farmers, will reveal that the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject
Rule 19: Intervention to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is necessary in
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 54281. March 19, 1990.]
CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, Petitioners,
v. HON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan,
Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT,
TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE PACITA, MATTHEW and
ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERVENTION;
QUALIFICATIONS OF INTERVENOR. — Intervention is not a matter of
right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson v.
Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is
his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such
interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); and other cases.]
2. TENANT EMANCIPATIONS DECREE (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 27); OBJECTIVES. — Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the
"Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the fundamental
objective of addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership
giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the countryside. More
importantly, it recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive
agricultural base of the country’s economy. To achieve this end, the decree
laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the
backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Landowners of
agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production
and exceeded the minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell,
through the intercession of the government, their lands to qualified farmers at
liberal terms and conditions. However, a careful study of the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer issued to qualified
order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.
3. ID.; ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENT; VEST OWNERSHIP.
— Under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the
registration of title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full
compliance by the grantee with the abovementioned undertakings is required
for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent
issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2,
Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent which constitutes
conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or
a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee. Clearly, it is only
after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to
an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy [See definition of
"vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928);
Republic of the Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987,
151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these
conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership
over the landholding.
4. ID.; ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFER;
EVIDENCES GOVERNMENT’S RECOGNITION OF TENANT’S
QUALIFICATION TO ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP THEREOF. — The mere
issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee
ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply evidences the
government’s recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the
statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by
him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent nor irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to
comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments
when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or
agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer
[Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANTEE NOT ENTITLED TO DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION IN CASE STATE EXERCISES POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN. — In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign
power of eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for
public use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department
1
of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand, petitioners have not been
issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute private
respondents’ allegation that they have not complied with the conditions
enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a
patent [See Private Respondents’ Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 34. And also
Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact, petitioners
do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through the
Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the
purchase of the subject property. Under these circumstances, petitioners
cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a
portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to
the value of the landholding. Anent petitioners’ claim for disturbance
compensation, the Court finds that the law cited by petitioners, Section 36 (1)
of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389, cannot be invoked
to hold the State liable for disturbance compensation [See Campos v. CA,
G.R. No. 51904, October 1,1980] where this Court by resolution denied for
lack of merit therein petitioner’s claim that, as agricultural lessee or tenant,
he was entitled to disturbance compensation against the State. It refers to
situations where the peaceful enjoyment and possession by the agricultural
tenants or lessees of the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor
thereof. Paragraphs l to 7 of the said section enumerate the instances when
the lessees may be evicted by the owner/lessor, and paragraph 1 thereof
provides that lessees shall be entitled to disturbance compensation from the
owner/lessor, if the land will be converted by the latter into a residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as
amended, deals with the liability of an owner/lessor to his agricultural tenant
lessee and cannot be invoked to make the State liable to petitioners herein for
disturbance compensation.
6. JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT (B.P. BLG. 129); REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT’S EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING. — On the issue of jurisdiction,
petitioners contend that since their motion to intervene alleges as justification
therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan is the bona fide tenant of the subject
property, the case should have been referred to the Court of Agrarian
Relations which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over expropriation
proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted properties. The Court
finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered
moot and academic by B.P. Blg. 129. Under Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P.
Blg. 129, all civil actions and special proceedings which were then under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly
the Courts of First Instance].
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
On January 17, 1978, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for expropriation of a
parcel of land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by private
respondents herein as evidenced by TCT No. 24006, issued by the Register
of Deeds of the province of Bulacan [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10]. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 5257-M and entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Turandot Aldaba, Et. Al."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 2, 1978, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession
placing the Republic in possession of the land, upon its deposit of the amount
of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P7,200.00) as provisional value of
the land. On June 8, 1978, petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for
leave to intervene, with complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging
that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of
a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to
Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation far his landholding or, in the
alternative, to order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide
tenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per
hectare.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On December 8, 1978, respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an order
denying the petitioners’ supplemental motion, holding that to admit
petitioners’ complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a
person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance
compensation is a claim against the State. On January 12, 1979, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by respondent judge in
an order dated February 13, 1979.
On July 23, 1980, the instant petition was filed and was docketed as G.R. No.
54281. On January 14, 1981, this Court issued a resolution denying the
instant petition for lack of merit. On March 10, 1981, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation case. On August 19,
1981, this Court issued a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration
2
and gave due course to the petition.
Meanwhile on December 22, 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal, as well as a
first motion for extension of thirty (30) days from January 12, 1979 within
which to file record on appeal which was granted by respondent court. The
Solicitor General was appealing from that portion of the December 8, 1978
decision of the Court of First Instance which fixed the compensation for the
land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter. Counsel for
private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent’s record on
appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. On
August 13, 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal interposed
by the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for
reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, public
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the
annulment of the orders of the Court of First Instance. On April 29, 1980, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing public respondent’s
petition. On October 24, 1980, public respondent filed with this Court a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886, asking this Court to annul the decision
of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to approve
the Government’s record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the petition
and directed the trial court to approve the Government’s record on appeal
and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I pursuant
The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of
petitioners to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the
State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject property.
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when
the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention [Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30,
1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an
officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual, direct
and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67
Phil. 279 (1939)]; Batama Farmer’s Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson v.
Revilla, supra].
In the present case, petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal
interest in the matter in litigation for he, not private respondents herein, is the
party entitled to just compensation for the subject property sought to be
expropriated or, in the alternative, disturbance compensation as a bona fide
tenant based on Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6389.
Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on Certificate of Land
Transfer No. NS-054560 issued to them, where the tenant farmer/grantee is
"deemed owner" of the agricultural land identified therein. ** Petitioners
contend that the certificate is a muniment of title evidencing their legal
ownership of a portion of the subject property. Thus, they conclude that they
are entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings
instituted over the subject property.
There is no merit to the above contention.
The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to
describe the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But the import of such
phrase must be construed within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No.
27, and interpreted with the other stipulations of the certificate issued
to this decree.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree")
was anchored upon the fundamental objective of addressing valid and
legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and
social tension in the countryside. More importantly, it recognized the
necessity to encourage a more productive agricultural base of the country’s
economy. To achieve this end, the decree laid down a system for the
purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy,
of the lands they were tilling. Landowners of agricultural lands which were
devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the minimum
retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the
government, their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions.
However, a careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the
certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the
transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and
conditions the compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees
3
can claim the right of absolute ownership over them. qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of
ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27.
A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Failure on the part of
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or
x x x amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the
landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of
land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].
I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, declare that
________________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a
cultivation and having complied with the implementing rules and regulations farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby deemed to be the owner of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
the agricultural land described as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy [See definition of
x x x "vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928);
Republic of the Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987,
151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these
subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership
tenant farmer as fixed by the authorities concerned, including the interest rate over the landholding.
at the rate of six percentum (6%) per annum shall be paid by the tenant
farmer in fifteen (15) equal annual amortization, that the tenant farmer must In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of
be a member of a Barrio Association upon organization of such association eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for public
in his locality, and that the title to the land herein shall not be transferred use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of
except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the Public Works and Highways. On the other hand, petitioners have not been
provisions of Presidential Decree Number 27, the Code of Agrarian Reform issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute private
and other existing laws and regulations. respondents’ allegation that they have not complied with the conditions
x x x enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a
patent [See Private Respondents’ Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 34. And also
Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact, petitioners
[Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 26, Emphasis supplied]. do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through the
Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the
And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the purchase of the subject property.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
registration of title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full
compliance by the grantee with the abovementioned undertakings is required Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that
for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the
issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.
Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent which constitutes
conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or Anent petitioners’ claim for disturbance compensation, the Court finds that
a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.chanrobles.com : the law cited by petitioners, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended
virtual law library by Rep. Act No. 6389, cannot be invoked to hold the State liable for
disturbance compensation [See Campos v. CA, G.R. No. 51904, October
Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in 1,1980] where this Court by resolution denied for lack of merit therein
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate petitioner’s claim that, as agricultural lessee or tenant, he was entitled to
simply evidences the government’s recognition of the grantee as the party disturbance compensation against the State. It refers to situations where the

4
peaceful enjoyment and possession by the agricultural tenants or lessees of tenanted properties.
the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor thereof. Paragraphs l
to 7 of the said section enumerate the instances when the lessees may be The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has
evicted by the owner/lessor, and paragraph 1 thereof provides that lessees jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation from the owner/lessor, if the moot and academic by B.P. Blg. 129. Under Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P.
land will be converted by the latter into a residential, commercial or Blg. 129, all civil actions and special proceedings which were then under the
industrial land. Thus, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, deals exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under
with the liability of an owner/lessor to his agricultural tenant lessee and the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly
cannot be invoked to make the State liable to petitioners herein for the Courts of First Instance].chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
disturbance compensation.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Nor may petitioners invoke this section as basis to hold private respondents
liable for disturbance compensation. Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as SO ORDERED.
amended, is applicable only when it is the owner/lessor who voluntarily opts Republic of the Philippines
for the conversion of his land into non-agricultural land. In the present case, SUPREME COURT
it is the State, not the private respondents, who disturbed petitioners’ Manila
possession of the subject property. The conversion of the property into a THIRD DIVISION
permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public G.R. No. 58168 December 19, 1989
Works and Highways was undertaken by the government independent of the CONCEPCION MAGSAYSAY-LABRADOR, SOLEDAD
will of private respondents herein. MAGSAYSAY-CABRERA, LUISA MAGSAYSAY-CORPUZ, assisted
be her husband, Dr. Jose Corpuz, FELICIDAD P. MAGSAYSAY, and
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the government has already paid MERCEDES MAGSAYSAY-DIAZ, petitioners,
petitioner Celso Pagtalunan approximately FIVE THOUSAND PESOS vs.
(P5,000.00) to compensate the latter for improvements introduced on the THE COURT OF APPEALS and ADELAIDA RODRIGUEZ-
property, and expenses for relocating his home [Petitioners’ Reply to the MAGSAYSAY, Special Administratrix of the Estate of the late Genaro
Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2; Rollo, p. 98. And also F. Magsaysay respondents.
Private Respondents’ Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p.
93].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FERNAN, C.J.:
Considering, therefore, that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation
for the expropriation of the subject property, nor to disturbance compensation In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reverse and set
under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, the Court finds that the trial court aside [1] the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July l3,
committed no reversible error in denying petitioners’ motion for leave to 1981, 1 affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and
intervene in the expropriation proceedings below. Olongapo City which denied petitioners' motion to intervene in an annulment
II suit filed by herein private respondent, and [2] its resolution dated September
7, 1981, denying their motion for reconsideration.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that since their motion to
intervene alleges as justification therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan is
the bona fide tenant of the subject property, the case should have been
referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of
Petitioners are raising a purely legal question; whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals correctly denied their motion for intervention.
The facts are not controverted.

5
On February 9, 1979, Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay, widow and special
administratix of the estate of the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay, brought
before the then Court of First Instance of Olongapo an action against
Artemio Panganiban, Subic Land Corporation (SUBIC), Filipinas
Manufacturer's Bank (FILMANBANK) and the Register of Deeds of
Zambales. In her complaint, she alleged that in 1958, she and her husband
acquired, thru conjugal funds, a parcel of land with improvements, known as
"Pequena Island", covered by TCT No. 3258; that after the death of her
husband, she discovered [a] an annotation at the back of TCT No. 3258 that
"the land was acquired by her husband from his separate capital;" [b] the
registration of a Deed of Assignment dated June 25, 1976 purportedly
executed by the late Senator in favor of SUBIC, as a result of which TCT No.
3258 was cancelled and TCT No. 22431 issued in the name of SUBIC; and
[c] the registration of Deed of Mortgage dated April 28, 1977 in the amount
of P 2,700,000.00 executed by SUBIC in favor of FILMANBANK; that the
foregoing acts were void and done in an attempt to defraud the conjugal
partnership considering that the land is conjugal, her marital consent to the
annotation on TCT No. 3258 was not obtained, the change made by the
Register of Deeds of the titleholders was effected without the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration and that the late Senator did not execute
the purported Deed of Assignment or his consent thereto, if obtained, was
secured by mistake, violence and intimidation. She further alleged that the
assignment in favor of SUBIC was without consideration and consequently
null and void. She prayed that the Deed of Assignment and the Deed of
Mortgage be annulled and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel
TCT No. 22431 and to issue a new title in her favor.
On March 7, 1979, herein petitioners, sisters of the late senator, filed a
motion for intervention on the ground that on June 20, 1978, their brother
conveyed to them one-half (1/2 ) of his shareholdings in SUBIC or a total of
416,566.6 shares and as assignees of around 41 % of the total outstanding
shares of such stocks of SUBIC, they have a substantial and legal interest in
the subject matter of litigation and that they have a legal interest in the
success of the suit with respect to SUBIC.
On July 26, 1979, the court denied the motion for intervention, and ruled that
petitioners have no legal interest whatsoever in the matter in litigation and
their being alleged assignees or transferees of certain shares in SUBIC cannot
legally entitle them to intervene because SUBIC has a personality separate
and distinct from its stockholders.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals found no factual or legal
justification to disturb the findings of the lower court. The appellate court
further stated that whatever claims the petitioners have against the late
Senator or against SUBIC for that matter can be ventilated in a separate
proceeding, such that with the denial of the motion for intervention, they are
not left without any remedy or judicial relief under existing law.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
recourse.
Petitioners anchor their right to intervene on the purported assignment made
by the late Senator of a certain portion of his shareholdings to them as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1978. 2 Such transfer, petitioners
posit, clothes them with an interest, protected by law, in the matter of
litigation.
Invoking the principle enunciated in the case of PNB v. Phil. Veg. Oil Co.,
49 Phil. 857,862 & 853 (1927), 3petitioners strongly argue that their
ownership of 41.66% of the entire outstanding capital stock of SUBIC
entitles them to a significant vote in the corporate affairs; that they are
affected by the action of the widow of their late brother for it concerns the
only tangible asset of the corporation and that it appears that they are more
vitally interested in the outcome of the case than SUBIC.
Viewed in the light of Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, this
Court affirms the respondent court's holding that petitioners herein have no
legal interest in the subject matter in litigation so as to entitle them to
intervene in the proceedings below. In the case of Batama Farmers'
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Rosal, 4 we held: "As clearly
stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, to be permitted to
intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest
against both, or he must be so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court or
an officer thereof ."
To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or otherwise qualified; and [b] consideration must
be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as
the first is not more important than the second. 5
6
The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other
parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties of the
action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable. And this is not the policy of the
law. 6
The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of
action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in a legal position to
litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which
plaintiff could not recover. 7
Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect,
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the very
least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in the
management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and in the
properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate
debts and obligations.
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the
property of the corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof with any legal
right or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate property
being equitable or beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense the
owners of corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as a distinct
legal person. 8
Petitioners further contend that the availability of other remedies, as declared
by the Court of appeals, is totally immaterial to the availability of the remedy
of intervention.
We cannot give credit to such averment. As earlier stated, that the movant's
interest may be protected in a separate proceeding is a factor to be considered
in allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention. It is significant to note
at this juncture that as per records, there are four pending cases involving the
parties herein, enumerated as follows: [1] Special Proceedings No. 122122
before the CFI of Manila, Branch XXII, entitled "Concepcion Magsaysay-
Labrador, et al. v. Subic Land Corp., et al.", involving the validity of the
transfer by the late Genaro Magsaysay of one-half of his shareholdings in
Subic Land Corporation; [2] Civil Case No. 2577-0 before the CFI of
Zambales, Branch III, "Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay v. Panganiban, etc.;
Concepcion Labrador, et al. Intervenors", seeking to annul the purported
Deed of Assignment in favor of SUBIC and its annotation at the back of TCT
No. 3258 in the name of respondent's deceased husband; [3] SEC Case No.
001770, filed by respondent praying, among other things that she be declared
in her capacity as the surviving spouse and administratrix of the estate of
Genaro Magsaysay as the sole subscriber and stockholder of SUBIC. There,
petitioners, by motion, sought to intervene. Their motion to reconsider the
denial of their motion to intervene was granted; [4] SP No. Q-26739 before
the CFI of Rizal, Branch IV, petitioners herein filing a contingent claim
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86, Revised Rules of Court. 9 Petitioners'
interests are no doubt amply protected in these cases.
Neither do we lend credence to petitioners' argument that they are more
interested in the outcome of the case than the corporation-assignee, owing to
the fact that the latter is willing to compromise with widow-respondent and
since a compromise involves the giving of reciprocal concessions, the only
conceivable concession the corporation may give is a total or partial
relinquishment of the corporate assets. 10
Such claim all the more bolsters the contingent nature of petitioners' interest
in the subject of litigation.
The factual findings of the trial court are clear on this point. The petitioners
cannot claim the right to intervene on the strength of the transfer of shares
allegedly executed by the late Senator. The corporation did not keep books
and records. 11 Perforce, no transfer was ever recorded, much less effected
as to prejudice third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of
the corporation to affect third persons. The law on corporations is explicit.
Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides, thus: "No transfer, however,
shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or
certificates and the number of shares transferred."
And even assuming arguendo that there was a valid transfer, petitioners are
nonetheless barred from intervening inasmuch as their rights can be
ventilated and amply protected in another proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
7
 [G.R. No. 81835 : December 20, 1990.]
192 SCRA 469
ROMEO J. ORDOÑEZ, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. ALFREDO J.
GUSTILO, in his capacity as presiding judge of Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch XVI, Cavite City, Municipality of Rosario, Cavite,
former Mayor Calixto D. Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite, and Valeriano
Espiritu of Mabolo, Bacoor, Cavite, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for Certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, the (1) Decision dated May 24, 1985; (2) Order dated
May 27, 1987 and (3) Order dated December 24, 1987, all issued in Civil
Case No. N-4367 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVI, Cavite
City entitled "Valeriano Espiritu v. Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite and Hon. Calixto D. Enriquez in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
Rosario, Cavite.
The pertinent background facts are:
Valeriano Espiritu, herein private respondent filed on April 22, 1983, a
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, against respondents
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite and Calixto Enriquez, the latter in his
capacity as Mayor of said municipality, to enforce their agreement contained
in a Reclamation Contract. In his complaint, Espiritu prayed that the
Municipality of Rosario, together with Enriquez, be ordered to convey to him
323,996 square meters of the reclaimed portion of the foreshore land of the
town. Espiritu filed the action in his capacity as the assignee of the Salinas
Development Corporation (SADECO), the entity which reclaimed the area in
question by virtue of a Reclamation Contract entered into between it and the
Municipality of Rosario, represented by Enriquez as Municipal Mayor. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4367 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Cavite City.
In its answer, defendant municipality resisted plaintiff's claim stating that it
was barred by the statute of limitation; the contract has been substantially
amended, modified and supplemented; and plaintiff has not performed his
reciprocal obligation.- nad
The barangay captain of Tejeros Convention, Rosario, Cavite, herein
petitioner Romeo J. Ordoñez, together with seven (7) other municipal and
barangay officials intervened, and in their Answer-in-Intervention, they
alleged that no actual reclamation was done by the plaintiff and the area
being claimed by the plaintiff came about by natural accretion; the
reclamation contract between the contractor and the municipality is either
void, voidable or disadvantageous to the defendant municipality.
The issues having been joined the trial court set the case for the mandatory
pre-trial conference on November 15, 1984.
At this scheduled pre-trial conference, all the litigants including the
intervenors, with their respective counsel, were present. In said conference,
plaintiff Espiritu and defendant municipality, manifested to the court that
having arrived at a satisfactory settlement, they would submit a compromise
agreement at a latter date.
On the other hand, the intervenors asked the court that they be allowed to
present their evidence to prove their defense asserted in their answer-in-
intervention. For the said purpose, hearing was held on December 13, 1984
wherein Ernesto Andico, vice-mayor testified. Another hearing was also held
on January 24, 1985 where Vice-Governor Jose M. Ricafrente, Jr. of the
Province of Cavite, and petitioner's counsel in the instant case, also testified.
On May 20, 1985, the principal litigants filed with respondent trial court their
promised compromise agreement. The parties agreed that 208,664 square
meters of the reclaimed area were to be alloted to the plaintiff and 211,311
square meters thereof were to be given to defendant municipality.
On May 24, 1985, the trial court approved the compromise agreement and
rendered a decision in accordance therewith. The intervenors received their
copy of the decision on September 19, 1985 thru Vice-Mayor Ernesto
Andico. The decision being already final, it was duly executed to the
satisfaction of the principal litigants.
On October 17, 1985 and July 2, 1987 additional hearings were held where
the intervenors presented three (3) additional witnesses.
On June 24, 1987, the intervenors filed a motion to set aside the compromise
agreement dated May 15, 1985. This was denied by the trial court, thru
respondent Judge Alfredo Gustilo (the former presiding judge, Judge
Alejandro Silapan having already retired) in its Order dated November 27,
1987, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
"It appears that on May 24, 1985, the former Presiding Judge of this Court
approved the said Compromise Agreement and rendered a judgment on the
basis thereof. It is settled that a judgment approving a compromise agreement
is final and immediately executory. (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524).
8
The motion in question therefore cannot be granted as it has the effect of
annulling the judgment of this Court which has already become final and,
according to the plaintiff, already executed.
"The Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement cannot even be
considered as a motion for reconsideration because the Court can no longer
set aside, amend or modify its judgment which has become final. Neither can
the said motion be deemed as a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court, since to set aside a judgment based upon a compromise agreement
under the said Rule, the petition for relief must be filed not later than six (6)
months from the date it was rendered. (Bodiongan v. Ceniza, 102 Phil. 750).
The decision of the Court based on the Compromise Agreement was
rendered on May 24, 1985. On the other hand, the present Motion to Set
Aside Compromise Agreement was filed only on June 24, 1987. Moreover,
under Section 3 of Rule 38, the petition for relief from judgment should be
filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment sought to be
set aside. The intervenor in this case received a copy of the decision based on
the Compromise Agreement on September 19, 1985. If the instant motion be
construed as an independent action to annul a judgment, this Court would not
have jurisdiction over it inasmuch as under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, an action for the annulment
of a judgment of the Regional Trial Court falls under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtual law library
Additionally, the intervenors have not convincingly shown that defendant
Mayor Enriquez was not authorized to sign the Compromise Agreement in
behalf of the Municipality of Rosario. On the contrary, the Mayor has in his
favor the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. (Sec. 5
[m], Rule 131, Rules of Court.) Likewise, they failed to sufficiently explain
why and how the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement have
contravened the law, morals, good customs and public policy." (pp. 41-42,
Rollo).
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1987, plaintiff Espiritu filed a manifestation and
Motion praying that the proceedings be terminated and that the case be
considered closed, which motion respondent judge granted in his Order dated
December 24, 1987. The pertinent portion of the said Order reads —
"In support of his motion to terminate the proceedings, the plaintiff argued
that further trial in this case will be an exercise in futility, considering that
the issues raised by the intervenors have become moot and academic in view
of the decision of the Court based on the Compromise Agreement submitted
by the plaintiff and the defendants.
"This contention appears to be well taken. The decision of the Court based on
the Compromise Agreement has in effect resolved the issues raised by the
intervenors, i.e., whether the reclamation contract entered into between the
town of Rosario and the Salinas Development Corporation, the predecessors-
in-interest of the plaintiff, is null and void; and whether or not there was
actual reclamation done by the said entity. This is so, for the decision of the
Court based on the Compromise Agreement has impliedly recognized the
validity of the said reclamation contract and the fact that the tract of land
divided between the plaintiff and the defendant municipality of Rosario
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement was the product of the reclamation
efforts undertaken by the Salinas Development Corporation, which
subsequently assigned its rights to the plaintiff.
"The continuation of the trial in this case will be useless. Should the
intervenors fail to adduce evidence showing that the reclamation contract
was null and void and that no actual reclamation was undertaken by the
Salinas Development Corporation, the correctness and propriety of the
decision of the Court based on the Compromise Agreement would be
strengthened. Even if they would succeed in proving that the reclamation
contract was null and void and that the area in question came into being
through the natural action of the sea and not through the reclamation done by
the Salinas Development Corporation, still the said decision could no longer
be set aside, inasmuch as it has already become final and, according to the
plaintiff, already executed. The continuation of the reception of the evidence
for the intervenors clearly appears to serve no purpose at all.
xxx
"WHEREFORE, the Manifestation and Motion dated August 6,
1987, filed by the plaintiff, is granted, and the trial of this case is
declared terminated and this case is considered closed.
"This order modifies the pre-trial order dated November 15, 1984 of
this Court, insofar as the said order has allowed the intervenors to
adduce evidence in support of their contention that the land in
question was not reclaimed by the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-
interest but the product of accretion, and that the reclamation
contract between the defendants and the Salinas Development
Corporation was null and void.: rd
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 45-47, Rollo)
In assailing the aforementioned Decision and Orders of the trial court,
petitioner Romeo Ordoñez (one of the intervenors, the other seven
9
intervenors did not join him in this petition) raises the following issues, to
wit:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in stopping/preventing the
intervenors from further presenting their evidence in support of their
Answer-in-Intervention.
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in approving the compromise
agreement of May 20, 1985 and rendering a decision based thereon dated
May 24, 1985, inspite of the clear lack of authority on the part of respondent
Calixto D. Enriquez to bind the Municipality of Rosario because of the
absence of an enabling ordinance from the Sangguniang Bayan of Rosario,
Cavite empowering him to enter into said compromise agreement.
We answer both issues in the negative.
Intervention is defined as a "proceeding in a suit or action by which a third
person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something
adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person
becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of
court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by
which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or
interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." (Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co. v. the Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 39, et al.,
G.R. No. 89909, September 21, 1990)
An intervention has been regarded as "merely collateral or accessory or
ancillary to the principal action and not an independent proceeding; an
interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to, the case between the
original parties." (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. 1) The main action having
ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the intervention may
be based. (Barangay Matictic v. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83, 89).
As we recently ruled in Camacho v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
79564, December 24, 1989 —
"There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary
to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled that the final
dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said
ancillary action." (Emphasis supplied)
A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and immediately
executory. (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524) All pending issues will
become moot and academic once a compromise submitted by the parties is
approved by the trial court. (Berenguer v. Arcangel, 149 SCRA 164)
In the case at bar, the compromise agreement submitted by the plaintiff and
the defendants and the decision approving the same recognized the validity
of the Reclamation Contract and the fact that the tract of land involved was
the result of the reclamation done by SADECO. In their answer-in-
intervention, petitioner alleges that there was no reclamation undertaken by
SADECO, that the land in question was the result of accretion from the sea
and that the Reclamation Contract is null and void. Clearly then, the
compromise agreement and the decision had in effect resolved the
aforementioned issues raised by the intervenors. As aptly observed by the
trial court, the continuation of the reception of the intervenors' evidence
would serve no purpose at all. Should intervenors fail to prove that the
Reclamation Contract is null and void and that no actual reclamation was
made, the correctness and propriety of the decision based on the compromise
agreement would be strengthened. Upon the other hand, should they succeed
in proving that the contract is null and void, and that the area in question
came into being through the natural action of the sea, still the decision of the
lower court could no longer be set aside, inasmuch as it has already become
final and executed.:-cralaw
There is, therefore, no merit to the claim of petitioner that the lower court
"unceremoniously terminated the proceedings" even "without the intervenors
completing their evidence." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 140, 143, Rollo)
Precisely, the court a quo gave credence and weight to the compromise
agreement and denied the claims of the intervenors which were controverting
the theories of the plaintiff and the defendants. In other words, due process
had been accorded the intervenors. It would have been different had the court
not taken into consideration the claims of the intervenors.
The petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the filing of the compromise
agreement. As can be gleaned from the pre-trial order, the intervenors were
represented during the pre-trial conferences, where the plaintiff and the
defendants intimated that they would submit a compromise agreement. The
intervenors did not interpose any opposition to the manifestation of the
plaintiff and defendants that they would be amicably settling their dispute.
The compromise agreement was filed in court on May 20, 1985. It was
approved by the lower court on May 24, 1986. Before its approval no
opposition had been filed questioning its legality. The intervenors received
their copy of the decision on September 19, 1985. They did not file any
motion for reconsideration to suspend its finality. It was only on June 24,
1987, or after the lapse of almost two (2) years when they filed a motion to
set aside the compromise agreement. It should be emphasized at this juncture
10
that the decision based on the compromise agreement had long been
executed.
Anent the other issue raised — whether or not respondent mayor needed
another authority from the Sangguniang Bayan to sign the compromise
agreement, suffice it to state that the mayor need not secure another authority
from the Sandiganbayan under Section 141 (c) and (i) of the Local
Government Code, which state that —
"Section 141. (1) The Mayor shall be the Chief Executive of the
municipal government and shall exercise such powers, duties and
functions as provided in this code and other laws. (2) He shall:
xxx
'(c) Represent the municipality in its business transactions
and sign on its behalf all contracts, obligations and official
documents made in accordance with law or ordinance.: rd
'(i) Direct the formulation of municipal development plans
and programs, and once approved by the Sangunian Bayan,
supervise and direct the execution and implementation
thereof.'" (p. 115, Rollo)
because the execution of the Compromise Agreement is but an act
implementing the reclamation contract duly approved by the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Further, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are beneficial
to the municipality because the share of Espiritu has been reduced
considerably from the 80% agreed upon in the reclamation contract.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89909 September 21, 1990
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Manila
Branch 39, RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEM, INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS,* respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Before the Court for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17341, dated July 19, 1989, 1 dismissing
petitioner's original action for certiorari and mandamus which seeks to set
aside the order of the trial court dated June 2, 1988, allowing the intervention
suit therein to proceed, and its order of January 11, 1989, admitting the
amended complaint in intervention.
The proceedings in the court below from which this appeal arose, as found
by respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metropolitan)
in whose favor a deed of chattel mortgage was executed by
Good Earth Emporium, Inc. (GEE) over certain air
conditioning units installed in the GEE building, filed a
complaint for replevin against Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide,
for brevity) and the BPI Investment Corporation and several
other banks collectively called BPI-Consortium, for the
recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in
the event they may not be recovered, for the defendants
which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be
required, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the unpaid
obligations on the units.
Per paragraph 3.11.3 of its complaint, plaintiff Metrobank
alleged that the air-conditioning units were installed on a
loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to Good Earth Emporium
& Supermarket, Inc. in its building located at Rizal Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, after the land and building had been
foreclosed and purchased on June 3, 1983 at public auction
by the defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure
repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage was
constituted over the personal properties listed in the deed
which included the airconditioning units.
It also alleged in par. 3.11.2 of the complaint, that '(T)he
loan proceeds were used by GEE to finance the acquisition
of airconditioning equipment from Reycor (sic) Air Control
System, Inc. (amounting to P4,250,000.00 and installation
11
costs of P650,000.00) under an Agreement of Sale dated 29
June 1984' (Annex A, Petition, Id., pp. 23-24).
The defendants filed their Answer, Uniwide on July 25, 1986
(Annex B, Petition, Id., pp. 32-48) and the defendants
(presumably the rest of the defendants), on July 14, 1986
(Annex C, Petition, Id., pp. 3949).
On July 17, 1986, Raycor Air Control Systems, Inc. filed a
motion for leave to intervene alleging' it has a direct and
immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such
that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment' and attached the 'Intervention
Complaint'(Annex D, Petition, Id., pp. 49-52). There was no
opposition to the motion and the intervention complaint was
admitted by the lower court per its order dated August 8,
1986. Metrobank on November 19, 1986, filed its Answer
To The Intervention Complaint (Annex E, Petition, Id., pp.
53-59).
On August 3, 1987, the lower court set the case for trial on
the merits on September 15, 1987 but before the date of the
trial, on September 7, 1987, plaintiff Metrobank and the
defendants Uniwide and BPI Consortium, filed a motion for
postponement of the scheduled hearing on September 15,
1987 and asked for thirty (30) days from September 15
within which to submit a compromise agreement. On March
15, 1988, plaintiff Metrobank and defendants BPI
Consortium filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint and
on March 18, 1988, the lower court issued the order
dismissing the complaint with prejudice (Annex D to
Comment of Raycor Air Control System, Inc., Rollo, p.
108).
On April 19, 1988, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint with
prejudice, claiming it was not furnished with copy of the
joint motion for dismissal and that it received the order of
dismissal only on April 4, 1988. On June 2, 1988, the
respondent court issued the order granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by the intervenor (Annex I,
Petition, Id., p. 67) which order is now subject of present
petition for certiorari.
On August 2, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to
admit amended complaint (Annex F, Intervenor's
Comment, Id., p. 110) and attached the Amended
Intervention Complaint (Annex J, Petition, Id., pp. 68-73) to
the motion. To this motion, plaintiff Metrobank filed an
opposition (Annex K, Petition, Id., pp. 71-76) and after the
intervenor had filed their Reply (Annex L, Petition, Id., pp.
77-81) and the plaintiff a Rejoinder (Annex M, Petition, Id.,
pp. 82-87), on January 11, 1989, the respondent court issued
the order admitting the amended complaint in intervention
(Annex N, Petition, Id., p. 88). This is the other order which
is subject of the petition for certiorari.
On February 9, 1989, plaintiff Metrobank filed a motion for
extension for 15 days or until February 24, 1988 within
which to file its answer to the amended complaint in
intervention and the intervenor on February 17, 1989 filed an
opposition to Metrobank's motion and at the same time
moved that Metrobank be declared in default on the
amended complaint in intervention. The respondent court
granted Metrobank's motion and on February 18, 1989,
Metrobank filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint in
Intervention with Counterclaim. 2
On April 14, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with respondent Court of Appeals contending that the lower court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per
its order of June 2, 1988, the intervention suit to survive despite the dismissal
of the main action and also in admitting, per its order of January 11, 1989,
the amended complaint in intervention. 3
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and
dismissed the same on July 19, 1989. Petitioner is now before us raising the
same issues and arguments. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
lower court was innocent of any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
orders complained of.
12
The contention of petitioner that the order of the lower court, dated June 2,
1988, has the effect of allowing the intervention suit to prosper despite the
dismissal of the main action obviously cannot be upheld.
There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order
of the lower court has the effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to
proceed but also of vacating its previous order of dismissal. The
reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights
of the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the
original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the
intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the
said original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim
of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without
opposition from the original parties. A resume of pertinent rulings on the
matter would be in order.
Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third
person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something
adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person
becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of
court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by
which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of
interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." 4
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the
success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in
such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the court
to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an
agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made by
the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor
is a party to it. 5
By the very definition of "intervention," the intervenor is a party to the action
as the original parties and to make his right effectual he must necessarily
have the same power as the original parties, subject to the authority of the
court reasonably to control the proceedings in the case.6
Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his
interests, an intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him and
the original parties tried and determined.7 He had submitted himself and his
cause of action to the jurisdiction of the court and was entitled to relief as
though he were himself a party in the action.8
After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has no absolute
right to put the intervenor out of court by the dismissal of the action. The
parties to the original suit have no power to waive or otherwise annul the
substantial rights of the intervenor. When an intervening petition has been
filed, a plaintiff may not dismiss the action in any respect to the prejudice of
the intervenor.9
It has even been held that the simple fact that the trial court properly
dismissed plaintiff s action does not require dismissal of the action of the
intervenor. 10 An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original
suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by
dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the filing of the petition and notice
thereof to the other parties. A person who has an interest in the subject matter
of the action has the right, on his own motion, to intervene and become a
party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been dismissed, may
proceed to have any actual controversy established by the pleadings
determined in such action. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action does
not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. 11
The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any other
party. 12 A claim in intervention that seeks affirmative relief prevents a
plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal of the main action. 13 Where a
complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff's action had been
expressly dismissed, the intervenor's complaint was not subject to dismissal
on the ground that no action was pending, since dismissal of plaintiffs action
did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal of
intervenor's complaint. 14 An intervenor's petition showing it to be entitled to
affirmative relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of
the principal action. 15
As we ruled in Camacho vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 the rationale
whereof is clearly applicable to the present controversy-
There is no question that intervention is only collateral or
ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled
that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the
dismissal of said ancillary action. The main action having
ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the
intervention may be based. In the case at bar, however, there
13
 was no such final or complete dismissal but rather an
approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied
in what was specifically designated as a 'Partial Decision'
affecting only the interests of herein petitioner and the
defendant in said case but not those of her co-plaintiff
municipality and the intervenor. The clear intent of the court
below in making the partial decision is to make a reservation
to determine the rights of the intervenor and, presumably, the
plaintiff municipality. There may be nothing much left to be
done with respect to the main case but as far as the
proceedings in the trial court are concerned, the controversy
therein has not been fully settled and the disposition of the
case is definitely incomplete.
Moreover, to require private respondent to refile another case for the
settlement of its claim will result in unnecessary delay and expenses and will
entail multiplicity of suits and, therefore, defeat the very purpose of
intervention which is to hear and determine at the same time all conflicting
claims which may be made on the subject matter in litigation, and to expedite
litigation and settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole
controversy among the persons involved. 17
On the propriety of the order dated January 11, 1988, admitting private
respondent's amended complaint in intervention, we sustain respondent Court
of Appeals in upholding the same. Incidentally, it will be recalled that
petitioner was granted the opportunity to file, as it did file, its answer to the
amended complaint in intervention and it even interposed a counterclaim in
the process.
Now, the granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter
particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that
discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments
should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the
case or that it was made to delay the action. 18Once exercised, that discretion
will not be disturbed on appeal, except in case of abuse thereof. 19
In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention shows
that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action
stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, it does not substantially change
intervenor's cause of action or alter the theory of the case, hence its
allowance is in order.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
In both the Intervention Complaint and the Amended
Complaint in Intervention, the private respondent seeks the
payment to it of the amount of P150,000.00 which should
have been paid to it from out of the P650,000.00 which the
petitioner as plaintiff in CC 86-3618 had referred to in pars.
3.11.2 and 3.11.3 of its complaint as cost of installation of
the airconditioning units under the agreement of sale
(between plaintiff Metrobank and GEE Inc). dated June 29,
1984 and so basically, the Amended Complaint In
Intervention did not really detract or depart from that basic
claim. 20
In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by
amendments to the complaint, what is to be ascertained is whether the
defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly
different from that which was stated in the original complaint. An
amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the
facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong
with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same
matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which
were implied are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy
or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same. 21
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the
parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the
merits without unnecessary delay. 22 This liberality is greatest in the early
stages of a lawsuit, 23 especially in this case where the amendment to the
complaint in intervention was made before trial of the case thereby giving
petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
On the issue regarding the propriety of the intervention, suffice it to state that
petitioner's failure to interpose a timely objection when the motion for leave
to intervene was filed by private respondent bars the former from belatedly
questioning the validity of the same on appeal. In any event, the trial court
duly considered the circumstances and granted the motion, which order was
not seasonably questioned by petitioner thus evincing its approval of the
court's action.
14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DENIED and the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186045 : February 02, 2011]
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MIÑOZA, NAMELY:
THE HEIRS OF FILOMENO T. MIÑOZA, REPRESENTED BY
LAUREANO M. MIÑOZA; THE HEIRS OF PEDRO T. MIÑOZA;
AND THE HEIRS OF FLORENCIA T. MIÑOZA, REPRESENTED BY
ANTONIO M. URBIZTONDO, RESPONDENTS
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated March 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70429, and the Resolution[2] dated January 8, 2009 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The procedural and factual antecedents, as found by the CA, are as follows:
On July 6, 1998, a Complaint[3] for Reconveyance, Cancellation of
Defendant's Title, Issuance of New Title to Plaintiffs and Damages was filed
by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for herself and on behalf of the other heirs
of the late Estanislao Miñoza. The complaint alleged that Leila's late great
grandfather, Estanislao Miñoza, was the registered owner of Cadastral Lot
Nos. 986 and 991-A, located at Banilad Estate, Cebu City, per TCT Nos. RT-
6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T10026). It was, likewise, alleged that the
late Estanislao Miñoza had three children, namely, Adriana, Patricio, and
Santiago, all surnamed Miñoza. In the late 1940s, the National Airports
Corporation (NAC) embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport.
For said purpose, the NAC acquired several properties which surrounded the
airport either through negotiated sale or through expropriation. Among the
properties that were acquired by the NAC through a negotiated sale were Lot
Nos. 986 and 991-A.[4]
Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically, Adriana,
Patricio, and Santiago executed a Deed of Sale on February 15, 1950
conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the assurance made by the latter
that they (Leila's predecessors-in-interest) can buy the properties back if the
lots are no longer needed. Consequently, they sold Lot No. 986 to the NAC
for only P157.20 and Lot No. 991-A for P105.40. However, the expansion
project did not push through. More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs
informed the NAC's successor-in-interest, the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA), that they were exercising the buy-back option
of the agreement, but the MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase on the
ground that the sale was in fact unconditional.
The MCIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Answer with Counterclaim.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, trial ensued.
On November 16, 1999, before the MCIAA could present evidence in
support of its case, a Motion for Intervention,[5] with an attached
Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, by the heirs of Filomeno T. Miñoza,
represented by Laureano M. Miñoza; the heirs of Pedro T, Miñoza,
represented by Leoncio J. Miñoza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Miñoza,
represented by Antonio M. Urbiztondo (Intervenors), who claimed to be the
true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao Miñoza. The
intervenors alleged in their complaint (1) that the plaintiffs in the main case
are not related to the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono
whose true and legitimate children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and Florencia, all
surnamed Miñoza; (2) that, on January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and
Santiago, executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and
adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses; and (3) that,
on February 15, 1958, the same Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently,
deceitfully, and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A to the NAC. The
intervenors thus prayed for the following reliefs:
a. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, legal and legitimate heirs of the
late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono;
b. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, rightful and registered owners of
Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate;
c. Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement executed on January 21, 1958 by
the late Adriana Miñoza and the late Patricio Miñoza and the late Santiago
15
Miñoza that they are the only heirs of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Aggrieved, the intervenors sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-
Inocencia Togono, who died intestate and without any debts or obligations G.R. CV No. 70429, on the following assignment of errors:
and adjudicating among themselves the estate of the deceased x x x as I.
void ab initio;
THE COURT A QUO IN ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 18, 2000
d. Declaring the sale of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ABOVE CAPTIONED
executed by the late Adriana Miñoza, the late Patricio Miñoza and the late COMPLAINT BASED ON THE GROUND THAT: 1). THE RIGHTS
Santiago Miñoza in favor of the National Airport Corporation on February CLAIMED BY MOVANTS-INTERVERNORS (NOW INTERVENORS-
15, 1958 x x x as void ab initio; APPELLANTS) WOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY BE ASSERTED IN,
AND WOULD BE FULLY PROTECTED BY, A SEPARATE
e. Ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 120370 and PROCEEDING; 2). IT (THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION) WILL
120372 for Lots 986 and 991-A in the name of the Mactan-Cebu DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTANT CASE; AND 3). THAT
International Airport Authority and restoring Transfer Certificate of Title THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION IS NOT VERIFIED AND DOES
Nos. RT-6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T-10026) to be the true and valid NOT CONTAIN THE REQUISITE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
torrens titles to Lots 986 and 991-[A]. SHOPPING.
II.
f. Condemning plaintiffs Leila M. Hermosisima and Constancio Miñoza to
pay intervenors, who are the true, lawful and legitimate heirs of the late THE COURT A QUO IN ITS ORDER DATED JULY 25, 2000 GRAVELY
Spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono, the amounts of ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MOVANTS-INTERVENORS' (NOW
P300,000.00 and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages respectively; INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DATED MARCH 20, 2000, AGAIN ON THE GROUND THAT TO
g. Condemning plaintiffs to pay the cost of suit.[6] ALLOW THE INTERVENORS TO INTERVENE IN THIS CASE WHICH
IS ALREADY SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WOULD ONLY DELAY
On February 18, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, issued an THE DISPOSAL OF THIS CASE AND THAT ANYWAY, THE
Order[7] denying the Motion for Intervention. INTERVERNORS HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR BECAUSE THEIR
CLAIMS, IF THERE IS ANY, CAN BE WELL THRESHED OUT IN
In denying the motion, the trial court opined that the ownership of the subject ANOTHER PROCEEDING.[10]
lots was merely a collateral issue in the action. The principal issue to be
resolved was whether or not the heirs of the late Estanislao Miñoza - On March 25, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal
whoever they may be - have a right to repurchase the said lots from the portion of which provides:
MCIAA. Consequently, the rights being claimed by the intervenors should WHEREFORE, the appealed Orders dated February 18, 2000 and July 25,
be asserted in and would be fully protected by a separate 2000 of the RTC of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. 22290,
proceeding. Moreover, if the motion was granted, it would unduly delay the are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC of Cebu City is directed to
proceedings in the instant case. Finally, the complaint-in-intervention was resolve with deliberate dispatch Civil Case No. 22290 and to admit the
flawed, considering that it was not verified and does not contain the requisite complaint-in-intervention filed by the intervenors-appellants.
certification of non-forum shopping.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] to which was attached
a Complaint-in-Intervention with the required Verification and Certificate of In ruling for the intervenors, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the findings
Non-Forum Shopping.[9] However, the RTC denied the motion in its Order of the trial court, the determination of the true heirs of the late Estanislao
dated July 25, 2000. Miñoza is not only a collateral, but the focal issue of the case, for if the
intervenors can prove that they are indeed the true heirs of Estanislao

16
Miñoza, there would be no more need to determine whether the right to buy
back the subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not have acquired
rights to the subject lots in the first place. In addition, to grant the motion for
intervention would avoid multiplicity of suits. As to the lack of verification
and certification on non-forum shopping, the CA opined that the filing of the
motion for reconsideration with an appended complaint-in-intervention
containing the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
amounted to substantial compliance of the Rules.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the
Resolution dated January 8, 2009.
Hence, the petition assigning the lone error that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS (CEBU CITY) GRAVELY ERRED IN
ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO INTERVENE IN CIVIL CASE NO.
CEB-22290.[12]
Petitioner argues that to allow the intervenors to intervene in the proceedings
before the trial court would not only unduly prolong and delay the resolution
of the case, it would make the proceedings unnecessarily complicated and
change the nature of the proceedings. Furthermore, contrary to the
requirements for the allowance of a motion for intervention, their legal
interest in the subject properties appear to be merely contingent or expectant
and not of direct or immediate character. Petitioner also posits that the
intervenors' rights can be better protected in another proceeding.
Anent the lack of verification and certification on non-forum shopping,
petitioner maintains that the trial court was correct in denying the motion on
this ground. In addition, even if the complaint-in-intervention with the
required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was appended to
the intervenors' motion for reconsideration, the complaint-in-intervention
was not verified by all the interested parties or all the heirs of Filomeno
Miñoza, which still warrants its dismissal.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to petitioner's contention, the
initial lack of the complaint-in-intervention of the requisite verification and
certification on non-forum shopping was cured when the intervenors, in their
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to intervene,
appended a complaint-in-intervention containing the required verification
and certificate of non-forum shopping.
In the case of Altres v. Empleo,[13] this Court clarified, among other things,
that as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Further, a
verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct.[14]
Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable
by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rules on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons." Also, the certification against
forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.[15]
Thus, considering that the intervenors in their motion for reconsideration,
appended a complaint-in-intervention with the required verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping, the requirement of the Rule was
substantially complied with.
Notwithstanding the intervenors' compliance with the procedural
requirements, their attempt to intervene is doomed to fail.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect
or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings.[16] It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person
is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of
them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
17
original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a
party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be
affected by such proceedings.[17]
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. -- A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties;
(3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody
of the court or an officer thereof.[18] Moreover, the court must take into
consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a
separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate
heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and not the original
plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. True, if their allegations were
later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.[19] Otherwise, if persons
not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable.[20]
Moreover, the intervenors' contentions that Leila's predecessors-in-interest
executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the estate
of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated
unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses, and that subsequently,
her predecessors-in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots
to the NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the
proceedings.
In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of Estanislao
Miñoza and Inocencia Togono are, the parties would also present additional
evidence in support of this new allegation of fraud, deceit, and bad faith and
resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity of certificates
of titles, and regularity in their acquisition. Verily, this would definitely
cause unjust delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the original
parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirs
represented by Leila have a right to repurchase the subject properties from
the MCIAA.
Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy
between the original parties and the intervenors. In general, an independent
controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such
intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the
action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are
certain facts giving the intervenor's case an aspect peculiar to himself and
differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is
for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate
suit.[21] Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of
the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of
the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the
effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action.[22]
To be sure, not only will the intervenors' rights be fully protected in a
separate proceeding, it would best determine the rights of the parties in
relation to the subject properties and the issue of who the legitimate heirs of
Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono, would be laid to rest.
Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests
on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances.[23] It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or
conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to
secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule,
and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms
of the applicable provision.[24]
Consequently, the denial of the motion to intervene by the RTC was but just
and proper. The conclusion of the RTC is not bereft of rational bases. It
denied the motion to intervene in the exercise of its sound discretion and
18
after taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, subject to the above disquisition, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 25, 2008 and the Resolution
dated January 8, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70429,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 22, dated February 18, 2000 and July 25, 2000,
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014
FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR, Petitioner, v. THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAUBAN, QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER
(PHILIPPINES) LIMITED, CO., PROVINCE OF QUEZON,AND
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court via a petition for review
on certiorari1assailing the Orders dated December 2, 20022 and March 13,
20033 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64
(RTC) which dismissed Civil Case No. 0587-M on jurisdictional grounds
and, concomitantly, petitioner Frumencio E. Pulgar’s (Pulgar) motion for
intervention therein.
The Facts4
Sometime in 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued 34 tax
declarations on the buildings and machinery comprising the Mauban Plant –
a coal-fired electric generation facility owned and operated by respondent
Quezon Power (Philippines) Limited, Co. (QPL) – and thereby assessed it
with a total market value of P29,626,578,291.00 and, hence, P500 Million,
more or less, in realty taxes per annum.The Municipal Assessor maintained
that the Mauban Plant was completed and already operational in October
1999. Subsequently, or on May 18, 2000, QPL filed with the Municipal
Assessor a sworn statement declaring that the said properties had a value of
only P15,055,951,378.00.5cralawred
On March 16 and 23, 2001, QPL tendered to the Municipal Assessor the
amount of P60,223,805.51 as first quarter installment of the realty taxes on
the plant, which the latter rejected.6 Hence, QPL filed a Complaint for
Consignation and Damages7 before the RTC against the Province of Quezon,
the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Mauban, Quezon, and
the Provincial Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Quezon (defendants),
docketed as Civil Case No. 0587-M, depositing to the RTC the above-stated
amount in payment of the first quarter realty tax for 2001.8 Albeit classified
as a consignation and damages case, QPL essentially protested the Municipal
Assessor’s assessment for, among others, its lack of legal authority to make
such assessment and its supposed non-compliance with the prescribed
valuation process.9cralawred
For their part,10 defendants averred, among others, that QPL was estopped
from denying the authority of the Municipal Assessor since it previously paid
realty taxes for its properties for the year 2001 based on the assessment of the
latter.
On January 28, 2002, Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-
Intervention11 and Answer-in-Intervention12 (motion for intervention),
alleging, among others, that as a resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province,
he has an interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. By
way of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees, anchoring the same on the ―mindless disturbance of the forest
and marine environment whereon the power plant of [QPL]
stands.‖13Pulgar’s motion was initially granted and his Answer-in-
Intervention was admitted.14cralawred
Sometime in June 2002, QPL and the Province of Quezon agreed to submit
their dispute before the Secretary of Finance, which resulted in a
Resolution15 dated August 30, 2002 where the basic issues between the
principal parties were passed upon.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order16 dated December 2, 2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No.
0587-M for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a payment of the tax
assessed under protest, which requirement QPL attempted to skirt by alleging
in its complaint that it is the very authority of the Municipal Assessor to
impose the assessment and the treasurer to collect the tax that it was
questioning. Declaring that QPL’s complaint essentially challenged the
amount of the taxes assessed, the RTC ruled that it is the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals that had jurisdiction over the complaint. Consequently,
it also dismissed Pulgar’s motion for intervention since with the dismissal of
the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.17cralawred
19
Aggrieved, Pulgar filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied in an Order18 dated March 13, 2003, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before The Court

The issue advanced before the Court is whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing Pulgar’s motion for intervention as a consequence of the
dismissal of the main case. While acknowledging the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction, Pulgar nonetheless prays that the Court pass upon the
correctness of the Municipal Assessor’s assessment of QPL’s realty taxes,
among others.
The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main

action.19 Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in
a court of competent jurisdiction.20cralawred

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No.
0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by
asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax
assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the
RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal
litigation – on jurisdictional grounds at that – means that Pulgar had, as a
matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x xx
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely
to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the
pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or
protect such right or interests.

Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right
of the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is
nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.21cralawred

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

20