1. Feria v. CA, G.R. No.

122954, February 15, 2000

2. Ilusorio v. Bildner [should be Court of Appeals], G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000
3. De Villa v. Director of New Bilibid Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004
4. De Guzman [should be Ordoñez] v. Vinarao, G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994
5. Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001
6. Calvan v. CA, G.R. No. 140823, October 3, 2000
7. Martin v. Guerrero, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1499, October 22, 1999
8. Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004
9. Velasco v. CA, G.R. No. 118644, July 7, 1995
10. Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, November 23, 2003
11. In re Azucena Garcia, G.R. No. 141443, August 30, 2000
12. Moncupa v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-63345, January 30, 1986
13. Alimpoos v. CA, G.R. No. L-27331, July 30, 1981
14. Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996
15. Suarez v. CA, G.R. No. 83251, January 23, 1991
16. Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990
17. Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994
18. Ngaya-an v. Balweg, G.R. No. 80591 August 5, 1991
19. Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985
20. Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000
21. Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990
22. Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, April 2, 2001
23. Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559 April 26, 1991
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF
THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR,
CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to

conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor
will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus.
The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a
duty of the prosecution as of the defense.

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April
28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment
of respondent appellate court.

Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the
antecedents of the present petition are as follows:

Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21,
1981, up to present by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
[1]

Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.

Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be

transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the
[2]

Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be

effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment
Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then discovered that the
[3]

entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing.
In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No.
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the
entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred
at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. [4]

On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ

of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the
[5]

Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994, the Second Division of this Court
[6]

resolved -

" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct
an immediate RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges
thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is
raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13,
1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and
thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision
thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or
before the close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994
and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of
Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of
hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the
Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly
authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and
make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his
duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and
ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of hearing."

The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order dismissing the
[7]

case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the
petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records
of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28,
1995, rendered the assailed Decision affirming the decision of the trial court
[8]

with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice"
and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the
requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to the
reconstitution of the original records.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for
lack of merit, petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following
[9]

errors of law:
[10]

I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS
OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONERS
CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
LAW.

COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF

APPEALS RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN
CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE
JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT
BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL

RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY
THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN
CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE
LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of
a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of
[11]

Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of
such judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v.
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much
the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or
abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235
SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the
prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it
surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those
records."

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole
[12]

inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis
to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more
than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners
continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity,
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
[13]

examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue

ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently,
[14]

the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial

proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess. Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground
[15]

considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the

lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional
right to due process.

Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner
which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
"habang buhay".

In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the
finding that - [16]

"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the

accused, his learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G.
 Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it appears clear
and indubitable that:

(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with

Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678
and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. ...
In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with
Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that
a decision was read to him in open Court by a
personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch
II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment (Habang
buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)

Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the
Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993, petitioner himself stated
[17]

that -

"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled

criminal case and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
move:

1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with

Homicide;

2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused
guilty and given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed
down in 1985; (emphasis supplied)

3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge

told the councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the
decision;

4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is

beyond the accused comprehension (sic) because the last time
he saw the counsel was when the decision was promulgated.

5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City

Jail attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that
transfer of the accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be
affected, but all in vain;"
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based
upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself,
unless such declaration were true, particularly with respect to such grave
[18]

matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner
does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.

The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that
[19]

petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January

11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under
Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima
facieevidence of facts therein stated.

Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal

dated January 18, 1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a
[20]

short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" and are therefore not
[21]

only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or
not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
[22]

asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that
such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent

rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the
return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on
its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent
on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason
[23]

of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the
validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that
the restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides:

"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it
appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered
 prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is
restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return
shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth,
and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts."

Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
petitioners release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court which provides that -

"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not
be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment."

In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was
convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the
New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of
the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost.
Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with
the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:

"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is
holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in
pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself
admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction
of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the
commitment, or authorize the prisoners release."

Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for
all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order that a judgment
[24]
may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack
of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director
[25]

of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and
ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear
that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a
competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there
were no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is
available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.

The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to
initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No.
3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under
[26]

the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their
finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court. Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception,
[27]

whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases. There is no sense in

[28]

limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important

as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. [29]

Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense." Petitioners invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA
[30]

152 (1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas
corpus therein was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of
Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed
to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by
the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own
admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged.
Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for
Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession
of Firearm, the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution
[31]

of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA

K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm

[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA

ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ
of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
[1]

one entitled thereto. Slx[2]

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,

commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and
place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
that behalf." [3]

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of

which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause. It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
[4]

from exercising legal custody over another person. [5]

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of

[6] [7]

Appeals and its resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to
[8]

have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce
consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion
[9]

of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation

rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from
enforcing the visitation rights.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property

valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted

matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia
(age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).

On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City
a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
[10]

Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,

Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her
[11]

husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,

judgment is hereby rendered:

"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners

manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia
Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or
anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff
especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children,
notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx

"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued

be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.

"SO ORDERED." [12]

Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.

As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
[13]

withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
[14]

relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. Jksm
[15]

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
[17]

must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. [18]

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.

The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.

As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed

that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will
run against his fundamental constitutional right. Es m

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights
in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such
right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do
so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with

his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for

lack of merit. No costs.

In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision
of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent
Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004]

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO
DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE
DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-
relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa;
and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are sought on
[1]

the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the
petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo de Villa, we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his
[2]

niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua; and
ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of
the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of
the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated January
9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on
January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. [3]

During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week
of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her
familys rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of
her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout
for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to
kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting
his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body,
petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy,
which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November
1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileens parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they
lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner. [4]

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight
months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and
8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom
she named Leahlyn Mendoza. [5]

In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he
was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of
having an erection. He further averred that Aileens family had been holding a
grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he
interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was
in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. [6]

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza. [7]

On automatic review, we found that the date of birth of Aileens child was
[8]

medically consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that
Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the
prosecutions contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old
baby by normal delivery. Thus, we affirmed petitioners conviction for rape, in
[9]

a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua and
ordered to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child Leahlyn Corales
Mendoza.

SO ORDERED. [10]

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced
with the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or innocence.
 Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a
scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father
of the victims child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case that DNA testing could
resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently furnished by
[11]

the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which
took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioners brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied in our
[12]

Decision of February 21, 2001.

On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests
be conducted. The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
[13]

November 20, 2001. Hence, the Decision became final and executory on
[14]

January 16, 2002. [15]

Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been

informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva,
petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and
a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and
[16]

gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as Container

A.
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of
Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with
distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to
the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute
(NSRI). During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were
[17]

kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample
given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors
of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made
known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. [18]

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March

21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between
the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other
samples, including Leahlyns. [19]

Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as

follows:

DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT

PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS
CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS
SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST
BE SET ASIDE. [20]

xxxxxxxxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER

AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF
THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED. [21]

Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to
the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child
Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that
his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said
child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the
2001 conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new
trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-
discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety
of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already
convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment;
and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual
scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for
those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement.
Very broadly, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto. Issuance of
[22]

the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the
celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, we stated that [a]ny restraint which
[23]

will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. [24]

 The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement
or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction
through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ
of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In
the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that review of a
[25]

judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ

of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. [26]

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to
anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the
review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside
the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v.
Homeres, for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ
[27]

of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ
of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction
of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual
is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere
errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. The reason for this
[28]

is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals: a habeas

[29]

corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. A record [30]

must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or

amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant,
are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if
at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and
manner prescribed by law. In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of
[31]

a courts appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ

of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. A survey of our
[32]

decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ

of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. We [33]

have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is
not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the
writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment
is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be
demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can
be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final
judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the writ of habeas
[34]

corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the

constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the
denial of an accuseds constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of
the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. Later, in Gumabon v.
[35]

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of
[36]

a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of the detention. Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals this
[37] [38]

Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In
that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving
illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth
a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the
prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends
to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. [39]

In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the

[40]

scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance
of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the
inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed
by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding
or judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity.
The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an
equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that
so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. It is the nullity of an
[41]

assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack

through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de
Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner.
As such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the
grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with
petitioners plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any
constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ
of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective
aid of counsel. In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors
[42]

committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial,
denied the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires
a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorneys
performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to
show that the outcome of the trial would have been different with competent
counsel. The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to
[43]

ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. [44]

The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one must examine whether counsels conduct
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent
that the trial did not produce a fair and just result. The proper measure of
[45]

attorney performance is reasonable under the prevailing professional norms,

and the defendant must show that the representation received fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness. For the petition to succeed, the strong
[46]

presumption that the counsels conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable
professional assistance must be overcome. [47]

In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioners
counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and
inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation
that he was leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue
of a petition filed in his favor. In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made
[48]

an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal in a

handwritten Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsels
Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court received by this Court on
September 14, 1999. Petitioner alleged that his counsels withdrawal is an
[49]

untimely and heartbreaking event, considering that he had placed all [his] trust
and confidence on [his counsels] unquestionable integrity and dignity. [50]

While we are sympathetic to petitioners plight, we do not, however, find that

there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to
a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the
proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa,
without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes,
petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We
are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this
case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner
seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas
corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the
child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not
central to the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim
Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the
question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v.
Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the victims pregnancy and resultant
[51]

childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped.

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to
Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small
measure, on the victims claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim
was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by
this Court on automatic review.
The fact of the childs paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil
award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioners
guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner
did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt,
and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
 Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon
erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A
motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available
only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1,
Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial
may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the
judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new trial on any of the
following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly
newly-discovered evidence, i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted,
allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of
the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as
far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within
the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered evidence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence
is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence
[52]

in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to
secure it.[53]

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered

after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for newly-
discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relators claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA
testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of
knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the
part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioners counsel. In either instance,
however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a
party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of
neglect. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latters
[54]

mistakes and negligence. It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to
[55]

a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure. [56]

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented
by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is
entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of
Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor
[57]

General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never
been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed
[58]

to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.

Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of
paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on
the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas
corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR DE GUZMAN,

CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, DIRECTOR EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar de
Guzman y Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City —
Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742, "People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188
SCRA 407, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that de
Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.

Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was
dismissed with costs against accused-appellant.

Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which
became effective on December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of People v.
Simon,1 if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the
event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the range of prision correccional (from
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years). Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the
reduction of penalty introduced by the new law.

Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than
ten (10) years now, his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic
human rights and that, therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of
judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise
released from prison.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained
of his liberty;

2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;

3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and

4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule

102, Revised Rules of Court).
It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the
same is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's
discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due
return of the writ, and to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated
within thirty days, to relieve them from further confinement. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001]

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered
nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,
Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her
for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo,
Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not
find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll
and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three
days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by
her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her
spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her
problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband
reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
 Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother
of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.[1] She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court
in order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez,
testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at
her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical
records.[2] The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late
Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the
edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing
capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with
children.[3]
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts
that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two
other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.[4] She said the birth of John
Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil
registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-
law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.[5] The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez
are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court
decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered

GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante
is ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D.
Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo
A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the
decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of
their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7] Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994,

the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In
his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he
turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish
that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,[9] and
disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10,
1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec.
Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be
returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of
said respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was

denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging:
I

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS ACTION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF
FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING

THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING THAT THE
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN
TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[11]
 In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and
is the son of petitioners?

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[12] Thus, it is the proper legal remedy
to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted
for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.[13] It must be stressed
too that in habeas corpusproceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ
sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by
Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita
insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and
Angelita is the minors biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to
prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other,
are indeed one and the same.[14] Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor
in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of
custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value
of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its
impugned decision, resolution or order.[15] But since the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on
the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the
evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing
son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very
lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the
Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of
ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no
longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother,
Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife,
Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.Though
Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no
offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after
the alleged birth of the child.Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must
be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. [16] Significantly,
the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida
were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage.[18] Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion
should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical
records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son
of petitioners.The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test[19] for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.[20] Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress.[22] Though it is not necessary in this case to resort
to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution
of parentage and identity issues.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140823. October 3, 2000]

JUDGE MELVYN U. CALVAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,

Municipal Trial Court, Branch 127, THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN of
the Provincial Jail of Ilocos Norte, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAYOR REYNOLAN T.
SALES, respondents.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

For resolution is the motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (for petitioners Judge Calvan, the Provincial Warden of Ilocos
Norte and the People of the Philippines) seeking the nullification of the Court's
resolution, dated 05 July 2000, that has denied the petition for review of the
decision, dated 18 November 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
54416, on a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners-movants claim that the
petition which respondent Sales filed is a petition for habeas corpus which
should then be confined to an inquiry on the validity of a person's detention at
the time of the filing of the petition, and that the Court of Appeals has thus erred
in ruling on the legality of the order and warrant of arrest which can only be a
proper subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for habeas corpus.
The factual antecedents -
On 02 August 1999, at about 11:30 a.m., in a shootout at a sitio in
Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, Reynolan T. Sales, incumbent town mayor of
Pagudpud, fatally shot former Mayor Rafael Benemerito. After the incident,
Sales surrendered his handgun, placed himself under the custody of the
Municipal Police and thereupon asked to be brought to the Provincial PNP
headquarters in Laoag City.
The next day, 03 August, Police Chief Inspector Crispin Aguno and Thelma
Benemerito, wife of the victim, lodged a criminal complaint for murder against
Mayor Reynolan Sales at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Adams-
Baagui-Dumalueg-Pagudpud, Branch 127, there docketed Criminal Case No.
9448-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mayor Reynolan T. Sales." Judge
Melvyn U. Calvan, the Presiding Judge forthwith conducted a "preliminary
examination" of the witnesses and issued the assailed order and warrant of
arrest against the accused "with NO BAIL." Mayor Sales was transferred, on 04
August 1999, from the Provincial PNP headquarters to the Provincial Jail where
he had since been detained under the custody of the Provincial Warden of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Jail. On 05 August 1999, Judge Melvyn Calvan, after
conducting a "preliminary examination in accordance with Section 6(b) of Rule
112 of the 1989 Rules in Criminal Procedure," issued a two-page resolution
forwarding the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor "for
appropriate action." On 10 August 1999, Sales was notified by the Provincial
Prosecutor to submit his counter-affidavit and defense evidence.
Contending that his right to due process was violated by the cavalier and
perfunctory manner by which Judge Calvan suddenly terminated and
concluded the preliminary investigation, without even allowing him to submit
counter affidavit and present his witnesses, Mayor Sales filed a Petition
For Habeas Corpus and Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 54416) before the Court of
Appeals. He questioned his detention on the thesis that the Order and Warrant
of Arrest were improvidently and illegally issued by Judge Calvan, the latter
being a relative of complainant Thelma Benemerito within the third civil degree
of affinity and, therefore, disqualified from conducting the preliminary
investigation.
On 30 August 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On 19
September 1999 and while his motion for reconsideration was still pending,
respondent Mayor Sales withdrew the petition for certiorari, leaving the petition
for habeas corpus to be the only remaining petition. The Office of the Solicitor
General was required to comment, and a hearing was conducted by the Court
of Appeals on the habeas corpus on 05 October 1999. Oral argument preceded
the filing of the respective memoranda of the parties.
On 18 November 1999, the appellate court granted the petition for habeas
corpus and ordered the release of private respondent Mayor Sales, viz:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby orders the release from
detention of petitioner Reynolan T. Sales, subject to the outcome of the proper
preliminary investigation."[1]

A petition for review was filed with this Court by the Office of the Solicitor
General seeking a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court
denied the petition in its resolution of 05 July 2000. In its instant motion for
reconsideration the Office of the Solicitor General would insist that the appellate
court resolved the issues beyond the basic precepts of procedure on the theory
that the determination on the legality of the order and warrant of arrest could
not be resolved in a petition for habeas corpus, the issue being appropriate only
for consideration in a petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals, in granting the petition for habeas corpus and in
ordering the release of Mayor Sales, ratiocinated that -

"Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity. This disqualification is mandatory, unlike an inhibition which is
discretionary. It extends to all proceedings, not just to trial as erroneously contended
by respondent Judge. Even Canon 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
a judge shall take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, as when he is `related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree.' Due process likewise requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, so that no judge shall preside in a case in
which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. (Gutierrez vs.
Santos, 2 SCRA 249, 254 [1961].)

"In Geotina vs. Gonzales, (41 SCRA 66 [1971]) the judge who was admittedly related
within the sixth civil degree of affinity to the private complainant ordered the arrest of
the petitioner. The Supreme Court held:

"`We therefore hold that the respondent judge is without authority to preside over the
criminal case in question. Section 1, in commanding him to withdraw from the case
herein involved, necessarily divests him of all authority to act in any judicial capacity
in connection therewith. We further hold that where the disqualifying fact is
indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification as in
the case at bar, sec. 1 forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to proceed. All
his acts in the premises are without authority of law.' (Emphasis supplied.)

"The High Court also stated that where the judge decides in favor of his own
competency, proceeds to try a case and renders a verdict from which there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, resort to the
extraordinary remedies, of which habeas corpus can be cited as one, constitutes the
only means available for review by a superior court.

"In the case at bench, the order and warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge
by virtue of which the petitioner is detained offers no speedy, adequate remedy
or appeal in the ordinary course of law.Habeas corpus is the only remedy to release
him from the effects of the illegal order or one issued without any legal authority, to
use the language of Geotina vs. Gonzales."[2]
 The Solicitor General now contends, however, that the writ of habeas
corpus is simply a writ of inquiry, tasking the person who keeps a detainee in
custody to explain or justify the detention, conformably with Sections 1, 3 and
6, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court.

"SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as otherwise expressly

provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

"x x x x x x x x x

"SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor. - Application for the writ shall be by

petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by
some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

"(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty;

"(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or,
if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an
assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the
person intended;

"(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

"(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be

procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or
restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.

"x x x x x x x x x

"SEC. 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. - In case of imprisonment or

restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command him to
have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment
or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall
command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before
the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to
summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said
court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint."
 The writ, the Solicitor General submits, should then be addressed, not to
the judge or person who issued the warrant of arrest, but to the officer or anyone
who actually detains the person in whose behalf the application is made. Since
the petition for habeas corpus concedes that Mayor Sales is in the custody of
the Provincial Warden of Laoag City, the latter, not petitioner Judge, should be
the proper party respondent.
The proceedings before the Court of Appeals being confined to the habeas
corpus case, the petition should ordinarily be addressed to the person under
whom Mayor Sales is in detention or in alleged illegal custody[3] who would
thereby be in a position to produce at the hearing the body of the person in
whose behalf the petition is made,[4] consistently with the import of Section 6,
Rule 102, of the Rules. Judge Calvan, it might here be pointed out, however,
has constructive custody over respondent for having issued the order and
warrant for his arrest.
The petition filed before the Court of Appeals was originally one for habeas
corpus and certiorari. The writ of certiorari was intended to assail the Order and
Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Melvyn Calvan while the writ of habeas
corpus was sought to relieve Mayor Sales from detention predicating the
application on the alleged illegal Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Calvan by reason of his disqualification. Indeed, a writ of habeas corpus could
be so employed as a remedy ancillary to a proceeding in certiorari for purposes
of review.[5] Later, however, respondent Mayor withdrew the petition
for certiorari but not the petition for habeas corpus leaving the latter to sail
alone. The withdrawal must not be deemed to affect adversely the jurisdiction
of the appellate court, already acquired, to resolve all the issues theretofore
brought before it. Procedural precepts, it must again be stressed, are aids, not
obstacles, in the achievement of substantial justice.
Judge Calvan concededly is related to the complainant, Thelma
Benemerito, within the third civil degree of affinity (his wife Susan Benemerito-
Calvan being the niece of the deceased).
Rule 137, Section 1 provides:

"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any

case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

The proscription against the judge from proceeding with the case is
predicated on the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he
may not be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.[6] In Geotina
vs. Gonzales,[7] this Court has said that where the disqualifying fact is
indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification,
the Rules forthwith strips the judge of any authority to proceed.
The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed
by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding
or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete
nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself
an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order
that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. Keeping in mind the
limitation that in habeas corpus the concern is not merely whether an error has
been committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether
such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process, an inquiry
into the validity of the proceedings or process[8]can be crucial in safeguarding
the constitutional right of a potential accused against an obvious and clear
misjudgment. The intrinsic right of the State to prosecute and detain perceived
transgressors of the law must be balanced with its duty to protect the innate
value of individual liberty.
Quite evidently, the circumspection and objectivity required of the judge
could not be assured in the case at bar. Stringent standard should be applied
in order to avoid hasty and improvident issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
an accused. The deprivation of liberty, regardless of its duration, is too
invaluable a price even just to stake for any wrongful prosecution and
unwarranted detention.
In Allado vs. Diokno,[9] the Court has cautioned:

"Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge
subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not
enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection
would be demeaned and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects' only in the fallible discretion of the judge. (Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85
S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed. 2d.142 [1964].) On the contrary, the probable cause test is an
objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances
must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that
the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed.(Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 889 [1968].)[10]

In this regard, the Court of Appeals has observed that -

"The preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge does not accord with
the prevailing rules.He did it under the old rules, where the preliminary investigation
by a municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during
which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the
preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the
accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced
against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so
desires. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, RA 5180, as amended by
P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination
stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings
consist of only one stage.(Sangguniang Bayan vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 566 [1996].)

"Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to issuance
of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the
form of searching questions and answers. (Roberts, Jr. vs. CA, supra; Sec. 6 (b), Rule
112.) The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the
Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of the stenographic notes do not bear
the signature of the stenographer.

"Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary investigation. He claimed to

have examined only the witnesses for the complainant. He issued a Resolution
and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor without giving the
accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
documents. (Sec. 3 (b), Rule 112.)

"While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular preliminary investigation is to

ask for a new preliminary investigation or a reinvestigation, such normal remedy
would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arrest which stemmed
from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecutor has no power to recall the
warrant of arrest."[11]

Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ,[12] which furnishes an

extraordinary remedy and may not thus be invoked under normal circumstances
but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained, the illegal order and warrant
of arrest issued by petitioner Judge subsists and private respondent is offered
no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of law. The writ
of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly administration
of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special circumstance
that requires immediate action. Such a special circumstance is here present
considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to quash,
the case no longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for a
reinvestigation because the preliminary investigation for purposes of filing the
information has already been taken over by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
latter, upon the other hand, does not have the authority to lift the warrant of
arrest issued by the disqualified judge.Meantime, respondent is being held and
detained under an illegal order and warrant of arrest which has no legal
standing.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This denial is
final.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1499. October 22, 1999]

GIL RAMON O. MARTIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ELEUTERIO F.

GUERRERO, Assisting Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City
(Branch 18), respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment, absent
any bad faith or malice. Nonetheless, they have an obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and
principles.There is no excuse for ignorance of elementary notions of law and jurisprudence.

The Case and the Facts

In a verified Complaint dated September 12, 1998, Gil Ramon O. Martin charged Judge
Eleuterio F. Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City (Branch 18), with
ignorance of the law and violation of the Philippine Constitution. Respondent allegedly issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus against herein complainant who was a resident of Paraaque City, although
the RTC was in Tagaytay City. Worse, the former incurred considerable delay in resolving the
latter's Omnibus Motion. The Complaint reads:[1]

Par. I - On December 27, 1995, a Petition for Habeas Corpus dated December 26,
1995 was filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 as Civil Case No. TC-
1552 by Petitioner Maria Victoria S. Ordiales against your undersigned complainant
for the custody of their begotten minor child born out of wedlock during their union[;]
a xerox copy of the said petition is attached as Annex A.

xxxxxxxxx

Par. IV - On December 28, 1995, Deputy Sheriff, Victor R. Hernandez submitted his
Sheriffs return certifying therein that on that same day he served upon your
undersigned complainant a copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, ANNEX C and a copy
of the petition, ANNEX A, without mention that he also served the Summons,
ANNEX B upon your undersigned complainant. Most notably, the Sheriff did not
mention in his return that he effected service of the courts processes at the business
address indicated in this complaint because both the Summons, ANNEX B and the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, ANNEX C directed him to effect such service at your
undersigned residence at 24 Madrid St., BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila. x x x.

Par. V - For your undersigneds failure to appear in the scheduled hearing of December
29, 1995, the respondent Judge issued an order in open court on the said date directing
the undersigned to appear before the said court at 8:30 oclock in the morning of Jan.
05, 1996 to show cause why no punitive action will be taken for his refusal to
acknowledge receipt of the Writ and for failure to appear; which order of respondent
Judge totally disregarded the Sheriffs Certificate in ANNEX D that the undersigned
instructed his secretary, Mr. Benjamin Bermejo to receive the said processes. A xerox
copy of the Order dated Dec. 29, 1995 is attached as ANNEX E.

Par. VI - On Jan. 04, 1995, Deputy Sheriff, Victor R. Hernandez certified on his
sheriffs return that on the same day he served a copy of the order, ANNEX E and alias
writ upon the undersigned at his residence thru his maid, Susan Nadal. A xerox copy
of said Sheriffs return is attached as ANNEX F. And a xerox copy of the alias Writ of
Habeas Corpus issued by respondent Judge on Jan. 04, 1996 is attached as ANNEX
G.

Par. VII - Both the Order of Dec. 29, 1995, ANNEX E, and alias Writ of Habeas
Corpus dated Jan. 04, 1996, ANNEX G re-scheduled the case for hearing on Jan. 05,
1996 at which hearing the undersigned did not appear. Consequently, on the same day
respondent Judge issued a Warrant for the arrest of the undersigned. And NBI agents
bes[ie]ged his residence at BF Homes from about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of that
day up to about a little past 8:00 oclock in the evening of that same day. And although
they failed to arrest the undersigned, the whole exercise for a duration of time that
lasted even thereafter, or up to Jan. 12, 1996, the date that Warrant of Arrest was lifted
and Writ of Habeas Corpus dissolved per ANNEX J hereof, your undersigned, his
subject child and all the members of the household including his employees, went thru
an untold length of immeasurable fear, emotional and mental anguish, sleepless
nights, physical and mental stress and fatigue aggravated by a sense of humiliation
and physical insecurity and safety. A xerox copy of the Warrant of Arrest issued on
Jan. 05, 1996 by respondent Judge is attached as ANNEX H.

Par. VIII - On Jan. 08, 1996, the undersigned complainant filed an Omnibus Motion
before the subject court of the respondent Judge praying for the dismissal of the case
on the basis of the legal grounds enumerated therein; as well as seeking for the
disqualification of respondent Judge from the case - briefly reciting therein the
incidents that chronologically took place from the beginning ANNEX A the petition
was filed up to the date the Warrant of Arrest, ANNEX H was issued inclusive of all
the incidents that occurred in the ANNEXES in between them. A xerox copy of the
Omnibus Motion dated Jan. 08, 1996 is attached as ANNEX I. Let it be stated that
your undersigned complainant in attaching a copy of ANNEX I hereto relies
principally on the allegation of facts therein narrated as well as the provisions of laws
therein cited in order to prove this case against the respondent Judge. All
accompanying ANNEXES attached hereto are intended to support this complaint in so
f[a]r as factual allegation are concerned. For this purpose, and in order to avoid
repetition, your undersigned elects not to reproduce the contents of ANNEX I
inasmuch as the same is already attached.

Par. IX - Obviously realizing his ignorance of the law as pointed out in the Omnibus
Motion, ANNEX I the respondent Judge dissolved the Writ of Habeas Corpus and
recalled the Warrant of Arrest, he both issued against your undersigned in his order
dated Jan. 12, 1996, a xerox copy of which is attached as ANNEX J hereof.

Par. X - In brief, the substance of the charges against the respondent are as follows:

1. The court of respondent Judge did not have jurisdiction over the case nor over the
person of your undersigned complainant.

2. The jurisdiction of respondent Judge was confined only to the territorial jurisdiction
of Tagaytay City and did not extend up to the territorial jurisdiction of Paraaque,
Metro Manila where your undersigned complainant resides with the subject child, as
alleged in the petition.

3. Jurisdiction is conferred by law particularly Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and the
exercise of this jurisdiction is affirmed in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
which are all cited in paragraph I (Motion to dismiss, ANNEX I hereof).

4. In addition, after the court issued the order ANNEX J dissolving the Writ and
recalling the Warrant, petitioner was given 10 days from Jan. 12, 1996 to file her
comment to the Omnibus Motion.

4.a. That 10-day period expired on Jan. 22, 1996 without the required comment
having been filed, yet up to this date per verification with that court personally made
by the undersigned on August 14, 1996 with the Clerk of Court of that court who
advised me to file a motion for early resolution.

4.b. As already above pointed out, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action nor over the person of your undersigned complainant and
notwithstanding the failure to file comment by the Petitioner as required by the court
up to Jan. 22, 1996, such failure amounted to an abandonment of Petitioners right to
do so, which in any manner did not operate to exculpate respondent Judge from
issuing a ruling on the motion to dismiss in culpable and palpable violation of the
three months period within which to decide as mandated by paragraph I, Sec. 15,
Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution, considering that the last matter to be
resolved was the Omnibus Motion, ANNEX I which was filed on Jan. 08,
1996. Hence, to date more than seven (7) months ha[s] already lapsed.

In his Comment dated March 10, 1998, respondent insisted that the RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but added that he subsequently sustained complainants argument
that the Writ could not be enforced in Paraaque. He contends:[2]

I wish to state that the complaint of Gil Ramon O. Martin, more particularly his
assertion therein that: The court of respondent judge did not have jurisdiction over the
case nor over the person of your undersigned complainant. - is totally untrue and
bereft of factual and legal moorings. The falsity of such complaint and assertion is
shown by the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, in which I was
designated to hear and decide cases as an Assisting Judge, like any other regional trial
court in the country, is vested with concurrent original jurisdiction not only with the
Court of Appeals but also with the Supreme Court of the Philippines pursuant to the
explicit provisions of Section 21 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act (JRA) or EO 33
and the ruling enunciated in the case of Almine vs. CA, 177 SCRA 796.

Likewise, may I also state that when the petition in Special Proc. Case No. TG-1552
was filed and docketed with [the] regional trial court, I issued the writ of habeas
corpus applied for therein based upon the allegations of facts of the petitioner not only
pursuant to what is mandated by the rules, but more importantly, to allow Gil Ramon
O. Martin the chance to answer the petition. Therefore, my issuance of the writ,
contrary to the complaint of Gil Ramon O. Martin, does not constitute ignorance of
the law resulting in grave incompetence and serious misconduct in office on my part,
as the writ itself was not intended to deprive Gil Ramon O. Martin of his day in court
but to accord to him his right to due process of law in connection with the petition
filed in Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-1552.

Let me emphasize that Gil Ramon O. Martin was allowed several opportunities to
dispute the petition filed in Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-1552 as sh[ow]n by the writ
itself and my order dated Dec. 29, 1995 (Annexes C & E, respectively, of
Complaint). And, what totally negates, if not dispute[s] the assertions and complaint
of Gil Ramon O. Martin for ignorance of the law is the undisputed fact that when he
filed his Omnibus Motion raising the enforceability of the writ that I issued, I
immediately considered his arguments and granted his prayer for relief through an
Order dated Jan. 12, 1996.

Anent the remaining charge of Gil Ramon O. Martin, let me stress that my failure to
act or resolve his motion to dismiss, as the same is incorporated in his Omnibus
Motion, is attributable to the fact that he, in the Omnibus Motion itself, asked for my
disqualification, if not inhibition, from taking part in Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-
1552. Thus, upon due and careful deliberation of the motion to disqualify and, if only
to remove some clouds of doubt on the part of Gil Ramon O. Martin regarding my
impartiality and integrity to resolve his motion to dismiss, I deemed it best and proper
to inhibit, if not disqualify myself from further handling Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-
1552.

In its July 6, 1998 Resolution,[3] the Court required the complainant and the respondent judge
to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
already filed.This the parties did.[4]

Office of the Court Administrators Report

In its Memorandum to this Court, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, recommended that Judge Guerrero be fined in the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) and admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of his judicial functions. The OCA justified its recommendations in this wise:[5]

The allegations of complainant x x x find basis in law and jurisprudence. x x x

Similarly, the Court, in Rafael Sr. vs. Puno (76 SCRA 115) agreed with the view of the
Solicitor General in the case that: It is obvious from the aforequoted provisions of the
law and rules that a writ of habeas corpus that may be issued by a Court of First
Instance or a judge thereof is enforceable only within his judicial district and not
outside it.

Clearly, Tagaytay City (Fourth Judicial Region), the site of the court where Judge
Guerrero presides, and Paraaque (National Capital Judicial Region) where the
complainant resides do not belong to the same region. Therefore respondent Judge
may be considered to have exceeded his authority in issuing the contested writ.

On the matter of delay in resolving the motion filed by complainant, we find that
Judge Guerreros alleged voluntary inhibition from the case does not relieve him from
responsibility because an unjustified delay has nevertheless been incurred in the
meantime. Stated otherwise, he could have resolved the matter of disqualification at
the earlier stage of the proceedings. His inhibition at this time seems more like an
afterthought, a device to evade or camouflage the real issue of failure to seasonably
rule on the pending motion. It must however be noted that our records do not show
that Judge Guerrero filed with this Office his Order of Inhibition, which should be the
most telling proof of his voluntary disqualification, if at all.
 This Courts Ruling

We agree with the OCA's findings and recommendations.

Ignorance of the Law

Section 21 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction (1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) On the other hand, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
reads:

SEC. 2. Who may grant the writ. -- The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by x x
x a Regional Trial Court, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Under the foregoing clear provisions of BP 129 and the Rules of Court, regional trial courts
have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be enforced within their
respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them are limited to and operative only
within such areas.[6] Clearly then, respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of habeas
corpus against herein complainant, who was a resident of Paraaque, an area outside his judicial
jurisdiction.[7]
Although respondent erred in issuing the Writ, his error did not constitute gross ignorance of
law.Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,[8] for no magistrate is
infallible.[9] In the present case, complainant failed to show bad faith or malice on the part of the
respondent. Indeed, any allegation of bad faith is negated by the fact that respondent, upon the
motion of complainant, dissolved the Writ of Habeas Corpus and recalled the Warrant of Arrest.[10]
Nonetheless, as the OCA emphasized, judges have a duty to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative, therefore, that they remain
conversant with basic legal principles.[11] For committing an error on a basic legal point,
respondent should be sanctioned.

Delay

Respondent judge should also be held liable for his failure to rule promptly on complainants
Omnibus Motion. His explanation that he opted to inhibit himself from further proceeding with
the case did not justify the delay. It was his duty to resolve matters pending before him
expeditiously.
 We reiterate that delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the
90-day period fixed by the Constitution amounts not only to gross inefficiency but also constitutes
a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a
magistrate shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.[12]
WHEREFORE, Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero is hereby FINED in the sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) and ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his judicial
functions. A repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS Present:

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,

and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
Petitioner,

- versus -

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,

Respondent. Promulgated:
August 16, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the

July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division,
in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The
dispositive portion[2] read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas

corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over
 the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient
in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on

August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United
Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby
girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a
plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest
relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter
in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she

continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left
the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to
Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family

Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of
the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay
office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3] that
respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents
cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court
of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in
the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the

ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that
since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate

Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1,
RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This
jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was

enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts

shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

 b. Petition for guardianship, custody of
children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas
corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer
is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word
exclusive than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court which
can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the
former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a

petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the
Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That
may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence
of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise
it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority

of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. The
enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the
remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the
legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving

custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving

family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of
the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003)
has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a
petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme
Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA
7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole
court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the
word exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an

iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do
not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family
Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
 Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State
is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children. The
creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three
major issues regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by
the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative
intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular
court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view
of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee
that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of

the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the

petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the
situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of
the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas
corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy
and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by
the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file
suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation
Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case
at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word exclusive in
the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus
cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in
the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The
Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only
within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where
the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same
writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the

Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day
and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any
member thereof in the instances authorized by law,
and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines, and may be made returnable before
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of
First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a
Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.(Emphasis
supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not

foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect
to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also
applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit
and intent, not the letter, of the law:

Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human being.

The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the
words of Shakespeare, the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
life.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice

guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions
of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the
fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of

being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature
actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead
to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal
interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children[8] under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute
 must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that
the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws
on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws
on the subject.[9]

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke

the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be saidthat the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does
not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involvingthe custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read inharmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that
family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with
the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section
20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified

petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall
be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

 The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within
the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals

and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all
over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which
the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
explained by the Solicitor General:[10]

That the serving officer will have to search for the child all
over the country does not represent an insurmountable or
unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from
or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant
of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within
the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition

for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,
Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995

DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL
INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of LAWRENCE A.
LARKINS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity,1 was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate
relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and
to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the
right under which a person is detained.3

Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however, under
the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the said Rule which reads:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273,5 a petition for habeas
corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners
to immediately release Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative
relief of certiorari.

The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the
parties are neither complicated nor disputed.
On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in
Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed
against her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo,
Rizal.6

Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion
and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21
November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her
rapist. 7 Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92.
Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on
16 September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from
confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause."

Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still
detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.

On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea.8 It contains a
certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having
opted to avail of his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to
Article 125 of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided
by Judge Felix S. Caballes.

On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he
had no carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was
neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no
intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal
Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release,10 principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met
vigorous opposition from the private complainant.11

In the order of 5 January 1995,12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:

After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the
Court finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused,
or to grant him bail. The filing of this case against the accused, which is [a] very
serious offense, justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of
a hold departure order.

WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and
as prayed for by the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
 hereby directed to include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its hold
order departure list until further order from this Court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein
petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution13 ordering the respondents therein to appear
and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show
cause why Larkins' liberty is being restrained.

On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at
the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor
General representing the People of the Philippines made no appearance.15 Neither did Judge
Caballes, for he had not received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein,
Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the
release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. 16

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision,
holding that:

From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate
release of Larkins from his present confinement on the ground that the complaint
presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins
was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after
the NBI was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in
connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information had
been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November 25,
1994 (when filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor)
and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by
Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for rape was filed with
the Antipolo RTC.

The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas
corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had
denied his application for bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it
was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not
by the mere filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of
commitment, which are the only two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and
the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not qualify as such.
She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan17 because that
case did not rule that the writ is no longer available after an information (or criminal complaint for
rape as in this case) is filed against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas
corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the
controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile,18 adverted to in Sanchez
vs. Demetriou,19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest,
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right
to be released because of such defect."

We find for the petitioners.

But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into the propriety of
the petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of
Appeals.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common-law
spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview
of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person
who has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who
shows some authorization to make the application.20 She is not, however, the real party in interest in
the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside
the order denying his motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.

It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas
corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when
there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless,
be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural
limitations which glorify form over substance.21 It must be kept in mind that although the question
most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court
has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches
the body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record
but not the body."22

And now on the merits of the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest
of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may,
by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo
vs. Chief of Police of Manila,23 this Court held:

[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their
release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued
by a competent court of justice. (emphasis supplied)

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained,
as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or
information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102
reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."
Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons,24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar
claimed to have been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint or information
filed against them, this Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed
the petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and confined by reason
thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago25 reiterates Matsura.

In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become
academic because the information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly illegally
restrained had already been filed and a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever
illegality might have originally infected his detention had been cured.

In Umil vs. Ramos27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ
of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. Thus:

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been
filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite
explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person
suffering from imprisonment under lawful judgment.28 (emphasis supplied)

It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody
of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero,29 this Court
stated:

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the
lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also
pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him. (emphasis supplied)

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal
import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the
giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction
of the court. In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson,30 this Court declared:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of

a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

In United States vs. Grant,31 this Court held:

 Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no
probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his
rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.

While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for
Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and
for Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was
a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired
jurisdiction over his person.

Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an
unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes
under the purview of the word order under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . .
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."

The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in Ilagan
vs. Enrile32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and
that there are only two recognized processeswhich justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment
order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of
Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is
also an undue and unwarranted restriction of the term process. A commitment order and a warrant
of arrest are but species of judicial process.

In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,33 this Court stated:

Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal

writing issued by authority of law; also, the means of accomplishing an end, including
judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of courts of justice
or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a
judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the
cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing
from a court of justice.

In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe,34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris' definition of the term
"process," to wit:

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and

many meanings. In its broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with
"proceedings" or procedure and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause
from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly
defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands. (50
C.J. 441)

We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within the
meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial
court of the complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain
incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts
before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a
warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the
crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest
was made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was
brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended
party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint
was actually filed in court.

Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions
merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their
commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement
authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the
constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld. What
this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia35 needs to be repeated:

It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a person
deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected. The good
name of the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part, by such
inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken against its
repetition. Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay
themselves open to the accusation that the greatest danger to constitutional rights
comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-meaning, but without
sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of law.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required
under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the
court's determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be
exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the
order would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence
in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the
amount of bail.38 It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the
prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be
partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was
cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country.39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1
February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139255. November 24, 2003]

RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORITO S.

MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, for the reversal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
[1]

of Pasay City, Branch 267, in Special Proceedings No. 10948 dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner.

The Antecedents

SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police (PNP) filed an

application with the RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, for the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American
citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles
listed therein at No. 17-21 Apple Street, Hensonville Homes, Balibago, Angeles
City, and the seizure thereof for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code. Judge Bernardita G. Erum granted the application and issued Search
[2]

Warrant No. 97-29 on November 29, 1997. The search was conducted on the
[3]

said date; articles were seized and the petitioner and Bueta were apprehended
and detained. Among the articles found in the possession of the petitioner was
U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued on June 2, 1983 by the U.S. Embassy in
Manila to and in the name of Raymond Michael Jackson, born on October 17,
1951 in South Dakota; and U.S. Passport No. 085238399 issued on August 15,
1996 by the New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana to and under the name
of Steven Bernard Bator, born on August 20, 1949 in Detroit, Michigan. [4]

Another application for a search warrant was filed by SPO3 Pedro B.

Barsana, Jr. with the RTC of Makati City for violation of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code for the search of the premises at No. 5518 Second Floor,
Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner Pasay Road), Makati City
under the contract of Raymond Jackson a.k.a. Allen Miller and Bernard Bator
and for the seizure of the articles described therein. Acting on the application
on November 28, 1997, Judge Pedro N. Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued
Search Warrant No. 97-029. [5]

On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-

2078 was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City against the
petitioner and Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]

When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the

petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the United States Embassy in
the Philippines advised the Department of Justice on December 10, 1997 that
the said passports had been cancelled. Summary deportation proceedings
[7]

were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against

the petitioner docketed as SDO No. BOC 97-46. On December 11, 1997, the
Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order ordering the summary
deportation of the petitioner to his country of origin and directing the Chief of
Civil Security Unit to implement the order within three days from notice thereof,
subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures - Office
Memorandum No. ELM-97-013. In the meantime, the name of the petitioner
[8]

was included in the blacklist of the CID.[9]

Aside from the aforementioned criminal cases, other criminal cases were
filed against Jackson with the RTC as follows:

Criminal Case No. The Accused In What Court Cases

are Pending

1. 98-1155 Raymond Michael Jackson Makati RTC

alias Allen Miller Branch 133

2. 98-903 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC

Branch 135

3. 97-202 Raymond M. Jackson QC RTC

a.k.a. Allen Miller and Branch 83
Jaime Bueta

4. 98-1152 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC

Branch 135[10]

On December 7, 1997, the Quezon City RTC ordered the release of the
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 97-202 after posting a P6,000 bail. [11]
 On September 18, 1998, the Makati RTC issued an order in Criminal Case
No. 98-1155 directing the CID to hold the departure of the petitioner from
the Philippines in view of the pending criminal cases against
him. On September 28, 1998, the Makati RTC ordered the release of the
[12]

petitioner in Criminal Case No. 98-1152 after he posted bail in the amount
of P40,000. [13]

On October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the
CID for the reconsideration of the BOC Order dated December 11,
1997 directing his deportation. He alleged inter alia that: (a) he was married
[14]

to Lily Morales by whom he had two children: Cristina Jackson and Judaline
Jackson; (b) his status was converted into that of a permanent resident on
September 30, 1987 under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act, as amended
with Official Passport No. 3121487; (c) his deportation from the Philippines
would deprive him of the opportunity to defend himself in the criminal cases
pending against him. He appended to his motion a copy of his marriage contract
with Lily Morales and their childrens birth certificates. On October 14, 1998, the
CID issued an order denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit. [15]

The petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the
summary order of deportation with the CID which as of December 15, 1998 had
not yet been resolved, pending the issuance of clearances from the NBI and
[16]

PNP, travel documents and an airplane ticket.

On May 18, 1999, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the Anti-Fraud Unit in the
U.S. Embassy in Manila, issued a certification that U.S. Passport No. Z4613110
issued to and under the name of Raymond Michael Jackson and No.
085238399 issued to Steven Bernard Bator had been cancelled because the
persons appearing in the photographs affixed in the said passports did not
match those appearing in the photographs affixed in the original applications
for the issuance of the same. The CID issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164
[17]

on May 21, 1999 for the petitioners arrest for being an undesirable alien under
Section 37(a), paragraph 9 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, based on the hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155
[18]

and the certification of Vice Consul Tedd Archabal. The petitioner was arrested
by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia of the Foreign Intelligence and Liaison Office,
PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who turned him over to
the CID on the said date. [19]

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28,
1999 against the Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and
on the same date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus and the respondents to make a return of the writ on or
before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (b) ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to whom
the case would be raffled to conduct a hearing of the petition, to render
judgment and to serve a copy of its decision within two days from its
promulgation. [20]

In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the respondents
alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on the
basis of the summary deportation order issued by the BOC on December 11,
1997 and of the hold departure order of the Makati RTC in Criminal Case No.
98-1155; the petitioners petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was
a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by
him. On July 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition
[21]

of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus. [22]

The petitioner assails the decision of the RTC and prays for the reversal
thereof, contending that:

A. RODRIGUEZ CANNOT ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST SINCE ONLY

JUDGES CAN ISSUE THE SAME.

B. ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT RODRIGUEZ CAN ISSUE

WARRANTS OF ARREST, SUCH CAN ONLY BE ISSUED TO ENFORCE A
FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION; HOWEVER, IN THE INSTANT CASE,
THERE IS NO FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION.

C. PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED. [23]

The petitioner avers that under Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine
Constitution, only judges are vested with authority to issue warrants for the
arrest of persons, including aliens.Even if it is assumed that the Commissioner
of the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest, this is limited only to those
cases where a final order of deportation had already been issued by the BOC,
and only for the purpose of implementing the said order. According to the
petitioner, the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1999 is
illegal; hence, null and void. The petitioner was not apprised of any specific
charges filed against him with the CID and was not heard on the said charges
as required by law before the order was issued. The petitioner asserts that there
was no probable cause for his arrest by the CID and that the respondents even
violated the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of Justice dated June 7,
1999. The petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Lao Gi v. CA to fortify his
[24] [25]

petition.
 In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID is
authorized under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens on the CIDs finding of the
existence of a ground for deportation. The petitioner cannot feign lack of due
process because he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the December 11,
1997 Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the BOC
denied on October 14, 1998. When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued
on May 21, 1999 to effect the arrest of the petitioner, it was on the basis of a
final and executory order of deportation. The RTC, for its part, held that (a) the
petition was premature because the petitioners petition with the CID to lift the
summary order of deportation had not yet been resolved by the BOC of the CID;
(b) the petition for habeas corpus was inappropriate because the petitioner was
validly detained under a mission order issued by the Commissioner based on
the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997; (c) the
petitioner is estopped from assailing his arrest and detention by the CID.
The petition is dismissed.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which he is detained. Section 4, Rule 102 of the
[26]

said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or
discharged authorized:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration. [27]

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his
release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such
supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person. [28]

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents

rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets
forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the
petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effects of such process. [29]

Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if

it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment
in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the
cause of restraint:

Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is
restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered
only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must
prove such facts.

In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner
was arrested and detained at the CID detention center at
Bicutan, Paraaque City, under Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 dated May 21,
1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated December 11, 1997which had
become final and executory. The BOC found, after due proceedings, that:

Records show that on 10 December 1997, Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila advised the Department of Justice that the U.S. passports which
were confiscated from the abovenamed respondent when he was arrested by PNP
operatives in Angeles City on 30 November 1997 and purportedly issued to Raymond
Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to have been
tampered. As a consequence, said passports were cancelled by the U.S. Embassy.

In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989),
the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or
does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the
country.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders
the summary deportation of NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL
JACKSON @ STEVEN BERNARD BATOR to his country of origin subject to
compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum
Order No. ELM-97-013.

The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is hereby ordered to implement this Order within
three (03) days from receipt hereof.

Include respondents name on the Blacklist.

Give respondent a copy hereof. [30]

The information relayed by U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene to the DOJ
on December 10, 1997 was reiterated by U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal in
his certification forwarded to the DOJ on May 18, 1999, thus:

CERTIFICATION

I, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the United States hereby certify that United States
Passport Number Z4613110 issued June 2, 1983 at the U.S. Embassy, Manila in the
name of RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, born October 17, 1951 at South
Dakota is a genuine United States Government document that has been altered and
photosubstituted.

I also certify that United States Passport Number 085238399 issued August 15, 1996
at the New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana, in the name of STEVEN BERNARD
BATOR, born August 20, 1949 at Detroit, Michigan, is a genuine United States
Government document that has been altered and photosubstituted, as well.

I further certify that a comparison of photographs affixed to U.S. Passports Number

Z4613110 and 085238399 which were seized by Philippine National Police officers
on or about November 29, 1997 from a man claiming to be Raymond Michael
Jackson and photographs affixed to the original applications for passports number
Z4613110 and 085238399 in the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven
Bernard Bator on file with the U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, revealed
that these are not/not the same people. [31]

The petitioners arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in
relation to Section 37(a)(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which
respectively reads:
SEC. 45. (d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission
by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or
misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact;

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:

(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Forty-five and Forty-
six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him:

In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, this Court held that such documents from
[32]

a foreign embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports held by their

national on the ground that the said passports were tampered with; hence,
cancelled were sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from
the Philippines:

The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of the petitioners

contention that his passport could not have been cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he
was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show that the Philippine
government was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.

Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese

government belie the petitioners submission that there was no evidence to prove the
findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily, these documents
constitute sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the
landmark case Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, [t]he mere fact that a citizen or subject is out
of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes
to his government, and his government may, under certain conditions, properly and
legally request his return.
[33]

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in the CID
and insist on being deprived by the BOC of his right to due process as
prescribed for in Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, thus:

(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
 This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion with the
CID for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC. The
petitioner did not allege therein that he was not informed of the charges against
him. In fact, the petitioner did not even rebut the claim of the U.S. Vice Consul
that the passport he was carrying was tampered and had been already
cancelled. Neither did he allege that he requested for the reinstatement of his
passport with the United States Embassy. Despite the finality of the deportation
order of the BOC, it still entertained the petitioners motion for reconsideration
but denied the same on its findings that there were inconsistencies in his sworn
statement and the documents he presented in support of his motion, thus:

After going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order of 12 (sic)
December 1997.Likewise, the same had long become final and executory.

Furthermore, the grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are irrelevant. The
alleged marriage of respondent to a Filipina, a certain Lily Morales, with whom
respondent allegedly begot two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both
surnamed Jackson, and the supposed conversion of respondents status to permanent
resident on 30 September 1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA No.
613, as amended), does not change the fact that the two (2) US passports purportedly
issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator which were used by
respondent, were tampered and subsequently cancelled by the U.S.
Embassy. Respondent already lost the privilege to remain in the country (Schonemann
v. Comm. Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989).

It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn statement of

respondent conducted by Special Prosecutor Henry B. Tubban on 5 December
1997 with the documents attached in the motion.Hereunder are the said
inconsistencies:

1. Annex A of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract between the

respondent and one Lily H. Morales showing Manila City Hall as the
place of marriage and which was held on 6 September 1984.

In the Sworn Statement, the respondent claimed to have entered the country for the
first time only in 1988(p. 1 of sworn statement), that he married a certain Lily Morales
sometime in 1989 in Angeles City (p. 2 of sworn statement).

2. The motion stated that out of the union of the respondent with Ms.
Morales, two (2) childrennamed Cristina and Judaline both
surnamed Jackson, were born. In the sworn statement of the respondent,
he stated that they have five (5) children.
In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex A of motion), it was stated that Ms.
Morales is 17 years of age, a minor. However, below the personal circumstances of
the respondent and Mrs. Morales is a statement in bold letters that BOTH PARTIES
ARE OF LEGAL AGES.

The foregoing creates a serious doubt on the allegations in the motion and on the
authenticity of the documents attached thereto. With more reason that the motion
should be denied.[34]

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID,
offered to post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure
the necessary documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his
permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner
thereby admitted that he was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily
accepted the jurisdiction of the CID. [35]

The present as clearly as the petitioners petition to lift the order of

deportation was as yet unresolved by the BOC when he filed the petition
for habeas corpus.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.