A.M. No.

SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into
certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's
power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds
channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money
was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the
House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all
over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names
of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers"
who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles),
wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly
transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-
dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions
and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out
to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as
the one receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
 32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and
other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or
join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary
Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman
Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline
Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty.
Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that
case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear
pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na
siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim
Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that
we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko
kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the
NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim
Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin
ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo
entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph
of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in
the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the
photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada
who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing
pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that
he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs.
Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was
acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the
then Acting Presiding Justice.4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " 5 wherein
she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have
visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29
Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong
opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay
may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba
naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari
sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang

mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501
Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES
sa conference room.

x x x x6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula
was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision
rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator
Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier.
He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been
rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the
party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or
social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our
court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I
have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been
advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs.
Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the
case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the
merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of
the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such
that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend
[his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair
and malicious innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the
testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the
malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim
Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the
intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya
"Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were
alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs]
involved in the scam).9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to
submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the
affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's
Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases
and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge
whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan;
what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's
testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually
made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media
coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a
looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later before the
Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in
their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do
all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and become
whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding
respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-
employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs.
Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent
said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was
taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous
healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned.
When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's
parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually,
respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his
prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's
robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton
taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any
ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of
courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that
was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said
she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in
Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have
personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no
longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division
of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his
Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as
sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution
was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-
DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within
a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C.
Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with
the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original
records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is
no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other
reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768
and 26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report
with the following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case
No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation
of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine
Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother
Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna
Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the
questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the
amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the
payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are
mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an
Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser
crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay
PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.

The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in
question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this
does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After
passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the
JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in
charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in
charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business
activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him
the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that
court who would help her.

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the
Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is
respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote,
"Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory,
Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then
going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo
alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng
ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot,
Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?

xxxx

A Yes po.

Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that
Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were
talking about, if you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento
talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga
nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory
Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated,
Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po
si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms.
Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po

sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung
decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara
that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case).
Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the
Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He
was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the
Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different
people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the
decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not
mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko
inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that
the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni
Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms.
Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang
pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na
Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms.
Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si
madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice
Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never
mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms.
Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya.
Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na
PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it
spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang
staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng
ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay
Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to
Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the
first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much
money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur
telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5
million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit
respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue
to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 as monthly
interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's
suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding
eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms.
Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si
Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na
pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o
nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si
Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan
niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit
money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang
opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po
ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles,
checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita
Madam yung nakalagay sa ...

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na
inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang
ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin
yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue
ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in
madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or
₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang
ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi
po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka
bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si
madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na
lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million
na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na
eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga
ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the
bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay
Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the
arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account
ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She
ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not
mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan,
he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but
he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod.
Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her
duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for
business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice
sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the
hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?

xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is
filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry
because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin

niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami.
Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO
billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam,
paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman
at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong
mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit
ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would
say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix
(aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her
acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi
masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the
photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is
shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of
the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that
picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I
immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be
going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his
Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his
side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him.
Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the
parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman
in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case;
and that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would
like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the

Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,

respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice
Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody,
not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from

Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent
deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles
considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012,

after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what
prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles
approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and
thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her
"evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she
would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese
priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests.
He was not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the name of
Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene
since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the
Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if
he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he
keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made
arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his
body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of
cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal
for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his
first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on
declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang
kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest

consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued to her
his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he
never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have
any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that
Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest.
He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can
only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit
or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula
testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case
involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is
too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four
things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case.
Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to
the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the
Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he
never interceded on her behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified
that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the
Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses
and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions
propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and
issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is
telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably
improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their
testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did
not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses
and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy
witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula
were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case
considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation.
Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's
belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a
mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and
Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that
in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a
ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for
the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years;
and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay,
inadmissible in evidence:

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to
Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ...
they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that
we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx
Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to
clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's
suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula.
Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He
should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim
regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan,

resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross
misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to
respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is
highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and
lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it
possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true,
nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted
business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of
₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his
judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of
the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in
part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her
office considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in

violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it
possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her,
respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he
visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely
frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt,
readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed"
the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly
perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted
position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence
in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for
reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the
same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not
present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have
waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have
acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been
charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada,
Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of
PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of
collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as
a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different
procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division,
respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles
did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as
she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no
proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion?
The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the
documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks
amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only
one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a
hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the
Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

xxxx

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating
Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the
charges against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while
it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to

the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure
("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she
handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of
₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited
in her personal account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator

Estrada and Napoles.11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery
during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed
to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually
visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or
attended any social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden

act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." 12 We agree with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and
after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption
or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence,

i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.13

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted
staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal
activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She
revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help
"fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely
observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in
contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not
disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they
even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00
million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed when
she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and
given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no
personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by
Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had
not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could
have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case,
especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the
Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said that
respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees
to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-
litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has
condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering
justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must
present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is
imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof
required should be more than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy
and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged
bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we
find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision
in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly
in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That
respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did
not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by
the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel"
controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the
present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public
revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has
tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their
close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with
government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed
by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings
where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would
testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their
previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-
examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great
weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's
claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles
talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar
as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to
respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and
also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles
made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees
of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct
examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding
her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the
Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran

niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na
niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice
Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero
hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa
sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-
in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso.
Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer
for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga
officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang
probation period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of
public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a
probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the
merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative
liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety
and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is
an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from
any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to
create an impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or
socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the
case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was
charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were
both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty.
Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers
or parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases
he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in
conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on
several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro
Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and
drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point
was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions
where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or
thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and
litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see
that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing
with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they
meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any manner connected
with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that
they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the
bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion
that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because
Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from
malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise
suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his
Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still on trial
as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing
her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because
at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending
and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of
partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p
]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel
appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality.
It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any
social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and
work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors
and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and
objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken
the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act
and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their
counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the
termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on
its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with
Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which
initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted
"contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court
tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion,
consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its
serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation
Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be
possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or
assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the
image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper
request. Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a
devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and
had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that
conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is
such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have
been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public,
you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked her
simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so
grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy
Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes
Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her
considering that she was a former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that.
"That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former
respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you
lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before
you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or
was that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada
who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel.
On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with
Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly,
respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and
asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is
unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him before
the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles
when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed advance
interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as
consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.1âwphi1 Such finding is consistent
with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said
case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles
office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her
office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support
Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest
for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such
an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with
the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts
of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative
investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he
vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to
mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission,
we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only
when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles
in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles
("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x
x."27).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a
violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28Dishonesty, being a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the Judiciary.29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious
charge may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate
of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.

Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 September 8, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)

LUCILA TAN, complainant,

vs.
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, 1 for
violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).

The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe
Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila,
then presided by respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge
allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan
Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member
told her that respondent was asking for ₱150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of
the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She
was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she
remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of
the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to
respondent’s demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported
by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge.2

Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead

stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable
decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal
Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan
Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked
to him several times to ask him to help complainant. The former even called him over the
phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation
of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no
sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the
Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that complainant
kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in
Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a
higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent judge also claimed
that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was planning to
buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff
gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he
had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120
before he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for
him to thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any
member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.3

In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and
recommendation.4

First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the
administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as
documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated
February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent judge’s
staff.5 Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos,
Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His
documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,6 copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,7 and various documents composed of the
machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the
letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front
and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop
Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record,
which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondent’s witness, Fernando
B. Espuerta.8

The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:

COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:

1. LUCILA TAN

Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case
in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she
filed two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s Office in Pasig.
After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57
and the other one went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding
Judge. Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she
moved for consolidation and the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch
57. Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer,
Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of
Respondent Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several
hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the Complainant and advised her to
talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the
phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie,
the Mayor’s Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she
wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie made
arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late
October 2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge
met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3,
2003). During the meeting, Complainant "told the Judge regarding this matter, how this
happened and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible" (TSN, page
23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes,
Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the
way home, Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge, "Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng
kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo" (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first,
Josie did not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the
former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser
amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of ₱20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two
days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money, the
Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court
asked her if she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said
that Josie went there and there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce
called up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when
Joyce called saying that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After
Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show
Complainant something. When they were in Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed
Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not
accede to Joyce’s request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. "Sabi niya it [was] for Judge
daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time" (TSN, page 34, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No.
59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit "A" for
the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further
alleged "Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of ₱150,000.00 for each case then they will
(sic) going to reverse the Decision" and "Si Judge daw" will reverse the Decision.
Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a
friend of the Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the
Mayor’s help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the
Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the
Office of the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the
country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the phone
number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in
touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge,
Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant heard the Mayor "because his voice is very loud." He said, "Judge, Saan ka?
Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and
then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na
kasi matagal na iyan" (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that they left the
Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again.
Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be
promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the
decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3,
2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when
he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in
Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She
was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening,
Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to know as Fernan
and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and drinking, the
Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant
claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the Prosecutor who talked in her
behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos
(₱6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his
company were still there drinking. While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a
man came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The Complainant
said that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment,
and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked
to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was still scared
because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be in her
behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the ₱20,000.00 because
her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised
them that she will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant
did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of
Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation.
When Complainant asked why, "Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila
ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation." She
received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision
was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).

RESPONDENT’S VERSION:

1. JOSEFINA RAMOS

She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former
Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and
2001, she was already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September
9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayor’s Office together with Tita
Pat, the sister of President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan
went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy
because they have a case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor
Jinggoy. She could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9,
2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she
suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed
up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking about
regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila
Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan and
Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila.
She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as
Exhibit "1" (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan
gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).

2. RODOLFO CEA

He testified that his acquaintances usually call him "Buboy" and for about two years or
more he had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he "was still working as
Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete
and eventually asked for a favorable decision against her case." He could not remember
anymore when that was because "it was a long time ago" (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro
Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court when she
approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce
Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete "because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a
favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete don’t (sic) like his
staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction" (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22,
2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court
in San Juan was "the first and the last time." When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan
that he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he
answered "I don’t know about that, sir." (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22,
2003.) He identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed
and affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit
"2" (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the
Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified
date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA

He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the
position Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became
Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled having
met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first
time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to
him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete
because they had not been together for a long time and they were long time friends. They
ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They
stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes
pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy
and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal
Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22,
2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge
Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did
not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The incident
where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the incident when
she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not
remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was
nearing Christmas in 2000. "Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin,
katunayan nandito po dala ko." Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso
Sy. "Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang
aking kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon
ang sagot ko sa kanya." He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In
their second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit "3" (TSN,
pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually given to
him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact same document given to
him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave
to him when she went to his Office were marked as Exhibit "4" and submarkings (TSN,
pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the
documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan asked him,
he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and they had been
together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the
latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief
Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that
he give Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like
that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ

She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant
Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know
Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, "may kaso ito sa inyo,
pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge" (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did
not say anything but Lucila Tan asked "may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office?" and she
said "yes, ma’am." After that there was a hearing and the sister of former President
Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was
on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila "na
pinakikiusap ni Mayor" (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge
Rosete about the things that the sister of the former President told her and that Judge
Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 that,
sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and
said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that
she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money stuffed
inside the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie
went to their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also
denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila
Tan was the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show
her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when
the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter
did not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with
Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete
was and she answered that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked
if she knew the telephone number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New
Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to
him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 29, 2003). "He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong kaso
na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I don’t know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were
talking and then he said ‘ganun ba?’ then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we
left the Office." She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in
Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and
claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in their Office. She
likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were
decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to
her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003,
which was marked as Exhibit "5," and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the
contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).9

The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that
respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of ₱150,000.00 for him
to render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy.
Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to
bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and
she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him
to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.

The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of
the parties’ evidence.

After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the
documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more
trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented
during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in
Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence
supports her allegation that a member of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her
copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and
demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays ₱150,000.00 for the reversal of the
disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a
judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from
the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant
the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.

The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that
the testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta
confirmed complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions,
Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City.
Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant
and swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The
Investigating Judge observed:

Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judge’s two
witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta
testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo
Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan
Restaurant.10 (citations omitted)

Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with respondent
judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.

We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as
regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines.
Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant
claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New
Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country.11 He did not show to the
investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he
entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore
infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with
complainant’s testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with
respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like
Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without
reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge
and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity
and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal
behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.12

Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises
beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by
members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule
140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office

without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998

FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-

BARRETO, complainants,

vs.

Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan

City, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148 July 22, 1998

Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant,

vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan
City, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was charged with "sexual harassment and/or
acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-complaint 1 dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride
Dawa, 2 Femenina Lazaro-Barreto 3 and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. 4 In view of the allegations
in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 1997, placed respondent
judge under preventive suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo S.
Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report
and recommendation. 5

Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, 6 who assisted the aforementioned

complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an affidavit-complaint 7 against Judge
Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of
lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of
moral[s] demanded by judicial
8
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998, we resolved to consolidate her
Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for
inclusion in his investigation, report and recommendation.

After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer submitted his Report,
dated March 16, 1998, which contained the following exhaustive and detailed summary of
the testimonies of the witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:

1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed as a stenographic reporter in

Branch 52 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan City. She
affirmed under oath the sworn statement (Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she
executed August 15, 1997. She related that on August 8, 1997, while on her way to the
ladies' toilet, she had seen respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking with a man at
the backdoor of his chamber. Out of respect for respondent, being the Acting Executive
Judge of the MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the ladies comfort room. When
she emerged from the same, she saw that respondent was still at the backdoor of his office
although this time he was alone. Upon seeing Dawa, respondent casually asked her whether
the toilet was clean. She answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she
approached him. When she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder
and led her into his chamber. Once inside and while she was standing near the edge of
respondent's office table, he placed his arm around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw
and kissed her on the lips.
Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act of the respondent. Before she
could recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and kissed her on
the lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent away. Respondent asked her where she lived
and with whom but she hurriedly left respondent's office.

Upon Dawa's return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria Teresa Carpio, who also works
in Branch 52, asked her what the matter was because she noticed that Dawa looked dazed
("tulala"). She first said that nothing was the matter but upon [Carpio's] insistent
questioning, she haltingly related her harrowing experience in respondent's office.

That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina Hernandez-Santiago, the
presiding judge of Branch 52 who, although [she] was then on leave, had gone to her office
on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her coworkers in Branch 52, who was
celebrating his birthday. Judge Santiago, after listening to Dawa's story, advised her to go
home and relate the incident to her parents before deciding to do anything further. Dawa
went home but did not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she told her sister.

The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday), Dawa went to see Atty. Mona
Lisa Buencamino, the Clerk of Court, and related her story. She was told that she was not
respondent's first victim but that Noraliz Jorgensen and the Clerk of Court herself had
been objects of respondent's amorous advances.

Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that if Dawa would file a complaint,
she would follow suit.

Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the respondent. Upon the advice of
Atty. Buencamino, the two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a city councilor. The latter
advised them to go to the police and have their complaints entered in the police blotter.
Calalang brought them to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel. The
latter called for a police investigator and SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them.
That same afternoon, the two complainants went to the police station to have their
complaints recorded in the police blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).

Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino, Noraliz Jorgensen and
Femenina Lazaro-Barreto where they filed the letter complaint (Exhibit "X").

Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She insisted on her story although she
admitted that respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.

2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a policeman. She affirmed under
oath her sworn statement (Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record). The following is her story:

Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City
and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short), MeTC, Caloocan City.
Among her duties was the preparation and follow up of the payrolls for RATA and
gasoline allowances of the Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon the approval of said payrolls, it
was her duty to receive the cash from the cashier and deliver them to the individual judges.

Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she had gone to the
office of respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides Branch 51 of the Court, for
the purpose of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges' allowances. Upon
entering the respondent's office, the latter approached her and suddenly kissed her on the
cheek. Jorgensen immediately left respondent's office after having secured his signature on
the payroll.

Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jorgensen had returned
to the respondent's office to deliver the cash representing his allowances for the months of
January, February and March. Upon entering the respondent's office, the latter
immediately stood up, held her two arms, and suddenly kissed her and licked her left ear,
saying "I love you". Jorgensen was surprised and afraid. She asked respondent, "Judge,
what is this", at the same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she could not
because his grip was strong. Respondent then said, "Don't make noise lest we be heard
outside". At the same time, respondent held her jaw and kissed her on the lips. He said,
"Open your mouth" as her continued to hug and kiss her while she tried to free herself. He
did not heed her pleas although she was then trembling with fear.

On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondent's office to secure his signature on
the payroll for June. Again he kissed her before he signed it. After he had signed the
payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen to eat with him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the
next Saturday. When she asked him why he was inviting her, he answered, "You are no
longer a child, you ought to know".

Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino not to send her again to the
respondent and she told Buencamino of what had happened to her. Atty. Buencamino told
Jorgensen that if she wanted to complain, Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was
afraid that nothing would come out of any complaint because respondent was a Judge and
powerful.

On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all judges except the respondent,
Jorgensen tried to look for someone who could deliver the money to him but she could find
no one. So she waited until she knew that someone else was inside respondent's office. At
about 3:00 o'clock, while Roderick Corral was inside respondent's office, she entered but
respondent immediately threw to Corral the paper he had brought for his signature, in
effect dismissing him. Corral immediately stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone in
respondent's chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood up and held Jorgensen's
jaw kissing her on her lips at the same time saying "Open your mouth". Jorgensen
immediately left respondent's office in tears.

On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa, a stenographer in Branch 52,
was the latest victim of the respondent. Jorgensen reported her experience to Judge
Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she informed the good judge that she was ready to file a
complaint against respondent in order to obtain justice.

Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who admitted that before August, 1997,
she had gone to respondent's office with Baby Mapue in response to his call and while there
they were shown an anonymous letter (Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged
misconduct on her part.

3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year-old married woman who is a Court

Stenographer II in Branch 53 of the Caloocan City MeTC. During her direct examination
by Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her sworn statement (Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of
the Record).

On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51 because Judge Romanito Amatong of
Branch 53 was on leave. While attending the session at Branch 51, respondent dictated an
"Order" in open court. Her stenographic notes are found in Exhibit "F". She transcribed
these notes (Exhibit F-1) and left them with the Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she
returned after lunch, Gina told her there were some corrections so she again typed and
submitted Exhibit "F-2". After typing one more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final
draft (Exhibit F-4) to respondent's office for his signature. After respondent signed the
"Order", he stood up and while Barreto was looking at the "Order", he held her chin and
kissed her. Barreto asked, "What are you doing?" Respondent kissed her again and tapped
her shoulder saying, "Sigue na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto went out of the
office and wiped her lips with her hand. Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She
did not relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it from the newspapers.

4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-year-old lawyer who is presently

the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment was on June 18, 1987 as
Branch Clerk of Court for Branch 51, presided by Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired.
After she became a lawyer in 1996, she was promoted to her present position as Clerk of
Court.

Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants. She first came to know Jorgensen
when she assumed office as Clerk of Court because Jorgensen was detailed to her office.
She had known Barreto since 1992 or 1993 and she personally came to know Dawa when
the latter, accompanied by Jorgensen, approached her on August 12, 1997 and related her
harrowing experience in the office of respondent. Jorgensen herself related similar
experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies that she would refer that matter to Judge
Santiago, the executive judge, who was then on leave. She reasoned that being a woman
and the executive judge, Judge Santiago would understand the complainant's situation.
Dawa and Jorgensen told Atty. Buencamino that they had already seen Judge Santiago and
the latter had advised them to consult their families before taking any step. They further
told the Clerk of Court that they had consulted their families and were decided to file an
administrative case against respondent judge. At this juncture, sheriff Noli Calalang
informed the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen that his brother, Councilor Gil Calalang,
was willing to help them.

On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, complainants Dawa and
Jorgensen were advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office. Buencamino and the two
complainants proceeded to Calalang's office who, after hearing their stories, advised them
to report the matter to the police. Atty. Calalang was willing to handle their case provided
permission was obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and the two complainants
were brought to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police colonel, and there they
were interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what cases could be filed against the
judge and Atty. Buencamino answered that a case for violation of the new "Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law" or for Acts of Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed
against respondent. At 5:30 o'clock that same afternoon, Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to
the Caloocan Police Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record;
pp. 46-47).

On August 14, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, accompanied by her sister, saw Atty.
Buencamino and told her that she, too, was one of respondent's victims. Ms. Barreto
decided to file an administrative charge against respondent and requested David Maniquis,
the deputy clerk of court, to accompany her to the police station to have her complaint
recorded. (Exhibits 7-B and 7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).

Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the three complainants to the Office of the
Court Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of Atty. Perez of the Office of
the Court Administrator, she had administered the oaths of the three complainants and
had signed the original complaint.

5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC,
Caloocan City, took the stand for the complainants to corroborate their testimonies. She
declared that —

She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the bondsmen when they were no longer
needed. In this connection, she had to prepare the vouchers and the breakdown of checks
and she had to go to the office of the respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997,
she remembers having been requested once by Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the
signature of respondent. After respondent signed the documents she had brought to him,
respondent stood up, went around his table and abruptly kissed her. She immediately left
with Emily Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and never again went to see
respondent alone. Mapue admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by respondent
in relation to a complaint of Judge Santiago. Asked by respondent where he had kissed her,
she retorted in the vernacular, "Sa bibig, hindi mo ba natatanda-an?" Made to explain
why she had not complained, she answered that she did not want anyone to know. As a
matter of fact, her husband did not know of the incident even as she was testifying.

6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a casual employee of the City Mayor's
office and detailed to Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following to say:

She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On August 8, 1997, she was rather in good
spirits because it was the birthday of one of their officemates and there was some sort of a
party. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, Dawa had gone to the women's comfort room.
When Dawa returned a few minutes later, Carpio noticed that she was pale and fidgety.
She kept wringing her hands and was on the verge of tears. Carpio asked her what the
matter was but Dawa answered that nothing was the matter. After some prodding, Carpio
asked Dawa to go with her to the court room and there asked what really the matter was as
she was no longer her gay self. Dawa cried and told the story of how the respondent had
twice kissed her on the lips.

At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52, came to join
the birthday party. She was told by Esper Cabiling, another stenographer in Branch 52,
that Floride Dawa wanted to see her in private. Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her
private chambers.

On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent appeared at Branch 52 and asked
if everything was okay, at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied by Rowena Martin, went to
the courtroom.

7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City MeTC, declared that on August 14,
1997, he had been requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to accompany her to police
headquarters to lodge a complaint against the respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana,
Noraliz Jorgensen and Floride Dawa were with them in the police station.

8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in respondent's court, was originally reluctant

to testify. She, however, appeared in the afternoon of February 18, 1998, to give testimony.
She declared that she knew the complaints and that she [was] directly under the
respondent who preside[d] Branch 51. On August 12, 1997, she learned from others that
Floride Dawa was kissed by the respondent. She also learned that Jorgensen had also been
kissed by respondent. She admitted that the respondent has the inclination for imposing
fines on employees who were late or made mistakes. She identified Exhibit "G" as an order
where [sic] requiring her to pay a fine.
9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge of Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, was the last witness to testify for the complainants. The following
is her story:

She had been sick and had been on leave since March of last year. For this reason, the
respondent, who had been designated Vice Executive Judge, had to act in her stead.

Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-7;
Record, pp. 17 to 24) which she had sent to the Court Administrator. This was submitted as
her direct testimony.

In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had unburdened themselves to her not
only in her capacity as executive judge but because she was a woman. On Friday, August 8,
1997, she had gone to her office because she had been invited to lunch by birthday
celebrants, Danilo Silverio and Esperancilla Kabiling. Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had
approached her and told her that Floride Dawa, one of her stenographers, urgently wanted
to tell her something in confidence. Dawa entered the judge's office "red[-]eyed, red-faced
and with a shiny nose". She kept clasping and unclasping her hands and could not stand
still. She spoke in an incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could scarcely
understand. She asked Dawa to sit down and compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to
cry, so that her story could hardly be understood. Between sobs, the judge was able to piece
out the fact that Dawa had been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by the
respondent sometime that morning.

Dawa sought Judge Santiago's help to transfer to another court and she wanted her to talk
to the respondent in order that the incident would not be repeated. Judge Santiago could
not promise Dawa but she advised her to go home as she obviously was not herself. She
further advised Dawa to think the matter over during the weekend and to talk to her
parents about it. Judge Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next week.

After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz Jorgensen, a casual employee
detailed to the OCC had the same experience. To verify the truth, the judge went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked Noraliz Jorgensen whether it was true that
she had been kissed by the respondent. Noraliz blushed and became red[-]eyed and told the
judge of the several instances that the respondent had forcibly embraced and kissed her on
the lips.

Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who presides Branch 49. She related the
stories of Dawa and Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she knew of anyone from her
branch who may have undergone the same experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie
Lazaro and the latter told them that there was one instance when she and Zenaida Reyes,
another employee of the court, were seated on a bench near the door of their court and
respondent sat between them and placed his arms on their shoulders and kissed them both
on the cheeks. Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa would complain, she too
would file a complaint. Judge Santiago advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and
her husband and to see her again the next week.

In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court stenographer in

Branch 53, accompanied by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago. Femenina
confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had been kissed and embraced by the respondent
twice. In between sobs and with her handkerchief almost torn to shreds by her shaking
hands, she related how she had harbored her shame in silence and her guilt at not being
able to tell her husband.

That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also related her own story to Judge
Santiago — how she was forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by the respondent.

Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge Santiago about the instances that
the respondent had kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the assistance of Judge
Santiago to transfer to another branch to escape the respondent. 9

The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's witnesses in this wise:

1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff in respondent's branch. He
affirmed the contents of his sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A; Record, pp. 56-57). He
declared that he had been with the MeTC, Caloocan City, since 1980. In 1995, he was
detailed to Branch 51 and later became its permanent sheriff.

In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the respondent was an official who was
faithful to his job. He observed office hours religiously. He was friendly and helpful to his
personnel and was very approachable whenever they needed anything. The workers in his
branch were free to enter his office, it being always open. It [was] not soundproof such that
if anything improper happened inside, it could be heard outside.

Apostol further declared that since the respondent assumed office as judge, he had not
heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct. On the other hand, he was the object of
praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a fiscal.

Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that the respondent had been charged
administratively by Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz Jorgensen) and Flor (Floride
Dawa) because he had not seen the respondent do anything indelicate to the three women.
Whenever Nina came to Branch 51 to see the respondent, she would greet him with a
"Hello Judge, I am sexy now". On the other hand, whenever Noraliz brought in documents
for respondent's signature, she was always smiling going in and coming out of respondent's
office. Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go to respondents' office only once
and she was in company with other employees of Branch 52.
On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondent's office ha[d] a back door and the
same [was] locked with a main lock and two barrel bolts. It was his daily chore to open this
back door from the inside by unlocking the barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go
down to the street to await the arrival of the respondent.

2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondent's second witness. She is a court
stenographer in Branch 51 presided by respondent. She had been with the MeTC since
January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn statement consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and
10-A) which she had jointly executed with Lina V. Cara, a clerk in the same branch who
had been in the service for 17 years.

She said that during the almost five years that she had been under the respondent, no one
had charged him administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful to those
working under him. His office was always open to his subordinates. The same is not sound
proof such that if anything untoward happened inside or [if there was] any loud
conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the staff room.

During these past days she was stunned to learn that Judge de Asa had been charged [with]
sexual harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she had not seen the respondent do
anything indecent to these three women. Everytime Nina saw the judge, she would
smilingly greet him with such remarks as "Hi, Judge" or sometimes "Hello, I'm sexy now".

She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when she [went] to the Office of the Clerk
of Court to fetch Fe Apostol. She [was] told by the employees thereat about the incident.
She said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n the third floor to ask her co-workers whether
they had heard the news that the respondent had kissed someone. Those who were still in
replied that they had not.

Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to Branch 51 to have papers signed by
respondent and sometimes she came to cut the hair of certain employees, including the
respondent himself. On the other hand, she had seen Dawa only once when she came with
her co-employees at Branch 52 to have their daily time records signed.

3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years old and single. He affirmed the
contents of his sworn statement (Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).

Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see the respondent about a job in the
MeTC. When he entered respondent's office, Atty. Buencamino was with him. De Asa
introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her about his application for a job in the court.
Atty. Buencamino told Muncal to wait for her at her office. When Muncal saw
Buencamino, the latter told him that he would have to undergo an observation period of
one to two weeks. She further told him that although he had been recommended by
respondent, she would be his direct superior and he was admonished not to relate
anywhere else whatever he heard or saw in her office.

Muncal was "taken aback" by this admonition knowing that respondent, as executive
judge, was her superior and was entitled to know everything that happened in the clerk of
court's office. He left after Buencamino had told him to return on August 11 to begin his
observation period. He returned to the respondent to thank him for his assistance.

Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another candidate for the vacant position so
that he had second thoughts about returning to her. However, on August 16,1997, after
reading in the papers that respondent was being charged with sexual harassment upon the
instigation of Atty. Buencamino, he decided to see respondent and relate to him what had
happened on August 11, 1997.

4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand in the afternoon of February 24,
1998. He affirmed his nine-page answer to the present charges (Exhibit "12"; Record, pp.
37-45).

Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door to his private office, the same [was]
locked from the inside with two barrel bolts besides a main lock. Every day, he would use
this door for entering his office as well as going out of it in order to avoid "ambush talks"
with people. It was the duty of Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel bolts before respondent
arrived at his office so that when he came, he could open the main lock with his key and
have no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol was absent, it was
Fernandez who did the opening for respondent.

In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed that all these charges "were
obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated". He accused the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this cabal" and that aside from her there
were "other people behind the conspiracy" who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.

Respondent further claimed that "the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to
destabilize and destroy the good image of the undersigned created in the minds of party
litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known
to be strict [in] fining lawyers, litigants, court personnel and even himself, for
unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications for violations of court rules and procedures, he
had gained respect and admiration for his reasonable, well[-]balance[d], compassionate
and well[-]meant application of the rule of law".

As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty. Buencamino toward him, the respondent
stated in his Answer, the following:
Accordingly, as acting executive judge, work concerns and attitudes, were honed up if not
altogether dramatically changed. Misconceptions have been straightened up. It was
emphasized that the Office of the Clerk of Court [was] not an independent body. It must be the
secretariat or unit that should serve and cater not only to its own concern, but that of all the
administrative as well as functional requirements of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat.
Not because, it is called the Office of the Clerk of Court, would mean that the clerk of court
installed, is a co-equal of the judges thereat. It was made clear that it was for this reason
why an Executive Judge/Vice Executive Judge is designated, to fill up this impasse.
Further, as clerk of court, functionally, such a position is under the direct control and
supervision of all judges thereat. Accordingly, except those as provided for under the rules
and applicable circulars, when a clerk of court can act independently, any action,
movement, process and exercise, taken, with national, local as well as private agencies must
bear the imprimatur of the Executive Judge. This directive apparently was not observed.
Either it was misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously resisted or even disregarded. But its
non-observance cannot be excused or countenanced.

Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court were scheduled and designed to update and
enhance their working knowledge on assigned task[s]. Important concerns and problems of
their offices [were] supposed to be taken up.

Hours of work were strictly implemented, loitering/roaming around during office hours was
prohibited, time records of the Clerk of Court, Clerks of Court of branches including its [sic]
personnel, with presiding judges on leave or vacant, must after, its being authenticated, must
[sic] be signed by the Executive Judge.

Reports of immoral acts and loose moral values were received, specifically in the office of the
clerk of court. Ms. Buencamino was apprised and directed to closely monitor such problem.
Before the staging of this hatch-up, the undersigned received reports of its unabated
occurrences. However, either these were treated with tolerance or viewed with blind eyes.

Most importantly, for purposes of effective control, an installation of an office for the
Executive Judge was conceived. This project was apparently disliked. It was about the last
week of July or first week of August, 1997, that Judge Santiago informed the undersigned,
that we ha[d] to implement such a scheme. The plan was to get the room of Atty.
Buencamino, to house the Executive Judge['s] office, as its perimeter, appeared easily
organizable with least renovation and expense, for a conference room and a library, folded
into one. Buencamino, in turn, would take the room of David Maniquis, deputy clerk of
court, who should occupy the executive table used by the former, located outside, along
with OCC personnel for proper monitoring and active control of the affairs in the office

As related to me by Judge Santiago, she told Mona Lisa about it and insinuated to her, to
follow first before talking with me, have the room vacated, place pertinent documents/papers,
to be signed and attended to, locked [sic] it, if the Executive Judge, [was] not around. Atty.
Buencamino approached me in disgust, proposing an alternative. She submitted a plan for
renovation, as she insisted in maintaining her present location. She suggested to move the
Executive Judge[s] office in the middle, the end part, housing the office of Maniquis, [to] be
the one to be converted as conference room and library. For her to occupy David
Maniquis['] office was "bad punsoy" (feng shui). However, Judge Santiago's directive was
firm. Mona Lisa, must have to comply first. The matter of renovation, to be further
studied. The suggested sketch plan with scribblings from Judge Delfina Santiago dated
August 6, 1997, is likewise hereto attached as annex "7". Mrs. Buencamino vacated her
office, refused David Maniquis' room and stayed [at] her table outside with the OCC's
personnel.

Also during the occasion, as there was a vacancy for the position of a sheriff in the said
office, the undersigned recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y de Castro, telling Ms.
Buencamino that for the more than four (4) years that he stayed in the office, he was not
given the privilege of appointing one of his own choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an
understudy for about one (1) to two (2) weeks. The undersigned acceded. Mr. Muncal
followed Ms. Buencamino to her office where he was interviewed, advised and instructed
by the latter. He came back before he left and informed me of the developments but he
never showed up at the designated time. He reappeared after reading the accounts in the
newspapers about the complaints lodged against me, with revealing statements why he gave
a second thought [about] returning or not. His affidavit is attached as Annex "8" (pp. 3-5,
Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the Record). (Emphasis supplied).

Considering the above, respondent believed that "Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my
actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her face, she regretted the fact
of my designation as Acting Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would
want to maintain her "madrina" and "godmother" (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not
only among the employees but also among the judges as well. Thus, these pathos, comics."
(p.5, Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).

On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the story of Floride Dawa. He stated
that on August 8, 1997, he had come to work between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock in the
morning. Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met him. He found that his back door was still
closed and could not be opened with his key. For this reason he had to enter through his
courtroom. He said he did not see Floride Dawa near the comfort room that morning. He
saw her at 11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.

The above testimony is also in respondent's Exhibit "12" where he stated that:

The Floride Dawa story, that she was seen by the undersigned after coming from the public
toilet located along the third floor hallway obliquely facing the backdoor exit of the
undersigned's chamber, asking her whether said comfort room was cleaned, to which she
retorted in the negative, thereafter calling her up, placing the judge's arm around her
shoulders, led her to his room and twice kissed her, to which she reportedly resisted.
Afterwards, conversing with him, answering questions, as the latter sat comfortably at his
seat, as though nothing had transpired. This is quite indeed a long process to lend credence
to such prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the backdoor of the undersigned's office
was not shown to have been closed on the date the alleged sham had happened, a
verification of the site where the reported incident took place would show that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office leads to a wide public hallway fronting directly the
stairs servicing the second and third floor[s] of said building, where people come and go.
The circumstances of persons, time and place cannot fit under such a frame set. (pp. 6-7,
Exhibit 12; pp. 42-43 of the Record).

As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he expressed surprise that Buencamino

believed her story. The following is what he said:

["]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz L. Jorgensen, a casual employee, . . . detailed

at the office of the Clerk of Court, and believed her story. Ms. Jorgensen is reportedly
separated from her husband. Her credibility throughout the court's environs appears
highly questionable, especially among her staff in the Office of the Clerk of Court. In fact,
an unsigned letter was sent not only to the undersigned but also with Judge Santiago,
divulging, her unchaste relationship with a co-employee, also assigned in the office of the
Clerk of Court. . . . Ms. Buencamino, as her immediate superior, was advised, to closely
monitor on [sic] this. Despite thereof [sic], the illicit relationship appeared to have
continued. Nonetheless, she was convinced by Buencamino to execute and swear to a
statement, which [was] maliciously and boldly concocted. . . . . Be that as it may, the story
of "victim" Noraliz borders the realm of illusion and fiction. In no less than three (3)
occasions, the dates of which, to lend credibility, were fixed to coincide when the allowances
were allegedly released and given to the respective judges, she claimed to have been licked
at her ear, her mouth forced open, and kissed by the undersigned. If one was indeed a
victim of such sexual harassment or lascivious conduct, why would she, after the first
incident (January 31, 1997) return for the second (May 26, 1997) and third time (August 4,
1997) and allow herself to suffer the same fate[?] This indeed, is preposterous. It does not
have the rings of truth to it. Her lame excuse, that no one could do her assigned chore, does
not have any legal as well as factual leg to lean on. As far as the undersigned can
remember, there was Roderick Corral (Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue had occasion
to do the same chore. Even others in the OCC can perform such feat. Such signing is not
the exclusive affair of Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even the August 4, 1977 incident, would not
dissuade [sic] a person in her right mind, that she will still allow herself to be left behind by
a co-employee (Roderick Corral) whom she saw ahead of her inside the judge's office and
be subjected to the same alleged indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD." (pp. 5-6, Exhibit
12, pp. 41-42 of the Record).

Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said the following:

["]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto account appear[s] to be a mere patch up. Under
the principle that in numbers there is strength, they blended another scenario consistently
claiming that they were kissed, their mouths forcibly opened. In Barreto's version, she
claimed that she went to the office of the undersigned to have an order signed as their
Presiding Judge was then, on leave. Immediately thereafter, the judge stood up,
approached her and kissed her. This was allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly resisted. Then
she left.

The size and arrangement of the undersigned's chamber, would rule out such
hallucination. The undersigned ha[s] developed the attitude of transparency, in his dealings
with the public and his personnel. His room [is] always open. Everybody come[s] and
go[es]. His staff can go inside, any time they wish, without even knocking at his door, [get]
cold water and even [use] his private comfort room. How then could this be possible.

In all these instances, nothing unusual was seen or heard, much less substantiated, except
the self serving narrations of the alleged offended parties themselves. If there was really
any commotion or resistance that occurred, the same could not escape the ears of my
personnel, whose tables are constrictedly [sic] placed and immediately outside. In fact, even
the dates alluded to, were even tailored to fit and coincide, just to give credence, to the
presence of the complainants, in the alleged places of incident.["] (p. 7, Exhibit 12; p. 43,
Record).10

After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Romulo S.
Quimbo arrived at a conclusion, the salient portions of which are reproduced below:

1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the
acts he is charged with. The testimonies of the three complainants were not in any manner
emasculated by the lengthy and thorough cross examination personally conducted by the
respondent. Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess the investigation several times to
give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke down in tears as
they were required to relate the repeated violations of their persons and their honors by
respondent.

Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony of

Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawa's story soon after it had
occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other complainants. Judge Santiago, on her
own accord, wrote a verified letter to the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7;
Record; pp. 17-24), wherein she narrated all that she knew of the different incident. . . . . 11
xxx xxx xxx

2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It
is highly improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to
accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real or imagined resentment
against respondent. Moreover, the reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty.
Buencamino felt against him is too superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence,
specially because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty. Buencamino
so that her office could be used by the executive judge. 12

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform their
duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the
premises of the court is not enough to motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves
to ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories
that would also be derogatory to them.

Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondent's calling her attention to an
anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with another employees of the OCC
who was also married. We are not convinced that this would move her into fabricating a
story as shocking as the one she related under oath. . . . . 13

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged the young
Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him, when she saw
him as she was about to enter the comfort room, was an invitation, he took advantage of
the young maiden and forced himself on her. Perhaps because Dawa was naive and
innocent, she panicked and became near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This
broke the dam, so to speak. When it became known that Floride Dawa was going to file a
case against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also wanting to file charges
against respondent for his many indiscretions. How many more remain who prefer to
suffer their humiliation in silence, we can only speculate.14

3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive assertions of
complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither were the negative
observations of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie the complainants' declarations. All
his witnesses could attest to was that they had not seen respondent do anything obscene to
the complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof
that they did not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of
respondent's chambers. 15
xxx xxx xxx

PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs. Rivera,
Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend that respondent be
dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government,
including government owned or controlled corporations. 16

The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and found the
findings, conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately
substantiated by the evidence presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and
jurisprudence. Thus, with no need to rehash the reprehensible indiscretions of the
respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and recommendation of the investigating
justice.

The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard
of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. 17 More than simply
projecting an image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he
must also appear to be a "good person." 18 It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
the following:

CANON 1

A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE

JUDICIARY.

RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 2

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPRORIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach."
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to
observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is
perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private
morals, as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge's
personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from
the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. 19 For this reason, "[t]he Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times." 20 This mandate has special import for municipal and
metropolitan trial court judges, like herein respondent, since they are the "front-liners" of
the judiciary who serve more people at the "grass-roots" level of society. 21

In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in
subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and
acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of
decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an
affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . .
result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for theemployee[s]." 22 Let it be
remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who
are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer.

In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official
responsibility over the complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with moral certainty that he acted beyond the
bounds of decency, morality and propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from
office. 23 In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate our
pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:

Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a

manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the
people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in
general.

xxx xxx xxx

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge.
He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was
the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. 24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby DISMISSED from the
service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001

RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST

JUDGE FERDINAND J. MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY.

PER CURIAM:

In a hand written letter dated December 9, 19961 addressed to the Honorable Andres
Narvasa, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith Marcos Barliso
complained against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at
Cebu City, alleging that ever since Ferdinand J. Marcos was appointed judge of the
Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never seen nor took hold of
his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient
for their education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was
only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC Judge; that it was only in August 1996
when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not even
enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private
persons; that he was enjoying his extra-ordinary allowance, local and city allowances,
bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14th month pays; that he even got his second quincena of
November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his
mistress.

Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the
remuneration due Judge Marcos from the Supreme Court be directly released to Mrs.
Marcos at the school where she has been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National
School) to prevent his mistress from getting them. They added that Judge Marcos was still
receiving local and city allowances and a salary from the Southwestern University where he
teaches in the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be advisable for him to
resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would eventually
deprive them of support for he will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she
would follow him and might pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to
file his comment on the complaint.2

In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,3 Judge Marcos denied his failure to support
complainants and alleged that during the first few months of assuming his job on the
bench, he faithfully and regularly gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he
alone spent for their daily transportation and for the daily miscellaneous expenses of their
son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical student at the time, notwithstanding the fact that his wife
also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount he gave to his wife was
sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan contracted with the CFI
Community Cooperative did not pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his
family because it was made during his first five (5) months in the judiciary when he had not
yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition fee of
their son Joshua; that said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments and that he
hoped it would be fully paid before the end of the year 1997; that he was not indebted to
any private person, not even when he was still a private law practitioner; that he had no
idea why his wife thought that he would be better off resigning from the judiciary; that
even if he were transferred to another sala his regular support to his family will continue;
that the issue of his having a mistress is not true as he has never been linked extra-
maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already signed a letter
withdrawing their letter/complaint against him; and he had signed a letter of undertaking
to give all the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He prayed among other
things, for the dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a
family and as this administrative case is becoming a wedge of hostility between them.

On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.4

In his report dated October 17, 1997,5 Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis
recommended that the complaint be considered closed and terminated, it appearing that
the complaint against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and there being
no more compelling reason to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-
withdrawal dated January 10, 1997 submitted by the complainants and the letter of
undertaking signed by Judge Marcos.

In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997,6 the complainants stated that they
wanted to withdraw their letter/complaint against Judge Marcos as he had made an
undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the
Supreme Court; and that the issue of the alleged mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports
and had already been thoroughly discussed by the family council. They requested that the
matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed matter.
On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no
objection to his wife getting all the checks due him from the Supreme Court and gave her
the authority to get them directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied having any relationship with any woman when he
talked with his wife and children. His alleged relationship sprung from unconfirmed
reports from the media.7

As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the
latter did not report the matter to the Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until
the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En Banc on
August 14, 2000, the scandalous incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the
Philippine Judges Association held on August 11, 2000. Among the RTC judges who
attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A woman who was
reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the
Judges at the temporary place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast
thereat were seated near each other.

Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit
relationship with the woman. Judge Marcos admitted, among other things, that he had
been living with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that he was
separated from his wife. Judge Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the woman.

In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for
investigation to OCA Consultant, Justice Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.

Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August
15, 2000 ordering the suspension of Judge Marcos from office until further orders from
this Court, in view of the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous relations between him
and a certain Mae Tacaldo and the referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation, report and
recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United States of
America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator.

Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the
Executive Judge in Cebu City from November 13 to 15, 2000.8

On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge
of Cebu City. Only the respondent and his counsel appeared because the notices did not
arrive soon enough in Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of RTC, Cebu City,
Branch 18, was requested to serve the notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive
Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came alone while respondent appeared with his
counsel. Complainant manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous
commitments. Counsel for the respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal
commitments. Thus the case was reset for the next day.

On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13,
RTC, Cebu City. After he was discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand
herself. Since her testimony (direct examination) was not completed the hearing was
continued the next day. Her direct testimony was completed on November 16, 2000 but her
cross-examination was deferred to December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.

On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-
examined the complainant. After her testimony, complainants introduced four other
witnesses, namely: Maximo Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig, and Lerma
Eguia, all of whom appeared in obedience to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-
designate. These witnesses were presented principally to identify certain documents that
were marked and later formally offered in writing.

Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" - picture of Maydelane

Tacaldo, the alleged mistress of the respondent; "B" - the letter/complaint received by the
Court on December 12, 1996;9 "C" - RCPI telegram directing respondent to attend a PJA
stay-in seminar on June 20-22, 1996 in Mandaluyong; "D" - Islacom Statement of Account
dated June 3, 1996; "D-1" - address of respondent at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension,
Cebu City; "E" - handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan, dated October 3, 1995
addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the sum of P11 ,400;
"E-1" - a portion thereof; "F" - RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent purportedly
from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" - a portion thereof; "G" - Bankard Statement of Account dated
September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent; "G-1 " - page 2 thereof; "H" - unsigned
Certification of Tenant; "I" - Invoice issued by Paramount General Insurance Corporation
(Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota Revo" Model 1999 allegedly owned in common by
respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" - portion showing the names and addresses of
the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo, Maydelene B. of Rodriguez St., Zosa
Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City"; "I-2" - particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" -
Order issued by respondent on January 24, 2000, in Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "J-1", "J-
2", "J-3", and "J-4" - portions thereof; "K" - October 28, 2000 issue of "THE
FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-2" - portions thereof; "L" - October 20, 2000 issue of the
"SUN STAR CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" - portions bracketed; "M" - SUN STAR
SUPER BALITA issue of October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" - portions thereof; "N" -
October 28, 1996 issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" - portions
thereof; "O" - SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996; "O-1" and "O-2" - portions
thereof; "P" – Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" - paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" -
Affidavit of Anacleta Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" - portions thereof; "R" -
Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated August 15, 2000 in the present
administrative matter10; "R-1" - portion thereof; "S" - Petition filed by respondent in Civil
Case No. CEB-25511 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C.
Ares; "T" - Marriage Contract of complainant and respondent dated December 31, 1971;
"U" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" - Certificate of
Registration No. 15676143 issued on August 4, 2000 in the name of respondent and
Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol Site, Cebu City; "V-1" - portion thereof; "W"
- copy of Certificate of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent and
Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 " -
portion showing owners' names; "X" - Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota
Revo"; "X-1" - portion regarding ownership; "Y" - Deed of Sale of one "Toyota Revo"
executed by one Leticia Cabanes; "Y-1 " - portion showing vendees being respondent and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" - date of execution; "Z" - PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance
Certificate; "Z-1 " - portion showing purpose of certificate; "AA" - Subpoena Duces
Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB" - Invoice No. 135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-
1" - name and address of respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" - name
and address of respondent; "CC-2" - Private Car Policy No. CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" -
signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office Manager; "DD" - Paramount's
Memorandum showing change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" - portions of
the same; "EE" - fax message received by Paramount re: inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo
as one of the insured; "FF" - Chattel Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B.
Tacaldo; "FF-1" - page 2 thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" -
portions thereof; "GG" - Motion for inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-19070;
"GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2", - portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment of Atty. Francis
Zosa on the motion for inhibition; "HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same; "II" - Deed
of Sale jointly executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota
Revo"; "II-1" and "II-2" - portions thereof; "JJ" - correction made by Paramount as to
who are the assured in CEB-PC-25687; "JJ-1" - the assured were the respondent and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-Affidavit of complainant on the charge of
adultery filed against her by the respondent; "KK-1" to "KK-10" - pages 2 to 11 thereof;
"KK-11 " to "KK- 23" - annexes to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" - opposition to motion to
disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case
No. CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2 thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" - portions of the same.

From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to
the respondent. Their marriage was celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist
Church, Cebu City and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of the
Gospel.11 When they got married, Judge Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar
exams and did not have a job. Since she was already working as a teacher in Catmon she
supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her grandparents. They have two
children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is 26 years old.

When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported
him and the children. In fact, he stayed home and looked after the children.

Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed
presiding judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City. After his
appointment, she noticed a change in his conduct towards her. He became cold and no
longer performed the usual acts of a husband, referring to sexual relations, because he was
very busy. What's more they no longer slept in one room. In March 1996, they were living
in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.

In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano
dialect, about her husband's infidelity. While she could no longer produce the letter at the
time of the trial, she could still remember its contents. In English it read: "You are a stupid
wife. Until now, you have not learned that your husband has a mistress. If you don't believe
me, go to the office of the RTC, Branch 20, right now. You go there-to Branch 20. Ask the
people there if there is a convention in Manila to be participated in by RTC judges. He
already bought two plane tickets."

Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She
found a telegram in Judge Marcos' attaché case from a Mario Umali designating
respondent as a participant in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at the
Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20 - 27, 1996.12

She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the
convention (seminar). Atty. Tecson asked her if she was not informed of the convention to
which she replied in the negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he was going.
She asked Judge Marcos that night. He told her that he was going and that it was
exclusively for the judges. She told him not to go, as she was afraid he was going to take
along another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at dawn, he told her that he
must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be distributed in the
Supreme Court.

She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to
attend the convention but she was sure there was a woman.

Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody

in Branch 20 gave her a Statement of Account from Islacom.13

The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand
J. Marcos at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose Village,
Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu, where he and his family lived. They have never resided at 615 ZA
P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, nor had they any telecommunication facility with
Islacom. Judge Marcos neither has a cell phone nor a telephone line with Islacom.

Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two
months to find it. She discovered that Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and er parents were living
in that house. A Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs. Enriquez, one of
her co-teachers, lives next door to the Tacaldos.

She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a
while in the office, as he will go out for 20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he
refused to take her as the place was only near the office. He would consult somebody. When
he came back, he told her that they would go to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was
lost.

She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The
confrontation took place in the Social Hall of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her
brother and his wife, Rotilla Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and her
sister were all present then. Rotilla Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the
name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but the billing address was that of the Tacaldos, and why she
was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter said that they were friends. The latter
did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00 for the cell phone's bill when
they were only friends.

Complainant found inside respondent's attaché case that was in his office a yellow sheet of
paper, dated October 3, 1995, addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment of
P11,400.00 for "May's Acct."

As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a
secret because she already had an inkling that he had a relationship with another woman.

She found a birthday card/social telegram14 addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between
the pages of a law book on a table in the latter's office. It read, among other things, "MT
cares a lot, you know," and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She discovered it
two weeks after his birthday, which was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences.
She did not show him the card, as it would precipitate another quarrel.

Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard
dated September 10, 1997.15 One of the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and
Jewelry. She never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was it given to her
daughter. One of the "purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe
Laguna. There was no occasion when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her husband. Another
item in the Statement of Account was groceries bought at Gaisano Metro. The groceries
purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for their house, as respondent was no longer going
home in 1997. Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and has not returned since
then.

Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located
at Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was
renting. She saw Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she did not go
inside. Maydelane Tacaldo left the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family
car and the station wagon, at times.

She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's
slippers, and empty water dispenser of a brand similar to what they have at their own
place, and the laundered clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.

She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went
to, and the latter replied in the affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using
aliases as the room was registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She obtained a
Certification of Tenant from the Zomer Development Company.16 It was dated May 18,
1998, and showed that a Mr. Victorino Timol was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1
Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City from
May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General Manager of the said
company, refused to sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.

The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was
even published in the newspapers.

Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K",
"L", "M", "N", and "O") where the affair of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was
mentioned. In Exhibit "K" (October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former Executive
Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as saying that respondent was not even discreet about his
alleged illicit relationship and that other Judges were complaining of his behavior. In
Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge Agana was once more
quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was going to destroy
him and that the latter never kept his relations with the law student a secret.

After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to
give them support, the latter executed an authority for them to collect his salary from
January 1997 up to January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998. Since
then they no longer received any support from him.

Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from
getting the checks was because he allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She
verbally complained to Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court Executive
Judge) about the stoppage of the checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court
because he told her that she was just an ordinary classroom teacher with a small salary and
that he would use his power as a judge against her.

Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was
because respondent judge threatened to kill her.

Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo,
upon seeing her picture. He had seen her twice: the first time during the wake of the late
Sandiganbayan Justice German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the
Philippine Judges Association held in a hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June,
1999. Both times he did not see her with a companion.

At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of
some RTC judges. He knew her to be a law student. He did not think that she was a
member of the Judiciary, the wife of a judge, or an employee of the court.

Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents,
the originals of which were in their possession.

Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short),
brought a photocopy of the certificate of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with
Motor No. 7K-0279834 issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as
joint owners.

Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for
brevity), Cebu City, brought to the hearing and identified the following documents: (1) the
office copy of Certificate of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by the LTO in
the names of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P.
Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (2) a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report (Exhibit
"X") regarding a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane
Tacaldo of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y")
executed by one Leticia R. Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier
Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999 Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor
Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia
Cabanes, for the purpose of transferring the ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier
Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.

Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought

to the investigation copies of certain documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB"
as the invoice for the insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor of Ferdinand
Marcos with residence at P. Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit
"C" as the Policy Schedule forming part of the policy which was also issued in favor of the
insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as
an endorsement (No. 2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the aforementioned policy No.
CEB-PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as an insured party. An
earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ," No. 2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the insured as
"Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, this change
was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated
that the change was occasioned by a verbal order they received from the PCI Brokers. He
further admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether respondent was notified of the
change.

The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by
respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo, both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St.,
Capitol Site, Cebu City, in favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as evidence.

Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit II) of the same Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The
same document appeared to have been signed by the respondent and Miss Tacaldo, and
acknowledged by them before Notary Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his
Notarial Register as Document No.385, Page No.78, Book No.220, Series of 2000. Another
document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which was an endorsement issued by
Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo,
Maydelene B".

Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked
Exhibits "1" (affidavit of desistance executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of
respondent directing the Clerk of Court to deliver all his checks to complainant); "3" to
"3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill);
"5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit application submitted to PCI Leasing); "6-A" (address
indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" (postdated checks
issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery together
with affidavits]; "9" (reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order dated February 22, 2000);
"11-A" and "11-B" (portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000); "12-
A" and "12-B" (portions thereof); "13" (original complaint for declaration of nullity in
Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof); "14" (letter/complaint to Provincial
Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B", and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15"
(certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These documents, however, were not formally
offered nor transmitted to Justice Quimbo.

Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the
support of his family. He alleged that he had supported her and their children, except at
the time that she abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was giving her
P22,000.00, more or less, monthly; that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the
letter/complaint against him was because she suspected that he was not giving her the
correct amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme Court; that he
revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from the Supreme Court
because he discovered that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that he alone
supported their children and her daughter's family from 1998 until the time he was
suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by paying their electric and
phone bills.

He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a
medical student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y"). While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he
was remitting to Joshua, a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly. When his son
found a job in the year 2000, he reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his daughter
Hazel Faith, he gave P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City; but when he was
transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to P2,000.00.

He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was
given to his daughter Hazel Faith Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries bought at
Gaisano Metro were bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu, especially for his
granddaughter. It was his practice, even when he was still a private practitioner, to
purchase all the groceries for the needs of his family.

He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened
all his communications. As to the birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law
book in his chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as her name did not
appear in the card - only the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the
initials M.T. but as his Clerk of Court, he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a card
with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know", and "It's wonderful to share my life with
you."

He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's
account by a Mrs. Dandan. He replied that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the
Bebot to whom the payment should be given. He had never incurred any unsettled account
with anybody when he was still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be spurious and
manufactured by his complainant-wife, it being undated and because he didn't recognize
the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note was not in his wife's handwriting but
surmised that it could have been the penmanship of the person who was asked by
complainant-wife to write it.

He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as
he has always lived in Talisay, Cebu where his conjugal home was situated. As to the claim
that his slippers and empty plastic water container were found outside one of the rooms in
the Zosa Compound, he contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his
slippers were always left at home and in his chambers. There were many consumers of
mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in Talisay but also in Cebu City. He denied
having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the Zosa Compound and using the
alias Victorino Timol.

With regards to the news item17 wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was
not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true because
Judge Agana had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.

He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star
Super Balita.18 He likewise denied that he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo
City where he was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he had to stay
overnight in Toledo City he usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur
Camonggan.

The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a
"for-hire" motor vehicle plying Cebu City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him,
being a close friend, to have his name included in the registration of the motor vehicle.
Since he was a judge in Toledo City, he could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop
Multi-Purpose, a cooperative that accepts motor vehicle units for plying the Toledo,
Balamban, and Cebu City routes.

As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an
accident or there was a damage caused to a third party, he as the owner would be held
responsible. He averred that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though the car
was insured it did not cover damages to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there
would be a foreclosure of the chattel because the chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or if
the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He put himself at risk because
he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are very close family friends.

The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The
address at P. Rodriguez, Zosa Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In
some of the documents, like the credit application submitted before PCI Leasing and the
promissory note he executed with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose
Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.

The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss
Tacaldo, not his. He and Maydelane Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle,
although it appears on paper that it was registered in both their names but he had no hand
in the preparation of the insurance policy nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was not
aware that his address was shown to be at Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City. He did
not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that he first saw the insurance policy.

The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos
have invested in said motor vehicle. In fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to
guarantee payment of the balance of P300,000.00.

The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted
because after his suspension, the vehicle was shown on television. The Tacaldo family was
afraid that the motor vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the
complainants.

He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a
paramour as early as March 1998 and he had told her that he would file the corresponding
adultery cases once he had sufficient evidence against her and her paramour. And this he
did. He filed 13 counts of adultery cases against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of
Balamban, Cebu and 21 counts of adultery before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
All these cases, including the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, were filed only after the
Court suspended him on August 15, 2000.

He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as
he has a bigger build than her.

He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent.
He was diagnosed with diabetes in 1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were
affected, especially his sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as early as 1993,
when he was first appointed to the Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he
could not have sex anymore. He was being treated for diabetes and sexual impotency. A
medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated December 6, 2000, stated, among
others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla) medical professional care
since September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since 1992, and was on
maintenance medication.

His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it
because his diabetes caused his sexual impotency.

In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his
order dated February 22, 2000, he denied the motion for reconsideration because it was not
true that he was living in the property of Atty. Zosa.

While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with
him. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. confronted him and asked him whether
Maydelane Tacaldo had a job and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he
didn't know if she had a job and that he didn't have a child with her. The Chief Justice told
him, "That is bad for the judiciary." Before he was able to explain the Chief Justice had
already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman who went there was
with him.

He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a
seminar of Judges at the penthouse of the San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She
was then the secretary of Judge Vestil.

He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar
Coliseum but he had never visited their house.

The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent
to a certain Urgello. He didn't have an account with Islacom. Neither did he have a cell
phone although he had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When he went to
the Islacom office regarding the allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the
real account holder was. All he did was to execute an Affidavit of Loss, per advice of
Islacom.

Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the
parents of Maydelane, his wife, and the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the
Islacom Statement of Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the cell phone
because during the confrontation, Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of
Maydelane also said he did not see his daughter with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly
denied having any relationship with him. He also told the group during the confrontation
that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife instigated the confrontation.

He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo.
The buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.

We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo
Quimbo, as contained in his Report. We find the details of his findings amply supported by
the evidence on record leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship
existed between Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -
that their illicit relationship started even before he separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos
in 1997.

Consider the following evidence:

The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not
in his conjugal dwelling at San Jose village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del
Rosario Ext., Cebu City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the residence of
Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an
improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner
thereof.

Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant
desirous of its services. Islacom would not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of Account
if he did not apply for a phone line nor sent it to an address he did not furnish them.

If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to
have stood his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is
preposterous of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.

Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation
that the bill was erroneously sent to him without raising hell, so to speak, in finding out the
identity of the Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when this Statement of
Account was the catalyst in the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms.
Tacaldo.

Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the
social telegram/birthday card, but was delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be
Maydelane Tacaldo or Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court
has these initials we, as well as Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge
Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it
with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos
would send such a card.

We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The
book was found tucked between the pages of a law book lying on top of his office table. He
is the most logical person to have inserted said card in the law book.

The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos
bought, presumably, jewelry/ies at the Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at the
Gaisano Metro, and dined at Cafe Laguna.

Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said
restaurant. She testified that her daughter also did not receive jewelry/ies from her father.
They also did not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer going
home then.

Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her
husband was staying. When she found it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered
clothes outside the place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she would have
known her husband's preferences as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would
have been able to recognize them upon seeing them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the
fact that he was residing in one of the units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty.
Zosa, counsel for one of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not categorically deny
the allegation. Neither did respondent, in his Order denying the motion, categorically deny
the allegation.

Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms.
Tacaldo as one of the tenants at Zosa Compound, the fact that they lived together was
apparent in the different documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota Revo, for the
address they both gave for these documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
Zosa Compound, by the way, is located at Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.

We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were
the owners of a Toyota Revo.

Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it
registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with
them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18,
2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions
clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota Revo.

We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he
accommodated the Tacaldos in their desire to get a slot in the cooperative because they are
very close family friends. If they are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had never
been to the house of the Tacaldos. In fact, he was not even sure as to the exact location of
the Tacaldo residence.

Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's
registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility
vehicles would be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having
the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.

There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered
as an owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A
simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have
been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of
transporting passengers.

Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor
even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his
wife's.
We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by
Chief Justice Davide. Judge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that
he had been living with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated
from his wife. Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering
that Judge Marcos was still very much married even if he and his wife Rotilla were already
living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was his wife. This
conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be beyond
reproach.

As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS,19 the personal behavior of a judge should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of
constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify
judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion." 20

In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,21 it was held that if good moral character is required of a
lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at
all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public
decency.22

Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to
possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical
standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the
judiciary.

Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of
dismissal for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing
scandal in the place where his court is situated.

"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the
Court laid down the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond
reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the administration
of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the
cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to
public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the
judiciary."23

No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an

individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.24

The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral
character and at all times observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency.25

Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife
and children.

"Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially

when executed as an afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina26: It would be a
dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice
simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one
reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witness(es)."27

Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,28 the Court once more held that:

"The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against
herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges
have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate
and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interesting
the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the
people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s desistance
from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated."

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He

has violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in
all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to
remain in office and continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest
form of disciplinary sanction – dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos

of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to
his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government owned or
controlled corporations, and forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.

This decision is immediately executory.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-16-3541

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P]

SYLVIA G. CORPUZ, Complainant

vs.
CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTOF DAVAO CITY DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. P-16-3542

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P]

PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN

CITIES OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent
vs.
CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF DAVAO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. P-16-3543

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P]

IRINEO F. MARTINEZ, JR., Complainant,

vs.
CIFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF DAVAO CITY, DAVAO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ

CEFERINA B. RIVERA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF DAV AO CITY, DAV AO DEL SUR, BRANCH 12, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE RUFINO S. FERRARIS, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 7, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution are four (4) consolidated administrative cases, namely: (1) A.M.
No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915-P); (2) A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 13-4049-P); (3) A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P),
respectively initiated by Sylvia G. Corpuz (Corpuz), Presiding Judge Rufino S. Ferraris,
Jr. (Judge Ferraris, Jr.) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7,
and Irineo F. Martinez, Jr. (Martinez, Jr.), against Ceferina B. Rivera (Rivera), Court
Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 12 concerning
the latter's money-lending business; and (4) OCA IPI No. 14-2731-MTJ initiated by Rivera
against Judge Ferraris, Jr. regarding his complicity to the said money-lending business.

The Facts

In the Complaint in A.M. No. P-16-3541 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3915- P), 1 it was
alleged that in February 2011, Rivera convinced Corpuz to invest the aggregate amount of
P252,500.00 in the former's money-lending business with the promise that Corpuz will earn
a monthly interest of two and a half percent (2.5% ), which interest will be deposited to her
account at the end of each month. Rivera never fulfilled her promise, which prompted
Corpuz to verify Rivera's aforesaid business. After discovering that no such money-lending
business existed, Corpuz immediately demanded the return of her money, and in response,
Rivera gave her two (2) checks amounting to P130,000.00 each. However, the checks were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. After her demands for payment
went unheeded, Corpuz filed two (2) counts of Esta/a and violation of Batas Pambansa Big.
222 against Rivera, 3 as well as the instant administrative complaint.

Similarly, the affidavit-complaints in A.M. No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-
P)4 and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4074-P)5 alleged that Rivera
convinced Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. to invest in her money-lending business the
respective amounts of Pl00,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 with the promise that their money would
earn monthly interest of five percent (5%). As guarantee, Rivera issued checks to Judge
Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. corresponding to their investments in her business. After
paying Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. the agreed interest for four (4) and three (3)
months, respectively, Rivera failed to pay the succeeding interests and even the principal
amounts. Judge Ferraris, Jr. and Martinez, Jr. then tried to encash their respective checks,
but both were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Ultimately, Rivera
failed to pay her liabilities despite demands, thus, constraining Judge Ferraris, Jr. and
Martinez, Jr. to file separate criminal cases against her.6

For her part,7 Rivera openly admitted having engaged in money-lending activities, albeit
offering the excuse that her business was done in good faith and with no intention of
blemishing the good name of her office, as the same was done mainly to augment her
meager salary and accommodate the monetary needs of other court personnel. She likewise
explained that her business took a downward spiral when majority of her borrowers failed
to pay their monthly obligations. Worse, she herself suffered financial troubles when her
family and relatives were hit by the Typhoon Pablo in 2012, which took much of her time
and financial resources in order to support them. 8 As a result, she defaulted in her
obligations to Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz. Rivera also averred that
Judge Ferraris, Jr. went to her office several times while she was on leave and threatened
to have her killed if she did not pay up. 9 Lastly, she clarified that she had already amicably
settled her obligations with Judge Ferraris, Jr., Martinez, Jr., and Corpuz resulting in the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case Corpuz filed against her; 10 and the affidavits of
desistance executed by Judge Ferraris, Jr. 11 and Martinez, Jr. 12 withdrawing their
criminal complaints against her. 13

In view of Rivera's claim that she received threats from Judge Ferraris, Jr., the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that: (a) Rivera's counter-affidavits in A.M.
No. P-16-3542 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4049-P) and A.M. No. P-16-3543 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 13-4074-P) be treated as a separate administrative complaint against Judge
Ferraris, Jr. to determine his involvement in Rivera's money-lending business; and (b)
Judge Ferraris, Jr. be ordered to comment on the administrative case against him. 14 Said
recommendations were approved and adopted by the Court in its Resolution dated October
8, 201415 and the counter-affidavits were, thereafter, docketed as OCA IPI No. 14-2731-J.

Pursuant to the Court's directive, Judge Ferraris, Jr. submitted a CounterAffidavit16 dated
September 17, 2015, vehemently denying Rivera's accusation that he threatened Rivera's
life. He then clarified that after finding out that Rivera has other creditors who were after
her, he merely commented that "good that she is not in the danger of being killed by reason
of her non-payment of her account to other creditors." 17

In view of the similarities in the factual milieu of the complaints, the OCA further
recommended that the four (4) administrative cases be consolidated. 18 Thus, the Court, in
its Resolutions dated October 1, 2014, 19 October 8, 2014,20 and March 18,
2015, 21 ordered, inter alia, the consolidation of the said cases and the referral of the same
to the First Vice Executive Judge of the RTC for a joint investigation, report and
recommendation. 22

In a Report and Recommendation23 dated October 4, 2015, First Vice Executive Judge
Retrina E. Fuentes (Judge Fuentes) found both Rivera and Judge Ferraris, Jr.
administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalties of
suspension of six (6) months and reprimand, respectively.

Judge Fuentes found that Rivera was indeed engaged in money-lending activities as she
herself had admitted, and as attested to by various court employees. According to Judge
Fuentes, Rivera's actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as
her money-lending business put the image of the judiciary in a bad light, especially in view
of the fact that she performs her transactions during office hours and within the court's
premises.24

Anent Judge Ferraris, Jr., Judge Fuentes did not find any evidence that would show his
active participation in Rivera's money-lending activities or that he exploited his position in
order to gain monetary benefit therefrom. These notwithstanding, Judge Fuentes opined
that Judge Ferraris, Jr. should have known that engaging in money-lending activities is
directly prohibited under prevailing Civil Service Rules and, thus, should have taken steps
to prevent Rivera from doing such activities. On the contrary, he even invested capital
therein. Consequently, he should be reprimanded for his lack of concern in the
moneylending activity of Rivera and his act of investing therein.25

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum26 dated March 30, 2016, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that: (a)
Rivera be held administratively liable for her money-lending activities, and accordingly, be
meted the penalty of one (1)-month suspension without pay with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; and (b) the
complaint against Judge Ferraris, Jr. be dismissed, but he be admonished for tolerating
and not taking steps to prevent Rivera from engaging in such business.27

The OCA ratiocinated that as a court employee, Rivera is required to serve with maximum
efficiency and with the highest degree of devotion to duty in order to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary. Thus, Rivera's act of engaging in her money-lending business
cannot be countenanced as it tends to distract her from devoting her entire time to official
work so as to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. However,
considering that this was Rivera's first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of
government service, the OCA deemed it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of one
(1)-month suspension without pay.28
As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., the OCA agreed with the conclusion of Judge Fuentes that
there is not enough evidence to show that he took advantage of his position as a judge in
order to receive any monetary gain from Rivera's money lending business. This
notwithstanding, the OCA recommended that Judge Ferraris, Jr. be admonished for his
lack of concern in taking steps to prevent Rivera from conducting her trade and even
expressly supporting it by investing money therein.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not Rivera and Judge Ferraris, Jr.
may be held administratively liable for Rivera's money-lending activities.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except as to the penalty to
be imposed on Rivera.1âwphi1

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the
former. 29 Stated differently, if the misconduct does not involve any of the aforesaid
qualifying elements, the person charged is only liable for the lesser offense of simple
misconduct.30

In this case, Rivera ought to have known that as a public servant, she is expected at all
times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity, as expressly commanded by no
less than Section 1, Article XI31 of the 1987 Constitution.32 Moreover, as an employee of the
Judiciary, she should be well aware that the nature of her work demands her highest
degree of efficiency and responsibility, and that she would only be able to meet this demand
by devoting her undivided time to government service. Essentially, this is the reason why
court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every
second or moment of such time to serving the public so as to ensure that undue delays in
the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided.33

In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera fell short of the standard
required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in general. Her money-lending
activities - which were done even during office hours and within the court premises - surely
put the integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she took
advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her
business.34 However, absent any showing that her inappropriate acts were tainted with
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, Rivera
should only be held administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.

Under Section 46 (D), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, 35 simple misconduct is a less grave offense which merits the penalty of suspension
for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense and dismissal from service for the second offense. Considering that this is Rivera's
first offense in her more than thirty-six (36) years of government service,36 the Court deems
it appropriate to impose upon her the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of one
(1) month and one (1) day, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

As regards Judge Ferraris, Jr., suffice it to say that the OCA correctly recommended the
dismissal of the case against him as there is not enough evidence to show that he exploited
his position to receive monetary benefit from Rivera's money-lending activities. However,
he must nevertheless be admonished for his lack of concern in taking steps to prevent
Rivera from conducting her trade and, in fact, condoned it by investing money into the
same.

It is well to reiterate that "those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and
the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possi~le individuals in the
service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would
violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith
of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of
justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."37

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ceferina B. Rivera, Court Stenographer III of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Davao del Sur, Branch 12 GUILTY of Simple
Misconduct. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDEDwithout pay for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Further, the Court DISMISSES the administrative case against Presiding Judge Rufino S.
Ferraris, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 7, docketed as
OCA IPI No. 14-2371-MTJ, for lack of sufficient evidence. This notwithstanding, he is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more vigilant in taking steps to prevent officials and
employees of the Judiciary from engaging in prohibited activities. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 06, 2016

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF CATALINA Z. ALILING AGAINST ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE MA. LUISA C. QUIJANO-PADILLA, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA
RELATIVE TO CA-G.R. CV NO. 103042

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by Catalina Z. Aliling (Complainant) against
Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla (Justice Padilla) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of
Manila for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting
violations of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint stemmed
from the Decision2 of Justice Padilla in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042.

Antecedent Facts

On 28 October 1997, Asuncion Zamora Jurado (Jurado) and Catalina Zamora Aliling
(Aliling) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Santiago City,
Isabela for the determination of the true origin and ownership of a 7,086-square meter
parcel of land, described as Lot No. 4900. Jurado and Aliling alleged that they, together
with their deceased brother Fernando M. Zamora, are the registered owners of Lot No.
4900 covered by TCT No. T-65150 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. They claimed to
have inherited the subject land from their father, Dominador Zamora, who holds the
property under the previous title, TCT No. T-2291, after having acquired this from the
previous owners, spouses Antonio Pariñas and Maura Balbin. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 36-2438.

Jurado and Aliling alleged that sometime in 1997, they learned that defendants in the case
were able to cause the subdivision of Lot No. 4900 into several titles in the names of:
Vicente Chai, married to Carmen Chai; Eduardo Sarmiento, married to Josefina M.
Sarmiento; Anastacio Pallermo; and Leonora Pariñas and Margarita Pariñas, married to
Melecio Pinto. Claiming absolute and lawful ownership over the subject property, plaintiffs
prayed for the nullification of the aforesaid titles.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment holding, among others, that
there was an irregularity in the reconstitution proceedings relative to OCT No. 3429 from
which defendants' titles were derived and that defendants, particularly appellants Spouses
Chai, could not be considered as purchasers in good faith.
The plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration while the defendants filed their
Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 February 2014 decision. The trial court denied both
of their motions.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision
in Civil Case No. 36-2438. It held that while it affirms the trial court's ruling on the
irregularity of the reconstitution of OCT No. 3429, it cannot sustain the finding that
appellants are not purchasers in good faith. The CA concluded that defendant Spouses
Chai exercised the due diligence required of them to be rightfully adjudged as buyers in
good faith. The decision was penned by Justice Padilla and concurred in by Associate
Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On 7 June 2016, plaintiffs-appellees Jurado, Aliling and the heirs of their brother
Fernando M. Zamora, filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the CA decision.

Pending resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration, Aliling on 27 June 2016 filed the
instant administrative complaint against Justice Padilla.

Our Ruling

Although complainant asserted that she is not assailing the CA decision in the
administrative complaint, it is evident that the error she is attributing to respondent Justice
Padilla pertains to the latter's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 103042. This Court has
maintained that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed
through judicial remedies.3chanrobleslaw

The assailed ruling of Justice Padilla was issued in the proper exercise of her judicial
functions, and as such, should not be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Well
entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross
ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part.4 Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their
performance of duty in good faith.5 As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be
subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts
in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment.6chanrobleslaw
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have
committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. 7 In her ponencia,
Justice Padilla explained, citing evidence and jurisprudence, why she arrived at her
conclusion that defendants were purchasers in good faith. Even assuming that she erred in
her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was moved by ill-will or malicious
intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it was
arrived at after deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the ruling of the
respondent justice.

Complainant should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. If
she disagrees with the ruling, there are judicial remedies to be exhausted under existing
rules. As in fact, it was noted that complainant, together with the other plaintiffs-appellees,
had already filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The CA has yet to
rule on the motion when complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.

This Court has settled the rule that administrative complaints against judges cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the
erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still
available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality.8 It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.9 Clearly, the subject civil
case has not yet reached its finality and the instant administrative complaint has no leg to
stand on.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint
filed by Catalina Z. Aliling against Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, Court of Appeals,
Manila for ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations
of Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of
the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan,"
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel
Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the
course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative

meetings" in her Order2dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e.,
a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the
rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so
that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial

adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and
development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also
the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,

leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the
creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed
the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend
the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the
court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify
and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns
regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She
also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18,
2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that
she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation
proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation
plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative
disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were
premature because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and
conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in
view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since
Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the
creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the
authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed
out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only
agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she
approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to
the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed
that her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or
prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not
orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other
creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did
not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that
the rest of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by
evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the
Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and
other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven
and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing
improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos
she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar
or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under
contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no
prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao
v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of
posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice,

conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her
January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the
complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature
since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of
SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s
interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule
on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting
judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in
approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary

bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were
reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with
what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls
below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done
recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum
in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on
this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should
be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her
office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of

impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be
dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in
the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary
action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting
seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth
by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We
sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the
respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish
the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however,
are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication
of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through
judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent
baseless. The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and
rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion
of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to
decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause.
The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the
complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule
4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan
even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor
if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the
creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to
the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged
that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions
of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent
was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of
gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad
faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we
find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of
gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution
demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to
prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to
the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a management
receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that
no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without
observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care
in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved
and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the
respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without
the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable
professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we
find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the
lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may
grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling
evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall
the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day
period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity
whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval
was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC,
the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1)
year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to
secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge
should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should
always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his
reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of
court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide
remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow.
They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the
decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a
judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be
so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof,
or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet –
a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each
other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part
in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their
status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light
that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in
a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges,
like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the
freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through
any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s
freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se
not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must
bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or
part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of
the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true
when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close
friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she
wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a
judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule
necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards
of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this
standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of
the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by
any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found
liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair
and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos
(₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts
of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with
the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168 April 21, 1999

LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J

On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the

Court 1 praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service
due to "gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession." 2 Attached
to her letter was a sworn statement, reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how
respondent allegedly molested her sexually.

SWORN STATEMENT

I, LUWALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road,

Pamana Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to law, hereby
depose and state:

1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of
B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting
to approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.

2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12)
informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua,
charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the
informations are hereto attached for reference.

3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
by Judge Paterno Lustre.

4. After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment
were (sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused.

5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came,
Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to
inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned.
At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in January and
February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the accused.
He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on December
15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.

7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty.
Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing.
Judge Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.

8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I
went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for
the accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I
will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and
told me he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched
my shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that
he acceded to my request. Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and
Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the
hearing on January 17, 1995.

9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17,
1995 because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me.

10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the
case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he cancelled hearings on all dates as per request
of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and March 7, 1995.

11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb. 28,
1995.

12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case,
granting postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case
was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the
accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.

13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked
him why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to
him as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I
must obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will
decide our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him
outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he
brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed
my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are
with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set
hearings for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in
May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office
on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.

14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at
around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his
chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on
the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered
me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my
lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with
him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is
on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.

15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see
Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set
for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.

16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new
cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I
went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any rate,
there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he was
early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not
come. He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit."

17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the
accused's lawyer.

18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office
because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous settings. I
requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that
he would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching
my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told
to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.

19. I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba
Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota
car and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna. I could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at
Riverview, he told me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed
himself and ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our
blood money is at stake. It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for
my family. Perhaps I was too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt helpless. He ordered me
to perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I
also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see
him again on July 10 in his office.

20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge
Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to
perform "fellatio" on him.

21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as
requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following
day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words,
he told me not to fool him.1âwphi1.nêt

22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized
before I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could
not take it anymore.

23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and
instead hearing was set in November, 1995.

24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of
the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me.
I could not refuse for fear of retaliation.

25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our
cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen from the transcript of the
hearings, he is not leaning; in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he
is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was
testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.

26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil
doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who
are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain
because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened by
disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to
give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.
27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who is
supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who
are not learned in law as his victims.

28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for
my better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I
did it for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his
money for our future. 3

Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11
photographs showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were
allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt
issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she
had with respondent. 4

Respondent's defense is anchored on denial. In a "2nd Indorsement" 5 he sent to the Court,

by way of answer to the complaint, he "strongly denie(d)" 6 the charges leveled against him
and dismissed them as "the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced
mind." 7 According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing
charges against him when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and
arrogant demands . . . to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily
within a very short period of time" 8the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by
complainant's husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by
respondent's refusal to accept complainant's offer to "reward" him with five percent of the
P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover.

Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the
morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten
minutes before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked
— thus, the impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines —
since the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to
use it may enter his room freely.

Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, "(s)ex is
beyond (his) physical capacity." 9 He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary men
indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt." 10 He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed
against him.

In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1)
affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually
arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A.
Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondent's fine work
ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that
respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes
mellitus. 11

In response to respondent's averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their
meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work
that early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his office, which
must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for respondent's health condition, complainant
pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only engaged
in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have
diminished respondent's sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same. 12

In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge
Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed
to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by complainant's husband.

On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from
hearing the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with
respondent. 13 The Court, however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request
and directed him to resolve the case with dispatch. 14

In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the
complaint against respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Judge Geraldez observed that:

In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he
could recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose
Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the
complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And,
why Jose Zafra allowed it.

The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the court's decision would be so vital,
that the judge can demand his "price".

There is a rather large disparity in the value of the "B.P. 22" cases vis-a-vis the seriousness
and mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanag's allegations are beyond comprehension. It
borders on the very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect
to the allegations of oral sex with its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more
than once. If indeed there were "blood secretions" the first time, the claim of a second time
is beyond relief (sic).
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched
her. But human nature would demand another oral sex as they had done before. Moreover,
in her complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why
they stopped at oral sex. 15

Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in
itself.

Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs
showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not establish the acts complained
of. Despite having the opportunity to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to
testify to substantiate her claims, thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-
examine her.

Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite
that of Judge Geraldez.

The OCA noted that:

. . . we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent
which the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his
subsequent report reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the
parties, particularly the complainant herein, and an egregious misapplication of the law
and jurisprudence.

xxx xxx xxx

We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears
the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely
etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive
handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust: . . .

The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint
and that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and — controlled corporations.

Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire
controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to
judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases.
Only substantial evidence is required, 16 as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence: 17

Sec 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,

a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.

Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently
establish complainant's case against respondent.

The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in
various places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andok's Litson Manok,
another shows respondent's car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The
car is seen leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in
the driveway of what appears to be one of a row of rooms. On top of this room's doorway is
the letter "D". Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming
out of the room together and heading towards respondent's parked car. 18

Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.

In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent
is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or
grave misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a
room together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the
resort did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.

Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. 19 On the basis of his
own pictures, he concluded that complainant's photographs could not have been taken at
that resort. When he testified on his behalf, he said:

. . . when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there because
I personally went there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign boards were not there,
sir. 20

A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant's pictures, was missing in

respondent's pictures.

Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint — which
she has denied — is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an "outrageous
demand" 21 for P3.5 million to settle the case.
We are not convinced, however, that respondent's conduct in this case is entirely blameless,
nor that complainant's alleged intent would excuse respondent's wrongdoing.

It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in
any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature,
such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to
us is only the narration of the parties involved.

Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the
resort himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of
complainant's.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with
complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed
for the photograph, 22 but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion
almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as
October 1995 in his comment to complainant's charges.

If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was
respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for
complainant and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the
photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and
under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament.
This, he failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any
plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently
a private room.

Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainant's
vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to
undue speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of
repeated postponements of the hearing of her cases?

Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable
delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with
sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature
and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with
respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing
herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the
exercise, save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.

As for complainant's failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment.

Complainant's affidavit stands in lieuof her testimony; the investigating judge even had her
re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of
complainant's evidence. 23

Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not
cross-examined by respondent is not her fault but respondent's.

As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrator's
assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary
and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well. 24All to the
grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.

The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every
level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public's faith
and trust in the judiciary. Respondent's disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if
he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. 25 For the serious misconduct of respondent,
the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed. 26

We are not in accord with the OCA's recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture
of all retirement benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty,
while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who
are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the
circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross

misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be
dismissed nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon
him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any
employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and -
controlled corporations.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC October 29, 2009

RE: ORDER DATED 21 DECEMBER 2006 ISSUED BY JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ

MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 275,
SUSPENDING LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. P-07-2320

JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS

CITY, BRANCH 275, Complainant,
vs.
LOIDA M. GENABE, LEGAL RESEARCHER, SAME COURT. Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This administrative matter against Loida M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II of the
Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, stemmed from a Letter
dated 22 December 2006 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed by
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge Maceda) of the same trial court. Judge Maceda
attached his Order dated 21 December 2006 suspending Genabe for 30 days by reason of
neglect of duty for attending a two-day seminar despite a pending assignment. In the letter,
Judge Maceda requested that the salary of Genabe be withheld for the period 21 December
2006 to 20 January 2007 since the suspension was immediately executory.

The Facts

On 20 November 2006, Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk of Court
of the same trial court, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe referring to her
neglect, in leaving for Baguio City on 16 to17 November 2006 to attend a seminar for legal
researchers, without finishing her assigned task. The assigned task required Genabe to
summarize the statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Marvilla, et al.," set for promulgation on 21 November 2006.
Atty. Escabarte reminded Genabe that such act could not be tolerated and that similar acts
in the future would be meted an appropriate sanction.

On 22 November 2006, Genabe submitted her explanation regarding the unfinished

assigned case. She stated that she was not able to complete the summary due to lack of
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN). Genabe added that she be absolved for humane
considerations.
On 29 November 2006, Judge Maceda called a staff meeting to discuss several matters in
the agenda, including the inter-office memorandum. Allegedly, even before the staff
meeting, Genabe resented the issuance of the memorandum and became disrespectful to
the court staff, including the clerk of court. At the meeting, Genabe allegedly continued her
combative behavior in total disregard of the presence of Judge Maceda.

On 30 November 2006, Judge Maceda ordered Genabe to show cause why she should not
be cited in contempt by the court and why she should not be administratively sanctioned
for conduct unbecoming, neglect of duty and misconduct.

In her Answer dated 11 December 2006, Genabe denied that she neglected her duty and
explained with counter-charges. Genabe stated that Atty. Escabarte did not give her the
opportunity to be heard and that she was not given sufficient lead time to finish the five
consolidated informations of the criminal case assigned to her. Genabe attributed the lack
of stenographers, which was beyond her control, as the cause of the delay in the
transcriptions of the minutes of the meeting. As a counter-charge, Genabe claimed that
Judge Maceda disciplines his staff on a selective basis.1avvphi1

On the same day, Judge Maceda conducted a fact-finding investigation inside his
chambers. The agenda of the investigation focused on the charges of contempt, conduct
unbecoming, neglect of duty, and misconduct against Genabe. Judge Maceda directed all
members of the staff, including Genabe, to attend. However, Genabe did not appear despite
notice. Later, she appeared to say that she was waiving her right to be present in the
investigation.

On 21 December 2006, Judge Maceda issued the Suspension Order against Genabe for
neglect of duty.

In a Letter dated 22 December 2006, Judge Maceda furnished the Office of the Court of
Administrator (OCA) with a copy of the Order dated 21 December 2006. Judge Maceda
suspended Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as authority the power given to
appropriate supervisory officials in disciplining personnel of their respective courts as
provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 dated 30 September 1991.
Judge Maceda declared that the suspension was to take effect immediately and would not
be stayed even if appealed to the Supreme Court. Judge Maceda then requested that
following the suspension order, Genabe’s salary be withheld for the period 21 December
2006 to 20 January 2007.

The OCA received a letter dated 12 January 2007 sent by Atty. Zandro T. Bato, Clerk of
Court VI of the same trial court, returning the salary check of Genabe following the
suspension order issued against her. On 22 January 2007, Genabe reported back to work
after serving the 30-day suspension order of Judge Maceda.
On 18 January 2007, Judge Maceda endorsed his Investigation Report and
Recommendation to the OCA, even without any directive from the latter. The report
mainly focused on the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe during the staff meeting of Branch
275 on 29 November 2006. Judge Maceda submitted the following recommendations:

1. Pending determination of the instant matter by the Honorable Supreme Court, Ms.
Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, be immediately
placed under preventive suspension, and thereafter dismiss her from the service; and

2. Allow the undersigned to recommend a replacement to enable RTC Branch 275 to

function normally soonest.1

In a Letter dated 18 April 2007, several staff members of the same trial court, headed by
the Branch Clerk of Court, assailed the alleged inaction of the OCA on the Investigation
Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda as well
as the request for the detail of Genabe to another post.

In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, this Court resolved to:

1. NOTE the letter dated 22 December 2006 of Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda x x
x x;

2. TREAT the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda as
an administrative complaint against Loida M. Genabe under a separate docket number,
A.M. No. P-07-2320 x x x x;

3. DIRECT Ms. Loida M. Genabe to REPORT BACK TO WORK pending resolution of

the administrative complaint against her, unless another administrative case directs
otherwise; and

4. REQUIRE Judge Bonifacio [Sanz] Maceda to EXPLAIN, within ten (10) days from
notice, why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed against him for having violated
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" approved on 27 January 2004
and became effective on 15 February 2004.2

Judge Maceda submitted his Explanation dated 29 June 2007, in compliance with the
Court’s Resolution dated 23 May 2007. Judge Maceda reasoned that there were other
charges against Genabe, such as "conduct unbecoming and grave misconduct," which
called for the imposition of a higher penalty. Thus, he endorsed the determination of such
other charges to the OCA, including whether the heavier penalty of dismissal or
replacement might be warranted. Judge Maceda prayed that his explanation be considered
as sufficient compliance and that he be absolved of any disciplinary sanction.
On 22 August 2007, the Court resolved to refer to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation the (1) Order dated 21 December 2006 and (2) Explanation dated 29 June
2007, both made by Judge Maceda.

On 29 August 2007, the Court resolved to inform the staff members of the same trial court,
in consideration of the Letter dated 18 April 2007, that until Genabe has been formally
charged with "contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct," which are not light
offenses, the propriety of suspending Genabe pending investigation of the charges against
her cannot be properly evaluated, and to await the outcome of A.M. No. P-07-2320.

On 19 November 2007, the staff members of the same trial court, headed by the Branch
Clerk of Court, filed their Manifestation dated 15 October 2007, that Genabe had been
formally charged with "contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct" as contained in
the Investigation Report and Recommendation dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge
Maceda to this Court.

In a Resolution dated 16 January 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the matter for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed. Judge Maceda and Genabe respectively filed their compliance on separate dates.

In a Resolution dated 4 June 2008, the Court resolved to:

1. APPROVE the previous recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, as

contained in its Agenda Report dated 24 January 2007 particularly items no. 5 and 6.
Accordingly, (a) the Financial Management Office is DIRECTED to pay the salary of Ms.
Loida M. Genabe pending resolution of the administrative case against her by the Court;
and (b) the Office of the Administrative Services-Leave Division is DIRECTED not to
deduct the number of absences incurred by Ms. Genabe from her leave credits since the
order of suspension is unauthorized; and

2. GRANT the application of Ms. Loida M. Genabe for leave for a period of five (5) months
starting 1 May to 30 September 2008 for purposes of taking the bar examination, this,
however, is without prejudice to the action that the Committee of the Education Support
Program may take on her application.3

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Report dated 23 October 2007, the OCA found Judge Maceda’s explanation
unsatisfactory. The OCA stated that Circular No. 30-91 had been impliedly amended by
the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their
Powers, Prerogatives and Duties as contained in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which became
effective on 15 February 2004. The OCA added that it was clear from the Guidelines that
Judge Maceda had no authority to directly penalize a court employee. As an Executive
Judge, he only had the right to act upon and investigate administrative complaints
involving light offenses. The power to decide and impose a penalty, even for light offenses,
rests with the Supreme Court. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Maceda be fined
₱12,000 payable immediately and be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future would merit a severe penalty.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we find reasonable grounds to hold both
Genabe and Judge Maceda administratively liable.

In A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of
duty has been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of
him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.4

Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that
no work would be left pending. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three
defense witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that Genabe
was only able to summarize the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to
finish the TSN of the other two witnesses consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving for Baguio,
Genabe had three working days to complete the task. However, the assignment remained
unfinished. When such task was assigned to another court employee, it only took the other
employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of the two witnesses.

Further, Judge Maceda stated that this was not the only time Genabe had been remiss in
her duties. In Criminal Case No. 98-926 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Russel Javier,
et al.," Genabe failed to include in the statement of facts the detail on the prosecutor’s
waiver of the cross examination and more importantly, neglected to include the testimony
of the accused Russel Javier upon completing his testimony. Also, in Criminal Case Nos.
02-0713 and 02-0714, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Alberto Ylanan," Genabe
included the testimony of an alleged poseur when his testimony, upon motion, had been
stricken off the record per Order dated 29 July 2003.

From these instances, we find that Genabe’s actuations constitute simple neglect of duty.
As a first offense under civil service law, we impose the penalty of suspension without pay
for a period of one month and one day.5 The suspension imposed upon Genabe under the
Order dated 21 December 2006 shall be considered as the penalty imposed. The remaining
balance of one day suspension must be served upon finality of this decision.

With regard to the other charges of contempt, conduct unbecoming and misconduct, we
find no sufficient basis to hold Genabe accountable for these offenses based on her alleged
unruly conduct at the staff meeting held on 29 November 2006. In administrative
proceedings, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint.6 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard
was not met in this case. The Order dated 21 December 2006 and Investigation Report
dated 18 January 2007 submitted by Judge Maceda centered mainly on Genabe’s neglect of
duty in not completing her assigned task on time. The other charges had been touched on
in a sporadic manner. While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant,
suspension, replacement or dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial
evidence to merit such penalties. In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,
Genabe cannot be held accountable for the other charges against her.

In A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find that Judge Maceda failed to observe due process in
ordering the suspension of Genabe and withholding her salary from 21 December 2006 to
20 January 2007.

Judge Maceda suspended a court personnel directly under his supervision by relying on the
authority laid down in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of Circular No. 30-91 which provides:

2. Lower Court Personnel

a. Light Offenses –

(1) Disciplinary matters involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service law
(Administrative Code of 1987 and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. 6713) where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for
not more than thirty days, or a fine not exceeding thirty days' salary, and as classified in
Civil Service Resolution No. 30, Series of 1989, shall be acted upon by the appropriate
supervisory official of the lower court concerned.

(2) The appropriate supervisory officials are the Presiding Justices/Presiding Judge of the
lower collegiate courts and the Executive Judges of the trial courts with respect to the
personnel of their respective courts, except those directly under the individual Justices and
Judges, in which case, the latter shall be their appropriate supervisory officials.

(3) The complaint for light offenses whether filed with the Court, the Office of the Court
Administrator, or the lower court shall be heard and decided by the appropriate
supervisory official concerned. x x x

The reliance of Judge Maceda on the provisions of this circular is misplaced. Judge
Maceda found Genabe to have neglected her duty in November 2006. The guidelines in
effect at that time were already those found in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which took effect in
2004 or two years before the administrative charge of neglect of duty was made against
Genabe. Judge Maceda should have applied these new guidelines and not Circular No. 30-
91.
Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which provides the guidelines for
administrative discipline of court employees over light offenses, states:

SECTION. 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses.– The Executive Judge shall have
authority to act upon and investigate administrative complaints involving light offenses as
defined under the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act
No. 6713), where the penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days,
or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil Service
resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except lawyers, who
both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of administrative
supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee, except lawyers, who
both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of administrative
supervision.

In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the necessary inquiry and
submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results thereof with a recommendation
as to the action to be taken thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any, within
thirty (30) days from termination of said inquiry.At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge
may delegate the investigation of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding
Judges or court officials within his/her area of administrative supervision.

In the case of a complaint (a) filed against court employees who are lawyers, or (b) filed by
private complainants against court employees, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, the same
shall be forwarded by the Executive Judge to the Office of the Court Administrator for
appropriate action and disposition. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring court
personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting
an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA
the results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be
taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry
and thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in
this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court personnel
guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.

In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty.
Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,7 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one
month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense. 8 Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC, an executive judge may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the
investigation, the executive judge is mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to
this Court for appropriate action.9

Even under Circular No. 30-91, Judge Maceda should have referred to Section A(2)(b) of
Circular No. 30-91 which provides:

b. Grave or Less Grave Offenses

All administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes
hereinbefore referred to shall be immediately referred to the Court En Banc for
appropriate action within 15 days from receipt by the Court Administrator if filed directly
with him, otherwise, within 15 days likewise from receipt by him from the appropriate
supervisory officials concerned.

Thus, under Circular No. 30-91, a court employee charged with a less grave offense could
not be directly penalized by an executive judge. Judge Maceda had no authority to suspend
Genabe outright for a less grave offense of simple neglect of duty even under Circular No.
30-91. Clearly, Judge Maceda exceeded his authority when he issued the 21 December 2006
suspension order against Genabe.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge in the discipline of judges of
regular courts:

Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. –

xxxx

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;

xxxx

Accordingly, Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions to be
imposed if one is found to be guilty of a less serious charge:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. –

xxxx

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.

xxxx

We hold that the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱12,000 is commensurate to Judge
Maceda’s violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. We sternly warn him that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, in A.M. No. P-07-2320, we find Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher II of

the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty.
We SUSPEND her for one month and one day without pay. The 30-day suspension imposed
upon Loida M. Genabe under the Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda shall be considered as a partial service of the penalty imposed. The
remaining balance of the penalty of one day suspension shall be immediately served upon
finality of this decision. Respondent Loida M. Genabe is sternly warned that commission of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In A.M No. 07-2-93-RTC, we find Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, GUILTY of violation of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC.
Accordingly, we FINE him ₱12,000, with a stern warning that commission of similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.