Change and Contrariety in Aristotle

Author(s): James Bogen

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-21
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182399
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 Change and Contrarietyin Aristotle'
JAMES BOGEN

1. Physics 1 5 says that the regularitiesin all of the processesof change,

coming to be, and passing away studied by the naturalsciences depend
upon the followingprinciple:
P* ... all things that come to be come to be out of, and all thingsthat pass away pass
into their contraries or (xac) intermediates [between their contraries]. And the
intermediates [arise]from the contraries.For example the colors come out of white
and black (XeVxoO xai ReXavog).And so all of the things which come to be by
nature are contrariesor things which come to be out of contraries.
(Physics 1 5 188b21-26. cp Metaphysics I 1055bl6-17, De Caelo I 3, 270al4ff,
Generationand CorruptionI 7, 323b28-324a9)

'Contraries'is the traditionaltranslationof EvaVTCca,a technicalterm for

oppositionsbelieved by Aristotleto hold betweenmetaphysicalpredicates
in some of the categories(e.g., black and white, odd and even), between
some linguisticpredicates(e.g., the words 'black' and 'white', 'odd' and
'even') andbetweensome sentences(e.g., 'allmen arejust'and'no men are
just' (De Interpretatione7 17b20). The examples with which Aristotle
illustratesP* leave no doubtthatin sayingthingscome to be out of andpass
away into their contraries,he was thinkingof metaphysicalrather than
linguisticcontraries.The first example is one color coming to be out of
another. What is at issue here is a relationbetween the colors, black and
white- not a relationbetween the linguisticpredicates'black'and 'white'.
The second examplefeaturesunmusicalityandmusicality- not the linguis-
tic predicates,'unmusical'and 'musical'(Physics1 5, 188a35-b8).2
' The first draft of this paper was presented at a conference on Aristotle's Physics,
sponsored by Rutgers and USC, organizedby Robert Bolton and FrankLewis, and held
at USC, Dec. 14-16, 1989. This version was benefited by discussionfrom the participants
including David Charles, Frank Lewis, Henry Mendel, and especially, Charles Young,
the commentator for my paper.
2 Connections and contrasts between metaphysicaland linguistic contraries and their
roles in classificationand the explanationof change are discussedin some detail in Bogen
(1).

Phronesis 1992. Vol. XXXVIII/ (Accepted October1991) 1

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 P* appearsto be a fundamentalprincipleof Aristoteliansciencegovern-
ing alterationand locomotion as well as generationand corruption.Far
from being entertainedand dropped after the first book of the Physics,
versionsof and appealsto P* figurein argumentselsewherein the corpus'.
As the examples of changes in color and musicalityindicate, P* governs
changes involving items from the category of quality. But in Physics V
(224b30-35)the principleis appliednot only to changein quality,but also to
changein place (locomotion)andquantityas well (PhysicsV, 226a25ff)4'5.
Substanceshave no contraries(Physics V 225bM0)but P* still constrains
their comings to be and passings away if (as Aristotle supposes6)the
comingsto be andpassingsawayof substancesrequire,andoccurby means
of, changes in category items which do have contraries.The most likely
candidateswouldbe quantities- degreesof heat, cold, density,rarity,etc. -
and qualities'.
I assumethat P* is centralto Aristotle'svisionof what a naturalscience
shouldbe. Thispaperis motivatedby thatassumptiontogetherwiththe fact
that - as is obvious from its formulation - the content of P* depends upon
3 In the Physics (see below), the Metaphysics(e.g., A 2 [1069b7-13]), Generationand
CorruptionII (whose topic is the way in which stuffs are generated throughprocesses of
change from contraryto contrary), De Caelo I 2-4, IV 3, and elsewhere in the Aristote-
lian corpus.
4 The examples in Physics I 5 leave no doubt that Aristotle intended to include changes

under the heading of comings to be and passingsaway governed by P*. A rationale for
thinking of changes in this way is provided in Physics VIII 3. Here Aristotle says that
almost everyone thinks that T6 XLVEiOOaL (motion or change) is coming to be or
passing away, and whenever anythingchanges, what it changes into (?i50 ... tETa,Bak-
kEt)comes to be something or comes to be in something, while what it changes out of (#t
oi ... 4ETaPdtXEL) ceases to be something or ceases to be in something (254a12 ff).
s In Physics V (and elsewhere), various terms (most notably xiv-oL;, tLEaT3oXi',
&XXoioL;)are used - sometimes interchangeably- for the comings to be and passings
away I am calling changes. See, e.g., 226a21 ff. The points to be made in this paper are
neutral with regard to theories of whether there is a canonical usage of these terms to
mark systematic distinctions, and theories of what the distinctionsmight be.
6 Physics I 5-7, e.g., 188b16ff, 189a32ff, which acknowledgesthe problem raised by the
doctrine that substances have no contraries, 190bl ff, 190bl 1-15.
7 The applicabilityof P* to the generation and destructionof sublunarysimple bodies
(earth, water, air, fire) and compounds (including semen, blood, flesh and bone) is
strongly supported by Mary Louise Gill's discussion of topics from Generation and
Corruptionin Gill, ch. 2 passim, especially, pp. 46-67. Livingorganismsare Aristotelian
substances par excellence, and their generation requires the generation of male and
female reproductive stuffs, blood, flesh, bone, and the rest. It seems clear from the
passages Gill considers that their generation involves coming to be out of and passing
away into contraries. If this is correct, then P applies to substantialchange because
changes which accord with it are necessary for the generationsof living organisms.

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the notion of metaphysicalcontrariety.My aimin whatfollows is to explain
some central features of that notion which I take to be importantfor our
understandingof P*.
2. We sawthat one of Aristotle'sexamplesof a regularityfallingunderP*
was a white subject which changes with respect to its color. To do so the
subject must come to be either blackor some color which falls in between
blackand white. It cannotchangefrombeingwhite to being sour (or heavy
or musical,etc.) except incidentally8.And even if somethingwhich lost its
white color turned sour incidentally,it would still have to acquire a new
color. Thus non-incidentalchangewith regardto color involves the loss of
one color and the acquisitionof another which belongs somewhere on a
continuumof colors runningfrom white to black. What holds for colors
holds for flavors and presumablyfor a great many other metaphysical
predicatesas well. For example, to changewith regardto its flavor a sauce
should lose one flavor and acquire another one falling somewhere on a
flavor continuum.Accordingto the following passage from De Sensu the
continuafor differentsorts of qualitiesmay exhibit remarkablestructural
similarities.
... objects (of sense) ... are said to correspond (Ta' olboToixwg... Xeyo6 eva)
although [they belong] in different genera (for example, I call sweet and white
corresponding [objects] although [they are] different in genus). (448a13 ff)

This suggests that there is a continuumof flavors rangingfrom sweet to

bitterand a continuumof colors rangingfromwhite to black (and so on for
all of the other contrarieswhichhave intermediates)such that divisionsof
one of the continua correspond somehow to divisions of the other as
follows:
Fig.1 1.2 .i.n
T T
white E..
.Es............
black
I ..........l_I
sweet bitter

Suppose the color of a ripe tomato occupies the ithposition of the color
continuum, while the lovely taste of unfiltered Virginia tobacco smoke
correspondsto red in the sense of occupyingthe ilh position of the flavor
continuum.Accordingto the De Sensupassage, somethingthat was black
8 What is white and sweet can become red and sour. We can say of it that what was white
(in addition to being sweet) can become (a red thing which is also) sour. Cp Bogen (2).

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 or white mightcome to be the color that correspondsto the lovely taste of
unfilteredVirginiatobaccosmoke. But accordingto P* it couldnot change
from a white thing to a tobacco flavoredthingexcept incidentally.
Aristotle's second illustrationof P* was the change in which what is
unmusicalbecomesmusical.Does this addanythingwe can'tfindout from
the example of color change? It may. Because Aristotle never speaks of
intermediatesbetween musicalityand unmusicality,I suppose they have
none, and accordingly,that the example is intendedto illustratechanges
involvingcontraries(ill-well,odd-even,for example)whichlackintermedi-
ates. Suchcontrariescan be treatedas limitingcasesof whatis illustratedby
Fig. 1. Thinkof the pairsmusical/unmusical,healthy/ill,odd/even, etc. as
extremesof continuawhichare too smallto have any divisionsin between
them. Ill would then correspondto unmusical,and healthy, to musical.
Somethingcould not change from being musical to being ill except in-
cidentally.And so on9.
This raisestwo questions.Appearancesto the contrary,they are closely
connected, as will be seen in ? 8 below.
(Question1) Does Aristotle provide enough in the way of a theory of
contrarietyto accountfor what is illustratedby Fig. 1? In particular,
(a) Does his accountof metaphysicalcontrarietyprovidethe possibility
of developinga principledaccountof whyblackis fartherfromwhiteon the
top strip than from the color of a ripe tomato (or any other color), why
bitteris fartherfromsweet thanfromanythingelse on the bottomstrip?In
discussingMetaphysicsI 4 below (see ? 3) I will suggestthat askingthese
questionsamountsto askingwhy black(insteadof some other color) is the
contraryof white, and why bitter (instead of some other flavor) is the
contraryof sweet.
(b) Does Aristotle's accountof metaphysicalcontrarietyshed any light
on the questionwhatdetermineswhichitemon the top stripcorrespondsto
a givenitem on the bottom?Forexampledoes it tell us anythingaboutwhat
sorts of factors determinethat (pretendthat this is the case) red and the
lovely taste of unfilteredVirginiatobaccosmokeoccupythe ith positionon
theirrespectivecontinua?Whyshouldn'tit be redandthe noxioustasteof a
ripe kiwi fruit instead?
(c) Does Aristotle'saccountof metaphysicalcontrarietytell us anything
about why red occursbetween black and white on the top stripinsteadof
fallingin betweenbitterandsweet on the bottomstrip?(The answer,'redis

9 If my speculationis wrongand there are intermediatesbetween musicaland unmusical,

what I've just said still holds for well and ill, odd and even.

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a color and not a flavor' is uninformative,because the question why red
belongs on the top insteadof the bottom stripamountsto prettymuchthe
same thing as the questionwhat makessomethinga color, as opposed to a
flavor).
Contrarieswith no intermediatesraise some of the same questions. For
example:
(d) Why do odd and even belong on the same (very short) continuum?
Why isn't there an odd - ill continuuminstead?
Whatis at issue here is whetherAristotlecansayenoughaboutcontrarie-
ty to make P* a systematicand substantivegeneral claim about change,
coming to be, and perishing. It would be quite informative to say that '... all
thingsthat come to be come to be out of, and all thingsthat pass awaypass
into their contrariesor into theirintermediaries'if we had a theoryof what
makestwo itemscontraries,intermediaries,etc. But if Aristotlehas no such
theory and can do no more thanto characterizecontrariesby unsystematic
and ad hoc stipulations,P* wouldhave no more scientificinterestthan the
trivialitythatall thingschangeinto whateverit is theychangeinto. Section4
below suggests that Aristotle says enough about metaphysicalcontrariety
to save P* from triviality.
The second question I want to consideris:
(Question 2) Quantitativechanges feature predicateswhich Aristotle
says have no contraries.Supposesomeone loses 5 poundsor growsan inch.
Increase and diminutionare changes (accordingto Categories14, 15a14-
15). They are changesin quantityaccordingto PhysicsV, 226a30-32.But
... a quantity has no contrary. In the case of definite quantities it is obvious that
there is no contrary;there is, for example, no contraryto four foot or five foot ...
(Categories 6 5b12-14)

How can this be reconciledwith P*? This will be consideredin ? 5 below.

3. What is metaphysicalcontrariety?Two metaphysicalpredicates(by
which I mean items from the categories),F and G, are contrariesonly if
Ml] there is at least one metaphysicalsubject, S, to whichboth F and G
can belong",
M2Jno subject can be both F and G at the same time, and
10 Why not require (M1*) that F can belong to every subject to which G can be
predicated, and vice versa instead of requiringmerely (Ml) that there be at least one
subject of which both F and G can be predicated?The answer is that some things (e.g.,
fire) which can be hot (dry) cannot be cold (wet), some things which can be cold (e.g.,
earth) cannot be hot, and so on. By M1* dry, wet, and other such items could not be
contraries. Since Aristotle says they are, we need the weaker condition, MI. For more
details, see Bogen (1).

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 M3]Thereis at least one metaphysicalsubjectwhichcan fail to be both F
and G11.
Though necessary, these conditions are not sufficientfor contrariety.
One reasonfor this is that while Aristotlemaintainsin additionto M1-M3
that
M4JNo metaphysicalpredicatehas more than one contrary,
conditionsMl-M3 are met by white and red, white and green, white and
grey, etc. no less than by white and black. If conditions M1-M3 were
sufficientfor contrariety,white wouldthushave morethanone contraryin
violation of M412.Thus Aristotle owes us an account of metaphysical
contrarietywhich explainswhy no metaphysicalpredicatecan have more
thanone contrary.And in addition,as noted above, he owes us an account
which explains e.g., why black instead of another color is the unique
contraryof white. Answersto these andsome of the otherquestionsraised
above are suggested by MetaphysicsI 4, where Aristotle characterizes
contrarietyas:
extreme or complete difference (peyLom bLa4ooQa 1055a4) (bLa4XoQa' TEXELOg
1055a16)

between
CI] predicates of the same genus (1055a26 ff),3

" We want M3 ratherthan the strongerrequirement(M3*) that every subject can fail to
be both F and G because even though hot and cold are contraries, fire cannot fail to be
hot as well as cold.
12 Cp. MetaphysicsI 5 1055b30, 1056al1, 19-20. According to one of the characteriza-
tions in MetaphysicsA 10contrariesare '... items whichdiffer in genus and which are not
able to be present in the same thing at the same time'. (1018a25 ff). As Charles Young
points out, this does not seem to require the uniqueness condition, M4. However the
three characterizationswhich follow do imply uniqueness. These latter agree with
MetaphysicsI 4 (see below) which sets out the notion of contrarietywhich I take to be
relevant to PI. At 1018a27 ff, contraries are the most different members of the same
genus. P* applies only to non-incidentalchanges (e.g., from white to black) involving
predicatesbelonging to the same genus (e.g., color). Because contrarietyas characteri-
zed at 1018a25 ff is a relation which holds between predicates of different genera, a
change from one to another contrary in this sense (e.g., changing from being white to
being musical) would be an accidentalchange and therefore, a change to which P* does
not directly apply. See ? 4. below.
" This is the way people define contraries according to Aristotle in Categories 6,
6al7-18. (Cp Generationand CorruptionI 7, 323b29-324a1).

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 C2] predicates which can belong to the same recipient (bextLxOv), or matter(iR-)
(1055a29 ff)'4, or
C3] items falling under the same ability or power (Tla'vt6o-iV Ctiri-v biv,vaLLv)
(1055a31 f)15".1

The characterizationof metaphysicalcontrarietyas extreme difference

solves the problem of how to accommodatethe uniquenessrequirement
(M4) to the case of contrarieswith intermediaries.We saw that conditions
Ml, M2, M3 are satisfiedby pairsconsistingof white and any other color
you choose. The reasonwhitedoes not have as manycontrariesas thereare
differentcolors is that only blackdiffersextremelyfromwhite. (See, e.g.,
MetaphysicsI, 1055al9 ff) And presumablyeven thoughsuchpredicatesas
odd andeven have no intermediates,theytoo can be characterizedin terms
of extreme difference if we treat them as constitutinglimiting cases of
continua.
4. What if anythingdo C1-C3 in the characterizationof contrarietyas
extremedifferencehaveto do withone another?Aristotleoffersno explicit
answerto this but his writingssuggestan answerin broadoutline. Whether
this outline could be plausiblyfilled out in any detail would depend upon
the outcomes of a numberof differentAristotelianscientificenterprises.
Accordingto whatI take to be the best case scenario,C2 is closelyconnect-
ed to Cl by theoriesabouthow the homonymyandsynonomy,commensu-
rabilityand incommensurabilityof metaphysicalpredicatesdepend upon
the subjectsof which they are predicated.And C3 would turnout to be a
14 Aristotle does not spell out C2 in any great detail or with muchprecision. Although he
does not say so explicitly, I think the condition fits his naturalphilosophybest, if read so
that accordingto C2, two metaphysicalpredicates,F and G are contrariesonly if there is
at least one subject (recipientor matter) such that (a) both F and G can be predicatedof
that subject, (b) F differsfrom G more than anythingelse that can be predicatedof it, and
(c) there is no other predicate, H, and no other subject, A, such that F, H, G are all
predicable of A and H differs more from F than G (or more from G than F). C2 should
not be understood as requiringG to be predicable of every subject of which F can be
predicated, or as requiringthat F can be predicatedof every subject to which of which G
can be predicated. The reason for this is that if the contrarietyof F and G requiredthem
to be predicable of exactly the same subjects, hot and cold would not qualify as
contraries. See note 10, p. 5 above.
15
It is worth noting that Aristotle says this is clear from "inspection"or "induction"((x
tfj; tnaywyfg). (MetaphysicsI 4, 1055a6.)That means the doctrine is not just a natural
language syntacticalor semanticalrule or a directconsequence of such a rule, that it does
not result from any sort of a priori conceptual analysis,and that it is not the resultof a bit
of ordinary language philosophizing. It is instead an empirically checkable if highly
abstractscientific claim.
16 Cp. MetaphysicsA 10, 1018a25ff (C3 should be spelled out after the manner of C2.
See previous note).

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special case of oppositionsfallingunder both Cl and C2. But I hasten to
repeat that whether this scenariocan be realizeddepends upon the out-
comesof issueswhichare neitherclearnorfree of problems.I turnto one of
these now.
5. An immediatedifficultyin understandingCl is the unclarityof Aristot-
le's usageof the term'genus'.If each memberof a pairof contraries(along
withtheirintermediates,if any)mustbelongto the samegenus(C1), we can
try to use the examples of contrariesAristotle gives us to infer what the
genera might be. Thus, since black and white are contraries,we should
expectcolor to be a genus'7.Sincehot andcold arecontrarieswe canexpect
(allowingfor the differencesbetweenAristotle'sandour conceptionsof it)
thattemperatureis a genus"8.But to havesome examplesof generais not to
have a principledway to decide for other predicateswhat genera they
belong to. For example, the examples don't determinewhat taxonomic
level genera belong to. It is clear that a genus should be divisible by
differentiainto sub-kinds.But whataccountsfor the factthatcoloris on the
righttaxonomiclevel to be the genusfor blackandwhite, thattemperature
is the rightgenusfor hot andcold, etc.? Is colora genuscontainingdifferent
hues, is each hue a genus containingdifferentshades, or do all of these
qualifyas genera?Thisis the sortof thingAristotle'sexamplesdon'ttell us.
In fact he does not seem to use the term'genus'consistentlyto markkinds
on any single level of generality.The taxonomiclevels of genera seem to
differwithcontext,'9but as faras I knowAristotlehasno principledstoryto
tell aboutwhether,to whatdegree,or how, generalevelsaredeterminedby
context.
Lackingboth guidancefrom Aristotle and argumentsto the contrary,I
think the best we can do is to acceptthe examplesat face value where we
find them and suppose that accordingto Cl blackis the contraryof white
because nothingin the genus of color differsmore from it, that hot is the
contraryof cold because no temperaturediffers more from it, and that
sweet and bitterare contrarieswithinthe genusof flavorbecauseno flavor
differs more from sweet than does bitter. More such suppositionswill be
made as needed. Where additionalexamplesof genera are needed, we'll
have to makethem up. Armedwiththispolicy,let us returnto the question
of how Cl, C2, and C3 are connected- startingwith Cl and C2.
'7 This is confirmed by Categories 11, 14a20, Metaphysics 1 7, 1057bI4.
18 See Generation & Corruption II 2-4.
'9 This point - a surprisinginstanceof which is that species of livingthings are sometimes

called genera- is establishedand discussedin the contributionsof Allan Gotthelf, James

Lennox, Pierre Pellegrin in Gotthelf and Lennox and in Balme, p. 74.

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 6. Accordingto C2 contrariesare extremelydifferentpredicateswhich
can be predicatedof the samerecipientor matter.The terms'recipient'and
'matter' are used by Aristotle for subjects of metaphysicalpredication.
Thus accordingto C2, two metaphysicalpredicatesare contrariesjust in
case:
C2a (Ml)] there is at least one subject (a matteror recipient) of which both can be
predicated, and
C2b] the predicates are extremely different.

By that I mean that each differs more from the other than anything else
which is predicable of any of the subjects of which both can be predicated20.
The reason to ask what C2 has to do with Cl is of course that C2 requires
predicability of the same subject and says nothing about membership in the
same genus, while Cl requires membership in the same genus but says
nothing about being predicableof the same subject.
Partof an answerto this questionappearsto be thatAristotleis commit-
ted to the principlethat
HI] predicates satisfy Cl only if they satisfy C2.

Some evidence for this is providedby a discussionof tests for homonymyin

Topics 1 15. Two metaphysicalpredicates,F and G, signifiedby the same
word (e.g., the slipperinessof a wet floor and the slipperinessof a politic-
ian) are homonymousjust in case whatit is to be F (andhencewhatit is for a
subject to have F) differs from what it is to be G (and hence what it is for a
subject to have G)21.At Topics106alO-35differencesbetween the mean-
ings of linguisticpredicatesand hence differencesbetween the metaphys-
ical predicatesmeantby themcan be inferredfromdifferencesbetweenthe
subjects of which they are predicated. For example, the linguistic predicate
'sharp' signifies a feature (metaphysicallypredicated) of sounds whose
contrary is the metaphysical predicate, flat. But when 'sharp' is predicated
of knives the relevant metaphysical contrary is notflat, but dull. The Greek
word we translate with the term 'flat' (IaQuv)signifies a feature of sounds
whose metaphysicalcontraryis sharp. But when the same term is predi-
cated of bodies, it signifies the metaphysicalpredicate we call 'light'
(xoj4og)22. 'Bright' (XEUXOg)and 'dark' (p?X6t;)do not signify the same
metaphysicalcontrarieswhen they are used to talk about sounds as when
they are used to talk about colors. Applied to the mind, the term 'love'
2' See n. 12, p. 6.
21
Categories 1, lal-5.
' As opposed to 'heavy' - not as
opposed to 'dark'.

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(?tXEw) is used for a statewhichhas a contrary(hate).But whenpredicated
of bodily activities(xaczca oouCtxnTXvivE,yELav) it signifiesa popular
Tq1v
pastimewhichhas no contrary23.
Despite our lackof a systematicaccountof genera,it seems intuitivethat
the predicatesfeaturedin the foregoingexamplesof homonymybelong to
different genera. For example it seems safe to say that on any sensible
accountof generathe brightnessof certaincolorswouldbelongto a differ-
ent genus thandoes the brightnessof certainsounds.Furthermore,in all of
these examplesthe genus of the metaphysicalpredicate(signifiede.g., by
'sharp'or 'bright')varies with the genus of the kind of subjectit is predi-
cated of. These examplesof homonymyseem thereforeto be instancesof
the principle(Hi) thatpredicatesbelongto the same genusonly if they are
predicableof subjectsof the samekind.PhysicsVII 4 providesevidencefor
the furtherconnectionbetween Cl and C2:

H2] two predicatessatisfyC2 (i.e., they are extremelydifferentitems predicableof

the same subject) only if they satisfy Cl (i.e., only if they are extremely different
members of the same genus).

I assumethatin orderfor two predicates,F andG, to be extremelydifferent

(as required by C2), they must be comparable or commensurable
(orvRPXiqt6). And as I understandthem, comparabilityor commensu-
rabilityrequiresome metric (no matter how rough), scale or continuum
relative to which G is closer to, fartherfrom, or at no greater (smaller)
distancefrom F than any other item, and where there is an answerto the
questionwhetherthere is any H such that G falls in between F and H or F
falls between H and G. For example, bitteris the contraryof sweet only if
there is a scale or a metricaccordingto whichit is fartherawayfromsweet
thananyotherflavoron the flavorcontinuum.Twopointslie at the extreme
ends of a line only if thereis a scaleor metricaccordingto whichnothingon
the line is fartherfrom the first of them than the second. A given color
differsextremelyfromwhiteonly if no othercolorcontainsless whitethanit
does24.And so on. But no such thing can be said of items which are
incommensurableor non-comparable(ovuUtjI3XqTa') for incomparables
cannotbe locatedon the samescaleor continuum,andcannotbe measured
by the same measure.
2 Topics 1 15, 106b1-3. According to Liddell, Scott, Jones, p. 1933, the pastime was
kissing. More strenuous activities were not included until after Aristotle's time.
2' This point will be discussedbelow. Notice for now that the measureneed not be a fine
one; as long as we can say e.g., that F is closer to G than H, it is not requiredthat there be
e.g. a numericalanswer to the question 'how much closer?'.

10

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 In Physics VII 4 Aristotle considersseveral examplesof incommensu-
rability.(A) If motion is homonymousandcircularand rectilinearmotions
are incommensurablebecause they belong to differentgenera, a circular
motion cannot be faster than, slower than, or of the same speed as a
rectilinearmotion. (248alO-b8;249al5-25)25(B) If Theloniushas a lot (To
nokXl)of plutoniumand Cecil has a lot of iron, it does not follow that
Theloniushas the same, more,or less of hischemicalelementthanCecilhas
of his26.Of coursewe coulddecidewho hasmorestuffif the radiumandiron
were measured on common scale, measure, etc. But the point is that
without a commonscale, measure,etc., there is no answerto the question
whetherthey have the same amount,whetherone has morethanthe other,
etc. (cp. Physics248b13ff) (C) Whenthe linguisticpredicate'sharp'(6o)';)
is used to talk about subjectsof differentkinds(e.g., writinginstruments,
wines, and musicaltones) it signifiesincommensurablemetaphysicalpredi-
cates27.Thusthereis no factof the matteras to whethermy stylusis sharper
thanyourhighC, let alone how muchsharper.Thereis no factof the matter
as to whetheror how muchsharperthanthe taste of my Pete's Five Staris
your high C or her stylus. (PhysicsVII 4, 248b8ff) And because they are
incommensurable(i.e., because there is no scale or measure relative to
whichthe sharpnessof the musicaltone does or does not fall somewherein
between the sharpnessof the stylus and the sharpnessof the taste of the
wine) these predicatescannot be extremelydifferent,let alone extremely
differentmembersof the same genus, as requiredby Cl.
In the examplesjust considered,commensurability failswhensubjectsof
predicationbelong to differentgenera.The speedsin (A) were incompara-
ble becausethey belongedto differentkindsof motions.In (B) the factthat
2 As Ross notes (Ross (1), p. 678) 248a10-b8is aporetic;it is by no means clear from this
passage what Aristotle's settled opinion on the commensurability of the speeds of
straight and circularmotions actuallyis. Furthermore,whether or not 249a15- 25 show
that they are incommensurabledepends upon the resolution of unsettled issues con-
cerning genera and homonymy. (See, e.g., 249a26 ff). But these uncertainties do not
affect the point that (C) if circularand rectalinearmotions (and their speeds) belong to
different genera (on the right taxonomic level, whatever that may be), then they are
incommensurable.What Aristotle is unclearabout is the antecedent of claim C, not the
claim itself.
26 The example is from Ross' commentaryon Physics248bl3-14. It illustratesAristotle's
idea (far less clearly illustratedby Aristotle's own example - lots of water - lots of air)
that 't'oXok5' means more thana certainstandardor averageamountwhere the standard
varies from case to case (248bl6-8). In Ross' example the standard amounts differ
because radium is so rare and iron, so plentiful. Ross (1), p. 678.
2 Physics 248a7 ff. The Greek term 6tvs is translatedas 'sharp'for pens, 'dazzling'for

lights, 'shrill' for sounds, 'pungent' for tastes.

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Theloniusand Cecil each had a lot wasn'tenough to establishwhetheror
not they hadthe sameamountbecauseeachone'sTO tOkVi waspredicatedof
a different stuff. And the sharpnessesin (C) were incomparablee.g.,
because a stylus isn't the kind of thing that can have the same kind of
sharpnessas a flavoror a musicalnote.
Can we generalizefrom these examples?Aristotle'streatmentof what
wouldseem at firstglanceto be a counterexample- a horsewhichis whiter
thana dog (Physics248b22ff) - suggeststhatwe can. The horseandthe dog
seem to providea counterexamplebecausethe colorsof these animalsare
commensurablecolors predicatedof subjects which belong to different
biologicalkinds. But Aristotle explainsthe commensurabilityof their col-
ors by appealto the claimthat strictlyspeaking,they are predicatednot of
the dog and the horse, but rather,of theirrespectivesurfaces.Apparently
Aristotle thinksall surfacesbelong to the same genus even if their owners
do not. His point in tryingto find a single kind of subject for the colors
emerges in his remarkthat what makesthe brightness(uevx6;) of speech
incommensurablewiththe brightnessof wateris the differencebetweenthe
recipients(&eXTLXa) of whichthey are predicated.Nonhomonymyis neces-
sary (even if not sufficient) for commensurability(Physics 248a9-13,
249a3ff).As this exampleillustrates,andas we saw in the Topicsexamples,
in order for metaphysicalpredicatesto be nonhomonymous,they must be
predicableof subjectsof the same kind28.
The connectionof C3 to Cl andC2 is easierto find. The reasonAristotle
gives for characterizingcontrariesas items which differ maximallyunder
the same ability is that the knowledge of the genus to which a pair of
contrariesbelongs is one (Metaphysics1055a32).This harks back to the
thought e.g. that a person cannot possess the knowledge(Jintinlll) re-
quiredto restore health withouttherebyunderstandingits contrary.Thus
the art of medicine enables the physicianto produce both health and
disease. Thus the point of C3 is e.g. that healthdiffersmore from disease
than anything else the medical art enables a doctor to bring about. If
abilitieslike the art of medicineare alwaysexercisedon the same sorts of
recipientsor matter, C3 is a specialcase of C2 and Cl.
None of this terrificallyclearin Aristotle,anda majorsourceof unclarity

I do not read248b25ff('but clearlywe could thus make all thingsone ...') as a rejection
of the doctrine that similarity in recipient is necessary for commensurability.What it
rejects is the idea that similarity in recipient is completely explanatory of commensurabili-
ty. (See 249b4 ff where difference in subject isn't necessaryfor incommensurability.)If
similarityin kind of recipient is not necessaryfor commensurability,that allows there to
be other sources of incommensurabilityamong recipientsof similarkinds.

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is what I noted earlier- Aristotle'sfailureto tell us how to decidewhatto
count as genera. Why (or in what contexts) should horses and dogs be
considereddifferentenough to make theirpredicateshomonymous?Why
(or in what contexts) are their surfacessimilarenough to make synonymy
possible for their predicates(e.g., their whites)? Is there any principled
reason why the health of a dog and the health of a horse belong (or don't
belong) to differentgenera?29 Aristotledoesn'ttell us enoughaboutgenera
to answersuchquestions.But all the same, sinceAristotlethinkscontraries
are extremely or completely different predicatesof the same genus, he
needs a storyaboutgeneraof predicateswhichallowshimsay thatin order
to be of the samegenus, predicatesmustbe predicableof the samerecipient
or matter. If we had the story our three characterizationsof contrariety
could fit together. Even without the story, I take it that the notion of
contrariety they point to is: maximal difference between metaphysical
predicates.
7. Needless to say, the characterizationof contrarietyin termsof maxi-
mal differencecan'tbe informativeunlesstherecan in principleat least be
measures (rough ones, at least) of differencesbetween predicates. For
some contraries,notablyup and down, extremesand intermediatescan be
interpretedstraightforwardly in termsof distancesin absolutespace. Aris-
totle's universe is a finite sphere whose extremes are determinedby the
naturalrestingplacesof earth,the heaviestof the five elements,andaether,
the stuff of the heavenlybodies. The center is absolutedown. If we could
extend straightlines from there to the outer edge of the region of aether,
each of theirends wouldbe absolutelyup. Up differsextremelyfromdown
because it is impossiblein principlefor physicalline to extend beyond it.
The distancesbetween up and down, and betweeneither extremeand any
other point on a line are extensions for which a fine, additive metric is
available'.
But what is the measureby whichone color, tone, flavor, etc. is more,
less, or maximallydifferentfromanother?(How can numbersbe assigned
in a principledway to positions along the continuaillustratedin Fig. 1?)
MetaphysicsI 4 suggestsan answer.Here Aristotle says the fundamental
sort of contrarietyis the relationbetween possessionand complete priva-
tion (1055a33 ff), and that one member of every pair of contrariesis a
privation (1055b18). Aristotle's use of the phrase 'complete (iEXE4a)
privation'insteadof just plain 'privation'acknowledgesthat privationand

2 Such questions were raised by Charles Young in discussion.

30De Caelo I 2-7.

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possessioncancome in degrees.Thusfor eachpairof metaphysicalcontrar-
ies a subjecthas one of them, G, just in case it is completelydeprivedof the
other, F. Intermediatesbetween F and its contrarywill then be character-
ized by degrees of privationof F. This allows Aristotle to say, e.g., that
white has only one contraryeven though there are lots of intermediates
betweenwhiteandblack.And in generala predicatecan haveno morethan
one contrarybecause there can be no such thingas two or more complete
privationsof the same item (MetaphysicsI 4, 1055al9).
Thispromisesanswersto the questionsillustratedby Fig. 1. Whetherthe
promise can be fulfilled depends upon what sort of account of colors,
flavors,etc. an Aristoteliannaturalsciencecan provide.Aristotleprovides
nothinglike a completeaccount.But the followingpassagesprovidea very
sketchyoutline of a theory whichseems to be of the rightsort.
Arguingagainstthe Platonicidea thatthe basicunitfor allcountingis one
and the same item, Aristotle says:
In [the case ofl color, the unit, one (r6 tv), is a color, e.g., white, and the other
colors (Tax6Xa) appearto come to be out of this and out of black, while black is the
privationof white, just as dark(ox6&Og)is [the privationof] light(4xWT6g)... And so
if all of the things that are (Ta'6vTa) were colors, then each of the things that are
would be a number. But [a number] of what? Clearly, of colors the unit (T6 (v)
would be some one [color] (-t (v), e.g., white. (Metaphysics1 2, 1053b28-34)

I have no idea how Aristotle would go about usingwhite as a unit for the
assignmentof numbersto the other colors. But the passagecertainlysays
differencesbetweencolorsare due to differencesin numericallyspecifiable
amountsof white. All colors come out of white and black,the latterbeing
its privation. Furthermore,on what he considersthe most likely stories
abouttheircomposition,eachcolorresultsfroma differentratioof whiteto
black.Thuswe couldassigna ratiolike 3/2, to one color, and3/4 to another.
Accordingto this story there are differentcolors becauseblackand white
combinein differentratios.Alternatively,he says, colorscould be charac-
terizedby numbersmeasuringthe excess of whiteover blackor blackover
white. Then there are differentshadesor hues becausethere are different
degrees of excess. If to be black is to be deprived of white, numbers
indicatingratiosof white to blackor excesses of one over the other can be
interpretedas indicatingdegreesof possessionor privationof contraries.If
such numberscould be orderedin a principledway, they could be used to
representnumbersby theirpositionon a possessionof white- privationof
whitecontinuumafterthe mannerillustratedby Fig. 1. De Sensuproposes
that the most agreeable colors (e.g., purple and crimson) have ratios
analogousto those which constitutemusicalconcords,and that disagree-

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able colors (and musical discords) might be constituted out of ratios of
incommensurablequantities. MetaphysicsI 2 proposes that melodies
(LE'Xq))whose unit is the boo; g- the smallest intervalof the scale) and
spoken sounds (whose units are phoneticelementslike vowels), and recti-
linear figures (for which the unit would be the triangle) can be treated
analogouslyto colors. Generalizing(and referringexplicitlyto several of
the categoriesof metaphysicalpredication)Aristotlesaysthe same account
holds for all of the other genera
... because there are numbers and particularunits in the affections (7t&OEoL), the
qualities, the quantities, and the motions (XLV(OEL), and [because in all of these
genera] the number is a numberof definite [things]and [because] the unit is some
one particularthing ... the unit in every genus is some particularnature ...1.

As the example of rectilinearfigures indicates, this applies to predicates

which do not have contrariesas well as to predicateswhichdo. In connec-
tion with contrariesit implies that each genus includingcontrariesshould
includesomething,F (analogousto white), suchthatto havethe contraryof
F is to be totally deprivedof it, and suchthat intermediaries(if any) can be
characterizedin terms of degrees of privationof F.
Suppose (what is certainlynot the case) that Aristotle could have pro-
duced empiricallyadequate theories of this kind for colors, flavors, etc.
Then he could have said thatwhite andblackare contrariesat the extremes
of the same continuum because to have the one is to lack the other
altogether. He could have said why bitteris not the contraryof white: it is
the complete privationof sweet, not of white. He could have said that red
belongs on the black - white continuum instead of the sweet - bitter
continuumbecausebeing red involvesthe partialprivationof white, not of
sweet. The numbersover the stripsin Fig. 1 would then representdegrees
of possession and privation. Red would correlatewith the taste of pure,
unfiltered, Virginia tobacco smoke because of an analogy between the
degree of privationof white whichconstitutesthe color and the degree of
privationof sweet whichconstitutesthe flavor. Finally,contrarieswithout
intermediates like health and disease would constitute limiting cases in
which F can be had or lacked, but in which there are no intermediate
degrees of privation.
Cautionarynote. This interpretationdoesn't do justice to texts sugges-
ting that all contrarietyis an oppositionbetweenpossessionand privation.
For exampleit doesn't knowwhatto do withodd andeven or up anddown.
As said, it doesn't know how the unitsin each genus(whitefor color, sweet
3' 1054a4 ff.

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for taste, etc.) are to be used to measuredistancesbetween extremesand
intermediates.All I claim for it is that it promisesto show how Aristotle
may have thoughtthe ideas of extreme, complete, and partialdifference
could apply to a numberof contrarieswhichlack an obvious metric.
8. The second majorquestionabout Aristotle's(P*) was: how can there
be changesin quantityif all changeinvolveslosingor gaininga featurewith
a contraryor a featurewhichfallssomewherebetweentwo contraries?The
problemarosefromAristotle'sclaim(in Categories)thatquantitieshaveno
contraries. In ? 2 above I introducedthis question in connection with
changes in height, and weight. But the interpretationjust proposed to
explainextremeandintermediatedegreesof differencebetweencontraries
extendsthe problem.Supposethatto changefromwhiteto redis to go from
complete possession to partial deprivationof white. That should mean
goingfromhavingmoreto less white,or froma higherto a lowerproportion
of white. But that sounds suspiciouslylike a change in quantityof white,
and quantitieshave no contraries.The same goes for changeswith respect
to flavor, temperature,and (presumably)a great many other predicates
outside of the categoryof quantity.Hence the connectionbetween ques-
tions one and two from ? 2. A furtherproliferationis worth mentioning.
Although substances have no contraries32, Physics I 5-7 leaves little doubt
that P* was supposedto applyto the comingsto be and passsingsawayof
substances33. P* wouldapplyto substantialchangeif, e.g., for each species
of plant or animal there is a feature or features, F, and a contraryor
contraries,G, such that a memberof that species comes to be just in case
some matterchangesfrom G (or an intermediatebetween G and F) to F,
andpassesawayjust in case a subjectchangesfromF to G (or an intermedi-
ate betweenG and F)3. If the differencesbetweenF, G, andthe intermedi-
ates are quantitative,substantialchangedependsas muchas anyother sort
of comingto be or passingaway upon quantitativechanges.
Finally,it's worthnotingthat PhysicsI 5-7 sayswe can thinkof the basic
factors (&Qxai)requiredfor change as a subject, the presence of one of

32 Categories5, 3b24.
33 See n. 7, p. 2 above.
' 188bl9 ff suggests that the contrariescould be (G) a feature or features constitutinga
particularsort of shape or organizationand (F) their privation, or the privationof that
particularsort of organization. Alternatively, G might be a feature belonging to the
differentiaof a species and F, its privation. There are probablystill more possibilities.
Whatever the correct alternative may be, Aristotle's apparent resolve to bring sub-
stantial change in line with P* requirescontrariesto play the roles assigned above to F
and G.

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the contraries,and its absence35.It is naturalto think this would be so
becausethe havingof one contraryis the privationof the other36.But if this
is correct we don't have to look beyond Physics I to find reasons for
worryingabout how to accommodateP* with the doctrinethat quantities
lack contraries.
9. A possible solution is suggested by what I take to be the reason
quantitieslack contraries.Presumablythe reason why definite quantities
(like a length of 4 feet length) lack contraries37 is that for any two numbers, i
andj, suchthatj >i, no matterhow muchlargerthani j is, we can (Aristotle
knows)produceanothernumber,k, whichis largerthanj. k will differfrom
i by more units than j. Because this holds for any j, no number differs
extremelyfrom i (i.e., no numberdiffersfrom i by more units than every
other number). Thus i has no contrary.Four feet can't have a contrary
unless4 has a contrary,j, suchthat a magnitudeof j feet differsfrom4 feet
by morefeet thaneveryothermagnitude.Sincethereis no suchj, 4 feet has
no contrary38. Aristotle also maintainsthat many-few,large-small,etc.
are not contraryquantities.Thatis because,e.g., one andthe same animal
canbe largefor a pony andsmallfor a horse,largefor a babyandsmallfor a
person,etc. Supposewe couldinfer(a) 'Mingois large'from'Mingois large
for a pony', and suppose also that we could infer (b) 'Mingois small'from
'Mingois smallfor a horse'.Then, if 'large'and'small'referto metaphysical
predicates,Mingo could be both large and small. Since nothingcan have
both a predicateand its contrarytogetherit followsthat even if 'large'and
'small'referredto quantities,theirreferentswould not be contraries39. On
the other handif we disallowinferences(a) and (b) then 'large'and 'small'
are relativessignifyingquantitieswhose magnitudeis determined tQo6 Tt.
35 191a6-7.
3 Cp. 191a13-14which identifies the contraryof a form (RoQLp-191alO) or of the object
of a definition (jiLa
6Ec&f 6 Xoyog) (191a13) with its privation for cases of substantial
change. Cp. Ross (1), p. 494.
37 Categories6, 5b11-13.
3 But Aristotle does not think the universe is unlimitedlylarge. If it has a limit, doesn't
that mean there is some finite n such that nothing can be longer than n feet long? And
then couldn't a length of 4 feet be an intermediatebetween some very small length and a
length of n feet? The answer is 'no' for two reasons. First, no actual quantityis too small
to be divided, and so there is no minimallysmall length. Secondly, Aristotle's reason for
saying that universe is not unlimitedly large is his belief that no actual quantity is
unlimited. But just as the impossibility of an actual duration of time of unlimited
magnitudedoes not mean that time will eventuallycome to an end, the fact that no actual
spatial extension is unlimited does not mean that the largest actual line could not be
extended. Thus there is no j such that nothing can be longer than j feet.
39 Categories VI, 5b32-6al.

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Then because these magnitudesdifferwhen determinedwith referenceto
differentobjects of comparison,'large'and 'small'do not signifydefinite
quantitiesat all, let alone contraryquantities'.
All of thisleaves open the possibility,e.g., thatforsome genera- let K be
one such- the expressions'long-for-a-K'and 'short-for-a-K'signifymeta-
physicalcontrariesto which numberscan be assignedin a principledway.
Supposethe shortest,healthy,adultmembersof some kindof organism,K,
are 2 feet long fromtail to snout, whilethe longestneverexceed a lengthof
4 feet. Suppose this is because limitationsof abilities belonging to or
determinedby their essences, environmentalfactors (e.g., the natureof
availablenutrients),etc., rule out lengthsot side of this rangefor K-ers
even though organismsof other kinds can longer or shorter. Then a
.

lengthof 2 feet differsmorefroma lengthof 4 feet thananyotherpredicate

in the genus, length, which can be predicatedof membersof K. And by
conditionsCl andC2 (above), 2 feet and4 feet arethe measuresof contrary
metaphysicalpredicates:short-for-a-Kand long-for-a-K.By the same to-
ken, 3 feet is the measure of an intermediate(mediumlength) between
these contraries.This allows us to say 2 feet is the contraryof 4 feet qua
measuresof lozg and shortfor organismsof kind K even thoughtwo feet
andfour feet are not contrarieseitherper se or in relationto long andshort
for other kindsof things.Thisin turnallowsus to maintainboththe doctrine
of Categories6 andthe principleP* whilewe call the growthof a memberof
K from a length of 2 feet to a lengthof 4 feet a quantitativechange.
I am indebtedto CharlesYoungfor showingme a passagefromPhysicsV
2 which appears to endorse part of the manoeuvrejust describedfor
accommodatingchangesin quantityto P* withoutviolatingCategories6:
... there can be change (xLvTol;)only with regardto quality, quantity, and place.
For in each of these there are contraries ... Change in quantity ... is called increase
or decrease ... increase is [change] toward complete magnitude (Edi TiXELOV
pkyr0og) and decrease [is change] away from this. (226a23-32)

This passage says that contraries figure in quantitative change and implies
that without quantitative contraries there could be no change in quantity. I
'o Categories6, 5bl5 ff. MetaphysicsA 13 1020a23appearsto contradictthe Categories
by allowing a distinction between calling something large (small, etc.) non-relatively
(xa6' auT'a)and relatively (nt6q 6XXr1Xa). But I think all Aristotle has in mind is the
difference between saying (i.e., uttering the words) 'John is small for a basketball
player', mentioning the comparisonclass explicitly, and saying 'John is small', leaving it
to context to indicate the reference class. Our abilityto use the latter xaH'aur'Tstyle of
utterance doesn't mean there is a non-relative sort of small, large, etc. Cp Kirwan, p.
161-2.

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take 'completemagnitude'to be the largestsize attainableby items of the
kind to which the changingindividualbelongs4".And althoughAristotle
does not mention it, we can suppose there is a minimumas well as a
maximummagnitudefor itemsof any kindwhose memberscan increaseor
decrease. On this supposition,our passageallowsus to treatmagnitudesin
betweenthe maximumandminimumas intermediatesbetweencontraries-
relativeof course to a given kind.
Thisstrategyfor dealingwithchangein quantitycanbe extendedto apply
to the other cases whichtroubledus as follows.
10. Accordingto MetaphysicsH 1, the changesand motions any given
thing can bring about in itself or in somethingelse, and the changes and
motions that can be broughtabout in any given case depend upon what
capacities,powersor abilities(buva' t;) belongto andcan be exercisedby
the items involvedin the change42.I supposethis appliesto all changesand
motions including those involved in coming to be and passing away. I
suppose also that for Aristotle a crucialsort of difference between any
naturalkinds - of stuffs, of inanimateobjects, of organisms- is that the
membersof one kindhavedifferentabilities(to change,to be changed,and
to resistchange)than membersof others43.It is by appealto their abilities
that an Aristotelianscientistwould try to explainwhy organismsof differ-
ent kindscan attaindifferentsizesso thatlargeorganismsof one kindcan be
longeror taller, or heavier,etc. thanlargeorganismsof anotherkind. And
it is by appeal to their abilitiesthat an Aristotelianscientistwould try to
explainwhy one ratherthan anotherspecificnumber(of pounds, of feet,
etc.) gives the maximumor minimumsize possible for a normal, mature
organismof any given kind.
To answerour question about changes involvingquantities,as well as
contrariesand intermediatesaccountedfor in termsof degreesof privation

4' Cp. Ross' gloss on PhysicsVIII 3, 252bl3-14: For growingthings, there is a normalsize
such that when the organismreaches that size, it stops growing, and can change size only
by getting smaller.This is what I take complete magnitudesto be for organisms.Ross (1),
p. 692. Furthertextual supportis to be found at PostAn 75b1 ff, Physics226a30ff, 241a32
ff, 261a34 ff, Problems 894b27 ff.
42 Metaphysics1045b28-1046a32.See also Prior Analytics 32a18, 32b4-11, Metaphysics

A 12, Metaphysics 3, passim. These and other relevant texts are briefly discussed in
Bogen & McGuire, ? v-vii.
43 For the distinction between abilities for acting, suffering, and resisting change, see

MetaphysicsA 13, Metaphysics0 1. For examples of the differences among abilities of

items of different kinds, consider the De Anima discussionof the different sorts of souls,
and the accounts of the different abilities of different sorts of inanimate items as well as
parts of living things in De Caelo 11 12, Gen & Cor. II 2-5, MeteorologyIV 6-12.

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or possession, we need to make the same kind of suppositionaboutother
items from the categories- colors, temperatures,statesof rarefactionand
condensation,personalitytraits(Et;) etc. Supposewe makethatsupposi-
tion. Then the naturalabilitiesof thingswhichfigurein changes,comingsto
be and passings away, determine how much and how little of anything
which consists of or which is determinedby measurablequantitiesthose
thingscan have. This will apply not only to length, weight, and the other
quantities, but also e.g., to degrees of possession or privation(e.g., of
black, white, sweet and bitter) which constitutepredicatesin other cate-
gories. Then we can say that even thoughnumbersper se have no contrar-
ies, the maximaland minimalamountsof measurablequantities,posses-
sions, deprivations,etc. possible for thingsof any given naturalkind are
contrariesto whichnumberscan be assigned.Any such numbers(and the
intermediateswhich fall between them) are the measuresof contraries-
relative, of course, to the kinds for whichthey are maximaor minima.It
follows that if somethinggoes from the possessionof one amounti, to the
possessionof anotheramount, j, of some quantity,possession,privation,
etc., this can be counted as a change to be accountedfor in terms of
contrarieseven though i and j are numbers.This is becausemaximaland
minimalamountsare contrarieswith numericalmeasures.
11. The proposalof the last section was intendedto resolve difficulties
raised by Aristotle's doctrinethat quantitieshave no contraries.To con-
clude, I want to point out what implicationsthis solutionwouldhave with
regardto the statusof P*, the principlethat
... all thingsthat come to be come to be out of, and all thingsthat pass awaypass into
their contraries or intermediates [between contraries].

According to my proposal P* turns out to be something like what science

textbookscall a phenomenologicallaw' - a generaldescriptionof natural
regularitieswhich are to be explainedby a scientifictheory, ratherthan a
fundamental,explanatoryprincipleof a scientifictheory.
Looked at thisway, P* describesregularitiesin natureto be explainedby
accounts of the abilities which belong by nature to subjects of change,
coming to be, and passing away, and the conditionsof exercise for the
relevant abilities. For each genus or species these accountswould tell us
what and why certain quantitiesand degrees of possession or privation
constitutecontraries(extremelydifferentpredicates)for membersof the
kind.Forexample,suchan accountwouldtell us whya humanbeingcan be
pale or swarthy,and why, e.g., a humanbeingwho changeswithrespectto
U
On what physicistsmean by phenomenologicallaws, see Cartwright,pp. 1 ff.

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color can become more or less pale or swarthy,but not, e.g., as blue as the
sky or as red as a ripetomato. Thata pale mancan become swarthybut not
brightblue is one (amongmanymore) of the naturalregularitiesabstractly
characterizedby the talk of contrariesin P*. Instead of explainingwhy
coming to be, passingaway, and changefollow such regularpatterns,the
regularitieswhichfall underP* are to be explainedin termsof abilitiesand
the conditionsunderwhichthey are exercised.Here we reachexplanatory
bedrock. Abilities and the conditionsof their exercise are explanatorily
more fundamentalthan P*, for they explainthe contrarietyrelationsupon
which P* depends.

Pitzer College

WORKS CITED
(other than Aristotle)

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