Dag Hammarskjöld files of Victor E.

Rosez:
please do not use this copy in any publications.
I received this copy from my friend Torben only for private use in may 2018:

German links to the Hammarskjöld case

Making the case for another possible murder weapon

Torben Gülstorff

On 18 September 1961, at approximately 00:13, a Douglas DC-6 came down

close to the North Rhodesian town of Ndola. Sixteen passengers and crew on
board died, among them the United Nations (UN) General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld. The plane was carrying a UN peacekeeping delegation to a
meeting with Moise Tshombe, the self-declared prime minister of the
secessionist Congolese province of Katanga, to discuss the future state of the
province and finally put an end to the crisis that had kept the Republic of the
Congo in suspense for more than a year.

Background to the crisis

On 30 June 1960 Belgian Congo became independent. Centralist parties
gained the majority in parliament and elected Patrice Lumumba prime minister.
Nevertheless, parties favouring a decentralized Congo still formed a strong
opposition and worked for a change of government. When on 5 July riots broke
out within Congolese military, decentralists took advantage of the country’s
unstable constitution and the government’s weakness to foster their ambitions.
On 11 July decentralist Moise Tshombe declared the Congolese province of
Katanga to be a free state, with himself as prime minister. Soon the former
colonial power, Belgium, which intervened with troops to protect its citizens,
became his prime sponsor.
The Lumumba government was unable to cope with the escalating crisis.
It called in a UN peacekeeping mission. On 15 July the first UN troops entered,
and Belgian intervention forces left the Congo, except for Katanga, where they
stayed to train and build a Katangese security force strong enough to resist the
Congolese military. UN troops took up position in Katanga as well but stayed
out of the intra-Congolese conflict. This position remained even into the new
year of 1961, when Léopoldville decentralists captured Lumumba and two of
his colleagues and deported them to Katanga where their secessionist allies
tortured and finally murdered them.
In the aftermath of these events, the UN mandate was strengthened, but
not to the point that its troops could end the secession. At that time the power
structure in the Congo did not permit such attempts.
Several months later, this situation changed fundamentally. On 2 August a
new Congolese government, led by Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, uniting
centralists and decentralists, was appointed. The UN felt that the time had
come to put Tshombe under pressure. On 28 August it began Operation Rum
Punch to take control of the secessionist territory and weaken its security
forces. The self-declared country became occupied. However, its government
was not yet defeated. The UN ordered it to surrender its political hardliners,
such as the Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munongo, whom the UN believed
to be responsible for ethnic cleansing, the death of Lumumba, attacks on UN
troops and, more importantly, the preparation of a counterattack. The Tshombe
government refused. On 13 September the UN began Operation Morthor to
pre-empt such an attack and finally put an end to the Katangese secession.
However, this time Katanga resisted. Its government established a temporary
seat at Kipushi, a small town close to the border with Northern Rhodesia,
several hours drive from Ndola. All over the province security forces engaged
with UN troops, who soon had to pull back and entrench themselves.
Nevertheless, Tshombe knew very well that the Katangese resistance was
limited and he had to negotiate. Thus he invited the UN General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld, who was in the Congolese capital Léopoldville, to peace talks.
They agreed to meet on neutral territory, at Ndola where, on 18 September,
just after midnight, Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 crashed during its landing approach.

Aftermath
Rumours soon spread that the crash had not been an accident but an
assassination: by sabotage, or an attack from the ground or from the air. The
last soon became the most likely variant. Several official investigations
declared the crash an accident. However the rumours continued. In 2011, a
book by Susan Williams outlined several serious doubts about the accidental
character of the crash.1 Her study led to the formation of the investigative
Hammarskjöld Commission in 2012. Three years later this commission’s
findings firstly formed the basis of the constitution of a panel of experts, and
later the appointment of Eminent Person Mohamed Chande Othman at the UN.
I first came into contact with the investigation in 2015, when I read about
it in the news. I remembered several documents mentioning the Hammarskjöld

1 Susan Williams, Who killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, the Cold War and white supremacy in
Africa (London: Hurst and Company, 2011).
case that I had found while working on my PhD thesis,2 and contacted the UN.
Soon after I became a voluntary researcher. I also believe in an aerial attack.
What follows is the current state of my research.

Katanga’s air force and the UN Operations Rum Punch and

Morthor
When Tshombe declared Katanga’s independence on 11 July 1960, his decision
was enforced by the provincial security force Gendarmerie Katangaise. In the
following months, the Tshombe government enlarged this force, improved its
training and equipment, and added foreign mercenaries to foster its combat
strength. A national air force, the Force Aérienne Katangaise (FAK) also known
as Aviation Katangaise (Avikat), was also added. The Belgian Victor Volant
became its commander. Reports on the number and the types of aircraft owned
by Avikat vary. It operated across several airfields in the hinterland and three
airports in the major cities of Katanga: Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Elisabethville,
the last harbouring its headquarters. Furthermore, landing rights for several
airfields in Northern Rhodesia, perhaps also Angola, existed.
All this changed on 28 August with the UN Operation Rum Punch. The UN
took control of Katanga and seized most of the Avikat planes, which were
based at the Elisabethville headquarters at that time. Only a small number of
planes (again, numbers tend to vary), which had been based elsewhere,
remained under the control of Avikat. These included aircrafts and helicopters
of the following types: Aérospatiale-Potez-Fouga CM-170 Magister, De
Havilland DH-104 Dove, Piper PA-18 Super Cub, Piper PA-22-150 Caribbean,
Douglas C-47A, and Sikorsky S-58C.
In the aftermath of Operation Rum Punch, Avikat moved its headquarters
to Kolwezi, one of the few cities still under control of the Katangese security
forces. Victor Volant was replaced as commander by the Katangese Jean-Marie
Ngosa. Ngosa’s former adviser, the Belgian José Delin, became chief of
operations.3 On 13 September, when the UN began Operation Morthor, Avikat
deployed one fighter jet, a Kolwezi-based CM-170 Magister with the aircraft
registration code KAT-93, to support the Katangese ground operations. On 14
September KAT-93 provided close air support to Katangese units attacking UN
troops at Jadotville and carried out an airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville.
This occurred again just one day later, when it provided close air support to

2 Torben Gülstorff, Trade follows Hallstein? Deutsche Aktivitäten im zentralafrikanischen Raum

des ‘Second Scramble’ (Berlin: Humboldt-Universität, 2016).

3Christopher Othen, Katanga 1960-63. Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged
War on the World (Stroud: The History Press, 2015), pp. 139–147.
Katangese units attacking UN troops at Jadotville and Kamina and carried out
another airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville. On 16 September, it provided
close air support to Katangese troops attacking UN troops at Jadotville and two
UN companies trying to relieve them, chased away a UN helicopter at
Jadotville, attacked a parked UN DC-3 at Kamina, and carried out another
airstrike on UN troops at Elisabethville. On 17 September, it provided close air
support to Katangese troops attacking UN troops at Kamina twice, destroyed a
Sabena Douglas DC-4 on the ground and chased away a DC-3.
Understandably, soon after the Hammarskjöld crash, KAT-93 became the
investigators’ prime target, even though no shoot-down of a UN plane by the
CM-170 Magister had been reported and, for technical reasons, its deployment
in an air-to-air combat operation on a dark night is highly questionable.
Furthermore, as by the end of 1961 Avikat began to use a De Havilland
DH-104 Dove to provide close air support to Katangese troops, investigators
became interested in this model as well.
None of the other aircraft, namely Piper PA-18 Super Cub, Piper
PA-22-150 Caribbean, Douglas C-47A, and Sikorsky S-58C, were ever seriously
considered. This also applies to another plane that was in operation in Katanga
on 18 September 1961. Due to several false reports dating its arrival not
earlier than mid-October, it has been overlooked for a long time: a Dornier
DO-28A with the aircraft registration code KA-3016.

Four plus one (plus four plus one) – selling several Dornier
DO-28As to Avikat
Altogether, five (or six or even ten) Dornier DO-28As were ordered and
received by Avikat in 1961 via the Belgian-Congolese trading company
MITRACO. Its owner was the retired Belgian Colonel Jean Cassart, who, in the
late 1950s, had become Dornier’s sales agent for Katanga. Negotiations for
buying several DO-28As had already started in July 1960. On 24 February
1961 MITRACO placed an order, and on 10 August the first receipt was signed.4
The first DO-28A, with the production number 3016, took off in Germany
on 21 August and bypassed Portuguese Angola on 28 August. It would have
reached Katanga around 29 August. Four further DO-28As, with the production
numbers 3017 to 3020, took off in Germany around 7 October and bypassed
Portuguese Angola on 15 October. They would have reached Katanga around

4 ZFST to Federal Agency for Commercial Economy, 21 December 1961, German Federal
Archive (BArch), B 102, 139598.
16 October.5 According to their production numbers, they received the
Katangese aircraft registration codes KA-3016 to KA-3020. These five planes
are already known about.
However, according to Dornier Representative Otto Wien6 and the West
German Ministry of Defence,7 at least one further DO-28A must be added to
this list. As the US State Department informed the West German Embassy in
Washington on 21 October, this further DO-28A had been disassembled, its
components shipped to Portuguese Angola and transported to Kolwezi where
they had been put together by a company technician.8 Furthermore, in the
same meeting, the US State Department also declared that four DO-28As
marked in the colours of Katanga had been seen flying through the airspace of
Gabon. These planes could have been KA-3017 to KA-3020 which probably
bypassed Gabon on 14 or 15 October. However, in November the British
newspaper the Daily Express published an unnamed eyewitness report, stating
that five DO-28As had taken off at Munich on 16 October,9 refuelled at Gabon
around 20 October, and arrived at Katanga about one day later, fitting
chronologically much better into the US State Department’s 21 October report
on five DO-28As entering African territory. In the following months, all these
DO-28As (whether five, six, or even ten) were used by Avikat for close air
support operations all around Katanga.
Yet it is only the first one, the plane with the aircraft registration code
KA-3016, that is of actual importance for the Hammarskjöld case. Only
KA-3016 arrived at Katanga around 29 August 1961, more than two weeks
before the crash on 18 September. Could KA-3016 have been used for an
attack on Hammarskjöld’s DC-6?

Making the case for a German plane: a lonesome Dornier

DO-28A
Accounts of the events of the night of the attack greatly differ. Some
5 West German Consulate in Portuguese Angola to West German Foreign Office, 19 October
1961, Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (PA AA), Section Foreign Office (AA), B 34,
254.

6 Representative Wien (Dornier) to Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West
German Foreign Office), without date, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

7 West German Ministry of Defence to West German Foreign Office, 8 December 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 130, 8371A.

8 West German Embassy in the USA to West German Foreign Office, 21 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 34, 254.

9 ‘I Took Planes to Tshombe’, Daily Express, 6 November 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 254.
eyewitnesses claimed to have seen one plane, others two planes. Some said
that they heard a jet engine, others a piston engine. There is even uncertainty
about what kind of weapon had been utilized. Some said a machine-gun had
been used, others that a bomb had been dropped out of a plane. Consensus
exists only in so far as a bigger plane, Hammarskjöld’s DC-6, flew at lower
altitude, while being attacked by a smaller plane, flying at higher altitude.10 It
is hard to gain any evidence out of this information that could help to identify
an attacking plane. Yet perhaps a comparison of the operational capabilities of
the three most probable planes, namely a CM-170 Magister, a DH-104 Dove,
and a DO-28A, can shed some light on the case. After all, the attacking plane
did not leave the scene without leaving any clues behind.
Firstly, the attacking plane obviously had to be armed. A CM-170 Magister
was equipped with two machine guns and brackets to carry bombs and
rockets. A DH-104 Dove was a civilian plane but could be armed with machine
guns and bomb brackets. A DO-28A was also a civilian plane. In the same way
as a DH-104 Dove, it could be armed with machine guns, bomb brackets and
even rocket brackets, even though Dornier management11 and the West
German Ministry of Defence denied this possibility. In July 1961 the latter
made the official claim that Dornier planes had ‘no fighting potential’.12 The
West German Foreign Office disagreed, claiming that DO-28As, like their
predecessors, the DO-27s, had already been armoured by several buyers for
military purposes. The Portuguese army and air force, for example, had used
more than a dozen DO-27s in Angola during the indigenous uprisings of
autumn 1961. Reports of the West German Foreign Office mention machine
guns, bomb brackets,13 and even rocket launchers14 installed on DO-27s and
used in combat to ‘burn complete villages’.15 Reports from the Foreign Office
also indicate the installation of these features in the Katangese DO-28As. On
24 November 1961, the West German Foreign Office informed Dornier that a

10 Williams 2011 (see note 1), pp. 91–129

11West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 12 July 1961, PA AA, AA, B 

130, 374a.

12 West German Foreign Office, 12 July 1961 (see note 11).

13 West German Foreign Office to Representative Wien (Dornier), 24 November 1961, PA

AA,AA, B 130, 374a

14West German Consulate in Portuguese Angola to West German Foreign Office, 29 August
1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 272.

15 West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 2 June 1962, PA AA, AA, B 68,
65.
DO-28A had attacked UN and Congolese troops.16 Therefore, armament cannot
be used as a clue as all three planes had the same capabilities.
Secondly, the attacking plane had to have flight characteristics that were
fitting to attack a DC-6: a great manoeuvrability and the ability to fly at a
speed of approximately 240 to 290 km/h, to which the DC-6 would have
slowed down during its landing approach. A CM-170 Magister is a twin-engine
jet, built to train jet pilots but also able to provide close air support. Its
maximum speed lies at approximately 740 km/h, its regular speed at
approximately 550 km/h, and its slowest flying speed at approximately 144
km/h.17 A DH-104 Dove is a twin-engine propeller aircraft, built to transport
people and goods. Its maximum speed is approximately 370 km/h, its regular
speed approximately 301 km/h, and its slowest flying speed approximately 120
km/h. A DO-28A is a twin-engine propeller aircraft, also built to transport
people and goods. Its maximum speed is approximately 328 km/h,18 its
regular speed approximately 250 km/h, and its slowest flying speed
approximately 65 km/h.19 Therefore, speed cannot be used as a clue.
Manoeuvrability, on the other hand, offers the first hint. All three planes had
average to good manoeuvrability. Yet a DO-28A, as it is a Short Take-off and
Landing (STOL) plane, is able to fly in very tight and abrupt curves with a
speed of less than 100 km/h. It, therefore, is the most manoeuvrable of the
three. After all, according to a UN report, not just KAT-93 but also at least one
DO-28A was used by Avikat to intercept UN aircraft in 1961.20
Thirdly, the attacking plane had to bring down another plane on a dark
night. This requires special technical navigation equipment. KAT-93, according
to the 2017 UN report, lacked this technical equipment, even though a CM-170
Magister usually had a Lear radio compass and a Very High Frequency
Omnidirectional Range (VOR) on board.21 A DH-104 Dove usually was delivered
with an Automatic Direction Finder (ADF).22 The first DO-28A, KA-3016, is

16 West German Foreign Office, 24 November 1961 (see note 13).

17Email from Laurent Rabier, Responsable des collections d’aéronefs et de toiles d’aéronefs,
Musée Air + Espace, 23 May 2018.

18Bavarian Ministry of State for Economy and Traffic to Federal Ministry of Economics, 10
November 1961, BArch, B 102, 139598.

19 ‘DO 28 im Examen’, in Dornier Post 3/4 (1962), pp. 12–15.

20 UN General Assembly, document A/71/1042, 2017, pp. 32–33.

21 Email from Rabier (see note 17).

22 Email from Curator Alistair Hodgson, De Havilland Aircraft Museum, 16 May 2018.
reported to have been equipped with the radio compass Lear ADF 14-d-1.23
Therefore, in the case of night flying equipment, a DH-104 Dove and KA-3016
would have been the most probable planes. However not one report of a night
attack by a CM-170 Magister or a DH-104 Dove exists. This is in contrast to a
DO-28A. Here, and only here, at least one night-time attack is reported.24
Fourthly, on the night of the attack, radio signals of the attacking plane
were received by a British intelligence radio station in Cyprus.25 To reach this
station, radio signals from Ndola had to cover 5,300 km. Only High-Frequency
(HF) radio signals can cover such a distance. Therefore, the attacking plane
had to have HF radio equipment installed. A CM-170 Magister usually only had
a radio for Very High-Frequency (VHF) and Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) on
board26 and a DH-104 Dove usually was equipped with a VHF Mark VIII radio.27
Both, therefore, would have needed a transmitter to cover the distance.28 The
Hammarskjöld Commission tried to solve this problem by declaring another
plane, equipped with a transmitter, to be the radio signal’s source. To me, this
solution seems highly questionable and unlikely. KA-3016 had such HF radio
equipment, namely a Narco Marc V, and the HF transceiver Sunair 5-T-R,
specially designed for long-range communications.29 Depending on the
frequency used and the plane’s altitude, radio signals sent with this equipment
could have been received by a regular HF receiver at a distance of
approximately 30 to 800 km by day and up to 4,000 km by night. Considering
the advanced reception and amplifying possibilities of an intelligence radio
station, it is highly likely that a radio signal from KA-3016, flying above Ndola,
would have been perceived and intercepted by the Cyprus station’s radio
specialists.
Fifthly, and finally, the attacking plane would have had to be based close
enough to its target area, Ndola airport. KAT-93 was based at Kolwezi. A
CM-170 Magister has a maximum range of 925 km. The distance between
Kolwezi and Ndola, there and back, is approximately 851 km. Therefore, an
attack, well-timed to the minute, would have been possible. However, the

23 ZFST, 21 December 1961 (see note 4).

24 UN General Assembly 2017 (see note 20), p. 32.

25 UN General Assembly, document A/70/132, 2015, p. 24.

26 Email from Rabier (see note 14).

27 Email from Hodgson (see note 22).

28 UN General Assembly 2015 (see note 25), p. 28.

29 <http://www.sunairelectronics.com/web/workspace/uploads/t5d_t5r-1313017033.pdf>
document accessed by author 20 June 2018
 chances of running out of fuel during the mission would have been high.
Furthermore, such an attack would have created another anomaly as, during
Operation Morthor, KAT-93 only operated within a range of 140 to 240 km
around Kolwezi. Certainly, the possibility exists that the plane was refuelled at
another airport or airfield between Kolwezi and Ndola, even though reports
indicate that no Katangese-held airport or airfield suitable for jets existed in
that area. One airfield particularly comes to mind, Kipushi, where the
Katangese government had raised its temporary headquarters. The distance
between Kipushi and Ndola, there and back, is approximately 404 km.
Nevertheless, even if KAT-93 could have handled the uneven runway at
Kipushi, it would have needed about 1.5 km to land and take off. The Kipushi
airfield was only 0.7 km in length. This was also too short for a DH-104 Dove.
That plane needs a runway of about 1 km to reach a height of 15 m, but it
does have a maximum range of 1.415 km.30 Based at Kolwezi, a DH-104 Dove
could have flown to Ndola, circled around for a while, attacked, and returned
safely to its base. A DO-28A has a maximum range of 1.220 km. Yet, as a
STOL plane, it does not need a long runway. It can take off and land in less
than 0.3 km,31 and so could have operated from the Kipushi airfield. Indeed,
sources suggest that KA-3016 was not based at Kolwezi but was, rather, at
Kipushi at the time of the attack. A report of a Dornier employee, Mr Sohn, to
the Foreign Office states that KA-3016 was solely used to transport members
of the Katangese cabinet.32 Furthermore, in a meeting with the West German
Embassy at Washington, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs at the US State Department Woodruff Wallner mentioned a
DO-28A, based at Kipushi.33 KA-3016, therefore, could easily have reached
Ndola, prepared, and finalized the attack and returned safely. Moreover, at
Kipushi, on 17 and 18 September, KA-3016 would have been in the hands of
the Katangese political hardliners, like Munongo. These were men who, fearing
accountability for their dark political doings, were willing to make every
sacrifice to secure Katanga’s sovereignty and their own political future. For
them, KA-3016 would have been an ideal tool to weaken the position of those
who were willing to compromise and eliminate the person they saw as central
to the UN’s disapproval of Katanga’s independence. This was not without good
reason. After Hammarskjöld’s death, the UN soon ended its occupation and the

30 Email from Hodgson (see note 22). ‘DO 28 im Examen’ (see note 19).

31 ‘DO 28 im Examen’ (see note 19).

32Federal Ministry of Economics to Federal Ministry of Economics, 30 October 1961, BArch,

B102, 139598.

33 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 8).
In the account of Pierre Coppens we can read that Jan Van Risseghem indicated that the depart of the mission or
action took place from the KM30 airstrip on the road to Kasumbalesa or Kipushi. If we include one or two other
aircrafts (a Dove and a DO28) together with the CM-170 Magister than the story of Van Rissegehm make sense.
A few other arguments make sense too... With the radio equipment of the DO28 the radio communication could
have been intercepted in Cyprus and indeed gunshots could have been heard during the transmission.
However one thing is clear, the 750m runway of Kipushi was abosolutly unfit for the Fouga Magister.

Tshombe government was back in power.

To conclude: all three planes had the capability to attack Hammarskjöld’s
DC-6. However, KA-3016’s abilities seem to fit best with the clues that were
left behind on 18 September. What is more, a closer look at the transfer of the
DO-28As brings some suspicious details to light which support the impression
that there was something special about KA-3016.

Suspect details of a rather unusual delivery

By the summer of 1961, news of a possible deal between Dornier and Katanga
had circulated in the international press. In the aftermath, the US State
Department and the UN presented the West German Foreign Office intelligence
regarding the deliveries and expressed their worries. Understandably, the West
German Foreign Office was not amused. With the West German Ministry of
Economics, it began an unofficial investigation which revealed some odd details
of the delivery process.
Dornier employees had serious problems stating the number of planes
that Katanga had ordered. Sales agents and employees sometimes stated
five,34 other times six.35 When asked how the delivery had taken place, Dornier
representative Otto Wien answered that the planes had taken off from the
company airport at Oberpfaffenhofen,36 even though the planes had taken off
from the international airport of Munich-Riem, approximately 30 km to the
east. Usually the pilot of a plane had to write a report regarding the market
situation in the delivery area and a copy of this report was sent to the West
German Foreign Office. Yet this time, no such copy was sent.
Finally, Dornier’s management was not able to name the pilots who had
delivered KA-3016 to KA-3020. For several months, the Foreign Office and the
Ministry of Economics had to investigate. Their focus regarding this issue lay
on KA-3016 as it was this plane their investigation had started with. In early
October, Dornier Representative Otto Wien mentioned ‘a German pilot, who is

some sources say:

The sixth DO28 arrived at Kolwezi or Brazzaville in parts and was assembled by Dornier technicians from Munich.

34Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office) to West
German Foreign Office, 25 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

35West German Foreign Office to West German Foreign Office, 5 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B
130, 374a.

36Representative Wien (Dornier) to Chief of the Aircraft Manufacturing Division Beauvais

(West German Ministry of Economics), 4 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.
not an employee of Dornier’.37 Later, Dornier Export Director Mr Leander38 and
Dornier employee Mr Sohn39 mentioned a German pilot who was not known to
them. By the end of October, the Dornier sales agent responsible for the
Belgian market, Mr Delattre, even identified the Belgian buyer himself, Jean
Cassart, as the pilot.40 Fortunately, in November a staff member of the Ministry
of Economics contacted the traffic department of the Munich-Riem airport,
which Otto Wien had falsely denied as the point of departure. Here, the airport
chief of traffic Kurt Bartz was finally able to name the pilot of the first delivery:
Heinrich Schäfer who, according to Bartz, was Dornier’s chief test pilot.41
However, this information was only partially accurate. The pilot of KA-3016
had been Heinrich Schäfer but on 1 March 1960 Schäfer had quit his job at
Dornier. He continued to work for the company, but as a freelance pilot.42 Bartz
also identified the four pilots of KA-3017 to KA-3020 who had taken off at
Munich-Riem around 7 October: Mr Boutet, Mr Paire, Mr Fouquet, and Mr
Bertaux. All of them were of Belgian nationality.43 Be that as it may, in the
context of this paragraph only the German pilot of KA-3016 is of further
interest. The fact that a former employee, well-known to the company’s
management, had been involved in its delivery raises one serious question: is
it probable that all the men involved in the process of selling the first DO-28A
to Katanga had not known when they were asked, and were unable to come to
know in the following days and weeks, that their former colleague Schäfer had
made the delivery?
Doubts are justified as clues even indicate the implementation of a staged
cover-up story by somebody. As already mentioned, on 6 November, the British
tabloid newspaper the Daily Express published a report, written by an
unnamed eyewitness.44 According to this witness, five DO-28As took off at
Munich on 16 October. He or she claimed that these planes had been flown by

37 Representative Wien (Dornier), 4 October 1961 (see note 36).

38Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office), 25 October 

1961 (see note 34).

39 Federal Ministry of Economics, 30 October 1961 (see note 32).

40 West German Embassy in Belgium to West German Foreign Office, 31 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 130, 8371A.

41 Federal Ministry of Economics to Federal Ministry of Economics, 24 November 1961, BArch,

B 102, 139598.

42 ‘Chefpilot Heinrich Schäfer jetzt freier Mitarbeiter’, in Dornier Nachrichten, 4 April 1960.

43 Federal Ministry of Economics, 24 November 1961 (see note 41).

44 ‘I Took Planes to Tshombe’ (see note 9).

British, Belgian and French pilots, marked with the aircraft registration codes
KA-3016 to KA-3020. As a proof, the witness had added a photograph, showing
KA-3016 and KA-3020 on an airfield. Was this fake news? Had this statement
been published to mislead the still ongoing investigation? Was it trying to prove
that no Dornier plane had been in Katanga earlier than late October 1961?
Another clue strengthens this assumption. Let us return to the already
mentioned US complaint about the four DO-28As flying through Gabon
airspace in mid-October for a moment. According to this complaint, a US
informant had recognized the aircraft registration codes of two of the four
planes: KA-3015 and KA-3017.45 Now, 3015 was the production number of a
DO-28A that the West German Ministry of Defence had bought for its special
air mission wing in 1961. It was marked with the aircraft registration code
CA+041 and decommissioned in the late 1960s.46 It is, therefore, rather
unlikely that it had been seen near Gabon, let alone marked with a Katangese
aircraft registration code. It is much more plausible that KA-3016 has been
misread or falsely reported by the US-American informant as KA-3015. Yet if
so, it would have been the second DO-28A, marked KA-3016, crossing Gabon
airspace in autumn 1961. Therefore, up to this point, one thing should have
become clear: efforts had been made to cover up the delivery of KA-3016 in
late August. At least so far, it is the only plane in the Hammarskjöld case for
which such a cover-up can be noted.

Conclusion

This article makes the point that a Dornier DO-28A might be the plane that
was used in a night-time air-to-air attack on UN General Secretary Dag
Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961.
This does not mean that the company Dornier had actively participated in
the planning, preparation or execution of such an attack. It is highly likely that
the timing of the arrival of KA-3016 in late August, between Operation Rum
Punch and Operation Morthor, was pure coincidence.
The same applies to freelance pilot Heinrich Schäfer. Nevertheless, the
investigation of KA-3016 is still at an early stage and nothing should be ruled
out without more research. An analysis of Avikat’s usual combat strategy and
tactics shows quite clearly that the attack on Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 was an
anomaly. Avikat’s pilots seemed to lack the experience required to bring down

45 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 8).

46 <https://tinyurl.com/y9va2gzt> or <https://www.klassiker-der-luftfahrt.de/geschichte/
flugzeuge/einsatzgeschichte-der-dornier-do-28-ab/653592>, document accessed by author 23
July 2018.
another plane. UN planes were intercepted while airborne but were destroyed
only while on the ground. The downing, therefore, formed one anomaly; flying
in a dark night was another. Something must have been different in September
1961. Schäfer comes to mind. He was an experienced German Luftwaffe
fighter pilot, trained for night-time air-to-air combat operations and had
participated in more than 60 World War II combat missions over Soviet and
North African combat zones.47
Yet, this fact is a clue, not evidence. Currently, there is no concrete
evidence for any active involvement of Schäfer in the Hammarskjöld case.
Nevertheless, not just for this reason further research on Schäfer might be
promising. On 29 August he arrived at Katanga. Usually delivery pilots stayed
for some time at their place of destination to instruct local pilots and
mechanics. According to Dornier’s representative at Bonn, Otto Wien, the
German ‘non-Dornier’ delivery pilot of KA-3016 returned to the company right
after the delivery.48 Yet, on 2 October the US Embassy at Bonn informed the
Foreign Office that a DO-28A, obviously KA-3016, armed with machine guns
and bomb brackets, had been seen at a Katangese airfield accompanied by a
‘Dornier technician’.49 About two weeks later, US intelligence added that the
parts of the sixth disassembled DO-28A had been put together in Kolwezi with
the help of a ‘Dornier employee’.50 As Otto Wien declared that no Dornier
personnel was based at Katanga51 and Schäfer also had been a technical officer
at the German Luftwaffe,52 he may very well have been the technician US-
American intelligence had falsely identified as a Dornier ‘employee’. Therefore,
further research on Schäfer’s stay might deliver new insights into the situation
of Katanga’s available planes and pilots, perhaps even into the situation of the
exiled government at Kipushi in September 1961.
Be that as it may, at least one thing can be said definitely: if the crash of
Hammarskjöld’s DC-6 was caused by an air-to-air attack, KA-3016 has to
seriously considered as the attacking plane. As the former Katanga Gendarme

47 Schäfer to Central Verification Authority (Federal Archive) and Wehrmacht Information

Authority (WASt), 3 November 1965, BArch, Pers6, 190806.

48Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office) to West
German Foreign Office, 5 October 1961, PA AA, AA, B 57, 65.

49 Representative Wien (Dornier) to Claudius Dornier Junior (Dornier), 2 October 1961, PA AA,
AA, B 57, 65.

50 West German Embassy in the USA, 21 October 1961 (see note 9).

51Chief of the West-East Trade Division Klarenaar (West German Foreign Office), 5 October 

1961 (see note 48).

52 Schäfer, 3 November 1965 (see note 47).

Victor Rosez confirmed to me: ‘About the 5 Dorniers [KA-3016 to KA-3020], I
can tell you that the very first was flown by their own pilots and arrived in
Katanga by end of August 1961. This aircraft could be modified easily in a light
bomber and possibly used in an attack on another plane.’ 53 To definitely prove
or rule out this possibility, further research is necessary.

Torben Gülstorff is a German freelance historian. In 2016 he earned his

PhD in contemporary history. The history of West and East German activities
in Africa after 1945 forms one of his special subjects. He supports the ongoing
UN investigation into the death of former UN General Secretary
Dag Hammarskjöld as a voluntary researcher.

more 2018 notes from Victor E. Rosez: As it is impossible that Jan van Risseghem was back
in Kolwezi before September 16th (probably together with Bob Denard and more others
whom all were expelled onSeptember 7th the multiple attacks of the Fouga Magister of
September 14th, 15th and 16th, 1961 couldn't have done by him.

The sole pilot who could manage this high number of raids was the Belgian José Magain,
it is not clear if he was assisted by the base commander colonel Joseph Delin.
Who piloted the Fouga on September 17th and 18th (the Claire Manoir with O'Brien is not clear).

José Magain, Roger Bracco, Jacques Demoulin Joseph Delin

53 Email from Victor Rosez (former member of the Katanga Gendarmerie), 25 February 2018.
 Pilot Heinrich Schäfer
January 1963 after an accident The four pilots whom flew over the 4 Do28
Mr Boutet
Mr Pair
Mr Fouquet
Mr Bertaux

Jan van Risseghem

Deze reportage heeft plaatsgevonden tussen 16 en 20 oktober 1961, één maand na de crash van de Albertina. Hier wordt
aangetoond dat de Avikat ook nog 5 extra Fouga-Magisters bezat, maar sinds hoelang? Misschien al voor 17 september 1961?

Van München naar Katanga… de geheim-

zinnigste vliegtocht van mijn leven!

T shombe heeft de eerste ronde gewon-

nen in de strijd tegen de UNO en tegen
wie zich niet wou neerleggen bij de
onafhankelijkheid van Katanga. Maar
iedereen voelt aan dat er een tweede,
veel hardere ronde komt. Thans zijn
zowel de Verenigde Naties als Moise Tshombe zich
aan het versterken. De Katangese president moet
dat in het geheim doen , daar geen enkel land of
firma wettelijk gerechtigd is om hem wapens te
leveren. Zondag Nieuws is er niettemin in geslaagd
zijn lezers een exclusieve reportage aan te bieden
in verband met vliegtuigleveringen aan Katanga.
Wat U in deze bijdrage verteld word door onze
medewerker , die natuurlijk onbekend moet blijven ,
Is geen fantasie, geen literatuur. Het zijn nuchtere
Feiten.

Lees verder bladzijde 4 en 5

Reconstructie en vertaling in het Frans en Engels door
© Victor E. Rose
 De onbekende tussenpersoon was ere kolonel Cassart die in het verleden al 1600 bommen van 12,5 kg had geleverd met
lanceringssysteem voor 3 bommen en tonnen anderen dingen. DO28 (KAT3016) werd op 29 aug 61 geleverd.
Bij de tussenlanding op het vliegveld van Loanda in Angola hadden
Tshombe’s vliegtuigen heel wat bekijk. (foto 5)

De naam van de DO 28 KA 3016 piloot was Heinrich Schäfer

Onder ons duikt Kolwezi op, het koper- en kobaltcentrum

I K
De onbekende die mij te München was komen afhalen
bracht mij naar de terreinen van de vliegtuigfabriek.
Op weg naar Nice maakten wij een
Rode Nota’s zijn van Victor E. Rosez
tussenlanding te Lyon, waar
nieuwe brandstof getankt werd.
Leverde...
waar de toestellen dienen afgeleverd. De opdracht is bijna
vervuld (foto 6)
De vijf Dorniers werden in goede orde aan de grond gezet.
Op het voorplan de Fouga-Magister waarover zoveel
gesproken werd (foto 7)
Vier piloten bij vertrek waarbij vier DO28 worden getoond.
In Kolwezi zijn er vijf DO 28. Het artikel is duidelijk, er
dingen zijn waarover absoluut niet mocht gepraat worden.

Daarbij blijft het echter niet. Wij weten uit goede
bron, dat de levering voorzien is van Alouette
helikopters, van een ongekend aantal Harvard-
Jagers uit Angola, van vijf Fouga-Magisters-
straaljagers en van evenveel Sabre-jagers uit
Rhodesië. Katanga heeft daarboven ook een
aantal DC 4 transporttoestellen aangekocht.
Tevens beschikt het Katangese leger nu reeds
mij zou aanspreken en mij mijn naam zou
zeggen. Eenmaal dit gebeurd, werd ik naar een
auto geloodst die mij naar de Dornierfabrieken
bracht, waaraan ik een bezoek bracht in
gezelschap van de reeds aangekomen vier
piloten. Na een rondrit, waarbij een vijftigtal
recuperatie – Sabrejagers voor de Duitse
luchtmacht Werden ontwaard, kregen de
De Fransman die onze formatie beval, besloot
toen om door te vliegen naar Kameroen over
Nigeria heen., dat wij in feite niet mochten
overvliegen. Tegen valavond bereikten wij
N’Gaoundere, in Kameroen. Bij de landing
geraakte een wiel van de KA 0018 geklemd maar
na twee uren herstelling, waren wij weer
startklaar. Op 20 oktober begaf onze Dornier-

II
over een grote hoeveelheid springstofbommen, pilote gedurende twee uren een korte luchtstoet zich naar Libreville in Galeon en
erse en ook Katangese napalmbommen en raketten tegen gronddoelen. opleiding op de Dornier 28-toestellen. De Pointe-Marie in Frans Congo. Een wijl later
gevangenen werden De Dornier 28 toestellen, die naar Katanga piloten waren van Belgische, Duitse en Franse ontwaarden wij de Congostroom en de haven van
uitgewisseld. Gebouwen die na vlogen, hadden een belangrijke lading materieel nationaliteit. ’s Anderendaags had ik samen Matadi: Loanda in Angola, waar wij de dag
het UNO optreden te bij, onder meer voor de verpleeginrichting van met de piloten afspraak bij de toestellen die eindigden, was spoedig in het zicht. Van de

Elisabethstad bezet werden
door de troepen van de
Verenigde Naties werden
opnieuw onder bewaking
gesteld van de Katangese
Rijkswacht. Men zou kunnen
denken dat alles in de
afgescheiden provincie van
Congo nu opnieuw voor het
beste is en dat de strijdkrachten
van president Tshombe en
eenheden van de UNO legers
op vreedzame voet leven. Men
Vliegtuigen
deze vliegtuigen. Nauwkeuriger kunnen onze
gegevens niet zijn maar omwille van de
waarheidsgetrouwheid, laten wij hier het verhaal
volgen van onze medewerker die met de Dornier-
toestellen kon meevliegen:
- Ik werd opgewacht aan het Regina Palace-hotel
te München op 15 oktober omstreeks 3 uur
’s namiddags. Het ging er geheimzinnig aan toe.
Terwijl wij een kijkje gingen Men had mij eenvoudig verwittigd dat iemand
nemen bij de toestellen
bestudeerden de piloten het
plan van de vlucht.
voor de loodsen waren gerangschikt. Nog even
keken de piloten het vliegplan na en
vervolgens begaven wij ons naar Nice met een
tussenlanding te Lyon, waar wij benzine
opdeden. Vanuit Nice, waar wij de nacht
doorbrachten, ging het naar Algiers, in
Algerije, over Bosa op Sardinië en over Corsica.
De KA 3018, aan boord waarvan ik plaats had
genomen maakte de overtocht over de
Middellandse zee zonder moeilijkheid. Met de
toelating van de Franse jachtluchtmacht
hoofdplaats van de Portugese kolonie logen wij
naar Villa-Luso, eveneens in Angola, om ten slotte
onze plaats van bestemming te bereiken:
Kolwezi, de luchthaven van Katanga, van waaruit,
de troepen van Tshombe, dank zij één enkele
Fouga Magister de UNO soldaten in bedwang
hielden.
Alvorens te landen zagen wij nog hoe oude
voertuigen werden weggetrokken door de
Katangezen., die ons met hun nieuwe Dorniers
uitbundig begroetten. Meer kan en mag ik niet

zou ook kunnen hopen. Dat na
de zolang verwachte uitvoering
van het bestand tussen de
Katangezen en UNO
vertegenwoordiger Khiari, de
weg geëffend is voor een
vruchtbaar overleg tussen de h.
aan
overvlogen wij in formatie Algerië. De nacht vertellen. Dit is geen literatuur maar een
van de 18de op de 19de oktober brachten wij eenvoudige opsomming van feiten, waaruit
keuren of laken. Men kan de
door te In-Salak. Een vlucht over de Sahara volgens mij blijkt, dat men president Tshombe en
mening toegedaan zijn, dat
Katanga uiteindelijk bij Congo leidde ons naar Taman-rassel, ons volgend zijn Katangese leger niet mag onderschatten
behoort, waarvoor deze rijke bevooradingspunt.
provincie onmisbaar is
geworden.

Tshombe en de centrale
Congolese regering van eerste-
minister Adula. Deze overtuiging
zou kunnen gegrondvest
worden op de aanwezigheid van
Katan-
Voor de loodsen stonden de DO28-toestellen, waarmede men de
piloten in een minimum van tijd vertrouwd had gemaakt.
Men ziet hier vier van de zes geleverde toestellen, één ervan werd
op 29 augustus in Katanga in ontvangst genomen.
Katangese afgevaardigden te
Leopoldstad, die met moeite
door de h. Khiari naar de
Congolese hoofdstad werden
geleid.
Niets is echter minder broos
en zelf minder schijnheilig dan
de overeenkomst, die door de
UNO verantwoordelijken na
een onterende nederlaag met
de h. Tshombe werd gesloten.
De Katangezen, die getoond
hebben, dat hun leger ook
zonder vreemde officieren
doeltreffend kan optreden,
hebben de tijd gehad om zich
voor te bereiden op het verzet
tegen een nieuwe poging tot
onderdrukking van hun
afscheiding.
Men kan deze scheiding goed-
Feit is, dat Katanga zijn
onafhankelijkheid bij
ontstentenis van een
erkenning door om het even
welke mogendheid te allen
voorlopig opgeschort. Deze beslissing
vloeit niet uitsluitend voort uit
politieke overwegingen maar veeleer
uit het besef van de Congolese
legeropperbevelhebber Mobutu dat
hij Katanga niet kan veroveren met
wapens. Het Katangese leger dat
meer dan een jaar de tijd heeft
gekregen om zich te laten opleiden,
niet door avonturiers maar door
Belgische en vreemde kaders, heeft in
de strijd tegen de eerder tuchteloze
en zelf wilde Indiase UNO soldaten
bewezen dat het een te duchten
strijdmacht vormt. Terwijl de
Verenigde Naties zich in Katanga
wederbewapenen, meer m Dan
noodzakelijk is voor de eenvoudige
“bescherming van mensenlevens”,
koste wil verdedigen met de
kopen ook de Katangezen wapens.
hulp van om het even wie. Daar
Omdat men de indruk opdoet, dat
ligt precies het knelpunt van de
wederinschakeling van de eerlang opnieuw een strijd zal
gouden koperprovincie in de opflikkeren, die ditmaal zou kunnen
Congolese eenheidsstaat. uitgroeien tot een algemene
Niemand erkent officieel het burgeroorlog in de Congo.
zelfbestuur van Katanga maar Dat de Katangezen het daarom
velen helpen onderduims ernstig menen en ook precies weten
president Tshombe in zijn welk hun zwak punt is blijkt uit hun
streven naar onafhankelijkheid. betrachting vooral hun luchtmacht te
De Congolese troepen van versterken. Men zou van op een paar,
generaal Mobutu, de eenheden of meer, duizend kilometer gezien
die nog onder het gezag staan kunnen geloven dat de troepen van
van de uitermate Lumubistische de Verenigde Naties bij machte zijn
gezagvoerders te Stanleystad te een wederbewapening van het
Stanleystad, mogen opdracht Katangese leger te beletten. Niets s
gekregen hebben zich op te
minder waar. Onder de blinde of
stellen langs de grenzen van
bijziende ogen van de Indiase
Katanga, toch hebben zij hun
Gurkas, voert Tshombe wapens en
“offensief” tegen deze provincie
munitie aan.
TSHOMBE
TSHOMBE
Reconstructie en vertaling in het Frans en Engels door
Meer nog, op de vliegvelden © Victor E. Rosez
bewaakt door de troepen van de
Verenigde Naties landen
spiksplinternieuwe toestellen voor
de Katangese luchtmacht. Dit lijkt
onwaarschijnlijk en nochtans is het
6
verhaal van onze medewerker
waarheidsgetrouw. Het gaat uit, of
beter, het verwijst naar de oproep
van de Indiase eerste-minister
Pandit Neroe, die aan alle landen
vroeg de wapenleveringen aan
Katanga te schorsen. Hij was
voldoende ingelicht om te weten
waarover hij het had. Zijn, Gurkas,
gelegerd te Elisabethstad hadden
hem verwittigd dat vijf nieuwe
vliegtuigen voor de Katangese
luchtmacht te Kolwezi waren
aangekomen. Het betrof Dornier
toestellen die uit Duitsland
kwamen en de nummers droegen
van KA 0016 tot KA 0020. De
Indiase eerste-minister was goed
ingelicht maar had het geluk niet,
dat een van onze fotografen te
beurt viel die de vijf toestellen van
uit München kon vergezellen. Hij
bracht ons het bewijs dat zowel aan
de zijde van de Verenigde Naties als
aan de kant van Katanga weder
bewapend wordt, vooral dan op
het gebied van de luchtmacht.
Katanga beschikt thans over een
helikopter S55, drie Piper Cups, één
Fouga Magister straaljager, twee
Dove-verkenningsvliegtuigen en
vijf Dornier toestellen, die uit
Duitsland kwamen. (of méér?)
Correction: Doof must be Dove

The KA3016 was already delivered on August 28th as

later was confirmed by the Dornier factory in Munich.