« Academy o/Manoffement Review, 1986, Vol 11, No. 2, 322-336.

A Critical Theory of Organization

BRIAN D. STEFFY
University of Minnesota
ANDREW J. GRIMES
University of Kentucky
Critical theory is presented as a general method for analyzing an
organization science based on either a natural science or interpretive
paradigm. This is accomplished by introducing epistemic inquiry into
organization science methodology. Specifically, critical theory pro-
vides a means of examining the socio-political interplay among the
researcher, the research enterprise, the practitioner, and the organi-
zation members. Such an analysis requires the examination of
ideology, technology, and praxis.

Recent critiques of organizational science re-
veal widespread doubts concerning an empiri-
cal-analytic research agenda. The term "empiri-
cal-analytic" refers to an organizational science
modeled after the natural science approach,
whose aim is to "establish general laws which
can serve as instruments for systematic explana-
tion and dependable prediction" (Nagel, 1979,
p. 450). Some of these doubts have appeared
regularly in the literature: there exists a gap
between theory and practice (Argyris, 1972; Frost,
1980; Louis, 1983; Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1984;
Thomas & Tymon, 1982); the bulk of organiza-
tional research focuses on static issues, not impor-
tant conceptual issues such as power, class,
conflict, politics, and ideology (Burrell & Morgan,
1979; Cicourel, 1964; Ferrell & Peterson, 1982;
Zey-Ferrell & Aiken, 1981); theory borne of or-
ganizational research may be ideological and
an instrument of control over the social organiza-
tion (Daft & Wiginton, 1979; Fischer, 1984; Frost,
1980; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 1982;
Perrow, 1979); there has been an over-emphasis
on research by outsiders (academic researchers)
as opposed to insiders (Evered & Louis, 1981);
Requests for reprints should be sent to Brian D. Steffy,
Industrial Relations Center, 271 19th Ave. So., Minneapolis,
MN, 55455.
and methodological rigor leads to specific expla-
nations of organizational phenomena as opposed
to generalized ones (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1978;
Silverman, 1970). Other doubts revolve around
the philosophical assumptions underlying the
empirical-analytic approach. These doubts have
been debated in the human sciences for some
time. For example, the objectivity of facts is now
viewed with suspicion by most researchers
(Ratcliffe, 1983). "Facts" should be seen as poten-
tially laden with socially-constructed values and
structures largely imposed by dominant coali-
tions (Campbell & Cook, 1979; Gergen 1978, 1985;
Kuhn, 1970; Mannheim, 1982; Poppser, 1959; Zey-
Ferrell & Aiken, 1981). More generally, organiza-
tional researchers have begun to systematically
question the soundness of the philosophical
assumptions which underlie an empirical-
analytic organization science. These concerns
largely revolve around questions of ontology,
epistemology and methodology (Fischer, 1984;
Louis, 1983; Mitroff & Kilmann, 1978; Mitroff &
Mason, 1982; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Silver-
man, 1970).
In light of these doubts, organizational scien-
tists have been encouraged to engage in more
rigorous research, conscious of the limits of their
method (Behling & Dillard, 1984; Cook & Camp-

322
bell, 1979; Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino,
1984; Lundberg, 1976; Pinder & Bourgeois, 1982;
Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1984; Thomas & Tyman,
1982). Other researchers, however, suggest a
departure from the natural science agenda. They
suggest that researchers employ interpretive, or
hermeneutical, modes of inquiry (Morey &
Luthans, 1984; Morgan & Smircich, 1980;
Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1984). For example, Hus-
serlian phenomenology (Sanders, 1982), ethno-
methodology (Bartunek, 1984; Hackman, 1976;
Morey & Luthans, 1984; Sanday, 1979), and ideo-
graphic studies (Grimes & Cornwall, 1984;
Mintzberg, 1973), have been proposed as alter-
native sciences. It should be noted, however,
that the interpretive position may be as suspect
as the empirical-analytic position, both in terms
of its criticisms of the natural science approach
and in the adequacy of its own methods. As
pointed out by Cook and Campbell (1979), many
criticisms of a positivist social science are unfair
because contemporary researchers now realize
the naivete of the assumptions underlying a strict
natural science approach to social science. Sub-
jective, or qualitative, analysis has become an
important facet of quantitative research (Ratcliffe,
1983).
It also is suggested the interpretive agenda is
as suspect as the natural science approach
because it, too, employs a monological form of
reasoning which may exclude certain topics of
discourse (McCarthy, 1978). Subjective ap-
proaches are especially vulnerable to biases
implicit in the culturally-conditioned perspective
of the researcher. Further, there exists the prob-
lem of validation (Bernstein, 1983). How can we
verify, with some confidence, that an interpreta-
tion is true?
The intent of this paper is not to add to the list
of problems of a natural science or interpretive
research agenda. Instead, by presenting a cri-
tical theory of organization science, the present
authors offer a normative and comprehensive
323
framework for systematically introducing philo-
sophical critique into organizational research.
Critical theory begins with the assumption that
one can rationally critique various modes of
science. The paper is presented in four stages.
First, an overview of two interpretive modes of
inquiry are briefly outlined; phenomenology and
hermeneutics. This discussion is provided be-
cause, even though these approaches have
become a major force in the organizational
literature, the philosophies underlying these
methods have rarely been discussed. Further,
because critical theory draws heavily from her-
meneutics, such an understanding is valuable.
The second half of the paper discusses critical
theory as a normative model for organizational
research. Critical theory does not reject an em-
pirical-analytic or interpretive science, it
merely rejects any science that reduces philo-
sophical critique to some normative methodo-
logy. Critical theory claims to be an empirical
and practical philosophy which incorporates
epistemological concerns such as the relation-
ship between method and theory and the social
consequences of theory validated through parti-
cular modes of research into methodology. As
such, it requires two forms of analysis: (a) a tax-
onomic analysis of the ontological, epistemolo-
gical, and methodological concerns underlying
organization science; and (b) a critique (based
on this analysis) of the dynamic interplay be-
tween organizational research, theory, and
practice. These constitute the main part of this
paper. Here critical theory significantly broad-
ens the philosophical component of research.
According to critical theorists, the natural sci-
ence and interpretive approaches largely con-
fine their criticism to whether research was con-
ducted according to rules prescribed by that
methodology. A comprehensive range of episte-
mological questions is not asked. Finally, a brief
example of how organizational researchers
might apply critical theory is presented.
 Phenomenology and Henneneutics:
An Overview
Phenomenology
Husserlian phenomenology, unlike an em-
pirical-analytic organization science, begins
with the assumption that researchable organi-
zational theories are second-level constructs.
First-level constructs are thoje thoughts and
experiences that organizational actors have
already preinterpreted and prestructured;
they are socially-constructed phenomena prior
to scientific observation (Fassnacht, 1982; Mc-
Carthy, 1978). First-order concepts are the facts
observed in research while second-order con-
cepts are the theories that explain organization
phenomena.
From the phenomenological perspective, an
empirical-analytic organization science is meth-
odologically naive in assuming that first-level
observed facts are objective and value-free, and
that abstract second-level concepts represent or
explain law-like and stable meanings (Atwood
& Stolorow, 1984). Organizational facts are not
objective, but socially sustained through day-to-
day organizational existence. Second-order con-
structs are really "interpretations of interpreta-
tions" (VanMaanen, 1979). Phenomenology
claims that stable and law-like explanations of
organizational phenomena can be obtained only
by directly studying the meanings of first-level
concepts (Dallmeyer & McCarthy, 1977).
A phenomenological organization science
requires that researchers (Evered & Louis, 1981)
become participants in the organization, in
order to reconstruct events and social processes
from which organizational phenomena can be
explained meaningfully. The aim of phenomen-
ology is to "make explicit the implicit structure
and meaning of human experiences . . . the 'es-
sences' that cannot be revealed by ordinary [po-
sitivist] observation" (Sanders, 1982, p. 354). To
observe these "essences," the observer must sus-
pend all judgment and preconceived notions of
possible meanings, and observe organizational
phenomena from that perspective (transcen-
324
dental ego). Objective and true organizational
phenomena are then empirically revealed and
their meanings understood. Theories are de-
rived inductively by aggregating the patterns of
these meanings. Verification of knowledge can
be accomplished only by evaluating the capac-
ity of the researcher to exp>erience pure mean-
ings. The scientific community could verify knowl-
edge insofar as there exists a corroboration of
meanings derived from the experiences of many
phenomenologists.
Henneneutics
Hermeneutics, defined as the art of textual
interpretation (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), had its
beginnings in jurisprudence and theology where
attempts were made to interpret biblical and
legal texts within the socio-cultural context of
their inception (Ricoeur, 1966). Henneneutics
(developed through the works of Dilthey, Heideg-
ger's existentialism, and, more recently, Gadamer
and Ricoeur) goes beyond Husserlian phenome-
nology in rejecting the notion that meanings can
be objectively and directly perceived. Instead,
hermeneutical analysis assumes that organiza-
tional meanings can only be approximated. First-
level organizational constructs must be interpre-
ted as "symbolic representations" (Schroyer,
1973). These representations are historically cre-
ated and thus can only be "translated" relative
to their situational and historical context. There
will never occur a reproduction of original mean-
ings (McCarthy, 1978).
Hermeneutics emphasizes the historical dimen-
sion of research. Drawing from socio-linguistics
and psychoanalysis, this method assumes that
social processes and events are revealed only in
light of the complex interaction between the
researcher and the research-domain. The re-
searcher is viewed as engaging in a complex
enterprise of interpreting first-level constructs by
translating observed symbolic representations
(for example, ritual, myth) in their socio-historical
context, while bearing in mind that the re-
searcher's own socio-historical background is
influencing the translation. In other words, any
research project must assume that the observer,
the actual tools of observation (method), and the
domain observed, are all historically created
entities. After all, one sees what one is trained to
see (Silverman, 1970). Second-level constructs
derived from such a research enterprise reflect
more the "traditions" underlying the observed
and the observer than any true meaning or gen-
eral law (Bleicher, 1982). It is therefore evident
that a hermeneutical investigation surrenders to
a somewhat relativistic framework in which
"interpretation" is itself a reappropriation; a fur-
ther development of the tradition to which the
researcher and research-domain belong (Mc-
Carthy, 1978).
In sum, the hermeneutical method forces the
researcher to reflect on three issues (Atwood &
Stolorow, 1984; Bleicher, 1982). First, the re-
searcher must view his/her self as an historical-
ly produced entity; the researcher must realize
his/her biases in engaging in research. Second,
the researcher must consider the specific context
and historical dimension of data collected (usu-
ally the tradition of the researcher and research-
domain are the same). Finally, the researcher is
forced to reflect on the relationship between the-
ory and history. All three of these hermeneutical
impjeratives provide a basis for contemporary
critical theory.
Critical Theory
Held (1980) suggested that defining critical
theory can be problematic since the term does
not mean the same thing to all of its adherents.
Confusion is further compounded since, over
the past five decades, two distinct schools of
critical theory have emerged: the Frankfort
School (Horkheimer, Adomo, Marcuse, Fromm)
and the contemporary critical theory of Jurgen
Habermas. This paper draws primarily from
Habermas' work. While the Frankfort School and
Habermas differ in their approaches, the differ-
ences are too subtle to depict in this paper.
[Those interested should see Marcus and Tar
(1984), Held (1980), or Warren (1984).]
325
While critical theory applauds phenomenol-
ogy and hermeneutics for their understanding
of a social science based on a natural science
model, critical theory contends that these two
approaches possess three major failings. First,
both forms of inquiry assume that a "quasi-
divine" (hermeneutics less so) spectator seeks to
understand organizational laws through some
form of "pure subjectivity," free from cognitive
or motivating interests (Habermas, 1971). Se-
cond, they share the objectivist illusion of pure
theory. That is, they employ a monological line
of reasoning. Third, both approaches fail to be
an "inquiry of change" (Habermas, 1970; Mc-
Carthy, 1978). In this sense, phenomenology and
hermeneutics resemble a natural science ap-
proach. All three assume some dominant form
of reasoning (Dallmeyer & McCarthy, 1977).
Critical theory is most succinctly defined as an
empirical philosophy of social institutions.
It may retain both an empirical-analytic and
interpretive component, but each is placed within
a reflective system of epistemic inquiry. Critical
theory assumes that organization science is a
social practice and as such, must give an account
of itself. This means that research should include
a critical discussion of the subjective, or theoreti-
cal, character of the observer and observed, as
is the case in hermeneutics. Critical theory fur-
ther expands its epistemic critique to include: (a)
a discussion of the limitations of alternative
modes of inquiry; (b) an analysis of the relation-
ship between the community of organizational
researchers and organizational practitioners
and members; and (c) the acknowledgement of
the practical aim of any particular mode of
research. In sum, critical theory assumes that
theories, systems of knowledge, and facts are
embedded in and reflect relativistic world-
views. Theories are merely insights and repre-
sent practical strategies to organizational prob-
lems. No absolute system of inquiry exists
(McCarthy, 1978).
As a method, critical theory has two basic
aims. First, critical theory includes a "critique of
ideology"; namely, a critique of the "cult of
 scientism" in social theory/method (Geuss, 1982).
By "scientism," Habermas (1971) means an insti-
tutionalized form of reasoning which accepts the
idea that the meaning of knowledge is defined
by what the sciences do and thus can be ade-
quately explicated through analysis of scientific
procedures (p. 67). When organization science
reaches such theological proportions, other forms
of reasoning (political, clinical), are displaced.
For example, in the research enterprise such
subordination means that non-positivistic re-
search may be defined as inferior by the incum-
bent academic elite; alternative approaches must
justify their existence. On the organizational
level, the domination of technical reasoning may
supercede other functional forms such as politi-
cal reasoning enacted through communication
and democratic processes. Scientism, enacted
in practice, may reduce individual "praxis" (for
now, defined as the intentional organizing ac-
tions of subjective actors) to "techne," or tech-
nocratic reasoning (Habermas, 1973). To counter
scientism, critical theory advocates an organiza-
tion science that incorporates an analysis of the
ontological, epistemological, and methodologi-
cal assumptions underlying research. Such an
analysis argues against dominating forms of rea-
son and forces discourse on the practicality of
theory.
The second aim of critical theory is to develop
an organization science capable of changing
organizational processes. Instead of denying any
motivating interest in conducting research (for
example, assuming that the researcher is value-
free), it might be explicitly stated that its purpose
is to minimize the "objectification" of organiza-
tional actors. At this point, it is enough to say
that such an analysis requires an investigation
of the dynamic interplay among research,
theory, practice, and organization members
(the social structure of organization science).
The Interplay among Ontology,
Epistemology« and Methodology
Discussion of the philosophies underlying
organization science typically includes onto-
326
logical, epistemological, and methodological
assumptions (Bunge, 1983; Burrell & Morgan,
1979). These terms are defined as follows: Onto-
logical assumptions deal with the makeup of
organizational reality; that is, whether it consists
of actual and objective structures (realism), or
whether organizational reality is symbolic and
socially constructed through subjective processes
(nominalism). Modem descriptive epistemology.
traditionally the domain of philosophy, evalu-
ates the relationships among knowledge, the
cognitive functioning of the inquiring subject,
and the social constraints on the inquiring sub-
ject. Methodology, or normative epistemology
(Bunge, 1983; Habermas, 1973), prescribes a
method for acquiring, defining, classifying, and
verifying knowledge. Criticisms of methods are
answered by checking the rules of inquiry speci-
fied by the methodology (Bunge, 1983; McCarthy,
1978). In this sense, epistemology can be nor-
mative. Descriptive epistemology requires
greater breadth of reflection. For example, it
requires an evaluation of the values embodied
in the research project, the proper means of vali-
dating knowledge, and the practical social effects
of knowledge gained through research. Table 1
summarizes the philosophical tenets underlying
the four modes of inquiry discussed in this paper.
For purposes of illustration, assume three lev-
els of constructs in any research enterprise.
Recall the first- and second-level constructs dis-
cussed earlier. Now assume a third-level con-
struct that consists of the prestructured mean-
ings and beliefs embodied in the researcher.
Within this context, Habermas (1971, 1973) might
claim that the potential weakness of any form of
organization science is three-fold.
Facts Possess a Normative Epistemology of
Their Own. like the interpretive perspective, criti-
cal theory assumes that first-level constructs are
constituted by a normative epistemology in
which organizational actors a n d events are
infused with values, beliefs, and attitudes. This
normative culture is constructed through selec-
tion, socialization, and the rules and procedures
of the internal labor market (Fischer, 1984; Geuss,
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 1982). Therefore, if one assumes-away the sub-
jective character of observed facts, knowledge
gained in organization science is severely one-
sided and incomplete because the historical and
ideological facets of facts have been neglected.
As indicated earlier, most researchers accept
the notion that facts are theory-laden. As sug-
gested by McCarthy (1978), however, many
researchers recognize the theory-ladeness of
facts, yet they still engage in research as if the
research-domain was objective.
The Research Enterprise Is Enacted in the Con-
text of a Normative Epistemology. Critical theory
assumes that the "worldview" of the researcher
constitutes a third-level construct. Theorists and
researchers are not assumed to be objective and
value-free, but are seen as laden with beliefs
and values obtained through training, peer-
group influences, and the goals and structures
of the research enterprise itself (Gergen, 1978;
Howard, 1985; Krupp, 1961). These forces guide,
constrain, and constitute a normative epistem-
ology for research; a universal or dominant
method for acquiring knowledge (Bunge, 1983;
Pfeffer, 1982). According to Habermas (1971),
every research paradigm has a "cognitive intent"
(an aim, intentional or unintentional, with practi-
cal consequences). The professed aim of critical
theory is the practical change of organizational
structures to facilitate the emancipation of the
subjective component of institutional actors. The
intentional aim of phenomenology and herme-
neutics is the understanding of practical and con-
crete organization phenomena. The intended
aim of an organization science based on the
natural science model is the successful manipu-
lation of the organization (the prediction and con-
trol of social processes and events). This leads
directly to a normative organizational order
based upon nomological knowledge and techni-
cal rules (Habermas, 1970).
Descriptive Epistemology is Reduced to Meth-
odology. From the perspective of critical theory,
much of organization science reduces descrip-
tive epistemology to methcxiology. As pointed
out by Miller (1983), criticism, the practical func-
328
tion of descriptive epistemology, gives wcry to a
discussion of the technical rules governing
methodology. Methodology becomes the a priori,
and the validity of knowledge, historically the
domain of philosophy, is reduced to an evalua-
tion of the adecjuacy of experimental design and
analysis.
Research, Theory , Practice, and
Praxis: A Critical Theory
A focus on epistemic issues forces a more com-
prehensive reflection upon the research enter-
prise. Critical theory extends analysis of the
ontological, epistemologicxil, and methodologi-
cal assumptions underlying organization science
to an analysis of the practical relations between
research, theory, technology, practice, praxis
and ideology. The following propositions tie
together much of Habermas' thinking as it relates
to organization science. These propositions
brcxjden critique to include the socnal context of
organizational research. It should be noted that
these propositions are normative in the sense
that Habermas' critical theory is a description of
modem bureaucratic institutions and the role of
science in forming and legitimizing these institu-
tions.
Research and Theory Influence Organiza-
tional Practice Through Technical Reasoning.
Habermas (1970) distinguishes between two
worlds of knowledge: the scientific world of for-
mal law-like statements derived objectively
through the observation and measurement of
assumed neutral and objective facts, and the
social-life, or practical world that consists of the
symbolically shared private experiences of sub-
jective actors. Assuming this distinction, the
question arises: what is the relationship between
organization science and organization practice?
Following the logic of Habermas (1973), and
consistent with the observations of Thomas and
Tymon (1982) and Shrivastava and Mitroff (1984),
conventional organization science does not have
a direct bearing on practice. The effect is indirect.
In other words, organization science itself is not
 a medium of practical change. Instead, knowl-
edge gained through research is transformed
into practice only through decision makers who
employ technologies and technical reasoning.
Technology and technical reasoning mediate
between knowledge and practice. Technology,
in and of itself, is socially neutral; that is it is not
a means of control. Such a conceptualization is
consistent with Argyris (1972) who spoke of tech-
nical reasoning as enacted through "theories in
use," or decision theories. Meyer (1984) further
states that decision theories are really "decision
metaphors" that, when implemented by deci-
sion makers, translate theory into practice. It
should be pointed out that in the present context,
"technology" is both material and behavioral.
Organizational development (Cobb & Margulies,
1981), management by objectives (Pringle &
Longenecker, 1982), performance appraisal, and
other practice-oriented activities drawn from
organizational behavior/theory, industrial/or-
ganizational psychology, and human resource
management all constitute behavioral tech-
nologies, or theories in use. This is not to say
that a discipline like human resource manage-
ment does not have an impact on practice. Criti-
cal theory merely states that these disciplines
only have an impact on practice through the
mediating effects of decision rules. This is a sub-
tle but important point. In and of themselves,
organization-related disciplines remain merely
neutral technologies. Only when technologies
and theories are put into use do problems occur.
The following section expands on this point.
Research and Theory Contribute to a Norma-
tive Social Order Based on Technical Rules and
Not Communicative Consensus. Habermas (1979)
distinguishes between two modes of action: (a)
"purposive-rational" action, in which social order
is built upon technical reasoning and the social
actor is viewed as an instrument for obtaining
the goals of the order; and (b) "communicative"
action, in which social order is normatively
defined through the reciprocal, social exchange
of subjective actors. In the former case, organiza-
tional knowledge is validated against objectively
329
verifiable criteria. In the latter case, it is vali-
dated through consensus [the group norms,
beliefs, and values socially constructed through
group experience and shared history (Davis,
1969; Hackman, 1976; Weick, 1969)].
From a socio-linguistic perspective, groups
construct and possess a language of their own
consisting of shared symbols. It is through this
language that meanings become objective and
are communicated (Habermas, 1979). Such a
perspective is consistent with Silverman's (1970)
whose action-frame-of-reference requires an
organizational analysis that centers upon the
constellations of meanings produced by individ-
uals and actors. These meanings result in social
structures if they are continually sustained and
reaffirmed in organizational life. The language
underlying these meanings is characterized by
high variety and ambiguity (Daft & Wiginton,
1979). Such a language allows social actors to
communicate while enabling the group to con-
trol the communication process (Feldman,
1984). According to Habermas (1979), the social
unit must have some control over language,
communication, and the construction of mean-
ing to validate knowledge arising both from
inside and outside the group.
When communicative consensus, however, is
displaced by technical rationality, the valida-
tion of knowledge is functionally taken away from
the social unit. Technical rationality imposes a
one-directional, specialized, and precise lan-
guage with low variety (Daft & Wiginton, 1979;
Hummel, 1977). Under such conditions, organi-
zational knowledge is validated, not by shared
consensus, but along a priori, objective criteria
(McCarthy, 1978). Practical questions are trans-
formed into technical questions. As a result,
technology, once neutral, becomes a means of
social control (see Comstock & Scott, 1977; Ed-
wards, 1979; Stanfield, 1976). Technical reason-
ing becomes a normative force in determining
practice and, subsequently, the day-to-day expe-
rience of members subjected to the practice.
'Praxis' is Reduced to Techne.' For Aristotle,
"praxis" referred to the sphere of human action.
 particularly human action within the "polis," or
political-ethical community (McCarthy, 1978). The
use of the term has varied since then, though
not dramatically. For Habermas (1973), praxis is
more narrowly defined as self-generated politi-
cal action. His concern is primarily with collec-
tive praxis, in which, through shared language,
history, and communicative action, social mem-
bers rationally construct their own conditions of
institutional existence.
Habermas' notion of praxis has been criticized
by other social scientists as too narrow (see
Bernstein, 1983; Heydebrand & Burris, 1984;
Warren, 1984). These social scientists feel that
praxis is enacted in many realms: political,
aesthetic, production, and moral. They favor a
definition that treats praxis more generally as
either the process of transcending alienation or
the self-determined act of furthering human
development and maturation. This broader
definition is consistent with that of Sartre (1976)
who defines praxis as the process of historical
totalization, or the activities taken by individuals
and groups in attempting to attain some end. It
is also consistent with Benson (1983), who de-
fines praxis as any rational and practical effort
to construct our social world.
Here, however, a narrower definition such as
Habermas' may be the most appropriate. His
definition is generally consistent with that of
Benson (1977), who, in an organizational con-
text, defines praxis as:
the free and creative reconstruction of social
arrangements on the basis of a reasoned analy-
sis of both the limits and the potentials of social
forms, (p. 5)
Benson (1977) continues by pointing out that, for
organization science, a "commitment to praxis"
requires a description and understanding of
those situations where individuals, through ratio-
nal analysis, reconstruct their organizational con-
ditions and hence themselves (for example, psy-
chological maturation). Further, he suggests that,
for organizational scientists, a commitment to
praxis requires an ethical commitment to en-
hance the process of reconstruction with the aim
330
of ultimately emancipating human potential. A
commitment to praxis therefore requires a con-
stant commitment to establishing the conditions
for organizational change. This definition is con-
sistent with Habermas' in the sense that, for
Habermas, the social scientist's purpose is to
unify theory, practice, and praxis in order to lib-
erate social members. To understand this im-
perative, it is essential to understand critical
theory's depiction of the relationship among the-
ory, practice, and praxis in modem institutions
that employ technologies and in technical rea-
soning which is supported by empirical-analytic
science.
When, in organizational practice, communi-
cative action is displaced by purposive-rational
action based upon the instrumental-technical
application of theory, praxis is systematically
withdrawn. In the words of Habermas (1973),
praxis is reduced to "techne," or to instrumental
activity externally determined by technical rea-
soning. Problems of praxis are reduced to
those of technical control and manipulation, re-
sulting in a serious depoliticization of the or-
ganization (Warren, 1984). The consequential
withdrawal of the subjective self from the or-
ganizational decision making and change pro-
cesses, whether on the level of language, com-
munication, politics, job design, or leadership,
results in "alienation" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).
That is, alienation is the objectification of the
subjective self.
Normative Consensus is Sustained Through
Ideology. Critical theory has to answer the ques-
tion: If organizational change and social pro-
cesses are increasingly governed by objectifying
technical rationality at the expense of intersub-
jective, communicative action, how do organiza-
tions attain and sustain consensus among their
members? Under the negative conditions out-
lined above, we might expect employees, unless
coerced, to be quite deviant. Critical theory,
however, contends that, as a whole, organiza-
tional actors are not aware of their objectification.
It contends that "ideology" leads institutional
members to act voluntarily in consensus.
 According to critical theory, ideology refers to
a coherent set of delusions, or a false rationality,
sponsored by dominant coalitions to stabilize and
legitimize their control and domination
{Habermas, 1975). Ideology possesses two neces-
sary traits that characterize it as a false ra-
tionality. First, it is self-imposed. Second, mem-
bers falsely interpret these self-imposed behav-
iors as self-determined (Geuss, 1982). In other
words, members impose false forms of rational-
ity upon themselves by continually reproducing
the normative, objectifying structures that dis-
tort communication and constrain praxis. Fur-
ther, and following the logic of Sartre (1976), the
members complete the neurosis by interpreting
their repetitive behaviors as products of their own
self-will. Further, Habermas (1979) pointed out
that self-imposed objectifying organizational
processes are perceived as legitimate and even
self-willed because ideology is itself built upon
distorted communication. Therefore, if organiza-
tional communication is structured to sustain
ideology, since members are unaware of their
state, they have few opportunities to realize their
delusion. In this sense, power is rooted in dis-
torted communication (Habermas, 1979).
An Expanded Research Agenda
Table 1 summarizes the philosophical assump-
tions underlying organizational research con-
ducted under alternative modes of science. Table
2 summarizes specific epistemic properties of the
organization sciences discussed so far from a
critical theory perspective. It should be noted that
these categories (for example, natural science,
hermeneutical) are somewhat artificial because
in practice, researchers rarely confine them-
selves to a single approach. As suggested earlier,
empirical-analytic researchers employ qualita-
tive procedures and all researchers, whether
empirical-analytic or interpretive, expand their
critique beyond the narrow analysis of the inter-
nal rules of methodology. This paper, neverthe-
less, is presented under the premise that, though
established modes of organization science incor-
porate philosophical critique in their research
331
(analysis of internal and external validity), the
critique could be more inclusive and systematic.
Further, while certain approaches may critique
other approaches, major orientations still exist,
and adoption of any given orientation has unicjue
consequences.
Most of this paper has been devoted to a dis-
cussion of the consequences of an empirical-
analytic organization science because, histori-
cally, critical theoiy has actively critiqued the
practical social consequences of a contemporary
society engaging in social sciences under a natu-
ral science orientation. It is possible, however,
to employ a "Habermasian" {perspective to cri-
tique the interpretivist tradition. Table 2 sug-
gests some of the weaknesses of a phenomeno-
logical and hermeneutical approach. For ex-
ample, Husserlian phenomenology is particularly
weak in establishing validity claims because
there is an inherent weakness in its system of
checks and balances for verifying and validat-
ing organizational knowledge.
The strength of critical theory is its require-
ment that methodology be subjugated to descrip-
tive epistemology. The question to be answered
at this point is: What are the practical implica-
tions of such subordination? The impact can only
be speculated about. To date, no one has specif-
ically outlined, even hypothetically, the impact
of a social science subjected to the requisites of
critical theory. Following is a brief outline of the
consequences of the hypothetical Institutionali-
zation" of critical theory. As the following proposi-
tions suggest, the impact on the structure of orga-
nization science would be significant.
First, critical theory requires that researchers
expand their critique to include the cognitive
intent, or aim, of research. In this sense, critical
theory is "self-reflective" (McCarthy, 1978). It
implicitly assumes that all organizational scien-
tists, due to training, competition, and the con-
straints of the scientific community, infuse their
values and beliefs into the research enterprise.
These infused values, which constitute a third-
level construct in research, should be consciously
and explicitly set forth. This means that the
researcher must explain why one of many theo-
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332
ries were chosen, as well as the consequences
of the theory he or she practices.
Second, critical theory includes an empirical,
quantitative analysis of organizational struct-
ures. Data obtained here might resemble that
typically obtained in empirical research. For
example, behavioral, affective, structural, and
decision-making variables may all be evaluat-
ed through empirical-analytic means.
Third, critical theory requires the hermeneuti-
cal evaluation of organizational facts obtained
through empirical-analytic means. Such an anal-
ysis includes: (a) an on-site evaluation of actors'
interpretations of organizational phenomena and
conditions which may or may not reflect condi-
tions suggested by quantitative analysis; (b) an
analysis of the historical-contextual dimension
of revealed empirical data and actors' interpre-
tations; and (c) a self-reflective analysis of the
constraints upon the researcher in understand-
ing first-level constructs.
Finally, critical theory requires a commitment
to organizational change. It is an "inquiry of
change" (McCarthy, 1978), and it is this commit-
ment which most clearly distinguishes critical
theory from the other approaches. Critical theory
intentionally evaluates the social consequences
of theory and subjects the relationship between
knowledge and practice to rational analysis
through discourse between the researcher and
organizational members constituting the re-
search-domain. Critical theory accomplishes this
by complementing hermeneutical analysis with a
critique of ideology. Not only does the researcher
consult members regarding their interpretations
of organizational phenomena, but the researcher
also engages in discourse with members con-
cerning the possible falsity of their interpretations.
In other words, the researcher is not a passive
observer or even a participant. Instead, the
researcher is a "reconstructionist," even a n
"activist," who finds within empirical structures
and members' interpretations false rationalities
usually reflecting organizational ideologies. It is
the role of the researcher to further members'
understanding of organizational phenomena by
333
exposing delusions. In doing so, researchers
should increase members' understanding of their
conditions and, subsequently, establish condi-
tions for organizational change. It is important to
note that critical theory does not prescribe any
normative course of change; it only requires norm-
ative procedures for the researcher when engag-
ing in research. It affirmatively defines the re-
searcher as a catalyst whose responsibility is to
ensure that the conditions are present for organi-
zational change. The researcher makes explicit
error-prone structures and processes, legitimized
through ideology. With the removal of these
barriers, organizational communication is facili-
tated and consensiis is arrived at less coercively.
It may even be possible that, through discourse,
and because of organizational realities, mem-
bers may reach a consensus requiring more
autocratic structures. This is fine, if the struc-
tures are not ideological and as long as condi-
tions exist to facilitate further change.
In summary, critical theory is committed to the
establishment of conditions to: (a) restore com-
municative action; (b) validate organizational
knowledge through practical discourse; (c) reas-
sign technologies (material and behavioral) to
their neutral status by subjecting them to ratio-
nal debate; and (d) reinstate praxis. To pursue
these aims the researcher engages in discourse
with members concerning the delusions and illu-
sions which characterize ideologies that legiti-
mize ineffective structures and maintain distorted
organizational communication. Validity claims
are tested, not according to whether empirical
evidence corresponds to some specified research
propositions. Instead, the real criteria of truth, or
the test of validity of organizational knowledge,
lies in the acceptance of the knowledge state-
ment by organizational members. Empirical con-
firmation of facts is certainly important in provid-
ing evidence for certain knowledge statements,
but the final arbiter lies in the perceived practi-
cality of knowledge as indicated by social con-
sensus. According to Hctbermas (1979), by sub-
jecting validity claims to rational debate, techni-
cal reasoning is reduced and praxis is reinstated.
 Conclusion
Besides expanding the research agenda by
subjugating methodology to epistemic critique,
critical theory would also affect the structure and
activities of the scientific community. First, criti-
cal theory suggests that research, as a well
defined activity of the scientific community,
should be the subject of more descriptive re-
search. For example, researchers could subject
the criticisms outlined at the beginning of this
paper to empirical investigation. Phillips (1978),
Galtung (1977), and Mitroff and Kilmann (1978)
provide a comprehensive list of researchable top-
ics drawn from the history, sociology, and psy-
chology of knowledge. Specific avenues of in-
quiry might include the role of the researcher's
career in determining research, the role of aca-
demic status and hierarchy in determining re-
search, the effects of competition and reward
allocation, the social structure of different sub-
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