III.

Special Proceedings (Rules 72 – 109)

A. Settlement of Estate

A.1. Silverio Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner, vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE

HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC.,Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 208828-29; August 13, 2014

FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived
by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son),
Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S. Silverio-Dee (daughter), and
Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-
2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging
several orders of the intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court.

CA-G.R. SP No. 121172

The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein
petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order of the intestate
court dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as
administrator to the... estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. The administrator first appointed by
the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation
dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to
withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court... and in
his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active
exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between
SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR.

CA-G.R. SP No. 121173

On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal
guardian moved for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based
on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest
allowing JUDGE GUANLAO,... JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he
appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has
shown bias and partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several
motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the... rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir
LIGAYA's Petition for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support has not been
resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be presided and
decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. On 23 March 2011, JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024

The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the
sale of certain properties belonging to the estate. By virtue of the aforesaid Order,
SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06September 2010 as
evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063. A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in
favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82
Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-
2011000050 was issued to Monica P. Ocampo. The... latter subsequently sold said property to
ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11 February
2011 under its name.

On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among
others, that aTRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from committing
any act that would affect the titles to the three properties.

On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as
Null and Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer
Certificate of TitleNo. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. and the Intestate Estate
of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.

On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining
Order.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr.
("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-
G.R. SP No. 121172 Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. asAdministrator;
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated March 23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.'s application
for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from
committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject... properties and enjoining the
Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other
documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March
23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.'s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge
Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary injunction); and inCA-G.R. SP
No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all
derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.

On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the fallo of which reads:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172 is DENIED for lack of merit.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173 is partly DENIED for lack of merit insofar as it
questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR's Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August
2011 Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all
derivative titles over the Cambridge and IntsiaProperty null and void is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ISSUES: The CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and
Cambridge properties upon the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has
a limited jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving... issues of ownership. It is
asserted that the CA should not have stopped there and looked into the nature of the
properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and
Beatriz S. Silverio.

HELD: The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.

In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006.
Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion bypetitioner.
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA
noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still...
in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as
administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale
was... executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.

The CA's ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:The more crucial question that needs to be
addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the properties in question granted under the
October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the... dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good
and valid.

The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the
sale of the three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void.

the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division)
was declared to be limited only to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the... removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and nothing else.

When the preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed
properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES
INC.

While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the
August 28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), we agree with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said
decision,... as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31,
2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath
of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set...
aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject
properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this
Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration of the
February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court
annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by
the... flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good
faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its
Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it...
allowed the aforesaid sale.
A.2. San Luis vs. San Luis
G.R. No. 133743; February 06, 2007, 514 SCRA 294.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, thereafter filed a Complaint for Divorce before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Felicidad alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Felicidad prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
Later Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal of the petition. The trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss, which were denied.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan and on the same day, Edgar also
filed a motion for reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration
arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Thereafter the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied
Edgar appealed to the Supreme Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City; and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration..
HELD:Petition denied. The subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, however the case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
Felicidad and Felicisimo.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death."
The rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She
also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership
of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his Alabang
address, and the deceased's calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
Applying the doctrine in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court to the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: . . . .
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
In the instant case, respondent Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
A.3. Agtarap vs. Agtarap
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs.SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO,Respondents.
G.R. No. 177099; June 8, 2011

NACHURA, J.

FACTS:Joaquin Agtarap contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), and
second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad) whom he married after Lucia died. Joaquin had 3
children with Lucia: Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by 3 children
namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). He also had 3 children with Caridad: Eduardo,
Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). Later on, Joaquin died (see
Figure below).

On September 1994, Eduardo Agtarap (Eduardo) filed with the RTC, Pasay City, a verified
petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap
(Joaquin) on November 21, 1964. The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate and without
any known debts or obligations and that the estate is composed of 2 parcels of land with
improvements covered by TCTs. Eduardo also prayed to be appointed as a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending
the appointment of a regular administrator. Sebastian filed a comment conceding to the
appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.

Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition alleging that a) the 2 subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in
1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties and b) Opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically
and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess
the desire to earn. On 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator and issued him letters of administration and later on issued an Order of
Partition. Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions
for reconsideration to which only Joseph and Teresa’s motion were granted. RTC declared
that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and
Lucia and ordered for modification of partition. However, before the RTC could issue a
new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA but both were
dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, both Eduardo and Sebastian filed a consolidated petition
for review on certiorari alleging that a probate court has no power to determine the
ownership of the property.

ISSUE:Whether or not RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, can
determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with
general jurisdiction?

HELD:Yes. RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the issues of

ownership.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate
court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir
and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.

We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by
the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the
estate of Joaquin. Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had
jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the
conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent.

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.

However, the general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
 JOSE+ Gloria

JOAQUIN LUCIA GARCIA+ Teresa

AGTARAP+ (1st marriage)

MILAGROS
JESUS+ Joseph
(died without issue)

EDUARDO
(petitioner)

JOAQUIN CARIDAD GARCIA+

AGTARAP+ (2nd marriage) SEBASTIAN

MERCEDES+ Cecile
A.4. Suntay 111 vs. Cojuangco-Suntay

Emilio M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Coangco-Suntay

G.R. No. 183053; October 10, 2012
PEREZ J.

FACTS: Christina Aguinaldo-Sunaty (Cristina), the decedent, married to Dr. Federico

Suntay (Federico), diedinstestate in 1990. In 1979, however, their only son, Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceasedboth Cristrina and Federico. At the time of her
death, Cristina wassurvived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including
therein petitioner, Emilio Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I was
married to Isabel Cojuangco and had three children, respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio
II. Emilio’s I marriage was subsequently annulled and Emilio I had two children out of
wedlock, Emilio III, herein petitioner and Nenita Suntay. Consequently, respondent and her
siblings Margarita and Emilio II live with their mother, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed petition for visitation rights
over his grandchildren but was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent, Isabel articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
After her spouses’s death, Federico legally adopted his illegitmate grandchildren, Nenita and
Emilio III. Reposndent later filed a petition for theissuance of letters administration over
decedent’s property but was opposed by Federico, alleging that being the spouse of Cristina,
he is capable of administering her state and he should be the one to appoint an adminsitatotr,
in the person of Emilio II and that as part owner of the mass of the conjugal properties, he
must be accorded legal preference in the administration. In the course of the proceedings,
Federico died. The trial court rendered a decision of appointing petitioner Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. The Court believes that to appoint Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay would go against the wishes of the decedent who raise Emilio III from
infancy as her own child and would likewise go against the wishes of Federico, who
nominated Emilio III for appointnment as administrator.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The Court of Appeals
focused on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and therefore barred from
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother and that he
cannot be appointed as administrator because the appointment of Emilio III was subject to a
suspensive condition, that between the legitimatye offspring (respondent) and illegitimate one
(petitioner) respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, and jurisprudence has consistently held that Art. 992 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab instestado from the legitimate children and
relative of his father and mother.

ISSUES:
A. In the appointemnt of an administator of the estate under Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, whether Art. 992 of the Civil Code applies?
B. Who as between Emilio III and respondent Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator
of the decedent’s estate?

HELD: The basis for Art. 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtail bar rule, is
opposite to the scenario in the facts obtaining the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of
legitimate relatives. In the appointment of an administrator, the principla consideration is the
interest of the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule our the
appoitnment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties of faction be represented in the management of the estates.

In the case at bar, Emilio III and Nenita were legally adopted by Federico, putting them in
equal footing with that of legitimate children and were treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their business,while the
relationship of the respondent was trained. The factual antecedents of this case accurately
reflect the basis of intestate succession, “love first descends”, for the decedent Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who legally raised the statusof Emilio III from an illegitimate
granchildren to that of a legitimate child. The law of intestacy is founded on the presumed
will of the deceased. Love, it is said, first descends, then descends, and finally spreads
sideways.

Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Christina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall be

issued to both the petitioner, Emilio III respondent, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

DOCTRINE: The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administratorover the

estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’sinterest in the estate.―The paramount
consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which
Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economicaladministration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer theconsequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, havethe
highest interest and most influential motive to administer theestate correctly. In all, given
that the rule speaks of an order ofpreference, the person to be appointed administrator of
adecedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in theestate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.

In a number of cases, the Supreme Courthas sanctioned the appointment of more than one
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.―In anumber of cases,
we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the
estate and those interested therein. We recognized that the appointment of administrator of
the estate of a decedent or the determination of aperson’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, toa great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment. Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of
coadministrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2)where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factionsbe represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;(3) where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexingone to settle; (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and therepresentatives to work in harmony for the best interests of
theestate; and when a person entitled to the administration of anestate desires to have
another competent person associated withhim in the office.
A.5. Lee vs. RTC of Q.C.
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines Internationl Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS
ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
G.R. No. 146006; February 23, 2004]

CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R.
59736, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma
Aggabao (in their capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine
International Life Insurance Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance Group.

FACTS: Dr.Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance

Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956, owning 90% of the subscribed capital stock. He died, leaving
his wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez)
and five illegitimate children by LigayaNovicio (herein private respondent Ma.
DivinaOrtaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed
Ortaez).

Rafael filed before the CFI of Rizal, (RTC of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration, which was opposed by private respondent Ma. Divina - who, in a subsequent
urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator. The presiding
judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose as joint special administrators while hearings
continued for the appointment of a regular administrator. As a result an inventory, which
included, among other properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the companys
outstanding capital stock, was submitted, to which half of said shares was being claimed by
the Wife as her conjugal share. She, then, sold them with right to repurchase in favor of
herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG). She failed to repurchase it within
the stipulated period, resulting to the consolidation of the ownership in FLAG’s name.

Special Administrator Jose, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the
remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said
shares with right to repurchase also in favor of FLAG, which after one year, consolidated in
its name the ownership of the said Philinterlife shares upon failure to repurchase. It appears
that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose, entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
extrajudicial settlement and partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock)
among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana
(1,014 shares) and by Jose (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
Private respondent Ma.Divina and her siblings (hereafter referred to as private respondents
Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares
of stock, which was opposed by Jose; but which, was granted by the intestate court,
appointing private respondent Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of
stock. She then filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of
agreement and another, to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement. Jose
opposed. AdministratrixEnderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of
sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which again was opposed by Jose, who filed an omnibus
motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the
release of Ma. DivinaOrtaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of
stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer, which
was eventually denied by the intestate court, which further issued another order granting the
motion of Special AdministratrixEnderes for the annulment of the memorandum of
agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the sale of the shares of stock is valid.
2. Wheherthe intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale.

HELD: No. What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without
securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of
[the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other
words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among
themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order
of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioners counsel, there was absolutely
no legal justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner
has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino Loan
Assistance Group.

It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the
intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since
the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to
him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that
is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not
any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner
FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the
intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate,
as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano,[22] we laid down the rule that the
sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is
void and passes no title to the purchaser.

Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2)
any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.

2. Can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul
the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other
words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before
final adjudication.

We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory
of the estate because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of
stock were owned by the decedent, Dr.JuvencioOrtaez. Rather, we are concerned here with
the effect of the sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez,
without the required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of
petitioners that the determination of the intestate court was merely provisional and should
have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect.

The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the writ of execution should
not be executed against them because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock.

We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be struck
down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the
logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several subsequent cases. The sale of any
property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the
probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao
et al. vs. Hon. MelencioGeneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court
to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the
administrator after finding that the sale of real property under probate proceedings was made
without the prior approval of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition
for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the
execution of its (trial courts) August 11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
A.6. Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZVS. COURT OF APPEALS,
MARIA PILAR MONTES, MA. CATHRYN RUIZ, etc.
G.R. No. 118671; JANUARY 29, 1996
PUNO, J,:

FACTS:Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Ma. Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughter, Ma. Cathryn, Candace Albertine and Ma.Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of
his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents. Edmond, the named
executor did not take action for the probate of the will. Four years after the testator’s death,
private respondent, Pilar, filed before the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
and approval of the Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of the letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz. This was opposed by the latter.

One of the properties of the Estate bequeathed by the testator to his grandchildren was leased
by Edmond. He was then ordered by the court to deposit with the branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payment. On March, 1993, he moved for the release of 50,000.00 to pay
for the real estate taxes on the Real properties of the Estate. On July 1993, Petitioner filed an
Ex-Parte Motion for release of funds which was opposed by respondent and prayed for the
release of the said payments to the granddaughters instead.

The Probate court granted the motion of respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
thus the probate court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only “such amount as
may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowance for support” of the
testator’s three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share of the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondents
Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of
publication of the notice of the creditor.

This decision was sustained by the CA upon appeal by the petitioner.

ISSUES:Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before the
payment of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority:
1) To grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren
2) To order the release of the titles to certain heirs, and
3) To grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will

HELD:

1st ISSUE:On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.

It is settles that allowances for support under Sec.3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Art 188 of the Civil Code of The Philippines,
the substantive law in force at the time of the testator’s death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the Estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are NOT entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children”

2nd ISSUE:No. Sec 1 of Rule 90 provides that: When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, xxx

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
1) after all the debts, funeral, charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow
and estate tax have been paid; or 2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributes
or any of them gives a bond in sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligation.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to private respondents
after the lapse of six months from the date of publication of notice to the creditor. The
questioned order speaks of notice to creditor and NOT payment of debts and obligations.
Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried.

3rd ISSUE:The petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his
right to take possession of all real and personal properties of the estate. The right of the
executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, “Sec. 3 of Rule 84 of the
Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:An executor or administrator shall have the right
to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased as
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.

It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
A.7. Unionbank vs. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
EfraimSantibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount
was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof,
Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a
Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors
for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
EfraimSantibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were
issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the
United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her
since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was
not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs
(Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the
unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum
of money from the deceased EfraimSantibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with
the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there
was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE: Whether the agreement entered by Edmund and Florence is valid? Whether the
heirs’ assumption of indebtedness is binding?

HELD:
1. No. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated: “In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the
public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will” This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased,
EfraimSantibañez, left a holographic will which contained, inter alia, the provision which
reads as follows: (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that
time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein
are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.

2. No. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of PyEng Chong v. Herrera: This requirement is
for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the
affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. Perusing
the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late EfraimSantibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file
its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to
any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter
further.
A.8. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen
G.R. NO. 189121; July 31, 2013

Perez, J.;

FACTS:Eliseo died intestate on December 12, 1992. On September 12, 1994, Elise filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration and claimed that she is the natural child of Eliseo,
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with FilipitoSandico. To prove her
filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth, signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion
to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown in the Death Certificate, Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City at the time of his death. Pursuant to Sec1,
R73, the petition for settlement of the estate should have been filed in Capas and not in Las
Piñas. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas and
directed the issuance of the Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the residence of the decedent as indicated in the death certificate should be
taken into account for purposes of determining the venue for the probate of the will.

B. Whether or not the natural child of the decedent may be appointed as an administrator.

HELD:
A. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death.

"Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided in Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. While the
recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void
for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days
of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation
of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

B. Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by
an interested person and no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also,
in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution
of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack
of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.

DOCTRINES: While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a

decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.
A.9. Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Briones

PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.

BRIONES
G.R. No. 150175; February 5, 2007

FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children.
When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husband’s estate. CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the
administratrix of Maximino’s estate. Subsequently, CFI issue an Order, dated 2 October
1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate estate.

On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of
Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged
that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded
in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the
heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision before the Court of
Appeals but the latter court affirmed the decision. Unsatisfied the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the heirs of Donata elevated the case before the SC. SC reversed the decisions of
CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment awarding ownership of the properties included in the
decedent’s estate to his surviving wife may be assailed on the ground of fraud after more than
30 years had lapse from the promulgation of the said judgment.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud,
no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not
through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata
the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not
merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband.

The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively
settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as
its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity
pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced
below –(m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting
as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.

By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in
every respect; and it could not give credence to the following statements made by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the
manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The
publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing
all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition,
regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
A.10. Sabidong vs. Solas

RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant, vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court

IV), Respondent.
A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); June 25, 2013

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-complaintdated May 29, 1999
filed before this Court by Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito
S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave
and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.

FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, Complainant, Rodolfo’s mother, is one of the longtime

occupants of the subject property - parcel of land. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-
half portion of Lot 11, subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate in the MTCC
Iloilo City Br. 4. On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered, with an order to immediately
vacate and to pay the plaintiff (Hodges Estate) rentals due.

Sometime in October 1984, Solas (Respondent), who was then the Clerk of Court, submitted
an Offer to Purchase on instalment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate
rejected respondent’s offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by the actual
occupant of Lot 12. The check for initial down payment tendered by Solas was returned to
him, but nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he
could put up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval
of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to
avail of the priority given to them,” to this, Solas immediately complied. The probate court
(Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) approved, upon observation that the occupants of
the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to
this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x
xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate x xx". Eventually, writ of possession and title of
the lot was transferred to Solas. Later, a writ of demolition was issued by the probate court
against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.

In 1999, a complaint was initiated against the Solas in the Supreme Court, alleging the
prohibition for court personnel to buy properties in litigation, which likewise alleged that the
respondent committed deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Criminal case for Estafa and Civil case for Annulment of title were also filed but were both
dismissed. SC referred the Administrative case of Judge Hortillo (RTC Iloilo) who required
Solas to file a memorandum, who, in the said memorandum asserted that he is a buyer in
good faith and for value. Sola, retired (compulsory) without his benefits being released.

OCA found respondent Solas liable for serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and
recommended the forfeiture of his salary for six months, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the subject property is no longer a thing in litigation and hence among those
prohibited under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether Clerk of Court violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property in
litigation

HELD:
1. No. In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the
Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that
time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672)

A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court,
but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A
property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of
litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate
court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there
is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already
been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage
dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation
of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.

This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate
the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.

2. No. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of
court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their
courts. Said provision reads: Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
x xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
peculiar control exercised by these persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud,
or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done."

For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, retired Clerk of Court IV,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND
DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6)
months to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE/S: Article 1491 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as
clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or
territory of their courts.

On probate proceedings – The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the
estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated.
A.11. Aranas vs. Mercado
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V.
MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

Bersamin, J.

FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate in 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita (appointed administrator), and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon,
Carmencita, Richard, and Maria Teresita; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime.

Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate for the consideration and approval by the RTC,
indicating that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal
properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties,
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved for the amendment of the inventory, which the
RTC granted. Teresita complied with the order, supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering Mervir Realty shares of stock; deed of assignments, involving
real properties; and the certificate of stock of Cebu Emerson.

The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory. Thelma opposed. With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the
inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.

Ruling of the RTC: After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued
an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted excluded properties that should be
included, denying the approval of inventory and orders the administratrix to re–do the
inventory of properties

Teresita, joined by other heirs, timely sought the reconsideration (opposed by Thelma) on the
ground that one of the real properties affected, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and
that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.The RTC denied the MR.

The CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, in favour of Teresita, et al.

ISSUES:
1. Whether certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC.
2. Whether the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the
properties in the estate of the decedent?
3. Whether the properties should be included in the inventory.
HELD:
1. Was certiorari the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

Yes. The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether
the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.

2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the
properties in the estate of the decedent?

No. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession
of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as
the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of
the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts
that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator,
has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1.Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3)
months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come
into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one
or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
3. Whether the properties should be included in the inventories.

Yes. The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless
of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the
inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of
the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the
inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306–R which are
supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined
in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado.
Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to
the Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in
Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation
which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab
business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these
shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one–half thereof or of the value
thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court
that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband
was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in
character, and so, one–half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of
Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described
in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it
was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it
was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir
Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This
fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x xxSo the said
property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio
S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the
administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the
thought that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition
(1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977
provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in
this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were
transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months
after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on
October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of
the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of
what properties should be included in the inventory.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued
on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB
entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

DOCTRINES:

1. The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a
final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.

2. An appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only
the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable”
may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory
order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial
on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-
appealable.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the

possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz.: Section 1. Orders or
judgments from which appeals may be taken.—An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in
offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian; (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the
case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting
or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

3. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator,
has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
4. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and
the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised
A.12. Butiong vs. Plazo

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA

FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, vs. MA. GRACIA RINOZA
PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187524; August 5, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma.Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort, and a family home. In their Amended Complaint for Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents alleged that they
discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had
sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who
are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr.Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge
and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing
respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita
from a bank. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he
has no record of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them certified true
copies of the titles to the same.

Subsequently, respondents learned a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their

late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto.

The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses
Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s as well
as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the
date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein
was left blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the
document was not signed. The trial court also observed that both documents were never
presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the
subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition,
the supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of
conveyance. On The basis thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment.

Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son RuelVillafria, filed a Motion for

Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was
alleged that when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the
nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the
trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction
when the action filed was for Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant action is really
one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction,
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus,
petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court.
When the appellate court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition
instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of
respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action
for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show
that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the
action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

DOCTRINE:
General Rule: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered
and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

Exception: Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no
debts due from the estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action
or partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. The reasons that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they
do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an
ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have
good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have
good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in
or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without
good and compelling reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property
to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment
of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same. That the
complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the estate's
properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and
extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings
alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed, where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being
dissipated.
B. Escheats (Rule 91)
B.1. Alvarico vs. Sola
CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA
G.R. No. 138953; June 6, 2002

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner CastorioAlvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while
Fermina Lopez is petitioner’s aunt, and also Amelita’s adoptive mother.On June 17, 1982, the
Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of
Fermina over Lot 5, SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.

On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over
Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions
imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of transfer was
filed with the Bureau of Lands. Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands.
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and
granting the amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.

On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed a civil case for reconveyance against Amelita. He
claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter,
he took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of
withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. For her part, Amelita maintained that the
donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when
it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She
added that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and
that she had validly acquired the land as Fermina’s rightful heir. She also denied that she is a
trustee of the land for petitioner.

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Lot 5, Sgs-3451, is hereby declared as

lawfully owned by plaintiff and defendant is directed to reconvey the same to the former.
CA: Reversed the RTC.

ISSUE: In an action for reconveyance, who between petitioner and respondent has a better
claim to the land?

HELD: Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we find that
no reversible error was committed by the appellate court in holding that herein petitioner’s
complaint against respondent should be dismissed. The evidence on record and the applicable
law indubitably favor respondent.

Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her name
and, based on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, he has a better right over the
property because he was first in material possession in good faith. However, this allegation of
bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary
support. For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of
Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is
required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was
issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioners bare allegation to
defeat the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world.
All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its registration.

Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land
Act. Thus:
Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.

In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since
AmelitaSolas’ title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question
the validity of Amelita’s title. It follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin
with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.

Anent petitioner’s contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the
property in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this
should have been clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the
Deed of Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive
proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner’s
bare allegation concerning the donor’s state of mind. The decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by petitioner against respondent is declared properly
DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE: Reversion; Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Section
101 of the Public Land Act.— Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to
the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under
Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Thus: Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.

A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the
basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain.—In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again
form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since AmelitaSola’s title originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no
standing at all to question the validity of Amelita’s title. It follows that he cannot “recover”
the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
B.2. Maltos vs. Heirs of EusebioBorromeo
G.R. No. 172720; September, 14, 2015

Leonen, J.

FACTS: On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo (Borromeo) was issued Free Patent over
a piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On June 15, 1983, well
within the five-year prohibitory period, Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos (Maltos).
Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly
told his wife, Norberta and his children to nullify the sale made to Maltos because the sale
was within the five-year prohibitory period. On June 23, 1993, Norberta and her children
(heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against
Maltos.

Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale
was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio
Borromeo's title. Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the
five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party
to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.

The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale
was presented for Registration after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial
on its part to register the deed. The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a
valid defense because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.

The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have a right of action because they were unable to
establish their status as heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo. They may have declared
themselves the legal heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not present evidence to prove
their allegation. Further, the determination of their rights to succession must be established in
special proceedings.

The trial court also ruled that "[t]he sale was null and void because it was within the five (5)
year prohibitionary [sic] period" under the Public Land Act. The defense of indefeasibility of
title was unavailing because the title to the property stated that it was "subject to the
provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124" of the Public Land Act. Since the
property was sold within the five-year prohibitory period, such transfer "result[ed] in the
cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain."

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the trial court and held that since Eusebio
Borromeo sold his property within the five-year prohibitory period, the property should revert
to the state. However, the government has to file an action for reversion because "reversion is
not automatic." While there is yet no action for reversion instituted by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the property should be returned to the heirs of Borromeo.

On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses |filed a Petition for Review before this court,
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:
(1)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the trial court and
ordering the reconveyance of the property from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita
Maltos to respondents heirs of Eusebio Borromeo.

(2)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and
Rosita Maltos are not entitled to reimbursement for the improvements they introduced on the
land.

HELD:
(1)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the trial court and
ordering the reconveyance of the property from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita
Maltos to respondents heirs of Eusebio Borromeo.
No, the CA did not err.

[T]he main purpose in the grant of a free patent of homestead is to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him so he
may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of
the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation of a family home is the
purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families as the foundation of
society, and thus promote general welfare.

The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under Section 124 of the
Public Land Act, which provides:

SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.

In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested in
Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale
was made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the
property in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the property in
favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion
must first be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.

Moreover, this court held that:

Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or
transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce
the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the
property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a
number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of effected the
transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. But we doubt if these principles can
now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public
Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not
absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its
enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public
interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important
limitation, namely, [']whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party
to sue for relief against the transaction[']"

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here appellee
desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the
principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried
out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because the subject of the
transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented
from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation.
This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It
is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to
preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present
action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.(Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who between the
parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This issue was addressed in
Santos:

What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession
of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon
annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest.
As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any
intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain in possession of the
land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in
it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its
reversion to the State. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In Binayug v. Ugaddan, which involved the sale of two properties covered by a homestead
patent, this court cited jurisprudence showing that in cases involving the sale of a property
covered by the five-year prohibitory period, the property should be returned to the grantee.

Applying the ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it clear that petitioners have no
better right to remain in possession of the property against respondents.

Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no action for
reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be conveyed by
petitioners to respondents.

(2)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and
Rosita Maltos are not entitled to reimbursement for the improvements they introduced on the
land.
No, the CA did not err.

With regard to the claim for reimbursement, respondents argue that it was not raised as a
counterclaim in the Answer to the Complaint.
During trial, petitioner Eliseo Maltos testified that when he entered the land, there were
around 100 trees, including coconut trees and a few banana trees. He then planted additional
coconut trees which, at the time of the trial, were already bearing fruit. Petitioner Eliseo
Maltos' testimony was not rebutted by respondents.

The general rule is that "[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set up shall be barred. Further,
the computation of the value of the improvements on the land entails findings of fact.

In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it stated in its Resolution dated April 7,
2006 that:

With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the land in
question, they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the necessary
improvements that they made thereon in the same manner that Appellants should lose the
value of the products gathered by the Appellees from the said land.

Restating the rulings in Angeles and Arsenal, this court finds that while the rule on in pari
delicto does not apply policy, if its effect is to violate public policy it is applicable with
regard to value of the improvements introduced by petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Petitioners had
been in possession of the land for 20 years before the heirs of Borromeo filed a Complaint.
The expenses incurred by petitioners in introducing improvements on the land for which they
seek reimbursement should already be compensated by the fruits they received from the
improvements.

DOCTRINE: The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the
five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of
land is proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not
automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for reversion.
B.3. Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP

FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE C. PONTRERAS, BONIFACIO
BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G. VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA,
CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE
G. VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J. FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO,
ZENAIDA LANUZA, MIGUELITO B. MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS,
MARIVIC TAN, JANE CLOR DILEMA, VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN,
ANTONIA M. MANGELEN, IMELDA MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N.
ANDRADE, AIDA L. CRUZ, MANUEL YAMBOT, JAIME SERDENA, ARIEL
PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO, LIBETINE MODESTO, MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY
ILAGAN, MICHELLE ROMANA, DANILO VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON,
ROSSANA MARASIGAN, NELIE BINAY AND ISABELITA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
v. VALBUECO, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 196888 July 19, 2017

TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:Respondent Valbueco alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an actual,
peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession since 1970. Respondent averred that from 1977
until 1999, Original Certificates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title
covering the lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners. Thus, Valbueco filed an
action for Annulment of the Free Patents, Certificates of Title and Damages against
petitioners Narcise, et al., the Department of Natural Resources (DENR) and the Register of
Deeds of Bataan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Petitioner Narcise et al. filed several Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action, failure to state cause of action, defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and
prescription. The RTC granted the motion of Narcise. The RTC ruled that the instant case
is an action for reversion because petitioners are not qualified to be issued said free patents.
As such, the land must revert back to the State. Thus, it is the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) who is the real party-in-interest, and not the respondent.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
Undaunted, respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Thus the Narcise filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment of
free patents and certificates of title?
2. Whether or not respondent is the real party-in-interest?

HELD:
1. No. We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in the
complaint show that respondent asserts its ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription.
A careful perusal of respondent's complaint reads:
 “3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful, adverse, continuous
and peaceful possession since sometime in 1970 and up to the present time, by
itself and its predecessor-in-interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of
rights, claims, interest as evidence [sic] by the documents x xx and the rest by
occupation and planting of root crops and other including trees x xx.

4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and the
cultivation and planting of different root crops and trees were always in the
premises since 1970 or thereabouts, and their presence were never disturbed nor
molested by anybody until sometime in the year 2000 x x x.(Emphasis ours)”

An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to
cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were
all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and nullifying such title, it
restores the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by the OSG pursuant to its
authority under the Administrative Code.

On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks
for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it
does not operate to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such
action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the
Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio.

Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of
the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an
action for annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiffs
ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant's fraud
or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed
by the plaintiff.

2. YES. Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is the
real party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the
registered owner.

DOCTRINE:Action for REVERSIONvs Action for ANNULMENT of Patent and Certificate

of Title:

In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for annulment of patent and certificate of
title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiffs ownership of the contested land prior to the
issuance of the same as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
C. Guardians and Guardianship (R-92 to 97)

C.1. Goyena vs Ledesma-Gustilo

GR No 147148 13; January 2003

FACTS: This is an appeal, a petition for review on certiorari, from the CA’s Decision which
affirmed the RTC’s Decision in a Special Proceeding appointing herein respondent Amparo
Ledesma-Gustilo, respondent, as guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta
Ledesma, Pilar Y. Goyena, petitioner, Julieta’s close friend and companion of more than 60
years.
Respondent filed with the RTC of Makati a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the
person and property of her sister Julieta alleging that Julieta’s health is under medical
attention and has been in and out of the hospital; Julieta is not in a position to care for herself
and needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in on-going corporate and
agricultural enterprises.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. Petitioner avers that
such petition lacked factual and legal basis because Julieta is competent and sane, thus,
guardianship over is absolutely not needed. Also, petitioner is not fit to be appointed as
guardian of Julieta since their interests are antagonistic.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be the guardian of Julieta?

HELD: No. The qualification of respondent to act as guardian over the person and properties
of Julieta has been duly established. As a sister, she can best take care of Julieta’s concern
and wellbeing. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family should be given the
opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying petitioner
access to her considering the special bond of friendship between the two.
Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not be said to be physically fit to
attend to all the needs of Julieta.
C.2. Caniza vs. CA
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA v. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J.

FACTS: Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent
by judgment in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
Caniza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a
suit to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing
through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged
that plaintiff Caniza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness,
she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent need of the house
on account of her advanced age and failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;” among others.
The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since the 1960’s; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caniza as her own family,
and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the
Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them
by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since
their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for
probate.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action;
2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

HELD:
1. Yes, a will is essentially ambulatory, it may be changed or revoked prior to testator’s death
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect, owner can still take back possession in the
meantime Carmen needed income from house due to his age, etc. Because of Amparo’s
appointment as general guardian of both the person and estate of her aunt – Carmen, it
became her duty to care for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to
assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and
friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no
right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage
the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone
who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. She has
full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or
provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the
management of her properties. Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was
merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the
ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, Evangelista may still pursue the case not as a guardian but in substitution for the
deceased. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward
is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no
advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the
latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On
their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. An ejectment case survives the death of a party. Carmen’s demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a
purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent
her interests in the appeal at bar.

DOCTRINE: While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule
affords no advantage to the Estradas. The action not being personal one, survived her death,
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
C.3. NERI VS HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: AnunciacionNeri had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo
Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. In 1977, Anunciacion died
intestate. Her husband, Enrique as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
together with the 3 elder siblings, executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale of the said homestead properties, and conveying them to the late
spouses HadjiYusopUy
Children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs) before the RTC. Heirs of Uy countered
that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the
homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from
the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the
defenses of prescription and laches.

ISSUE: Whether the sale made by Enrique was valid considering that the said sale was
purportedly made in behalf of the latter’s children.

HELD: YES except insofar as the shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas are concerned
because (1) Eutropia and Victoria were not under Enrique’s guardianship AND (2) although
Douglas was under Enrique’s guardianship, he did not ratify the said sale upon reaching
majority age.

Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the
petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint
another suitable persons.

DOCTRINE: Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or
alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then
only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the
Rules of Court.
C.4. Oropesa vs. Oropesa
G.R. No. 184528; April 25, 2012

FACTS: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians
over the property of his father, the (respondent) CiriloOropesa. In the said petition, it is
alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June
1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses
in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due
to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely,
and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly
Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the
court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon. Pursuant to the
abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently
submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk
to the social worker. On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
(respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they
were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record;
and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence. Considering that the petitioner has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent
to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence
is GRANTED, and the case was DISMISSED. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals but his appeal was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is considered an incompetent person as defined under section 2,

rule 92 of the rules of court who should be placed under guardianship.

HELD: No. A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable
of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not
that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those
of one in loco parentis as well.

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective

ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules
of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship.
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on
clear, positive and definite evidence. We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and,
thus, must be applied in the case at bar. With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies
given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal
properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their
direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to
grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen.
Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his
own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening
Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the
domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions
to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive
functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is
the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
certain exceptional circumstances; however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It
is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are
entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence
was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
C.5. Abad vs. Biazon

Eduardo T. Abad, Petitioner vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel A. Magno, Respondent
G. R. No. 191993; December 5, 2012

Reyes, J.

FACTS: Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B.
Abad (Maura) with the RTC of Dagupan on the ground that Maura is already sickly and can
no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy
prey of deceit and exploitation. Nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to
present evidence ex parte. After formal of Plaintiff’s evidence and the case was submitted for
decision, Atty. Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Opposition-in-
Intervention. Subsequently, Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the
Petition. Specifically, Defendant alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was
not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the Maura’s guardian.

RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s
guardian.

Plaintiff filed an appeal to the CA, wherein the CA decided to affirm the decision of the RTC.

Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died.Maura averred that Biason’sdeath
rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thusprayed that the petition
be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.

The Court issued a Resolution, requiring Abad tocomment on the manifestation filed by
Maura. Abad filed his Comment and expressed hisacquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss
the petition. He asseverated thatthe issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in
the appointmentof Biason as guardian which he believed had been rendered moot
andacademic by the latter’s death. He also supported Maura’s prayer for thetermination of the
guardianship by asseverating that her act of filing of apetition-in-intervention is indicative of
the fact that she is of sound mind andthat she can competently manage her business affairs.

ISSUE/S: WON Biason’sdeath rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the Petition
for Review in SC filed by Abad.

HELD: YES. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue wouldbe without practical use and
value. In such cases, there is no actualsubstantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled and which wouldbe negated by the dismissal of the petition.

In the petition, Plaintiff was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which
theRTC appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become
impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian andward is necessarily terminated by the
death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless
to delve intothe propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and
Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of itsdisposition, will not afford
Abad, or anyone else for that matter, anysubstantial relief.

DOCTRINE: ~ It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is

necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening
event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since
the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless
of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.
D. Trustees (R-98)
D.1. Land Bank of the Phil. Vs. Perez
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, et al.
G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012

FACTS:
LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of a CreditLine
Agreement. ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of theAgreement to buy
construction materials. The respondents, as officers andrepresentatives of ACDC, executed
trust receipts in connection with theconstruction materials. The trust receipts matured, but
ACDC failed to return toLBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction
materials subjectof the trust receipts.

When ACDC failed to comply with the demands of LBP, the latter filed theaffidavit-
complaint for estafa before the City Prosecutor’s Office.

ACDC argued that its clients for the construction projects have not yet paid them;thus,
ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials that were the subjectof the trust
receipts and were allegedly used for these constructions. As there wereno proceeds received
from these clients, no misappropriation thereof could havetaken place.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal complaint for estafa is the proper remedy for analleged
violation of the Trust Receipt Law by the Trustee.

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. However, the transaction between the parties tothis
case is not a trust receipt. Violations of Trust Receipts Law are criminallypunishable, but no
criminal complaint for violation of Article 315, paragraph 1(b)of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation with P.D. 115, should prosper against aborrower who was not part of a genuine trust
receipt transaction.

It is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the person who advancedpayment for the
merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise andcontinues as owner until he
or she is paid in full, or if the goods had already beensold, the proceeds should be turned over
to him or to her. In all trust receipttransactions, the trustee has the obligation to either the
return of the proceeds of thesale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or
processed.

When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the
trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of thetrustee, it is not a trust
receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115;the only obligation actually agreed
upon by the parties would be the return of theproceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where theborrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount
spent for the purchase of thegoods.

The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materialsto a
construction site ACDC’s projects, repudiates the idea that LBP intended to bethe owner of
those construction materials. As a government financial institution,LBP should have been
aware that the materials were to be used for the constructionof an immovable property, as
well as a property of the public domain. As animmovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with thosematerials would presumably belong to the owner of the
land, under Article 445 ofthe Civil Code.

It should be noted line of work that the borrowers were engaged in was construction.
In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished products, these finishedproducts –
if not the raw materials or their components – similarly remain in thepossession of the trustee
until they are sold. But the goods and the materials that areused for a construction project are
often placed under the control and custody of theclients employing the contractor, who can
only be compelled to return the materialsif they fail to pay the contractor and often only after
the requisite legal proceedings.The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty in claiming
these materials (or thebuildings and structures which they become part of), as soon as
the bankdemands them, disqualify them from being covered by trust receiptagreements.

Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for estafa should not bebrought
against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan. As the law standstoday, there can be
no violation of the right against imprisonment for non-paymentof a debt.

Furthermore, the proceedings regarding the criminal aspect of this case, should bedismissed
as it does not appear from the records that the complaint was filed withthe participation or
consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
E. Adoption and Custody of Minors (R-99-100)
E.1. Castro vs. Gregorio
E.2. Cang vs. CA
E.3. Vda de Jacob vs. CA
E.4. Republic vs. CA
E.5. Reyes vs. Mauricio
E.6. In the Matter of Stephanie NathyAstorga-Garcia
E.7. In Re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim
E.8. Nery vs. Sampana
E.9. Bartolome vs. SSS
F. Habeas Corpus (R-102)

F.1. Ilusorio vs. Bildner

G.R. No. 139789; May 12, 2000
Pardo, J.

Facts: In 1942, Petitioner Erlinda (Erlinda)Kalaw and PotencianoIlusorio contracted

matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati City when he was in Manila and at
Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City.Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children, including
hereinRespondentsErlinda (Lin)IlusorioBildner and SylviaIlusorio.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5months in
Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health
deteriorated.

In 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.

After attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.

In 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
Potenciano. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

After due hearing, the CA rendered a decision ordering that the writ of habeas corpus
previously issued be recalled and the petition for habeas corpus be denied. The CA dismissed
the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the Potenciano.

ISSUE: Whether a spouse may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel his/her spouse to
live with him/her.

HELD: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not
be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
PotencianoIlusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
PotencianoIlusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was
not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any
true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.

DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.To justify
the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action.The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.
F.2. Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan
F.3. Lacson vs. Perez
F.4. Sangca vs. City Prosecutor of Cebu

ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA vs. THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBUCITY

G.R. No. 175864, June 8, 2007

FACTS: PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of RA 9165. The
inquestprosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the
CityProsecutor. Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section5,
Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filed before RTC.

On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M.Gonzalez found
no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense chargedThe Justice Secretary directed
the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw theinformation. PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the JusticeSecretary on December 8, 2006.

On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petitionraying for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely ImpalAdam.

Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Inglesissued an
Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw Informationand ordering the
release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another validground.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case ofwarrantless
arrests where there is pending motion to withdraw information beforethe trial court.

HELD: Yes. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detentionin which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody
ofanyperson is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purposeis to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from itif such restraint
is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is toprotect and secure the
basic freedom of physical liberty.
 F.5. Mangila vs. Pangilinan
F.6. Tujan-Militante vs. CadaDeapera
F.7. Datukan Malang Salibo vs. the Warden
F.8. Padilla vs. Congress of the Phil.

H. Change of Name vs. Correction/Cancellation of Entries, as amended R.A. 9048 and

10172 (Rule 103 vs. Rule 108)
H.1. Eleosida vs. Civil Registrar of Q.C.

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child,
CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.[G.R. No. 130277.
May 9, 2002] FIRST DIVISION
PUNO, J.:

FACTS: On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth
certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to
"Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the
informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon."
In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on
May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the
child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded
the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos VillenaBorbon as respondents.
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room
118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and published in Metro Manila, to
be selected by raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at which date, time and place, the
petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that all other persons having or claiming any
interest thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall not
be granted.

Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the petition,
respondent Carlos VillenaBorbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if any.
In the event that the Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to
designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in behalf of the State.SO
ORDERED.

On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation of
evidence on July 23, 1997. On August 25, 1997, the trial court motuproprio dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. It ruled:It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL
ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name,
occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may
affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will
ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN. With the petition's
ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which would authorize a
change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action improper.
The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by petitioner cannot be considered falling
under the ambit of the words clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.

ISSUE: whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412
of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the
errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature.

HELD: YES. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may
either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we
held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule
108 adversary, thus:

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to--(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing
of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.If all these
procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.'

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance
with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial
court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at
Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the publication of
said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall
prove her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest
thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be
granted. Respondents Carlos VillenaBorbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a
copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the
petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to
present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the
requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the
trial court to dismiss the petition motuproprio without allowing the petitioner to present
evidence to support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter
to oppose the same.
H.2. Republic vs. Kho

H.3. Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang

In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang,G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
CHANGE OF NAME VS. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES

TINGA,J.

FACTS: Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna
Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the
Civil Registry. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, . . . they executed a deed of legitimation of
their son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. . . .

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because
they will let him study there. . . . Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of
the mother are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle
name.

The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given
for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that petitioner Julian may be
discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name — did not fall
within the grounds recognized by law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that
is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE:Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174
7 of the Family Code.

HELD:Yes. Petition denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and reasonable
cause' for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e)
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change
of name would prejudice public interest.

Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with
requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for
change of the given name and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to
answer in the negative.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right
to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may
bear the father's surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a middle name. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when
the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that
the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle
name, and a surname.

Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards
set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is
amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use
of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to
his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he
may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of
the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

H.4. Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ.

H.5. Republic vs. Silverio
H.6. Republic vs. Cagandahan
H.7. Republic vs. Uy
H.8. Minoru Fujiki vs. Marinay
H.9. People vs. MerlindaOlaybar

H.10. Onde vs. CR of Las Pinas

Ondevs Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City,
G.R. No. 197174; September 10, 2014

FACTS:
-Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the
RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A.
Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married.

-His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is
Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected

-RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in
form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction
is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further
held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city
civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048.

Petition raises fourissues:

(1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his
mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048;
(2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate
that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial
in nature requiring adversarial proceedings;
(3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and
(4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not
married on December 23, 1983. – HELD: It is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue
as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on
December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.

-Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries
in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,the case
cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now
allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents
were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the filing of the petition for
correction of entries.

-Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition
for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be
corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol
to "not married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt
with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.

RULING:
1. RTC is correct in ruling that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing
in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048
Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a
civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city
civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No.
10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

2. RTC is correct in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that
his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a
substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as
it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In
Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial
alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings.

3. RTC is correct in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. petitioner no longer
contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first
name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained
to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated since
the same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.RTC’s
dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail ofthe administrative remedy
for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new petition
before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

A petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as

parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed
petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court:

SEC. 3.Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial
Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

H.11. Almojuela vs. Republic

H.12. Gan vs. Republic
EMELITA BASILIO GAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision dated April 26, 2013 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98112.

FACTS: Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born out of wedlock to a Chinese father, Pia
Gan, and a Filipino mother, Consolacion Basilio, The petitioner's birth certificate, which was
registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.

The petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita
Basilio Gan" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, claiming
that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from
elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government
records.

The RTC granted the petition for change of name.

The RTC denied the sought a reconsideration of the respondent.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated July 19, 2011 and October
17, 2011.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in granting the petition for the change of name.

HELD: Yes. The petition is denied. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right;
a proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his
name.21 "In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. x x x What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts."

The petitioner's reliance on the cases of Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines, Republic of the
Philippines v. Coseteng-Magpayo, and Republic of the Philippines v. Lim to support her
position is misplaced.

In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth certificate was Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate child of her father and mother. She
filed a petition for change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the surname "Alfon,"
her mother's surname, instead of "Duterte." The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating
that under Article 364 of the Civil Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname
of the father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname of her mother since
Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word "principally" and not "exclusively" and, hence,
there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the mother's surname to
which he or she is legally entitled.27chanrobleslaw

In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a
natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father.
Thus, the petitioner cannot insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner's birth certificate
indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. SO

ORDERED.
I. Prerogative Writs
I.1. Tapuz vs. Del Rosario
I.2. Caram vs. Segui
I.3. Vivares et Al. vs. St. Therese College et Al
I.4. Razon vs. Tagitis
I.5. Roxas vs. GMA
I.6. Burgos vs. Esperon
I.7. Dolot vs. Paje
I.8. Meralco vs. Lim
I.9. Lee vs. Ilagan
I.10. Arigo vs. Swift
2015 Supreme Court Decisions:
I.11. Paje vs. Casino
I.12. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Angelo
Reyes et Al.
I.13. West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind, Corp. (on precautionary principle)