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MASINSIN V ALBANO (1994)


Jackie Canlas

VITUG, J.:
FACTS:

This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin.As a result of the
case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises, to remove theirhouse/apartment, to surrender possession
of the subject land, and to pay the sum of P100 a month fromJanuary 1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until
the land is actually vacated. No appealhaving been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory.

On August 22, 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking theannulment of the
decision of the ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition wasdismissed.

On October 7 1985, a complaint for “Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed
by the Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint wasdismissed due to res
judicata.

Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before thecompletion of the demolition,
a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari,with preliminary injunction and for declaratory
relief. Petition again was denied.

Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimatelydismissed on
August 23, 1990.

In this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction to
enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed anarea for priority development by
the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD2016
ISSUE:
WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016
RULING: NORATIO:

According to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National HousingAuthority, pursuant to PD
No. 1967 (which after amendments became PD No. 2016), the disputed lot isnot for acquisition by the NHA. It is located
outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal ImprovementProject. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and
therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus theMTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case.

What immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the evident predile
ction of petitioners, throughdifferent counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has been
spared.The utter lack of merit of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to
prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final andexecutory. The petitioners through
different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court. The lawyer’s oath is a sacred trust that mu
st be upheld and kept
inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyer’s oath involved in this case:

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
not delay any man’s cause
for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends toobstruct, pervert,
impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both anexercise of disciplinary action
and warranting application of the contempt power.

Petition is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infractionof
the lawyer’s oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.

Florido vs. Florido, 420 SCRA 132


January 20, 2004

Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido, complainant,


vs.
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, respondent.

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from
the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer “by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution.

Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimate spouse of the respondent Atty. James Benedict
Florido, the respondent, but because of the estranged relation, they lived separately. They have two children whom the complainant has the
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage; meanwhile there, was another related case pending in the Court of
Appeals.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and
demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter
informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to
her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. The complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
obtained a certification dated January 18, 2005[from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender
custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Florido was liable for making false court resolution.

Held:

Yes. A lawyer who used a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. Candor and
fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.
LIBIT V OLIVA

26FEB
AC No. 2837 | October 7, 1994 | Per Curiam

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.

Facts:
Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to conduct an investigation to determine the
author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a result of which, the NBI charged respondents Attys. Edelson Oliva and
Florando Umali for obstruction of justice.
The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.

In view of NBI’s report that Umali’s signature in the complaint in the civil case was not his, the case was dismissed with respect to
him.

Issue:
W/N respondent violated Code of Ethics

Held:
Yes. After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that
respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers.
The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any
falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His
license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.

MONTEREY VS ARAYATA
FACTS: Atty. Arayata drew up in his favor deed of sale of a land, stating therein thatthe person who executed the document
and sold the land to him was his father whois already dead. He appears to Notary public Montoya to legalize said
document.However, in the course of investigation, he alleged that it was his uncle who signedthe deed of transfer and ratified it
before Montoya.ISSUE: WON Atty. Arayata’s acts constitute malpractice and unprofessional conductmeriting for him a disciplinary
action.RULING: The acts committed by Atty. Arayata relative to the deed of sale and hisstatements to notary Montoya with regards
to said document, constitutemalpractice and unprofessional conduct, meriting for him a disciplinary actionmitigated by the
circumstance the he was the heir and complainant has no directinterest. He was suspended for one month.

INSULAR LIFE EAU V. INSULAR LIFEGR. NO. L-25291, January 30 1971FACTS:The union jointly submitted proposals to the companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts. Thereafter, negotiations were conducted on the union’s proposal but there
were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result, a notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining was filed. During the
strike, the company sent individually to the strikers in which contains several benefits such as free coffee, occasionalmovies and others, to
whoever wish to continue to work. However, a few unionist were convinced to desist and the others continued the strike. Thereafter, some
management men tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Due to resistance by some picketers, picketers and
strike-breakers were injured. Then, another letter was sent to each strikers which threatens them that if they won’t report for work on June 2,
1958, the company will replace them. However, prior to their readmittance to the company, three conditions must bemet: 1) the employee
must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; 2) there must be no criminal charges against him and; 3) he must report
for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise the employees would be replace.Strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members were not
readmitted for they had pending criminal charges. Upon clearance, 34 were still not readmiited on the ground that they committed acts
inimical to the companies and received a letter containing the terminations of their employment. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is
guilty of unfair labor practice.HELD: YES. The act of the employer in notifying the strikers individually that their jobs is open for them should
they want to come in has been held as unfair labor practice for it interferes the rightof the employees of collective bargaining through dealing
with them individually instead of negotiating with their collective bargaining representative. Thus, when the respondent offered reinstatement
and attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable cots, free coffee and occasional movies, overtime pay for work performed in excess of
eight hours and arrangementsfor their families so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union busting and consequently of unfair labor practice