Torcello 2016

Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016) 19–48
Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

ISSN:1756-8757 print / 1756-8765 online
DOI: 10.1111/tops.12179
The Ethics of Belief, Cognition, and Climate Change

Pseudoskepticism: Implications for Public Discourse
Lawrence Torcello
Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology
Received 8 August 2014; received in revised form 8 August 2015; accepted 25 August 2015
Abstract
The relationship between knowledge, belief, and ethics is an inaugural theme in philosophy; more
recently, under the title “ethics of belief” philosophers have worked to develop the appropriate
methodology for studying the nexus of epistemology, ethics, and psychology. The title “ethics of
belief” comes from a 19th-century paper written by British philosopher and mathematician W.K.
Clifford. Clifford argues that we are morally responsible for our beliefs because (a) each belief that
we form creates the cognitive circumstances for related beliefs to follow, and (b) we inevitably influ-
ence each other through those beliefs. This study argues that recent cognitive research supports Clif-
fordian insights regarding patterns of belief formation and social influence. From the confirmation
offered by such research, it follows that informational accuracy holds serious ethical significance in
public discourse. Although scientific and epistemological matters are not always thought to be linked
to normative morality, this study builds on Clifford’s initial insights to show their linkage is funda-
mental to inquiry itself. In turn, Clifford’s ethical and epistemic outline can inform a framework
grounded in “public reason” under which seemingly opposed science communication strategies (e.g.,
“information deficit” and “cultural cognition” models) are philosophically united. With public dis-
course on climate change as the key example, empirically informed and grounded strategies for
science communication in the public sphere are considered.
Keywords: Anthropogenic global warming; Ethics of belief; Climate change; Cultural cognition;
Information deficit; Mere-exposure effect; Public reason; Science denial; Scientific consensus
1. Introduction
Climate change is overtly related to global justice since those most vulnerable to the
effects of climate change are those least responsible for causing it and least able to
respond to it proactively (Kreft & Eckstein, 2013). These are the global poor. Here, I
Correspondence should be sent to Lawrence Torcello, College of Liberal Arts, Rochester Institute of
Technology, U.S., 92 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, New York 14623. E-mail: lgtghs@rit.edu
20 L. Torcello / Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016)
want to concentrate on a less obvious facet of the ethical significance of climate change,
by considering more closely the relationship between ethics and epistemology. This rela-
tionship is captured by the following proposition: We are ethically responsible for the
consequences of our beliefs (including fact-oriented, value-laden, and attitudinal beliefs).
As a general rule, professional ethicists aim to rationally analyze concepts and discourse
about how we ought to live in relation to others. We may draw from the sciences to offer
a moral analysis (as I do here), but our obligation is to offer sound arguments about viable
ways to engage in moral decision making and to debunk unsound arguments.1 Drawing
attention to the relationship between ethics and belief continues this practice, but also
emphasizes that belief itself is not something about which one may be vague, inconsistent,
or heedless, morally speaking. The case of anthropogenic climate change and pseudoskep-
tical arguments against it provides a good focal point for exploring the ethical relation
between inquiry and belief formation, but as I will argue, climate change is also a matter
of such pressing hazard, about which it is now so important to communicate effectively,
that we cannot afford to neglect the ethics of belief as a valuable resource. This is both
because, from a philosophical perspective, beliefs are ethically implicated, and because, as
scientists are finding, the moral context is especially effective as a didactic and commu-
nicative strategy capable of influencing behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Young, Chakr-
off, & Tom, 2012; Young & Durwin, 2013). Study of the ethics of belief, then, is a
productive convergence point for moral philosophy and the cognitive sciences.
A constellation of objectives meet here. I want first to identify and contextualize what
I call pseudoskepticism, as opposed to scientific skepticism. This is a vital distinction and
one that will prove essential for understanding the kind of epistemic warrant established
with a scientific consensus. Pseudoskepticism, as I will argue, is a species of science
denialism related to pseudoscience; I will examine the relationship below. I then draw
upon the 19th-century philosopher W.K. Clifford to reconstruct his notion of the ethics of
belief. With that in place, I extend, and adapt, Clifford’s arguments to address contempo-
rary discourse about climate change. Toward these goals, I will connect my argument
with two contending lines of contemporary research about effective science communica-
tion, and I will show how the apparent discord between them may be effectively dis-
solved. Finally, I close with recommendations about how science communication on
climate change might be responsibly framed given the relationship between belief forma-
tion and ethics.2 My recommendations will be made in the context of the philosopher
John Rawls’ conception of public reason (Rawls, 1993, 1997, 2001).
2. Identifying pseudoskepticism and its connection to science denialism and

pseudoscience
Science denialism occurs when established science is rejected for motives independent
of scientific research and progress. Such denialism may result from the procedural
observance of religious faith. In this sense, one rejects a claim not because one fails to
understand the science behind it but because one chooses to ignore the science in favor of
L. Torcello / Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016) 21
one’s faith-based belief. In such cases the recognition of science may serve to strengthen
one’s commitment to faith. For instance, in taking communion Catholics implicitly recog-
nize normally understood laws of nature (and logic) as they accept, on faith, that they are
literally consuming the flesh of Christ by a miracle of transubstantiation. In doing so, one
recognizes science but denies its claims against faith. Alternatively, one may promote
science denialism as part of philosophical efforts to refute methodological naturalism. Such
philosophical efforts can be found in Paul Feyerabend’s promotion of epistemological
anarchy. Feyerabend understands the arguments in favor of epistemologically privileging
science over other approaches to gathering knowledge of the natural world, but he finds
(mistakenly in this author’s judgment) such arguments unconvincing (Feyerabend, 2010).
In contrast to the cases above, the form of science denialism I wish to explore below
is what I refer to as pseudoskepticism.3 When scientific consensus is rejected by non-
experts who naively consider themselves more scientifically astute than the collective sci-
entific community, it is appropriately labeled pseudoskepticism. Pseudoskepticism, I
argue, may be influenced by, though perhaps not exclusively, the following two factors:
(a) ignorance of the scientific process and (b) ideologically motivated reasoning (as
opposed to the exercise of faith).
2.1. Ignorance of the scientific process
When it comes to ignorance regarding the process of modern science, a contributing

factor to pseudoskepticism may be the Dunning–Kruger effect. This effect occurs when
one lacks sufficient knowledge of a topic to accurately judge the depth of one’s own
ignorance on that topic (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In such cases responsible awareness
of one’s own epistemic limitations may give way to unwarranted confidence in one’s
ability to critique the findings of professionals. Pseudoskeptics caught in the Dunning–
Kruger effect may not wish to reject science at all—they may even consider themselves
scientifically astute—but their ignorance of how modern science works can lead to an
inflated view of their own ability to judge technical matters.
2.2. Ideologically motivated reasoning
Tension between the ideological beliefs, and values, important to one’s cultural identity
and the findings of modern science play an important role in pseudoskepticism. This form
of pseudoskepticism is often exhibited by those with a commitment to free-market ideals
when assessing the robust evidence for anthropogenic global warming (Dunlap & Jac-
ques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 2010, 2011; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac,
2013a; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a,b; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Ideologically driven
pseudoskepticism may also be religious in nature, as in the rejection of evolution by
natural selection. Yet a distinction exists between religiously reasoned pseudoskepticism
and the faith-based “suspension of disbelief” discussed above. Religiously driven
pseudoskepticism leads to motivated reasoning in favor of ideology preserving conclu-
sions. In contrast, faith-based science denialism depends on an arational exercise of faith,
which need not involve attempts to reconcile one’s belief to scientific evidence (such
efforts might even be viewed as antithetical to one’s faith).
All forms of science denialism involve selective validation of some scientific conclusions
while rejecting others. This is understandable since living in a modern world influenced
everywhere by science and technology makes it impossible for science deniers to function
without sustained cognitive dissonance. Pseudoskepticism is no different in its displays of
selective validation. In the case of pseudoskepticism an odd twinning of extreme credulity
and cynical disbelief is particularly pronounced since pseudoskeptics seek to both deny
accepted science and adopt the authority of scientific skepticism. For instance, pseudoskep-
tics may aggressively criticize an established scientific consensus while uncritically refer-
encing non-scientists who assert unsubstantiated claims (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013). To fully
understand pseudoskepticism and its relationship with pseudoscience, it is necessary to
examine the distinction between pseudoskepticism and scientific skepticism.4
2.3. Scientific skepticism and scientific consensus
Scientific skepticism, or reasoned skepticism, is a vital component of the modern scien-

tific process (Merton, 1942, 1973). Indeed, the scientific process is distinguished, in part, by
the methodological application of skepticism, aimed at the most evidentially warranted
understanding of natural phenomena. Clearly understanding the skeptical process of science
allows for better appreciation of why disregarding scientific consensus (a defining feature of
pseudoskepticism) is epistemically unwarranted and a key aspect of pseudoscience.5
The scientific skepticism of modern science is applied by a community of inquirers;
it is not enough that one researcher endorse a particular conclusion, for scientific find-
ings must be confirmed repeatedly by other scientists (if they are to gain traction in
the broader scientific community). Part of what scientists do is to test conclusions,
examining and when warranted rejecting them, before they are accepted as established.
In this sense, the scientific process represents a form of empirical contest. When an
overwhelming scientific consensus among active researchers in a field exists, it is often
because attempts to disprove a particular claim have instead converged to strengthen
its credibility. This is not to say that any claim, strictly speaking, can be formally fal-
sified or verified. There will always be a large background of scientific hypotheses and
concepts bundled together in support of any particular consensus, which in turn resist
logically formal justifications (Harding, 2013; Quine, 1951). When a consensus view
does exist, it signals that the consensus view functions reliably, under a wide range of
skeptically informed empirical applications, to predict and explain observational results
(Cook & Lewandowswky, 2016; Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016).
Non-experts hold a considerable disadvantage with regard to methodological training and
experience, but rather than realizing this, pseudoskeptics may take their lack of training as a
virtue. A virtue that, or so they may believe, frees them from the traps of professional
“groupthink.” For this reason, non-experts wishing to deny anthropogenic global warming
sometimes reference historic figures like Galileo as evidence that a scientific consensus can
be wrong.6 Yet figures like Galileo and other thinkers of his time are responsible for usher-
ing in the modern age of experimental research that has driven the very need for advanced-
level training separating professional researchers from the lay public. It is consistent with
the Dunning–Kruger effect that those evoking Galileo and other historic figures do not know
enough about science, and its history, to understand the error of their comparison.
Consequently, when we refer to the denial of well-established scientific consensus as
skepticism, we invite confusion. Overgeneralizing and misusing the term skepticism is
damaging to informed public discourse in at least two ways: (a) Insofar as many people
have a nebulous sense that skepticism is good, pseudoskeptics win a rhetorical advantage
by portraying themselves as skeptical in contrast to “mainstream” scientific research,
which they portray as dogmatically set against their skeptical challenge. (b) Because rea-
soned skepticism is a crucial component of the scientific process, misuse of the term
skepticism—to mean any form of doubting something, for any reason—chips away at an
understanding of how science actually works, which should be regarded as the core of
scientific literacy (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009). This point is important because in
cases of science denial not explained by motivated reasoning or ideological bias, the
rejection of settled science may simply involve ignorance of the scientific process and the
epistemic significance of consensus in science (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Galesic,
Kause, & Gaissmaier, 2016; Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016; Joslyn & LeClerc, 2016;
Newell et al., 2016; Ranney & Clark, 2016). Thus, one of the dangers of pseudoskepti-
cism is its potential to mislead the uninformed.
2.4. Pseudoskepticism and the public sphere
To be clear, disagreements about policy and ensuing debates only involve pseudoskep-
ticism to the degree that relevant scientific consensus is denied in the context of policy
decisions. Strictly speaking, the term pseudoskepticism is most reasonably applied to
rejections of established scientific consensus only—not widely recommended public pol-
icy or popular political opinions. Yet science and its findings are woven into most every
aspect of our lives and sustainable modern democracies require informed publics, able to
make the distinction between data skeptically vetted through authentic peer-review, and
ideologically inflected claims that are made directly to the public, often bolstered by the
support of like-minded institutions (Brulle, 2013; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Dunlap &
McCright, 2010, 2011; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Pfau, Haigh, & Wigley, 2007). It is
crucial then that public disagreement with a scientific consensus must be accompanied by
the honest acknowledgment of such consensus to avoid the charge of pseudoskepticism.
Acknowledging well-established science (Rawls, 1993, 1997, 2001) and resulting scien-
tific consensus is a requirement of responsibly applied public reason. (Torcello, 2011,
2014b).7 The concept of public reason is discussed further below (Section 4.3).
2.5. Pseudoskepticism and pseudoscience
The importance of skepticism to science stands in stark contrast to pseudoscience.

One identifying feature of pseudoscience is circular belief. In other words, circular
acceptance of a contentious claim guides the pseudoscientific pursuit. Thus, for

instance, “investigators of the supernatural” assume the existence of “supernatural”
phenomena beforehand, which encourages confirmation bias and motivated reasoning
in support of their preconceived conclusions.8 The absence of any reliably estab-
lished justification for such endeavors encourages motivated reasoning, emphasizing
anecdotal evidence, the discounting of established scientific vetting, and the existence
(or epistemic weight) of scientific consensus. The skeptical process of scientific anal-
ysis is procedurally designed to protect research from motivated reasoning of this
sort.
The scientific process does err, it should be emphasized, but it also self-corrects over
time (Merton, 1942, 1973). Again, it is this process of progressive self-correction that
relies upon robust genuinely skeptical methodologies. Those who challenge the view that
science is necessarily self-correcting, in doing so, can even play a role in the long-term
trend of scientific critique and self-correction (Ioannidis, 2012).
I therefore want to insist on the term pseudoskepticism as a more accurate label for
describing the rejection of scientific consensus based on ideologically driven reasoning,
or on the grounds of some formless preference for contrarianism or cynicism parading as
scientific skepticism (Torcello, 2011, 2012, 2014b). It is worth emphasizing that pseu-
doskepticism, as I formulate the concept, is a species of science denialism but not a syn-
onym for science denial.9 Pseudoskeptics attempt to portray themselves as scientifically
objective while they depict mainstream scientists as credulous dogmatists. Pseudoskeptics
are unique among science denialists in their attempt to reject science while appropriating
the epistemological authority of science and scientific skepticism. In this way pseu-
doskepticism is akin to pseudoscience in that both run contrary to the very conceptions
from which they contrive their justifications (i.e., pseudoscience disavows the method-
ological constraints of modern science while seeking the approbation of science. Pseu-
doskepticism seeks to critique scientific consensus as uncritical, or fraudulent, while
ignoring the extent to which rigorous methodological skepticism informs modern scien-
tific consensus).
Moreover, pseudoskepticism is a key feature of pseudoscience, but it need not be
part of any broader pseudoscientific effort. For instance, any given practitioner of
pseudoscience (e.g., a homeopathic practitioner) will exhibit a degree of pseudoskepti-
cism with regard to modern science (e.g., modern medical science and physics), but it
does not follow that pseudoskeptics necessarily promote a larger pseudoscientific
agenda.10 Therefore, pseudoskepticism should be defined more narrowly than either
science denialism or pseudoscience. I propose therefore that pseudoskepticism be rec-
ognized as a subspecies of science denialism and an essential element of pseudo-
science.11
2.6. Pseudoskepticism, belief formation, and morality
Likewise, the problem of pseudoskepticism goes straight to the crux of the relationship
between belief formation and morality. A major danger of pseudoskepticism, as well as
of pseudoscience, is its role in the development of socially generated ignorance.12 Exam-

ples of the harm related to such ignorance include the following: (a) South Africa’s fail-
ure to respond appropriately to its HIV/AIDS epidemic under the leadership of former
president Thabo Mbeke. The Mbeke administration’s denial of the well-established link
between HIV and AIDS may have contributed to an estimated 365,000 deaths between
2000 and 2005, in the absence of timely antiretroviral programs (Chigwedere, Seage,
Gruskin, Tin-Hou, & Essex, 2008). (b) Outbreaks of otherwise preventable and poten-
tially eradicable diseases may result from ignorance and active disbelief regarding the
well-established safety of childhood vaccination programs. Countries with active anti-vac-
cination campaigns, or that lack robust policy requiring childhood vaccinations, have
lower rates of vaccination and significantly higher rates of vaccine-preventable disease
(Gangarosa et al., 1998). Furthermore, there is a significant correlation between geo-
graphic regions where greater numbers of parents resist vaccinating their children and the
occurrence of vaccine-preventable outbreaks (Atwell et al., 2010).
2.7. Pseudoskepticism and anthropogenic global warming
I want to concentrate now on what I take to be the most pressing example of pseu-
doskepticism: the denial of anthropogenic global warming. The United States is the
world’s leading producer of GHG emissions per capita, followed by a number of other
wealthy nations (The World Bank, 2013). A variety of traditional ethical perspectives
converge on the conclusion that the United States, and other wealthy polluting nations,
should take a leading role in responding to challenges of global climate change (Caney,
2010; Cuomo 2011; Gardiner, 2006, 2011; Jamieson, 2010, 2014; Nussbaum, 2013; Pos-
ner & Weisbach, 2010; Shue, 2010; Singer, 2004, 2006; Torcello, 2011). Yet the United
States has the highest level of climate pseudoskepticism among both private citizens and
publicly elected officials (IPSO MORI, 2014). News media outlets, especially in the Eng-
lish-speaking world, mention anthropogenic global warming relatively infrequently, often
providing equal time for pseudoskeptical views (Boykoff & Bokoff, 2004; Boykoff,
2007; Jones, 2014; Painter, 2011; Santhanam, 2014). Under these conditions, even
among U.S. citizens who accept anthropogenic climate change, there exists a widespread
belief that climate change poses no significant threat within one’s own lifetime and that
the causes of climate change remain scientifically controversial (Butler & Pidgeon, 2009;
Jones, 2014; Painter, 2011).
Such perceptions are dangerously out of step with reality. Active climate researchers
overwhelmingly conclude that global warming is the result of human behaviors (Ander-
egg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009;
Oreskes, 2004). In addition, as Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets continue to melt,
coastal cities are increasingly vulnerable to storm surges and flooding (Parris et al.,
2012). This means that misinformation regarding climate change has serious implications
for public safety if allowed to influence policy decisions. To make matters worse, much
of the climate change misinformation circulating in the public realm has been introduced
through organized, corporate-funded campaigns of disinformation. These vested interests
leverage their political influence in the form of lobbyists, policy think tanks, and political
funding (Brulle, 2013; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; McCright et
al., 2016; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Citizens misinformed about the human causes, and
resulting risks, of climate change are unlikely to pressure politicians to address the prob-
lem through policy action. It is, therefore, important to recognize climate pseudoskepti-
cism as a key element of the United States’ failure to take meaningful action to curb
carbon emissions during the last 30-year period (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, &
Leiserowitz, 2011; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013).
3. Ethics and epistemology
As a challenge to contemporary science communication, pseudoskepticism draws atten-

tion to the relationship between ethics and epistemology. Precisely this relationship, or
the ethics of inquiry and belief, is a worthy topic of renewed scientific and philosophical
interest. Recent research suggests that framing a given issue in terms of moral facts
related to it has a positive effect in motivating moral behavior (Young & Durwin, 2013).
So there is some reason to believe that understanding the ethical or moral implications of
climate change and of pseudoskepticism about it will increase the effectiveness of science
communicators in countering the problem. Likewise, research indicates that, cognitively
priming people, especially at an abstract, general level, to view themselves positively as
moral agents, tends to inspire behavior thought, by the agent, to be moral (Aquino &
Reed, 2002; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Young & Chakroff,
2012). And just as one might then expect, studies reveal that when people judge them-
selves to have acted immorally, the judgment may trigger compensatory behavior aimed
at maintaining a positive moral identity (Conway & Peetz, 2012). This too suggests that
even where some person or group has behaved in a morally problematic way, our ability
to frame their behavior in terms of moral reconsideration and correction may facilitate a
positive change.
While these research efforts give us some cause for optimism, they help to underscore
the startlingly high stakes of effective science communication. Science communication
might fail not only because we are unsure about how best to frame any given scientific
position, or to counter misinformation about it, but because of our inadequate considera-
tion of the moral link between how we form our beliefs, what we believe, and how we
behave. I have already stated that climate change directly entails matters of global justice
—for whether we speak of the young, of future generations, or of the global poor, the
fact remains that those most vulnerable to its effects are those least responsible for con-
tributing to climate change (Samson, Berteaux, & McGill, 2011). But as I said earlier,
there is another, ethically weighty connection between what we think climate change is
and how we respond to it. Given that so very much hinges on getting this connection
right, and being able to talk to people about it effectively, it is here that I’d like to go
into more detail.
In his essay “The Ethics of Belief” (1877), mathematician and philosopher William
Kingdon Clifford examines the often overlooked reasons why the epistemological quality
of our beliefs is ethically important. The emergence of pseudoskepticism as an ethical
problem heightens the relevance of his essay. In addition, I argue that current findings in
cognitive science support crucial elements of Clifford’s thesis. I want to outline Clifford’s
argument to draw conclusions from it regarding the relevance of moral framing in coun-
tering pseudoskepticism and the latter’s moral implications regarding belief formation.
3.1. The ethics of belief
Clifford begins with the following example:
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant ship. He knew that she was old,
and not ever-well built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and often
had needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not sea-
worthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that
perhaps he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this
should put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he succeeded in
overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone safely
through so many voyages and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose
she would not come safely home from this trip also. He would put his trust in Provi-
dence, which could hardly fail to protect all these unhappy families that were leaving
their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind all
ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and contractors. In such ways he
acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and
seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes for the
success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his insur-
ance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales. (Clifford, 1887)
Clifford makes clear that the tragic ending is irrelevant to the ethical conclusions one
ought to draw from this case, for these conclusions would hold even if the ship had made
the voyage successfully. The question, rather, is whether or not the ship’s owner was jus-
tified in believing that his ship was seaworthy. One might object that it is not the owner’s
belief that caused the tragic outcome, but his failure to maintain his ship properly. After
all, it is possible that one would believe in the safety of one’s ship and still go through
responsible procedures of maintenance and inspection. This counterargument fails to con-
tradict Clifford’s point, though, since such an owner would have a warranted belief in
the soundness of his ship.
Getting further into the portrayal of epistemic warrant, Clifford presents a second
example involving the reckless dissemination of misinformation. In this example, a rumor
is spread through a community, to the effect that certain teachers are conniving to have
children removed from their legal guardians to indoctrinate them into a particular reli-
gious sect.
Clifford’s text is once again worth quoting at length:
There was once an island in which some of the inhabitants professed a religion teach-
ing neither the doctrine of original sin nor that of eternal punishment. A suspicion got
abroad that the professors of this religion had made use of unfair means to get their
doctrines taught to children. They were accused of wresting the laws of their country
in such a way as to remove children from the care of their natural and legal guardians;
and even of stealing them away and keeping them concealed from their friends and
relations. A certain number of men formed themselves into a society for agitating the
public about this matter. They published grave accusations against individual citizens
of the highest position and character and did all in their power to injure these citizens
in the exercise of their professions. So great was the noise they made that a commis-
sion was appointed to investigate the facts; but after the commission had carefully
inquired into all the evidence that could be got, it appeared that the accused were inno-
cent. Not only had they been accused on insufficient evidence, but the evidence of
their innocence was such as the agitators might easily have obtained, if they had
attempted a fair inquiry. (Clifford, 1887)
The issue for Clifford is not whether those involved in the two examples were sincere
in their beliefs, but whether the beliefs were formed through responsible investigations
or, instead, by motivated reasoning. In both cases, it is possible to determine the differ-
ence, through serious consideration of how evidence was gathered and examined. Epis-
temic warrant attends only the analysis of evidence garnered carefully and understood for
the causative links it tentatively confirms or falsifies.
Clifford’s illustrations lend themselves to modern examples of climate science pseu-
doskepticism. The first example straightforwardly involves one person risking the safety
of others over dubious beliefs arrived at through motivated reasoning. In keeping with
the spirit of Clifford’s example, take the inevitability of sea level rise from climate
change. Even conservative estimates of sea level rise resulting from climate change
implicitly place a large number of the world’s coastal poor at increased risk of losing
their property as well as their lives (IPCC, 2013). Politicians in nations responsible for
the majority of GHG emissions who allow ideologically motivated reasoning to justify
their denial of anthropogenic climate change treat those most vulnerable to sea level rise
as Clifford’s ship-owner treated his seafarers. In both cases, unwarranted beliefs con-
tribute to people’s willingness to risk the safety of innocent others.
Clifford’s second example parallels climate science pseudoskeptics who slander cli-
mate scientists and others working on topics related to climate change. It is routine for
pseudoskeptical climate bloggers to accuse scientists of fraudulent research and data
manipulation (Clynes, 2012). In 2009, famously, emails were stolen from Britain’s
University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit. The emails were released online along
with accusations that climate researchers were engaging in fraudulent activity. Subsequent
investigations repeatedly demonstrated the innocence of those climate researchers, though
to this day, many in the public know only of the accusations against and not of the
vindication of the scientists (Fischer, 2010). Such behavior puts researchers at risk of not
being able to do and disseminate their work by slandering their reputation.
Clifford takes a hard line, arguing that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any-
one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (1877). Elsewhere, I examine the
viability of so categorical a conclusion (Torcello, 2011, 2014b), but here it is not neces-
sary to delve into an extended philosophical or textual examination. It is enough to recog-
nize Clifford’s key claim, that our beliefs carry a moral relevance that is often
overlooked. In addition, one can profitably acknowledge that the values influencing our
beliefs have moral implications. Clifford helps us to consider how even everyday beliefs,
most commonly considered a matter of personal prerogative, animate far-reaching behav-
iors that impact the lives of others. The claim I wish to advance upon the back of Clif-
ford’s argument is that our beliefs always involve a degree of moral hazard (Torcello,
2011, 2014b). In other words, our beliefs entail risks that may expose innocent people to
harm from which we are insulated and that we cannot predict. Such a claim, explored
below, is supported by the very premises Clifford uses to advance his stronger, more con-
troversial conclusion about morality and epistemic warrant.
3.2. Clifford’s premises and science communication
Clifford’s argument depends on the truth of the following two premises regarding the
formation of our beliefs and their social influence:
P1: Any given belief will set the cognitive conditions for related beliefs to follow.
P2: Our beliefs carry a social influence that we cannot easily control or predict.
The first premise (P1) suggests that we should consider our beliefs as part of a larger
cognitive web. This view is consistent with a position referred to by contemporary
philosophers of mind as mental holism. On this view, individual beliefs derive meaning
in the context of a holistic web of related background beliefs (Block, 1995, 1998; Quine,
1951). It does not follow from this that all of our beliefs will be rationally consistent.
Instead, it suggests that our beliefs are related through patterns of reasoning suggestive of
a consistent cognitive style, but not necessarily by rationally consistent content. Philoso-
phers have long argued that one set of beliefs will contribute to the cognitive conditions
for related beliefs to follow.13 This is the raison d’^etre behind efforts to instill a strong
understanding of logic and critical thinking in our students.14 It has also been long
acknowledged by philosophers that our attitudinal and value beliefs influence our percep-
tion and understanding of the larger world (Engelhardt, 1996; Kitcher, 2001; MacIntyre,
1984, 1988; Rawls, 1993, 1997, 2001).
Contemporary cognitive research supports the notion that our value beliefs are closely
linked to our scientific beliefs. A striking example can be found in the research of
Lewandowsky et al., which indicates that strong belief in the value of free market econo-
mies serves to predict the likelihood of climate science rejection. Similarly of relevance,
it is also found to be the case, to a lesser but still significant degree, that belief in con-
spiracy theories predicts the rejection of climate science (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Ober-
auer, 2013b). It should be noticed that conspiratorial accusations aimed at mainstream

science are common among both pseudoskeptics of evolution and climate change. Indeed,
there is evidence suggestive that conspiratorial claims are positively correlated with
pseudoscientific beliefs (as well as paranormal beliefs more generally) (Lobato, Mendoza,
Sims, & Chin, 2014).
A connection between pseudoscience and conspiracy theory is not surprising. Those
engaging in pseudoscience often invoke conspiratorial claims to explain why their views
are not taken more seriously by mainstream scientists. Such views are consistent with
holistic background beliefs, held by proponents of pseudoscience, that their theories are
correct and that their epistemic standards are scientific. An important aspect of conspira-
torial thinking is that it is self-sealing in nature. This means that attempts to refute con-
spiracy claims are commonly incorporated into the conspiracy (Lewandowsky, Gignac, &
Oberauer, 2013b). The self-sealing nature of conspiracy theories ensures that no evidence
given against a conspiracy theory need be taken seriously by the conspiracy theorist.
Importantly, links between epistemically strong beliefs also occur.
Researchers have recently gathered evidence for what has been called the “gateway belief
model.” The gateway belief model has been used to explain why belief in the scientific con-
sensus on anthropogenic climate change is found to causally correlate with increased belief
in the reality of climate change (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; van der Linden, Leiserowitz,
Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). Such findings are consistent with other research on the persua-
siveness of “consensus messaging” (discussed below in Section 4.3) (Lewandowsky, Gig-
nac, & Vaughan, 2013c; Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Gould, 2013; Maibach, Myers, &
Leiserowitz, 2014). These findings suggest the existence of beliefs, or cognitive patterns,
that reflect particular cognitive styles, which serve to encourage or discourage particular
types of belief (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Such cognitive styles are consis-
tent with Clifford’s moral concern that any given belief will contribute to cognitive condi-
tions for related beliefs to follow.
3.3. Clifford’s second premise and social influence
The beliefs that we hold influence the groups with whom we identify, and the groups
with whom we identify in turn reinforce and influence the beliefs and values we hold.
When we believe that something will benefit “our” group, we have a greater tendency to
engage in motivated reasoning to support that belief. This phenomenon is well recog-
nized, beyond Clifford, by moral and political philosophers who must confront the reality
of group polarizations while seeking workable approaches to moral and political problems
(Berlin, 1990; Engelhardt, 1996; Habermas, 1985; Kitcher 2003; Rawls, 1993, 1997;
Singer, 2011; Talisse, 2009, 2011; Torcello, 2011).
Again, cognitive research confirms that political and economic ideologies predict the
acceptance or rejection of our beliefs about climate science (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, &
Braman, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; McCright,
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a,b; Painter, 2011). Such influence speaks to the impact
of others with whom we identify and are affiliated culturally (Sweetman & Whitmarsh,
2016). The correspondence between cultural identification and a person’s acceptance of

climate science has been documented by Kahan and others, who label the impact of cul-
tural identity on our formation and acceptance of beliefs as the effect of “cultural cogni-
tion” (Kahan et al., 2011, 2012). According to this research, individuals will gravitate to
beliefs, and interpret information, in ways that serve to protect the values they associate
with their cultural sense of self. Once we have established our sense of cultural identity,
it is difficult to revise beliefs strongly associated with that identity. Indeed, this problem
is supported by research conducted by Shtulman and Valcarcel showing that our previous
beliefs continue to influence our understanding of science even after updated information
is received (Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Shtulman, 2016).
These findings are consistent with my formulation of Clifford’s second premise (P2) that
our beliefs (including ideological and value beliefs) exert a social influence in ways that are
not easily predictable. The driving assumption here is that given our social nature, our reli-
ance on community life, and our tendency toward group identifications, our beliefs are
bound to be socially impactful. Indeed, our examination of the first premise (P1) and of the
role that group affiliation plays in affecting our cognitive styles provides further support for
the social nature of our beliefs taken up in the second premise. It is, therefore, morally haz-
ardous to hold epistemically unwarranted beliefs (including value, metaphysical, or reli-
gious beliefs, which stand outside the realm of empirical support). The ethics of belief (and
its implications for inquiry), especially in the context of the research cited above, suggests a
level of increased epistemic and ethical responsibility, especially for those with greater
access to the public sphere and influence over their fellow citizens.
4. Implications for inquiry and public discourse
The question remains as to what this all means for the individual inquirer. Some
philosophers frame the development of strong skills of critical inference and argumenta-
tion as a matter of good cognitive hygiene (Aiken & Talisse, 2013).15 Habits of physical
hygiene have consequences for communal health and the same can be said of cognitive
hygiene in that false beliefs are more dangerous in a communal sphere than they might
seem when considered in isolation of one’s community and larger society. Knowing how
to weigh the evidential merit of propositional claims, and measure the validity and sound-
ness of arguments attached to such propositions, is a fundamental feature of solid reason-
ing and good cognitive hygiene.16
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the epistemological criteria
associated with reasoning skills conducive to sound cognitive hygiene and responsible
belief formation. Such skills are well understood to make up the foundations of critical
thinking, basic philosophical analysis, and logical methodologies. Developing practices of
good cognitive-hygiene and incorporating them into one’s mode of inquiry in the world
is morally important, and excellent resources exist to aid one in this endeavor (Aiken &
Talisse, 2013; Cohen & Nagel, 1993; Pigliucci, 2010; Sagan & Druyan, 1997; Schick &
Vaughn, 2013; Walton, 2008). It is taken as a starting point in this paper that such prac-
tices play a central role in the methodological processes of modern science as well as the
analytic tools of philosophy. It is worth pointing out that the arguments in this study
support a larger role for scientific and philosophical training in our school systems to
make the tools of critical thinking (essential to good cognitive hygiene) foundational in
the educational lives of citizens. Relevantly, research has demonstrated that debunking
fallacious patterns of inference, common to science denial, is an effective means of cog-
nitive inoculation against disinformation (Banas & Rains, 2010; Bedford, 2010; Muller,
Bewes, Sharma, & Reimann, 2008).
As philosophers Scott F. Aiken and Robert B. Talisse observe, consistent with the
arguments made above, “we depend on each other epistemically” (Aiken & Talisse,
2014). One reason for this dependence is that we cannot personally have all the various
levels of expertise needed to accurately evaluate the entire range of information relevant
to our private lives and our political decisions. This means that we must rely on experts
to help guide our opinions on matters where we lack personal expertise.
4.1. Evaluating experts
It is thus necessary that one be able to recognize appropriate expertise in science when
such expertise exists. The philosopher Alvin Goldman has examined some of the criteria
of use to non-experts in their efforts to discern appropriate scientific expertise. The first
criterion introduced by Goldman involves straightforwardly assessing the quality of argu-
ments presented by the alleged expert (Goldman, 2001). This, as philosopher Massimo
Pigliucci points out, is sometimes possible for an intelligent and informed layperson to
assess, but it becomes increasingly difficult as information becomes more technical (Pigli-
ucci, 2010). For this reason, it is important to look for agreement among other experts in
the field (Goldman, 2001; Pigliucci, 2010).
This requires that one pay attention to the credentials an alleged expert has, and evi-
dence that they are performing their role as experts in as unbiased a fashion as possible.
In addition, researchers who have achieved a strong record of accomplishment in their
field, as judged by their peers, deserve to have their opinions weighted more heavily than
less accomplished experts (Goldman, 2001; Pigliucci, 2010). There is reason to be cau-
tious if a given expert is employed by a corporation that benefits from that expert’s pro-
motion of evidence conducive to the latter’s corporate agenda (Pigliucci, 2010). An
obvious example is if a scientist, with legitimate expertise, is positing contrarian views
regarding anthropogenic climate change while being paid by an oil company for consulta-
tion work. Another example is if a scientist receives private funding from corporate enti-
ties with an obvious stake in particular findings.17 This is why it is crucial for scientists
to make such conflicts of interest known and it is a serious ethical concern when conflicts
of interest are not declared.18 The possibility always exists that individual experts can be
wrong or inappropriately influenced. It is all the more important for the layperson to defer
to the consensus opinion of experts, when available, since a community of experts is less
vulnerable in the aggregate to inappropriate influence than any one individual.
None of this is epistemically perfect and all of it requires some initial ability to iden-
tify relevant matters (like the existence of relevant educational credentials). Despite the
legitimate challenges poised for the layperson in assessing expertise, there are some cases
where determining expertise is relatively straightforward. In cases like anthropogenic
climate change, the existence of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
organized independently of any one group’s agenda, and tasked with sorting through the
global body of research related to climate change, makes it easier for the lay person to
know where to turn for good information. IPCC reports are widely publicized and avail-
able online for easy access to policy makers and the general public.
4.2. Trusting scientific consensus
It bears emphasizing again why trusting in scientific consensus is important for non-
experts wishing to engage responsibly with scientific findings. As the philosopher Ber-
trand Russell explains:
There are matters about which those who have investigated them are agreed; the dates
of eclipses may serve as an illustration. There are other matters about which experts are
not agreed. Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. Einstein’s view
as to the magnitude of the deflection of light by gravitation would have been rejected by
all experts not many years ago, yet it proved to be right. Nevertheless the opinion of
experts, when it is unanimous, must be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be
right than the opposite opinion. The scepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: (a)
that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; (b)
that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert;
and (c) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the
ordinary man would do well to suspend his judgment. These propositions may seem
mild, yet, if accepted, they would absolutely revolutionize human life. (1928)
Though Russell uses the word unanimous in this passage, we can reliably assume, con-
sistent with the rest of the quote, that he actually means consensus. Assuming Einstein to
be an expert who was not in agreement with other experts reflects the reality of consen-
sus, but not unanimity (Torcello, 2011).
4.3. Public reason and the importance of referencing scientific consensus in public
discourse
The ethical and political significance of referencing a scientific consensus when rele-
vant to ongoing public discussions (such as policy discussions regarding anthropogenic
climate change) supports the crucial role of public reason in political discourse. Public
reason is a concept emphasized by the political philosopher John Rawls as a discursive
framework to help guide constructive debate in highly diverse and pluralistic modern
societies. The impetus for emphasizing public reason is the recognition that a plurality of
comprehensive doctrines exist within free societies. A comprehensive doctrine is one that
purports to explain the world in a detailed way involving both epistemic and ethical
values. It may be a religious doctrine or a secular philosophical doctrine. In many cases
members of differing comprehensive doctrines come into conflict over basic issues of
justice and the essential features of democratic governance.
In working out these differences the ideal of public reason requires that arguments be
made in a way understandable to reasonable members of distinct comprehensive doctrines
even if they disagree. For instance, in public-sphere political discussions about con-
tentious topics like abortion, reasonable citizens should avoid making metaphysical and
religiously laden claims and instead appeal to arguments independent of such contentious
content. Likewise, if established science exists, citizens ought to agree to reference such
science, even when in disagreement with that science. In this way a fair and civil dis-
course can be procedurally maintained to determine the best democratic policy decisions
(Rawls, 1993, 1997, 2001). Placing an emphasis on public reason helps to address Clif-
ford’s ethical concerns regarding inquiry and belief since it requires us to reference scien-
tifically vetted facts in public discourse when such facts are available. It turns out that
public reason’s emphasis on settled science in public discourse can also be part of an
effective strategy for climate communication consistent with empirical findings.
There is a great deal of evidence that repeatedly highlighting in particular the scien-
tific consensus on climate change can serve to neutralize cognitive resistance to climate
science (Cook & Jacobs, 2014; Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Kotcher, Myers, Maibach,
& Leiserowitz, 2014; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013c; Maibach, Leiserowitz,
& Gould, 2013; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013). It is important to think clearly
about what these findings mean. It is not enough that the research referenced in this
paper offers support to Clifford’s concerns regarding the ethics of belief, or Rawls’
concerns regarding public discourse. If cognitive research is to inform our normative
approach to science communication, on publicly contentious topics like climate change,
it must be the case that different research findings ultimately lead us to consistent
recommendations.
5. Dissolving the false dilemma between “cultural cognition” and “information

deficit” models of science denialism
As we have seen, comprehensive cultural and ideological influences clearly play an

important role in our beliefs, related values, interpretations of science, and the world in
general (Section 2.2), but the fact of cultural influence on cognition does not negate the
need for accurate information to inform epistemically warranted beliefs and opinions.23
The explanation (Section 2.1) that some people deny well-established science, such as the
reality of anthropogenic global warming, because they lack the information necessary to
develop informed opinions or to be inoculated against misinformation remains vital. The
notion that the rejection of settled science stems from a person’s lack of reliable informa-
tion or scientific literacy is known as the information deficit model. According to the
information deficit model, providing clear, accurate, and consistent information, (i.e.,
emphasizing the fact of scientific consensus) is essential to good public communication
on science. It follows from the information deficit model that one of the reasons people
reject established climate science is because they fail to understand that a large consensus
actually exists among scientists. The information deficit model provides a straightforward
path to increase the societal acceptance of anthropogenic climate change, thereby making
meaningful action to address the problem more likely: In particular science communica-
tors should strive to make clear and consistent information, consistent with public reason,
including the fact of scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming, widely known
to the general public (see Section 4.3).
Yet the information deficit model has been called into question by findings that scien-
tific literacy (as measured by one’s knowledge of what scientists actually believe) does
not reliably predict the acceptance of climate science (Kahan et al., 2011, 2012). The
information deficit model suggests that increased scientific literacy should be correlated
with increased belief in anthropogenic climate change. However, according to Kahan
et al., increased scientific literacy better enables individuals to engage in motivated
reasoning against established science more effectively. Such findings have led Kahan
et al. to emphasize the cultural cognition model over the information deficit model (see
the appendix below for more on the concept of scientific literacy).
Still, as stated earlier in this section, the influence of culture and ideology (i.e., cultural
cognition) on our beliefs and values need not invalidate the importance of consistent and
accurate information (i.e., consensus messaging) in belief formation. This is especially
the case in a society where citizens with low levels of political polarization, or even with
politically left leanings, are unaware of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global
warming.19
The cultural cognition model supports the premises discussed in this study (see Sec-
tion 3.2). People do tend to embrace the discourse on climate science that most reflects
their political and cultural ideologies without understanding the nature of scientific con-
sensus. Yet the messaging of scientific consensus (consistent with the use of public rea-
son) may still be the best way to begin a conversation that prompts those in denial of the
science to reconsider their own beliefs and to provide a touchstone for that conversation
in the larger context of publically circulated disinformation (see Section 4.3). The facts
on the ground, currently, regarding organized disinformation about climate science and
ignorance of the scientific consensus certainly suggest the need to convey and insist upon
the reality of climate consensus in public discourse.20 Furthermore, framing belief in
terms of moral obligations and cognitively priming discussants to think of themselves as
moral agents could, and should, make a significant difference to that discussion (see Sec-
tion 3).
Given the existence of strong supporting data for the cultural cognition model, and
for the importance of consensus messaging in climate communication, it is worthwhile
to ask what underlying mechanism exists to clarify both data sets. I propose that the
effectiveness of consensus messaging and the influence of cultural cognition are both
related to the impact that repeated familiarity and exposure have on belief and value
formation.21
5.1. Familiarity and exposure in belief formation
The more familiar we become with a set of beliefs, the more open we are to the accep-
tance of those beliefs. Marketers and political operatives know this; it is also the operative
reason that arguments from repetition work, even if they are fallacious. As a fallacy, the
argument from repetition involves the repeated utterance of a controversial claim until the
audience comes to accept it, through the sheer force of familiarity. This argumentum ad
nauseam is fallacious if it is offered as a substitute for evidential justification. Otherwise,
clear and unequivocal repetition of a concept can be an effective tactic in communicating
unfamiliar information to an audience. In psychology, the familiarity principle, sometimes
referred to as the mere-exposure effect, is well documented (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968,
1980, 2001). We are influenced more by those with whom we are familiar, and those with
whom we are familiar tend to make up our social and communal spheres (Sweetman &
Whitmarsh, 2016).
It bears emphasizing that the psychological effect of familiarity is consistent with stud-
ies demonstrating both the influence of cultural cognition and the importance of commu-
nicating climate consensus. Even when a group is polarized and hostile against a
scientific finding, there is reason to think that consistent exposure to the fact of scientific
consensus will soften resistance and may even eventually be incorporated into a group’s
cultural identity. Once interpreted this way, the apparent conflict between the cultural
cognition model and the information deficit model disappears. What is more, repeated
exposure to new information may be necessary to mitigate the lingering influence of prior
misinformation, or misunderstanding, given the findings of Schtulman and Valcarcel
(Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Shtulman, 2016).
6. Summary recommendations and conclusions
I have described the scientific process as one that incorporates a strongly skeptical
methodology in its progressive extension of knowledge. This is an ideal conception of
what science is like. I do not claim that scientists always live up to the ideal but when
viewed over the long course of history, this is overall how the scientific process works
and how we continue to insist it must work. The process of science, with all its imperfec-
tions, has contributed more to understanding the natural world than any other methodol-
ogy, and it depends on rigorous, skeptically minded peer-review as well as skeptical
methodologies, to do so. A consensus in science does not imply that testing comes to an
end. The fact of consensus signals that belief in a concept (i.e., evolution, anthropogenic
global warming, the link between HIV and AIDS) is warranted. It follows for the layper-
son that rejection of scientific consensus is not a form of epistemologically warranted
skepticism (even if the consensus is later overturned by ongoing science).
Referring to science denialists as skeptics serves to strengthen their rhetorical position

by implying an intellectual virtue that they do not demonstrate. Let us instead identify
their actual practice of pseudoskepticism, or of another form of science denial. Those
who fall into the category identified here as pseudoskepticism use motivated reasoning to
avoid conclusions they have predetermined themselves to reject. Let us not dodge the
conclusion that pseudoskepticism is morally problematic. The moral relevance of belief
provides good reason to frame discourse around climate change in the context of ethical
and epistemological responsibility. One strategy suggested by John Nolt is to speak of the
harms of climate change in terms of projected casualties (Nolt, 2014). Nolt’s suggestion
forces us to think deeply about the ethical costs of climate change in terms of lives lost.
Other strategies for framing public discourse in a morally and epistemically responsible
way might involve the following:
1. Mindful of the role of cultural cognition and the existence of diverse comprehensive
doctrines, it is important to preface discourse (when appropriate) with affirmations
of familiar overlapping commitments. For example, insofar as we are citizens bound
together in a collective political body, we share common moral and constitutional
responsibilities that transcend individual affiliations with specific groups.
2. It is critical to follow and promote responsible tenets of public reason (see Sec-
tion 4.3). People are free to disagree with a scientific consensus, but in doing so
they continue to have a moral and intellectual responsibility to acknowledge when a
scientific consensus exists.
3. Educators, journalists, and politicians have a moral and professional responsibility to
counter erroneous statements by emphasizing the actual scientific consensus on cli-
mate change, and other publicly consequential topics, whenever they are able to do
so.
4. Climate scientists have an ethical responsibility to clearly correct misunderstandings
of their research to the degree they are able to do so in the public sphere (Aikin &
Harbour, 2010; Torcello, 2011). This is important because climate scientists,
whether they like it or not, are the representatives of their research (often made pos-
sible through public funds). The more members of the public are familiar with indi-
vidual scientists, the more they are likely to trust them and their work. This may be
uncomfortable for scientists wishing, understandably, to remain out of the public’s
eye. Nevertheless, given the high stakes of anthropogenic climate change, such pub-
lic engagement is necessary to encourage the civic and political engagement needed
to mitigate risks to health and public safety posed by climate change.
5. Public discussions of climate change in the media should always involve reference
to the scientific consensus. Journalistic neutrality requires objectively reporting the
state of climate consensus and does not require equal time for pseudoskeptics.
Science is not in the category of things settled by political debate. Moreover, it is
inappropriate for journalists to refer to pseudoskeptics, or other science deniers, as
“skeptics.”
The rationale behind these suggestions is to emphasize exposure and familiarity with
both climate science as well as the moral and political responsibility to address climate
change in accordance with Rawlsian public reason, which (in part) procedurally deempha-
sizes ideological differences and encourages familiarity with scientific facts. The influence
of familiarity is crucial, I maintain, in understanding why one’s ideological groupings
predict belief in climate change and why emphasizing scientific consensus is an effective
way to move opinion on climate change despite one’s ideologically comprehensive com-
mitments. The information deficit model and the cultural cognition model are not contra-
dictory to each other. Both models are consistent with what we already know about
cognition and familiarity. Making the realities of scientific consensus on climate change
and the moral urgency of climate change familiar to the general public through sustained,
consistent, and politically responsible messaging should now be the focus of effective cli-
mate communication.
As recently as 2012 in the United States, a majority (61%) of citizens recognized
anthropogenic climate change as happening, but just under half (48%) see it as a serious
threat to the United States (Pew 2012). On the “full side of the cup,” this means that
repeated messaging will resonate with, and reinforce the views of, more than half of the
United States population. Consequently, citizens more confident in their warranted scien-
tific beliefs will be more likely to have a positive influence on fellow citizens. These fig-
ures also suggest that more messaging on the dangers of anthropogenic climate change
needs to repeatedly reach the public. It would make sense for public information cam-
paigns on the risks of climate change, similar to previous campaigns on the risks of
smoking, to be implemented.
We have reason to believe that public opinion can shift rapidly on even the most divi-
sive topics, as it has, for example, regarding public support of same-sex marriage.22
Generational shifts may be responsible for much of this, but an aging out of conservatism
is not the whole picture. Those who have changed their minds to be more supportive of
same-sex marriage report they became more familiar with someone, such as a family
member, who identified as homosexual (Pew Data Center, 2013). Again, this reinforces
what has been said here about exposure and familiarity as tools against entrenched ideo-
logical beliefs, and I believe that it also lends support to findings about discussing the
moral context of our beliefs. It is also worth noting that same-sex marriage, like climate
change, is a topic that requires a commitment to the tenets of public reason in order for
politically responsible public discourse to inform legislation and public policy (Torcello,
2008). With regard to climate change, a wide-ranging public campaign to communicate
the facts of climate change in the context of moral and epistemic responsibility is over-
due, and we can each contribute to pushing it forward now. Continuing to examine the
most effective strategies for climate communication and developing a deeper appreciation
for the scientific process is an intellectually vital and morally necessary task for research-
ers in a range of fields.
7. Appendix on scientific literacy
Perceived tension between the information deficit and cultural cognition models may
stem from the fact that participants in the most relevant study (Kahan et al., 2012) who
reject climate consensus could more accurately demonstrate knowledge of what climate
scientists believe. In point of fact, however, this type of demonstration is not necessarily
an appropriate measure of scientific literacy (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009). It may
merely be a measure of familiarity with general concepts that one can name and identify,
without an informed grasp of how those concepts developed. These are the concepts that
Kahan et al. subjects believe scientists get wrong, and that those subjects suppose them-
selves to understand correctly.
A more robust measure of scientific literacy involves the ability to articulate what is
methodologically entailed in scientific consensus and how that epistemological process
measures up against other attempts to understand the natural world. Scientific literacy
should be reflected in the ability to understand the scientific process, to articulate why it has
a place of epistemic privilege, and to incorporate such understanding into one’s own belief
formation in a way that can be identified and accounted for (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009).
Knowledge of claims made by scientists (that one believes to be erroneous) fail to cap-
ture the deeper, and I argue, more relevant epistemological understandings of why the
scientific process works as well as it does. Furthermore, one cannot be expected to know
the current claims being made by researchers in every field of science. So any under-
standing of scientific literacy depending on such knowledge is necessarily incomplete and
arbitrary. Scientific literacy, regarding the epistemological merits of the scientific process,
should be relevant across scientific domains. The information deficit relevant to science
denial is more appropriately understood as a philosophical deficit in understanding the
epistemology of science.
Acknowledgments
I thank the editor of this issue and the article’s anonymous reviewers for their generous
and exceedingly helpful comments.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this study, I will use “ethics” and “morality” interchangeably,
with no assumption that their realms of reference are meaningfully different.
2. A great deal of contemporary philosophical work explores questions relevant to the
communication of climate science in the public sphere and related issues of social
epistemology and justice: Questions of how laypersons can come to determine
appropriate sources of expertise (Brewer, 1998; Goldman, 2001; Pigliucci, 2010),
as well as conceptions of justice and virtue in the context of social institutions,
have been explored to great profit along with the nature of epistemologically linked
social injustice (Anderson, 2012; Fricker, 2009). Such philosophical work (some of
which will be examined below) is important, needed, and indeed relevant to the lar-
ger concerns of the author.
3. The term was coined by sociologist Marcello Truzzi to describe what he considered
to be dogmatic skepticism (Truzzi, 1987). The present author uses the term in a
similar fashion, but with important caveats that are developed below and in other
writings. A detailed contrast between Truzzi’s application of the term and my own
would go beyond the present paper’s appropriate scope. For further usage of the
term by the author, see Torcello (2011, 2012, 2014b). This study develops a more
precise distinction between pseudoskepticism and science denial, more broadly con-
strued, than contained in previous work.
4. In referring to scientific skepticism, I mean skepticism that is aware of its own
fallibility and cautious in both rejecting unsupportable claims and accepting eviden-
tially cogent and rationally sound conclusions. I use “scientific skepticism” for clar-
ity given the topic of this study. I also could use “reasoned skepticism” to
emphasize that such skepticism is not unique to professional science but common
to philosophical analysis in general—despite a separate epistemic category of skep-
ticism known as “philosophical skepticism.” The latter generally refers to the
hyperskeptical position that knowledge requires certainty, which, strictly speaking,
is thought to be epistemologically unattainable.
5. This claim need not imply that an established scientific consensus cannot be mis-
taken, but such mistakes are best discovered through the ongoing skeptical, and
self-correcting, process of modern science. The dissenter may be correct, but it
does not follow that she is evidentially warranted in her correct belief. A correct
belief may be necessary for knowledge, but it is indistinguishable from a lucky
guess absent evidential warrant. If someone who has relevant scientific training
rejects an established scientific consensus, that person takes on an evidential burden
to show why the consensus is flawed and, in doing so, work to change the currently
predominant view with empirically strong research. This is a tall task and when the
burden falls to someone who lacks scientific training, it is a practically impossible
task, given the importance of domain-specific technical training in evaluating
appropriate evidence, in addition to the normal epistemic constraints on what
counts as supporting evidence and strong argument.
6. Former Texas Governor Rick Perry has famously attempted to justify his own
rejection of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming by compar-
ing himself, and others who deny scientific consensus, to Galileo (Romm, 2011).
7. The idea of public reason is a familiar one in contemporary political philosophy.
The concept was made famous by John Rawls, who formulates it as the appropriate
framework for public discourse on issues of basic justice and constitutional form.
Public reason requires that one formulate one’s public arguments in such a way
that everyone, regardless of ideological allegiance, can understand the argument
even while disagreeing. This means that in a diverse open society one should avoid
appealing to contentious metaphysical and religious arguments with regard to mat-
ters of public legislation and policy. As a corollary, one should defer to established
science when it is available and relevant to matters of public policy. If one does
invoke controversial metaphysical or religious principles, they should be accompa-
nied by public reason or transparently translatable in terms of public reason (Rawls,
1993, 1997, 2001).
8. The concerned reader might point out that the biologist likewise presumes the exis-
tence of biology. The relevant distinction is that the existence of biological life is
not a question of controversy. Indeed, whether or not biological life (as a whole) is
in existence is not the very thing biologists are seeking to prove.
9. It bears repeating, the philosophical science denier is deliberative and honest in her
attempt to argue against methodological naturalism. The faith-based science denier
need not deny that evidence is on the side of science. Indeed, regarding matters of
the miraculous (as with the above example of transubstantiation), the very defini-
tion of a miracle hinges on the assumption that a particular event stands in viola-
tion of understood physical laws, and therefore, beyond the explanatory power of
science. It follows that such faith-based denialism ought to play no legislative role
in secular democratic societies, and those who understand the epistemological
implications of what it means to have faith will recognize this limitation (this point
relates to the dictates and requirements of public reason).
10. It may be the case that some pseudoskeptics of climate science elevate the denial
of climate change to the level of a pseudoscience, but full examination of this pos-
sibility goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
11. For useful discussions of pseudoscience and the demarcation problem, see Pigliucci
(2010) and Pigliucci and Boudry (2013).
12. A proper understanding of pseudoskepticism, and pseudoscience, falls within the
domain of agnotology. Agnotology refers to the study of how socially constructed
ignorance is generated and spread (Proctor, 2008).
13. This concern goes as far back as the writings of Plato (Cooper, 1997) in the
ancient world and is particularly relevant in Renee Descartes’s 1641 Mediations on
First Philosophy (Dicker, 1993).
14. Once a logical form of inference is accepted as the appropriate foundation for one
belief, whether sound or not, it stands to reason that the same form may be
accepted vis-a-vis related beliefs.
Take as example the case of Smith, who thinks in the following manner regard-
ing environmental regulations and political ideology: Smith believes that socialist
leaders are eager to enforce environmental regulations. Smith knows that President
Obama is currently promoting new environmental regulations to curb carbon emis-
sions. Smith concludes that President Obama is a socialist.
The formation of Smith’s belief that President Obama is a socialist, based on the
above inferential pattern, provides reason to expect that Smith will accept the follow-
ing argument presented by Jones, who is Smith’s favorite radio personality: “Scien-
tists know that long before human beings existed, natural forces caused the earth’s
temperature to rise. The Earth’s temperature is currently rising. Therefore, science

demonstrates that natural forces are causing the globe’s temperature to rise.”
Accepting either of these arguments, regardless of their ordering, should make
it easier to accept the other, simply because they share a common logical form.
The form these arguments share is referred to by logicians as affirming the con-
sequent or converse error. The fallacy of affirming the consequent (converse
error) is a fallacious logical form by which one erroneously accepts the con-
verse of the original proposition. The logical symmetry that would exist if this
were a valid form of argument might be intuitively appealing; nevertheless,
arguments of this form are always invalid; that is, their conclusion does not fol-
low from its premises. The form is symbolized below:
P!Q
)P
Affirming the Consequent=Converse Error
My intent with such examples is not to provide actual denialist arguments trans-
lated into a logically invalid form. My claim is merely that we are likely to
repeat inferential patterns when we accept particular logical forms as valid or
invalid (regardless of the form’s actual validity).
15. The idea that developing good reasoning skills is a part of good “cognitive
hygiene” can be related, as Aiken and Talisse acknowledge, to the ancient notion
promoted by Aristotle in his ethical teachings that the cultivation of high-order
reasoning skills is necessary for human flourishing (Aristotle, 1999).
16. See Brown, et al., 2016, in this issue, for an intriguing account of how factors
influencing communal health may in some circumstances exert influence on norms
of social cooperation.
17. There is a great deal that can be said about the moral implications of corporate
vested interests actively seeking to undermine the public’s informed understanding
of matters relevant to health and public safety. I have written on this topic else-
where (Torcello, 2011, 2014a). It is clear that such behavior is grossly immoral
and dangerously irresponsible, but delving deeper here would bring us away from
the topic at hand.
18. The recent case of Wei Hock Soon, who received 1.5 million dollars in funding
from various fossil fuel interests over the course of a decade, while often neglect-
ing to divulge conflicts of interest as part of his published work on climate
science, is a case in point (Gillis & Schwartz, 2015). Soon is not trained as a cli-
mate scientist but has spent the last decade arguing, counter to the vast majority
of trained climate scientists, that natural forces (the sun in particular) are responsi-
ble for current global warming.
19. The contrast between the number of scientists who accept climate change and the
number of U.S. citizens who do not realize that a scientific consensus exists, or
how strong that consensus is, is significant. Even among liberals, recent polling
suggests there is low recognition that a scientific consensus actually exists (Pew
Data Center, 2012).
20. The concern might be raised that given the cultural cognition model, consensus
messaging risks further polarizing the public. Yet this concern is at odds with
data, referenced above, providing repeated empirical support for the positive
effects of consensus messaging (see Section 4.3).
21. See Hahn, Harris, and Corner, 2016 as well as Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016, in
this issue, for a discussion of consensus messaging in the context of Bayesian rea-
soning.
22. For a summary of polling trends on same-sex marriage, see Silver (2013).
23. “For a critique of the “cultural cognition” concept, as problematically circular, see
van der Linden, 2015.” The criticism offered by van der Linden raises important
points about the need to carefully define the concept but the critique in and of
itself does not undermine the notion that culturally informed biases exert an influ-
ence on one’s understanding of scientific discourse in the public sphere.
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Torcello 2016

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Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016) 19–48

Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.

The Ethics of Belief, Cognition, and Climate Change

2. Identifying pseudoskepticism and its connection to science denialism and

2.1. Ignorance of the scientific process

When it comes to ignorance regarding the process of modern science, a contributing

2.2. Ideologically motivated reasoning

2.3. Scientific skepticism and scientific consensus

Scientific skepticism, or reasoned skepticism, is a vital component of the modern scien-

2.4. Pseudoskepticism and the public sphere

2.5. Pseudoskepticism and pseudoscience

The importance of skepticism to science stands in stark contrast to pseudoscience.

acceptance of a contentious claim guides the pseudoscientific pursuit. Thus, for

2.6. Pseudoskepticism, belief formation, and morality

of pseudoscience, is its role in the development of socially generated ignorance.12 Exam-

2.7. Pseudoskepticism and anthropogenic global warming

3. Ethics and epistemology

As a challenge to contemporary science communication, pseudoskepticism draws atten-

3.1. The ethics of belief

Clifford begins with the following example:

Clifford’s text is once again worth quoting at length:

3.2. Clifford’s premises and science communication

auer, 2013b). It should be noticed that conspiratorial accusations aimed at mainstream

3.3. Clifford’s second premise and social influence

2016). The correspondence between cultural identification and a person’s acceptance of

4. Implications for inquiry and public discourse

4.1. Evaluating experts

4.2. Trusting scientific consensus

5. Dissolving the false dilemma between “cultural cognition” and “information

As we have seen, comprehensive cultural and ideological influences clearly play an

5.1. Familiarity and exposure in belief formation

6. Summary recommendations and conclusions

Referring to science denialists as skeptics serves to strengthen their rhetorical position

7. Appendix on scientific literacy

temperature to rise. The Earth’s temperature is currently rising. Therefore, science

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