ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y.
2015-2016
I – INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and
indicates to individual remedies for the violations of his rights.
Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to
control, the administrative operations of the government.
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. Constitution
2. Statutes
3. Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (old law)
4. Administrative Code of 1987 (new law)
5. Jurisprudence
6. Rules and regulations by administrative agencies
Q. Is the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 still alive considering that
there is already the Administrative Code of 1987?
Yes, as was ruled in Mercado v. COA.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1917 remains a source of
administrative law.
Mecano v. COA
Facts: An employee claimed reimbursement for medical expenses but
this was denied because the provision he invoked in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 was omitted in the Administrative Code of
1987.
Held: In the absence of express repeal, the omission does not
necessarily mean it is repealed. In the absence of inconsistency between
the two laws and intent to cover the whole subject matter of the old
law, it was neither impliedly repealed. Thus, the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 remains a source of administrative law.
Ferdie: He says that he suffered the disease in the performance of his functions
or in the line of duty. He’s now trying to recover reimbursement from the
government invoking a certain provision from the Administrative Code of 1917.
The COA said that it cannot be allowed because the specific provision invoked was
not carried over to the Administrative Code of 1987. It was already amended by
omission according to COA.
This is a Statutory Construction case. The SC said that it does not follow that just
because it was omitted, it is no longer alive. The Administrative Code of 1987 did
not expressly repeal the 1917 Revised Administrative Code. In which case, there
was no express repeal. So, we go to implied repeal.
An implied repeal only works if there is:
1. Irreconcilable inconsistency, and
2. If the subsequent law was intended to cover the entire prior law.
In this case, it was only for administrative coordination. Hence the end result is,
the Administrative Code of 1917 is still part of Administrative law. It is still alive.
Administrative law may be sourced from statutes other than
the Administrative Code.
Leveriza v. IAC
Facts: The government leased a parcel of land but it was cancelled by
the airport manager. It was argued the airport manager has no authority
to cancel; that it is only the department secretary acting for the
president or the airport director by delegated authority who could validly
cancel the contract.
Held: Under the Revised Administrative Code, the authority to lease
belongs to the President, officer authorized by him or by law. The
authority of the airport manager falls under the third category as it is
expressly granted by RA 776. Thus, administrative law may be sourced
from statutes other than the Administrative Code.
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Ferdie: Administrative Code is not the only sole source of Administrative Law.
There are other statutes. In this case, there was a question of whether or not the
airport manager can lease government property to a third person. But it was said
that it was only the President, in the exercise of its administrative powers.
However, there were actually three sources of the Administrative Code for the
power or authority to lease:
1. The President
2. Officer authorized by
3. Those granted by law.
In this case, the airport manager belongs to the third category because there is
a specific law that grants him the authority. Remember leasing of government
property is administrative as opposed to selling that it is strict act or omission.
This case explains why the Administrative Code is not the only source of the
Administrative law.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REASONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
To help unclog court dockets.
Abejo v. De la Cruz
They have special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters are essential.
To cope with the growing complexities of modern society.
Solid Homes, Inc. v Payawal
They can deal with problems in their particular fields with more expertise
and dispatch than the legislature or courts of justice.
Q. Why is there an administrative agency?
Because Congress cannot do it on its own. It needs the help of
administrative agencies.
Ferdie: Here, one of the reasons is to cope with the growing complexities of
modern society. When Congress legislates, it cannot anticipate each and every
situation in the Philippines. That expertise belongs to the administrative agencies.
On the issuance of the voter’s receipts, sir thinks that the SC is just misinformed
because the law merely provides that there must be an auditable hard copy. It did
not specify voter’s receipt. The official ballot is already the hard copy that can be
subject of audit. After election, Comelec does a random manual audit. Almost
always, the match is perfect. The plan of the Comelec is to go to the SC, file an
MR and show them how it is done. But take note: SC has already ruled against the
Comelec.
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG AGENCIES
1. Supervision
2. Control
3. Attachment
Beja v. CA
Facts: An employee of an agency was charged administratively before
the department it is attached.
Held: The department is without jurisdiction over personnel action
involving employees of an agency attached to it. Attachment is a mere
lateral relationship between the department and the agency attached to
it for program and policy coordination. As such, the attached agency
retains independence insofar as personnel action and management are
concerned.
Attachment is only for policy and program coordination
How accomplished?
1. Representation of the department in the governing board of the
attached agency either as chairman or member, with or without
voting rights, if permitted by the charter.
2. Periodic reporting by attached agency to the department about the
progress of programs and projects.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
3. Providing by the department general policies to serve as framework
for the internal policies of the attached agency (Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987)
Ferdie: In attachment, you actually retain your identity. The agency to which you
are attached does not absorb you. You retain your independence. Example, Land
Registration Authority (LRA), it has attached agencies such as Register of Deeds.
Another example is NLRC which is attached to DOLE. They are independent from
each other. Insofar as personal action is concerned, the agency to which it is
attached has no jurisdiction. Attachment is only for policy and program
coordination.
Eugenio v. CSC
Illustration of the above numbers 1 and 3.
Representation of the department in the governing board of the
attached agency
The Career Executive Service (CES) Board is attached to the Civil Service
Commission composed of the CSC Chair as Presiding Officer.
Providing by the department general policies to serve as
framework for the general policies of the attached agency
The functions of the board (CES Board) include promulgation of rules,
standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of CES members
NATURE AND MANNER OF CREATION AND ABOLITION
An attached agency conceived to be autonomous does not lose
its independent character by mere attachment.
Eugenio v. CSC
Facts: The Career Executive Service Board is attached to the Civil Service
Commission which later absorbed it through reorganization.
Held: An attached agency conceived to be autonomous does not lose its
independent character by mere attachment. The CESB is not one of the
offices listed under the Civil Service Commission. As such, the CSC
cannot absorb it because its authority to reorganize is limited to the
offices under its control as enumerated.
Ferdie: Reorganization normally contemplates reduction of personnel, abolition
and consolidation of offices. Provided, these offices are under your control. But if
it is an attached agency only, you have no right to absorb them even when you
reorganize.
Reasons for delegation of legislative power.
Pantranco v. PSC
Facts: The Public Service Commission approved application of a
transportation company to operate additional trucks but subject to
conditions that it is valid for 25 years only and may be acquired by the
government which were argued as total abdication of legislative
functions. The controversy here is that Congress seemed to have
washed its hands and passed the buck to the administrative agency.
Held: This is valid subordinate legislation warranted by complexities of
modern governments. This multiplication of subjects of government
regulation, and the increased difficulty in administering the laws, there
is a growing tendency to delegate legislative power.
Ferdie: Again, Congress cannot do everything. There has to be that delegation to
the administrative agencies.
Solid Homes v. Payawal
Facts: A buyer of subdivision lot sued the real estate developer before
the trial court after it failed to deliver certificate of title despite full
payment.
Held: It is the National Housing Authority, and not the trial court, that
has jurisdiction over unsound real estate business practices. As an
administrative body specialized in the particular field assigned to it, it
can deal with problems with more expertise and dispatch than Congress
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or the courts. Thus, the increasing vesture of quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative powers on administrative bodies.
Ferdie: The regular courts do not have the expertise at all times. Insofar as this
one is concerned, like real estate business practices, it is the administrative agency
that has the expertise to focus on these particular issues, not necessarily the
regular courts. NHA is now HLURB. So if there is a conflict in the homeowners’
association, you go there.
A public office may be created by the Constitution, by law or by
authority of law.
Secretary of DOTC v. Mabalot
Facts: By authority of the President, the DOTC Secretary transferred the
functions of the DOTC-CAR to the LTFRB-CAR. It was argued it is a
purely legislative act hence not even the president much less the
secretary can do so.
Held: A public office may be created by the Constitution, by law or by
authority of law.
By authority of law
Example: The creation of the LTFRB-CAR falls under the third category
which may be decreed through Executive Order issued by the President
or by an administrative agency like the Civil Service Commission
By law
Examples:
1. Presidential Decrees expressly grant the President continuing
authority to reorganize the national government. It includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies to abolish
offices, create, transfer, and classify functions.
2. Section 62 of the General Appropriations Act authorizes the
President and Congress to reorganize the department of agency,
including the power to create an office.
3. Section 20, Book III of the Administrative Code grants the
President residual powers to reorganize the national government.
Ferdie: Do not confuse this with the power of the President to reorganize the
Office of the President. The case about the Truth Commission where the SC said
the authority of the President to reorganize the office of the President does not
include the power to create an office. Here, if it involves the national government,
the President has the authority to create an office.
Larin v. Executive Secretary
Facts: The President streamlined the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
abolished the Excise tax Service resulting in the termination of the Asst.
Commissioner. It was argued that there is no law authorizing the
President to reorganize executive agencies particularly the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
Held: Sec. 48 of RA 7645 directs department heads to identify activities
no longer essential in the delivery of public services which may be the
basis of the president to scale down, phase out or abolish. This appears
to not include the power to create.
Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Chargers – Unless otherwise
created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
It now grants power to create aside from the residual powers. Likewise,
presidential decrees expressly grant the president continuing authority
to reorganize the national government
Ferdie: Presidential decrees date back as far as the time of Marcos. They are still
alive. Even if the President issues an executive order, it is still allowed. That is the
rule-making power of the President pursuant to the Ordinance Power of the
President.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016

Effect of expiration of administrative agency. Examples of Sufficient Standards:

Cebu United Enterprises v Gallofin
Facts: The Import Control Commission issued import licenses subject to
conditions. But later its term of existence expired.
Held: The conditions set forth in the import licenses remain in force and
effect even if the administrative agency that issued it has expired. The
valid acts of an administrative agency survive its own death.
Ferdie: Even if the agency has expired, its orders are still valid for as long as they
were made pursuant, or in conformity of the law.
Q. Who enforces the orders which survived after the expiration of the
administrative agency which issued such order?
If the agency was merely reorganized or replaced with a new one, the
replacement may be the one to carry out the order. But if it was
abolished, it may be some other agencies which will assume the
responsibility of ensuring compliance of the order.
Conversion is not equal to abolition.
Crisostomo v. CA
Facts: The President of the Philippine College of Commerce was
suspended. But later he was ordered reinstated but the PCC was already
converted it into the Polytechnic University of the Philippines by the
President of the Republic.
Held: Conversion is not equal to abolition. It merely changed the
academic status of the educational institution and not its corporate life.
Ferdie: Take note of the highlighted portion. Conversion is not equal to abolition.
It merely changes the academic status.
1. To maintain monetary stability in the Philippines.
2. To promote a rising level of production and real income in the
Philippines. (RA 265)
3. Promotion of public safety (Edu v. Ericta)
4. Public interest (People v Rosenthal, Pantranco v PSC)
5. Justice and equity (Antamok Gold v. CIR)
6. Simplicity, economy and efficiency (Cervantes v Auditor General)
7. Sense and experience of men (Mutual Firm Corp. v Industrial
Commission)
8. National security (Hirabayashi v. US)
9. Fair and equitable employment practices (Eastern v POEA)
10. Along the guidelines (De la Llana v. Alba)
Example of Insufficient Standard:
Viola v. Alunan
Facts; The seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions
and other institutions as the Chair of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Held: The phrase “may see fit” is a generous and dangerous condition.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. There is no standard, guidelines or limitations on how to
distribute, the options are boundless
Who are the beneficiaries? What is the criteria by which they are
chosen?
Only the officers can answer and they have the sole direction. This is a
roving commission, a wide and sweeping authority which is not
canalized within the banks that keep it from overflowing. It is an invalid
delegation of legislative powers

To create such other positions as it may deem necessary is a But compare this with “create such other positions as it may deem
sufficient standard. necessary for the management of its affairs” which was considered
Viola v. Alunan sufficient standard.
Facts: The Liga ng mga Barangay elected its first, second, third vice-
presidents and auditors for all chapters. It was challenged as Ferdie: As it may deem necessary – you need to justify. As it may deem fit - it’s
overflowing. The discretion is unlimited.
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
Abolition of administrative agency, when valid.
Held: There is no undue delegation of legislative power as no less than
the Local Government Code authorizes the liga board “to create such 1. It is carried out by a legitimate body
other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
Who or what is that legitimate body?
chapter” which is deemed a sufficient standard.
Congress by legislation
Ferdie: First premise is, there is a law. And in delegation, the rule-making power
President by decree
of the administrative agency. But prior to delegation, there must be that sufficient
standard which can be made as a basis by that government agency or 2. It is done in good faith.
administrative agency to make rules and regulations.
When is it done in good faith?
Here, when you say ‘to create such other positions as it may deem necessary for Abolition pursuant to reorganization is in bad faith if any of the
the management of the chapter,’ it validates the action of the Liga ng mga following is present:
Barangay to include a first, second, vice presidents and auditors from all chapters.
They added positions that were not necessarily specifically enumerated under the a. Significant increase in the number of positions (Take note of
mother law or source law. But here’s a catch all phrase which says that “for as the word “significant”)
long as you deem it necessary, you can create that position.” So, that is a sufficient b. An office is abolished but another one created performing
standard.
substantially the same functions
But there is another case which says that when the sufficient standard says “as it c. Incumbents are replaced by less qualified in terms of status
may deem fit”, SC said that it is not sufficient standard. In this case, the standard of appointment, performance and merit
used is “as it may deem necessary”, SC ruled that it is a sufficient standard. d. Reclassification where the classified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices
The difference is that “as it may deem fit” is more encompassing. There is no limit. e. Removal violates order of separation
It is not a sufficient standard. Whereas, in the standard “as it may deem
necessary", the need should be established to justify it.
What is that order of separation?
AGAIN: Source law, congress legislates. It cannot specify that much that is why it 1. Casuals with less than 5 years of service
gives a sufficient standard so that it can delegate the power to specify the law to 2. Casuals with 5 or more years of service
administrative agencies. 3. Employees holding temporary appointments
4. Employees holding permanent appointments

Important: But regardless of length of service, those in the

same category enumerated above who are least qualified in
terms of performance and merit shall be laid first. Thus, the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
order of separation after abolition through reorganization is
dictated not only by length of service, but also by performance
and merit, all things being equal.
Ferdie: If they are in equal footing, it should be based on merit and fitness. For
example, there are 10 permanent employees, you need to decide which one to fire
and which one to retain, base it on their merit and fitness.
Minor changes that do not substantially affect composition,
powers and functions of an agency does not amount to
abolition.
Canonizado v. Aguirre
Facts: The PNP was reorganized. It expired the terms of office of the
incumbent commissioners of the NaPolCom on the basis that it was
already abolished
Held: Minor changes that do not substantially affect composition,
powers and functions of an agency does not amount to abolition. As
such, the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners are not
expired, aside from the fact that they are members of the civil service
who can only be removed by cause and after due process pursuant to
the security of tenure. Without a valid reorganization, termination in the
form term expiration is unconstitutional.
Abolition of administrative agency by the President, basis of.
National Tobacco Adminstration case
Facts: An executive order streamlined (simplified) the National Tobacco
Administration that substantially reduced its personnel. The affected
rank and file employees argue an executive order cannot reorganize an
office, bureau or agency attached to a department, it being a legislative
act.
Held: The legislative power to abolish does not extend to a bureau,
office or agency in the executive department which the President may
reorganize pursuant to the power of control.
Abolition of administrative agency, effect on security of tenure.
Bagaoisan v. NTC
Termination arising out of valid abolition does not offend security of
tenure because it is one mode of terminating official relations. But
preference of appointment in favor of affected employees merely entitle
them to priority in consideration, but not to automatic appointment.
In case of abolition of one office and creation of another, outsiders may
be appointed to the newly created office provided they qualify and it is
in the best interest of public service.
Ferdie: Example, if there is an office abolished or reorganized, and there is
another created, those who were terminated on the basis of the abolition or
reorganization, they do not necessarily have the right of first refusal nor the vested
right to be appointed. But in the government, for humanitarian consideration, they
are always accommodated, unless there is no basis to be appointed.
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION FROM POWERS
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION FROM POWERS
Purpose: To prevent concentration of executive, legislative and judicial
powers to a single branch of government.
How is it attained?
It is attained by allocating their exercise to the three branches of
government. Separation of powers is independent, coordinate, and co-
equal.
Q. Are they entirely independent from each other?
No, it not an absolute statement because sharing and mixing of powers
between and among the branches is allowed.
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Examples:
1. The President shares legislation through his veto power.
Ferdie: Congress enacts a law and the President might not like it and
vetoes the law. That is sharing with the legislative power.
A bill becomes a law when the President signs it. Consequently, the
President actually participates in the legislation because he or she is the
last approving authority, except if he does not sign, and the 30-day period
lapses. By passage of time it becomes a law without the participation of
the President. But normally, there is.
2. The Court shares legislation through its power of judicial review
which interprets or invalidates a law.
Ferdie: It is the Supreme Court that has the final say as to how a certain
law is supposed to be construed.
3. Congress shares exercise of executive power through
confirmation of appointments and assent to treaties. It also
shares judicial powers through its power to create inferior courts
and regulate number and pay of judges.
Ferdie: There are certain public officers appointed by the President that
need the confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments.
PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
PRINCIPLE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Purpose: To prevent supremacy of one branch over the other and
secures coordination of various departments.
Thus, the principle of separation of powers:
1. Allows blending of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial
powers in one body.
Ferdie: Take note of the word ‘blending’ because sometimes it may take to
mean that one is encroaching over the jurisdiction of another. Probably this
only means ‘blend’. You have to make the difference.
2. Does not prevent one branch from inquiring into the affairs of other
branches to maintain the balance of power, but ensures that it does
not encroach on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of other
branches.
Ferdie: For example, one branch asks what the other is doing, it is alright.
But it cannot say ‘you should not have done it this way’ because that is
already encroachment.
POWER OF OVERSIGHT
POWER OF OVERSIGHT
The principal power of Congress to legislate includes the auxiliary power
to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. Power of
oversight pertains to the supervisory power of the Congress to ensure
that the laws it legislates are complied with.
Ferdie: Principal power to legislate + auxiliary power to ensure faithful compliance
= power of oversight.
Power of oversight
A. Intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
B. Integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government
C. It embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of its
enactments.
D. It concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress to:
1. Monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives
2. Determine whether agencies are properly administered
3. Eliminate executive ways and dishonesty
4. Prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority
5. Assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
Categories of Congressional oversight functions:
A. Scrutiny
B. Investigation
C. Supervision
LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY
Purpose: To determine economy and efficiency of the operation of
government activities
Basis: Power to specify the project or activity to be funded.
Ferdie: This includes the power of appropriation which includes the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded. It is otherwise known as the power of
the purse. It is the Congress that holds the purse. It appropriates the budget to
all of the government agencies.
Exercised through:
1. Power of the purse, and
2. Power of confirmation.
1 – Power of appropriation or power of the purse through
Budget Hearing
A. Administrative officials defend their budget proposals
B. It is the means to review policy and audit the use of previous
appropriation to ascertain whether they have been disbursed
accordingly
C. It is an opportunity for Congress to express its confidence or
disgust in the performance of a public officer.
Ferdie: If you are a government agency that somehow offended a Congressman
or a Senator, for example, then there is a budget hearing, you have to go there
and defend your budget proposal to be included in the next budget.
(Recall what happened to the son of Senator Miriam who committed suicide after
applying for admission to the UP Law Center) When the UP representatives went
to Congress asking for budget increase, and Miriam was there in that committee,
she castigated the UP Law Center representatives.
If you are going to be there, be prepared. Don’t be onion-skinned because for
always, they will sting, especially if somehow in the past you offended the
Congress.
But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings
As such, Congress can ask department heads to appear before and be
heard by it on any matter pertaining to their departments.
However, Section 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
“department heads, may upon their initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, appear before and be
heard on any matter relative to their departments.”
Ferdie: Remember when GMA prohibited all her secretaries and department
heads from appearing in any investigation conducted by the House of Senate.
2 – Power of Confirmation
Who exercises?
The Commission on Appointments composed of:
1. The Senate President as ex officio chair
2. Twelve (12) senators, and
3. Twelve (12) representatives
Ferdie: There is a ratio and proportion of representation on who are the majority
party and the minority party.
Nominees of the President whose positions need confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments:
1. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
2. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain
3. Other officers whose appointments are vested with the President
under the Constitution
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Ferdie: All appointments under the Constitution, including Comelec chair
and Commissioners need to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CoA).
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
Who exercises?
Senate of Representatives or any of its committees.
Limitations to Congressional Investigations
1. Must be in aid of legislation
2. In accordance with its duly published rules and regulations
3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
Arnault v. Nazareno
Facts: During Congressional Investigation, a witness refused to answer
question he claimed to be self-incriminatory. The Senate cited him in
contempt, committed him to the custody of the Sgt-at-Arms and
imprisoned him until he answers the question.
The contention of the witness: Senate has no power to cite him in
contempt. The information sought to be obtained was immaterial and
does not serve any purpose in aid of legislation. The answer required
incriminates him.
Supreme Court ruling:
1. The power of inquiry includes the power to enforce. Legislation
presupposes information. Mere request for information are often
unavailing as some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
legislative information.
Ferdie: The power of contumacy to cite in contempt for refusing to answer
a question on the basis of thinking it is self-incriminatory, has to have that
compulsion. Otherwise, there is no point for the hearing.
2. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require the witness to answer any
question pertinent to its inquiry, subject to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Ferdie: There has to be a balance between the power of inquiry and the
right against self-incrimination.
3. The inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of the
power. Hence, the witness cannot be coerced to answer a question
that has obviously no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
4. The witness admitted that the transaction was legal. That he gave
P440, 000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s
verbal instruction. Then he refused to reveal the name of the
representative on the ground that it incriminates him.
5. It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his liability.
Ferdie: Bottomline is, you are not the sole judge of your liability. You cannot
impose it on the one who is asking the question. Just like when you are
taking the witness stand. You cannot say that you will not answer the
question because it is a leading question. It is the lawyer who can say that,
not the witness even if the witness is a lawyer.
6. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real
to the court. The fact that the testimony of the witness may tend
to show that he violated a law is not sufficient to entitle him to the
protection.
7. It cannot be invoked by reason of fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
Grounds for Contumacy (House Rules and Procedures
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation):
1. Refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey such summons
without legal excuse
Ferdie: Example is Junjun Binay (the son). He doesn’t attend despite
summons so he was cited in contempt.
2. Refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmations
3. Refuses to answer any relevant inquiry
4. Refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that
are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession
5. Acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of the
Committee or commits misbehaviour in the presence of the
committee
6. Unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION
It allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated
authority.
Ferdie: It is only the President that has the veto power, and Congress can override
the veto. However, there is an instance when Congress has the power to veto.
There is such a thing as subordinate legislation. If Congress enacts a law and it
leaves to the administrative agency the power to formulate implementing rules
and regulations to fully implement the law, Congress sometimes requires the IRR
to be submitted to it for approval. If Congress does not like that, it vetoes the IRR.
That is the veto power of the Congress. Take note that this is an exception.
GR: It is only the President that has the veto power.
XPN: When Congress vetoes the IRR submitted to it by the
administrative agency for approval.
How exercised?
Through its veto power when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the
proposed regulations to Congress, which retains the right to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect
It allows Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or
disapproval of “subordinate law” or those enacted by the executive
branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress
Q. Does Congress have the veto power over the Comelec?
Makalintal v. Comelec
Facts: This case is about the constitutionality of RA 9189 (Overseas
Absentee Voting Act). SC struck down Section 17.1 as unconstitutional
insofar as it allows the Joint Oversight Committee of Congress to review
and approve the rules and regulations issued by Comelec. This violates
the independence of the Comelec as mandated by the Constitution.
Section 17 or RA No. 9189 provides:
“Sec. 17. Voting by mail – For the May 2004 elections, the Commission
shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries,
subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee.
Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following
conditions:
(a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to
prevent occasion of fraud;
(b) Where there exists a technically established identification system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting;
(c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in
the embassies, consulates and other Foreign Service
establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon
review and approval of the Joint Oversight Committee.”
6|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Ferdie: Congress enacts a law and it delegates the power to an administrative
agency. But in the delegation of power to formulate the IRR to fully implement the
law, Congress provides for sufficient standard as basis for the administrative
agency to formulate the IRR. But Congress now says that even after you are given
the standard and you have made an IRR based on that standard, that is still subject
to review by Congress.
Held: It is clear that Congress has already set the necessary standards
to guide the Comelec in identifying the countries where voting by mail
may be allowed. Since the standards have been defined, all that is left
is their enforcement.
Ferdie: In other words, there is a standard and almost, the law is complete. So
what is left is only enforcement.
The Constitution has given the Comelec power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power
is exclusive. As such, it cannot be subject to review and revision or veto
by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power.
The legislative veto power or congressional oversight power over the
authority of the Comelec to issue rules and regulations in order to
enforce election laws is unconstitutional.
The power of the Comelec to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations can only be struck down if it is illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
Ferdie: And the one that strikes it down is not even Congress, but the Supreme
Court. Take note of that exception.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Quasi-legislative
2. Quasi-judicial
3. Implied powers
Doctrine of necessary implication and inferences.
LLDA v. CA
Facts: An administrative agency issued a cease and desist order against
a local government unit from operating an open dumpsite. But it was
challenged as without basis because the law merely says it has the
power to “make, alter, modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution”
Held: While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted, it has also implied powers
necessary to exercise its express powers
Ferdie: The principle applied here is Doctrine of Necessary Implication and
Inferences which is otherwise known as common sense.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies
only when the agency exercises quasi-judicial powers.
SMART v. NTC
Facts: Telecommunication companies challenged the billing rules and
regulations promulgated by the NTC. It was argued to be premature
because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Held: The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the administrative agency exercises quasi-legislative power.
It only applies when it exercises quasi-judicial power.
In the same way, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only when
the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial power
Ferdie: It is all about texts. There was a proposal that the name of the recipient
or the receiver of the message or call will be recorded in the billing. TN: There is
a particular remedy when you can say that that is premature because there was a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is available only when the
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial power.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER: SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Ferdie: We discussed in detail already the quasi-legislative power of the
Comelec to administer elections, so this is just a reiteration of what we
learned in election insofar as quasi-legislative power is concerned. This
also would touch on some principles of statutory construction.
A. Nature and Definition
B. Kinds: Interpretative and Legislative Regulation
C. Source: Valid Delegation
D. Requisites of Valid Regulation
E. Penal Regulations
F. Construction and interpretation
Power of Subordinate Legislation
Administrative bodies are authorized to “fill in the details” which
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by promulgation of implementing rules known as
supplementary regulations.
NATURE AND DEFINITION
NATURE AND DEFINITION
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force and
effect of law.
Rizal v. NLRC
Facts: An insurance company terminated its employee on the ground of
tardiness and unexcused absences. But the Labor Arbiter reinstated him
with back wages. The insurance company moved to extend time to file
Appeal Memorandum on the last day. The motion to extend was denied
by the Labor Arbiter and the appeal was dismissed for being filed out of
time. The Revised Rules of the NLRC says decisions of the Arbiter
become final and executor unless appealed in 10 days and no motion
for extension is entertained.
Ferdie: Appeal Memorandum shall be filed within 10 days and it is non-extendible.
Motion for Reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in an appeal memorandum. In
other words, the motion for extension is a prohibited pleading just like the motion
for reconsideration.
Contention of the Insurance Company: The NLRC gravely abused its
discretion for dismissing the case out of technicality. It invoked the Rules
of Court on liberal construction in the interest of substantial justice.
Held: It may be true insofar as the Rules of Court is concerned whereas
the NLRC Rules of Procedure is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force and effect of
law thus entitled to great respect.
Ferdie: Labor Laws are actually social legislation and so the NLRC is tasked to
provide subordinate legislation. They actually formulate the IRR, or in this case,
the NLRC Rules of Procedure which actually interprets the law.
In statutory construction, interpretation and construction is the exclusive province
of the SC. However, in so far as who first interprets the constitutionality of law is
not really the SC. It could be the President or the Administrative Agency which is
tasked to enforce the law, because they cannot enforce the law without construing
it. They have to understand it first before enforcing it. It is actually first interpreted
and construed by administrative agencies.
But that interpretation is binding only until it is nullified by the SC. Once it is the
SC that construes the law, its interpretation is binding. But if it is the administrative
agency, it is good as it gets because later on it might be nullified by the SC. Absent
any nullification by the SC, it is valid and binding.
7|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Conditions for a valid subordinate legislation.
Sigre v. CA
Facts: A land tenant had been paying rental to the landowner with 32
cavans every agricultural year. But he stopped paying rentals to the
landowner and instead remitted it to LBP pursuant to the Memorandum
Circular issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform. It set guidelines
in the payment of lease rental by farmer-beneficiaries under the land
transfer program of PD No. 27.
Ferdie: PD 27 is the Agrarian Reform Law under the Marcos Regime. A presidential
decree has the force and effect of law. The question here is, can a Memorandum
Circular supersede a Presidential Decree?
It says payment of land rentals terminates on the date the value of land
is established. Thereafter, tenant-farmers pay their lease rentals to the
LBP or its authorized representative.
Ferdie: There are instances when tenant-farmers make little payments because
the landlords do not issue receipts. Sometimes, the landlords take advantage. So
there is this Memorandum Circular to protect their interests.
The Court of Appeals nullified the Memorandum Circular as there is
nothing in PD 27 that sanctions it. It is in conflict with PD 816 which
says payment of lease is to be made to the landowner. As a statute, PD
816 prevails over the Memorandum Circular.
Ferdie: There is another PD that specifically says payment must be to the
landowner, but the intent of the MC here is to protect the interest of the tenant-
farmers because sometimes their payments are not reflected or not accounted for
because they don’t issue receipts.
Held: The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies
to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by “filling in”
the details, provided:
1. It is germane to the purpose of the law and
2. Conforms to the standard prescribed by law.
TN: As an administrative agency you can fill in the detail in the gap of
the law, provided you follow the conditions. Germane means related as
opposed to mundane which means worldly.
PD 27 emancipates tenants from the bondage of the soil by transferring
to them ownership of the land they till. The Memorandum Circular is
intended to avoid the situation where payments of lease exceed the
value of the land. It is to remedy the situation where lease payments
are not recorded or monitored because of the refusal of landowners to
issue receipts to the tenants. In the exercise of the power of subordinate
legislation, administrative bodies are empowered to promulgate rules to
fill in the gap of the statute to fully implement the law.
Ferdie: What the SC is saying is that even if it is a mere memorandum circular
but if it actually gives life on the purpose and intent of the law then that is allowed
in subordinate legislation. If Congress legislates, it cannot anticipate each and
every situation in the field as the law is being enforced. That is why an
administrative agency is better equipped in understanding the situation and they
can fill in the gap on law.
KINDS OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
\
KINDS
1. Interpretative regulation
2. Legislative regulation
Eslao v. COA
Facts: A state university entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to evaluate
government reforestation operations. The Board of Regents of the State
University confirmed the appointments and designations of the state
university personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diem. The
Commission on Audit however found that the approved rates of
honoraria were higher than the rates in the National Compensation
Circular (NCC) No. 53 thus disallowed.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
Ferdie: The natural propensity or tendency of auditors is to find disallowance
there. If there is something going to be disbursed from the pockets of the
government and if the auditor will find that there is no legal basis to it, that auditor
will stop it. Because they are fixated to disallowing, that is their job.
The auditor based the disallowance on the Compensation Policy
Guidelines (CPG) which provided for lower rates and should apply to the
Memorandum of Agreement. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) clarified that the honoraria should be based on NCC
because it pertains to foreign-assisted projects whereas the CPG
pertains to locally funded projects. But the COA argued that CPG is
applicable because it does not distinguish between projects locally and
foreign funded.
Held: It is true that the CPG does not distinguish between foreign and
local funded projects. The CPG was issued by the DBM in 1980 whereas
the NCC was in 1988. As such, it is meant to amend the CPG. Also, the
provisions of the NCC are clear that it is applicable to foreign-assisted
projects only. It was issued “to prescribe/authorize the classification and
compensation rates of positions of foreign-assisted projects including
honoraria rates for detailed personnel”.
The DENR certified that its review of reforestation projects undertaken
by state universities is one of the components of the Forestry Sector
Program Loan. Thus, it is a foreign-assisted project. DBM clarified that
the honoraria rate should not be based on the CPG since it pertains to
locally-funded projects while the NCC pertains to foreign-assisted
projects.
It is difficult to understand why despite these certifications, the COA
took a rigid and uncompromising posture that the CPG is the applicable
criterion for the honoraria to members of the reforestation evaluation
project team of the state university. Administrative regulations and
policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the
force and are entitled to great respect.
Ferdie: When you are going to make guidelines out of the source of law, the first
thing that they refer to is the interpretation of the law because you can never
make a guideline without that interpretation or construction. So this is a result of
interpretation that has the force and effect of law, unless nullified later on by the
SC. Because it only says “with great respect”, meaning, it is binding so long as the
SC did not find anything to the contrary.
Interpretative regulations are at best advisory, for it is the
court that finally determines what the law is.
Peralta v. CSC
Facts: A trade specialist in the Department of Trade and Industry
received his initial salary. But it was deducted with the amount
corresponding to his absences during the covered period on Fridays
hence it included Saturdays and Sundays because he had no
accumulated leave credits. The basis for deduction is the Handbook of
Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that:
“When an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on a day
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or a Holiday, such Saturday,
Sunday or a Holiday shall also be without pay.”
Ferdie: Before in the government, for example, when you are absent on a
Thursday, and Friday is a holiday, you cannot avail of a holiday in Saturday and
Sunday. It was meant to discourage you from incurring a long absence or a long
vacation. In the government, we are paid in monthly basis and so even Saturdays
and Sundays are supposedly paid.
Contention of the trade specialist: The General Leave Law in the Revised
Administrative Code, the old Civil Service Law, the Civil Service Decree
and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations have no specific provision
which supports the rule. The deduction without legal basis deprives
property without due process of law.
Ferdie: Insofar as Civil Service is concerned, to them what governs now is the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, if you look at the Code of 1987 it does not
expressly repeal the Civil Service Act of 1959. If there is no express repeal, there
is a chance that the old law may still be alive. For me, my opinion is, the Civil
8|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Service Act of 1959, no matter how old it is, it is still alive so long as there is no
irreconcilable inconsistencies.
Contention of the Civil Service Commission: The rule that applies only
to employees paid on a monthly basis rests on the assumption that one
who has no leave credits who absents on a Monday or Friday, could not
be favourably credited with intervening days had the same been working
days. To allow otherwise allows an employee who is on leave of absence
without pay for along period of time to be entitled to payment of his
salary corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays.
It also discourages employees who have exhausted their leave credits
to absent on a Monday or Friday to have prolonged weekend to the
prejudice of the government and the public in general. While the law
excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave
credits, it does not however include a case where the leave of absence
is without pay.
Issue: Whether the salary representing the intervening days of
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays is deducted if the employee is absent
or on leave without pay on a Friday or Monday?
While it was pending however, the CSC amended the policy. The
employee is not deemed absent on the intervening days. This mooted
the issue. But for reasons of public interest and public policy, the SC
says it is its duty to rule on its validity.
Ferdie: Before that was the rule but it was already amended, however the SC said
that even if the issue is now moot and academic, we are still going to rule because
it will be for future guidance. The SC is sometimes very inconsistent, if the issue
is moot and academic but very controversial, the SC might say, it has been mooted
so it is useless to discuss up to this time. But sometimes it says the case is of
transcendental importance so even if it has been mooted, they need to decide on
the issue to serve as guide for the future because it might be repeated.
Held: The law empowers the CSC Commissioner to prescribe, amend,
and enforce suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
the civil service law. The law in point says: After at least 6 months of
continued satisfactory service, the department head may, in his
discretion, grant an employee 15 days vacation leave of absence with
full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays for each calendar
year of service. In addition, another 15 days of sick leave is granted
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. The CSC construed this
as referring only to employees who have earned leave credits against
which their absences may be charged with pay as its letters speak only
of leaves of absence with full pay.
The intent and spirit prevail over the letter of the law. Government
employees, whether or not they have exhausted their leave credits, are
not required to work on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday. Thus, they
cannot be deemed absent on such non-working days. The law did not
distinguish between those who accumulated leave credits and those who
exhausted them. When an administrative or executive agency renders
an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law. It is at best advisory, for it is the court that finally
determines what the law means. It is not binding upon the courts. It
may be set aside if there is error of law, abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion conflicting the letter or spirit of
the law. As such, these interpretative regulations need not be published.
Ferdie: Common sense would tell us that if you are not required to work on a
Saturday or Sunday, thus you cannot be declared absent on a Saturday or Sunday.
You cannot be deemed absent on such non-working days.
Bottom line: If the administrative agency makes a guideline, that is actually the
result of their interpretation which is why we call that Interpretative Regulation.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
SOURCE: VALID DELEGATION
SOURCE: VALID DELEGATION
Unbridled discretion delegated to the provincial board.
People v. Vera
Facts: A convict applied for probation under Act No. 4221. The private
prosecution opposed on the ground that Act No. 4221 violates the equal
protection clause because its application is not uniform throughout the
country. Section 11 empowers the provincial boards to make it effective
or otherwise in their respective provinces. It is an undue delegation of
legislative power. The trial court denied the application.
Ferdie: There is a section there in the law which provides that the budget for the
Office of the Commissioner depends on the Commission Board. So if the
Commission does not appropriate the budget then there is no probation for that
particular province.
Held: The general rule is legislative power cannot be delegated. But
immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The delegation of legislative
power is valid if the law is complete in all its terms and provisions when
it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing is left for the judgment
of the appointee or delegate of the legislature.
An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies shows that the ratio decidendi varies. But it can
be broadly asserted that it revolves around the sufficiency of standard
in the law to aid the delegate in the exercise of discretion. In some
cases, it is sufficient, in others, it is insufficient and still in others, it is
lacking. It is incomplete if it does not lay down any rule of definite
standard by which the administrative body or officer may be guided in
the exercise of the power of discretion delegated. What is granted by
Section 11 is a roving commission that enables the provincial board’s
arbitrary discretion.
TN: Roving commission means unlimited, unbridled discretion.
Section 11 presupposed that if the provincial board does not wish the
Probation Act to apply, it simply declines appropriation of salary for the
probation officer. This leaves the entire matter to the provincial board
to determine, a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
While delegation allows an administrative body or officer to determine
the facts according to the terms of the law, the legislature did not
provide for the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified
facts or conditions to be ascertained by the Provincial board. The
discretion is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. It is not
required to justify refusal to appropriate funds for the salary of probation
officers.
Ferdie: In this case, it depends on the Commission board on whether or not to
appropriate budget for the probationer. And here it does not even require
explanation why they didn’t appropriate in the first place.
This makes the applicability of the Probation Law dependent not only
upon the full discretion of the provincial board, but on its pleasure. While
it may be argued that the Probation Law may take effect any way at
some future time when the Provincial Board appropriates, it still rests
solely upon the will of the Provincial Board and not upon the happening
of a contingency.
Ferdie: What if the Commission Board now says, well we did not appropriate
because there is no budget in the first place. Can we just appropriate later on? If
that happens, if we allow that, we are actually empowering the Commission Board
to suspend the enforcement of the law, which it cannot do.
In effect, the Provincial Board is empowered to suspend the
enforcement of the law. The power to suspend law pertains to Congress
subject to the condition that when it suspends, it cannot be suspended
as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others.
9|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
The suspension must be general. Thus, Section 11 is an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and
is therefore unconstitutional.
Public safety is a sufficient standard.
Calalang v. Williams
Facts: The Reflector Law provides:
“(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. – Appropriate parking
lights or flares visible 100m away shall be displayed at a corner of the
vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that
are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing
traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times
with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible
at light at least 100m away. No vehicle not provided with any
requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered.”
A motorist challenged this as unconstitutional because it deprives
property without due process.
Ferdie: Reflector Law is a service law. There is a question there on whether or
not the policy as implemented by the administrative agencies have basis under the
Reflector law? Another issue is its constitutionality.
Held: The law is enacted under the police power to promote public
safety. Police power is the state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general
welfare.
Thus, persons and property could be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. It is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.
Ferdie: Public safety is a sufficient standard. So it is up to you to formulate
guidelines based on public safety. AO No. 2 is the IRR of the Reflector Law and it
is more specific.
Edu v Ericta
Facts: Administrative Order No. 2 (IRR of Reflector Law) says:
“No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination
shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall
either be factory built-in reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection
tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam
of light shall be visible 100m away at night.”
Another section prescribes dimension, placement and color. This was
likewise challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
Held: Generally. Legislative power cannot be delegated except to local
governments that participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated
is the authority of Congress to enact laws, alter and repeal them. If it
involves discretion as to what the law shall be, it cannot be delegated.
If it involves authority to execute pursuant to the law, it can be
delegated. The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions.
There must be sufficient standard that defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. The standard may either be express or implied. If implied, it
need not be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the purpose
and policy of the act considered as a whole.
Ferdie: Two tests to know proper delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in itself
2. Sufficient Standard test – the law must have sufficient standard that defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specified the
public agency to apply it.
If the law is complete then that can be delegated because you don’t need to
determine what the law is. The administrative agency has nothing else to do but
enforce the law. But in the enforcement, there is interpretation and if during the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
interpretation, there is something missing, the agency can fill in the gap. Rationale
is that Congress cannot anticipate what happens on the field.
In the Reflector Law, the objective of the law is public safety. The
principle of non-delegation has been constrained to adapt to the growing
complexities of modern life thus the birth of the principle of subordinate
legislation. While law-making is non-delegable, the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the law is allowed
provided it is germane to the purpose of the law and conforms with the
standard of the law.
Two categories of legislative powers:
1. Determine what the law should be.
2. Authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of
legislative policy.
Rationale: It is impracticable to anticipate multifarious and complex
situations during enforcement of the law
Two tests to determine valid delegation of legislative power.
Eastern v. POEA
Facts: An overseas worker was killed in an accident in Japan by virtue
of which his widow was awarded death benefits and burial expenses by
the POEA pursuant to EO No. 797 and MC No. 2. But the employer
argued that the POEA has no jurisdiction, as it pertains to the SSS
against the State Insurance Fund. EO 797 says that POEA governing
board shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern its
exercise of adjudicatory functions pursuant to its mandate to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment
practices.
Ferdie: Take note that it is only an EO and memorandum circular that provides
burial benefits. “Fair and equitable practices” is a sufficient standard.
MC No. 2 Sec C. Compensation & Benefits. –
In case of death of the seamen during the term of his contract, the
employer pays his beneficiaries the following:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and
master electrician
c. P130,000.00 for ratings.
Contention of the employer: This Memorandum Circular violates non-
delegation of legislative power. There is no statutory authority given to
POEA to promulgate it. Even if there is, the regulations represent
exercise of discretion which cannot be delegated.
Ferdie: The issue here is the POEA does not have the authority to promulgate to
give the standard in awarding the death benefits and burial expenses.
Held: It is true that legislative discretion as to substantive contents of
the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion
on how the law is to be enforced and not what the law shall be. Two
tests to determine valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness Test – the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions such that when it leaves Congress, there is nothing else
left for the delegate to do but enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines in the
law to define the boundaries of the delegated authority.
The reason is the increasing complexity of governmental task and the
growing inability of Congress to cope directly with its myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that Congress cannot
be expected to seasonably comprehend. This demands specialized
legislation. With the myriad of problems besetting society, Congress has
become incompetent to provide specific solutions. Thus, the need for
delegation.
10 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
This justification for delegation of legislative power is applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problem, Congress found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules to carry out the general provisions of the law. This is
the Power of Subordinate Legislation. With this power, administrative
bodies are authorized to “fill in the details” which Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
promulgation of implementing rules known as supplementary
regulations.
Memorandum Circular No 2 is one of such administrative regulation
guided by the mandate to protect the rights of overseas workers to fair
and equitable employment practices which is deemed a sufficient
standard.
Ferdie: Take note, it is very important, “the power of subordinate legislation” and
remember this key phrase, do not paraphrase. The standard says fair and
equitable employment practices. If you die in line of duty, logically, your
beneficiaries should be entitled to some amount of compensation.
The code-making authority is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. Thus, unconstitutional.
Shechter v. US
Facts: The National Industrial Recovery Act authorizes the President to
“approve codes of fair competition” for the live poultry industry. It may
be approved upon the application by one or more trade or industrial
association if the President finds that:
1. The applicant imposes no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership and that is truly representative.
2. The code is not designed to promote monopolies or eliminate or
oppress small enterprises or will not discriminate.
Thus, the birth of the Live Poultry Code.
Issue: Valid delegation of legislative power?
Held: This is an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws the
President thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and
expansion of trade and industry. In approving the Code, the President
may impose his own conditions, adding to or taking from what is being
proposed, as “in his discretion” he thinks necessary “to effectuate the
policy” declared in the law.
Ferdie: Take note, “in his discretion” and “as it may deemed fit”, that could be
unbridled.
It likewise authorizes the President to create administrative agencies to
assist him. But their finding or recommendation in the making of the
code is subject to the discretion of the President who may either accept,
modify or reject them as he pleases. The authority relates to a host of
different trades and industries thereby extending presidential discretion
to all varieties of laws. It is a sweeping delegation of legislative power.
Aside from the general statement of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion, it has no standard for any trade, industry or activity. Instead
of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to
prescribe them. The code-making authority is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power
Ferdie: In this case, it’s as if there is an abdication on the power to legislate on
the part of Congress allowing the President to make the code. That is unbridled,
therefore, there is no sufficient standard. Congress has been lazy in stating that
Mr. President knows better, that is not allowed.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
EFFECTIVITY OF PRESIDENTAL ISSUANCES, RULES, ETC.
EFFECTIVITY OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES, ETC.
GR: Publication is required before they take effect.
XPN: Interpretative or internal in nature not concerning the general
public.
Ferdie: When it is interpretative, it just guides the employees. There are
regulations, laws, and subordinate legislation that are hard to understand, so what
we do is write the said office to give us guidelines. It then issues an advisory for
our guidance. It is interpretative in nature and is clearly an internal matter. If it is
only for the benefit of consumption of those inside the administration and does
not involve the public, it does not need to be published.
Presidential Issuances
Basis: Ordinance power of the President.
Authority to issue executive orders, proclamations, administrative orders
and memorandum, circulars, general or special orders.
Ferdie: Even if the law-making power is vested exclusively with Congress, the
President can still issue executive orders that have the force and effect of law.
Basis is the Ordinance Power of the President.
Effectivity of Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
(Penal or Non Penal)
1. Publication
2. Filing with the UP Law Center
Except: When the law dispenses with filing. However, it cannot
dispense with publication.
Nature of administrative rules and regulations
A. They have the force and effect of a law
B. Partake the nature of a statute
Rule-making power of a public administrative agency
It is a delegated legislative power
Test of validity of delegation of rule-making power
1. Completeness test – The law must be complete in itself
Ferdie: Take note – Complete in itself. But it must not be super
complete that it precludes the specific details that only the
administrative agency can identify.
2. Sufficient standard test – The law must fix a standard where
the limits are sufficiently determinate or determinable.
Take note: In case of discrepancy between the statute and IRR, the
statute prevails.
Types of administrative rules and regulations
1. Enforces the law – Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
2. Interprets the rule – Letter of Instruction (LOI)
Ferdie: LOI is only for the consumption of those inside the organization for
their guidelines. It need not be published because the public is not involved.
Test of validity of administrative rules and regulations
1. Germane to the object of the law
2. Conforms to standards prescribed by the law
3. Sole purpose of carrying into effect general provisions of the law
11 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
REQUISITES OF A VALID REGULATION
REQUISITES OF A VALID REGULATION
1. Authorized by law
2. Promulgated within the scope of authority
3. Promulgated in accordance with prescribed procedure
4. Reasonable and fair
5. Duly published
6. Filed with UP Law Center
Authorized by Law.
Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank
Facts: Central Bank imposed 10% penalty on past overdue loans of rural
banks. But the law does not authorize it thru the Monetary Board to add
penalty for past due accounts.
Held: when an administrative agency promulgates rules, it must be in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred by law. When this is
complied, it partakes the nature of a statute, and its compliance may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided by law. Hence, an administrative
agency cannot impose a penalty not provided by law, much less one
that applies retroactively.
Ferdie: The trend or the attitude of the SC is that, when you are an administrative
agency, you can promulgate, you can implement rules and regulations. However,
if you start to provide for penalty, the presumption is that it is invalid because it is
not to be exercised by the administrative agency. They cannot penalize.
But is a case to case basis. Sometimes the SC allowed but sometimes it does not.
But once it involves penalty, the presumption is it’s an invalid delegation.
Promulgated within the scope of authority.
Boie-Takeda v Dela Serna, Philippine Fuji Xerox v Trajano
Facts: Sales Commissions of medical representatives were ordered
included in the computation of 13th month pay. But the employer refused
to pay because commissions do not form part of the basic salary as basis
of the 13th month pay. PD 851 says the 13th month pay is based on basic
salary which should be defined in its common and generally accepted
meaning. A rate of pay for standard work period exclusive of such
additional payments as bonuses and overtime. But the Labor Secretary
revised the guidelines on the implementation for the 13th month pay law.
Held: The inclusion of commission in the computation of the 13th month
pay unduly expands the concept of basic salary defined in the 13th month
pay law. Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions
of law it is designed to implement. It must be in harmony with the
provisions of law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot
widen its scope much less amend an act of Congress.
Ferdie: Is the employer correct that commissions don’t form part of the basic
salary as basis for the 13th month pay? Yes.
The Labor Secretary probably thought that anyway presumption is, you do
something in favor of labor it is in favor of labor. An administrative agency cannot
expand the definition of basic salary by adding commissions. But if employer gives
it as a matter of liberality, then it is alright.
Republic v. CA
Facts: In 1985, the BIR assessed and demanded payment of tax
deficiency from a company which did not pay after it availed tax amnesty
under an EO. BIR insisted because the implementing memorandum
limits tax amnesty to assessments made after EO took effect in 1986.
Held: The executive order merely provided for a general statement
covering all tax liabilities from 1981-1985. It did not limit its applicability
as it is designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty.
Administrative issuances to enforce the law must be in harmony with it,
not modify or supplant it.
Ferdie: The EO does not limit until 1985. It merely identifies tax liability wage but
it did not really say it cannot be applied outside. It must follow the law, not modify.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
People v. Maceren
Facts: the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of any poisonous or
obnoxious substance” in fishing. But the administrative order prohibited
and penalized electro fishing. The trial court quashed the information on
the ground that no law was violated since electro fishing is not a
poisonous or obnoxious substance contemplated by law.
Held: The Fisheries Law does not expressly criminalize electro fishing
hence the administrative order cannot penalize it. The administrative
agency cannot transcend the bounds demarcated by statute to exercise
that power
Ferdie: Source law says it prohibits the use of any poisonous or obnoxious
substance but an administrative order somehow expanded it by penalizing electro
fishing. If it is about penalty the attitude of the SC is to strike it down as
unconstitutional. Because if you provide penalty that is somehow in the
competency of Congress.
Echegaray v. Justice Secretary
Facts: A dead man walking challenged the constitutionality of the death
penalty law for being cruel and inhuman, arbitrary and unreasonable,
undue delegation of legislative power and unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Justice Secretary to the Bureau of Corrections
Director.
Contention of the dead man walking:
The death penalty is cruel and inhuman because it fails to provide drugs,
dosage and procedure to be used for lethal injection. The implementing
rules are uncertain as to the date of execution, time of notification and
the court which will fix the date of execution.
Ferdie: Echegaray claims that it is inhuman and that it prolongs his agony for he
doesn’t know when he will die. He was the only guy convicted when the death
penalty law was resurrected.
Held: The death penalty law says the court which designates the date
of execution is the trial court which convicted him. The implementing
rules, when read in conjunction with the law, says the death sentence
is carried out not earlier that 1 year nor later than 18 months from the
time the death penalty became final and executory, subject to executive
clemency.
Ferdie: SC said there is actually a date but it is a range and not a specific date.
This is to afford the President a chance to grant executive clemency. The case was
that Echegaray raped his daughter but he never admitted until his death.
Contention of the dead man walking: There is undue delegation of
legislative power because the power delegated to the Justice Secretary
to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection
was likewise delegated to the Prisons Director.
Ferdie: The issue here is that the delegation is given to the Justice Secretary but
the latter himself delegated the power to the Prison Director.
Held: The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated or
potestas delegate non delegari potest.
Exceptions.
1. Delegations of tariff powers to the president under Section 28(2)
Article VI, 1987 Constitution
2. Delegation of emergency powers to the president under Section
23(2) Article VI, 1987 Constitution
3. Delegation to the people at large (This refers to people’s initiative.
We can propose law)
4. Delegation to local governments.
5. Delegation to administrative bodies.
6. Empowering the Justice Secretary in conjunction with the Health
Secretary and the Prisons Director to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation
of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
12 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
It is subject to the following Requisites:
1. It must be complete in itself – it must set forth the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
2. It must fix a standard – the limits sufficiently determinate or
determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and definiteness of the death penalty law, it
sufficiently describes what is the job to be done, who is to do it and
what is the scope of authority. It is executed under authority of the
Prisons Director who shall take steps to ensure the administration of
lethal injection causes instantaneous death by personnel trained prior to
the performance of such task. Requiring detail greater than that does
not serve any useful purpose. A delegated legislative power is proper
even if the standard appears general provided it is capable of reasonable
application.
Requiring detail greater than that does not serve any useful purpose.
Ferdie: There is a law and it is complete already but lacks the necessary specifics
that is why there is subordinate legislation. But if you are too specific rather than
the ordinary specific, that is not necessary.
A delegated legislative power is proper even if the standard appears
general provided it is capable of reasonable application.
Ferdie: Sufficient standards such as public interest, public safety, equitable
practices etc., they are general but are capable of reasonable application so they
are reasonable standard.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Justice
Secretary to the Prisons Director for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice. The DOJ is tasked to take
charge of the administration of the correctional system. But the
execution procedure that empowers the Director to prepare the manual
to detail procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal
injection is invalid.
No undue delegation from Justice Sec to Prisons Dir. AO 1987 states
that Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department
of Justice.
Ferdie: It was not delegated at all because in the 1 st place they belong to one
DOJ. But something is wrong there the execution procedure from manual to detail
procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection is invalid.
They are pin pointing each other as to who is at fault.
It virtually abrogates the Power of Justice Secretary to promulgate the
manual to the Prisons Director. It does not provide for a mode of review
and approval by the Justice Secretary who is the rule-making authority
identified by the death penalty law and the administrative superior who
should stamp imprimatur of a manual prepared by a constituent unit.
The suspension of execution of death sentence under the implementing
rules is likewise invalid. The Revised Penal Code suspends the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within 1 year after delivery. But
the implementing rules suspends the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within 3 years following the date of sentence. Since the 3-
year reprieve does not find support in the Revised Penal Code, it
expands the death penalty law.
Ferdie: When should the death sentence be executed? RPC provides that it has
to be suspended if the woman is pregnant or within one year after delivery. But
the IRR says 3 years following the date of sentence. It is not in the source law
(RPC). So SC found it invalid because it somehow expanded the law which is not
allowed.
These two provisions being invalid, respondents are enjoined from
enforcing the death penalty law until the implementing rules and
regulations are appropriately amended revised or corrected according to
this section.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
Duly Published.
Republic v. Medina
Facts: The PSC approved the application of Meralco for rates adjustment
which was challenged for lack of notice of hearing. The Public Service
Act grants it discretion to approve rates proposed by public services
provisionally without need of hearing. But it appears that the notice of
hearing was published in 2 newspapers for 10 days but the hearing
started ahead on the 6th day and the rates were approved on the 11th
day.
TN: There must be notice of hearing for 10 days.
Held: If the PSC is empowered to approve provisional rates even without
a hearing, a fortiori it may act on such rates upon a 6-day notice.
Ferdie: You may not be allowed to dispense with the publication of the notice of
hearing but you can shorten that. There is already substantial compliance just like
in Tanada v. Tuvera.
Phil Consumers Foundation v. Education Secretary
Facts: the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issued a
Department Order authorizing 15-20% increase in school fees. This was
challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds of lack of legal basis and
violation of due process.
Contention: Lack of legal basis because the authority to regulate school
fess does not always include the power to increase them
Held: The Education Act of 1982 vests the DECS with the power to
promulgate rules regulating the educational system of the country. It is
also charged with rule-making authority to promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations. The authority to prescribe school fees may not
have been expressly granted to it. But in the absence of a law stating
otherwise, this power includes the power to increase school fees. Since
no other government agency is vested with power to prescribe school
fees, it defaults to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Ferdie: DECS has the power to prescribe school fees and now it increases. Is
increasing the fees included in the power to prescribe? The contention there was
that the power must be somewhere else, not expressly stipulated under the law.
But the question is, if it is not DECS, who will? So, there’s no one else but DECS.
Contention: Lack of due process because the Department Order was
issued without notice and hearing to the parents and students.
Held: The power to prescribe fees is either quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial. Remedies differ depending if quasi-legslative or quasi-judicial.
It is quasi-legislative when the rules are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the country. As such, prior notice and hearing
to affected parties is not a requirement of due process. (It is for
everybody in so far as the prescription of school fees)
It is quasi-judicial when the rules apply exclusively to a particular party,
based upon a finding of fact. As such, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of the rules. (This case is quasi-legislative
because it is not intended for a particular person)
13 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
DEFINITION
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
The power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards to enforce and administer the law.
Ferdie: This is just a reiteration of the Quasi-Judicial Powers. Remember Comelec
has Quasi-Judicial powers. In Admin law, we have to just magnify some concepts.
Quasi-means semi “mura-mura”. Quasi-Judicial, you are like a judge but not
actually a judge.
Acts in the exercise of quasi-judicial power, enumerated.
It is required to:
1. Investigate and ascertain the existence of Facts, hold hearings ,
weigh evidence
2. Draw conclusions from them as basis of their official function
and exercise discretion in a judicial nature. It determines Facts
then applies the law on the given set of Facts.
3. But an administrative body cannot assume jurisdiction over a
case pending in the regular courts.
Ferdie: Even if it was filed with the judicial courts but it turns out that it is
the wrong venue, the administrative agencies cannot just take it away from
the courts unless the courts themselves dismisses it for lack of jurisdiction
or the higher court says “you have no jurisdiction”. Once it is dismissed,
that is already the time that the case can be filed in the administrative
agency. But the administrative agency cannot just encroach or tell the court
that “you have no jurisdiction, give it to us.” It cannot be done.
4. Administrative agencies are neither part of the judicial system
nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.
5. Even if it performs quasi-judicial functions, it does not depart
from its basic nature as an administrative agency.
6. They remain with the executive branch. As such, they cannot
impose their judgment upon the judiciary. (TN: Administrative
agencies are passive agencies. They can only act if the case is
filed before them)
REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID EXERCISE
1. Jurisdiction
2. Due process
Jurisdiction.
Globe v. PSC
Facts: An international telecommunications company operates a
franchise granted by law which failed to deliver a message abroad. A
case was filed before the PSC which found it liable for unsatisfactory
service.
Held: The law authorizing franchise limited the jurisdiction of the PSC
“only with respect to the rated” charged to the public and it does not
include acts of negligence.
The jurisdiction of administrative agencies is limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied by law.
Ferdie: So if you have a problem with the service given to you by a
telecommunications company at that time, the remedy is not to file that with the
PSC but with the regular courts. Jurisdiction is expressly granted or necessarily
implied by law. We are again haunted here by the doctrine of necessary implication
and inferences.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
Due Process.
Utto v. Comelec
Facts: The Comelec en banc voided the proclamation of the mayor who
argued his right to due process was denied because the twin-notice
requirement of prior notice and hearing was not observed.
Held: Even if it was not observed, the twin-notice requirement does not
apply if the proclamation was void ab initio. In administrative
proceedings, due process simply means an opportunity to be heard and
to reconsider or to explain, either written or verbal.
Ferdie: Administrative proceedings are summary in nature. Those procedural due
process elements or steps enunciated in “Ang Tibay” case, that does not
necessarily hold true for all cases because today what we are saying is, for as long
as there is an opportunity to be heard, give it to the respondent, that would be
enough. There is already substantial compliance insofar as substantial procedural
due process is concerned. You cannot invoke “I have the right to counsel”, “I have
the right to cross-examine witnesses”. As long as you were given an opportunity
to present your side, that would be enough.
This rule applies a fortiori if the respondent chose not to avail of the
opportunity to answer charges because of the belief that the disciplining
authority is without jurisdiction.
Ferdie: When we say “a fortiori” it means that with more reason. In this case, he
thinks that the authority has no jurisdiction so he snubbed altogether and did not
appear. Normally, if you know that there is no jurisdiction, you file a motion to
dismiss or reserve the question of jurisdiction.
Garcia v. Pajaro
Facts: An administrative case was filed by the treasurer against the
revenue collector who refused to attend the scheduled hearings despite
notice because he believes it is the mayor who has authority to discipline
him.
Held: When a party refuses to answer the charges against him, he
cannot invoke denial of due process. The refusal to attend the scheduled
hearings, despite notice, is at his own peril.
Rivera v. CSC
Facts: The Merit System Protection Board (MPSB) ruled on the motion
for reconsideration filed by the manager who was found guilty of grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the
LBP. It was appealed to the CSC which sustained the original decision
of the LBP.
Ferdie: The problem there is that the MPSB chair which rendered the decision is
now the CSC commissioner. So can he review his own findings?
The manager argued he was denied due process because the MPSB
Chair that ruled on the motion for reconsidered is now the CSC
Commissioner who ruled on the appeal.
Held: The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose
decision is under review else there could be no different view.
Ferdie: This is very unprocedural or it violates due process for you to review your
own findings. The most that you can do is inhibit.
RELATED POWERS
RELATED POWERS
Powers could either be express or implied, but we also have the Related
Powers.
1. Power to promulgate rules of procedure
2. Subpoena power
3. Contempt power
14 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Power to promulgate rules of procedure.
Provident Tree Farm v. Batario
Facts: The BOC banned the importation of wood, wood products or
wood-derived products. But its jurisdiction was challenged because the
Tariff & Customs Code does not outline the enforcement of the import
ban.
Held: The absence of rules of procedure does not diminish jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Where the law does not require any particular
rule of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, it may
adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function.
Ferdie: There is no clear basis in the law for you to promulgate rules and
procedure. The law is silent. If the law is silent, you cannot be crippled by the
mere silence of the law. You have to use your imagination. How do we carry out
our functions? Just use a reasonable method. For other government agencies, they
actually adopt the rules of procedure of other agencies or they can also adopt, by
suppletory character, the Rules of Court. So if the rules are silent, a reasonable
method can be used to carry out its function.
Subpoena and contempt powers must be granted by law.
Carmelo v. Ramos
Facts: The mayor created a committee to investigate anomalies in
licensing. The committee subpoenaed a private citizen to appear before
it but he refused hence a case for contumacy was filed before the trial
court.
Held: Subpoena and contempt powers must be granted by law.
Whatever power claimed by the committee comes from the power of
the mayor to investigate as implied from the power to suspend or
remove employees. There in so statutory grant of power to investigate.
Hence, the Ombudsman has contempt power because Section 15(g) of
the Ombudsman Act gives it the power to “punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
the same penalties provided therein.”
Ferdie: It was just the mayor doing the extra mile by creating a committee to
investigate anomalies. The person then did not appear after being summoned. Is
that contumacious? No, it isn’t because the LGUs do not have the power to cite
you for contumacy because there is no such grant under the law. So what they do
is just invite you. It is not a subpoena but an invitation. Can you refuse? Yes. Is
there a consequence? No because this is a mere invitation. You can snob that.
It is very clear as far as the Ombudsman is concerned. He has the power to punish
for contempt.
Lastimosa v. Vasquez
Facts: The ombudsman ordered a prosecutor to show cause why she
should not be punished for contempt after filing a case for acts of
lasciviousness, instead of attempted rape.
Held: It constitutes defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful
process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable
for indirect contempt.
Ferdie: Because one of the defenses is that the Ombudsman cannot cite her in
contempt since they don’t have jurisdiction over him. But Ombudsman proceeded
and cited her in contempt. She resigned as prosecutor.
QUANTUM OF PROOF
QUANTUM OF PROOF
Lamyera v. Pangilinan
Facts: A janitor was dismissed from service by the mayor due to absence
without leave on the strength of the certification by a personnel officer
that the janitor did not report for work one month. This was affirmed by
the CSC.
Held: While findings of fact of administrative agency must be respected,
it must be supported by substantial evidence. Certification of the
personnel officer does not amount to substantial evidence, especially
against the allegations that the janitor was prevented from signing the
log book, replaced by another and forced to resign. And when it is
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant, it must be respected, except when there is grave abuse
of discretion, fraud or error of law.
Ferdie: Bottom line here, the janitor was oppressed. He wanted to work but he
was prevented to work. He cannot login or logout so exactly he did not have any
evidence for attendance of work. Substantial evidence should be considered in a
case to case basis but in this case the SC said that there is no substantial evidence.
It is grave oppression.
ERB v. CA
Facts: The ERB approved the application for a gasoline retail outlet in a
trading area but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals because it
results in ruinous competition and its feasibility study is already state.
Held: The power to determine whether a gasoline station benefits the
oil industry and public interest lies with the ERB and not the appellate
court.
Ferdie: The ERB has the specialized expertise insofar as the grant of gasoline
station franchise is concerned. If it is about safety and public convenience, the
agency that is in the best position to determine that is the ERB and not the CA,
except if there is grave abuse of discretion.
Substantial evidence, defined.
Rubberworld v. NLRC
Facts: An employee was dismissed due to stock cards discrepancies. But
the employee filed a case for unfair labor practice because the dismissal
is a mere result of his refusal to disaffiliate from the union.
Held: Unfair labor practice was belied by the fact the employee pursued
the case alone where normally he is supported by the union. There is
likewise no proof of affiliation, much less the existence of the union.
There is no substantial evidence which is defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Ferdie: Unfair labor practice can only be forwarded if there is a union. There is
no union in the first place. It must be within reason for you to assume that that is
adequate to support you conclusion.
ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION
ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION
Lapid v. CA
Facts: A governor was suspended by the Ombudsman for 1 year after
he was found guilty of conspiracy with other officials for illegal quarrying
and collecting fees without the benefit of an ordinance.
The governor filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and
prayed for injunctive relief but it did not act on it. Thus, the governor
went to the SC which likewise did not grant the injunctive relief and
instead required parties to comment. On the same day, the CA acted
and denied it. Thus, the DILG enforced the decision.
Issue: Whether the one-year suspension is immediately executory?
Held: It depends. If the law creating the administrative agency states
that its orders or decisions are immediately final and executor, an appeal
does not stay its execution.
Sec. 68 of the LGC says: “An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
being final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having
been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results
in his exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
15 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Ferdie: Take note when you say preventive suspension, for 60 days for example,
the rule that “there is no pay for no work” applies. What we are talking here about
is appeal and it says here that if you are later on exonerated, consider the period
when you were placed under prevention. But if the first premise is in the preventive
suspension, you are not entitled to salary.
Why are we saying here that you are entitled to salary in case of exoneration?
Because in exoneration, you are not placed under preventive suspension but you
were considered to have been placed under preventive suspension. You were not
placed under preventive suspension but merely “considered to have been
preventively suspended.” So in case you’re exonerated, you are innocent of the
charge, you are entitled to salary. But if it is purely preventive suspension, you are
not entitled to salary. (He repeated and emphasized this).
Whereas the Administrative Code of 1987 says:
“An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case
the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered
as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins an appeal.”
Ferdie: The law is silent whether if you are entitled to salary/wage during the
period of preventive suspension after exoneration. My answer is? Apply by
analogy.
But Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act says:
“Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be
final and unappealable.
Ferdie: Why is it final and unappealable? The reason is because is too short. Let
it go. Move on. #hugot. It is only reprimand and public censure. This is only saying
you did something wrong, don’t do it again. There is no fine, no suspension. This
is just public censure and reprimand.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman likewise says: “In case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable.” In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent x xx”.
Suspension for one year without pay is not enumerated as immediately
final and unappealable. That an appeal prevents finality and execution
depends on whether the law expressly says so.
Since the governor was charged before the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman Act applies. If before the Office of the President, the LGC
applies. If before the CSC, the Administrative Code applies:
Ferdie: Caveat! Here, the CSC says that it is now the Administrative Code of 1987
that governs the Civil Service rules and regulations but to my mind, it does not
necessarily follow that the Civil Service Act of 1959 is already useless because the
repealing clause of the administrative code of 1987 does not expressly repeal the
Civil Service Act of 1959.
Caveat: Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003
amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman says the decision is final, executory and unappealable
where the respondent is:
1. Absolved of the charge
2. Convicted where penalty is:
a. Public censure or reprimand
b. Suspension of not more than one month
c. Or a fine equivalent to one month salary
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the CA under Rule
43. But such “appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.”
Ferdie: The only way that a decision is prevented from being executory is when
there is a restraining order. But can the CA issue a restraining order for a decision
of the Ombudsman? That is one of the assignments. The Junjun Binay Case. But
this will not come out in the exam.
The Ombudsman rules of procedure are procedural in nature
thus may be applied retroactively to cases pending and
unresolved at the time of passage.
Villasenor v. Ombudsman
Facts: Two electrical inspectors were dismissed and suspended for one
year by the Ombudsman for violation of code of conduct and ethical
standards for public officials and employees for negligence resulting in
a hotel fire that killed 74 persons.
Despite their appeal form their suspension and dismissal, the
ombudsman enforced the decision.
But they argued that the AO that amended the rule does not apply to
them because it took effect 3 months after the decision was issued and
3 years after it was enforced. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively.
HELD: While Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall not have
retroactive effect, it does not apply to rules of procedure of the courts.
Being retroactive in nature, they apply to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.
As a general rule, no vested right attaches or arises from procedural
laws and rules, hence retroactive application does not violate any right.
The Ombudsman rules of procedure are procedural in nature thus may
be applied retroactively to cases pending and unresolved at the time of
passage.
There is no such thing as vested interest in an office or even an absolute
right to hold it. No one has vested right in an office except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards tenure and salary.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRIOR RESORT
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRIOR RESORT
PSUMW v Samar Mining. Cited in Abejo v dela Cruz
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal where the question demands exercise of sound discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes
of the regulatory statute administered.
Ferdie: If the case was filed before the regular court for example, and seemingly
the regular court has no jurisdiction because the issue pertains to an administrative
agency because it is under their expertise. It does not necessarily follow that it is
transferred right away to that administrative agency. You may file a motion to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. If it is dismissed then probably your
opponent can transfer the case to the administrative agency.
When you think about it, it actually is a remedy available in favor of the regular
courts so when the regular court says they have no jurisdiction, because the
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction pertains to a specialized administrative agency, it
can dismiss it right away, on its own for lack of jurisdiction.
16 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
Thus, jurisdiction over unsound real estate practices pertains to the
National Housing Authority, and not the courts, the former having been
granted regulatory authority with quasi-judicial functions.
Antipolo Realty v. NHA
Facts: A buyer of a subdivision unit stopped paying after the developer
failed to beautify the subdivision per contract to sell. After the buyer
refused to pay, the developer rescinded the contract to sell but it was
reinstated by the NHA which jurisdiction is now assailed by the
developer.
Held: NHA is vested by statute exclusive jurisdiction over certain
disputes falling within its special expertise.
Ferdie: But the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not necessarily divest the
court from jurisdiction. It merely suspends the proceedings pending referral to the
administrative body. It depends – sometimes the court will dismiss, sometime the
court does not. Here, it actually means that it can be referred to commissioners.
There are questions there that cannot be resolved by the court on the simple basis
that the court has no expertise. For example, court appoints a commissioner for
land disputes.
Where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of a claim requires the resolution of issues which under a regulatory
scheme have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.
In such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body.
This is not a hard and fast rule. It could either be:
1. The court dismisses due to lack of jurisdiction; or
2. Suspends the proceedings and refer the matter to the commissioners
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRTIVE REMEDIES
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, direct
recourse to court does not prosper until after all administrative remedies
are first exhausted.
Garcia v. Court of Appeals
Facts: A complaint was filed against an administrator of the Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) for alleged irregularities. The PCA Governing
Board created an Investigation Committee which recommended
administrative charges against and preventively suspending the
administrator.
But the administrator filed several motions and pleadings that unduly
delayed the case hence the Investigation Committee ruled that the delay
be not counted in the period of preventive suspension.
He went to court for injunctive relief.
Held: The immediate recourse to the court is premature and precipitate
(rushed). Apart from the fact that the investigation was still ongoing,
there is still an administrative remedy from the decision of the PCA
Governing Board, that is, an appeal to the CSC.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, direct
recourse to court does not prosper until after all administrative remedies
are first exhausted. The remedy is not to halt the proceedings but to
take part, assert and vindicate the rights in administrative proceedings
Ferdie: It could also be a ground for dismissal because of prematurity. You have
to exhaust all available administrative remedies before going to court. The reason
there is to screen filing of cases before the court because of clogged court dockets.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016

EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF CHECKS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
CHECKS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Due process is violated 1. President
2. Issue involves pure question of law 2. Congress
3. Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or a. Confirmation of appointments
excess of jurisdiction b. Creation and abolition
4. Estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned
c. Appropriation
5. There is irreparable injury
6. Respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego d. Legislative investigation
of the president, bears implied and assumed approval of the latter 3. Ombudsman
7. Exhaustion is unreasonable 4. Courts
8. Exhaustion amounts to nullification of claim
9. Subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding PRESIDENTIAL CHECKS
10. The rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
11. There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial PRESIDENTIAL CHECKS ON ADMIN AGENCIES
intervention.
12. When strong public interest is involved The deactivation is a valid measure of reorganization, as part
13. In quo warranto proceedings of the executive check on the economy and efficiency of an
14. When the claim involved is small administrative agency.

When is there strong public interest? Buklod v. Zamora

Buklod ng Kawani ng EIIB v. Zamora
When it involves question relating to the status and existence of a public
office, it must be settled without delay.
Dario v. Mison
When it involves question relating to validity of reorganization, its
serious implications in the administration of civil service and rights of
public servants, which resolution is needed for stability in public service.
Facts: The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) was
created to investigate and help prosecute illegal acts affecting the
national economy such as economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion
and dollar salting, among others. It has the primary responsibility for
anti – smuggling operations.
Due to its redundant and overlapping functions with other existing
agencies however, the President deactivated the EIIB and transferred
its functions to the BoC & NBI.

Ferdie: Public Interest is not exactly defined under the law and jurisprudence so
it is case to case basis. Public interest involves the common good.
When is there pure question of law?
When doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on certain state
of facts. What is the law applicable to the set of facts.
When is there question of fact?
There is question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Here, there is still a debate as to the
facts.
Castro v. Gloria
Facts: A public school teacher was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. But he argues it warrants suspension only for first time
offenders
Thus, the EIIB personnel were deemed separated from service under
reorganization. But the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force was
likewise created performing similar functions.
Contention of the employees:
1. It violates their security of tenure
2. It is in bad faith because it is intended to give way to the Task
Force performing essentially identical functions.
3. It usurps power of Congress to abolish an administrative agency.
Contention of the Solicitor General:
1. Reorganization is part of the totality of executive power under the
Constitution
2. It is in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work
and to streamline the bureaucracy.
3. It is not abolished, it is merely deactivated.

HELD: When the issue asks what the applicable law is, it is a pure
question of law. As such, it is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Ferdie: In this case, he is not actually questioning the findings of facts. He is
actually trying to say that he is a first time offender and therefore only merits
suspension, not dismissal. That is a question of law. We are now trying to discern
what is the penalty applicable for established set of facts.
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, EFFECTS
1. It renders the action premature, meaning the claimed cause of
action is not ripe for judicial determination hence there is no cause
of action to ventilate in court.
2. Results in lack of cause of action.
3. It results in dismissal for failure to comply with a condition
precedent. ( Sec. 1, Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court)
Held: Abolition and deactivation are both reorganization measures. To
abolish means to do away with, annul, abrogate or destroy completely.
To deactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by
discharging or reassigning personnel. Section 78 of RA 8760 mandates
that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency
organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
The President may reorganize for simplicity, economy and efficiency.
The ultimate purpose of deactivation is economy. The creation of task
force does not entail additional cost to the government:
Section 78 of RA 8760 mandates that the actual streamlining and
productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the
Office of the President,

The President may reorganize for simplicity, economy and efficiency.

The ultimate purpose of deactivation is economy. The creation of task
force does not entail additional cost to the government:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016

1. No new employees are appointed. 1 – NLRC Chair, Commisioners

2. Employees from other agencies are merely detailed or assigned
to it temporarily. Calderon v. Carale
NLRC Chair and Commissioners do not fall under any of the
It is to maximize use of personnel, facilities and resources of existing enumeration.
agencies. The amount of appropriation for the EIIB ranged from 128m
to 238m as opposed to the maximum 50m for Task Force. The Task Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively
Force is empowered to affect searches, seizures and arrests. for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
The deactivation is a valid measure of reorganization, as part of the captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
executive check on the economy and efficiency of an administrative President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various
agency. Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those
Ferdie: So the President is allowed to deactivate a government agency. It is like whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
circumvention because it is only Congress that can abolish. The President cannot confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.
but the President can deactivate with the same effect as abolition. That is how the
SC accommodated this case.
There is deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of CoA over
presidential appointments. The remedy is not to pass a law but to amend
CONGRESSIONAL CHECK the Constitution.
CONGRESSIONAL CHECK
1. Confirmation of appointments 2 – Central Bank Governor
2. Creation and abolition Tarrosa v. Singson
3. Appropriation Reiterated ruling in Calderon v. Carale. Congress cannot by law expand
4. Legislative investigation the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of
Confirmation of appointments, basis.
the Constitution.
“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
Who are the other officers?
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
1. Chairs & Commissioners of the CSC, Comelec and CoA
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
2. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
a. Representative of the Integrated Bar
(Take note of this period because this separates the sentences)
b. A professor of law
c. A retired Member of the Supreme Court
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
d. A representative of the private sector.
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint.
Sectoral representatives. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7)
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of officers lower in
What about Justices, Judges, Ombudsman and deputies?
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
Try to find out. They are not subject to confirmation of CoA. It is the
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”
Judicial and Bar Council which nominates them, to be appointed by the
President. No confirmation required.
To simply:
The first sentence speaks of a 3-step process:
Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
1. Nomination
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
2. Consent
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
3. Appointment
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the
The second sentence speaks only of appointment.
President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
What is the significance of the separation of the first and
second sentences?
Section 9, Article XI, 1987 Constitution
It means only those enumerated in the first sentence need the consent
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
of the Commission on Appointments:
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial
1. Heads of the executive departments
and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
2. Ambassadors
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
3. Other public ministers and consuls
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.
4. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain
Who are “all other officers of the government whose
5. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
appointments are not otherwise provided by law”?
Constitution.
These are officers whose appointing authority is not specified by law,
like the Chair and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
Is this list exclusive?
Yes, the list is exclusive as of today. Try to lookup these cases.
Who appoints them?
The President.

What is the significance then?

Their appointments do not need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
What does the phrase “in the President alone” mean?
It means to the exclusion of the courts, the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. But Congress has authority to decide
whether the appointment of “officers lower in rank” should be preserved
to the President alone or shared with the courts, department heads,
agencies, commissions or boards.
Ad-interim appointments, basis.
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”(Section 16, Article VIII)
Recess – period when it is not in session.
2 Kinds of Recess:
1. Voluntary recess – Neither House during the sessions of the
Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than 3 days, nor to any other place than that to which the 2 Houses
shall be in sitting. (Art. VI,Sec.16)
2. Compulsory recess – period when, even if in existence, Congress
is not allowed by the Constitution to be in session either:
A. 30-day period between sessions, 30 days before the 4th
Monday of July. (Art. VI, Sec. 15) Day of SONA
B. The period between the beginning of a new term and the
beginning of a regular session on the 4th Monday of July (Art.
VI, Secs. 7 & 15)
Ferdie: It is not always 30 days then since when you reckon it with
the 4th Monday of July, it is not always 30 days. It is not constant. But
what is constant is, the day when you assume office – Noon of June
30 following the day of elections.
When does an ad-interim appointment become effective?
A. If it does not require consent – when it is accepted by the
appointee.
B. If it requires consent – only until disapproval and adjournment
prior to action by CoA.
Ferdie: An ad-interim appointment is very shaky. It really depends if the
Commission on Appointments acts on it, then good. They can also not act on it.
Then after the Congress adjourns, your appointment is lost.
Two modes and entities which can terminate ad-interim
appointments:
1. Disapproval by the CoA
2. Adjournment prior to action by the CoA
How is it different from appointment in an acting capacity?
Ad-interim appointment Appointment in an acting capacity
Extended only during recess Extended any time
and to appointments there is a vacancy.
reviewable by the CoA
Subject to action by CoA Not subject to action by CoA
Both are effective upon acceptance
Ferdie: So if the President wants to evade the approval of the Commission on
Appointments, he can appoint you in a temporary capacity because you will not
be subject to their approval. But then again, there is a principle that we cannot
subject the public office into an uncertainty. So, it must be filled in.
19 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
CHECK BY THE OMBUDSMAN
CHECK BY THE OMBUDSMAN
The power of the Ombudsman to check on administrative
agencies is broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance. Such power is not only
recommendatory but mandatory.
Uy v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: The Court ruled that the prosecutor power of the Ombudsman is
limited to cases under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, to the
exclusion of cases under the jurisdiction of regular courts.
RA 6770 vests the Ombudsman “primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan” and the Special Prosecutor “to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.”
Held: The grant of primary jurisdiction merely authorizes the
Ombudsman to take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. It does not exclude
authority to investigate and prosecute over cases against public officers
and employees cognizable by the regular courts.
The primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is
not incompatible with the duty to investigate and prosecute other
offenses committed by public officers and employees cognizable by
regular courts.
The Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This
power to investigate and prosecute is plenary and unqualified.
Ferdie: Take note ha, “appears to be”. This means even by mere perception, it
now merits an investigation by the Ombudsman.
Thus, the power of the Ombudsman to check on administrative agencies
through investigation and prosecution of illegal, unjust, improper and
inefficient acts is broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance. And such power is not only
recommendatory but mandatory.
The word “recommend”, when taken in conjunction with the
phrase” and ensure compliance therewith” makes the power of
the Ombudsman mandatory.
Ledesma v. CA
Facts: The Ombudsman found the Division Chair of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation liable for conduct prejudicial to the service
after he extended temporary resident visas (TRVs) with anomaly. As
such, he was ordered suspended by the Ombudsman. He argues the
findings of the Ombudsman is merely advisory on the BID.
Held: Section 13(3), Article of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
Ombudsman to:
“Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demoting, fine, censure and prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.”
The word “recommend”, when taken in conjunction with the phrase”
and ensure compliance therewith” makes the power of the Ombudsman
mandatory.
It merely concerns procedural aspect of the Ombudsman functions, not
its jurisdiction. Thus, the Ombudsman power to recommend is not
merely advisory, but mandatory in nature within the bounds of the law.
It does not usurp because the power to investigate and prosecute any
illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
It is shared and concurrent with other investigative and prosecutorial
arms of the government with respect to the offense charged.
Honasan v. DOJ
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute is not
exclusive. It has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigate agencies
of the government.
Ferdie: But there are cases wherein the Ombudsman, because of its power of
primary jurisdiction, can take over any time the investigation by other government
agencies of any act that appears to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient as
committed by Public Officers.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JUDICIAL REVIEW
If the authority is excessive, it does not preclude judicial review
even if it is based on an agreement that it be final and
unappealable.
Chung Fu v. CA
Facts: Two entities entered into a construction agreement but one party
violated its terms and conditions by virtue of which a case was filed in
court. During the pendency of the case however, they submitted the
dispute to arbitration where they mutually agreed that the decision of
the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable.
Thus, there is no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with
the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award except to enforce it.
Thus, the arbitrator awarded a substantial amount to one party.
But the other party disagreed and cited several instances of grave error
on the part of the arbitrator who departed from the terms of the contract
and misapplied the law in excess of the delegated power and authority.
But the trial court confirmed the award and issued a writ of execution.
The aggrieved party went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari but was
denied on the ground of estoppel.
Issue: Is the arbitration award agreed by the parties as final and
unappealable beyond judicial review?
Held: Under Article 2044 of the Civil Code, the finality of arbitration is
not absolute. It is subject to exceptions where it is clearly shown that
the arbitrator:
1. Gravely abused discretion
2. Acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
Thus, the remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of court. As a
special civil action, the court neither reviews the facts nor the
interpretation of law, unless errors of fact or of law are so patent or
gross and prejudicial amounting to grave abuse of discretion. In the
same way, decisions of administrative agencies declared final by law are
not exempt from judicial review when so warranted.
Final decisions of administrative agencies may still be subject
to judicial review for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction (continuing ground for dismissal)
2. Grave abuse of discretion
3. Violation of due process
4. Denial of substantial justice
5. Erroneous interpretation of law
Ferdie: If the authority is excessive, it does not preclude judicial review even if
based on agreement that it is going to be final and unappealable. Whether or not
it is final or unappealable does not lie in the hands on the party litigants. It is under
the law, under the courts.
The arbitrator gravely abused his discretion when he failed to apply the
terms and conditions of the construction agreement. He exceeded his
power when he awarded unjustified extra compensation.
20 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S S L G
The trial court likewise gravely abused its discretion when it refused to
review despite showing of prima facie evidence of grounds warranting
judicial review. The CA likewise gravely abused its discretion when it
denied due course to the petition despite clear showing of grounds to
annul, vacate or modify the award.
Atlas v. Factoran
Facts: Mining claims overlapped. Thus, it was awarded to the entity
which registered it first.
Held: Whether or not there is valid location and discovery of the disputed
mining claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of
administrative agency charged with the implementation of the law. All
that is required is such finding of fact is supported by substantial
evidence which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
It should not be disturbed, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
Except if there is a clear showing of:
1. Denial of due process
2. Mistake of law or fraud
3. Collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceedings
4. Procedure leading to factual finding is irregular
5. Palpable errors are committed
6. Grave abuse of discretion
7. Manifest arbitrariness or capriciousness.
By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of the
administrative agencies, they are in the better position to pass
judgement.
Amigo v. Cluett
Facts: A foreign corporation owned the trademark for its socks GOLD
TOE. It went to the Bureau of Patents to cancel the trademark of a
domestic corporation GOLD TOP. After considering the totality of
similarities between the two sets of marks, the Bureau of Patents found
they are of such degree, number and quality as to give the overall
impression they are confusingly and deceptively the same.
The CA sustained the Bureau of Patents after it noted that there is no
variance in the appearance of GOLD TOP and GOLD TOW since both
represent a man’s foot wearing a sock and the marks are printed in
identical font.
Contention of the domestic corporation:
It first used the trademark in 1956 whereas the foreign corporation used
it in 1962. But the Bureau of Patents found that the foreign corporation
registered it in 1954.
Held: The findings of fact of administrative agencies in matters falling
under their jurisdiction are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of the
administrative agencies, they are in the better position to pass
judgement. The court cannot once more weigh evidence and substitute
judgement.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Composition
Chair and four members
Qualifications
1. Natural- born citizens of the Philippines
2. Majority shall be members of the Bar
Term of office, other qualifications and disabilities
Provided by law
1. EO no. 163 set the term of office of the Chair and members to 7
years without reappointment.
2. Fiscal autonomy
Bautista v. Salonga
Facts: In 1988, the President designated Mary Concepcion Bautista as
Acting Chair of the Commission on Human Rights. She took oath of,
qualified to, assumed and discharge functions of her office.
But in 1989, the President extended her a permanent appointment.
The Commission on Appointments requested her to submit credentials
and attend hearing and deliberations in support of the confirmation of
her appointment. But she refused on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Can the President still issue another appointment, this time in a
permanent capacity?
Held: No. The first appointment is a completed act of the President.
Can the CoA review appointment if the President submits?
Even if the President voluntarily submits for confirmation to the
Commission on Appointments an appointment outside its jurisdiction, it
is still not subject to confirmation as the President and Congress cannot
from time to time move constitutional boundaries of power.
Ferdie: Bottomline, CHR chair and commissioners do not need the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments even if the President voluntarily submits
because it cannot be by their own doing or by their own will that they can move
constitutional boundaries. (He likes this phrase)
The jurisdiction of the CHR is limited to investigation of all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It has no power to adjudicate.
Carino v. CHR
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers left their classes to dramatize
their plight resulting from failure and disregard by authorities of their
grievances. The Education Secretary ordered them to return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal. But they defied the order. Instead, more
teachers joined the mass action.
Some were either dismissed or suspended or replaced. Invoking lack of
due process, they filed a case with the Commission on Human Rights
which enjoined the Education Secretary to appear and bring necessary
documents.
The Education Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. But
the CHR denied and instead ordered the Education Secretary to answer
the charges, showing its intent to hear and decide the case.
Issue: Does the CHR have adjudicatory power?
Held: No. This is adjudicatory, a power NOT granted to the Commission
on Human Rights. The most that can be conceded to it in the way of
adjudication is the power to investigate which is limited to receive and
find facts.
Ferdie: CHR - fact finding only. It can recommend, it can file cases for violation
of Human Rights but it cannot adjudicate. It cannot decide.
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A. Fact finding is not adjudication. It must be accompanied by
the authority to apply the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that it may be decided subject to review.
B. Investigate commonly means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study.
C. Adjudicate commonly means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, or settle. In legal sense, adjudicate
means to settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights is limited to
investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.
If the CHR is without authority to hear and decide a case for human
rights violations, a fortiori that it is without authority to issue injunctive
relief, it being an ancillary remedy.
The power of contumacy of the CHR applies only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.
Simon Jr. v. CHR
Facts: Farmers occupied and planted agricultural products on a parcel
of land owned by the Export Processing Zone Authority which project
manager, together with an entire PNP company bulldozed the area,
despite showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President
postponing it.
Violence ensued and media men were beaten up and their cameras
snatched by the police. Hence, the case for human rights violations.
The CHR issued an order of injunction against EPZA the PNP and
Governor to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism
and other acts of harassment.
The CHR argued its power is not limited to investigation. As such it can
issue injunctive relief based on the constitutional provision “provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged”
Held: It cannot be constructed to confer jurisdiction on the CHR to issue
a restraining order or writ of injunction. If it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is expressly
conferred by law; it is never derived by implication.
It merely refers to the extra – judicial or judicial remedies which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human
rights violations. CHR can just file the injunctive relief to the courts in
behalf of the victims.
It follows then that CHR likewise has no power of contumacy. But there
is a constitutional authority for the CHR to adopt its operational
guidelines and ruled of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court
The power of contumacy applies only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers.
It can only be used against persons who:
1. Refuse to cooperate with it
2. Unduly withhold relevant information
3. Decline to honor summons and the like.
Since it has no adjudicatory power from where the power to issue
injunctive relief is derived, defiance of issued injunction does not
constitute violation. Where there is no contumacy, there is no power to
cite it.
Ferdie: It has no adjudicatory power and based on the lack of adjudicatory power,
it cannot issue injunctive relief because that is ancillary remedy. Also it cannot cite
you for contempt. But, in the exercise of investigative powers of the CHR, it can
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW l Atty. Ferdinand Gujilde l For the exclusive use of EH 407 A.Y. 2015-2016

cite you for contempt if you do not cooperate because that is pursuant to the fact
finding powers of the CHR.

Thus, the defiance of the order to desist from demolishing stalls,

carenderias, sari- sari stores and temporary shanties is not
contumacious. As a matter of fact, the Constitution envisioned the CHR
to focus on more severe cases of human rights violations such as:
1. Protection of rights of political detainees
2. Treatment of prisoners, prevention of tortures
3. Fair and public trials
4. Cases of disappearances
5. Salvaging & ham letting
6. Other crimes committed against the religious.

Ferdie: Essentially, the creation of the CHR is in reaction to the Marcos Regime
insofar as Human Rights violation is concerned. So the intention there is for big
time human rights violations. So the demolition of stall, carrenderias, sari-sari store
and temporary shanties is not contumacious in other words the CHR should not
prioritize them. But there is no prohibition, they can also take that into
consideration.

A. Civil rights – Those that belong to every citizen of the state or

country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the
government.

They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of

the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in
its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.

B. Political rights – The right to participate, directly or indirectly,

in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and,
in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis- a –vis the
management of government.

The demolition of stalls, carrenderias, sari-sari stores and

temporary shanties does not fall under the compartment of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights,
especially where it is intended to avoid danger to life and limb.

Ferdie: So it looks like it is the fault because what we are saying is “It is for your
own safety that we demolish your shanties.” But bottom line again, CHR can look
into these demolitions but it is not the priority supposedly if we are to revisit the
original intent of the framers of the Constitution.

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