Tad-y vs People

G.R. No. 148862. August 11, 2005

J. Callejo, Sr., 2nd division

Facts: Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was accused direct bribery of demanding and receiving P4,000.00 from
Encabo on July 24, 1995 in consideration for his signing a certificate of occupancy, which he also
signed on the said date. Tad-y was also charged with violation of Section 3(c ) of RA3019 He was
convicted by the MTC of violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, which
decision was upheld by the RTC with modifications as to penalty, and the RTC decision was affirmed in
toto by the CA. while the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, however, it agreed with Tad-y’s
contention that what the latter signed was a certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of
occupancy, in connection with which he was acquitted of charges of violation of Section 3(c) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

Issue: whether the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt for direct bribery
under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on its finding that the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in consideration of signing a certificate of occupancy, and that
on July 24, 1995, the petitioner received the said amount from Encabo and signed the said certificate
for the Atrium building.

There is no iota of competent and credible evidence to support these findings. There is no evidence
on record that the petitioner and Encabo met on April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only on April 25, 1995
that Encabo arrived at the OCE to make arrangements for the final inspection of the building by the
officers concerned, the signing of the certificate of inspection by said officers, and the signing of the
certificate of occupancy by the building official. There is also no dispute that what was signed by the
petitioner, on July 24, 1995, following his final inspection of the building, was the certificate of final
inspection and not a certificate of occupancy of the building. Even Encabo admitted that the
petitioner refused to sign the said certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had been no final
inspection of the building, and not because he was demanding P4,000.00 from Encabo.

There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong,
through Encabo, in exchange for the signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible
that the petitioner would demand the said amount as a precondition to his signing a certificate,
considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No. 1096, the authority to sign said certificate is vested
specifically on the building official, and not on the petitioner:

Petition granted; decisions of the MTC, RTC and CA reversed and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted.

[ G.R. No. 147904, October 04, 2002 ]

NESTOR B. MAGNO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CARLOS C. MONTES,

RESPONDENTS.
CORONA, J.:

Facts :

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution dated May 7, 2001 of the Commission on Elections as well as the resolution dated May 12,
2001 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the
disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the
May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of
private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor
in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001.
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged
from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the
Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001
elections. Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija. Thus, on June 19, 2001, petitioner filed a supplemental petition which this Court merely noted in
its resolution dated June 26, 2001. In his supplemental petition, petitioner assailed the proclamation of
Sonia Lorenzo on the ground that the propriety of his disqualification was still under review by this
Court. Petitioner likewise asked this Court to declare him as the duly elected municipal mayor instead of
Sonia Lorenzo.
Issue :
WON petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. In resolving this, two sub-issues
need to be threshed out, namely: (1) whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude and
(2) whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government Code that should apply in this
situation.

Ruling :
Regarding the first sub-issue, the Court has consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary
of ‘moral turpitude’ as:
“x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the law.
In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the crime
considering that petitioner did not assail his conviction. By applying for probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view
to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between
the five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-
year disqualification period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while
the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction
that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will.[4] Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the
former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could
not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as
of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor
of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of
Sonia Lorenzo’s proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as
Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner
would have been a timely election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated May 7, 2001 and May 12, 2001 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding
probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has
committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the
grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers
from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on
this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of RA 7080.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

ANALYSIS:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general
terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long
as that law provides some comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the
said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the
crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is enough
that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration
in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

CONCLUSION:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.