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Intelligence Community
Terrorist Threats
In the weeks and the months following the 9/11 attacks the press evokes a huge
failure of intelligence. Experts and Veterans of Special Services were asked to provide
explanations, and often drive the point: "You cannot imagine how this goes wrong, - said Bob
Baer - , a former CIA officer. The White House was saved when Flight 93 one that crashed in
Pennsylvania! And that's why you pay thirty billion dollars? This has resulted in the largest
series of surveys since the mid-1970s. The largest was conducted by the National
victims of the attacks, the commission has acquired a remarkable influence. As soon
recommendations to reform the intelligence and US security apparatus. They were approved
in their entirety by President Bush and most members - regardless of political divisions. If its
bankruptcy seems obvious, the division of responsibilities is much less clear. For the analysis
of the attacks indicated that several agencies had pieces of a puzzle wrong or not assembled.
The CIA and the FBI have thus thrown the stone, as policymakers in the Bush and Clinton
administrations. The strong consensus that has emerged is that September 11 was a national
failure. To different extent all intelligence agencies found themselves involved. For instance
CIA and its fieldworkers, who regained favor with Americans because they were seen as the
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only ones capable of neutralizing other threats. September 11 thus had the effect of tipping
the balance between the technical and human intelligence in favor of the second. A peak was
reached in 2004 when 134,000 people were turned candidates for 200 vacancies. The
September 11 attacks also revealed the limits of an anti-terrorist response essentially judicial.
"It's as if we had asked the special agents to go to Tokyo and stop the Emperor after the
attack on Pearl Harbor," said one of them before Congress Benjamin D. and S. Simon, the
Age of Sacred Terror the powers of the services has been improved, but they were also asked
to work hand in hand. Because large quantities of fragmented information should be cut in
order to have a chance to stop a terrorist network with international vocation before it goes
into action. They must be shared between the different actors of the fight against terrorism,
many incidentally: the intelligence services, of course, but also the police at the local and
national, airports, port areas, guards borders, coast guard, customs, immigration, etc. In
summary, this is not the rule of "need to know" that bonus - partition information to ensure
confidentiality - but the "need to share", brought up to date and adapted to the nature of new
The reforms undertaken after the attacks thus aim to bring down a strict division of
tasks established in 1947 with reinforcement of new institutions and new laws such as the
Patriot Act. The latter example eased restrictions on the FBI to monitor suspected terrorists or
foreign agents. This measure is part of a broader framework to expand the Bureau
intelligence capabilities. But, despite these reforms and the growing number of foreign
officials under his control (about 200, according to the latest estimates), the FBI "is
acculturates" hardly practical intelligence. It will never become the kind of domestic security
service (like the British MI-5) some of which called for the establishment in the aftermath of
11 September. Especially in this time when the army is deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
several concessions have been granted to the military, through the influence of politicians
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wishing to preserve the old balance of power, including the Secretary of Defense.
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence in order to defend the best interests of the
Pentagon. This is a kind of "Military Intelligence Directorate," since all Pentagon intelligence
power has played for the DNI is not the all powerful leader recommended by the National
The DNI will indeed a say in the appointment of heads of the various services. It will
control the budget and identify priorities for civilian agencies, but the Pentagon will have the
last word as regards the allocation of staff and budget of military intelligence - a good half of
the tens of billions of dollars awarded annually to intelligence. Thus, the major problem of
the law on intelligence reform is that it assigns considerable responsibility to the Director of
National Intelligence, without the authority and related authorities. It does not explicitly
specify what the DNI can and cannot do, and leaves a margin wide enough man to work for
different agencies did not comply with its guidelines. It was a six-point program aimed at
further promoting integration and collaboration within the community: creating a "culture of
collection activities; regain the initiative and excellence in technology; modernize relations
with the private sector; and finally clarify the authority of the DNI. The United States are
experimenting with solutions which inspired many countries face - all things being equal - the
same threats. But he is not about to break a system criticized as too rigid to build another.
"The main difficulty, as pointed McConnell, rightly, is to find the right balance between
centralized direction and decentralized execution, so that the office of the Director of
National Intelligence does not become a mere bureaucracy placed on top of existing
This is the problem left to the new administration and especially the new DNI from
political alternation. For intelligence policy, President Obama quickly distanced himself from
the "mistakes" of the Bush administration, such as the use of intelligence for political
purposes and the conditions of detention of prisoners and other "enemy combatants". During
a speech accompanying the appointment of the new DNI and the new CIA director in January
2009, Obama has said that under his administration, the United States will not be practicing
torture. It certainly reminded how it was "difficult to overstate the importance of intelligence
for the XXI century. “Good intelligence is not a luxury but a necessity. We can rest on the
successes and good reforms conducted in recent years." But the president added that "here in
Washington, we also learned hard lessons. We learned that to make pragmatic policy choices,
we will build on the current estimates solely on facts, not on information corroborating any
The new DNI boss, Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, and the new CIA director, Leon
Panetta, have notably been chosen because they were in any way associated with the most
controversial practices and the choices of the outgoing administration in intelligence. Former
commander of US forces in the Pacific, Blair has no particular and personal ties with Obama,
but he advised the latter on several occasions when he was senator from Illinois. It is on these
occasions that Obama has acknowledged and appreciated Blair's views to strengthen and
streamline the US intelligence community. In the Navy, where he became familiar with
charismatic leader. Since the CIA, he also coordinated the military and intelligence
operations during the Clinton administration. Former congressman and secretary general of
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the White House under Bill Clinton, Leon Panetta has not, however, a very limited
experience and knowledge of the information. To channel and discipline the CIA, Obama has
preferred the services of a good manager and a loyal politician to those of a seasoned
professional, but close to his compromise in one way or another in the controversies of past.
Indeed, the question of the authority of the DNI and his ability to lead the intelligence
confirmation of Panetta, Senator Carl Levin asked if it would work under the supervision of
the DNI. Not satisfied, obviously, to be asking such a question, Panetta still answered in the
affirmative. Adding that the CIA was "operational arm", while the mission of the Admiral
Blair was "to coordinate the activities" of the NSA, NRO and other agencies (Bray, 242).
nuclear weapons: first, the increasingly porous border between civil and military nuclear
technology; secondly, the declaratory nature of the monitoring process and the non-real
definition of "evidence" of any shortcomings. Finally, the possibility for some NNWS bound
by the Treaty to continue to maneuver to reach the "threshold" nuclear or beyond, throughout
concludes by quoting blackheads always topical:" Main downside to identify: Atomic rise of
enemy brothers of South Asia, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers respectively
military in 1974 in 1985 - and have not signed the NPT. The case of Iran seems clear:
countries that signed the treaty, would violate its commitments apparently seeking the
weapon; safeguards, no more China than Russia can have any effective influence on the
choice of this country. North Korea, meanwhile, offers the review also a serious case, since
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unlike Iran, she withdrew from the treaty in 2003. On the other hand, his progress, although
A second category of countries with atomic weapons as some of Israel have not
signed the NPT and detain hundreds of bombs. This is also the case of India and Pakistan
who develop without problems both civilian nuclear power but also military nuclear. A third
class consists of countries mastering civilian nuclear power but have not developed military
technology although they can quickly make is the case of Germany and Japan. We also have
those who in theory of civilian nuclear reactors, (Spain, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Belgium) and former Eastern countries suspected of not being sufficiently vigilant in
monitoring uranium and their risk of being "stolen" by Islamic terrorists (Kreps, 146).
We finally plague two countries first that North Korea would have the atomic bomb,
nuclear reactors and which aims to launch a rocket with satellite on April 12 the day of the
centenary of Kim Il-sung's father Korean communism. North Korea will not abandon "never"
the right to launch "peaceful satellite, so they can see with their own eyes the peaceful nature
of our satellite launch." Then Iran which painfully has been able to walk, despite all
impediments, the Buscheer Central and wants to enrich its own uranium, which wants banned
Iran does not stop declaring that its program is peaceful. Just a few weeks we thought
we were on the verge of an attack from Israel who, with US help, think punish Iran in the
bombing. Moreover, it seems that almost two-thirds of Israeli Jews believe that an attack
against Iran would be less dangerous than leaving the Islamic Republic to acquire nuclear
weapons. (Müller, 62). Meir Dagan, former head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service,
said he was opposed to the time of the strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, in an interview on
US television. "Attacking Iran before thinking to all other approaches is not sustainable," said
M.Dagan in extracts of an interview with CBS and to be broadcast in full on Sunday. Barack
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Obama "has made it clear that the military option is possible and he would not allow Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons, and experience I trust the American president," yet entrusted Meir
Dagan. US President Barack Obama said that the security of the world depended on actions
agreed between the US Intelligence Community (Kreps, 151). "The security of the world
depends on the actions we take" here, Mr. Obama said, "much had been achieved" since the
inaugural summit in Washington in 2010, citing the strengthening of security at nuclear sites
and elimination or making safe of dangerous materials. Countries shall be called upon to do
more often used his services, to comply with its regulatory frameworks and to increase
financial contributions they pay him. As announced before the opening of the summit, issues
of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear were not discussed in plenary, but only in bilateral
exchanges.
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Works cited:
The Iran Nuclear Threat". Intelligence and National Security 23.5 (2008): 608-628. Web.
After The Cold War". The Nonproliferation Review 4.2 (1997): 62-71. Web.