G.R. No.

158144 July 31, 2008

ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO MANILA, Respondents.

Facts:

Plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 sq m of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin,
Las Piñas City under TCT No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XL of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution authorizing
defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters
of the land covered by the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A).

Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return to
plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the
plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining
twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598) square meters of the subject property.

A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and defendant
Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the signing on 5 September
1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the ownership of the subject land from herein plaintiff
to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima effected the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of plaintiff and in lieu
thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the name of defendant Prima was issued
by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

On 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned
four thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the subject property which development thereafter
led to the cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 and the
issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City of two separate titles both in the name of
defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863 covering the aforementioned four thousand
square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand
five hundred ninety-eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.

In its complaint, herein plaintiff alleged that the authorization certified to by Antonio V. Agcaoili,
Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in selling the subject
property to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of directors of the plaintiff never enacted a
resolution authorizing herein defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to
defendant Prima or to anyone else for that matter. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant Prima in
collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the forged
authority without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff as owner of the subject property.
According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale entered into between defendants Prima and Rodolfo
A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was void.

On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their respective
answers, sought and insisted constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the
ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the
original complaint and the amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively,
lacked legal capacity to sue because they were not authorized therefor by the board of directors of
the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on
the face of the purported authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of
absolute sale and paid in full the purchase price of PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This
fact, according to defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its argument,
defendant Prima in adopting the defense of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana asserted that even
assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its
President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the aforestated
purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property,
plaintiff has been precluded as it is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed of absolute
sale and reconveyance of the subject property.3

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint for
annulment of sale with damages filed by the petitioner.4 It found that the respondent was a buyer in
good faith and for value

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

Issue:

1. Won Resp Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner to enter into the sale of the subject property
as evidenced by the Certification issued by said Petitioner?

Ruling:

Anent the forged signature of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the
findings of the Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that
the findings were not really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of
questionable handwriting was not properly followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively
show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to
the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the same Atty. Antonio
Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the standard
signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and
physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting’s
characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature
appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more accurate
comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in
the party making the allegation.9 Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to discharge
this burden.

Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary’s Certification,
petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not
appear before a notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the past, we have
already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed
does not necessarily nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non-
appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction
by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not enough to
overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board resolution. To
overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.11 In the absence of such proof, the
document must be upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.12
1avv phi 1
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo
Agana’s authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent
purchaser for value in good faith. Our pronouncement in Bautista v. Silva13 is instructive:

A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time
of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives
the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of
the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to
explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient
only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land;
second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware
of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title
of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.14

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for
us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in
the buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent exerted efforts to
verify the true background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to respondent the (1)
notarized board resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board
of directors authorized Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-1648;15 (2) a separate Certification by the petitioner’s
president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to sell said
property;16 and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property. Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the
authority to sell on behalf of the company after being presented all these documents, the sale
between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed of sale was executed on September 5,
198817 and the full consideration of ₱2,567,760.00 for the subject property was paid.18

It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company
which, according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the
extent of Agana’s authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary
considering that respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced
by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista case:

When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to
be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its
due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing
and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has
removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its
import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing
and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely
relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that
because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across
borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to the
property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he
inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he
relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized special power of attorney.
He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to
establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.19

Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and
certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the land
likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the petitioner and
signed by the corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner’s authorized agent and
had full authority to bind the company in that transaction with Cruz.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana’s authority was only limited to
negotiate and not to sell the subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution further
averred that he was "authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers
or writings which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the Corporation in this
undertaking."20 The certification of the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this fact. With
this notarized board resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the authority to cede the subject
property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to implement said transaction. On the
strength of the deed of absolute sale executed pursuant to such authority, title over the land in
petitioner’s name was cancelled and a new certificate of title – TCT No. T-617521 – was already
issued in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.

Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo
Agana in his Comment22 on the Petition filed with this Court. Therein, he admits that he acted solely
and without proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to end once and for all
the rift that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the parties and for
himself, he is willing to return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of the property can be
returned to the petitioner. In light of this admission that Agana had no authority, petitioner posits that
there is justifiable reason for the Court to re-visit or evaluate the facts of the case anew.

Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will the
Court lend credence to Agana’s assertion that he acted solely and without proper authority from the
corporation, inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and only after 8 years from
the inception of the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in
his position that he had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds
the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his
pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.23 In
the instant case, there is no proof of these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was
merely an afterthought on the part of respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family
corporation.

G.R. No. 151952 March 25, 2009

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERACLEO ABELLO Y FORTADA, Accused-Appellant.

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) stands convicted of one (1) count of violation of
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended;3 and two (2) counts of
violation of sexual abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law). For these crimes,
he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, and two reclusion perpetuas, respectively.
Facts:

The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was
seven (7) months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she
could only read and write her name including that of her friends.

On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house
in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was
suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello
again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation while the latter was
sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from
outside which illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time
placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally
kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He
was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-
law and mother.

Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of
denial. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his
way to his room after retiring home.

The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations.

The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal.

Issue: WON the conviction must be sustained? YES.

1. The court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime of violation of paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

2. The court a quo has committed an error in not exculpating the accused-appellant of the crime of
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.13

He emphasizes that it was impossible for him to have committed these crimes considering that: (a)
he is AAA’s stepfather who has a healthy sexual relationship with her mother; (b) AAA was not alone
during these alleged incidents; and (c) AAA admitted that she was asleep when these incidents
happened making it likely that she could have just dreamed of them.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains the correctness of Abello’s conviction on the basis of
AAA’s positive and candid narration covering the elements constituting the crimes of rape by sexual
assault and sexual abuse.

Ruling:

Determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, based solely on the victim’s testimony, is not an
easy task in reviewing convictions for rape and sexual abuse cases. For one, these crimes are
usually committed in private so that only the two direct parties can attest to what happened; thus, the
testimonies are largely uncorroborated as to the exact details of the rape, and are usually in conflict
with one another. With this in mind, we exercise utmost care in scrutinizing the parties’ testimonies
to determine who of them is believable. Oftentimes, we rely on the surrounding circumstances as
shown by the evidence, and on common human experience.
We carefully reviewed AAA’s testimony in light of the issues Abello raised in his appeal, and in light
of matters he did not raise but which materially affect his innocence or culpability. After due
consideration, we find no reason to doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of the
events that led to the filing of the present charges.

In her testimony, AAA positively and unequivocally narrated the details of her rape and sexual abuse
she suffered in Abello’s hands.

We note that both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical,
while the RTC found the defense’s version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human
experience; the RTC refused to accept the claim that Abello was prosecuted for rape and sexual
abuse simply because he stepped with his knees on her stepdaughter’s hand.15 A material point we
noted is that Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him.16 The substance and tenor of
the testimony and the element of motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward,
categorical and candid narration by the victim deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown
driving her to falsely testify against the accused.17

Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject them for
the following reasons:

First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended party’s positive
testimony and the denial of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically and unmistakably identified
Abello as her rapist and sexual abuser;18 the identification was positive because the scene was
illuminated by a light coming from outside the parties’ house at the time of the incidents.19 She also
testified that during the rape, she saw Abello suddenly enter the room of her mother after she yelped
in pain when he stepped with his knee on her hand.20 Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere
denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party.21

Abello likewise admitted that in the wee hours of the mornings of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998,
he passed by the sala of their house where AAA and her companions were sleeping.22 This
admission shows that he had the opportunity and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his
location and close proximity to AAA who, together with her companions, were then sleeping.

Second, we flatly reject Abello’s argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the
crimes charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the
relationship between the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the
commission of the crime against chastity. Although alarming to admit, this kind and degree of
relationship is now quite common in these types of crimes. Studies show a rising incidence of family
and domestic violence where 98.8% of the victims are women; an estimated 26.7% of these cases
involve sexual abuse, while 33% involve incest committed against children.23 In these cases, the
male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male relatives, have been identified as frequent
abusers. 24

Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be
preposterous. It is highly unlikely that a woman in her right mind would expose and declare herself a
victim of rape and sexual abuse, when she would thereby open herself to the humiliating experience
of a public trial and to the possible social stigma of being a victim of rape and sexual abuse. In the
normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks unless she is certain of what
happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the perpetrator. We note in this regard AAA’s
categorical testimony that she filed the criminal charges because she did not know what to do; she
thus reported the incidents to her mother and sister-in-law who thereafter sought police assistance.25
The record also shows that AAA lived a sheltered life cared for by her relatives because of her
polio.26 Unless the contrary is shown, it is highly unusual for her to have the worldly sophistication to
invent or fabricate the charges she made, particularly one made against her stepfather. A charge
against one’s stepfather, too, is unusual in our socio-cultural context because of the respect we give
our elders, and is only understandable if there is a deeply felt cause for complaint. We particularly
note that no imputation has been made at any time in the case that AAA is not normal, save for her
physical disability, or has a strained relationship with her stepfather prior to the acts charged.

Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear indications of errors in giving credence to
AAA’s testimony, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.

Rape by sexual assault

The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended defines rape by sexual assault as
committed by any person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 … shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The elements of rape by sexual assault are:

(1)That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2)That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

xxx

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force or intimidation;

(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

x x x27

AAA’s testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abello’s male
organ into her mouth; AAA also consistently identified Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual
assault. These statements satisfy the first and second elements of the rape.

Her testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abello’s male organ inserted in her mouth, goes
into the third element of the crime.28 In this respect, we observe that both the RTC and the CA failed
to notice the variance between the allegations in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial
on the mode of committing the offense. The Information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode
of commission, while AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and
only awoke to find Abello’s male organ inside her mouth.

This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, 29 we
ruled that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails
to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was
alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the
crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus,
the variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

Acts of lasciviousness

Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

The essential elements of this provision are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.

3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 30

Paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 761031 (implementing
rules) defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
among others. Records show that AAA duly established this element when she positively testified
that Abello fondled her breasts on two separate occasions while she slept.

The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence
proving that: (a) AAA was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is
a child as defined under R.A. No. 7610.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,32 we explained that the phrase, "other sexual abuse" in the above
provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious
conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s
will.33

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion
attended Abello’s sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time these
crimes happened and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled. Hence, she could have
not resisted Abello’s advances as she was unconscious at the time it happened. In the same
manner, there was also no evidence showing that Abello compelled her, or cowed her into silence to
bear his sexual assault, after being roused from sleep. Neither is there evidence that she had the
time to manifest conscious lack of consent or resistance to Abello’s assault.

More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which
reads:

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]

The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a "child" as one who is below 18
years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist or
psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental
disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.

While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the
corresponding Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability that rendered her
incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the prosecution’s
compliance with the implementing rules. Specifically, the prosecution did not present any evidence,
testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding from a qualified physician,
psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAA’s physical condition rendered her incapable of fully
taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse. Under the circumstances, we
cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law referring to a
particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular
class to warrant the application of the statute’s provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve
in favor of the accused.

From another perspective, we also note that no evidence has been adduced showing that AAA’s
physical disability prevented her from resisting Abello’s attacks; the evidence only reveals that Abello
took advantage of the opportunity presented to him (i.e., that AAA and her companions who were
then asleep) to commit the sexual abuses; this inference is supported by the fact that he stopped his
sexual assault when AAA started to awaken. It can also be reasonably deduced from these
circumstances that Abello sought to commit the sexual abuses with impunity -- without AAA’s
knowledge and without any interference on her part.

In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still
find him liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.

In Olivarez, we emphasized that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the complaint or information.34 In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly
designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts
punishable under Article 336 of the RPC whose elements are:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;

 2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.35

The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed, albeit in
the consideration of a charge under R.A. No. 7610. The prosecution established these elements
through AAA’s testimony that her breasts were fondled while she was asleep. While she did not
actually see Abello fondling her (as the fondling was done while she was asleep and stopped when
she awakened), she related that she identified Abello because she saw him enter her mother’s room
immediately after she felt her breasts fondled and after he stepped with his knees on her
hand.36 AAA also testified that Abello was illuminated by a light coming from outside their
house.37 Further, the perpetrator could only be Abello as the only other occupants of the house at the
time were her mother, her sister-in-law and her young nephew who were all asleep.38 The third
element was proven by her testimony that, on two occasions, Abello mashed her breasts while she
was sleeping.39

As we discussed above, the Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the
mode of committing the sexual abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the trial
that AAA was asleep on the two occasions when the offenses were committed. Pursuant to our
above discussions citing Corpuz,40 the deficiencies in the allegations will not relieve Abello of liability
under the circumstances of this case.

G.R. No. 177361 February 1, 2010

ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" and

JOHN DOES and PETER DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army officer, Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda (Dioneda), was
brutally murdered and valuables taken from his house located at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion,
Bacon District, Sorsogon City.

Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein petitioners Armando
Vidar @ Ricky (Vidar), Norberto Butalon (Butalon), Sonny Marbella @ Spike (Marbella), and several
Does was filed.

Petitioners, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as charged in the Information. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the prosecution witnesses Florecita Dioneda
(Florecita) and Niña Dioneda Elemanco (Niña) that led to the conviction of the petitioners are as
follows:
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 30, 2001, Florecita, wife of the victim, and her sister-in-
law Niña, were inside the former’s house at Burabod, Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City. They
were watching television when three armed men suddenly barged inside. One of them, later
identified as Marbella, poked a gun at Florecita while the other two ransacked the house taking a
wallet, crash helmet and a .45 caliber firearm with its magazine. These items belong to Dioneda who
was then taking a bath outside the house. Florecita and Niña followed the three men when the latter
went out. At the yard, they saw the three men together with more or less 10 other persons
surrounding Dioneda who was lying facing the ground. Despite Florecita’s pleas not to kill her
husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots causing Dioneda’s instantaneous death. The
three then boarded Dioneda’s motorcylcle and fled the area. 1avvphi1

Niña corroborated the material details of the robbery and the killing and testified further that she
could not forget the faces of the three malefactors as she was very sure that they were the ones who
barged inside the house and later killed her brother.

Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. Marbella averred that he does not
know Dioneda and that he was in his house in Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon on April 30, 2001 while Vidar
asserted that he has no knowledge of the killing of Dioneda. Butalon, on the other hand, professed
his innocence, claiming that he also does not know Dioneda and that he was in his house at
Omoroy, Legaspi City on April 30, 2001. Collectively, they alleged that the possible motive behind
the charge against them is that they were known members of the New People’s Army (NPA).

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense interposed by the petitioners and accordingly
rendered a Decision3 on September 2, 2004 finding all of them guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered its Decision4 finding the appeal to be
unmeritorious. The appellate court gave credence to the eyewitnesses’ account of the victim’s death
and the identity of herein petitioners.

Accordingly, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from
Death to reclusion perpetua.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court despite
the absence of proof adduced before the court below establishing beyond reasonable doubt that
they committed the crime of robbery with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year in
filing formal charges against them cast serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant.
They aver that while the incident took place on April 30, 2001, formal charges against them were
filed only in February 2002.
Ruling:

Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit. The delay did not greatly weaken the credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, we believe that the delay in reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for
which the petitioners have been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that
after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke further reprisals from
the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice
for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, personal safety takes priority as dictated by our
culture. Moreover, considering private complainant’s honest belief that petitioners are known to be
members of the NPA, the fear of reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary
silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is
well known.9 Others reveal the perpetrator of the crime only after the lapse of one year or so to make
sure that the possibility of a threat to his life or to his loved ones is already diminished if not totally
avoided. In People v. Gornes10 we held that:

It is true that the charge against the appellant was initiated only three and a half years after the
commission of the crime. However, the fact of delay alone does not work against the witness.

Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them.11 What
is important is that their testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and
dependability.

One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to
prevaricate against the petitioners. They were not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts
and to foist a very serious offense against them. Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to
indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.12 For personal
motive on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its
presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.13 Aside from their bare allegation, petitioners
miserably failed in this regard. On the contrary, we are not prepared to disbelieve the prosecution
witnesses’ testimonies on their vital points substantiating the circumstances of time and place of the
offense charged against petitioners.

Petitioners likewise contend that their identification by the prosecution witnesses was attended with
irregularity considering that they were identified merely from among the four photographs presented
at Camp Escudero. They posit that this manner of identification provides an incredible suggestive
procedure.

We beg to disagree.

In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted
the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: 1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’s degree of
attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.14

We have scrutinized with great caution the witnesses’ manner of identifying petitioners vis-a-vis the
foregoing factors and we discern nothing irregular that would result in an erroneous identification.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed view of the
petitioners’ appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter barged
inside the house. There is no indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an
obscure view at the time. They even testified that one of the petitioners even poked a gun at them
while the others were ransacking the house. Thus even for a while, there was a frontal confrontation
between petitioners and the witnesses, giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at
petitioners. Nothing in the records allows the presence of any distraction that would have disrupted
the witnesses’ attention during the occurrence of the incident. Niña even described to the policemen
the physical appearance of petitioners though no cartographic sketch was presented.15 Experience
dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses’ eyes,
that they remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.16 Though a considerable
length of time had elapsed, the witnesses never wavered in their identification of petitioners. They
cannot forget their faces.

It is worth mentioning also that the identification of petitioners was effectively admitted when
petitioners failed to dispute the same before the lower courts. The in-court identification of the
petitioners later on dispels any doubt as to the correctness of their identities. As we held in People v.
Rivera:17

Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera’s out-of-court identification was tainted
with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it.
Without hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito Baylon identified the
appellant as one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified through a show-
up. The accused assailed the process of identification because no other suspect was presented in a
police line-up. We ruled that a police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the
identification of the accused through a show-up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the
out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent positive
identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-up identification x x x should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.

Moreover, the burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug shot identification was unduly
suggestive. There is no evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to the
witnesses that petitioners were the suspected gunmen. We, therefore, fail to see any flaw that would
invalidate the eyewitnesses’ identification. As aptly observed by the CA:

Both Florecita Dioneda and Niña Elemanco gave a credible eyewitness’ account of the victim’s x x x
death [by gunshots] in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic] giving details of a
startling and shocking incident that cannot easily be fabricated deserves credence and full probative
weight for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events. Both of these witnesses
had a good look at the victim’s assailants, who did not at any time during the incident attempt to
conceal their faces. Accused-appellant MARBELLA even stood less [than] a meter from Florecita
Dioneda as he pointed a gun at her while another accused-appellant even [etched] upon her a
distinct impression of his baldness as repeatedly mentioned by her during her testimony. As there is
nothing to indicate that these two principal witnesses were moved by improper motives, their positive
declarations on the witness stand deserve full faith and credit.18

The fact that the prosecution witnesses are related to the victim will not necessarily taint their
testimonies. The weight of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their
relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their
part.19 Relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that
the witness is biased.20 These prosecution witnesses are the most aggrieved parties, being the
victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their motive of putting the killers behind bars cannot be considered
improper.21 It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in avenging the crime to implicate
persons other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished.22

Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts – and
when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.23

Significantly, in the pleadings filed before the trial court and in the appellate court, petitioners were
steadfast in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to
escape criminal liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed
the crime. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.24 Moreover, when a party adopts a certain theory in
the court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not
only be unfair to the other party but would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.25

Treachery was also duly proven. The deadly and successive actions of the petitioners did not allow
the victim any opportunity to defend himself. The victim was innocently taking a bath totally unaware
of the planned attack against him. Or while he may have realized a possible danger to his person,
the attack was executed in such a manner as to make defense, not to say counter attack,
impossible. The suddenness of the assault, without the slightest provocation from him who was
unarmed and with nary an opportunity to repel the aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified
the crime with alevosia.26

The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity
of the accused.27 And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.28

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was
done with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of
homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.29

G.R. No. 181829 September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

Facts:

On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Crim. Case No. T-3157:

That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at dawn, x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA,"3 a minor 12 years
of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.4

Crim. Case No. T-3158:

That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999, in the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the
father of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9
years of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudicie of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.5

Crim. Case No. T-3159:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999, at dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the
father of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9
years of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.6

When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.7

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed
that "AAA" was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and medical
certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9

Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA" narrated that when she was about 4 years
old, her mother left her in the care of her father, herein appellant. Since then, she had been living
with her father.

"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9,
2002. During her testimony, "AAA" narrated that:

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Will you please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

WITNESS:
A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth, presently residing at x x x11

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, do you still remember September 27, 1999?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A That was the birthday of my father and the date when he touched me, sir.

xxxx

Q Who rape[d] you?

A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused.

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q You claimed that your father touched and used you. How did he begin in touching you?

A He tied me, sir.

xxxx

Q What part of your body was x x x tied by your father?

A My mouth, sir.

Q What other parts of your body, if there [are] any?

A My hands and my feet, sir.

PROS. ULANDAY:

My witness is crying, your Honor.12

xxxx

Q Now, after your father tied you on September 27, 1999, what did he do, if there’s any?

A He raped me, sir.

COURT:
Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped you?

xxxx

A He undressed me, sir.

xxxx

COURT:

And we make of record that [witness is now] in tears.13

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you uttered the word "incua na." What do you
mean by that?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q How long a time did your father [insert] his penis into your vagina?

A About two minutes, sir.

Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what happened if any, between you and your
father?

A The same, sir.

Q What do you mean by the same?

A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q Before your father inserted his penis into your vagina, what did he do, if there was any?

A He first undressed me, sir.

Q While he was undressing you what were you doing, if any?

A I failed to do any, sir.

Q Why did you fail to do any?

A Because I was afraid, sir.

Q Why were you afraid at the time?

A Because he threatened me, sir.

 Q How did he [threaten] you?

A That if I would report the matter to anyone he would kill the person to whom I will report,
sir.

Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00 o’clock dawn?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A Because he again raped me, sir.

Q Who raped you?

A My father, sir.

Q In what particular place [were] you raped?

A In our house, sir.

xxxx

Q You claimed that you were raped by your father, how did he rape you?

A He undressed me, sir.

Q What else did he do aside from undressing you?

A He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q And after poking a knife at you, what happened next, if any?

A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.

Q What part of your body was touched by your father?

A My vagina, sir.

Q How did he touch your vagina?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q What happened when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A I cried, sir.14

After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the prosecution rested its case.
Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA"
is his daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was
living in the same house as "AAA."16 However, when asked regarding the rape charges filed against
him by his daughter, appellant denied the same. Thus:

Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you [with] rape in Crim. Case Nos. T-
3157/3158/3159 for allegedly having sexual intercourse with her against her will and
consent. What can you say against these charges by your daughter?

A [Those are] not true, sir.17

The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva (Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of
the appellant.18He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape cases against appellant because the latter
forbade her to entertain suitors.19Marcelino also alleged that after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA"
eloped with her 20-year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from her boyfriend when she
was brought under the care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.20 When asked
how old "AAA" was when she allegedly eloped with her boyfriend, Marcelino answered that "AAA"
was only 13 years old.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA." However, it noted that although it was agreed
upon during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the fact remains that "AAA"
was 12 years, six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9,
2002.22 The court below also observed that "AAA has always been a pathetic child of oppression,
abuse and neglect" and that "[h]er innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for survival,
and her virtual orphanhood sufficed to qualify every sexual molestation perpetrated by her father as
rape x x x."23

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused SATURNINO VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated
against [his] daughter on September 27, 1999, September 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, x x x and as
mandated by Article 266-B, same Code, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH for each offense, to indemnify the complainant "AAA" for damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 per [count], and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to present
evidence that would overcome the presumption of his innocence. Appellant also alleged that the trial
court erred in lending credence to the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of "AAA."25 He claimed that
it was unusual for "AAA" not to offer any resistance to the advances allegedly made by him
considering that he was unarmed. According to the appellant, "AAA" should have struggled or at
least offered some resistance because she was not completely helpless.26Appellant also suggested
that "AAA" must have been coached because initially, she did not know the acts which constitute
rape. However, during the succeeding hearings, "AAA" allegedly testified in detail the bestial acts
committed against her.27

Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence the medical
certificate and to present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his
findings.28 Likewise, "AAA’s" birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil
Registrar who allegedly prepared the same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed that
assuming he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape
and not qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly established.29Further, with the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346, appellant should not be sentenced to death.30

On the other hand, appellee maintained that "AAA’s" credibility was beyond doubt31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his
victim, as in this case.32Appellee insisted that the crimes committed were three counts of qualified,
and not simple, rape considering that "AAA" was a minor and the offender was her father,33 and that
the parties had already stipulated during pre-trial as regards the age of the victim.34

On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157, T-3158 and T-3159 finding
accused-appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
qualified rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua for each count of qualified rape, without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103, as
amended. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant/victim ["AAA"], for
each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as
moral damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
"AAA."36 Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not immediately answer the questions
propounded to her, the CA opined that it was because she was either distressed in recounting her
horrible experiences or in tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the fact that "AAA" was
only 13 years old when she testified on her harrowing experiences.38

The appellate court likewise brushed aside appellant’s contention that "AAA" did not offer any
resistance. According to the CA, appellant’s moral ascendancy over "AAA" substitutes for violence or
intimidation.39

The CA also concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable
for three counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and
the medical certificate would only be corroborative evidence.40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA
recalled that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the appellant had
already been stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the
Informations and proven during trial.41

Finally, the CA held that appellant’s denial is intrinsically weak and self-serving especially
considering "AAA’s" credible and straightforward testimony.42

Our Ruling
 Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file their supplemental briefs.43

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt that appellant thrice raped his daughter,
"AAA." We examined the records and we find "AAA’s" testimony convincing and straightforward. We
therefore have no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
victim’s testimony, more so in this case where the said findings were affirmed by the CA.

We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that appellant could be convicted of rape even
without the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony
of the victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things."44 As stated above, "AAA’s" testimony was credible and
convincing. As such, appellant’s conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only
serve as corroborative evidence.

We, however, agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate,
although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered by the trial court
and the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution
rested its case after presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally offering any documentary
exhibit at all.

Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

xxxx

The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.’ A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

xxxx

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during
pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as
evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It
must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the
party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that
any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.46ten.lihpw al

We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals47 where one of the issues presented
was whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the
admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.48 In finding the case impressed with merit, the Court held that:

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed
before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.
Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the
rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the
CTA. x x x

xxxx

x x x [T]he presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the
truth of BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence,
despite CTA’s directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a
single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the
BIR.49

We are not unaware that there is an exception to the above-stated rule. In People v.
Mate,50 Silvestre Mate (Mate) was charged with the crime of "Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder
and Frustrated Murder."51 During arraignment, he entered a plea of "guilty." The court then
propounded clarificatory questions to determine whether the accused understood the consequences
of his plea. Immediately thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty
as charged and sentenced him to death.52 It was only after the rendition of the judgment that the trial
court conducted hearings for the reception of the prosecution’s evidence.53

From the prosecution’s evidence, it would appear that during the investigation, Mate voluntarily
made extra-judicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." Also, after his conviction,
he appeared as witness for the prosecution against his co-accused where he affirmed his extra-
judicial statements in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." However, the state prosecutor failed to formally offer
said exhibits.

In debunking the defense’s contentions that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of
conviction on Mate even before the prosecution could present its evidence, and in considering the
exhibits which were not formally offered, the Court held thus:

The defense contends that the trial court committed a serious error in rendering judgment of
conviction immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime charged on the basis of his plea of
guilty and before receiving any evidence. While the trial court committed an error in rendering
judgment immediately after the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter, conducted hearings for
the reception of the evidence for the prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify the
setting aside of the judgment of conviction, considering that it is supported by the judicial and extra-
judicial confessions of the accused and by other evidence. x x x
xxxx

The defense questions also the failure of the state prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal
offer of his exhibits, although they have been marked and identified. Such an oversight appears
trivial because the entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded. Even without the exhibits which
have been incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case
because the witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.

Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate because it appears with clarity that he
voluntarily and spontaneously gave those narrations without compulsion from anybody. In fact, . . .
when he testified against Ben Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.54

In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the above ruling by holding that evidence, although not
formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case."56 In
Ramos v. Dizon,57 we deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records because they
had been "presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case."58Likewise, the first requisite was
deemed satisfied because one of the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when
interrogated by the respondents’ counsel.59

In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in People v. Mate,60 Mato v. Court of Appeals,61 and
Ramos v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing
the admission of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth certificate. The records would show that the
lone witness for the prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain their contents. When
"AAA" was placed on the witness stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No reference
was ever made to her birth certificate. The same is true with the medical certificate. After the
marking during the pre-trial, the prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the proceedings.
Neither did it present the doctor who prepared the same.

Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of
age63 would not help the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court found this admission inaccurate as
in fact, "AAA" was already above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9, 2002.
Second and more important, appellant’s admission during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. x x x." In
People v. Chua Uy,64 we held that:

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to
"D-4", inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot
be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his
counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by his counsel.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his
counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused
against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered
into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference;
eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused of the facts agreed upon.

In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order was not signed by both appellant and his
counsel.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to
prove "AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged
must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the
victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven
beyond reasonable doubt."65

In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape66 the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be
reduced to ₱50,000.00 and moral damages to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages
is proper. "Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Relationship as an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code is considered aggravating in the crime of
rape."67 In this case, the aggravating circumstance of relationship was duly established. Appellant
himself admitted when he testified in open court that he is "AAA’s" father. However, the award of
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages must be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.68

WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino Villanueva GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and
accordingly sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim
"AAA" the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156178 January 20, 2006

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, Petitioners,

vs.
REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision1 dated November 22,
2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51912. The decision affirmed the Summary
Judgment2 dated August 7, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 61, in Civil
Case No. 13944.

The facts in this case are culled from the records.

Petitioners are the Philippine National Bank (PNB), a private banking corporation, and the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), an agency created by Proclamation No. 50 that takes title to or
possession, conserves, provisionally manages, and disposes assets, which have been identified for
privatization or disposition, for the benefit of the National Government.

Respondent Refrigeration Industries Inc. (RII) is a manufacturer of refrigerators and compressors.

Prior to 1984, respondent RII occupied a portion of the assembly plant of Delta Motor Corporation
(DMC). RII installed in the plant equipment, machinery and other chattels RII used in its business.3

In February 1984, PNB, then a government-owned and controlled bank, foreclosed several parcels
of real estate and chattels of DMC located at the DMC Compound. In an auction of the foreclosed
properties, PNB was the highest bidder. Thus, it took possession of all chattels inside the DMC
compound, both as owner of chattels and as mortgagee of the remaining properties.4

On June 18, 1984 when PNB took possession of the DMC compound, RII demanded the release of
its properties still inside the compound, now the subject of the case, after RII made statements
claiming ownership over them. PNB allowed RII to remove some of its personal properties from the
DMC compound, upon the latter’s showing of proof of ownership. However, respondent failed to
produce any proof of ownership,5 with respect to the contested properties found in Annex "C" of the
Complaint. PNB’s refusal to release the subject properties led to the filing of a complaint by RII
for Recovery of Possession with Damages before the RTC of Makati on June 10, 1986.

At all the scheduled pre-trial conferences, PNB consistently manifested in court its willingness to
release the chattels conditioned upon RII’s showing of evidence of ownership. Eventually, some of
the properties were released.

By virtue of Proclamation No. 50 as implemented by Administrative Circular No. 14 dated February

27, 1989, certain properties of RII inside DMC’s compound, with some other acquired assets of PNB
covered by the Circular, were transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). Hence in 1992, APT
was impleaded as a party-defendant. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8758,6 the corporate existence of
APT expired on December 31, 2000. On December 6, 2000, former President Joseph Estrada
signed Executive Order No. 323 creating the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) which
succeeded the APT. At the time, RII had not yet shown additional evidence to support its claim over
the remaining personal properties in PNB’s possession.

Six (6) years later, on February 10, 1995, RII filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.7 It averred
that there was no genuine issue to any material fact except the issue on damages, costs and
attorneys’ fees. RII alleged that during the pre-trial conference, PNB manifested to APT, in a
letter8 dated May 11, 1989, that the machineries and equipments of RII listed in Annex "C" of the
complaint were erroneously transferred to APT, and that in a letter9dated May 31, 1989, APT
acknowledged the mistakes and agreed to release the properties to the authorized representative of
RII.

Both PNB and APT (PMO) opposed the motion on the ground that there still existed a genuine
factual issue, which was the ownership of the chattels.

On August 7, 1995, a Summary Judgment was rendered by the lower court, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered, and there is no genuine issue left to be litigated, the
motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff as
against defendants who are hereby ORDERED to effect the return of all the chattels and/or personal
properties of plaintiff that were taken by them as stated in Annex "C" of the Complaint.

SO ORDERED.10

PNB appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On November 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
petition raising a single issue as follows:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CONSIDER THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE
ISSUE IN THIS CASE, THAT OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE CONTESTED CHATTELS, THAT
WOULD PRECLUDE ISSUANCE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.11

Simply put, was the summary judgment proper? Did the appellate court err in affirming the trial
court’s decision?

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the summary judgment.
There was no admission made as to RII’s ownership of the contested chattels, thus, there still exists
a genuine issue as to a material fact that precludes the issuance of summary judgment.

After considering the records of this case, we find that petitioners’ contention could not be upheld.
We agree that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the summary judgment was properly rendered
by the trial court.

Firstly, it may be noted that PNB admitted in its May 11, 1989 letter to APT that the contested
chattels belonged to RII, but were erroneously taken during the foreclosure of DMC’s properties; that
these were eventually transferred to APT. Secondly, we also note that APT admitted that PNB wrote
the letter dated May 11, 1989; and that APT wrote a letter dated May 29, 1989 to PNB. With these
admissions, there is no genuine issue concerning RII’s ownership of the chattels and their erroneous
delivery to APT had remained. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation
of evidence. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to the facts.12 lavvphil.ne+

Summary judgment, as prescribed by the rules must then ensue as a matter of law, to weed out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, to avoid the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial, and to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is
genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of trial.13

Contrary to petitioners’ claim that there was no admission on their part that respondent owned the
chattels, our review of the records shows that petitioners failed to either specifically deny or directly
assail and raise as an issue, the validity of the letter dated May 11, 1989 and the letter dated May
29, 1989. Their failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the said documents amounts
to a judicial admission pursuant to Section 8, 14 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

Judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior
showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.15 These letters are deemed
admitted as evidence, and they likewise supersede the defenses interposed by petitioners in their
respective answers.
It may lastly be recalled that from the very start, PNB consistently manifested its willingness to
release the said properties upon respondent’s proof of ownership over them. The correspondence
between the parties shows that PNB actually admitted that the subject chattels belonged to RII but
were erroneously transferred to petitioner APT. Conformably then, the trial court’s summary
judgment is proper and correct. No reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in
affirming it.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
November 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51912 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.