, failing to
31 | P a g e
prove that Ah Chong willfully committed the crime, must fall to the presumption of
the truth of facts and the presumption of innocence.
32 | P a g e
(Partially) in favor of the plaintiff
Bon v. Ziga and Arcangel
429 SCRA 177 27 May 2004
Tinga, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Ziga and Arcangel. The plaintiffs allege
bad faith against both lawyers, claiming that both had coerced them into signing a
waiver and quitclaim through deception and fraud. The main point of contention is
whether or not Attys. Ziga and Arcangel had acted in accordance with the law to the
best of their knowledge in executing and notarizing the document.
FACTS:
Alfredo Bon filed a complaint for disbarment against Attys. Victor Ziga and
Antonio Arcangel. Allegedly, the respondents, conspiring with each other and with the
use of fraud, intimidation, stealth, deception and monetary consideration, caused
Amalia Bon-Padre Borjal, Teresa Bon-Padre Patenio, Felecito Bon and Angelina Bon
(collectively, the Bons) to sign a document entitled Waiver and Quitclaim. According to
the complainant, the Bons signed the Waiver and Quitclaim because of Ziga’s
representation that the document was merely a withdrawal of a previously executed
Special Power of Attorney. As it turned out, the document was a waiver in favor of
Ziga of all the properties which the Bons inherited from their parents and predecessors-
in-interest. Attached to the Complaint are Affidavits executed by the Bons renouncing the
Waiver and Quitclaim.
Moreover, the complainant claims that the Bons are residents of Manila and did
not appear before Arcangel who was then in Albay to acknowledge the Waiver and
Quitclaim. Despite this fact, Arcangel notarized the document and even made it appear
that the Bons personally appeared before him to acknowledge the same.
According to the joint comment from the respondents, the allegations in the
Complaint that the Bons did not understand the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim
and that they did not personally appear to acknowledge the same before Arcangel
indicate that the cause of action is based on alleged intrinsic defects in the document.
As such, only the parties to the document, i.e., the Bons, whose rights were violated can
file the Complaint. Being a stranger to the allegedly defective document, the
complainant cannot file the Complaint. Besides, Maria Bon Borjal and Rafael Bon-
Canafe who are co-signatories to the Waiver and Quitclaim both declared in their Joint
Affidavit that Ziga thoroughly explained the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim to
the Bons before they signed the document. The subscribing witnesses, Rogelio Bon-
Borjal and Nida Barrameda, also declared in their Joint Affidavit that the contents of
33 | P a g e
the document were explained to the signatories. Additionally, they are incredulous to
said allegations as the Bons were educated.
Arcangel also asserted that assuming he notarized the document in the absence
of the signatories, such act is merely a ciolation of the Notarial law but not a ground
for disbarment.
In sum, the respondents aver that the complainant must first prove that the
Waiver and Quitclaim is defective before he can file an administrative case against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ziga and Arcangel must be disbarred.
RULING:
As to Atty. Ziga, the presumptions that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that acquiescence
resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact
have not been sufficiently overcome. The fact that Amalia and Angelina Bon are both
high school graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college graduate makes it difficult to believe
that they were deceived into thinking that the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim
were other than what they themselves could have easily ascertained from a reading of
the document.
However, as to Atty. Arcangel, the said presumptions were duly disputed as Atty.
Arcangel knew that acknowledging a document in the absence of the parties is contrary
to law, which he acknowledged in his comment.
34 | P a g e
City of Manila v. El Monte de Piedad
5 Phil 234 10 November 1905
Willard, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case against El Monte de Piedad, a corporation which sought to register

a certain parcel of land as an owner. However, said land was only ceded to it by the City
of Manila through a resolution, through which the corporation has the right to possess
the land but not own it. El Monte de Piedad alleged good faith as a defense.
FACTS:
El Monte de Piedad constructed a building over a certain parcel of land in Manila,

where it is now devoted to charitable purposes in accordance with a resolution it sought
from the City of Manila for the relocation of defendant’s offices. On 14 May 1902, El
Monte de Piedad presented to the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition asking
that its possession as owner of the land and building in question be inscribed in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. The inscription was made in the
registry of the property for the city of Manila.
On 13 October 1903, the City of Manila brought an action to cancel the

inscription, and that possession be given to plaintiff, with the sum of $14,000 as
damages. Judgment was rendered in favor of the City of Manila insofar as to show that
it was City of Manila which owned the land, and that El Monte de Piedad had a right
to occupy it gratuitously, so long as it devoted the land to the purposes agreed upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not El Monte de Piedad forfeited its right to possess by making a

claim of ownership of the land.
RULING:
No. At the trial, El Monte de Piedad introduced evidence to show that this claim
of ownership was made by the officers then in charge of the defendant institution under
a mistake of fact; that the only documents which the then officers had before them at
the time the proceeding commenced, indicated that the city had conveyed in 1887 to
the defendant an absolute title to the land. The evidence tended to show that the then
managers of the Monte de Piedad were not informed of and did not see copies of the
petition to which the Court has referred, nor the resolution of the city of Manila making
the cession, and the claim of the defendant is that there was no intention on its part in
presenting the petition for the inscription, to make any claim which was not justified by
35 | P a g e
the grant made to it by the city in 1887. There is no need to further pass upon this
question of good faith.
On the question of whether or not El Monte de Piedad must be dispossessed of

the land, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative, stating that there is no basis for such
an action in the Civil Code.
36 | P a g e
Rule 131 Sec. 3(y):
That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
37 | P a g e
Landmark case
People v. Filemon Mirasol
62 Phil 120 23 September 1935
Recto, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a rape case against Filemon Mirasol, a 24-year old man, married to a
woman “younger and better-looking than him,” according to the trial court judge. The
main point of contention is, whether or not the theory of rape can dispute the ordinary
course of nature and habits of life, given that the supposed victim is a 36-year old
woman.
FACTS:
Modesta Gelvezon filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of

Occidental Negros against Filemon Mirasol for rape. The trial court ruled that the crime
committed was merely at the attempted stage, hence, this appeal.
On the date of the alleged commission of the crime, both the complaining
witness and the accused were residents of the barrio of Palaka of the municipality of
Valladolid. Gelvezon is a widow aged 36, while Mirasol, aged 24, is married for two
years to Marciana, who in the opinion of the judge of the trial court, was younger and
better looking than the accused.
Gelvezon lived with her daughter in her house. She claimed that between 1 and
2 o’clock in the morning, a man attempted to lay in bed with her. She stood up, lit a
match, and saw that it was Mirasol. She shouted for help as Mirasol fled through
jumping out the window, but she only woke up her daughter. On the following day, she
informed her mother of the incident, and reported the matter to the police two days
after.
The complainant’s testimony is uncorroborated, insofar as the testimony of

Gelvezon’s daughter, Rosalina, is conflicting. She said that she saw Mirasol as the man
who jumped out of the window, but later admitted that she did not recognize the man;
only that her mother informed her that the man was Mirasol.
It is noteworthy to include the fact that the mother and daughter frequented the
Mirasol household and spent time with Mirasol; if Rosalina failed to recognize one
whom she often saw, it muddles the theory of the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mirasol is guilty.
38 | P a g e
RULING:
No. Accepting the theory of the prosecution and granting that the accused left
his house that night, goaded by an indomitable lust which he could not gratify with his
own wife, noted to be younger and better-looking than the accused himself, it would
be inexplicable why he had to set his eyes precisely on the complainant and not on
Rosalina who, by reason of her youth and virginity, should excel her mother in point of
exciting the lust of a human beast, a category within which the prosecution has placed
the appellant.
While it is true that the Government's theory does not transcend the limits of
possibility but in examining the facts, the courts should be guided in their judgment by
the ordinary course of nature and habits of life, in the absence of strong reasons
prompting them to act otherwise. The prosecution failed to dispute this presumption.
39 | P a g e
In favor of the Plaintiff
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co.
84 Phil 618 29 September 1949
Feria, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case for recovery of money. The main issue is whether or not the Court
of Appeals have jurisdiction over actions for certiorari.
FACTS:
Breslin et al. filed an action against Luzon Stevedoring Co. (Luzon) for the
recovery of money alleged to be due to the plaintiffs from the defendant in Luzon’s
capacity as agent for and in behalf of Pacific Islands Towing Co. Inc. (Pacific). Luzon
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, as
Luzon is merely an agent and is not the real party in interest. Before the motion to
dismiss had been acted upon the plaintiff filed an amended complaint so as to cure the
defect of the complaint by alleging that the defendant was being sued as principal and
not as an agent.
The amended complaint was accompanied by a notice to the adverse party,

through its attorneys, informing them that the plaintiffs will submit the amended
complaint for admission by the court on March 27, 1948. The defendant asked for the
postponement of the hearing for April 3, 1948, and the court set the hearing and heard
the motion on April 10, 1948. The lower court on June 8 denied the admission of said
amended complaint on the ground that it has been presented without the court's leave;
and on June 22 dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the ground that "the defendant is
being sued in its capacity as agent of the Pacific Islands Towing Co., Inc.," that "there
is no allegation in the complaint or elsewhere in the pleading or record that the plaintiffs
were hired by the defendant," and therefore "the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against the defendant." A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and
denied by the respondent judge; hence the filing of the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled to admit the amended complaint; hence
this petition questioning the jurisdiction of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. It is evident that the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. According
to section 29 of Republic Act No. 296, "the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive
40 | P a g e
appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings properly brought to it from
the Court of First Instance," except those enumerated in section 17 of the same Act
which are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and must be
determined by the allegations in the pleadings. As to whether on appeal the question of
jurisdiction of the inferior court or only question of law will be raised, unless the
pleadings show otherwise, it is to be presumed that no such question of jurisdiction and
questions of fact and law will be raised and, therefore, the parties have the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeals; because the presumption is that Courts of First Instance
as court of general jurisdiction have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and
that "things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.”
41 | P a g e
In favor of the Defendant
Potenciano Ilusorio et al. v. Hon. Guillermo Santos
4 SCRA 704 30 March 1962
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case for the compensation of tenant-farmers as to the crops they farmed
during certain years. There were certain years wherein the apportionment of the profits
was not in accordance with law, so the court held that the landholders must pay for the
unpaid crops. The main point of contention is whether or not the amount of payment
is proper, as the landholders alleged that the quality of the crops varied per year and per
season.
FACTS:
Eighteen (18) tenants (private respondents herein) had been working irrigated
ricelands owned by the petitioners Ilusorio, located in Barrio Bantog, San Miguel,
Bulacan. Prior to 1954, only one crop used to be planted and harvested per calendar
year, from May or June to January. From 1954 onward, two crops were planted yearly:
one crop, called dayatan, was planted in May harvested in October of the same year and
the other, termed kalaanan, planted in October and harvested in February of the
succeeding year. In the production of the dayatan crop, the tenants did not perform 4 ,
of ten items enumerated in section 38 of Republic Act No. 1199 (i.e., gathering and
bundling of the reaped harvest, piling of bundles into small stacks, preparation of the
place for stacking the harvests, gathering and transferring of the small stacks, and piling
them into a big stack for threshing), because the harvest having been made in October,
the rice had to be threshed immediately to avoid its rotting due to rains and wet. The
kalaanan crop was divided 55% for the tenants and 45% for the landholders; while the
dayatan crop was divided in the starting year (1954) at 80-20 in favor of the tenants; in
1955 at 75-25; and in 1956, at 70-30.
In September of 1957, the respondents-tenants petitioned the Court of Agrarian

Relations for a reliquidation of their crop shares since 1951-1952. After hearing the
evidence submitted, the court found the lands to be secondclass ricelands, and that the
crops thereof should have been apportioned on the basis of 75% for the tenant and
25% for the landholder; that consequently, the tenants had been "short-shared" by 12-
1/2% of the net produce between 1951-1952 to 1953-54, and by 7-1/2% thereafter;
that the tenants had likewise been made to bear a larger proportion of the irrigation fees
than what was proper; and rendered judgment as stated at the beginning of this opinion.
The landholders appealed, citing that the percentages applied were not accurate as the
quality of the crops varied per season and per year.
42 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not the landlords are correct.
RULING:
No. The argument of the landholders is not tenable. The court's computation of
the average yield of the lands in question being based on actual crops harvested, it is to
be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that such crops were normal
crops. The mere fact that the tenants' harvests varied from one crop to another is not
sufficient to declare them abnormal; for the law itself, in basing the classification of the
land on the normal average yield for the three preceding agricultural years (Sec. 8, Act 4054,
and Sec. 33, R.A. 1199), assumes that such yield will be variable. The presumption is
"that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature" [Rule 123, sec.
69(z)], and the burden of proof to show abnormality is on the one claiming it; in this
case, the landowners, but they have failed to submit adequate evidence in support of
their claim that the crops taken into account by the court below were affected by
abnormal or unusual factors. The lower court was likewise justified in making the
inference that the average yield for the three years preceding the 1951-1952 crop was
the same as the average for the three years following it, there being no evidence to the
contrary.
43 | P a g e
Contributor: Ogoc, Sheryl L.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (z)
That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;
44 | P a g e
LANDMARK CASE
Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng
G.R.No. 2888. October 23, 1900
PONENTE: Chief Justice Arellano
SYNOPSIS:
This is a civil case were the firm was concluded to be merely a de facto
partnership and giving effect to the provisions of article 120 of the Code of Commerce,
the right of action was against the persons in charge of the management of the
association.
FACTS:
Chua-Che-Co, Yu-Yec-Pin, and Ang-Chu-Keng were partners of Kiong-Tiao-

Eng, under the firm name of Kieng-Chiong-Seng. It was a mercantile partnership
organized for the purpose of engaging in commercial pursuit through importation of
goods for sale as testified by its managers Yu-Yec-Pin, and Kiong-Tiao-Eng. However,
such organization was not evidenced by any public document as required by article 119
of the Code of Commerce nor was it registered as required by article 17 of the said
code. The agent Yu-Yec-Pio himself and some of his- so-called partners have merely
noted in the books of the partnership, the capital which each had contributed. The
agent further testified that the partnership was not recorded in the Mercantile Registry
but in the Internal Revenue office.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for claim of sum of money against defendants. The
Court of First Instance of Manila entered judgment against each and all of the
defendants, Chua-Che-Co, Yu-Yec-Pin, and Ang Chu-Keng for the sum of 7,962.14
pesos, Mexican, equivalent to 7,372.75 pesos, Philippine currency, with interest at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum from December 7, 1903, and costs. Aggrieved, only Chua-
Che-Co made an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is partnership that existed between the defendants and
Chua-Che-Co
45 | P a g e
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The partnership in question was a
mercantile one. It has not been proved that Kieng-Chiong-Seng was the firm name, but
rather the designation of the partnership.
Furthermore, the alleged partnership never had any legal existence nor has it
acquired any juridical personality in the acts and contracts executed and made by it. But
as the said partnership was a partnership de facto, although it had no legal standing, and
contracted obligations in favor of the plaintiff, the liability arising from such obligations
must be enforceable against someone.
Since the partnership in question is not included in any of the classes of

partnership defined by the Code of Commerce the general provisions applicable to all
partnerships contained in article 120 of the Code of Commerce, which reads as follows:
"The persons in charge of the management of the association who do not comply with
the provisions of the foregoing article (art. 119, which requires that the articles of
partnership be recorded in a public instrument, and that the partnership be registered
in the Mercantile Register) shall be responsible together with the persons not members
of the association with whom they may have transacted business in the name of the
same."
In the instant case, the defendant, Chua-Che-Co’s duties and responsibilities

does not fall within the ambit of the aforementioned provision since the latter was not
in charge of the management of the association, nor did he make any contract at all
with the plaintiff. Based on the testimony of the various witnesses, the agent of the
partnership, Yu-Yec-Pin, being the person who made all the contracts for the
partnership as well as Kieng-Tiao-Eng. It is evident, therefore, that he has incurred no
liability and that he cannot be held individually responsible for the payment of plaintiff's
claims, as the court below found.
46 | P a g e
Emilio Boada vs. Juan Posadas
G.R. No. L-36994 March 30, 1933
Justice Ostrand
SYNOPSIS:
This is an appeal to determine whether or not the appellee is a merchant and is

therefore liable to pay internal revenue taxes imposed and collected by the Collector of
Internal Revenue.
FACTS:
Emilio Boada, Pedro Boada, and Jose Boada were partners of "Los Catalanes de
Pedro Boada". engaged in the sale of merchandise until February 1, 1927 upon the
dissolution of the partnership and merge it into the corporation known as "Boada,
Castro & Peñafiel". The merger resulted in a new corporation of which Emilio Boada
was a stockholder.
The interest of Emilio consisted of P57,112.51, inventoried value of certain

merchandise of the partnership "Los Catalanes de Pedro Boada", and was turned over
to the corporation. Such payment of said merchandise was guaranteed by a reserve fund
of the corporation which was to be made by way of a yearly amortization of not less
than 15 per cent of the profits having interest at 8 per cent per annum and the reserve
fund to be cancelled as the said amount was being paid. Consequently, the partnership
"Los Catalanes de Pedro Boada" has been doing business for fifteen years, and as such
has paid the corresponding internal revenue taxes and that Emilio Boada has never paid
any tax.
Citing the case of Whitaker vs. Rafferty (38 Phil., 508), Emilio Boada contends
that since he has not been engaged in commerce in recent years, he cannot very well be
regarded as a merchant. The partnership "Los Catalanes de Pedro Boada" having paid
its merchant tax as a de facto partnership, Emilio Boada cannot be subjected under any
law to pay the merchant tax of 1 per cent on the sale only because, desiring to retire
from the business, he decided to sell his interest in said partnership to the new
corporation "Boada, Castro & Peñafiel".
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellee is a merchant and is therefore liable to pay internal

revenue taxes imposed and collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
47 | P a g e
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Court held that one who has
negotiated with an unregistered partnership, cannot allege in defense that the same
cannot collect from him the debt for not being a registered partnership (U.S. vs. Asensi,
34 Phil., 674). T These deviations from the rule are due to the theory of estoppel.
In the case at bar, it is admitted by both parties that the partnership "Los
Catalanes de Pedro Boada" has never been registered. The said partnership existed and
carried out its business, however, as a registered partnership, although it has never been
so. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has considered "Los Catalanes de Pedro Boada" as
a registered partnership for purposes of taxation, and it is now asked if it could be
permitted to allege that said partnership has no juridical personality because it has not
been registered. It seems to the court somewhat anomalous to sustain the contention
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue could do it after having collected the tax from "Los
Catalanes de Pedro Boada" as a partnership with juridical personality, instead of
collecting from all and each of the partners. This is important. "Los Catalanes de Pedro
Boada" could have paid the income tax on the basis of its profit in lump sum as a
partnership, which all and each of the partners should not have been obliged to do, had
the profit been considered as distributed and simply added to the individual income of
each partner.
Under the circumstances of the case, the court, is of the opinion that, for
purposes of taxation, the partnership "Los Catalanes de Pedro Boada", although not
registered, was a de facto corporation, whose personality could not be questioned by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This being so, the transfer of the interest of Emilio
Boada to the new corporation, "Boada, Castro & Peñafiel", was not commercial act, as
there is no evidence to the effect that he had executed other commercial acts which
would constitute him a merchant in the legal sense.
48 | P a g e
Teck Seing v. Pacific Commercial Company
G.R. No. 19892. September 6, 1923
Justice Malcolm
SYNOPSIS:
TEST OF PARTNERSHIP.— The legal intention deducible from the acts of

the parties controls in determining the existence of a partnership. If they intend to do
a thing which in law constitutes a partnership, they are partners, although their purpose
was to avoid the creation of such relation.
FACTS:
Upon declaration of insolvency by Teck Seing & Co., Ltd., the Pacific
Commercial Company, Piñol & Company, Riu Hermanos, and W. H. Anderson &
Company who are creditors of the former instituted an action against the same for a
claim in the firm and prayed to enter an order to wit: "(a) declaring the individual
partners as described in paragraph 5 parties to this proceeding; (b) to require each of
said partners to file an inventory of his property in the manner required by section 51
of Act No. 1956; and (c) that each of said partners be adjudicated insolvent debtors in
this proceeding."
The trial judge first granted the motion, but, subsequently, on opposition being
renewed, denied it. It is from this last order that an appeal was taken in accordance with
section 82 of the Insolvency Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Teck Seing & Co., Ltd is a partnership or a corporation
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Teck Seing & Co., Ltd is a partnership. To
establish a limited partnership there must be, at least, one general partner and the name
of at least one of the general partners must appear in the firm name. (Code of
Commerce, arts. 122 [2], 146, 148.) But neither of these requirements have been
fulfilled. Well settled is the rule that those who seek to avail themselves of the protection
of laws permitting the creation of limited partnerships must show a substantially full
compliance with such laws. A limited partnership that has not complied with the law of
its creation is not considered a limited partnership at all, but a general partnership in
which all the members are liable.
Article 125 of the Code of Commerce provides that the articles of general
copartnership must state the names, surnames, and domiciles of the partners; the firm
49 | P a g e
name; the names, and surnames of the partners to whom the management of the firm
and the use of its signature is intrusted; the capital which each partner contributes in
cash, credits, or property, stating the value given the latter or the basis on which their
appraisement is to be made; the duration of the copartnership; and the amounts which,
in a proper case, are to be given to each managing partner annually for his private
expenses, while the succeeding article of the Code provides that the general
copartnership must transact business under the name of all its members, of several of
them, or of one only.
Upon careful scrutiny of the documents presented, it will be noted that all of the
requirements of the Code have been met, with the sole exception of that relating to the
composition of the firm name. The remaining possibility is the revised contention of
counsel for the petitioners to the effect that Teck Seing & Co., Ltd. is only a de facto
commercial association and that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hung-
Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng [1906], 6 Phil., 498), is controlling.
The court ruled in the cas Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng (6 Phil., 498
1906) the partnership had not been recorded in the mercantile registry; and that Kieng-
Chiong-Seng was not proven to be the firm name, but rather the designation of the
partnership. The conclusion then was, that the partnership in question was merely de
facto and that, therefore, giving effect to the provisions of article 120 of the Code of
Commerce, the right of action was against the persons in charge of the management of
the association.
The order appealed from is reversed and the court ordered that the record shall
be returned to the court of origin for further proceedings pursuant to the motion
presented by the creditors, in conformity with the provisions of the Insolvency Law.
Without special finding as to the costs in this instance, it is so ordered.
50 | P a g e
Contributor: Ogoc, Sheryl L.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa)
That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
51 | P a g e
Landmark Case
Son Cui, et. al vs. Guepanco
G.R. no. L- 6163. March 14, 1912
Justice Moreland
SYNOPSIS:
PERSONS DWELLING TOGETHER IN APPARENT MATRIMONY.—

Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law.
FACTS:
It is undisputed that Ferando Roxas Tan Tungco was born in 1842 and when he
was 11 years old, he went to the Philippines and lived in the Philippines and became a
businessman. He met Atanasia Guepangco and they lived together as husband and wife.
After having five children where one died, they got married and had other children but
some of them were dead. When Tan Tungco died and left a last will and testament
which was executed in 1891. Under the said will, testator Tan Tungco made Leon
Guepangco, Antonio Roxas, and the defendant Atanasia Guepangco as alternative
executors and that upon the death of the latter, they took possession of all of his
property, both real and personal together with all his papers, documents, and books of
accounts, and administered said property until the April 25, 1901. It was then distributed
among the defendants, in whose possession it has since remained.
However, plaintiffs filed a claim against the estate of Tan Tungco and alleged
that plaintiff Son Cui was married to Tan Tungco in China in 1868 and had six sons.
Consequently, three of his sons with Son Cui namely Tan Muico, Tan Chujay, and Tan
Quico died intestate and the plaintiffs herein are their only heirs. They alleged that
defendant Atanasia Guepangco acquired other properties of considerable value during
her administration of the same however she never accounted for the property taken
over by her from the estate or acquired by her from the proceeds thereof. Instead, she
concealed and hid that property together with the rents and profits therefrom, making
it impossible In favor of the plaintiffs to ascertain its amount and value. However,
upon ascertaining the value of the property belonging to said estate, plaintiffs estimated
it at about P700,000.00.
Since the deceased is a subject of China at the time of his death, his property
ought to be distributed according to the laws of China. Under the laws of China, the
mistress and illegitimate children living outside the family shall take nothing and the
52 | P a g e
daughters are entitled to nothing but support until marriage, when they may claim the
marriage dowry.
The plaintiffs herein prayed for the following to wit: 1)a discovery, an accounting;
a receivership; 2) the notation of a lis pendens in the registry of property with respect
to all of the real estate belonging to the estate; 3) that the plaintiffs be declared the only
surviving heirs of Tan Tungco, and as such the legal owners of the original estate of
Fernando Roxas Tan Tungco and the property into which it has been converted; 4)
that the defendants be declared to have held the original property and the property into
which it has been converted, as well as the rents and profits therefrom, in trust In favor
of the plaintiffs; 5) that the will above referred to be set aside as making an unlawful
disposition of the estate in that it deprives the plaintiff s of the property to which they
are entitled under the law and of which the deceased could not legally deprive them.
The defendants denied the allegations and averred that defendant Anastacia was
married to the deceased and lived together as husband and wife and begot four children
who are the other defendants in this case. The last will and testament, dated 15, 1891,
left by the deceased named these said children as his only legitimate children and as his
only legal heir. Defendants further alleged that the plaintiffs have no right, interest or
participation in the estate of the deceased other than that given to them in the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Tan Tungco with Son Cui is valid
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a disputable presumption that
such persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, are in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law.
In the instant case, there were evidences presented by the defendants to rebut
the presumption of marriage of Tan Tungco with Son Cui. Tan Tungco was not
permitted or given a passport to leave the Philippines at any time during 1867 to 1871
and that the registered residence number of Tan Tungco remained the same proving
the fact that he lived continuously in the Philippines from 1853 to 1872 and thus he
could not have married Son Cui in 1868.
Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that the testimony of Atanasia herself is a

substantial admission upon the part of the defendants that the marriage between Son
Cui and Tan Tungco actually occurred and that the only difference is the date of alleged
marriage is 1883 and not 1868. However, the Court did not consider it as a proof for
the occurrence of marriage between Son Cui and Tan Tungco.
53 | P a g e
The Court held that such continuous cohabitation and such relationship for a
long period of time that led to the creation and rearing of a family lead people generally
to speak of the parties to that relationship as husband and wife, and the fruits thereof
as the legitimate offspring of the parents. This testimony of Atanasia should not be
given weight for it was testified to an event which happened twenty eight years ago and
that such words were not properly chosen.
The Court gave much weight on the oath the deceased made during his marriage
to Atanasia in 1872 that he was single and was never married to any other woman. Also,
the last will and testament of the deceased, that was duly attested and probated, made a
declaration that the testator was married to Atanasia Guepangco and that they had
various children. This was given the greatest consideration.
Based on the foregoing evidences presented by the defendant, the Court ruled
that marriage of the deceased with the plaintiff Son Cui is not valid. However, the rights
of the three sons as illegitimate children shall be considered only insofar as that given
to them in the will aforementioned.
54 | P a g e
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
G.R. No. L-18081. March 3, 1922
Justice Malcolm
SYNOPSIS:
PRESUMPTION AS TO MARRIAGE.—Every intendment of the law leans

toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law.
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China, was married Tan Dit on February 16, 1895 in
the city of Amoy, China 1895 as evidenced by a document in Chinese. Cheong Boo
remained in China for one year and four months and had a child named Cheong Seng
Gee. When Cheong Boo left China and went to the Philippines, he had a concubine
named Mora Adong and had two children named Payang and Rosalia Cheong Boo.
Cheong Seng Gee followed his father in the Philippines and was permitted to
enter the country as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to
China and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any
further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
When Cheong Boo died intestate on August 5, 1919 in Zamboanga, he left

property worth nearly P100, 000.00. The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong
Seng Gee, the alleged legitimate child of the former. However, the alleged wife of the
deceased named Mora Adong, claiming she is lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896
in Basilan, also claimed the estate of Cheong Boo.
CFI of Zamboanga held that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. On
the other hand, the trial court rendered a decision that the marriage between Mora
Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but under the laws of the
Philippines marriage is invalid. Accordingly, daughters of Cheong Boo, Payang and
Rosalia, would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these
conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of Cheong Boo
between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
ISSUES:
55 | P a g e
(1) Whether or not the marriage of Cheong Boo with Tan Dit is valid
(2) Whether or not the marriage of Cheong Boo with Mora Adong is valid
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The immigration documents

presented by Cheong Seng Gee only showed the relationship existing between the
Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee. But it did not establish the marriage
between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All
marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the
country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a
valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove
before the courts of the Philippines the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
The Court also cited the case of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910], 16 Phil.,
137; [1913], 228 U. S., 335). The courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of
the United States held, in the issue of conflicting claims between the descendants of an
alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage, the
Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United
States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of
uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of
the husband and administration of his estate, through an alleged prior Chinese marriage,
" save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction
of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son
Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).
In the instant case, no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As it was previously held in the
case of Encarnacion there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to
produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
56 | P a g e
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper præsumitur pro matrimonio—Always presume
marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil, 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
supra; U. S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101
Ind., 129.)
In the instant case, Cheong Boo and Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife
for twenty-three years until the latter’s death. They begot five children, two of whom,
Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third
persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted
this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when different legal
documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he
was married to the Mora Adong, while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the
marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Therefore, the Court ruled that marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong
is valid and thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights
accruing to them under the law.
57 | P a g e
Que Quay vs. The Insular Collector of Customs
G.R. No. 10992. January 6, 1916
Justice Moreland
SYNOPSIS:
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE.—In the absence of evidence to the

contrary, the courts of the Philippine Islands will assume that continuous marital
relations and cohabitation between a man and a woman for a period of 34 years,
resulting in the birth of a child, would create in China under Chinese law the
presumption of a lawful marriage.
FACTS:
On May 3, 1915, Petitioner Que Quay arrived at the port of Manila from China
claiming the right to enter the Philippine Islands as a citizen thereof by reason of being
the illegitimate son of a Filipino woman named Hilaria Santa However, the immigration
inspector refused to admit the petitioner to enter the Philippines. He was held for
examination by a board of special inquiry, composed of two immigration inspectors
and a stenographer employed in the Bureau of Customs, and questioned his right to
enter the Philippines as a citizen thereof.
After hearing the testimony of witnesses, petitioner was not permitted to enter
the Philippines by the board of special inquiry on the ground that he was not entitled
thereto under the Chinese Exclusion Laws. Aggrieved, an appeal was made to the
Insular Collector of Customs. However, the decision appealed for was affirmed by the
said bureau. Application was then made to the Court of First Instance for a writ of
habeas corpus, which was denied on the ground that that the Court of First Instance
acquires no jurisdiction and therefore has no power to interfere with the custody of the
Insular Collector of Customs in cases of this character, until it has been clearly shown
by the petitioner that the board of special inquiry, in excluding the petitioner from the
Philippine Islands, acted on a wrong principle of law and in violation of law or that it
abused or exceeded its authority. Also, there was no error of law prejudicial to
petitioner's rights, hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of marriage was overcome by the evidences

presented by the petitioner.
RULING:
58 | P a g e
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The contention of the Petitioner that
his parents were not married and therefore as illegitimate son he follows the citizenship
of his mother is untenable.
It is admitted that the petitioner’s parents lived and cohabitated together in China
as husband and wife for thirty four years. . In most countries, particularly in civilized
countries, marital life and cohabitation for such a length of time would give rise to a
presumption of marriage which would require clear and convincing proof to rebut the
same. The Court is not informed of provisions of the Chinese law regarding the matter.
And since there is no proof to the contrary, the court believed that it is incumbent upon
them to assume that the law of China on that subject is the same as that of other
nations, including the Philippines. The continuous marital relations and cohabitation
between a man and a woman for a period of 34 years, resulting in the birth of a child,
would create in China the presumption of a lawful marriage.
And since there is no clear and convincing evidence presented by the petitioner
to counter the presumption of marriage, the Court assumed that the petitioner is a
legitimate child.
However, granting arguendo that petitioner’s claims are correct, the Court still
sustained the decision appealed for and ruled that he is not entitled to enter the
Philippines. Petitioner’s actuations of having stayed in China for years after he arrived
at the age of majority without any effort to claim Filipino citizenship led the court to
believe that he is deemed to have abandoned the same and have assumed that of the
country in which he was born and in which he had lived all his life.
59 | P a g e
Contributor: Capitle, Arjay P.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (bb)
That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry.
60 | P a g e
Landmark case
VIRGINIA OCAMPO v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO
G.R. No. 19890 August 3, 2015
SYNOPSIS:
After a judicial decree of declaration of nullity of marriage, the trial court ordered
herein parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties. They failed
to agree on a project of partition and thereafter, the trial court ruled that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing. Herein petitioner
opposed on the ground that the respondent should be deprived of his share in the
conjugal partnership of gains since it is the petitioner’s sole exertion of effort which
resulted the acquisition of the properties. However the Supreme Court ruled that the
petitioner failed to prove that they acquired the properties solely on her own efforts
and failed to dispute the presumption laid down by the rules.
FACTS:
A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed by petitioner against

her husband before the Quezon City RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled for the dissolution of their marital ties and ordered that
the inventory of their properties shall be submitted for purpose of liquidation.
The trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition however, they
failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties. The trial court
rendered a ruling and declared the parties to be entitled on equal sharing of the
properties. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Respondent filed a Motion to Deny or
Dismiss the Notice of Appeal. The trial court denied the motion and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s notice of appeal and her subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review and contended that the respondent
shall be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith
and psychological perversity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling that the herein parties are entitled
to 50-50 share on their properties?
61 | P a g e
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court and the appellate court correctly
held that the parties will share on equal footing considering that petitioner failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
Only the testimonial evidence was presented by the parties respectively, to prove
and dispute the claim of the other with regard to the properties and assets acquired
during the marriage. In the absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove
the contrary, all the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are
presumed conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed
at establishing that respondent took no part in acquiring said properties failed to
convince the Court that the latter be given only a meagre share thereof.
It must also be noted that Rule 131 Section 3 (bb) emphasized that:
xxx “(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry.” xxx
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint work or industry and
shall be owned by them in equal shares.
Here, the Court held that in void marriage, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by either Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Here, any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia
or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
By virtue of this, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. This
presumption was not rebutted by the evidence presented by herein petitioner. As noted,
the certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome this
presumption. Article 116 of the Family Code states that all properties acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The failure of Virginia to rebut this
presumption resulted to the conclusion of the Court that said properties were obtained
by the spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry and shall be jointly owned by them in
equal shares.
62 | P a g e
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO v. SUSAN YEE CARINO
G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001
SYNOPSIS:
Death benefits of the deceased husband have been in conflict between two
wives. The first wife, who was held by the Court as having contracted a void marriage
for lack of a valid marriage license despite not falling under the exemptions provided
for by Family Code, claim for the death benefits of her husband who married another
Susan. Both ladies claim for the death benefits. It is admitted to the trial court by the
second wife and the deceased contracted marriage without first securing a decree of
nullity of marriage. Petitioner was declared to be in default and ordered to pay the
respondent half the amount of the death benefits. Petitioner contended in her appeal
that since she and the deceased contracted marriage without first securing a valid
marriage license, therefore, the marriage is void. By virtue of that, she is entitled to half
of the total amount of the death benefits for she falls within the ambit of the
presumption of co-ownership in cases where properties acquired by a man and woman
who have a void marriage are considered to be of their joint efforts and work. The
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner.
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first
one was with herein petitioner Susan Nicdao. However, it was contracted without a
valid marriage license despite the fact that the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased do not fall within the marriage exempt from the license requirement.
Thereafter, Santiago Carino contracted another marriage with Susan Yee despite an
absence of any declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.
Carino died under the care of Susan Yee. By virtue of the death, Susan Nicdao
claimed a total of Php 146,000 amount of death benefits. Susan Yee received only a
total of Php 21,000 as death benefits.
An action for collection of sum of money was filed by respondent against the
petitioner alleging that petitioner shall be ordered to return at least half of Php 146,000
as death benefits. The trial court declared the petitioner in default for her failure to file
an answer despite proper service of summons.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She however presented the marriage
certificate of the petitioner and the deceased which bears no marriage license number
and a certification from the local civil registrar that no marriage license has been duly
63 | P a g e
issued for the petitioner and the deceased. These pieces of evidence were presented to
bolster the respondent’s action for collection of sum of money.
The trial court ruled against the petitioner and ordered her to pay the respondent
the sum of Php73,000, half of the amount of the death benefits which was paid to the
petitioner.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the full amount of the death benefits
valued at Php 146,000.00?
RULING:
The Court ruled in favour of the petitioner. The Court discussed that marriage
license is indispensable to the validity of the marriage of herein petitioner and deceased.
The Court held that the certification issued by local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage is void. However, it
does not necessarily follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that the marriage of Susan Yee with the deceased was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan and
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, then the death benefits are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. This rule is by virtue of Article 148 of the Family Code.
On the other hand, Article 147 of the Family Code governs the property regime
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased. This article applies to unions of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry
and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
64 | P a g e
Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith
in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Therefore, half of the death benefits will be in favour of the petitioner and the other
half shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs.
The petition is granted and the decision of Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside.
65 | P a g e
Edgar San Luis V. Felicidad San Luis
(G.R. No. 133743)
RODOLFO SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD

SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
SYNOPSIS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on the issue of ownership of an estate
of a deceased who married three times during his lifetime. The widow of the third
marriage asserts ownership over her interest from the estate by virtue of cohabitation
with the deceased without the benefit of marriage. On the other hand, the children of
the first marriage opposed the same and wanted to exclude the herein respondent from
any interest whatsoever from the estate and claimed that the marriage of the deceased
with the respondent is void by the divorce decree obtained by the second wife from the
USA. The Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the widow rationalizing that the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage who are capacitated to marry should be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. It ruled that the property obtained during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts, unless the contrary is proven. Children
of the deceased from the first marriage contradicted the ruling of the lower court. The
Supreme Court however affirmed the claim of the widow for the petitioners failed to
present evidence to prove that the deceased and the widow have not been cohabiting
as husband and wife and that the property obtained are not acquired through joint
efforts. The validity of the divorce decree which will determine the relationship of the
respondent with the deceased was remanded to the lower court for a full-blown trial.
FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna, contracted three marriages

during his lifetime. He married Virginia Sulit and begot six children. Virginia died and
thereafter, Felicisimo contracted another marriage with Merry Lee Corwin, an American
citizen and had a son. Merry Lee filed a divorce petition which was later granted by the
American court. Felicisimo for the third time, married respondent Felicidad Sagalongos
a.k.a. Felicidad San Luis. He had no children with the respondent. Felicisimo died while
cohabiting with the respondent.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of the deceased’s estate. Respondent alleged that the decedent’s surviving
heirs are the respondent as his legal spouse and the six children of the first marriage
66 | P a g e
and the son of the second marriage. That Felicisimo left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at Php 30,304,178.00.
Children of the first marriage opposed the petition of the respondent on the
ground of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. It was further alleged
that the respondent has no legal personality to file the case since she was a mistress of
Felicisimo, and that at the time of his death, Felicisimo was still married to Merry Lee.
The trial court denied the numerous motions to dismiss filed by herein
petitioners. The trial court judge was substituted and thereafter ruled that the letters of
administration are filed without the proper jurisdictional requirement. The petitions are
filed with the Makati RTC, however, the proper court would be in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
since the deceased, is a former governor of Laguna and therefore a resident of the
province. Further, the trial court ruled that the respondent lacks legal personality to file
the instant case for her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, therefore, void ab initio.
The trial court ruled that the divorce decree dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind a Filipino citizen.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower court. CA ruled that the marriage of Felicisimo and the respondent
was valid since the divorce decree obtained was also valid here in the Philippines citing
the rulings of Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. Herein petitioners
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has the legal personality to file the letters of
administration?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that
the issue on the validity of the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee from America
shall be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence. It is noted by the
Supreme Court that it cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent, the
Court ruled that the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation. The Court cited Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
Rules allowed any person having interest over the estate to file a petition for letters of
administration.
67 | P a g e
As aptly discussed by the Court, an interested person has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proved the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the USA, then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
In relation to this, it is provided for by Rule 131 Section 3 (bb) it states that:
xxx “(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry.” xxx
Here, the petitioners failed to prove that: (1) the respondent and the deceased
was not living exclusively as husband and wife, (2) that they are not capacitated to marry
each other, (3) that their marriage is void (4) the properties obtained during the union
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. Here, actual contribution of money, property or industry need
to be alleged and proven in order to obtain favourable judgment.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent’s legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner as the case may be.
The Supreme Court thereby denied the petition, further, it reinstated and
affirmed the order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration.
68 | P a g e
Contributor: Capitle, Arjay P.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (cc)
That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares
including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.
69 | P a g e
Landmark Case
GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
SYNOPSIS:
This case is about the alleged relationship of the petitioner and the respondent.
Petitioner averred that since they (with the respondent) have an amorous relationship,
her administration of the property they allegedly acquired together shall be considered
as their co-owned property and thus she must not be ejected from it. However, the
Court is not persuaded with this allegation. If there were no evidence presented to
validate and sufficiently prove the presumption that a man and woman cohabiting with
each other without the benefit of a marriage but have legal impediment to marry are
co-owners of the properties they acquired during their union, the Court shall rule that
there can be no co-ownership and thus no presumption of equal shares. Actual
contribution is required to validly establish the presumption.
FACTS:
An ejectment case was filed by herein spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez
before Valenzuela MTC against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos and Gina Tumlos.
The spouses alleged that they are the absolute owner of the apartment building. That
they allowed the Tumloses, through tolerance, to occupy the apartment building for the
last seven years without payment of any rent. They further alleged that it was agreed
upon that after a few months, Guillerma shall pay a monthly rent of Php 1600 and the
other defendants to pay Php 1000. However, the Tumloses failed to comply with their
obligations and that several demands have been served to them to vacate the premises.
Despite demands, the Tumloses refused to leave the parcel of land, thus the
spouses filed the ejectment case. The MTC of Valenzuela ruled against the defendant.
In their appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in
their memorandum that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma Tumlos had an amorous
relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was
further alleged that they lived together for 10 years and that Guillerma administered the
property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments. She discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
RTC resolved the case by ruling that Mario and Guillerma acquired the property
during their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage.
The trial court concluded that Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject
property and could not be ejected therefrom.
70 | P a g e
The Court of Appeals rejected the findings of the trial court as there was no
other evidence presented to validate such claim except for the said affidavit/position
paper. The Court of Appeals also ruled that Mario and Lourdes are validly married and
that Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus the property
relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guillerma is a co-owner of the land in dispute?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. The applicable law here as correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals is Article 148 of the Family Code which reads:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by

petitioner, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because
he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-
ownership merely on her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. Her claim of having
administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. Article 148 does
not provide that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition.
71 | P a g e
In favor of plaintiff
JACINTO SAGUID v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
SYNOPSIS:
This case involves a claim of the value of the personal properties allegedly
acquired solely by the respondent. However, the Court modified the ruling of the trial
court favouring the respondent. The Court limited her share up to the extent of her
actual contribution as evidenced by the receipts under her name. The regime of limited
co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who have legal impediment
to marry each other but live as husband and wife applies to properties acquired during
the said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
any proof of actual contribution, the presumption remains stable, their contributions
and corresponding share shall be equal.
FACTS:
Gina Rey was married but separated from her husband when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque. The two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a
house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. The couple decided to separate and end
up their 9-year cohabitation when Gina decided to work in Japan when her relationship
with Jacinto’s relatives turned sour.
Gina Rey filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal property with
receivership against the petitioner with RTC Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that her
income from Japan contributed to the construction of their house. She was also able to
acquire furniture and household effects. She prayed that she be declared as the sole
owner of these personal properties. Gina also testified that she deposited her earnings
in her savings account. Also, she stated that she had a joint account with Jacinto
maintained with same bank. Gina declared that the said deposits were spent for the
purchase of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties.
Petitioner denied the allegations of Gina and averred that the expenses for the
construction of the house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their
fishing vessel. He further averred that the income from Japan earned by the respondent
was not used for the construction of the house but rather utilized for the daily needs
and business of her parents. He alleged that Php 75,000 out of Php 130000 of his total
income was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent.
The trial court declared the defendant in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also denied. A decision was
rendered in favour of the respondent. The trial court ruled that the respondent was the
exclusive owner of the household effects and furniture and order the partition of the
72 | P a g e
house and that the petitioner shall return to the respondent an amount of Php 70,000
which the respondent actually contributed to its construction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the same but not as to the amount of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed properties belong to the respondent.
RULING:
The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It is settled that
Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies
to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons and multiple alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution
is required.
Private respondent alleged that she contributed Php 70,000 for the completion
of the house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of
construction materials amounting to Php 11, 413. On the extent of the respondent’s
co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of Php 11, 413, her
proven contribution in the construction thereof.
Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal
properties came partly from their joint account. While there is no question that both
parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof
of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Here the disputed value of the
personal properties was Php 111, 375. It was not questioned by the petitioner.
Therefore, their share is equivalent to one-half that is Php 55, 687 each.
73 | P a g e
In favor of defendant
ERLINDA AGAPAY v. CARLINA PALANG and HERMINIA DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
SYNOPSIS:
Settled is the rule that in cases of cohabiting man and woman with legal
impediment to marry each other, it must first be established that the properties were
acquired by both parties through their actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Proof of actual contribution would still be essential to justify that there is co-
ownership between the spouses, much more if the said conveyance of property is done
with bad faith and to circumvent the law governing the rule on co-ownership of
cohabiting man and woman with legal impediment to marry each other.
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina Palang. After the
marriage, Miguel left to work in Hawaii. Herminia Palang was also born a year after his
departure.
After his last visit in the country, Miguel stayed in Zambales with his brother and
not with his wife and child. Miguel contracted another marriage with a 19-year old
Erlinda Agapay. The then 63-year old Miguel and Erlinda purchased a parcel of
agricultural land in Pangasinan. A house and lot was allegedly bought by Erlinda as the
sole vendee and a title was issued in her name. Carlina, the first wife, and Miguel
executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a
case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property to
their only child Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage. Two years thereafter, Miguel
died. An action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner was filed with RTC Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Petitioner contended that the
agricultural land was registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already
given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She also averred that the
house and lot is her sole property.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient evidence. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property belongs to herein petitioner?
74 | P a g e
RULING:
The applicable law as in this case is enshrined under Article 148 of the Family
Code which reads:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was void because the
prior marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the de facto
separation.
It was found out by the court that Erlinda cannot actually contributed money to
buy the subject Riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance,
petitioner was only around 23 years of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a
pensioner of the US Government. Her youthfulness created a doubt that she actually
contributed her share in the purchase price of the subject property, there being no proof
of the same.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the agricultural land in Binalonan Pangasinan, the Court find no basis to justify her
co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
On the other hand, the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the house and lot testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlina’s name alone be placed as the vendee. The said transaction
can be deduced as a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons
guilty of concubinage at the time of the donation. Further, the Family Code provides
that donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage is prohibited.
75 | P a g e
Contributor: Herradura, Jed Lenard A.
Sec. 131 (dd)
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules
shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
76 | P a g e
De Aparicio v. Paraguya
G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987
GANCAYCO, J:
SYNOPSIS:
A woman fell in love with a priest and they conceived a child. To hide her
disgrace, the woman married another man. The child was born and was instituted as
sole heir in the will left by her biological father. Upon reaching majority, she sought to
recover parcels of land from another person who allegedly bought it from the girl’s
grandfather and uncle. The question of legitimacy of the girl to inherit from his father
was sought to be resolved in this case.
FACTS:
Trinidad Montilde fell in love with priest, Fr. Felipe Lumain, and became
pregnant with his child. When she was almost four (4) months in her pregnancy, she
decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao to conceal her disgrace. Father Felipe Lumain
even solemnized their marriage. Anastacio and Montilde never lived together as
husband and wife. On September 12, 1924, exactly 192 days after her marriage, Trinidad
gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. Based on the birth certificates, her registered parents
are Anastacio and Matilde. Father Lumain died but left a will wherein he acknowledged
Consolacion as his universal and sole heir. It was duly probated by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol and on appeal, it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Soon after reaching the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of three (3) parcels
of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. The
trial court rendered a decision stating that Consolacion is the owner of the third parcel
of land and that of portions H, F, and G of Sketch Exhibit E-1 while Paraguya is the
owner of the second parcel of land and portions A and B of the same exhibit.
Hipolito elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. Facts based on the
evidence showed that there are three (3) parcels of land involved. The second parcel
and a portion of the third were allegedly have been bought by the defendant through a
pacto de retro sale from Roman and Macario Lumain, father and brother of Fr. Felipe
Lumain, Consolacion’s father. The fact remains that while Roman, Macario, and Fr.
Felipe are now dead, Roman died before his two (2) sons, making them joint heirs of
the said parcel of land in question; and when Felipe died, he left a will, thereby
prohibiting Macario to inherit from him.
Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev.
Fr. Felipe Lumain on the ground that she had been recognized as daughter of the latter
in his testament Exhibit A-1 which has been duly probated by this Court and the Court
77 | P a g e
of Appeals, as shown from Exhibit A- 2. Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that
plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain
for the reason that she is an adulterous child. He further maintains that the
acknowledgment of plaintiff by the late Fr. Felipe Lumain is null and void she being
not a natural child of the latter. In support of this contention, defendant offered in
evidence Exhibit 2 which is the marriage certificate of Anastacio Mamburao and
Trinidad Montilde, mother of plaintiff. According to this certificate, the marriage of
both spouses took place on March 4, 1924. Defendant also offered in evidence Exhibit
I showing that plaintiff was born on September 12, 1924. Taking into account both
documents, it can be said that plaintiff was born six months after her mother's marriage
to Anastacio Mamburao. During the trial Trinidad Montilde declared that she had never
lived together with her husband and at present the latter is living with another woman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the plaintiff-appelle
Consolacion is a natural child of the late Fr. Felipe Lumain.
RULING:
Under the assigned error, appellant points out that appellee Consolacion Lumain
is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde as she
was born on September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage of said spouses citing the
provision of Article 255 of the Civil Code (then Article 108 of the Spanish Civil Code)
—
ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of

the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
78 | P a g e
Appellant further argues there is no evidence of physical impossibility on the part
of husband Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the first 120 days of the
300 days which preceded the birth of the child. Under Article 115 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now Article 265 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing

in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
(Italics supplied.)
Appellant concludes appellee Consolacion is the legitimate child of said

Mamburao spouses as shown by the birth certificate.
Appellant also avers that the declarations of Trinidad Montilde against the
legitimacy of appellee Consolacion cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 256 of the
Civil Code.
However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee

Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only
acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as
his only heir. Said will was duly probated in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any
compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in
his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
79 | P a g e
Andal v. Macaraig
G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
SYNOPSIS:
A minor, assisted by his mother, sought to recover a parcel of land which was
subject of a donation propter nuptias by his grandmother to his father. The
grandmother entered the land in question. A question of legitimacy of the minor was
sought to be resolved given the fact that at the time of the child’s conception, his alleged
father was sick and that his mother eloped with another man.
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in Calabanga, Camarines Sur. The complaint
alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas;
that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner
of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig
by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that
Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when
Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered
the land in question.
The following facts have been proven during the trial: Emiliano Andal became
sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to
live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could
hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife,
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle
of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other
as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his
wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth
to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the
land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to the Supreme Court upon
the plea that only questions of law are involved.
80 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate son of Emiliano.
RULING:
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of
marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible
for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred next preceding the birth of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January
1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was
physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was
sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his
bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of
conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book
"Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the
initial period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21,
1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough
evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house,
and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not
preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could
hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But
experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where
81 | P a g e
persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the
reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably
dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence
to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under
the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule
123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son
d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed
to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage,
or after the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least
had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born
within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no
other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen
that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or
naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such
proof. The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this
presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did
not err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueñas.
82 | P a g e
Gerardo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
CORONA, J.:
SYNOPSIS:
Petitioner and Respondent were married but it was found out that the
respondent was previously married to another man. A case for annulment on the
ground of bigamy was lodged. Consequently, the legitimacy of the child and his filiation
was questioned during the trial. Such was the issued held to be resolved in this case.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo and respondent Ma. Theresa were married on December 29,
1989. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo. However, on December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy wherein he alleged that nine
years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive which
Ma. Theresa did not deny but averred that she never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody
of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision as to the visitation rights granted
to petitioner. She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed
from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate
child shall use the mother’s surname. Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his
visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as Jose Gerardo’s surname. Applying
the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the
ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardo’s surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo
had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte).
The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
appellate court which reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the
son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage and it brushed
aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their
son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was born a
little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. Gerardo moved for
83 | P a g e
a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo is the son of Gerardo.
RULING:
No. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court
of Appeals:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded
on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any
right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as
to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside
in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
84 | P a g e
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that
no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering
these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in
the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the

assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his
legitimacy.
85 | P a g e
Contributor: Mirabel, Christie Faith Anne
Rule 131 Sec. 3(ee)
That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the
nature;
86 | P a g e
Landmark case
People v. Figueroa
GR No. L-1607. January 12, 1949.
SYNOPSIS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance convicting

Atanacio Figureroa for the crime of murder. Here, the Supreme Court ruled the
presumption that “a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things
of that nature” cannot prevail over the positive testimony of two principal witnesses of
the prosecution.
FACTS:
A dance was held in the house of Mayor Ty of the municipality of Calbiga, Samar
that was attended by Felicisimo Abellar, Jose Daradal, Tirso Ocenar, Doroteo Labro,
Baldomero Daradal, Vicente Abellar, and the appellant, Atanacio Figueroa. At one
o’clock of the following morning, Baldomero Daradal and Doroteo Labro quarreled
about a certain girl who also attended the dance. When Baldomero tried to box
Doroteo, Felicisimo and Atanacio interrupted thus nothing happened and the group
merely dispersed.
On their way home, Jose and Baldoremo saw Atanacio draw a weapon which the
latter used to stab Felicisimo on the leg. Felicisimo said to Atanacio, “Tanting, why did
you wound me?”
After the incident, Felicisimo returned to his house and was asked by his wife,
Adela, as to who wounded him. Felicisimo later revealed to Adela and Vicenete that it
was Atanacio. Notwithstanding the medical aid given by Dr. Gaborni, who was
summoned by Adela, Felicisimo died in the same morning as a result of severe
hemorrhage produced by the leg wound inflicted by Atanacio. Atanacio, however, set
up the alibi that he did not attend the said dance and was instead staying in his father’s
house. It was also stressed in his appellant’s brief that the intervention of the Felicisimo
in the quarrel between Baldomero and Doroteo could not have been resented by the
Atanacio to such a degree as to have driven the him to commit such crime of murder.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Adela and Vicente as the principal
witnesses. Atanacio’s counsel vehemently insisted that Vicente lied when he testified
that Felicisimo was able to name his assailant before he died because Dr. Gaborni
observed that Felicisimo was unconscious when said doctor arrived for the first time at
Felicisimo’s house and when he returned for the second time not long after the first
visit. This time, Atanacio’s counsel invokes the presumption that “a thing once proved
to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.” (Rules of Court 123,
87 | P a g e
section 69, pár. [dd].) The lower court found Atanacio guilty of murder. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputable presumption invoked prevails over the testimony
of the witnesses.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the presumption that “a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of that nature” which was relied upon is merely
disputable, and in this case that presumption cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of two witnesses. It is noteworthy that Dr. Gaborni came to the house much later than
the arrival of Felicisimo therein, and the revelation not only to Vicente but also to Adela
was undoubtedly made before Felicisimo became unconscious. The trial court correctly
found Atanacio guilty of the crime of murder.
88 | P a g e
Imbing v. Tiongson
A.M. No. MTJ-91-595. February 7, 1994.
SYNOPSIS:
This is an administrative case filed against Judge Tiongson for his immoral
conduct. The Supreme Court found Judge Tiongson guilty of gross immorality and
dismissed him by applying the presumption that a thing once proved to exist continues
as long as is usual with things of that nature not having been rebutted. It was concluded
that the first marriage of the said judge was still subsisting when he had an affair with
Imbing.
FACTS:
Imbing claims in a letter-complaint that she was married to Judge Tiongson, then
City Judge of Pagadian City, in accordance with the rites, customs and traditions of the
Subanen tribe of which she is a member, at Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, and which
marriage was solemnized by the tribal head, Lantay Imbing. After the marriage, they
lived in Pagadian City and, in the succeeding years, had two children, namely, Anna
Freya and Benjamin, Jr. Later on Judge Tiongson was assigned as City Judge in Manila
and he brought along his family. However, after a time, Imbing and her two children
were abandoned by Judge Tiongson for another woman. There being no financial
support coming from the said Judge, Imbing was forced to go back to her hometown
in Zamboanga del Sur together with her two children.
In his comment, Judge Tionson denied that he and complainant were married;
that he is the father of Benjamin, Jr. and that he neglected to support Anna Freya. Also
he contended it was impossible for him to have married complainant Priscilla Imbing
because it was of public knowledge that the latter was married to and had a child with
another man at the time of their alleged marriage, and that as a matter of fact her
husband and her child were living in the same municipality where he lived. He, however,
acknowledged his paternity of Anna Freya but denied that of Benjamin, Jr. He alleged
that it was highly improbable that Benjamin, Jr. is his son considering that he was
assigned to Manila at which time he had supposedly already stopped seeing herein
complainant. Respondent theorizes that Benjamin, Jr. could have been the child of
somebody else since complainant allegedly cohabited with two other men after her
separation from him. Finally, respondent denied that he had neglected and abandoned
his daughter, Anna Freya, insisting that he had been sending P1,000.00 monthly for her
sustenance.
Imbing addressed a letter of desistance to the Justices of the Supreme Court

stating that she had decided to withdraw her complaint against respondent judge
89 | P a g e
because they had already settled their differences and the latter had agreed to increase
their financial support.
Notwithstanding her letter of desistance, the Court issued a resolution on

referring the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days from receipt of the
records. Thereafter, the corresponding report and recommendation was submitted to
the Court, finding respondent judge guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
recommending his dismissal from the service
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tiongson is guilty of gross immorality.
RULING:
Yes. The Court here applied the presumption that a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of that nature in the case at bar. From the
extant documents in Judge Tiongson’s personal file, it is not explicitly stated that
respondent was married at the time of his amorous relationship with complainant.
However, in his Personal Data Sheet therein, it is specifically stated that respondent was
married to Estrellita R. Tiongson on March 10, 1963 and that they had two children,
namely, Erwin, born on August 25, 1966, and Ma. Regina Pia, born on July 15, 1971,
who were respectively eight and four years old at that time. There is no showing that
the marriage was dissolved or annulled, or that Estrellita Tiongson was already dead at
about the time of Tiongson’s sexual dalliance with Imbing and when Anna Freya was
born.
The presumption that a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature not having been rebutted, it would therefore be safe to
conclude that the first marriage of respondent was still subsisting when he had an affair
with Imbing.
90 | P a g e
Teves v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004.
SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Sandiganbayan finding Edgar

Teves guilty of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The Supreme Court
affirmed the assailed decision and ruled that absent any evidence that Teves divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be
presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things
of that nature.
FACTS:
It was alleged in an information filed before the Sandiganbayan that Edgar Y.

Teves, the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, violated Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions as a mayor and
conspiring with his wife, Teresita Teves, when they caused the issuance of the
appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or
pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned
and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.
Upon their arraignment, the petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” Trial ensued and
the Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law. The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed
pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that (a) nothing on
record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said
cockpit; (b) Teresita Teves was of record the “owner/licensee” of the cockpit; and (c)
since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992,
their property relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
was that of the conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property
over which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited
under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law.
The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing

the issuance of a business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center for not being well-founded.
91 | P a g e
The petitioners filed a petition for review, which was first, denied by the Supreme
Court for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by
this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction but upon petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration the Supreme Court reinstated the petition.
According to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the

Valencia Cockpit in 1992 was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since
Mayor Teves was the cockpit operator and licensee in 1989, said interest continued to
exist until 1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor
Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary interest thereof was direct. But under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest thereon is at most inchoate and
indirect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in presuming that the interest of Mayor
Teves in the said cockpit still exists.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not err in presuming
that Teves’s pecuniary interest over the said cockpit still exists. It is noteworthy that the
evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application
for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Game-fowl
Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January
1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership
thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long
as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring
that effective January 1990 he “turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager
of the said entity due to other work pressure” is not sufficient proof that he divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was
transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit,
his interest over it was direct.
92 | P a g e
Contributor: Mirabel, Christie Faith Anne
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (ff)
That the law has been obeyed;
93 | P a g e
Landmark case
Meralco v. The Public Service Commission
GR No. 42317. September 21, 1934
SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Manila Electric Company against the
Public Service Commission praying that its order that the former desist from enforcing
its regulation be declared null and void. The Court ruled in favor of Manila Electronic
Company since there is a presumption that the law has been obeyed when Public
Service Commission failed to prove that the said regulation is in violation of section 16
(c) of Act 3108.
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company is enforcing a measure or regulation wherein a

customer who does not have any outstanding sufficient deposit with the company to
guarantee his account for electric service and who is disconnected for non-payment of
bills, shall not be reconnected unless the bills in arrears are paid and a deposit to
guarantee future accounts is made. The deposit shall be equal to the amount of the
approximate consumption for two months. It shall bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent
a year, and shall be refunded at the end of one (1) year, if the customer has promptly
paid all electric bills rendered during that period.
However, Public Service Commission sent a letter to Manila Electric Company

ordering the latter to desist from enforcing the said measure or regulation because it is
contrary to the provision of section 16 (c) of Act 3108. It is also stated in the letter that
“the burden of proof shall be upon you (Manila Electric Company) to show that such
regulation, practice, or measurement is not unjust, unreasonable, unduly preferential,
arbitrarily or unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of law.”
Hence this petition for certiorari filed by the Manila Electric Company against
the Public Service Commission praying that judgment be rendered declaring null and
void said commission's order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a presumption that the measures or rules adopted by

public service companies are unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary.
RULING:
No. Nothing in the provision of section 16 (c) of Act 3108, otherwise known as
the Publie Service Law, or in any other provision thereof establishes or discloses the
presumption that the measures or regulations adopted by public service companies are
94 | P a g e
unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary. Section 334, No. 31, of the Code of Civil Procedure
establishes the disputable presumption that "the law has been obeyed". If compliance
with the law is presumed, it should be presumed that the petitioner Manila Electric
Company has complied with the prohibition contained in section 16, subsection (c), of
Act No. 3108, not to adopt any unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary measure or
regulation, and that the measure or regulation which was adopted by it and of which it
gave notice to the Public Service Commission, is just and reasonable. Inasmuch as this
presumption exists in favor of the petitioner, the burden of proof rests with the person
claiming that said measure or regulation is unjust, unreasonable or arbitrary, to show
that his allegation is true.
Therefore, in requiring the petitioner Manila Electric Company to show that the
measure or regulation which it attempts to enforce is just and reasonable, the Public
Service Commission violates one of the rules of procedural law.
95 | P a g e
Santos-Yllana Realty Corp. v. Sps Deang
G.R. No. 190043. June 21, 2017
SYNOPSIS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse
and set the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC and
finding petitioner Santos-Yllana Realty Corporation liable for damages to the
respondents spouses Ricardo Deang and Florentina Deang. The Court rendered a
judgment favoring the petitioner by ruling when the petitioner moved for the Writ of
Execution such enjoys the disputable presumption under Sec. 3(ff), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence that the law has been obeyed.
FACTS:
Florentina Deang (Florentina), doing business under the name and style of
“Rommel Dry Goods,” is a former lessee of Stall No. H-6 at Santos-Yllana Shopping
Center, which is located on Miranda Street, Angeles City, Pampanga, and owned and
operated by petitioner since 1975.
Due to Florentina’s failure to pay her rents and other charges due on the rented
stall, petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages against respondents
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City. The MTC rendered a
Decision based on a Compromise Agreement that the parties executed. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Execution due to Florentina’s failure to comply with the terms of the
Compromise Agreement. Respondents objected, alleging that the amount due to
petitioner had already been paid in full. But Angeles City MTC issued an order granting
the issuance of the Writ of Execution, and the same was accordingly issued.
Respondents moved to quash the Writ of Execution but Sheriff Sicat of the RTC
of Angeles City implemented the Writ of Execution and padlocked respondents’ stall.
The stall, however, was ordered reopened by the MTC within the same day due to the
pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration.
During the hearings on the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents reiterated

their claim that they had already paid the rental arrearages and other fees and charges
due to petitioner; hence, the Motion for Execution should be rendered moot and
academic.
However, Angeles MTC issued an Order upholding the Writ of Execution and
commanding the sheriff to immediately implement the same. Consequently, Sheriff
Pangan, implemented the writ and padlocked respondents’ stall
96 | P a g e
Aggrieved by the implementation of the Writ of Execution, respondents filed a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Injunctive Relief against petitioner and Sheriffs
Sicat and Pangan before the Manila RTC, alleging that the Writ of Execution was
illegally implemented. The trial court observed that the undue haste by which the
Angeles MTC issued the Writ of Execution violated respondents’ right to due process
and to question the propriety of the issuance of the Writ. Consequently, it held that the
enforcement of the Writ was tainted with malice and bad faith on the part of petitioner.
The trial court held the petitioner as well as Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan, jointly and
severally liable for the damages being claimed.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the ruling on appeal. But the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner must be held jointly and severally liable with the
Sheriff when it moved for the Writ of Execution before the MTC.
RULING:
No. Petitioner clearly elected to exercise its right to move for the execution of
the MTC’s Decision pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The rule allows
for the immediate execution of judgment in the event that judgment is rendered against
the defendant in an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case, provided that certain
conditions are met; thus, its move to execute the MTC judgment enjoys the disputable
presumption under Sec. 3(ff), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that it obeyed
the applicable law and rules in doing so.
A reading of the RTC’s judgment shows that it was not conclusively proved that
petitioner committed bad faith or connived with the sheriffs in the implementation of
the Writ. Moreover, no less than the CA, in the body of its Decision, absolved petitioner
from any fault and participation in the injury inflicted upon respondents by reason of
the haphazard implementation of the Writ of Execution.
97 | P a g e
Rafols et al. v. Barba
GR No. L-28446. December 13, 1982.
SYNOPSIS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ruling
against the plaintiff that their cause of action has already prescribed. The Supreme Court
ruled that it is appropriate to apply the presumptions that the law had been obeyed
when the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were not given notice.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants Rafols are the wife and the four (4) children of Nicolas
Rafols, a resident of Cebu City, who died testate. His estate was the subject of
administration in Sp. Proc. No. 154-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled
“Testate Estate of Nicolas Rafols” in which a certain Vital T. Montayre, now deceased,
was appointed administrator.
Montayre, thru counsel, sought authority from the probate Court to sell a parcel
of land belonging to the estate in order to pay taxes, expenses of administration and
other indebtedness of the estate. The said motion was granted. The land authorized to
be sold was a parcel of cogon land with an area of approximately 100 hectares situated
in Barrio Bunga, Toledo City.
A certain Marcelo A. Barba purchased the land for the stated and a deed of sale
was executed in his favor by administrator Montayre which was later on approved by
Judge Juan L. Bocar who manifested such approval on the face of the deed of sale.
More than fifteen (15) years after the execution of the deed of sale in favor of
Barba, Rafols instituted the declaration of the nullity of the said deed of sale against
Barba before the CFI of Cebu on the ground that they are not notified of the hearing
for the application to sell such land nor the approval of such sale. In Rafols’ answer, it
was alleged that he bought the land in good faith, that Rafols is in estoppel, and that
the action had already prescribed.
The CFI held that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations thus
it has already prescribed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI correctly ruled that the action has already prescribed.
98 | P a g e
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that it is true that when an application is made by an

administrator to sell real property of the estate for the payment of debts, expenses and
other obligations of the estate, an application must be filed with the probate court which
may grant the same on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees. (Section 2, Rule
89, Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 90, of the old Rules of Court which was
the rule in force at the time of the transaction herein involved.) It is also the rule that a
sale of property of the estate without such notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees is
void.
However there is no clear showing that the authority granted by the probate
court to sell the parcel of land in question was without written notice to the heirs,
devisees and legatees. Plaintiffs-appellants offered no proof as to such alleged lack of
notice. They rely solely on Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” and “D-1” which were
presented not by them but by defendant-appellee during the hearing of the motion to
dismiss to support such contention. Exhibit “A” is the motion of Atty. Emilio
Lumontad, counsel for the administrator, praying that the administrator be authorized
to sell the land in question. Exhibit “B” is the order of Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg
granting said authority for the purpose of meeting the obligations of the estate. Exhibit
“C” is another motion of Atty. Lumontad praying that the sale in favor of defendant-
appellee be approved. Exhibit “D” is the deed of sale and Exhibit “D-1” is the approval
of said sale indicated by Judge Juan L. Bocar on page 2 thereof. Plaintiffs-appellants
capitalize the fact that in none of said documents or papers does it appear that they
were served or given notice of the same.
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstance pointed out by plaintiffs-
appellants does not suffice to annul the sale in question. The lack of any indication on
the documents mentioned that they were served with copies of the same does not
necessarily mean that they had no notice thereof. In the absence of a positive showing
that the requirements for securing the authority to sell had not been complied with, it
is appropriate to apply the presumptions that the law had been obeyed; that official duty
has been regularly performed; and that private transactions had been fair and regular.
(Sec. 5, pars, m, p and ff, Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
99 | P a g e
Contributor: Gonzales, Francisco Jeremiah S.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (gg)
That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by

public authority, was so printed or published.
100 | P a g e
Landmark case
Suntay v. Suntay
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case wherein a law supported by an incompetent evidence to prove its existence is
questioned to be officially published or printed by a public authority in order to enforce a foreign will in
our jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city
of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in
the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first
marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel,
Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by
the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan

and after hearing, letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the
estate.
One day, the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and
signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition
was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said
will.
An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this
Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further
proceedings.
In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24
April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will,
the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram
from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition.
In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he
had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that
101 | P a g e
the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of
Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or
of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of a law

in the allowance or disallowance of a foreign will.
RULING:
Yes. Citing the case of Fluemer vs. Hix (54 Phil. 610, 611, 612, and 613) and in
accordance with Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to wit: “Sec. 300. Printed
laws of the State or Country. — Books printed or published under the authority of the United States,
or one of the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain statutes, codes,
or other written law of such State or country or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of such
State or country an evidence of the written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine Islands are
evidence of such law.” The law of the Republic of China is a public or official record and it
must be proved in this jurisdiction through the means prescribed by our Rules of Court.
The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should
also be established by competent evidence.
In the instant case, the Petitioner has presented in evidence the certification of
the Chinese Consul General, Tsutseng T. Shen, of the existence of the law in China
(Exhibit B-3), relative to the execution and probate of the will executed by Jose B.
Suntay in Amoy, China (Exhibit P).
The Supreme Court has its doubts as to the admissibility in evidence of the
Chinese Consul General in the Philippines of the existence of the laws of Republic of
China relative to the execution and probate of a will executed in China. Such law may
exist in China, but —
"An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for

any purpose, may be evidence by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. ... If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office." (Sec. 41 of Rule 123.)
102 | P a g e
It is, therefore, obvious that the Chinese Counsel General in the Philippines who
certified as to the existence of such law is not the officer having the legal custody of the record,
nor is he a deputy of such officer. And, if the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the United States stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
103 | P a g e
Partially In favor of the plaintiff
Sy Joc Lieng v. Encarnacion
G.R. No. 4718 March 19, 1910
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case wherein a law supported by an incompetent evidence to prove its existence is
questioned to be officially published or printed by a public authority in order to enforce such law in our
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs, who are all chinese citizens, filed a Complaint against the Defendnats,
alleging that they are the heirs of Vicente Romero Sy Quia, being married to Yap Puan
Niu in or about the year 1847 in Amoy, China. Because of such allegation, Plaintiffs
concluded that they are entitled to the inheritance left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia and
hence, they are the rightful heirs of said Sy Quia.
By way of opposition, defendants who are Filipino citizens contended that they
are the heris of said Vicente Romero Sy Quia because the latter was canonically married
to Petronila Encarnacion as shown by a certificate of marriage.
By way of a Reply to the Answer of the Defendants, Plaintiffs alleged that the
subsequent marriage of Vicente Romero Sy Quia is void, hence, his children to Petronila
were not and never had been the legitimate children of Sy Quia, and that they were not
and never had been his legitimate heirs and descendants.
Defendants maintained that the claim of the plaintiffs regarding the alleged first
marriage of Vicente were fraudulent. The plaintiffs presented witnesses and got their
respective depositions in China to prove that the first marriage took place.
The lower court found that there is no marriage to Yap Puan Niu contrary to the
allegations of the Plaintiffs. The decision is based on the improbability of the allegations
of the Plaintiffs that Vicente lived in China for around four years after such marriage.
There being no valid marriage certificate presented and the testimonies of the witnesses
presented contradict each other.
In the plaintiffs' subsequent pleadings, they prayed that the decision be reversed
and that the properties of Vicente be distributed to them according to the laws of China.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law of China, which was the basis of prayer of Plaintiffs
that the properties of Vicente be distributed to them, can be applied in our jurisdiction.
104 | P a g e
RULING:
No. Vicente is a Filipino citizen. It is an admitted fact the Vicente was a native
Chinaman and therefore a foreigner; that he came to this country in 1839 or 18940,
when he was 12 years of age. He having resided in these Islands since then and until
January 1894, when he died, that is to say for a period of more than 53 years, having
obtained for the purpose the necessary license or permission, and having been
converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a native woman in the city of Vigan and
establishing his domicile first in the Province of Ilocos and later in this city of Manila,
with the intention of residing here permanently, engaging in business generally and
acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that by virtue of all these acts he acquired a
residence and became definitely domiciled in these Islands with the same rights as any
nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in force in these Islands while he lived
here and until his death.
Even disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs should have, but have not, alleged
in their complaint, as one of the facts constituting their cause of action, the existence
of a law passed and promulgated in China, the existence of which law, being foreign,
should have been alleged in the complaint, the fact remains that there is absolutely no
evidence in the record as to the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by plaintiffs
in their subsequent pleadings, the evidence of this character introduced by them
consisting of books or pamphlets written in Chinese characters and marked "Exhibits
AH, AI, AJ, andAK,’ which they claim contain a compilation of the laws of China, being
useless and of no value.
It may be that contain, as plaintiff claim, the laws of China, but we have no
Spanish translation of them, they being in the Chinese language, and written with
characters which are absolutely unknown to this court and to the defendants. Further,
the plaintiffs have not prescribed by section 292 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and,
finally, there is no evidence that these four books or pamphlets were printed by
authority of the Chinese Government or that they have been duly authenticated by the
certificate of competent authorities or that they are properly sealed with the seal of the
nation to which they belong. For this reason the said books or pamphlets can not, under
any circumstances, be considered as documentary proof of the laws of China.
Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State
or country, attested by the certificate of the officer having
charge of the original, under the seal of the State or country,
is admissible as evidence of such law or writing.
Section 302 provides as follows:
"The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible

as evidence of the unwritten law of the United States or of any
105 | P a g e
State of the United States, or foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the United States or of such State or country, or
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts."
The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform on this subject.

For the purposes of this decision however it will be sufficient to refer to the judgment
of the supreme court of Spain of the 26th of May, 1887, where in it is said:
"Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence must be satisfactory
established as any other fact.”
If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do not satisfactory

establish the existence of certain Chinese laws invoked by the plaintiffs, not only
because such pamphlets or books lack the aforesaid formalities and requisites, but
further because there is no evidence as to the nature of the laws contained in those
books or pamphlets and the subjects with which they deal; on the other hand, the two
witnesses whose testimony was introduced for the purpose of establishing the
authenticity of the laws which, according to the plaintiffs, are contained in the said
books, were unable to say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH contains
an exact copy of the original. And the Chinese consul of this city, Sy Int Chu, after
stating that he had never made a regular study of the laws of his country, simply
consulting the same in connection with his official reports, admitted that he had never
read or seen the original copy of this alleged compilation, the books not being duly
certified, adding that he could not say whether the book marked. "Exhibit AH" was an
exact copy of the original.
The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as to the written and
unwritten laws of China, does not show, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure,
that he knew such laws or that he was acquainted with the nature of the laws alleged to
be contained in the said books. He merely confined himself to expressing his own
opinion with reference to the two classes of laws. He, not being an expert on the subject
throughly conversant with the laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in
which laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he testified, can
not even be accepted as a partial evidence that the said four books really contain the
written and unwritten laws of China.
However, the Supreme Court renders its Decision partially in favor of the
Plaintiffs as the Defendants are declared to be liable to pay interest or rent upon that
portion of the property which they posses which rightful belongs to the Plaintiffs.
106 | P a g e
Fluemer v. Annie Coushing Hix
G.R. No. L-6236 17 March 1930
SYNOPSIS:
This is a case wherein a law extracted from a book is questioned to be officially

published or printed by a public authority in order to enforce a foreign will in our
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
The Petitioner, A.W. Fluemer is the special administrator of Edward Randolph

Hix. It is theory of the Petitioner Fluemer that the alleged will he presented for probate
was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction.
Hence, Petitioner Fluemer concluded that that law of West Virginia should
govern the subject will. To support his contention, Petitioner Fluemer submitted a copy
of Section 3868 of Act 1882 as found in a certain book entitled “West Virginia Code,
Annotated”, by Charles Hogg and a document, certifying the same issued by Director
of the National Library.
However, the Court of First Instance denied the probate proceeding instituted
by the Petitioner Fluemer on the ground that Sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were not complied with, to wit:
"Sec. 300. Printed laws of the State or Country. — Books printed

or published under the authority of the United States, or one
of the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and
purporting to contain statutes, codes, or other written law of
such State or country or proved to be commonly admitted in
the tribunals of such State or country an evidence of the
written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine Islands
are evidence of such law."
"Sec. 301. Attested copy of foreign laws. — A copy of the written

law or other public writing of any state or country, attested by
the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the state or country, is admissible as evidence
of such law or writing."
Hence, this appeal.
107 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such

law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.
RULING:
Yes. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. In the instant case, the requirements of the
law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken
was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided
in Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested
by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No
evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was
in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
Hence, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the Petitioner.
108 | P a g e
Contributor: Gonzales, Francisco Jeremiah S.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (hh)
That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases

adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct
reports of such cases.
109 | P a g e
Landmark case
223 F.3d 898 August 22, 2000
FAYE ANASTANOFF, appellant
vs.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHT COURT,

appellee
This is a case wherein a decision not published nor printed in book is questioned to have no precedential
effect to other subsequent cases having similar issues.
FACTS: Faye Anastasoff seeks a refund of overpaid federal income tax. On April 13,
1996, Ms. Anastasoff mailed her refund claim to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes
paid on April 15, 1993. The Service denied her claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b), which
limits refunds to taxes paid in the three years prior to the filing of a claim. Although her
claim was mailed within this period, it was received and filed on April 16, 1996, three
years and one day after she overpaid her taxes, one day late.
In many cases, "the Mailbox Rule," 26 U.S.C. § 7502, saves claims like Ms. Anastasoff's
that would have been timely if received when mailed; they are deemed received when
postmarked. But § 7502 applies only to claims that are untimely, and the parties agree
that under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which measures the timeliness of the refund claim itself,
her claim was received on time.
The issue then is whether § 7502 can be applied, for the purposes of § 6511(b)'s three-
year refund limitation, to a claim that was timely under § 6511(a).
The District Court held that § 7502 could not apply to any part of a timely claim, and
granted judgment for the Service.
On appeal, Ms. Anastasoff argues that § 7502 should apply whenever necessary to fulfill
its remedial purpose, i.e., to save taxpayers from the vagaries of the postal system, even
when only part of the claim is untimely.
The denial of such claim was based on the same argument founded in the case of
Christie vs. United States. Anastasoff contended that the latter case should not be
applied in the instant case since such was not published, hence, not a precedent.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary for a judicial decisions/opinions to be published

in order to be a precedent.
RULING: No.
110 | P a g e
The U.S. Supreme Court hold that the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that
unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it
purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the "judicial."
It is not about whether opinions should be published, whether that means printed in a
book or available in some other accessible form to the public in general. Courts may
decide, for one reason or another, that some of their cases are not important enough to
take up pages in a printed report. Such decisions may be eminently practical and
defensible, but in our view they have nothing to do with the authoritative effect of any
court decision. The question presented here is not whether opinions ought to be
published, but whether they ought to have precedential effect, whether published or
not. We point out, in addition, that "unpublished" in this context has never meant
"secret." So far as we are aware, every opinion and every order of any court in this
country, at least of any appellate court, is available to the public.
111 | P a g e
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 April 11, 2011
ANTONINO MONTICALBO, complainant
vs.
JUDGE CRESENTE F. MARAYA
This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24, 2008 filed by
complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and
grave abuse of authority thru false representation by citing a non-existent case.
FACTS: Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection
of a sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife
before Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte.
The case was dismissed by the said court on the ground that the representative
of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case.
The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant

Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion
for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.
Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court - Calubian, Leyte.
He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal, which
was granted by respondent judge.
In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been
filed out of time. He stated that:
Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to

govern the proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading. Being a prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the
period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd
Division). Since the appealed Order was received by counsel In favor of
the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not
a motion for reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15
days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was
filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and
the appealed Order has become final and executory. The lapse of the
112 | P a g e
appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment
(Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).
Complainant Monticalbo imputes one of the errors on the part of the respondent
judge that the latter motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case
of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order.
Judge Maraya argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is
baseless and that the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba,
his counsel, in an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the
appeal in the case.
On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and
Recommendation, absolving Judge Maraya but his citation of a non-existent case in his
assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect
poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore
recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a
repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order containing report or case decided by tribunal contains

correct reports of such cases.
RULING:
Yes until contradicted. However, in this case, a search of available legal resources
reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, CA G.R. And,
it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the Court of Appeals. This
undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected of
those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.
113 | P a g e
465 U.S. 89 January 23, 1984
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL HOSP., Defendant-Petitioner
vs.
TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent
SYNOPSIS:
This case presents the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief
against state officials on the basis of state law wherein the Supreme Court of Alabama adopted various
cases published in the United States Reports in order to decide the instant case.
FACTS:
Halderman, a retarded resident of Pennhurst, brought a class action in Federal

District Court on behalf of herself and all other Pennhurst residents against Pennhurst
and various officials responsible for its operation. It was alleged, inter alia, that
conditions at Pennhurst were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous, and that such
conditions denied the class members various specified constitutional and statutory
rights, including rights under the Act, and, in addition to seeking injunctive and
monetary relief, it was urged that Pennhurst be closed and that "community living
arrangements" be established for its residents.
The District Court found that certain of the claimed rights were violated, and
granted the relief sought.
The Court of Appeals substantially affirmed, but avoided the constitutional

claims and instead held that U.S.C. 6010 created substantive rights in favor of the
mentally retarded, that mentally retarded persons have an implied cause of action to
enforce those rights, and that the conditions at Pennhurst violated those rights. The
court further found that Congress enacted the Act pursuant to both § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the spending power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Halderman has legal capacity in a class suit, seeking injunctive
relief based on a state law.
114 | P a g e
RULING:
No. In deciding the instant case, the Supreme Court of Alabama cited various
cases that was said to be decided by the said Supreme Court and then published in the
same volume of the United States Reports, to wit:
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit alleging that
a state officer has wrongfully administered a state statute. The Court
awarded injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of both state and
federal law. In Atchison, T. S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912),
the Court held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of taxes
paid under duress was not against the State since a state statute required the
recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In Lankford v. Platte Iron
Works Co., 235 U.S. 461 (1915), the Court assumed that the Eleventh
Amendment would not bar a suit "to compel submission by the officers of
the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing at once the policy of the
law and its specific purpose," id., at 471, but rejected the appellees'
construction of the state statute. See also Farish v. State Banking Board of
Okla., 235 U.S. 498 (1915); American Water Softener Co. v. Lankford, 235
U.S. 496 (1915). In Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918), the Court
stated that the case was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment since the
claim "is based, as we have seen, upon the tortious conduct of Lankford,
not in exertion of the state law but in violation of it. The reasoning of
[ Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918),] is therefore applicable and the
conclusion must be the same, that is, the action is not one against the State,
and the District Court erred in dismissing it for want of jurisdiction on that
ground." Id., at 551. While it is true, as the Court points out ante, at 109, n.
19, that the Martin Court went on to hold that there was no federal diversity
jurisdiction over the case, it cannot be denied that the majority today
repudiates the reasoning of Martin. As for the Court's treatment
of Johnson v. Lankford and O'Connor, ante, at 109-110, n. 19, it is true
that Johnson sought only damages, but the holding of that case, that the
action was not barred by the Constitution since it alleged conduct in
violation of state law, is utterly at odds with the Court's decision today.
Surely the Court cannot mean to rely on a distinction between damages and
injunctive relief, for it states: "A federal court's grant of relief
against state officers on the basis of state law, whether prospective or
retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. . . . We
conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit
against state officials on the basis of state law." Ante, at 106. Awarding
damages for a violation of state law by state officers acting within their
authority is inconsistent with the majority's position that only a need to
vindicate federal law justifies the lifting of the Eleventh Amendment bar. If
115 | P a g e
an order to pay damages for wrongful conduct against a state officer is not
against the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, an additional
order in the form of an injunction telling the officer not to do it again is no
more against the State. It cannot be doubted that today's decision
overrules Johnson. Finally, as for O'Connor, while it involved an allegation
of unconstitutional action, that allegation was insufficient to lift the bar of
the Eleventh Amendment because the complaint sought retroactive relief.
It was the fact that relief was authorized by state law that defeated the
Eleventh Amendment claim in O'Connor. See 223 U.S., at 287.
Accordingly, none of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio holdings; all
of them explicitly consider and reject the claim that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
federal courts from issuing injunctive relief based on state law. There is therefore no
basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this case is an open one.
Contributor: Roque, Regine Juliene G.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (ii)
That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect
the title of such person or his successor in interest;
116 | P a g e
Landmark Case
Severino v. Severino
G.R. No. L-18058 January 16, 1923
SYNOPSIS:
Defendant Guillermo Severino, after the death of his brother (Melecio Severino),
was the latter’s administrator and as such, continued to occupy the land owned by
Melecio. Eventually, cadastral proceedings were instituted for the registration of the
land titles. Guillermo claimed such land and since no opposition was presented, the
court decreed the title in his favor. Melecio’s daughter and sole heir, plaintiff Fabiola
Severino, compelled Guillermo to convey to her the land. It bears noting that Fabiola
was a minor during the time of the cadastral proceedings.
FACTS:
Melencio Severino owned 428 hectares of land in Silay,Negros Occidental.

During Melencio’s lifetime , his brother Guillermo worked to administer former’s land.
Melencio died in 1915, Guillermo continued to occupy the said land. In 1916, survey
was made of the lands in municipality of Silay, including the land in question and
cadastral proceedings were instituted for the registration of the land titles within the
surveyed area. In the cadastral proceedings, Roque Hofileña, as lawyer for Guillermo,
filed answers in latter’s behalf, claiming the lots mentioned as the property of his client.
No opposition was presented in the proceedings, therefore, the court decreed the title
in Guillermo’s favor in 1917.
It may be further observed that at the time of the cadastral proceedings, Fabiola,
herein plaintiff, was a minor; that Guillermo did not appear personally in the
proceedings and did not there testify; that the only testimony in support of his claim
was that of his attorney Hofileña, who swore that he knew the land and that he also
knew that Guillermo Severino inherited the land from his father and that he, by himself,
and through his predecessors in interest, had possessed the land for thirty years. Thus,
this action brought by Fabiola, alleged natural daughter and sole heir of Melecio to
compel Guillermo to convey to her four parcels of land described in the complaint, or
in default thereof to pay her the sum of P800,000 in damages for wrongfully causing
said land to be registered in his own name. Felicitas Villanueva, in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Melecio Severino, has filed a complaint in intervention
claiming the same relief as Fabiola, except in so far as she prays that the conveyance be
made, or damages paid, to the estate.
The court recognized Fabiola as the natural child of Melecio and ordered
Guillermo to convey the land to administratix of the estate. Also, it did not allow
Guillermo to present evidence to the effect that the land was owned in common by all
heris of Ramon Severino (Father of Melencio and Guillermo) and not by Melencio
117 | P a g e
alone. The court also said that Guillermo was already stopped from denying Melencio’s
title since on the previous case, Guillermo admitted that he was a mere agent of his
brother and that the subject land is owned by Melencio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guillermo can be compelled to convey the land to Fabiola, even
if there is already a title in Guillermo’s name.
RULING:
YES. Guillermo’s position as agent is analogous to that of a trustee. The Court

that the principal's right of action to compel a reconveyance is not extinguished through
the registration of the land in favor of the agent; though the final decree of registration
may not be reopened after the expiration of one year from the date of its entry, there
appears to be no reason why the agent should not be compelled, through a suit in equity,
to make such reparation as may lie within his power for the breach of trust committed
by him, and as long as the land stands registered in his name such reparation may take
the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the cestui que trust, i. e., the principal.
SC reiterated that an agent, who has entered and surveyed a portion of that land
for himself and obtained a patent for it in his own name, becomes a trustee for his
principal. He cannot hold the land under an entry for himself otherwise than as trustee
for his principal. The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a person obtains
the legal title to land by any artifice or concealment, or by making use of facilities
intended for the benefit of another, a court of equity will impress upon the land so held
by him a trust in favor of the party who is justly entitled to them, and will order the
trust executed by decreeing their conveyance to the party in whose favor the trust was
created.
There have been a number of cases before this court in which a title to real
property was acquired by a person in his own name, while acting under a fiduciary
capacity, and who afterwards sought to take advantage of the confidence reposed in
him by claiming the ownership of the property for himself. This court has invariably
held such evidence competent as between the fiduciary and the cestui que trust. What
judgment ought to be entered in this case? The court simply absolved the defendant
from the complaint. The proper procedure in such a case, so long as the rights of
innocent third persons have not intervened, is to compel a conveyance to the rightful
owner.
118 | P a g e
In favor of plaintiff
Marabilles v. Quito
No. L-10408. October 18, 1956
SYNOPSIS:
This concerns an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines

Sur by plaintiffs against defendants for the recovery of a parcel of land consisting of 18
hectares situated in Pili, Camarines Sur wherein the lower court dismissed the case on
grounds: no cause of action, parties have no legal capacity to sue, and action is barred
by prescription. However, CA ruled that the defense of prescription cannot be availed
of when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the property
registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. And when a person through
fraud succeeds in registering the property in his name, the law creates what is called
“constructive trust” in favor of the defrauded party and grants to the latter a right to
vindicate the property regardless of the lapse of time.
FACTS:
This case is for recovery of parcel of land consisting of 18 hectares located in

Pili, Camarines Sur. Instead of filing an answer, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
on grounds that (1) that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue, (2) that the complaint
states no cause of action, and (3) that the action had prescribed. [Defendants attached
to their motion as Annex A Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1065 issued in the name
of one Guadalupe Saralde on March 31, 1941 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1018
as Annex B issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles on February 19, 1954. This is a
homestead patent granted under Act No. 2874.]
Herein, plaintiff files a written opposition which the defendant replied and the
lower Court issued an order sustaining the motion on grounds that: (1) the plaintiff do
not have legal capacity to sue because it appear in the title of land was issued in the
name of Patricio Marabiles who already died and complaint does not allege that Severina
Marabiles and her child who now appears as plaintiffs had been duly declared as his
heirs to entitle them to bring the action. The court is of the impression that judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may have legal capacity to bring
the action to recover a property belonging to the deceased; (2) The complaint has no
cause of action while it appears in the complaint that the land was transferred to one
Guadalupe Saralde, deceased wife of defendant Alejandro Quito, there is no allegation
that said Alejandro Quito and his daughter Aida, a co-defendant, had been declared
heirs or administrators of the estate of the deceased; and (3) the action of the plaintiffs
had already prescribed because the 4-year period within which an action based on fraud
may be brought had already elapsed it appearing that the title of plaintiffs' ancestor was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of Guadalupe Saralde in 1941, whereas the
complaint was only filed in 1954. Hence, plaintiff filed an appeal.
119 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint based on the
following grounds: that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; that the complaint states
no cause of action; and that the action had prescribed.
RULING:
As to the first issue, the contention of lower court is not tenable. The right to
assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so,
if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the
property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir
by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it
in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the
limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself.
On the second contention of the lower court, it is not meritorious because in

order to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the
facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, and considering the facts herein
alleged, there is enough ground to proceed with the case. Thus, it appears in the
complaint that Guadalupe Saralde is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the defendant, and as
said Guadalupe has already died, under the law, the husband and his daughter Aida are
the legal heirs. We have already said that in order that an heir may assert his right to the
property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. It was
therefore a mistake to dismiss the complaint on this ground.
Lastly, we also find this conclusion erroneous. While legally the registration of
real property serves as a constructive notice on which an action based on fraud may be
predicated, however, this cannot be invoked in the present case, for there is an averment
in the complaint that the issuance of such title has been accomplished by defendant
Alejandro Quito through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation and not through a valid
and voluntary transfer. It is a rule well settled that the defense of prescription cannot
be availed of when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to convey the
property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. And, when a
person through fraud succeeds in registering the property in his name, the law creates
what is called "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and grants to the latter
a right to vindicate the property regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, it has been held
that "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity
will impress upon the title a so called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.”
It is clear that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in this case.
120 | P a g e
In favor of defendant
Heirs of Abela v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142546. August 9, 2001.
SYNOPSIS:
This pertains to an action for reconveyance where there is a presumption that

the trustee or current possessor of the real property being the rightful owner of such.
To ascertain this presumption, the adverse claimant must prove that the ownership is
based on the strength of his claim and not the weakness of the defense. He
accomplishes the same by presenting convincing evidence of just title as well as
incontrovertible identity of the property he seeks.
FACTS:
On 1985, the Heirs of Anastacio Fabela, the petitioners, filed a reconveyance of

property as well as damages against the Heirs of Roque Neri Sr., the respondents,
involving the two (2) parcel of lands located in Misamis Oriental: Lot 868 and Lot 870.
The petitioners alleged that their grandfather Anastacio Fabela owned said lands. These
parcel of land became subject of litigation in Court of First Instance Misamis oriental
between Carmelino Neri as plaintiff and Simeona Balhon and children heirs of
Anastacio Fabela s defendants and parties entered into “Escritura De Transaccion”, a
notarized document in Visayan Language which provides that Carmelino Neri , as
vendee-a-retro had been entrusted with the possession of parcel of land for a period of
fourteen (14) years from date of instrument which was May 10, 1924 and upon
expiration of said perios, Carmelino Neri was to restore the possession of the property
to Simeon Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio Fabela without need of
“redemption.” Neri did not comply with the conditions setforth on said document.
In 1977 or 1978, The Bureau of Lands conducted survey on this land when a
road was constructed across the land dividing it into two separate lots—Lot 868 and
870. Roque Neri, Sr. then declared the said lands in his name with the Bureau of Lands
and Assessor’s office and on 1980, Philippine Veterans Industrial Development
Corporation (PHIVIDEC) negotiated with Roque Neri Sr. for the purchase of lot 870
but the petitioners protested. Then, Roque Neri Sr. executed a waiver of rights over a
portion of lot 870 satting that a portion of said lot was erroneously included under his
name, hence, petitioners receive the proceeds of the heirs of Fabela.
Despite demands by the plaintiffs for lot 868, Roque Neri, Sr. continued to
ignore them. The Court of First Instance (RTC) ruled in favor of the heirs of Fabela
on two grounds: (1) The heirs of Neri failed to answer the complaint and thus were
declared in default, (2) The Escrittura Transaccion indicated that Neri Sr. was merely a
trustee and should have returned said property long ago. However, heirs of Roque Neri,
Sr. appealed to the Court of Appeals which the latter reversed the decision of the RTC’s
121 | P a g e
judgment by default and dismissed the complaint since the petitioners has not
successfully adduced the required preponderance of evidence on their claim on absolute
ownership over lot 868.
Petitioners claimed that Lots 868 and 870 are owned by their grandfather
Anastacio Fabela. The records of the Bureau of Lands, as well as the survey plan
presented in court, however, indicate Roque Neri, Sr. as the registered claimant of both
lots. The original of the Escritura de Transaccion on which appellees relied heavily, was
not presented in court. Its probative value, however, remains doubtful since said
document does not really prove appellees absolute ownership of the subject property,
nor was Lot 868 explicitly referred to as the property being entrusted to the vendee-a-
retro (Carmelino Neri). Also, the court admitted the presentation of tax receipts of said
land which has been religiously paid by Roque Neri, Sr. through the years. Hence, the
Court of Appeals said that defendants-appellants are entitled to such favorable
presumption of ownership which so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees.
Hence, herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Heirs of Fabela provided substantial evidence of ownership over

the contested property.
RULING:
No, the Court ruled that Heirs of Fabela fails to establish their ownership over
the property. Despite the default of the Heirs of Neri, the allegations of the Heirs of
Fabella rested on shaky ground. The latter failed to establish their case on
preponderance of evidence.
The petitioners claim that the respondent court erred in concluding that
petitioners’ predecessor Roque Neri, Sr. appeared as the registered claimant of lot 868
and 870 which was contrary to the findings of the trial court that the plan showing lot
868 and lot 870 although appearing to have been approved by Jose F. Gatus, OIC,
Regional Director, on July 17, 1986 does not on its face indicate for whom it had been
approved; that Neri Sr. failed to produce evidence of ownership on how he acquired
the subject Lot No. 868. They further claim that the execution in their favor by Roque
Neri Sr. of a waiver of right over lot 870 where the former acknowledged the erroneous
inclusion of the lot in his name was a strong admission against interest on Neris part.
They also contend that the respondent court erred in doubting the probative value of
the Escritura de Transaccion only for the reason that the original was not presented in
court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and thus the contention of the
petitioners are not within the ambit of the court’s jurisdiction. In the instant case,
petitioners based their claim of ownership on the 1924 Escritura de Transaccion, the
original copy of which was not presented in the trial court, while the photocopy was
also lost when the original records were elevated to the respondent court. This was the
122 | P a g e
only piece of evidence that would establish petitioners’ ownership and the identity of
subject lot 868. In ruling for petitioners heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the absolute owners
of lot 868, the trial court found that in the Escritura, it appears that the portion which
is now identified as lot 868 had been entrusted to the possession of Carmelino Neri, as
vendee-a retro, for a period of 14 years from the date of the instrument which was May
10, 1924 and upon the expiration of which said Carmelino Neri was to restore the
possession of the property to Simeona Balhon and her children heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, namely Petra Buenaventura, Julio and Pedro, all surnamed Fabela, without need
of redemption, and that fulfillment of Neris obligation was presumed to have taken
place. We note, however, that nowhere in the trial courts narration of facts were the
boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with particularity, nor the parcel of land
referring to as lot 868. What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in
its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limit.
Consequently, where it was shown that plaintiff has never paid the land tax, while
the defendant has faithfully done so for many years, there being no explanation offered,
it was held that such payment of taxes should be taken into consideration in favor of
defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of the subject property who have declared
the same for tax purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are entitled to such
favorable presumption of ownership which so far had not been overturned by
plaintiffs-appellees.
123 | P a g e
Contributor: Raymundo, Jhoanne B.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj)
That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same
calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and
there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is
determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed
to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
124 | P a g e
Landmark case
Intestate Estate of Pablo C. Luce. Portea v. Pabellon
G.R. No. L-1367 August 16, 1949
SYNOPSIS:
The appellant who is the nephew of Pablo Luce asserts that Pablo survived his
child Cristeta Luce by applying the presumption of survivorship under Rule 123 of the
then Rules of Court which is now Sec. 3(jj) of Rule 131. The present case is an appeal
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance stating that Cristeta survived his
father. The issue is whether or not the presumption of survivorship applies.
FACTS:
The herein appellant is the nephew of Pablo Luce. The present case is an appeal
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance holding that upon the death of Pablo
Luce; all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter Cristeta Luce who
survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour after the death
of her father.
The appellant insists that since there is no proof as to the definite time of the
death of Pablo Luce and his daughter Cristeta Luce, the law applicable is section 69,
sub-section ii (5), of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, under which it is presumed that,
in the absence of any showing as to which of two persons died first, the person between
the ages of 15 and 60 is presumed to have survived the person under 15 or over 60. In
this connection, it is alleged that Pablo Luce was 45 years old, whereas Cristeta Luce
was only 13 years of age.
The appellant also contends that even assuming that Cristeta Luce survived her
father Pablo Luce, her estate should still be adjudicated to the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of survivorship applies
RULING:
In the face of the factual conclusion of the trial court that Pablo Luce died half
an hour before Cristeta Luce died which finding the appellant is now estopped to
controvert and which is furthermore supported by the evidence, the rule cited by the
appellant regarding the disputable presumption of survivorship cannot apply.
Therefore, the appellant’s contention is wrong as there is no more need to apply the
presumption under the law because the facts of the case are clear as to who died first.
Such presumption only applies if there is no evidence that was presented that may prove
the circumstances that happened; however, in this case, there was.
125 | P a g e
As to the appellant's contention that he would still inherit from Cristeta Luce,
such is also not tenable. Reliance is placed on article 925 of the Civil Code providing
that the right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line but
never in the ascending, and that in the collateral line it shall take place only in favor of
the children of brothers and sisters, whether they may be of the whole or half-blood. It
is intimated that because the oppositors-appellees are not in the direct descending line,
but are only maternal grandparents of Cristeta Luce, they cannot inherit by
representation. Aside from the fact that the trial court correctly withheld any
adjudications as to the estate of Cristeta Luce, because it is not included in the intestate
proceedings instituted by the petitioner-appellant, said oppositors-appellees are
claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce in their own rights as
ascendants, and not merely by right of presentation, it appearing that the said Cristeta
Luce did not leave any legitimate children or ascendants.
126 | P a g e
IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
SYNOPSIS:
This case stemmed from the death of the Navarro family in a massacre of
civilians during the liberation of Manila in 1945. The petitioner sought to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the mother named Angela Navarro
survived his son named Joaquin Navarro Jr. which is not in accordance with the
presumption of survivorship under Rule 69 of the then Rules of Court which is now
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj). The Supreme Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not
the presumption of survivorship under the law will be applied.
FACTS:
The present petitioner is an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and

adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, the respondent, is the
son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by his first marriage. This case was instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the summary settlement of the estate of Joaquin Navarro
Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro. They
were all killed in the massacre of civilians in Manila in 1945. The facts according to
Francisco Lopez, the neighbor of the family who miraculously survived are as follows:
On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's
wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During
their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the
Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside
the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit
and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided
to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela
Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor,
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay
flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the
German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed
to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10,
127 | P a g e
1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open. They
flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met
Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law. At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife
Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro
was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and
Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25.
The trial court found the deaths of these persons to have occurred in this order:
1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro,
Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro
and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision stating that Joaquin
Navarro survived his mother
RULING:
Yes. The testimony of Francisco Lopez contains facts quite adequate to solve
the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep
the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, it
must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the
German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the
building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from
the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father
and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five
or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True,
people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly
refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was
not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made
frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
themselves to gun fire.
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the
building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative, and
128 | P a g e
the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese
sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living
members of her family, she could not have kept away from protective walls. Besides,
the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for
the Japanese to be their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises.
Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building
was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes,
these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five
seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the particular circumstances from which
survivorship can be inferred that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of
evidence. In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for inference is
never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact.
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the
rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her
son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son
— is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender
the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
129 | P a g e
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner vs.REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent
SYNOPSIS:
The petitioner in this case wishes to alter his birth certificate from male to female
and thus filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed an opposition after the court a quo granted the request. The Supreme
Court is then tasked to resolve the issue of whether the alteration could be made and
the basis for its affirmation or denial.
FACTS:
The herein petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio was born as a male in the City of Manila on April 1962 and was registered as
such in his birth certificate. He alleges in his petition that he is a male transsexual, that
is anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. By reason of such, he underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts
to transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto"
to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female. The Regional Trial Court then rendered
a decision in favor of the petitioner stating that such would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. The Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeal erred in its decision
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals did not err in its decision of reversing the ruling of
the trial court. The granting if the court a quo lacked legal basis as there is no law
allowing the change of sex and name of a person in their birth certificate by reason of
sex reassignment.
130 | P a g e
Furthermore, assuming that such change would be allowed, there are several
repercussions. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant
the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. Especially if between a man and a
woman, the presumption of survivorship, is generally in favor a man. Therefore, there
will be a confusion as to what the petitioner is considered as, if ever the circumstances
present itself, if the change would be allowed. The Court then would have a hard time
determining the appropriate gender to be applied. Whether the sex stated under his
birth certificate or the sex he is born to?
These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
131 | P a g e
Contributor: Roque, Regine Juliene G.
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (kk)
That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered
to have died at the same time.
132 | P a g e
Landmark case
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
SYNOPSIS:
Presumption of survivorship pursuant to the provision of Article 43 of the New

Civil Code and Section 3 (kk) of Rule 131 of Rules of Court applies only when there is
a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, and whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the
same time.
FACTS:
During the battle of liberation in Manila, Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70 and wife Angela
Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33 years of age), and Concepcion and Natividad (23-25
years of age), Joaquin Navarro Jr, 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on ground
floor of German Club Building which was set on fire and Japanese starter shooting
hitting the 3 daughters who fell. Joaquin Navarro Sr decided to leave building. His wife
did not want to leave so he left with his son, son’s wife and their neighbor, Francisco.
However, when they came out, Joaquin Navarro Jr., was hit and fell on the ground the
rest lay flat on the ground in order to avoid bullets. But the Club has collapsed where
the people inside has been trapped, which includes Angela Joaquin. Joaquin Navarro
Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three (3)
days. On their way to St. Theresa Academy, they encountered Japanase Patrols and
Joaquin Navarro Sr. and Adela has been hit and killed.
Thus, during the settlement proceeding of the estate of Joaquin Navarro Sr. and
Angela Joaquin, there is a dispute as to who died first between Angela and his son. Trial
Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son
outlived his mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angela died first before his son or vis-à-vis.
RULING:
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died first. Pursuant to the provision of Civil Code
“whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons
who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either
must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they
died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take
place.” In the instant case, there is presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her
133 | P a g e
son—this presumption is just a mere speculations and not evidence. Gauged by the
doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference
should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential. Art. 43 speaks about resolving doubt when two (2) or more persons
are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be
no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of
calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship as provided in Section 3 (jj) of Rule 131 of
Rules of Court.
134 | P a g e
CASE TITLE: Intestate Estate of Pablo C. Luce. Pio PORTEA, petitioner and
appellant, vs. JACINTO PABELLON ET AL., oppositors and appellees.
No. L-1367. August 16, 1949
SYNOPSIS:
This case pertains to non-applicability of presumption on survivorship since the

time of death of the two persons who are called to succeed each other has been
determined as supported by evidence.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance holding that
upon the death of Pablo Luce, “all his properties were inherited by his legitimate
daughter Cristeta Luce who survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about
half an hour after” the death of her father. Pablo Luce was 45 years old, whereas Cristeta
Luce was only 13 years of age. The appellant is the nephew of Pablo. The appellees are
the maternal grandparents of Cristeta.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not presumption of survivorship applies.
2. Whether or not the appellees may inherit from Cristeta by right of representation
RULING:
As to the first ISSUE: Yes. There is a factual conclusion, supported by evidence,

that Pablo died half an hour before Cristeta. And as such, the appellant is not correct
in claiming that “the presumption, in the absence of proof as to which of two persons
(who have perished in the same calamity) died first, the person between the ages of 15
and 60 is presumed to have survived the person under 15 or over 60”. In this
connection, it is alleged that Pablo Luce as 45 years old, whereas Cristeta Luce was only
13 years of age. In the face of the factual conclusion of the trial court that Pablo Luce
died half an hour before Cristeta Luce died, which finding the appellant is now estopped
to controvert and which (in the opinion of the writer hereof) is furthermore supported
by the evidence, the rule cited by the appellant regarding the disputable presumption of
survivorship cannot apply.
However, as to the second issue, No. Article 925 of the New Civil Code provides
that the right of representation shall take place in the direct descending line but never
in the ascending, and that in the collateral line, it shall take place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters, whether they may be of the whole or half blood. The
appellees are not in the direct descending line, but are only maternal grandparents of
135 | P a g e
Cristeta, they cannot inherit by representation but the appellees are claiming inheritance
from their grandchild in their own rights as ascendants and not merely by right of
representation, it appearing that Cristeta did not leave legitimate children or ascendants.
136 | P a g e
Young Women's Christian Home v. French
187 U.S. 401 (1903)
SYNOPSIS:
This case is about a person who made a last will and testament. The conditions
setforth in her last will are: one-half of the income from her estate will be secured in
favor of her husband but subject to which the whole was devised and bequeathed to
her only son. In the event of her son's predecease, the entire estate to trustees in trust
for the husband for life, and on his death to the Young Women's Christian Home; And,
in the event testatrix survived husband and son, then to the Home. The mother and
son survived the husband, and perished in a shipwreck, going down together. Thus,
question on presumption of survivorship arise.
FACTS:
Oliver Wheeler Rhodes died at Washington, January 27, 1895, at which time his
wife, Sophia Rhodes, and their only child, Eugene Rhodes, were in Heidelberg,
Germany. They sailed for home from Bremen on the steamship Elbe at three o'clock
P.M. on Tuesday, January 29, 1895. About half-past 5 o'clock the next morning, the
Elbe collided with another steamship, and sank in about twenty minutes after the
collision. Mrs. Rhodes was about fifty-two years old, corpulent, and short of breath,
and her son was about twenty-three years old, a single man, and rather a good swimmer.
His body came up in a fishing net off the coast of Holland some six weeks after the
collision, but his mother's body was never recovered. Of the persons who survived the
shipwreck, only two had any knowledge of the mother and son at the time of the
disaster. One of them saw Mrs. Rhodes come out of her cabin just after the collision
with a blanket over her night dress, and some minutes later saw her son. The other saw
the mother and son on deck after the collision, the son endeavoring to put a shawl
around his mother, and she with her arms thrown around her son's neck. This person
was the last to get into the last boat to leave the ship, and, when it had gotten some
distance away, the ship went down with a lurch and everyone on board was drowned.
He testified that "both of these parties died together, and, so far as this affiant was able
to learn, after he saw these parties on the deck clasped in an embrace that would never
be loosened until after death, no one else saw them."
By her last will and testament, Mrs. Sophia Rhodes provided for her husband by
securing to him the income from one-half her estate, subject to which the whole was
devised and bequeathed to her only son; in the event of her son's predecease, the entire
estate to trustees in trust for the husband for life, and on his death to the Young
Women's Christian Home; in the event testatrix survived husband and son, then to the
Home. The mother and son survived the husband, and perished in a shipwreck, going
down together. The estate was claimed by the next of kin of Mrs. Rhodes, by the next
of kin of the son, and by the Young Women's Christian Home.
137 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not presumption of survivorship applies.
RULING:
The US Supreme Court of the District held that there was no presumption of
survivorship as between the mother and son; that the will manifested an unmistakable
desire to guard against intestacy, and that the intention of Mrs. Rhodes was clearly
apparent that, if her husband and son should not survive her so as to receive the
property, or if it remained under her control at the time of her death, it should go
absolutely to the charity she had named, the Young Women's Christian Home, and
decreed accordingly. From this decree, Barbara Faul and Andrew Wasner, next of kin
of Mrs. Rhodes, and John L. French, administrator of Eugence Rhodes, carried the case
to the Court of Appeals of the District, which concurred in the view that there was no
presumption of survivorship as between the testatrix and her son, but held that, the
terms of the will "vesting the estate in Eugene Rhodes immediately upon testatrix's
death, we agree that it raises a prima facie right in the personal representatives of the
son, and imposes the burden upon her next of kin of displacing them by proof of his
mother's survival," and that the representatives and next of kin of the son were entitled
to the entire fund. The decree was thereupon reversed, and the cause remanded to the
court below with a direction to enter a decree in conformity with that conclusion.
Contributor: Carreon, Michaelangelo M.
Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There is no presumption

of legitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the
marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his allegation.
.
138 | P a g e
RAFAEL FERRER, et. al. vs. JOAQUIN DE INCHAUSTI, et. al.
GR No. L-12993, October 28, 1918
Torres, J.
SYNOPSIS:
Rafael Ferrer and Maria Angelina Ferrer sought before the Supreme Court the
declaration of their mother, Rosa Matilde Viademonte, as a legitimate child of Isabel
Gonzales-Viademonte, in order to receive their alleged respective share in the
inheritance from Isabel. The Court ruled against the children because evidence
revealed that Rosa could not have been born during the lifetime of Ramon, their
father
FACTS:
Isabel Gonzales was married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Sr., with whom
she had two children, namely: Ramon Martinez Viademonte, Jr. and Rosa Matilde
Viademonte. After the death of Ramon, Sr., Isabel married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti,
and had three children, namely: Clotilde Inchausti, Rafael Inchausti, and Joaquin
Inchausti. When Isabel died, all her children have been possessing her property in co-
ownership. During Rosa’s lifetime, her demands for the delivery of her share in the
inheritance were all refused by her siblings. Before the CFI of Manila, Rafael Ferrer and
Maria Angelina Ferrer, children of Rosa, filed a complaint against Joaquin, Rafael,
Clotilde, and Ramon, Jr., praying for the Court to declare Rosa’s right to succeed to the
inheritance left by Isabel. In turn, Joaquin, et. al. alleged that Rosa was an illegitimate
child of Isabel. Thus, Rosa was not entitled to inherit from Isabel. CFI favored Joaquin,
et. al. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Rosa was a legitimate child entitled to inherit from Isabel.
RULING:
No. At the trial, the death certificate of Lieutenant Ramon, Sr., Rosa’s father, was
not presented in evidence but it is uncontroverted that he died on September 30, 1836,
as corroborated by the Puerto Galera Naval Division Accountant Jose Atienza and as
appears in the list of officers found in the payroll under his custody. He issued the
proper certificate to and by request of Isabel on December 31, 1836.
On January 31, 1837, Isabel applied to the Government for a pension to cover
her widowhood expenses, alleging that she was a widow with children of Ramon, Sr..
The application was stamped as of the years 1836 and 1837, a fact which proves the
authenticity of the document written in a stamped paper.
The said documents were corroborated by an entry in a notebook belonging to
Ramon, Jr., wherein it stated that Isabel was married to Ramon, Sr. who died on
September 30, 1836, at the age of 33 years, being then a Lieutenant in the Naval
Division assigned at Puerto Galera, Mindoro.
Notwithstanding the fact that the death certificate of Ramon, Sr. was not
presented in evidence, the documentary and circumstantial evidence of record,
especially the fact of the marriage of Isabel with Jose Joaquin some years after the death
139 | P a g e
of Ramon, Sr., before that marriage, or on September 30, 1836. If this be true, Rosa did
not have legitimate status, even after the dissolution of their marriage by the death of
the husband.
A baptismal certificate, showing that on September 1, 1852, a child three days
old born of unknown parents was baptized and given the name Rosa Matilde Robles.
In view of the fact that Rafael, et. al. have not shown that such baptismal certificate was
not that of their mother Rosa, it remains proven therefore that said certificate was
presented as exhibit by Rafael Inchausti in a case concerning the delivery of a legacy
instituted against Rosa, who, instead of denying that such a baptismal certificate referred
to her, admitted that such certificate might have been hers.
On the day-book of Ramon. Jr., a memorandum states that on September 1,
1852, seven o’ clock in the evening, a three-day old Rosa was delivered to my mother
(Isabel). According to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents.
Juan Ferrer, another witness for Joaquin, et. al., testified that Rosa Matilde and
Benigno Ferrer married in 1972, that Rosa Matilde must have been then between 22
and 30 years of age. It is inferred from this testimony that, if Rosa Matilde could not be
over 30 years old in 1872, she could not have been born between 1842, and much less
in 1836 or 1837.
In 1893, Rosa Matilde declared to the notary public before whom the document
was executed that she was then 39 years of age. If she was 39 years old in 1893, she
could not have been born in 1854 and much less in 1836 and 1837.
A certified copy of a discharge in full executed by Rosa Matilde in 1894 stated
that the maker of the deed was 40 years old, thus corroborating in a convincing manner
what had been stated regarding this point in the preceding paragraph.
From all the evidence adduced, the slightest indication cannot be inferred that
Rosa Matilde was born during the marriage of Ramon, Sr. with Isabel or within the 300
days after the dissolution of their marriage by the death of the husband, nor has the
said Ramon, Sr., in his lifetime, recognized said Rosa Matilde as his daughter.
Rosa Matilde was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel and it follows that her
children as well as her privies have no right to a part of the hereditary property of said
Isabel.
140 | P a g e
GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA
THERESA ALMONTE
GR No. 123450. August 31, 2005
SYNOPSIS:
Gerardo and Theresa’s annulment on the ground of bigamy was granted, which
resulted to the change of Jose Gerardo’s status from legitimate to illegitimate. The CA
found Jose Gerardo to be the child of Theresa by Mario, and not by Gerardo. Gerardo
insisted that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue and relied on Jose
Gerardo’s birth certificate. However, Gerardo and Theresa’s admission that Jose
Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. The Court stated that it would be
tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her
child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her
husband.
FACTS
Gerardo and Theresa were married and blessed with a child, Jose Gerardo.
However, their relationship turned out to be short-lived. Before the RTC, Gerardo filed
a petition for annulment on the ground of bigamy against Theresa claiming that before
their marriage, the latter was married to Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, but averred that the marriage was a
sham and she never cohabited with Mario. RTC ruled in favor of Gerardo and declared
their marriage annulled for being bigamous; that Jose Gerardo was an illegitimate child;
and that Gerardo was granted visitation rights. On Motion for Reconsideration by
Theresa, she argued that nothing in law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child. Also, Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
mother’s surname. The RTC, in applying the best interest of the child principle, denied
the Motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. On Motion
for Reconsideration by Theresa, the CA held that Jose Gerardo was the son of Theresa
and Mario during her first marriage; that Gerardo cannot claim custody nor visitation
rights; and that Gerardo cannot impose his name upon the child. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE
Whether Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
RULING
Yes. Gerardo relies on Theresa’s statement in her Answer to the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an
admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission
that was binding on her. Gerardo’s argument is without merit. Theresa’s statement does
not mean that there was never an instance where she could have been together with
Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was
that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them. Both Theresa and Mario were living in Quezon City during the time material to
Jose Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital
141 | P a g e
intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus,
the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has
no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence
of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof
of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or
when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
sought to be established.
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it
could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in his case
was improper and uncalled for.
142 | P a g e
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION
AND/ OR CORRECTION OF ENRTIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
ERNESTO ROSALES vs. ASUNCION CASTILLO ROSALES, VIDAL
RIVERA, Minors TERESITA CASTILLO, CECILIA ROSALES,
EMMANUEL ROSALES, MILAGROS SOCORRO RIVERA, represented by
Asuncion Castillo Rosales, their mother and legal guardian, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CIVIL REGISTRAR OF CEBU CITY, and HON.
ALFREDO LAYA
GR NO. L-31712, September 28, 1984
Makasiar, J.
SYNOPSIS:
Ernesto sought before the Supreme Court the declaration of illegitimacy of his
wife’s two children from an illicit adulterous relationship through a petition for
cancellation and/ or correction of entry of birth records in which he was erroneously
named as their father. The Supreme Court favored the Local Civil Registrar by ruling
that Ernesto had no cause of action for the said petition because substantial changes in
birth records, such as change in status from legitimate to illegitimate, should be threshed
out in a proceeding for that purpose.
FACTS
Ernesto and Asuncion were married and blessed with four children in Cebu City.
Ernesto and Asuncion ceased to cohabit with each other because Ernesto sought
employment in Iloilo City. During their separation, Asuncion had illicit, adulterous
relationship with Vidal Rivera, which bore four children. In their two children’s
(Cecilia’s and Emmanuel’s) birth certificates, Ernesto was erroneously listed as their
father. Before the CFI of Cebu, Ernesto filed a petition for the correction and/ or
cancellation of the entries in the Civil Registry, praying that the Court declare the four
children not his and to correct the birth records so that the surname Rosales shall no
longer be used by them. The Local Civil Registrar filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that Ernesto has no cause of action for the correction or cancellation of entries in the
Civil Register since the error sought to be corrected is a substantial one, and not a mere
clerical error. CFI ruled in favor of the Local Civil Registrar, and dismissed the petition.
Hence the present appeal by way of Certiorari.
ISSUE 1
Whether the CFI erred in holding the facts alleged in the petition do not
constitute a cause of action for correction and/ or cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
ISSUE 2
Whether the CFI erred in holding that the errors sought to be corrected, being
substantial and not clerical, should not be threshed out in the instant petition under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
143 | P a g e
RULING 1 and 2
No. An action for the correction and/ or cancellation of entries in the Civil
Registry allows changes or corrections, which relate only to harmless and innocuous
alterations such as misspellings or errors that are visible to eyes or obvious to the
understanding and that changes in the citizenship of a person or in the status from
legitimate to illegitimate or from married to not married are substantial as well as
controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Here, the changes or corrections sought by Ernesto are substantial as well as
controversial since the issue involved the legitimacy of the four children, which can only
be resolved in a direct action bought for that purpose; not through the instant petition
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is no presumption of legitimacy
or illegitimacy if a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the
marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his allegation.
144 | P a g e
Rules on Electronic Evidence: Rule 6 Sec. 4:
Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a digital

signature, it shall be presumed in addition to those mentioned in the immediately
preceding section, that:
a. The information contained in a certificate is correct;

b. The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
c. The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the
time it was signed; and
d. A certificate had been issued by the certification authority therein.
145 | P a g e
Landmark Case
Barwick v. GEICO
2021 Ark. 128 2011 Ark. LEXIS 111
Duncan, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This case stems from a claim from a medical insurance policy applied for online.
The signature was thus only electronic; the petitioner then contends that the section
where the application rejected the medical claims must not be admitted as it was not
“in writing,” contrary to the Arkansas Code. The Supreme Court of Arkansas applied
the UETA, discussed below.
FACTS:
Dustin Barwick appealed from an order by the Benton County Circuit Court
granting summary judgment and dismissing his claim for medical benefits under an
automobile insurance policy issued by appellee Government Employee Insurance Co.,
Inc. (GEICO). Barwick contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that an
electronically generated record containing an electronic signature meets the requirement
that a rejection of no-fault coverage be “in writing” under the terms of Arkansas Code
as his wife, who had applied the insurance policy for him, merely ticked a box and left
an electronic signature in the application for the policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the electronic signature is sufficient to prove acquiescence to the

contract.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), “an electronic
signature satisfies a law that requires a signature;” additionally, “an electronic record or
signature is attributable to the person who created it. Creation may be proven in any
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of a security procedure. ‘Security procedure’
means a procedure employed to verify that an electronic signature, record, or
performance is that of a specific person or to detect changes or errors in the electronic
record formation.
The legal effect of the attribution is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances at the time the record or signature was created, executed, or adopted,
including the parties' agreement.”
146 | P a g e
As such, the signature is still binding to the parties. It is also audacious that
Barwick questions the binding nature of the signature when they procured the insurance
policy online in the first place.
147 | P a g e
BPI v. Amado M. Mendoza
GR No. 198799 20 March 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SYNOPSIS:
This case involves an email notice that was unauthenticated in accordance with
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, prompting the CA to reverse the ruling of the RTC
granting relief to BPI. The main point of contention as to that piece of evidence is
whether or not it still has probative value despite being unauthenticated.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for
Writ of Attachment filed by BPI against respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that
on April 8, 1997, respondents: (a) opened a foreign currency savings account with
Account No. 0584-0007-08 (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan Branch and deposited
therein the total amount of US$l6,264.00, broken down as follows: US$100.00 in cash
and US$16,164.00 in US Treasury Check with No. 3149-09693369 payable to "Ma.
Marcos Vda. de Mendoza" (subject check); and (b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00
in a time deposit account. After the lapse of the thirty (30) day clearing period on May
9 and 13, 1997, respondents withdrew the amount of US$16,244.00 from the US savings
account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank charges. However, on June 26, 1997, BPI
received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New York
(Bankers Trust), that the subject check was dishonored due to "amount altered", as
evidenced by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers Trust, and (2) a
photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers
Trust as the original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the
government of the United States of America (US government). This prompted BPI to
inform respondents of such dishonor and to demand reimbursement. BPI then claimed
that: (a) on July 18, 1997, respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their time
deposit account in the amount ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding obligation; (b) upon
the exhaustion of the said time deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory note
dated September 8, 1997 containing his promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount
of ₱l,000.00 monthly; and (c) when respondents failed to fulfill their obligation despite
repeated demands, BPI was constrained to give a final demand letter to respondents on
November 27, 1997
For their part, while respondents admitted the withdrawals and exchanged the
same with BPI at the rate of ₱26.l59 per dollar, they did not receive the amount of
₱582,140.00 from the proceeds. Respondents then maintained that Amado only affixed
his signature in the letter dated July 18, 1997 in order to acknowledge its receipt, but
148 | P a g e
not to give his consent to the application of the proceeds of their time deposit account
to their purported obligations to BPI. According to Amado, he would have been willing
to pay BPI, if only the latter presented proper and authenticated proof of the dishonor
of the subject check. However, since the bank failed to do so, Amado argued that BPI
had no cause of action against him and his mother, Maria.
The RTC ruled in favor of BPI, finding that: (a) BPI duly notified respondents
of the dishonor of the subject check, thus, creating an obligation on the part of the
respondents to return the proceeds that they had already withdrawn; and (b) Amado
unmistakably acknowledged the same by executing a promissory note dated September
8, 1997 promising to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of ₱l,000.00 monthly in
connection with such obligation. In this regard, the RTC opined that since respondents
withdrew the money prior to the dishonor and that BPI allowed such withdrawal by
mistake, it is only proper that respondents return the proceeds of the same pursuant to
the principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the Civil Code.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and consequently,
dismissed BPI's complaint for lack of merit. It held that BPI failed to prove the
dishonor of the subject check, since: (a) the presentation of a mere photocopy of the
subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and (b) the e-mail advice from
Bankers Trust was not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence as the person who sent the e-mail advice was neither identified nor
presented in court. As such, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint due to BPI's
failure to prove its claim against respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the email was properly authenticated to create presumptions as

to its authenticity.
RULING:
No. However, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance
with the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence,
and thus, its admissibility or inadmissibility should not diminish the probative value of
the other evidence proving respondents' obligation towards BPI, namely: (a) Amado's
voluntary acts of conforming to BPI's letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 and
executing the promissory note to answer for such obligation; and (b) the photocopy of
the subject check, which presentation was justified as falling under the afore-discussed
exception to the Best Evidence Rule. As such, their probative value remains.
It should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the
evidence presented by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition
to the latter's formal offer of evidence. It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is
deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the court in arriving at its judgment,
149 | P a g e
as what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better position to assess and weigh
the evidence presented during the trial.
150 | P a g e
Capalla v. COMELEC
GR No. 201112 23 October 2012
SYNOPSIS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the decision of the Supreme Court
dated June 2012, upholding the validity of the contract of COMELEC with Smartmatic.
One of the issues on point is the accuracy of the digital signatures that secure the PCOS
machines that were used for the elections.
FACTS:
On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for
the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the
goods listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December
31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially
exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding
canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the
provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010,
Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the
option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the
storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not exercise the
option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the Comelec to
exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31, 2012. Movants Tan Dem, et al.
convey their view on the absurdity of the Court’s decision in justifying the resurrection
of the dead OTP with the continuing effectivity of the stipulation on performance
security notwithstanding the presumed existence of uncured contractual breach by the
contractor. They also express doubt that the PCOS machines are capable of running
with digital signatures compliant with the minimum accuracy rate.
They assert that there is no justifiable basis to accept mere arguments that the
PCOS is capable of running with digital signatures, secure[d] from hacking and
compliant with the minimum accuracy rate of 99.995%, when in actual performance
during May 2010 [elections,] the PCOS operated without digital signatures, found
vulnerable to hacking and failed by the accuracy requirement, as shown by the
applicable COMELEC resolutions, TWG-RMA report, audit logs and print logs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCOS machines comply with RA 9369 (Automate Elections
Law).
151 | P a g e
RULING:
Yes. As to the issue of digital signatures, the alleged flaws and deficiencies of the
PCOS machines do not affect its compliance with the requirements of RA 9369. The
use of digital signatures and their availability for use in future elections have been
adequately established. As to the alleged glitches, Smartmatic-TIM are not attributable
to any inherent defect in the PCOS machines and, in any case, enhancements have
already been made. The arguments challenging the validity and constitutionality of the
AES Contract and the performance by the Comelec of its mandate have already been
rejected with finality by the Court in Roque v. Comelec, where it was declared that the
contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet”
long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up
such infrastructure as to ensure that the voter can write his preference in relative
privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will
personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy
of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so.
152 | P a g e

Evid COMPILED-Group2

Încărcat de

Informații document

Descriere originală:

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Evid COMPILED-Group2

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Contributor: Santos, Jay Mark A.

Rule 131 Sec. 3 (u)

That a writing is truly dated;

G.R. No. 57589. March 18, 1985

EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; WRITING IS DATED;

NO, PRESUMPTION THAT A WRITING IS TRULY DATED PREVAILS.

This contention is unsupported by any evidence. Against it is the presumption

Mosquerra v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission

G.R. No. L-45833. June 20, 1988.

Roman Mosquerra, is a former employee of the respondent, He started to work

The decision of Workmen’s compensation Unit is in favor of Ramon Mosquerra.

The respondent company appealed. Acting on the appeal, the Workmen’s

However it is claimed by the respondent company that the decision of the

Whether or not the evidence presented by the respondent is enough to overcome

NO, Presumption prevails in this case.

It is clear, however, that the decision in question is dated 30 December 1976 so

G.R. No. 156132

This case started when Modesta R. Sabeniano a client of both petitioners

Citibank et al admitted that Sabeniano had deposits and money market

Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome

The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank

Rule 131 Sec. 3 (v)

Protector's Services, Inc v. CA

[G.R. No. 118176. April 12, 2000]

Petitioner was assessed for deficiency percentage taxes including surcharges,

Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome

BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES INC. v. CIR

This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649

Lapulapu Foundation Vs Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004

In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring

Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is enough to overcome

NO, the presumption still holds.

Rule 131 Sec. 3 (w)

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS,

G.R. No. L-1780, August 31, 1948

Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death of a person who is unheard

No. A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had

G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner Victory

Whether the rule on presumption of death applies

G.R. No. 101797, March 24, 1994

Buenaventura Nogalada corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon.

Whether the circumstances proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish

However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough

GR No. 182760, April 10, 2013

Robert P. Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. Sometime in 1994, Marina

G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

Wifredo is a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,

Whether judicial declaration of presumptive death of a person is a requirement

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter

Whether Janet may be presumed dead.

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

The Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in

Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring

Rule 131 Sec. 3(x):

United States v. Ah Chong

15 Phil 188 19 March 1910

Defendant Ah Chong worked as a cook at Fort McKinley at the same place as

Whether or not Ah Chong may be found guilty.

Bon v. Ziga and Arcangel