ADELINO H. LEDESMA V. HON. RAFAEL C.

CLIMACO
G.R. NO. L- 23815 (JUNE 28, 1974)

Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in
the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The
respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel
de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this
certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner
is a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired
of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened
with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of
the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should
not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other
officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section
32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The
lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file
a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register
of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for
the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right
of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of
the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless
he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People
vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 90294 SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
RLCARDO RIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
RAY ANTHONY F. FAJARITO FOR ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

PADILLA, J.:
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CXLVI * of Makati, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 12042, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio
interposed his appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said regional trial court
branch forwarded the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
however, forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court in view of the penalty
imposed upon the accused.
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14
December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant
Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to
his poverty.1
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to require the Solicitor General to
comment on the appellant's manifestation to withdraw the appeal.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court
to ascertain from the accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court,
whether he desired the appointment of a counsel de oficio on appeal, in view of the
reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty should
not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of
court of the trial court be required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-
appellant along with a certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on him2 by Section
13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. — It shall be the duty of
the clerk of the trial court upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to
ascertain from the appellant, if he is confined in prison, whether he desires the
Intermediate Appellate Court or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him de
oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the
appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the response of the
appellant to his inquiry.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed to the Assistant Clerk of Court of
the Second Division, this Court, in compliance with the resolution of this Court, dated 16
April 1990, adopting the suggestions of the Solicitor General, which required him to comply
with his duty mandated in Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, submitted the reply
of the accused-appellant informing the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing
his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal.3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated
1 October 1990, denied the appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him
for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de
parte on account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking
justice in any forum.4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de
oficio to prosecute his appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and
the constitutional mandate provided in Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial branch of the government
which can cannot be taken lightly. "The Constitution", as aptly stated in one case, "is a law
for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances."5
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a
criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary
examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions
to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of counsel for the defense' ".6 Today
said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps
the privilege most important to the person accused of crime."7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity
to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor,
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial
court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a
counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case,
such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal,
the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole
reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de
oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists
and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in
law."9 Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or
cogitate in order to favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent
person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-
free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-
appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, upon
submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly
subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will.10
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido
Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11 The evidence for the prosecution adduced at the trial established the
following facts:
During the months of February and March 1984, complainant Wilma Phua, then only 13
years of age, was living with her mother and three (3) sisters in a house in Barangay
Bayanan, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. At a distance of about three (3)
meters from this house is another house with a toilet and bath also owned by
complainant's mother but which was uninhabited at that time. The accused, complainant's
uncle, being the younger brother of complainant's mother, was staying in their house, free
of board and lodging, although he helped in the household chores. The children used the
bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities in the inhabited house were
used only by the adults.12
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984, classes having closed for vacation
and while Maria Zena Phua Rio was in the house occupied by her family, her daughter
Wilma (complainant) asked her for the key to the comfort room of the uninhabited house
because she had to answer a call of nature. After having delivered the key to Wilma, the
latter proceeded to the other house, entered the comfort room, and seeing that nobody
was around and that her uncle was washing dishes in their house, proceeded to answer
nature's call without taking the precaution of locking the comfort room from inside.13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her panty, the accused entered the
bathroom with his body already exposed, held Wilma's hands, and ordered her in a loud
voice to lie down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to lie down.
After she lay down on her back, the accused put himself on top of her and tried to insert
his private organ into her private part. Wilma kept pushing the accused away and calling
for her mother; however, since the accused was heavier than she, the accused succeeded
in overpowering her, inserting his penis into her vagina and having sexual intercourse with
her. After satisfying his lust, the accused released Wilma and allowed her to leave the
bathroom.14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother Maria Zena who, meanwhile,
had proceeded to the said other house after sensing that an inordinate length of time had
passed and her daughter, complainant herein, had not returned from the bathroom. Maria
Zena, upon noticing that Wilma was speechless, trembling and looking fearful, suspected
something remiss so she tried to open the door of the bathroom. Unable to open it the
first time because it was locked from inside, Maria Zena waited a few minutes before
pushing the door again. This time she was successful in finding her brother, the herein
accused-appellant in the process of raising his pants. Maria Zena was ignored by her
brother when she asked him the reason for his presence inside the bathroom.15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to her daughter, Maria Zena
continued her inquisition of her brother for several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9 April
1984, the accused was asked to leave the house and move out by his sister Maria Zena.16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to her mother the fact that she
had been raped by the accused four (4) times between the months of February and March
of that year (1984). After receiving such information, Maria Zena wanted her daughter to
immediately undergo physical examination; however, Wilma, apparently traumatized by
her experience, was too weak to go with her for such examination and frequently suffered
from fainting spells. It was only on 30 April 1984 that Maria Zena was able to bring Wilma
to the police to report the matter and to file the complaint. After the report to the police,
they were referred to the P.C. Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame where Wilma underwent
physical examination.17
Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the internal examination of Wilma,
submitted a report of his examination dated 6 May 1984. The medical report showed,
among others, the following findings:
There is a scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and gaping which pale
brown, slightly hypertrophied labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
is disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep lacerations at 3, 8 and 9 o'clock. ...18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no external signs of recent
application of any form of trauma."19 All these findings led him to conclude that Wilma is
"in a non-virgin state physicially."20 Later, on the witness stand, Dr. Gajardo would further
testify that Wilma, on inquiry, revealed that the first rape happened in the month of
February 1984, but that he could not tell the approximate period or age of the
lacerations.21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma went back to the police where a
sworn statement of Wilma was taken and the complaint for rape against the accused was
filed before Third Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro on 12 May 1984.22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony of the accused himself and his
brother, Amado Rio. The accused's defense was anchored on alibi and he substantially
testified as follows: that contrary to the statements made by the witnesses for the
prosecution, he was not asked to leave their house in April 1984, the truth being that he
left in the month of January 1984 or about a month before the alleged first rape on Wilma
was committed because, contrary to an alleged employment agreement between brother
and sister, his sister, Maria Zena, had not paid him any salary as helper in their house; that
from the month of January 1984, up to 24 March 1984 when the rape charged in the
complaint was allegedly committed, he was in their hometown in Kambalo, Cahidiocan,
province of Romblon; that at the time of his arrest, he was informed of the criminal charge
of rape on his niece filed against him in court; that from January 1984 up to the time of his
arrest on 6 May 1984, he had stayed in the house of his uncle, Francisco Rio, and had never
left the place during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured that his sister could have
fabricated the charge because he left her house due to her non-payment of his salary as
helper. The brother of the accused in the person of Amado Rio corroborated the defense
of alibi of the accused.23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B. Merca, the Election Registrar of the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, who brought with her a Voter's Affidavit which was executed
on 31 March 1984 by one Ricardo Rio and was subscribed and sworn to on 31 March 1984
before Tessie Balbas, Chairman of Voting Center No. 37-A of Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. On cross-examination, Registrar Merca admitted that she does not know the
accused personally but that the xerox copy of the Voter's Affidavit that she brought to
court was copied from a book containing about 60 voter's affidavits of said precinct.24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's Affidavit with the penmanship
appearing on a letter25 dated 12 December 1985 written by the accused to his brother,
Amado Rio and on the envelope of said letter,26 the trial court ruled that the writing
characteristics on the presented documents are the same, especially the rounded dot over
the letter "i" appearing in the afore-mentioned mentioned documents. It was, therefore,
satisfied that the Voter's Affidavit was indeed prepared by the accused in Bayanan,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie Balbas and that this piece of
evidence completely belies the defense of the accused as corroborated by his brother,
Amado, that he was in Romblon continuously from the month of January 1984 up to the
time that he was arrested on 6 May 1984.27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-named accused guilty of the crime charged in the
information beyond reasonable doubt the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify Wilma
Phua in the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This claim
was corroborated by the accused's brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was
in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the Court is convinced, as the trial court,
that the affidavit was indeed executed by the accused himself and the date appearing
therein must be presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents and
children, husband and wife, and other relatives and even among those not related to each
other. For such defense to prosper, the accused must prove that it was not possible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, in
this case the accused's brother Amado, it deserves but scant consideration.29 Moreover,
the Court notes the fact that while the accused-appellant had another brother and sister
living in Manila besides the complainant's mother, those two never came to his aid. Were
the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings would have readily helped in
his defense. The testimony of his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary
doubt to acquit him as against the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a twelve-year old child,
would undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention
suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen
as allow an examination of her private parts if her motive were not to bring to justice the
person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not come out in the open if her motive
were not to obtain justice.30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will abuse her child and make
her undergo the trauma of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for
leaving her without the services of an unpaid helper were it not with the aim to seek justice
for her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish to stamp his child falsely with
the stigma that follows a rape.
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. The new
theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-
appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de
oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was the fourth time
accused had abused complainant. This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed
to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there was
consent. The charge was filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only because the
complainant's mother caught them.31
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant,
fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation
indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world, would
permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
own mother.
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of
the incident in question, by way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged
consent of the complainant. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the
fact that counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. Although the
Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by
the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted,32 the Court deems it more
likely that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief
without examining the entire records of the case. If the appointed counsel for the accused,
on appeal, had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he would not have
changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak well of the credibility
of the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies equally in criminal
cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been
more conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative of
aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant
(his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as
advocates of their clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of
his client's cause."33 Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction.34 And a lawyer who performs that duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.35
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws,36 he is expected to take such
reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional
guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its
precepts.37
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility
owed to his client.38 The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal
and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees.39 Any
attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation distracts the
administration of justice and discredits the Bar.40
Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the sudden shift of defense theory as
warranted (which we do not), the Court is just as convinced, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime as charged. His conviction must be
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Court, however, increases the amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant to
Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in line with prevailing jurisprudence on
this matter. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
_________________________________________________________________________

G.R. NO. L-30543 JULY 15, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
RODRIGO CAWILI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule
and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan T. Aquino (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The difficulty that faces appellant Rodrigo Cawili, prosecuted and convicted for the crime
of rape in the lower court, arises from the coherent and straight-forward story narrated
by the offended party, a thirteen-year old girl, who, while asleep in her house was taken
by surprise by the accused and thus fell victim to his carnal desires. Nonetheless, there is
in the brief submitted by counsel a sustained effort to seek a reversal predicated on the
ground that an appraisal of the testimony offered by the prosecution would reveal that
the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome.1 A careful study of
the records, however, discloses that the lower court did consider carefully and
meticulously the evidence of both the complainant and the accused. It was his conclusion
that there was enough proof to satisfy the requirement that guilt be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. We are not justified in viewing the matter differently. We affirm.
The victim of rape in this case is Elizabeth de Jesus, who, at the time of the commission of
the offense, was thirteen years of age. She was in the sixth grade. She began by stating
that she was asleep in her house at Barrio Almacen, Hermosa, Bataan, at about 10:00 in
the evening of February 11, 1968. Then she continued: "I was awakened by a certain weight
upon my body and when I was awakened, accused Rodrigo Cawili was on top of me and
[I] felt pain in my private parts."2 She then pushed and kicked him and shouted at the top
of her voice "Inang" (Mother).3 Asked why she had felt such pain, she answered that his
genital organ was inserted in hers.4 Obviously alarmed by her shout, Rodrigo Cawili
released her and ran downstairs; her mother, awakened by the shout, went to the kitchen
and came back with a bolo to chase Cawili but she did not catch up with
him.5 On cross-examination, Elizabeth de Jesus admitted that when she went to bed she
had her panties on, but that when she woke up, she noticed that not only was appellant
on top of her but also that she was divested of such garment.6 The trial court itself did not
merely accept her story. It pursued the matter further.7 She explained that the previous
night, a Saturday, she had attended a party in Barrio Pulo, Hermosa, Bataan, one that
lasted until almost morning. All day the next day, she pressed clothes. Thus it was that on
the night of February 11, 1968, she went to bed tired and drowsy. She slept soundly. It was
not unexpected then for appellant to be able to remove such garment and for him to place
himself on top of her, without her immediately noticing it.8 When the incident happened,
on February 11, 1968, the young girl's father was not at home. When he came back from
work from Subic, Zambales, on February 17, 1968, his daughter was so ashamed of what
had happened to her that she did not even tell him specifically that appellant had
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. It was only after she was brought to a doctor
on February 19, 1968, and it was discovered that she had a swollen vulva, a swollen urethral
orifice and a ruptured hymen with two healed lacerations, 9 that she admitted to her
father that appellant succeeded in his designs. Rodrigo Cawili, a neighbor and a
"compadre" of the young victim's mother, was readily recognized by Elizabeth de Jesus
because "the house was bright inside, it being lighted by a lamp, second, there was a light
on the post just opposite our house, and third, it was a moonlit night." 10 The facts
narrated above gave rise to the charge of rape against Rodrigo Cawili.
After trial duly had, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party and to recognize and support the offspring, if
any. The case is before us now on appeal. As noted at the outset, the principal ground
relied upon as the basis for reversal is that the constitutional presumption of innocence
had not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there is a recognition
that the appraisal of the lower court of the evidence offered is accorded deference and
respect, it is submitted that such finding cannot prevail in the absence of a showing that
suffices to overturn what is so clearly expressed in the fundamental law that guilt is not to
be presumed. 11 As a statement of juridical norm, that is correct. This Court has repeatedly
stressed that accusation cannot be considered as synonymous with culpability, and the
evidence offered by the prosecution must meet the required standard. Only then is a
conviction warranted. 12 It is on that basis that in several recent decisions, a person
accused of and sentenced for rape succeeded in obtaining a reversal. 13 This is not,
however, as already mentioned, one such case.
1. In appellant's brief, the principal authority cited in support of the plea that the
constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome is an excerpt from
Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Manoji. 14 What was conveniently left out was the
opening phrase of the citation which certainly casts a different light on the matter.
Accuracy demands that this particular sentence relied upon he quoted in full: "In the light
of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man on
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. ..." 15 As a matter
of fact, the opening sentence of that particular paragraph starts with this phrase: "Upon
the other hand, there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the
mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, ..." 16 In this
case, on the contrary, the testimony of the offended party, so firm and so categorical, does
not give rise to any such misgivings. When put on the stand by her counsel, she was able
to narrate clearly and concisely the untoward event that befell her in the evening on
question. Afterwards, she was cross-examined intensively and exhaustively for two
days. 17 Questions searching in character but unavoidable considering the nature of the
offense, quite embarassing for a young girl of tender years, came not only from the
defense but also from the judge, desirous of ascertaining the truth and conscious of the
dire penalty that goes with conviction for this heinous crime. At one stage, her counsel had
to ask the court for a recess of five minutes as she was evidently under strain and she was
feeling dizzy. 18 The court granted a suspension of the session not for five minutes sought
but for ten minutes. Moreover, right afterwards, it was adjourned. 19 The grueling ordeal
to which she was subjected continued all throughout the next day when the hearing was
resumed. Her version of what transpired came under the most rigorous scrutiny, again
from both the defense and the court itself. No contradiction was elicited although it was
quite obvious that she would rather not remember the details of that unfortunate
incident. Twice the session had to be suspended because she was in tears. 20 The second
time, the court itself was moved to declare: "The witness is still crying. Let us have a
recess." 21
2. This notwithstanding, counsel for appellant would have the temerity to assert that the
testimony of complainant was "evasive." 22 He would seek to impress on us that there was
not enough evidence to warrant conviction for the offense of rape and would imply that
perhaps only trespass to dwelling was committed. Such a contention is devoid of merit. As
was stressed in People v. Baylon: 23 "The other point raised in the brief for appellant that
the crime of rape was not shown to have been committed defies rationality, let alone
commonsense. Time and time again, this Court had correctly observed that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would willingly expose herself to the embarrassment of a
public trial wherein she would have not only to admit but also to narrate the violation of
her person, if such indeed were not the case. Far better it is in not a few cases to spare
herself the humiliation if there be some other way of bringing the offender to justice. Here,
there was such a testimony coming from the offended party, firm, categorical,
straightforward. ... It is quite a strain on one's credulity to believe that under such
circumstances, the young girl's honor remained unsullied, the nefarious design unfulfilled.
To repeat, appellant had not made out a case for a reversal." 24 The succeeding paragraph
in the opinion therein rendered likewise deserves mention: "Nor is this all. As was noted in
a recent case, People vs. Molina, it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the
offended parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this case, there is a marked
receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be
wondered at. The state, asparens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of
rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her family
must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern
in the fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the
rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted." 25
3. There is one other matter equally deserving of attention. Counsel for appellant did not
even mention the defense offered by his client. It is understandable why. In the statement
of the accused taken before Corporal Cipriano Vistan 26 and subscribed before the
Municipal Judge Bernabe T. Peñaflor of Hermosa, Bataan, he admitted having entered the
house of complainant with the explanation that he made a mistake due to his being in a
state of intoxication, but denied having done anything reprehensible. At the trial, he had
another version. He would rely on alibi. This is how the lower court disposed of the matter:
"The defense interposed by the accused is alibi. His testimony is to the effect that starting
from 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 11, 1968, he was in his house at Almacen,
Hermosa, Bataan, asleep with his wife and child. He asserts that the filing of the instant
criminal charge against him was ill-motivated, because his wife and the spouses
Dominador de Jesus and Rufina Santos had a misunderstanding; that the spouses used to
buy goods on credit from their store and failed to pay their account; that prior to February
11, 1968, the spouses tried to get some more goods on credit which he refused, because
the old debt was not paid; that because of the incident, the spouses went to the extent of
approaching Nicanor Sioson, the owner of the lot where his store is erected for the
purpose of having him ejected from Sioson's lot. The accused further testified that he was
forced to give his statement, Exhibit C, and had to sign it because he was mauled. He
showed a scar on the upper left eyebrow; and [said] that he signed his statement not
before the subscribing officer, Municipal Judge Peñaflor, but in jail. The defense deserves
no serious consideration. The accused could not produce any one of the persons he
mentioned ... to corroborate his testimony. His claim that his sworn statement, Exhibit C,
was forcibly taken out of him as evidenced by his swollen left eyebrow, was belied both
by Pat. Conrado Alvaro of the Hermosa Police Force, who fetched the accused from his
house to the Municipal Building for investigation, and by P.C. Sgt. Cipriano Vistan. Pat.
Alvaro testified that when he made a preliminary inquiry, the accused admitted to him
having entered the house of Dominador de Jesus on the night in question because he was
drunk. Pat. Alvaro denied having mauled the accused. Likewise Sgt. Vistan declared that in
the course of his investigation, the accused revealed to him that he (accused) was boxed
by Dominador de Jesus, father of the complainant, [thus explaining] the swollen face and
cut on the upper left eyebrow." 27 What had been stated earlier as to the ordeal
undergone by the offended party when she was placed on the stand to give her credible
and competent testimony with a clear identification of the accused would serve to bolster
further the characterization of his defense as undeserving of serious consideration.
Moreover, there is this excerpt from the recent decision of People v. Cudalina: 28 "It
suffices to state that this Court when confronted with the defense of alibi in rape cases
has invariably found it unconvincing and unsatisfactory." 29
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of March 31, 1969 by the then Judge Tito V. Tizon of
the Court of First Instance of Bataan is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
__________________________________________________________________________
A.C. NO. 378 MARCH 30, 1962
JOSE G. MEJIA AND EMILIA N. ABRERA, COMPLAINANTS,
VS.
FRANCISCO S. REYES, RESPONDENT.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.
On 27 September 1947, Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank
attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit
H), as follows:
Atty. Francisco S. Reyes
Baguio City, Mt. Province
(Thru: The Manager, Phil. National Bank
Baguio Branch) .
Sir:
Please be advised that you are hereby appointed as Bank Attorney and Notary Public of
our Baguio Branch, effective September 19, 1947, and as such you are to perform the
following: .
1) To ratify documents covering bank transactions;
2) To represent the Bank in cases filed in the local courts when, in the opinion of the
Government Corporation Counsel, there is a necessity for an attorney for the purpose; and
3) To give legal advise on ordinary routinary matters to our Branch Manager thereat and
sign collection letters when so requested by the latter.
It is understood that you shall receive no regular compensation from the Bank but that you
will be allowed to collect fees authorized by the Notarial Law when ratifying documents
and 5% of the amount of judgment in cases where your appearance for the Bank is
requested, if and when actually collected, which fees, however, may be changed as
circumstances may warrant. Furthermore, it is also understood that under this
appoinment,you are not entitled to any other form of compensation or privileges
accorded to regularly appointed employees of this Bank.
Yours very truly, .
(Sgd.) V. CARMONA
President
I AGREE:
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. REYES
In June 1955 while still holding such position his professional services were engaged by
Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court
against the Philippine National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the
Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural
and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio
City recorded on their certificate of title No. 2499 (civil No. 532). On 28 June 1955 a
complaint, signed by Attorney Francisco S. Reyes for the law firm of Reyes and Cabato,
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio against the two banks, praying that the
sum in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 paid on 27 October 1944 by Jose G. Mejia and
Emilia N. Abrera to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and received by the Philippines
National Bank, Baguio Branch, to pay the balance of real estate mortgage loan, be credited
by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as successor-in-interest of the defunct
Agricultural and Industrial Bank and that the mortgage annotated on transfer certificate
of title No. 2499 be cancelled (Exhibit A). After trial, on 4 August 1956 the Court rendered
judgment declaring valid the payment in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 on 27 October
1944 but crediting only the sum of P67.34, Philippine currency, the equivalent value of
P2,693.53 under the Ballantyne Schedule (Exhibit 8). On 31 August 1956 the Reyes and
Cabato law firm filed a motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 9) and the Philippine National
Bank on 5 September 1956 (Exhibit 10), to which on 15 September 1956 the former filed a
written objection (Exhibit 11). On 15 September 1956 the Court denied both motion for
reconsideration (Exhibit 12). No appeal was taken by either party.
In this administrative proceedings, the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera
allege that they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the respondent's advice; that thereafter for
the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public of the
Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the
Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and notary public,
without revealing to them such connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and
pray this Court to disbar him.
In his answer filed on 2 March 1959 respondent Francisco S. Reyes avers that after a
conference among the complainants, attorney Federico L. Cabato and himself, they
agreed not to appeal the judgment rendered by the Court and, instead, to take advantage
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1286 that condoned interests accruing on debts to
the Government provided that the principal was paid on or before 31 December 1956; that
all the time he was handling their case the complainants knew his professional connection
with the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that he worked hard with attorney
Cabato on their case, for which he was paid by them a meager sum of P90 as attorney fees;
that he is not guilty of malpractice, because he was not a retainer lawyer of the Philippine
National Bank but represented it only in collection cases where he was paid 5% of any
amount collected; that the malpractice charge is just to harrass, embarrass and force him
to pay the complainants' debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; and praysthat
the complaint be dismissed..
On 4 March 1959 the Court referred the administrative case to the City Attorney of Baguio
for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting the investigation during
which the parties presented their evidence, on 23 March 1960, Sixto A. Domondo, City
Attorney of Baguio, rendered a report finding the respondent guilty of malpractice and
recommending reprimand..1äwphï1.ñët
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs.
Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing
and acting as counsel for the complainantsJose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil
case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and
notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear satisfactorily
proventhat during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the
respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. On the other hand,
it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by Mr. L.D. Herrera,
manager of the BaguioBranch, quoting a part of a previous letter sent to him (Herrera) by
attorney Ramon B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank, stating
that —
We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty.
Francisco S. Reyes, in behalf of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is
unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is presently the attorney of the Bank, to represent the
plaintiffs here whose interest are diametrically opposed to those of the Bank. As this is
certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is requested that you
please take this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist from
representing the plaintiffs in this case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our
regret, to recommend severance of his official connection with this Bank,.
which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing
as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank
attorney and notary public; that in the civil case the respondent did not appear as counsel
for the Bank which was represented by attorneys Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio P.
Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan
on or before 31 December 1956 in order that the interests thereon be condoned as
provided for in Republic Act No. 1286 (Exhibits 13 to 17); and that the respondent was
deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very small
attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He
is just admonished and warned not to repeat it.

G.R. NO. L-28546 JULY 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA AND NICETAS HENSON, PETITIONERS,
VS.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
QUIJANO AND ARROYO FOR PETITIONERS.
JOSE M. LUISON FOR RESPONDENTS.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against
Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the
machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,
in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued
on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located
in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January
31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago
thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were
denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders,
the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the
sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-
plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986)
to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which
judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and
that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which
were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction
of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture
in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not
benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession.
A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon
City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the
petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon
City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-
restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining
order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was
being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession.
This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3,
1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August
2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed
the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The
said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession
on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes
Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case
No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-
7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-
equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued
the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously
issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of
Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld,
the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment
against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case
invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case,
the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business
venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong,
for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business
that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made
by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ
of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but
that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with
jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval
between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third
parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in
the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties
or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time
writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that
the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot"
in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife
filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share
in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the
logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did
not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-
half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in
esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor
equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there
appears to be assets of the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule
that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house5 which is
conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from
the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now,
which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes
continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal
properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must
be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than
to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below
which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we
have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the
present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits
has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-
defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension
to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint
and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder
stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties
of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to
Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin
suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is
whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of
the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was
herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the
complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas
and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000
up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it
fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at
the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates
of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the
sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago
contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of
the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if
it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but
did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the
Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause
of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless,
the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for
not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining
the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were
unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded
action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the
defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the
purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two
other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer
and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank;
and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to
the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano
(60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that
the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by
the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also
true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties
could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but,
we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original
complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of
the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-
7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file
of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 43491 : DECEMBER 26, 1990.]
192 SCRA 674
ATTY. TEODORO V. CABILAN & ALEJANDRO A. PARALISAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE & PROVINCIAL/CITY JAIL WARDEN of Cebu City,
Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking the
annulment of the April 2, 1976 Judgment of Hon. Jose R. Ramolete in Criminal Case No. CU-
1388 declaring herein petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment.
Herein respondent judge is the presiding judge in Criminal Case No. CU-1388, and herein
petitioner Atty. Teodoro V. Cabilan is the private prosecutor. Petitioner Alejandro A.
Paralisan is the husband of Norma Yap Paralisan, one of the prosecution witnesses who
was ordered arrested by respondent judge for failure to attend the scheduled hearing of
the said case, Mrs. Paralisan wrote a letter to respondent judge, explaining her failure and
attached an unverified medical certificate.
At the hearing of March 29, 1976, the prosecution presented an illegible xerox copy of a
supposed Deed of Sale of a truck executed by the complainant in favor of the accused.
Consequently, petitioner Cabilan, as private prosecutor, moved for the production of the
original which is being kept in the same building. Respondent judge granted the motion
and ordered a ten minute recess. The prosecuting fiscal, petitioners and Mrs. Paralisan
went to the Notarial Division to search for the original of the document. Thereafter, upon
instruction of the fiscal, petitioner Paralisan returned to the courtroom to watch their
exhibits. Shortly thereafter, respondent judge allegedly approached him and a heated
exchange of words transpired between them, the details of which are contained in an
affidavit Annex "A" filed later on March 30, by petitioner Cabilan attached to a motion to
disqualify respondent judge from further hearing the case. The pertinent portions of the
said affidavit, read:
"4. The Honorable Presiding Judge, upon seeing the affiant sitting on the bench walked
back and forth towards said affiant and then, with a pointed finger directed to affiant said,
'you, you where is your wife? I will have her arrested. I do not accept that kind of medical
certificate she submitted. I will order the Sheriff right now to detain your wife,' in a voice
so loud as if affiant were his notorious enemy. Drowned by extreme humiliation, shame
and amazed by the violent attitude of said judge, the affiant rushed up to the Judge and in
a loud voice also asked, 'Judge do you have personal grudge against my wife and my family
and why? Why do you shout at me? I am not a party to the case. Your show of partiality is
conduct unbecoming of a Judge. Are you interested personally in this case? I have not seen
a Judge acting like this.' I further told him that his partiality is very apparent. 'Since the
start of the trial in this case, you have been threatening witnesses for the prosecution.'
After uttering those words, I left out of the court room and the Honorable Presiding Judge
followed me and threatened me with arrest and called the Sheriffs available in the vicinity.
"5. Since the start of the trial of this case almost a year ago, I noticed suspicious behavior
of the Honorable Presiding Judge like allowing counsel for the accused and even the
accused himself to enter his chambers without the presence of the Fiscal and/or private
prosecutor.
"6. Personally, I have no intention of intervening or appearing as witness in this case
although I know the facts hereof I also know the questionable acts of accused especially
Romeo Ceniza. But after reading in the papers that the Honorable Presiding Judge is fond
of issuing illegal orders like that Tanhu Case as enunciated by our Supreme Court, I got
interested in said Judge because my wife was also ordered arrested by her failure to attend
the hearing of this case as a mere witness. I believed that the order of arrest is another
illegal order because I believe that my wife's failure to attend a trial as a witness is NOT
direct contempt but an indirect one instead of arrest, she should merely be cited for
contempt.
"7. In my observation, by the conduct of the Honorable Presiding Judge which he
demonstrated to me as above-stated, he is not only fond of issuing illegal order but is
tyrannical, oppressive, whimsical and capricious when he feels like tilting the scales of
justice in favor of a party in the case adverted to under trial.
"8. I feel that taxpayers of this province wherein the Honorable Presiding Judge is sitting
should at least be respected in their rights. We tax payers expect fairness in the
dispensation of justice." (Rollo, p. 13)
Respondent judge, finding the allegations in the said affidavit contemptuous, prepared
the herein questioned judgment, but on April 2, 1976, the same was promulgated only to
petitioner Paralisan because petitioner Cabilan was then in Ozamis City. Petitioner
Paralisan was escorted to the City Jail and had already served the sentence.:-cralaw
On April 7, 1976, petitioners filed the instant petition in this Court, and on the same date,
the Second Division of this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order, and to
order the immediate release of the petitioners (Ibid., p. 36-A).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge erred in declaring herein
petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
ten (10) days imprisonment.
The answer is in the negative.
It is the contention of the petitioners that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
in ordering the incarceration of the petitioners without preferred charges, considering
that respondent judge implied in his order that the charges of the petitioners were
unsubstantiated (Par. 2, Judgment, Annex "E"); that it may be that the contempt
contemplated by respondent judge was an indirect contempt; that it was next to
impossible to substantiate the charges in the motion for disqualification because
petitioner Paralisan was immediately placed under arrest and sentenced to jail without
charges; and that the acts of respondent judge were highly arbitrary and derogatory to his
oath to hear before he condemns and to render justice to anyone regardless of his station
in life.
Petitioners' contention is untenable.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Court has repeatedly declared that the power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Halili vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 136 SCRA 112, 135 [1985]), citing the cases of Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons,
58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA
1241; and Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). Under the Rules of Court, contempt is
classified into direct and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing. Indirect
contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after
hearing (People v. Navarro, 121 SCRA 707, 710 [1983]). In the case of Ang vs. Castro (136
SCRA 453, 458 [1985]), this Court ruled that if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehaviour
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration
of justice. This ruling was reiterated in the case of Ante vs. Pascua (162 SCRA 780 [1988]),
where it was held that contemptuous statements made in the pleadings filed with the
court constitute direct contempt.
In the instant case, the basis of the judgment for contempt of court is petitioner Paralisan's
affidavit which was attached and made as an integral part of the motion for
disqualification filed by petitioner Cabilan which therefore falls squarely under the above
ruling.: nad
As to the claim of petitioner Cabilan that the affidavit was modified by petitioner Paralisan
and that he discovered the insertion of the derogatory remarks only upon his return to
Cebu City from Ozamis City, suffice it to say that aside from the arguments presented by
respondent judge to the contrary, petitioner Cabilan, as counsel of record, has control of
the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and
responsibility (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23 [1970]).
Nevertheless, considering that petitioner Cabilan has been practicing for nineteen (19)
years and this is the first time that he is charged with contempt of court, and considering
that the power to punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment
(Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA 391 [1988]), imposition of a fine of P500.00 without
imprisonment would be enough (Caniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]).
On the other hand, petitioner Paralisan having already served his sentence, this case is
moot and academic insofar as he is concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, but the questioned
judgment of April 2, 1976 is MODIFIED by changing the sentence often (10) days
imprisonment to a fine of P200.00 without imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.

EMILIO CAPULONG VS MANUEL ALIÑO

22 SCRA 491

In 1957, the spouses Emilio and Cirila Capulong lost a civil case. They were represented by
Atty. Manuel Aliño. The spouses then gave P298.00 (then a significant amount of money)
in order for the lawyer to use the money in paying for fees in appealing the case. However,
the appeal was dismissed because Atty. Aliño failed to pay the docket fees and other
required fees.
The spouses then filed an administrative case against Atty. Aliño. In his defense, Atty. Aliño
claimed that he was given the option to either use the money for appeal if in his judgment
an appeal is proper or to appropriate the same for his legal services. The investigating fiscal
recommended disciplinary action against Atty. Aliño. The Solicitor General agreed with the
fiscal. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Atty. Aliño manifested his intent to
produce additional evidence. The SC granted his request but, after four postponements
which Atty. Aliño asked for, he still failed to adduce additional evidence within the
prescribe period. The SC still gave him a chance and scheduled an oral argument but again,
Atty. Aliño asked for postponement. In lieu of the oral argument, the SC required Aliño to
submit his memorandum which he again failed to comply with.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aliño should be subjected to disciplinary action.
HELD: Yes. Aliño was already negligent when he failed to pay the docket fees. In the first
place, he already filed the appeal, hence, he should have applied the money given to him
to pay for the docket fees. It is clear that Aliño misappropriated the funds when he applied
the same as payment for his fees.
But his later actions in this case shows his high degree of irresponsibility. He was given all
chances by the SC but he continually failed to comply with the orders of the court. Such
display of irresponsibility indicates his unworthiness as a member of the legal
profession. Aliño was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

A.M. NO. 892 OCTOBER 23, 1974

ANDRES G. MALABED, JR., COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. BENEDICTO L. NANCA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p
What transpired in this administrative case between lawyer and client is not too unusual.
Such a relationship, usually started with a feeling of goodwill on both sides, could
deteriorate at times into a situation where the former would be resentful of his services
not being fully appreciated, or, what is more, not compensated, and the latter
disappointed in the performance of counsel. That would seem to be the explanation for
the charges of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty being filed against respondent
Benedicto L. Nanca, a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant is one Andres G.
Malabed, Jr., a victim of a vehicular accident, who alleged that while confined in the
National Orthopedic Hospital he was approached by respondent, then unknown to him,
offering his services as a lawyer and asking the amount of Four Hundred Pesos presumably
for the payment of court fees the sum to which was added another Three Hundred Pesos.
The first advance was made on August 19, 1968. Complainant became suspicious as after a
lapse of several months, or on February of 1969, when he was already out of the hospital,
respondent had not even informed him as to the progress of his case. He took steps to
verify the matter but he found out that no suit against the bus company was filed. He had
to have recourse then to another lawyer. It is on the basis of the above allegations that he
would hold respondent liable not only for unprofessional conduct but also for dishonesty
in failing to return the money.1 Respondent, in his answer, denied the above allegations,
asserting that it was at the instance of the father of complainant that he accepted the case.
Thereafter, he cited his appearance as private prosecutor on behalf of complainant in a
criminal case pending in the municipal court of Aringay, La Union. Likewise, he had filed an
administrative complaint against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Company before the Public
Service Commission. While he took the preparatory steps to file a civil action for damages
against such firm, there were overtures for amicable settlement, thus delaying the filing
thereof. With reference to the administrative charge, however, before the Public Service
Commission, it did not reach the final step as there was also fresh talk of amicable
settlement between the bus company and complainant who instructed respondent to
defer the filing of the civil complaint for damages. There came what for him was a
surprising turn of events when in February, 1968 his services were unceremoniously
terminated. He denied that he received the additional sum of Three Hundred Pesos and he
likewise claimed that for his professional services in the criminal complaint he had not been
paid at all. His prayer is for the dismissal of this administrative charge for being devoid of
merit.2
The matter was, thereafter, referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation, according to a resolution of this Court dated June 23, 1970. On October
1, 1974, an extensive and thorough report of thirty-six pages was submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr.
The conclusion reached in such report is that based on what was considered credible
evidence, both oral and documentary, coming from the parties: "The charge of
"unprofessional conduct in the circumstances under which"[respondent was hired by
complainant as his lawyer] has no basis."3 The charge of dishonesty was likewise held to
be not proved. Respondent was, however, required to return the sum not of Four Hundred
Pesos but of Four Hundred Forty Pesos to complainant. Why it should be the case is
explained in the report thus: "It would seem, therefore, that the respondent was minded
to extend his services for free and this attitude was apparently not unknown to the
complainant when the latter sent the respondent a telegram (Exh. "D") and a written
demand for the return of the P400 in February, 1969 (See Exh. "C"). The respondent
confirmed the arrangement (for free legal services) when he replied in writing that
"everything will be refunded" (Exh." D")."4 Further on this point, Solicitor General
Mendoza stated in his report: "While we do not abet or commend the manner in which
respondent's services was summarily terminated, for his inability to institute the civil
action required of him by his client, the fact remains that since the P400.00 (and the
P40.00) was given in relation to such contemplated action, his inaction or omission
whether through negligence or not calls for the return of the amounts advanced. There
having been neither agreement for attorney's fees nor a bill for legal services rendered,
respondent had no lawful cause to retain complainant's money after its return was
demanded. (Sec. 25, Rule 138, New Rules of Court). Respondent's act, albeit censurable,
is, however, not essentially one of dishonesty, ... . His having accepted the case was more
for accommodation of a friend than just an impersonal undertaking. His reaction in
retaining complainant's money clearly stemmed from a hurt feeling because of the
apparent display of ingratitude, on the part of the complainant."5The recommendation,
therefore, was for dismissing the charge for unprofessional conduct and for holding
respondent accountable for the return of the full amount of Four Hundred and Forty Pesos
to complainant, although he was not to be held liable for dishonesty.
This Court, after going over the records of the case, accepts such report and
recommendation as to respondent being cleared of the charges.
WHEREFORE, the charges of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty against respondent
Benedicto L. Nanca are dismissed, reserving to the complainant the right to file an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of the sum of Four Hundred Forty Pesos. Let a copy of this
resolution be entered in the record of respondent.
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. NO. 104600 JULY 2, 1999

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO AND AFRICA, PETITIONER,
VS.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. AND P
HILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

PARDO, J.:
The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P26,350,779.91)
for handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were terminated in midstream and the
client directly compromised the case with the adverse party.
The Facts
In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the
case. On August 28, 1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented
by the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm
appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting ETPI's
application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During this period, SAGA
was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De
Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. The latter signed
a retainer agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987. 1
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the traffic
revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the contract
between them. Second, ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against the PLDT's threats
to deny ETPI access to the Philippines international gateway switch. Third, ETPI called this
the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief
against PLDT's incursions and inducements directed at ETPI's foreign correspondents in
Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their correspondentship contracts with PLDT,
using the threat of denying them access to the international gateway as leverage.
In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining order,
one on October 30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications were not
acted upon, ETPI brought the case up to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva,
President and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was
terminating the retainer contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney's lien,
furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and PLDT.
On the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial billing
statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations towards a
compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable
settlement and that the same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner
filed a motion for the enforcement of attorney's lien with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. 2 We noted the
manifestation in a resolution dated July 23, 1990.
On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to nor
in any manner involved in the attorney's lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for and in
behalf of the law firm, 3 while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.
The Lower Court's Ruling
The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed
by the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact and in law,
and therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorney's Lien.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.
(s/t) ZEUS C, ABROGAR
Judge 4
On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the above-
mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme Court only via a
petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In an order dated January
16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.
The trial court said:
There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. Under
the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of
the Regional Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review
on certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila.
(s/t) ZEUS C, ABROGAR
Judge 5
Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, which we remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in a
decision promulgated on November 14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge committed no abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:
We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave one, in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien.
Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien, it cannot be corrected by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with
cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120634 December 3, 1999

FLORA DORONILA-TIOSECO, BENJAMIN DORONILA, JR., SALVADOR DORONILLA, and
SOLEDAD DUNGCA-DORONILA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE WILLIAM M. BAYHON, and RAMON A.
GONZALES, respondents.
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 2

As a result of dispute among the heirs of the late Alfonso Doronila and their counsel,
Ramon Gonzales, over his claim for attorney's fees, on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Manila 3 denied the heirs' Motion to Cancel Attorney's Lien and declared Ramon
Gonzales entitled to ten per cent (10%) of the shares of the heirs of the late Alfonso J.
Doronila, including Salvador Doronila, who did not hire the services of Ramon Gonzales.

In due time, petitioners and respondent Ramon Gonzales both appealed the trial court's
ruling to the Court of Appeals. 4

After the appeals of both petitioners and respondent Ramon Gonzales had been
perfected, on November 29, 1993, respondent Ramon Gonzales filed with the trial court a
motion to annotate attorney's lien, praying that his attorney's lien be annotated on the
title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs of the late Alfonso J. Doronila had
inherited.

On December 3, 1993, the administrator of the estate filed with the trial court an
opposition to the motion pointing out that an attorney's lien does not extend to land and
that the proper remedy for the misgivings of Atty. Ramon Gonzales that the heirs of the
late Alfonso J. Doronila might dispose of their property was to ask for preliminary
attachment. 5

On April 22, 1994, the trial court granted respondent's motion to annotate attorney's lien.

On May 20, 1994, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration,
pointing out that the opposition of petitioners had also adopted the arguments of the
estate administrator. 6

On June 15, 1994, respondent Ramon Gonzales filed with the trial court an opposition to
the motion. 7

On July 4, 1994, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. 8

On August 29, 1994, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing the Orders of April 22, 1994 and July 4, 1994 in Special Proceedings
No. 144406 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila, granting the motion to annotate
in the titles of land belonging to the estate the attorney's lien of respondent Ramon
Gonzales. 9
On March 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision denying the petition
for certiorari, as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.

Hence, this petition. 10

On July 26, 1999, we gave due course to the petition. 11

The issues raised are:

1. Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant respondent

Ramon Gonzales' Motion to Annotate Attorney's Lien on the title of parcels
of land of the estate after the perfection of the appeal of both petitioners
and respondent from the order declaring Ramon Gonzales entitled to
attorney's fees of ten (10%) percent of the shares of the heirs in the estate,
and

2. Whether or not an attorney's lien extends to land.

Resolving the issues:

First Issue. —

At the time the trial court issued on April 22, 1994 the order granting respondent's motion
to annotate attorney's lien, both petitioners and respondent Ramon Gonzales had
perfected their appeal from the orders of July 3, 1991 and December 14, 1992, which denied
petitioner's motion to cancel attorney's lien and ruled that respondent Ramon Gonzales
was entitled to ten per cent (10%) of the shares of the heirs who were his clients. Thus, the
trial court had no more jurisdiction over the case and had no authority to act on the motion
to annotate attorney's lien. 12

The order of April 22, 1994 cannot be justified on the ground that it was for the protection
and the preservation of the rights of parties not involved in the appeal. The order
practically executed the claim of respondent Ramon Gonzales that he is entitled to
attorney's fees. In effect, the trial court granted execution pending appeal, without any
special reason to do so.

Second Issue. —

We have ruled that an attorney's "lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter
of the litigation." 13

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35003. In lieu thereof, the Court ANNULS the orders dated April
22, 1994 and July 4, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila, in Special
Proceedings No. 144406.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENT POOL, INC. VS. NALDOZA, 315 SCRA 406

Facts:

The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for appealing a decision
which is final and executory, deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from the client allegedly for “cash bond” in
the appealed case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal the illegal act. Respondent denies that he
persuaded complainant to file an appeal and asserted that it was the latter who initiated the action to
delay the execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two other charges. Trial procedures were
instituted before the IBP.

Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before RTC Makati, Branch 141.
Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of $2,555. Having
been acquitted in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for Dismissal of the IBP case.

Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the ground that the criminal case for
estafa is completely different from the proceedings before him. Acquittal in the former did not
exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the
administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555.
He was suspended by the IBP for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative proceeding since he was
acquitted of the criminal charge.

(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the decision of the POEA knowing it to
be final and executory.

Held:

(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

xxx

Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding
of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the
respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court.

(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been
any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final
and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was
unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for
petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order.
Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.

xxx
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to
strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

A.C. NO. 3910 JUNE 28, 2001

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. AND CRISPULO DUCUSIN, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case,
finding respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The dispositive
portion of the Court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty

of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the
registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering
the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision,
at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this
reconsideration.

The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon whom the
case was referred for investigation. We again quote the said findings for emphasis:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward,

spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while
testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are
saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill motive on the part of
the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant
complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the
complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full faith and credence.
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense
(that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening
and incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.
Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat,
Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly
authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied
having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult
to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said
property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a

real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing.
Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the
subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose
Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-
2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent
Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land
which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of
dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said
property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as
admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over the
typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose
Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose
Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he
should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap
of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the
subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that
Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial
is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent
and Exh. "A-3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor
of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he
prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character.
Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document.
He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does
not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe
to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00
representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity
of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent
no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the
 same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was
for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as
another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his
defense.1

We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his sworn oath as
a member of the bar to "do no falsehood nor consent to its commission"2 and further
violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession."3

In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first and only
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a member
of the bar. At one time, he was even the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)-Manila 1 Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to uphold the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of
his brethren. Furthermore, it appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon
already returned to the complainant himself the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No.
M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged receipt4 thereof, thus there is a need to delete
the directive to deliver the said TCT from the Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce
the penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and MODIFIES
the Decision dated August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. The directive
in the Decision to deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the
delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July 8, 1997.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as an

attorney and as a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1336

DECEMBER 19, 2000
PETRA M. SEVILLA, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
JUDGE ISMAEL L. SALUBRE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment dated June 24, 1998, earlier docketed as
A.C. No. 4970, against Atty. Ismael L. Salubre, presently a Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Tagum, Davao del Norte, charging the respondent with violations of Cannons 16 and 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.1

In the verified complaint, complainant alleges that respondent, prior to his appointment
as a Judge, was her legal counsel in Civil Case No. 91-01 entitled "Sps. Petra Sevilla and
Sancho Sevilla vs. Sps. Shem J. Alfarero, et al.", for Repurchase and Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction. On December 26, 1990, upon the advice of
respondent, complainant turned-over to the former the amount of P45,000.00 to be
consigned with the trial court as repurchase money. Moreover, instead of consigning said
amount, the respondent deposited the money in his name with the Family Savings Bank,
Panabo, Davao Province. And without the consent of the complainant, the said amount
was withdrawn from the said bank, misappropriated and used by respondent for his own
purposes and benefit.

This was followed by a series of promises and pleas for extension to pay. On April 14, 1994,
respondent issued a promissory note promising to pay the amount of P45,000.00 in June
1994 or immediately thereafter.2 On July 8, 1994, respondent asked for an extension of one
month.3 On October 17, 1994, respondent issued another promissory note promising to
pay on or before January 31, 1995.4 However, on January 30, 1995, respondent asked for a
fifteen-day extension or up to February 15, 1995 within which to pay.5 This was followed by
a telegram from respondent addressed to complainant and received on February 28, 1995
asking for another extension to pay because his loan with the PNB, Tagum Branch was still
being processed.6 Thereafter, on May 9, 1995, respondent executed yet another
promissory note promising to pay the total amount of P63,000.00 (P45,000.00 as principal
plus P18,000.00 as interest four (4) years and five (5) months at 10% per annum) on or
before June 30, 1995 without necessity of demand.7 But on June 28, 1995, respondent
through a telegram, asked for an extension on the ground that his loan with PNB, Tagum
Branch was still being processed.8 On August 1, 1995, respondent once again asked for an
extension based on the same ground and promised to pay before he assumes his post as
judge of the Municipal Trial Court.9 The 201 file of respondent shows that he assumed his
post on August 1, 1995. On August 15, 1995, respondent promised to turn over to
complainant the amount necessary to cover his obligation as soon as his loan with PNB
was approved.10 On May 23, 1996, respondent asked Sancho, the husband of complainant,
to come back on July 3, 1996 by which time the loan not with PNB but this time with Land
Bank would allegedly be ready.11 On August 21, 1996, the daughter of complainant, Leonor
M. Sevilla, sent a demand letter asking respondent to pay the amount of P77,787.59
(P45,000.00 as principal plus P32,787.59 as 10% interest per annum for five (5) years and
eight (8) months) on or before August 25, 1996, otherwise they will resort to court
action.12 Subsequently, respondent issued two (2) checks, the first is dated April 30, 1997
for P45,000.00 and the second is dated May 15, 1997 for P31,000.00.13 However, on
November 4, 1997 both checks were dishonored on the ground "account closed".14 Finally,
complainant, now through her counsel, sent a demand letter dated November 15, 1997
asking respondent to make good the value of his two (2) checks within five (5) days from
receipt of the letter.15
On November 25, 1998, this case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.16 On November 25, 1998, the OCA
through Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez, recommended that respondent be
allowed to file his Comment. The OCA opined that although the complaint focuses on acts
of respondent prior to his appointment as judge of the Municipal Trial Court, the charges
falls as one of the serious charges in Rule 140, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, to wit, willful
failure to pay a debt. The obligation was not extinguished by his appointment as a Judge.

In his Comment,17 respondent denied all the allegations of complainant regarding how he
handled the repurchase money. He averred that the allegations of the complainant in her
complaint were merely the result of a minor misunderstanding and that he and
complainant had already resolved the matter. In fact, he said, the complainant had
executed an Affidavit of Desistance18 dated August 9, 1999, wherein complainant alleged,
among others, that the filing of the case was a result of a misunderstanding and could not
be blamed for any criminal intent on the part of the respondent. Furthermore, in view of
the settlement of the civil aspect of the case, she is no longer willing to pursue her
complaint against the respondent.

Relying in the case of Imbing vs. Tiongson,19 the OCA recommended that respondent be
informed that the mere desistance of the complainant is not a ground for dismissal of the
complaint and is not an excuse for delaying the filing of his comment. Accordingly, he
should be required to comment anew on the complaint, addressing the facts and issues
raised therein.

In his subsequent Comment20 (with attachments) dated March 31, 2000, respondent
explains that he was then the legal counsel of herein complainant in several cases before
the RTC, Branch 4, Panabo, Davao, namely:

a. Civil Case No. 91-01, entitled "Sps. Petra and Sancho Sevilla vs. Sps. Shem Afarero, et al.,"
for Repurchase of the Land in the amount of P200,000.00;

b. Another Civil Case entitled "Sps. Petra and Sancho Sevilla vs. Milky Amatong" for
Repurchase also;

c. A case for support filed by Petra Sevilla against her husband Sancho Sevilla.

Respondent narrates that the aforecited cases were filed in 1990 and 1991. The case
against Shem Alfarero is still pending before the Court of Appeals while the case against
Milky Amatong is still pending before the RTC, Panabo, Davao. Sometime in the middle
part of 1990, complainant paid him the amount of P45,000.00 for litigation expenses and
appearance fee in the above-mentioned cases which he (respondent) deposited in his
name with the Family Savings Bank, Panabo, Davao. However, complainant caused him to
sign a receipt which stated that the purpose thereof is for the repurchase of the property
subject of the case she filed against Shem Alfarero. Respondent claims that this amount is
not for the repurchase of the said property considering that the value of the property
subject in the said case is P200,000.00.
When respondent assumed office as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Tagum, Davao
on August 1, 1995, complainant demanded for the return of the amount of P45,000.00 plus
interest thereon which has reached a total amount of P77,787.50. Respondent then paid
the amount of P35,000.00 with a balance of P10,000.00 on the principal but complainant
insisted for the payment also of the interest. When respondent failed to pay the full
amount and interest, as demanded, complainant filed a criminal case for Estafa against the
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, Branch 4. To avoid
embarrassment, respondent paid the amount demanded and eventually complainant
executed an Affidavit of Desistance on August 9, 1999 with the assistance of her counsel,
Atty. Jacinto T. Rubillar. Later, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the said criminal case
in its Order dated August 27, 1999.21

On the basis of its evaluation, report and recommendation, the OCA found the contention
of respondent to be without merit. It opined that the contention of respondent that the
amount he received from complainant was in payment of his appearance fee and other
litigation expenses is belied by the receipt respondent signed on February 15, 1994. And
still, in another receipt which respondent had signed, respondent acknowledged having
deposited said amount of P45,000.00 with the Family Savings Bank, Panabo Branch. The
OCA also found that respondent’s deliberate refusal to return the said amount despite
repeated demands from his client (complainant herein) was a violation of Canon 16
particularly Rule 16.03, Code of Professional Responsibility and that it was of no moment
that respondent had eventually settled his obligation. The respondent paid his obligation
only after complainant had filed a case for the purpose. From the foregoing, the OCA
recommended that respondent Judge Ismael L. Salubre be fined in the amount of
P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. The OCA likewise recommended that the instant complaint be re-
docketed as an administrative matter.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of the Office of the Court Administrator.
However, taking into consideration the attendant circumstances of this case we believe
that the amount of the fine recommended should be increased.

The Affidavit of Desistance of herein complainant did not divest this Court of its jurisdiction
to impose administrative sanctions upon respondent Judge. In like manner, while it may
be true that the complaint for Estafa had been dismissed, the dismissal was on account of
the complainant’s voluntary desistance and not upon a finding of innocence of the
respondent. It neither confirms nor denies the respondent’s non-culpability. It must be
emphasized, that the primary object of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to
punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration
of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to
remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath
have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar. Thus, administrative cases against lawyers can still proceed despite the dismissal
of civil and/or criminal cases against them.

In Fernando Cruz and Amelia Cruz vs. Atty. Ernesto Jacinto,22 we held that -
"The practice of law is so intimately affected with public interest that it is both a right and
a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The
Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. Since the practice of
law is inseparably connected with the exercise of its judicial power in administration of
justice, the Court cannot be divested of its constitutionally ordained prerogative which
includes the authority to discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and unworthy member of
the Bar by a mere execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance and quitclaim (par [5],
Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution).

A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in
probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court (Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997]), and the complainants who called the
attention of the Court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct are in no sense a party, and
have generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93[1998])."

We likewise agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent Judge
Ismael L. Salubre is liable for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for his failure to return the funds of his client (complainant herein) upon
demand. As noted earlier, respondent finally returned the funds to his client but only after
the latter sued him for estafa.1awp++i1

In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr.23 , we stated that –

"The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree
of fidelity and good faith. It is designed ‘to remove all such temptation and to prevent
everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client.’

Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.’
Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that ‘a lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the client.’ The Canons of Professional Ethics
is even more explicit:

"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."

In the present case, the appointment of the respondent as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court is not a valid reason for respondent not to properly address and comply with the
demand of complainant, his former client, to pay and settle forthwith the amount he had
received in trust from the latter. Respondent’s contention that the money he received
from complainant was actually the latter’s payment for his appearance fee and other
litigation expenses should have been made known to complainant at the earliest time
when the demand was made. However, instead of properly saying his piece regarding the
matter he bombarded complainant with a long line of promises in the hope that
complainant would eventually allow the matter to be left unsettled. Nothing in the
numerous communications which respondent judge sent to complainant would indicate
that he had really exerted efforts to explain the real story as he claimed it to be.
Respondent did not even squarely addressed the veracity of the letters he sent to
complainant and offer an explanation why his contention now is different from the
contents of those letters. What is evident from the record is the fact that respondent
misappropriated the money entrusted to him by his client (complainant herein) while he
was still in trial practice. The fact that he was eventually appointed as Judge will not
exculpate him from taking responsibility of the consequences of his acts as an officer of
the court and, more so, now as Judge.

Though the acts complained of were prior to his appointment as a Judge, it is trite to
emphasize that the Code of Judicial Ethics no less mandates that a judge should avoid
the appearance of impropriety.24 Even his personal behavior in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach.25 By issuing the two checks after he was already discharging his duties
as a Judge purportedly to settle the obligation, i.e., the first dated April 30, 1997 for
P45,000.00 and the second is dated May 15, 1997 for P31,000.00, which later on were both
dishonored on the ground "account closed",26 respondent failed to keep up with the
exacting standards of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Such act tends to show his apparent
intention to further delay payment due the complainant, which delay in fact lasted for five
(5) years and eight (8) months. Being the visible representation of law, and more
importantly, of justice, the people sees in the respondent the intermediary of justice
between two conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation practice lawyers do not
know how to uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to their appointment as
Judges, how then could people expect them to render just judgments in the cases before
them? This is the price that judges should pay for the honor bestowed upon those who
occupy an exalted position in the administration of justice. No position exacts a greater
demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.27

With respect to the claim or allegation that the respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, we find that said allegation was not substantiated in this
case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ismael L. Salubre is hereby found guilty of violation of

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to return and
immediately deliver the funds of his former client, Petra M. Sevilla upon demand, and
Canon 2 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics for his failure to avoid the appearance of
impropriety. The respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of Judge Ismael L. Salubre
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. NO. 2736

MAY 27, 1991
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY MR. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA,
JR., AS ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, AND/OR MRS. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, AS
ITS VICE-PRESIDENT, PETITIONERS,
VS.
ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, RESPONDENT.

Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged 1 on two

counts, to wit:

1. Negligence and

2. Betrayal of his former client's confidences.

A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation LFC,
hereinafter), and received by the Court on February 25, 1985.2

The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report, and recommendation.

After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation," dated February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26,
1990.

From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized
as follows:
Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his
former client's confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge
of negligence:

Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on

January 8, 1981 as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six
months later (tsn. pp. 6-7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta
Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against
complainant before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment
(MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the
requirement that position papers be submitted (Exh. G).

During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to
explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached
the hearing was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed
to go to his office on that date respondent failed to appear for the second setting
(tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset
the hearing to June 28, 1983. Respondent received on June 23, 1983 the Order for
the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).

In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor
case, setting the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a
conflicting schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the
Hanopol case. However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he
opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for
postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985). Respondent's telephone message
apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28,
1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's
complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper.

After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to
pay Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol's
evidence alone.

Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) on August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4). The case was remanded to the
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984
and July 12, 1984 wherein attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile.
The Labor Arbiter set two more dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984
(tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).

In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his
intention to resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty.
Rogelio Udarbe to take his place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his
resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the cases of complainant to Atty.
Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).
 During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one
appeared for complainant.1avvphi1 So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a
"Manifestation and Motion" praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5).

On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty.
Udarbe and he immediately came across the abovementioned "Manifestation and
Motion". On September 5, 1984, he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on
September 19, 1984, he followed this up with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7).
However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his earlier Decision dated July 29,
1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby prompting Atty. Loy to
appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, the NLRC
ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's
confidences, the following facts appear on record:

While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager,
Sebastian Cortes, issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its
employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his
alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. Another memorandum
dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by complainant's internal
auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant's president, summing up
San Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was
furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive committee, to
which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On
account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under preventive
suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).

On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent
a demand letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh.
N-2). Since he failed to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was
lodged against him before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter
resigned and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of his
counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5, 1985). Respondent prepared San
Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his
counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985).3

xxx xxx xxx

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the
Hanopol case which resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the
Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that
Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the
scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not.4
It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by
the Constancia5 setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By agreement
of the parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled."6 Since it
was signed by both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General argues that the
respondent's explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory.

With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent
justified his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he
told his secretary to call up the Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the
Hanopol case postponed.7 The Solicitor General avers:

. . . It is submitted that respondent's actuation was not warranted by the

circumstances. As it turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the
Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining him to declare complainant in default and
render judgment against it.8

In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he
was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set
aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings,
then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already.9 We find
this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree ,with the position of the Solicitor
General:

Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the
Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had
respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required position
paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case,
which, perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was
prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time
which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to
prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier
(Exh. 7).10

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a
clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility:11

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had
betrayed complainant LFC's confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics, to wit:

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the
lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employee's and neither of them
 should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of
these confidences, either for the private advantages of the client, without his
knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources of such
information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that this
obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new
client.

xxx xxx xxx

Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is:

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the
preparation of the counter-affidavit,12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation
of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat
of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the
respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the
complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC

Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General:

. . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by

testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito
R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he
called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; that
he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan
filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and
signature still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).

It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's

explanation is incredible.1âwphi1 His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his
comment on the complaint . . .13

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant,
his former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated,
and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case
other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct
from and independent of the former case.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of
negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his
former client's confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.

Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof
furnished to all courts and IBP chapters.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 94457 MARCH 18, 1991

VICTORIA LEGARDA, PETITIONER,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, RESPONDENTS.

Singson, Valdez & Associates for petitioner.

Lenito T. Serrano for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is
only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and
accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.

The present case is a typical example of such rare exception.

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements
thereon located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New
Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with
preliminary injunction and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Quezon City
alleging, among others, that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private
respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated
property of petitioner effective January 1, 1985 until December 31, 1989 or for a period of
five (5) years; that the rental is P25,000.00 per month with 5% escalation per year; that on
November 23, 1984, private respondent deposited the amount of P72,000.00 with
petitioner as down payment of rentals; that respondent drew up the written contract and
sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the same
despite demands of respondent; and that the respondent suffered damages due to the
delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant business. The private respondent
prayed that pending the resolution of the case a restraining order be issued against
petitioner or her agents enjoining them from stopping the renovation and use of the
premises by private respondent. It was also prayed that after due hearing the petitioner
be ordered to execute the lease contract; to pay actual compensatory, exemplary and
other damages in such amount as may be proved during the trial including P30,000.00
attorney's fees plus P300.00 per appearance of counsel, and to pay the expenses of
litigation.1

Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10)
days from February 26, 1985.2 However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the
extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to
declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and
private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25,
1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Victoria G. Legarda

to execute and sign Exhibit "D":, the lease contract for the premises at 123 West
Avenue, Quezon City. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction earlier issued on
January 31, 1985 is hereby made permanent.

Judgment is likewise rendered ordering defendant to pay exemplary damages in

the sum of P100,000.00 to serve as example and deterrent for others, and actual
and compensatory damages as follows:

1. For loss and destroyed goodwill and reputation in the amount of P100,000.00;

2. The sum of P61,704.40 as adjustments in the costs of labor and materials for the
renovation of the premises;

3. The sum of P50,000.00 as unearned income for the delay of plaintiff 's operations
from January 1, 1985 up to February 25, 1985 or a period of almost two (2) months;

4. The sum of P16,635.57 and P50,424.40 as additional compensatory damages

incurred by plaintiff for the extension of the lease of its premises at Makati and
salaries of idle employees, respectively;

5. The sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and

6. The costs of suit.3

Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any
action. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of
private respondent, a writ of execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court.4

At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of petitioner to Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr. for the sum of P376,500.00 to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff issued a
certificate of sale dated June 8, 1985 covering the said property.5 After the one year
redemption period expired without the petitioner redeeming the property, ownership was
consolidated in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff issued a final deed of sale
on July 8, 1986 in his favor. Cabrera registered the same in the office of the Register of
Deeds on July 11, 1986.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel,
to seek the appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment calling attention to the unjust enrichment
of private respondent in securing the transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5
million without justification; that when the complaint was filed in court by private
respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to an agreement to settle their
differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed shall be
withdrawn so petitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer any need to file an
answer to the complaint; that on February 22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless filed
an ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner in default; that petitioner was deprived of the
right to present her defense through false pretenses, misrepresentation and fraud
practiced upon her by private respondent warranting the annulment of the judgment; that
the documentary evidence presented by private respondent, which served as the basis of
the decision, is falsified and tampered with; that as an example, the voucher filed by
petitioner, contains typewritten entries to the effect that the term of the lease is for five
(5) years to which petitioner never agreed, and that the option to buy the property was
given to the private respondent; that the fact that the property worth P2 million was sold
at public auction at a shockingly and questionably low price of P376,500.00 is by itself a
sufficient basis for annulling the sale for being grossly inadequate to shock the conscience
and understanding of men, giving rise to a presumption of fraud.6 Thus, it was prayed that
a preliminary mandatory injunction issue ordering the private respondent to surrender the
property to petitioner and to enjoin the former from further harassing and threatening the
peaceful possession of petitioner; and that after hearing, the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. Q-43811 and the sheriffs certificate of sale7 be likewise annulled; that private
respondent be adjudged to pay petitioner no less than P500,000.00 actual and moral
damages, as well as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus the costs of the suit.8

On February 2, 1987 an amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court
of Appeals raising the additional issue that the decision is not supported by the allegations
in the pleadings or by the evidence submitted.9

In due course, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on November 29,
1989.10 The appellate court made the following observations:

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced

upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the
Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's counsel by
then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions
imposed by petitioner, said law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper
motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused
to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be
declared in default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise
agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract
in question which plaintiff had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could
have been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be
entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel Law
 Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a
new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to
protect the interests of their client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff
to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly promised the
latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of-pure and simple negligence on the
part of defendant's counsel who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of
defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been
furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief from the order declaring their client
in default or from the judgment by default. [sic] Again, counsel negligently failed to
do either. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different if it had
proceeded differently (Pulido vs. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257,
among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be
an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and
show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or
learned" (Fernandez vs. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138).11

Despite these findings, the appellate court nevertheless dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment with costs against the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment
appears to have been served on counsel for the petitioner. However, said counsel did not
file a motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom, so it became final.

It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter
of the adverse decision against her only after persistent telephone inquiries of the
petitioner.

Hence, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer who filed this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is prayed that the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43811, the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10487 and the sheriff's sale at public auction of the property in
question be annulled, as the same are attributable to the gross negligence and inefficiency
of petitioner's counsel, whose blunder cannot bind the petitioner who was deprived of
due process thereby. It is further prayed that private respondent Cathay House, Inc. be
ordered to reconvey to petitioner the property covered by TCT No. 270814, which was sold
at public auction to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. and in whose favor its ownership was
consolidated, and thereafter ownership appears to have been transferred to private
respondent.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be

expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner.
Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing
to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said
counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to
file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared
in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private
respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the trial court.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the
same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory.
The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of
private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of
private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period
expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera,
who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her
great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith
in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under
the circumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its
amendment in the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 But that was all he did. After an adverse
judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said
counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration
thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It
was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the
secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with
the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of
his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties
to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public.12

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to
exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause.13 It is not only a
case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross
negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process
of law.

In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa,14 this Court ruled as follows:

Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate

grievance. When such technicality deserts from being an aid to justice, the courts
are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case. Where there was
something fishy and suspicious about the actuations of the former counsel of
petitioner in the case at bar, in that he did not given any significance at all to the
processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients,
 under a lame and flimsy explanation that the court's processes just escaped his
attention, it is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in court, thus
entitling said clients to petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing said period for filing said petition.

In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay,15 this Court, in holding that the counsel's blunder in procedure
is an exception to the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the
following disquisition:

Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered
against them by the respondent court are null and void, because they were therein
deprived of their day in court and divested of their property without due process
of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous
counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake
of their counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their
trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence
changed their cause of action and violated their substantial rights.

We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.

Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a
substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal)
under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the application of the rule will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.

xxx xxx xxx

While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in
the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in
accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the
general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their
property through a technicality.

In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no
uncertain terms, the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file
the proper motion to dismiss or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they
agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an answer; and that after having
been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file
a petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances the
appellate court found said counsel negligent but his acts were held to bind his client,
petitioner herein, nevertheless.

The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so
gross and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said
counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for
annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of
petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court,
he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He
allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence
should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived
of her day in court.

Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the
property of petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross
negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and
ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the
owner of the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all
because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to prevail. It cannot tolerate such unjust
enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. The situation is
aggravated by the fact that said counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and the dean of
a law school as the Court at the beginning of this discourse observed. His competence
should be beyond cavil. Thus, there appears to be no cogent excuse for his repeated
negligence and inaction. His lack of devotion to duty is so gross and palpable that this
Court must come to the aid of his distraught client, the petitioner herein.

As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He
should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a
practicing lawyer should accept only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he
should do any less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City dated March 25, 1985 in Civil Case No. Q-43811; the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487; the Sheriff 's
Certificate of Sale dated June 27, 1985 of the property in question; and the subsequent
final deed of sale covering the same property, are all hereby declared null and void. Private
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is directed to reconvey said property to the petitioner,
and the Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel the registration of said property in the name
of private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of petitioner. Costs against
private respondent. Said counsel for petitioner is hereby required to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and
omissions hereinabove described in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. L-23956 JULY 21, 1967

ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
VS.
NICOLAS LUTERO, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY AND THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF JARO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Hautea and Hinojales for plaintiff-appellant.
Luisito C. Hofileña for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing
a petition for relief directed against the judgment rendered by the municipal court of Iloilo
City in its civil case 7220.

On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint
against Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas
Lutero. The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure
of the defendant to receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same
reason. It was thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August 27, all
at the behest of the defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not
finished his business transactions in Manila" and that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last
postponement was granted by the municipal court with the warning that no further
postponement would be entertained.

When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his
counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Peña who was present in court
verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in
Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion
on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's previous
admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then
manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for
presentation on that date. The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the
plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the presentation of the plaintiff's
evidence, the municipal court received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting
postponement of the hearing. The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the
plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and
against the defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of the decision on September
9, 1963. On the following September 11, he filed a motion to set aside judgment and for
new trial. This motion was denied on September 26; a copy of the order of denial was
received by him on the same date.

On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a
petition for relief (from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case
be set for trial on the merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction
issue restraining the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that
his absence on the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business
transaction in Manila; that before his departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the
respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that he might not arrive on
time for the trial of the case as set; that he called at both the law office and the residence
of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of the desired postponement and
the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost
diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram to the
respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing,
the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his
client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a
decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the
petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial defense, which is, that
the complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises subject-matter of the
complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the private respondent no
real injury.

This petition was given due course, the respondents were required to file their answers,
and a cease-and-desist order was issued as prayed for. On February 22, 1964, after due
hearing, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.1äwphï1.ñët

Hence the present recourse.

From the perspective of the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case, the
present appeal is palpably devoid of merit.

A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics,
and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for
trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a
detainer case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss
in this respect.

The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said
counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal
admonition by the judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The
case was reset for hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel
had more than a month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict
between his business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and
neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not
occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and
justifiably prevented him from appearing in court.

In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a
mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable
as it reveals more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established
machinery of justice.

Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the appearance in court on August 27 of

another attorney who verbally moved for postponement nor by his telegram received by
the municipal judge on the same date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon
the contrary, emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal judge.
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that the petitioner-appellant was not
deprived of his day in court, and that the respondent municipal judge did not err in
proceeding with the trial, allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte,
and thereafter rendering decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner
was not entitled to the remedy of a petition for relief.

Moreover, after the denial of his motion to set aside judgment and for new trial, the
appellant had ample time to appeal; instead he allowed the judgment to become final and
executory. His argument that an appeal would have been futile as there was no evidence
upon which such appeal could be based, merits scant consideration. An appeal from the
decision of a municipal court to the Court of First Instance has the effect of vacating the
decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of Court; sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules), and the
action is to be tried de novo without regard to the proof presented in the municipal court
or the conclusions reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo
vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To grant the
appellant's petition for relief would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he had
irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa vs. Yatco, etc., et
al., L-16435, Jan. 31, 1963, and the cases therein cited). This in law cannot be done.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As this appeal is patently frivolous
and dilatory, this Court, under the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of the Rules of Court,
hereby assesses treble costs against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs
to be paid by his counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. NO. 78885 FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FILINVEST LAND, INC., PETITIONER,
VS.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE UNDERWRITERS FINANCE
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioner.

Salva, Villanueva & Associates for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent was properly declared in default.
We are asked to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing considerations, all the appealed Orders,
Decision, and Resolution are hereby nullified, lifted and set aside, the
 defendant's Answer with counterclaim, as well as the Third-Party Complaint,
admitted, and the case remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No costs.

The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are not in dispute:

On October 10, 1983, plaintiff Filinvest Land Incorporated filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint dated September
30, 1983, against the defendant Philippine Underwriters Finance
Corporation, both corporations being organized and existing under
Philippine laws, for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of land, Lot No. 3,
Block 13 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-6254, containing an
area of 999 square meters, located along Benavidez Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati, Metro Manila, including an unfinished seven-storey building
thereon, alleging that it is the owner thereof as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-109458, issued in its favor on July 28, 1981, but which
is occupied by the defendant to house some of its offices, and who, inspire
of repeated demands by the plaintiff, has refused to vacate the same.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon the
defendant on October 13, 1983. A motion dated October 24, 1983 was filed
by defendant, through Atty. Emerita T. Salva, requesting for an extension of
twenty (20) days from October 28, 1983, or up to November 17, 1983, on the
ground that undersigned counsel had to confer with the officers of the
corporation conversant with the facts of the case and to go over voluminous
documents and other related cases, which was granted by the court. A
second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days dated November 16, 1983,
or up to December 2, 1983, to file an answer was filed by the defendant,
through Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr., on the ground that the transactions
involved voluminous records and in order to prepare an intelligent answer,
undersigned counsel had to read all the records in his possession in addition
to the heavy pressure of work in other equally important cases, which was
also granted by the court. Then a third motion for extension to file an
answer dated December 1, 1983 for ten (10) days was filed by defendant,
through Atty. Angel D. Bautista, Jr., or up to December 12, 1983, on the
ground that the lawyer assigned to handle this case was quite busy
preparing for his wedding, as well as daily court appearances, which was
similarly granted by the court on December 5, 1983.

In a motion dated December 10, 1983, an urgent request for another

extension of twenty (20) days from December 12, 1983, on the ground that
the issues to be brought up for judicial scrutiny in the answer and in the third
party complaint of defendant are very controversial, complicated and
difficult requiring careful analysis, study and research, was filed by
defendant, through Atty. Magno F. Salva, and which was likewise granted
by the court.
Then for the fifth time, defendant filed another urgent motion for extension
of time to file its answer, dated December 28, 1983, asking for another
twenty (20) days from January 1, 1984, on the following grounds: the heavy
pressure of work in pending cases before the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the preparation of other pleadings, motions, memoranda and
papers in other cases; the preparation and attendance in the trial of cases
before the Regional Trial Courts of Metro Manila, all of which would prevent
counsel for defendant from being able to file their answer on or before
January 1, 1984. This was also granted by the court, but only for five (5) days
from receipt of the order dated January 3, 1984, which was received by
defendant's counsel on January 4, 1984, and which would then expire on
January 9, 1984.

Finally, another verified urgent motion dated January 7, 1984, asking for a
final and last extension of ten (10) days from January 9, 1984, was filed by
defendant's counsel on the ground that Atty. Emerito Salva, who was the
one personally studying and preparing the answer, was stricken ill and
collapsed in his house due to lobar pneumonia on December 18, 1983, and
was bedridden for ten (10) days, as shown by the sworn medical certificate
issued by his attending physician (Annex "A"). Besides, even while still
recuperating, he had to file a lengthy motion for reconsideration in the case
of Philfinance, pending before the SEC, regarding the order of liquidation
thereon, as well as a brief in IAC Case No. DV-00931. This motion was denied
on January 9, 1984.

On January 10, 1984, the day immediately following the extended period up
to January 9, 1984, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion to declare
defendant in default and be allowed to adduce evidence ex-parte. On the
same date, January 10, 1984, the lower court issued an order which was
received by defendant on January 17, 1984, declaring the defendant in
default, and allowing the plaintiff to adduce evidence ex-parte. A hearing ex-
parte was conducted and terminated that same day, January 10, 1984.

The very next day, January 11, 1984, a two-page decision was rendered by
the lower court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, the
dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendant, ordering the latter to vacate the building and lot
thereon, and turn over the possession thereof to the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED."

A verified Answer with Counterclaim dated January 9, 1984, consisting of

fifteen (15) pages, excluding its annexes, was filed by the defendant on
January 12, 1984, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, which denied plaintiffs
claims and averred that Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-109458 and
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1 09809, and all the transactions or
documents executed by Hermilo V. Rodis, Sr., President of defendant
Philfinance, in favor of the Aboitiz Group, which led to the issuance of said
titles were without consideration and thus null and void, illegal and invalid,
as well as unauthorized, and the deed of sale between the Aboitiz Group
and the plaintiff was done in bad faith, and that while said parcel of land and
the unfinished seven-storey building thereon were under receivership by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the defendant was still the owner
thereof and entitled to its possession.

On January 25, 1984, defendant filed a sworn and verified motion/petition

for: (a) the reconsideration of the order dated January 9, 1984 in order to
admit defendant's answer filed on January 12, 1984 at 8:00 o'clock A.M. (b)
the setting aside of the default judgment dated January 11, 1984; and (c)
leave to file, and the admission of defendant's Third Party Complaint
attached to the motion/petition, against Filinvest Credit Corp., Aboitiz & Co.,
Inc., Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc., Cebu Shipyard & Engineering
Works, Inc., Enrique M. Aboitiz, Vidal Aboitiz, Lucy Ugarte and Alberto
Rotaeche as Third-Party Defendants.

On February 7, 1984, plaintiff filed its opposition to defendant's

motion/petition, to which defendant filed a verified reply on February 17,
1984, both pleadings substantially reiterating their prior arguments and
issues raised in their earlier pleadings.

In a rather long and extended 12-page single-space Resolution dated March

19, 1984, the lower court denied defendant's motion/ petition in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, finding the neglect of defendant's counsel to

file the answer to the complaint for a period of ninety (90)
days to be inexcusable; that there being no prima facie case
showing that defendant has a meritorious defense to warrant
the change of the decision already rendered and considering
that the matter alleged in the third-party complaint is foreign
to the issues subject of the complaint which is only proper to
be a subject of a separate complaint, this Court hereby denies
defendant's motion/petition for (a) reconsideration of the
order dated January 9, 1984; (b) setting aside of the default
judgment dated January 11, 1984 and (c) leave to file and
admission of defendant's third-party complaint. (At pp. 89-
92, Rollo)"

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's order, decision, and
resolution.

The petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:

 I — In finding that private respondent's failure to answer the complaint in a
period of ninety (90) days is excusable and that having been declared in
default is a denial to have its day in court.

II — In finding that there was substantial compliance by private respondent

of the requirements of submission of affidavit of merits in its motion to
admit answer; lift order of default and default judgment and also erred in
citing jurisprudence not applicable to the case.

III — In faulting the lower court for the failure of private respondent to
prove its meritorious defense.

IV — In ruling that the third-party complaint by private respondent should

be admitted on the sole ground that the third-party defendant is the
predecessor in interest of petitioner. (At page 15, Rollo)

As earlier stated, the real issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in setting aside the order of default dated January 10, 1984 of
the lower court.

While it is true that this Court in many earlier cases has remained faithful to the principle
that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default judgments are
frowned upon (Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 161 SCRA 45 [1988]) the Court
finds that the order of default must be sustained in the case at bar.

The petitioner filed its complaint on October 10, 1983. Summons and a copy of the
complaint were served on the private respondent on October 13, 1983. From October 28,
1983 up to January 9, 1984, private respondent's counsel, through four (4) of its lawyers
filed no less than six (6) motions for extension of time asking for a total of ninety eight
(98) days from October 13, 1983 to January 21, 1984 to answer the complaint.

The lower court granted the five (5) motions and denied the sixth motion before it
declared Philfinance in default. All in all, the lower court gave the private respondent
eighty-eight (88) days to answer the complaint, so it can not be stated that the trial court
has in any way unduly favored the petitioner neither can it be considered that private
respondent has been denied due process.

In reversing the default judgment, the respondent court relied on the contention that
Philfinance was placed under receivership making it difficult for its lawyers to have access
to the records of the corporation. The court stated:

... It is a matter of official record that the defendant Philippine Underwriters

Finance Corporation (Philfinance for short) had been placed under
receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), thus making
it rather difficult for the defendant's counsel to have access to the records
of said corporation. Such records, as would naturally be expected of a
corporation of its size and type of business, are voluminous, and ferreting
the relevant facts and documents to support them would not be an easy
 task, as it proved to be. Besides, the placing of the defendant under
receivership by the SEC deprived the corporation's officers of the full
control of its operations, assets and records. (Rollo, p. 93)

Certainly, the trial court took into consideration the private respondent's situation which
is the reason why it allowed the several extensions of time in the exercise of extreme
leniency. But much as we would like to sympathize with private respondent's plight and
agree that its counsel indeed had difficulty with the records of the corporation, such
reason is not only insufficient to explain six motions for postponement but was also
belatedly raised. It was a mere afterthought on the part of counsel when he raised such
reason after they were already adjugded in default. In all of the six (6) motions, the private
respondent's counsel chose to justify their requests on the basis of the inability to read the
records because of too much work, or heavy pressure of work, illness of counsel or a rather
frivolous reason such as the unexpected wedding of one of the counsel. The firm had
several lawyers and the motions were alternately filed by the four counsel. If the sixth
motion had not been denied then the court would probably have had another succession
of requests for extensions of time. The pattern of inexcusable neglect, if not deliberate
delay is all too clear. (Development Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
143 SCRA 62 [1986]). Equity and justice should also be considered for both party litigants.
The private respondent was given extraordinary opportunity to have its day in court when
the lower court had given it a total of eighty-eight (88) days from service of summons to
file its answer to the complaint. The inability of four (4) lawyers to prepare the answer for
this long period of time is to our mind not justified.

We reiterate the Court's ruling in the case of Pahilanga v. Luna, 164 SCRA 725 [1988], where
we stated that:

It is within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of default
and to permit a defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits
even after the reglementary period for the filing of the answer has
expired, but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the court
to refuse to set aside its order of default and to refuse to accept the answer
where it finds no justifiable reason for the delay in the filing of the answer. In
motions for reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the
burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being excused from
not filing the answer within the reglementary period as provided by the
Rules of Court, otherwise, these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious
procedure would be rendered meaningless. Unless it is shown clearly that a
party has justifiable reason for the delay the court will not ordinarily exercise
its discretion in his favor (Emphasis supplied.)

Going over the records, we agree that the motion to lift the order of default was properly
denied in view of the absence of any meritorious defense interposed by the private
respondent.

Philfinance has not asserted any leasehold or other possessory right over the properties
independent of their ownership. It mainly anchors its claim of ownership upon the
contention that Filinvest's Torrens Title to the property is void because the original
transfer of the properties from Philfinance to Filing vest's immediate predecessor-in-
interest, Aboitiz and Company, Inc. (Aboitiz Group) was not authorized by Philfinance's
Board of Directors. This Court gives more credence to the lower court's finding, to wit:

Contrary to the allegation of the defendant that the deed of assignment of

the premises in question executed by the former President of Philfinance
was without the knowledge and approval by the Board of Directors, records
show that said deed of assignment was executed pursuant to the authority
given by the Board of Directors of Philfinance in Resolution No. SB-81 passed
during the meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 25, 1981 as
per Secretary's Certificate issued by Mr. Vivencio R. Alcasid, the duly elected
and qualified Corporate Secretary of Philfinance (Annex 'A' — Plaintiffs
opposition to defendant's motion/petition).

In its efforts to prove that there was no meeting of the Board of Directors
of defendant Philfinance on February 25, 1981 which passed Resolution No.
SB-81 aforementioned, defendant, in its reply to opposition to
motion/petition, submitted copies of the affidavits of several persons
(Annexes K to K-15). Examination of these affidavits, however, disclosed
that the affiants did not execute their affidavits as members of the Board of
Directors or as officers of defendant Philfinance, but as members of the
Board of Directors of Sterling Life Assurance Corporation and that of
Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation attesting to the fact that there
were no meetings of the Board of Directors of said corporation on February
25, 1981 whereby minutes were allegedly passed authorizing Atty. Hermilo
V. Rodis to assign to Insular Bank of Asia and America its rights over the deed
of sale with mortgage of Units A; B; C and D of the Sterling life Condominium
and the assignment of the rights of Filriters Guaranty Corp. of the 3rd and
4th floors of Sterling life Condominium and the disposal of its CBCI'S.

Defendant also attached in its reply, copy of the affidavit of Mr. Vivencio R.
Alcasid, the duly elected and qualified Secretary to the Board of Directors of
Philfinance who issued and signed the Secretary's Certificate (Annex A-
Plaintiffs opposition). Said affidavit of Mr. Alcasid, however, was executed
by him in his capacity as the duly elected and qualified Corporate Secretary
of the Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation and he was talking on
matters relative to assets of said company. There was nothing mentioned
on resolution No. SB-81 by the Board of Directors of Philfinance.

While it is true that Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. executed his affidavit (Annex
K) as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Philfinance,
nevertheless, he only denied that there was board meeting on February 25,
1981 whereby a resolution was allegedly passed authorizing Mr. Hermilo V.
Rodis to pledge the shares of stocks of Insular Bank of Asia and America and
the assignment of rights over lst, 2nd, 3rd and 4th floors of Sterling Life
Condominium, There was nothing therein which mentioned Resolution No.
 SB-81 and of the lot and building subject of the present case. The same
manner also as to the affidavit of Mr. Bienvenido L. Reyes, the Assistant
Corporate Secretary of Philfinance. All the said annexes, therefore, have no
value or weight in assailing the due execution of Resolution No. SB-81
(Annex A — Opposition) as well as the Deed of Assignment executed by Mr.
Hermilo V. Rodis (Annex A — Answer). So to speak, nothing has been done
yet by the Board of Directors of defendant Philfinance in assailing the
validity of said resolution and deed of assignment, not until now when the
instant complaint was filed, but by mere allegations without documentary
proofs. The inaction by the Board of Directors of defendant Philfinance in
assailing Resolution No. SB-81 and the deed of assignment aforementioned
for the last three (3) years and up to the present, clearly indicates its
acquiescence or knowledge of the matters subject thereof. (Rollo, pp. 82-
83)

Considering the above, we fail to see how mere denials can prevail over convincing
evidence on record.

Furthermore, in assailing the transfer of said properties to Aboitiz Group, Philfinance

alleges that there was no valid consideration given in exchange of the deed of assignment.
It prayed that its third-party complaint against the Aboitiz Group be admitted considering
that the money placement made by Aboitiz in the amount of P19,800,000.00 was illegal
and anomalous and that the trading of commercial papers relative thereto was unlawful
and fraudulent since said commercial papers were fake and spurious. Hence, the deed of
assignment of the premises in question (in favor of Aboitiz) was null and void and without
effect.

We agree with the lower court that the third-party complaint of Philfinance against Aboitiz
does not pass the test of admissibility. For a third-party complaint to be admissible, it must
be shown that the third-party defendant may be held liable to the defendant or to the
plaintiff for all of the latter's claim against the defendant. The allegations of the third-party
complaint (re: legality or illegality of the money placements) involve transactions purely
between Aboitiz and Philfinance. Whatever defenses the Aboitiz Group may have against
Philfinance can not be validly raised against Filinvest's claim since said transaction between
Philfinance and Aboitiz is entirely different and foreign to Filinvest's complaint for the
recovery of possession of the subject premises. Filinvest merely relies on the indefeasibility
and incontrovertibility of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the Aboitiz Group over the
subject properties. As an innocent purchaser for value of a registered land, it has all the
light to depend on the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the title as guaranteed under
the Torrens System of Registration.

Considering private respondent's failure to establish a valid defense, we therefore do not

find any abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in denying the motion to lift the
order of default. As we stated in the Pahilanga case, (supra):

... [N]othing would be gained by having the order of default set aside where
the party held in default has no valid defense in his favor for in such case, he
 will just the same fail on the merits even if the default order is lifted
[Development Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 71360, July 16, 1986, 143 SCRA 621].

This Court reiterates that it is concerned with the heavy caseloads of courts at all levels.
Most of the delays for which the justice system is assailed come from failure of counsel to
cooperate with candor and will in the speedy resolution of cases. We have instituted
continuous trial. We are revising the Rules of Court to make them responsive to current
problems. We call judges to task when their cases are not adjudicated with accuracy and
dispatch. The least we can do is sustain them when they come across litigants like the
private respondent in this case.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the resolution
of the Regional Trial Court dated March 19, 1984 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 89571 FEBRUARY 6, 1991

FRANCISCO LIM TUPAS AND IGNACIO LIM TUPAS, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDEZ, VELASCO & GRAPILAN FOR PETITIONERS.

CRUZ, J.:

In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court denied the petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure to show that the respondent court committed
reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989.1The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on November 23, 1989, to which we required a Comment, which was
followed by a Reply and later a Rejoinder.

After considering the issues and the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings,
we affirm that the respondent court was, indeed, correct when it held that the appeal had
been tardily made. The record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3, 1989, and that the motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days later. The order of
May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989.
Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of
the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May
23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy.

In Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals,2 which was promulgated on August 26, 1986, before the
case at bar arose, we held:

APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.

 The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final
judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal
circuit trial court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review in accordance with Section 22 of BP no. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim
Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules. The reason for extending the period for the riling of a record
on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial
court, the movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for
review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for
extension of time to file such petition for review (emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period,
which he should have known was only one day. Neither did he move for an extension that
would have been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably
late, he could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which can be filed within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be
employed as a substitute for a lost appeal.3

It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot
now plaintively claim that they have been denied due process.

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give
effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution
of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights
is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.4

The petitioners' argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of their
counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law is not
acceptable. If clients could disauthorize their counsel on this ground, the administration of
justice could be hopelessly encumbered. The petitioners have not shown that their counsel
was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts. There
is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of
their counsel, including his mistakes5

The petitioners' submission that their counsel's failure to appeal on time should be
regarded as excusable neglect or honest error is not compatible with his impressive
credentials. He is a prestigious member of the bar and his conduct at the trial
demonstrated his experience and skill as a trial lawyer. The petitioners themselves
describe him as "a graduate of one of the top law schools in the country, a bar examiner
in Remedial Law, a law professor in Remedial Law and other law subjects, a former
National Officer of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and a seasoned practitioner for
more than 30 years."6

The procedural mistake might have been understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not in
the case of the petitioners' former counsel.

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize
his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was
grossly inept. Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioner's new counsel
should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do to salvage his case
is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the
adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through
another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by
the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render
court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.7

It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the trial court was filed on the fourteenth day of the reglementary period and
that the petition for review was filed, presumably under the belief that a new 15-day period
had begun, fourteen days after the petitioners' counsel was notified of the denial of the
motion. This smacks of a dilatory tactic. It would seem to the Court that if the petitioners
felt so strongly that the said decision was erroneous they would have demonstrated more
spirit and promptitude in assailing it. Instead, they waited to move for reconsideration until
the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion was denied, filed the petition for review
only when it was already too late. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be extended
to them to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe.

For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement.1âwphi1 Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means
that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in
an earlier case, and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional
appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard
of the mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes
back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists — and is now still reverently observed — is
"aequetas nunquam contravenit legis."8

It is clear that the respondent court did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the
petitioners' appeal on the ground of tardiness. On the contrary, the challenged resolution
is conformable to the applicable law and jurisprudence that, despite the confusion of the
petitioners' former counsel, carried no esoteric meaning not available to the ordinary
practitioner.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.