A.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral
I. TO THE RULE OF LAW
CANON 1
1. PEOPLE v. TUANDA
A.M. 3360 | Jan 30, 1990
Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court
of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several
pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks.
These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made
no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted
of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense
involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her
suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of
the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she
intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez) and she is not guilty
of the offense charged.
ISSUE: W/N the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.
character of a person convicted of such offense.
Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation
of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from
this Court.
2. ROYONG v. OBLENA
A.C. 376 | April 30, 1963
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the
latter. In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to
have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena
threatened to kill her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to
a child Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a
relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.The Solicitor General
recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney even
though the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is
more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident.
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his
application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having
an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong
but also has a legal husband in the province Oblena moved to dismiss the case
because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the
complaint but the court overruled his petition. After the hearing, the investigators
concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without
incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously
cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.)
Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the
bar.
ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles,
a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblena’s disbarment.
HELD: Yes. Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or
adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec
25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of
the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any
statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statues do not explicitly
specify that as a ground of disbarment.
Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character
when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. One’s own
approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what
the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge
with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his
knowledge of the law. Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he
enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royong’s trust on him.
Oblena’s contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing
the present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is
untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is
that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent,
he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in
his investigation.
3. TAPUCAR v. ATTY. TAPUCAR
A.C. 4148 | July 30, 1998
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez
Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground
of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña
under scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved
on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.
 
 shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI team arrested Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose
ISSUE: W/N respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
 perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the
responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive
qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at
all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only
the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
4. ACEJAS III v. PEOPLE
G.R. 156643 | June 27, 2006
On December 17, 1993, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Agent Vladimir
Hernandez, together with a reporter went to the house of Takao and Bethel Aoyagi to
serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12. Hernandez told Takao, through his wife Bethel, that
there were complaints against him in Japan that he was a suspected to be a Yakuza
big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien. Takao showed his passport and
signed an undertaking issued by Hernandez, stating his promise to appear in an
investigation at the BID and that as a guarantee of his appearance, he was entrusting
his passport to Hernandez. Bethel called Expedito Perlas and informed him of the
taking of Takao’s passport. Perlas referred them to Atty. Lucenario of the Lucernario,
Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law firm. Following the advice of the latter,
they did not appear before the BID.
Meanwhile, Hernandez prepared a progress report and submitted it to the Chief of
Operations and Intelligence Division, Ponciano Ortiz, who recommended that Takao be
placed under custodial investigation. On December 22, 1993, the Aoyagis met accused
Atty. Francisco Acejas and were informed that Acejas would handle their case. On
January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon (Bethel’s brother), Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Hernandez, Vic
Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant. Another meeting was set
at the Manila Nikko Hotel on January 8 with Pelingon, Perlas, Acejas and Hernandez
attending. On January 11, on account of the alleged demand of 1million pesos for the
return of Takao’s passport, Pelingon called BID Commissioner Zafiro Espicio of Davao.
The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI agent. An entrapment
operation was arranged. On January 12, Hernandez returned the passport at the coffee
Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money.
ISSUE: W/N the accused guilty of direct bribery.
HELD: Yes. The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to
present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of bribery, which contained the
following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received gifts o
presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not
constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.
Hernandez took the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with the
Aoyagi spouses and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez
then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he directed Bethel to
deliver the money to Acejas.
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients
behalf, he still failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The
witnesses all testified that he had received the purported payoff. It would be illogical to
sustain his contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal
fees. It was given to Hernandez immediately after the return of passport.
In sum, the Court found that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery.
First, the offense was committed by BID Agent Hernandez who extorted money from
Aoyagi for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring visa.
Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the
group and gave it to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return
of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and
the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties. For taking direct
part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals. A
conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same act, if the participants
performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal
design.
5. VELEZ v. ATTY. DE VERA
A.C. 6697 | July 25, 2006
Atty de Vera was suspended for three years by the State Bar of California for illegally
depositing his client’s funds on his personal account and later on Atty de Vera resigned
from the California Bar. May 13, 2005, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove
Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as EVP. Atty. De Vera allegedly made
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP
10th National Convention of Lawyers on April 22,2005, making it appear that the
decision of the IBP Board to withdraw the Petition questioning R.A.9227, was due to
influence and pressure from the Supreme Court, thereby bringing the IBP Board and
the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute, in violation of Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that a lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others. On May 13, 2005 IBP issued a resolution removing
Atty de Vera as a member of the IBP board and IBP EVP.
ISSUE: W/N there is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. De Vera
independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State
Bar of California.
HELD: Yes; HOWEVER, judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of
the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction.
The judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
acts as lawyer. Considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of,
the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant
must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which there commendation by the
hearing RECENT JURISPRUDENCE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS officer was
based A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAYCOME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Atty. de Vera's act of holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence
is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that he, by depositing
the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit, is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to
himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member
of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. Atty. De Vera violated his oath to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. That the elder Willis "expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. De Vera of his client's funds. Rather, it was more an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. De Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds,
which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. De Vera or the way such
character was perceived. Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is
no to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer.
6. UI v. ATTY. BONIFACIO
A.C. 3319 | June 8, 2000
Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children.
Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against respondent before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos
Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.
ISSUE: W/N she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law.
HELD: The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, was dismissed. All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However,
the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
7. COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS v. LO BU
G.R. L-40136 | March 25, 1975
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for entertaining an Appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit
which was correctly dismissed by the latter as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge
that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating
the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy.
Said unfair labor practice case was already passed upon and sustained by the
Supreme Court, hence, cannot be further appealed for being final and executory. In the
petition, it was stated that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of
Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack
of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop,
followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time
asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third,
this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which
were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the
certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. Counsel Yolando F.
Busmente in his Answer to this petition had the temerity to deny such allegations. He
simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu, he did specifically
maintain that respondent filed a motion to recall the writ of execution and followed by
the motion to return the levied properties.
ISSUE: W/N the conduct of Atty. Bustamante in denying the facts alleged in the petition
to defend the cause of his client is commendable.
HELD: No. The conduct of Atty. Bustamante is far from commendable. He could, of
course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which
he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also
prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or
coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be correlated
with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted.
That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if
such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course
expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and
in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his
obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires
that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and
eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts
into serious question his good standing in the bar.
8. LINSANGAN v. ATTY. TOLENTINO
A.C. 6672 | September 4, 2009
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support
his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,
000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his
defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.
ISSUE: W/N Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
HELD: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuatio
n constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that
lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting
of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s
law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on
the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly soli
cited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’
s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.
Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.
9. IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTION OF THE IBP
A.M. 491 | Oct. 6, 1989
After the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter “IBP”) held on June 3, 1989, the newly-elected officers were set to take the
their oath of office before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings
and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo
Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities.
The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated
Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports. The election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the
three candidates for president of the IBP. The Court en banc formed a committee and
total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas
issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
ISSUE: W/N IBP by-laws were violated.
HELD: Yes. Elections held on June 3,1989 be annulled, relevant by-laws be amended
as per the court’s resolution and new elections be held such that the persons named in
the resolution cannot contest for any IBP position.
10. SORIANO v. DIZON
A.C. 6792 | Jan. 25, 2006
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds
that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself
(treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim
f. Despite being granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the
victim
ISSUE: W/N Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide may be considered a crime
involving moral turpitude that could warrant disbarment
HELD: Yes. Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals…”
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only
because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe
off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly
indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
Likewise, his illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is
bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4
years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation.
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
11. STEMMERIK v. MAS
A.C. 8010 | June 16, 2009
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He
consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could
legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he
can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the
necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to
Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of
the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik
agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the
necessary paperwork.
When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name, Atty
Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to
his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and that the property
was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas
abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.
ISSUE: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.
HELD: Yes.
Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine
Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental
constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of
basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
Deceitful Conduct
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in
the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable,
respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct
By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the
purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in
nature.
12. DE YSASI III v. NLRC
G.R. 104599 | March 11, 1994
In 1980, De Ysasi III (employee-son) was employed by his father, who is the private
respondent in this case. It is safe to assume that the employer-father is De Ysasi II.
The case does not say, I swear. Anyway, De Ysasi III was working as farm
administrator for his father in Hacienda Manucao in Negros Occidental. Starting in
1982, De Ysasi III, the employee son, started suffering from various illnesses which
required hospitalization. First, he underwent fistulectomy which is the removial of the
fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. He had to recuperate for 4 months. Second, he was
confined for acute gastroenteritis. Third, he was also confined for infectious hepatitis for
2 months.
During the entire period of the illnesses, De Ysasi II, the father-employer, took care of
the medical expenses of his son and continued to give him his salary. However, in April
1984, without due notice, the father stopped paying his son”s salary. The son made
oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden stop of his income flow.
The demands were not heeded. So, De Ysasi III, the employee-son, filed an action with
the NLRC against his father for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: W/N the father illegally dismissed his son
HELD: Yes. De Ysasi III, the son, maintains that his dismissal was illegal because
there was no just cause and that due process was not observed. On the other hand,
De Ysasi II, the father-employer, says that the dismissal was based on a just cause. He
says that his son was guilty of abandonment of his functions as farm administrator,
therefore giving him a ground to terminate employment.
The Supreme Court ruled that the absences of De Ysasi III from work cannot be
considered as abandonment because he has a justifiable excuse. He was suffering
from the scientific mumbo jumbo illnesses mentioned above. During the period of his
illness and recovery, De Ysasi III did not stay in the farm in Negros Occidental.
However, he performed his job as manager which did not require him to stay in the
farm itself. Work from home, kumbaga. The father”s contention of abandonment cannot
be sustained because it is not mere absence that is needed to warrant abandonment.
There must be deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment which was not
present in this case.
De Ysasi III was also refused due process because there is no factual question that he
was never given any notice of his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much
less a chance to be heard. The father was ordered to pay his son back wages and
separation pay.
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties sorely disappoints the Court…It is
their responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible. Both counsel for petitioner and
respondent fell short of what was expected of them as there was no showing that they
took pains to initiate steps to avoid litigation between a father and a son. They did not
initiate steps which would lead to the reconciliation of the family. The Court reminded
the counsels that it is their duty to avoid litigation as much as possible, as long as
justice would still be served.
 13. CORDON v. BALICANTA blatantly used the corporate veil to perpetrate his fraudulent acts. In this case, it is clear
A.C. 2797 | Oct. 4, 2002 that Balicanta behaved in a way that merits more than a mere suspension.

When Rosaura Cordon”s husband died, she and her daughter, Rosemarie, inherited 14. ROXAS v. CA
around 21 parcels of land in Zamboanga City. Atty. Jesus Balicanta settled the estate G.R. 118436 | March 21, 1997
of her late husband and also advised the Cordons on how to manage their inheritance.
He enticed them to organize a corporation and transfer their properties to such
Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of
corporation for development. Thus, Rosaura Enterprises, Inc. was born and the
unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
Cordons assumed majority ownership. However, it was Balicanta who served as the
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza
Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager, and Treasurer. More than that,
as vendor who bought the property from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a
Balicanta also transferred the titles of the property to one Tion Suy Ong. He also made
half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
them sign a voting trust agreement and a SPA allowing Balicanta to sell and mortgage
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
the Cordons” properties.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario
Using a spurious board resolution, Balicanta obtained a P2.2 Million loan from the Land
Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified
Bank of the Philippines, supposedly to develop the Baliwasan Commercial Center
because she was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant.
using 9 of the Cordons” properties as collateral. However, it was later found out that the
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. After an
structure was made out of poor materials such as sawali. For four years, Balicanta did
Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
not pay a single demand despite numerous demand and notice from LBP.
registration case.
Finally, in 1983, Rosemarie found out what was happening when she saw that
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of land had previously been
Balicanta had their ancestral home demolished, selling the land to Tion Suy Ong again,
applied for registration at the CFI of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon
and transferred her mom to a house in a different town on the pretext that their home
but no decision has been made.
was being renovated. Thereafter, the Cordons filed a disbarment case against
Balicanta with the IBP Comission on Bar Discipline. Commissioner Cunanan issued a
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's application for
report recommending Balicanta”s disbarment. While Balicanta”s disbarment was
registration. Consequently RTC issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March
pending review before Executive VP and Northern Luzon Governor Pilando, Balicanta
14, 1991, after it ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon
alleged that Commissioner Cunanan”s report was penned by the Cordons” lawyers.
dismissed.
Aside from this, Balicanta”s main defense is that he hid not do anything out of line, that
he was only doing his job, and it was the Cordons who should be held accountable for
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
being negligent in the running of the corporation.
petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the
lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for review before the
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Balicanta should be disbarred
RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud, alleging that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale
HELD: Yes. Balicanta”s actions show an organized plan to deceive the Cordons and
and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted
deprive them of their property. In fact, Balicanta”s deceptions show in the evidence he
her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for
adduced to supposedly defend himself. In his supporting evidence, it showed that the
registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could not send her a Notice of
Cordons only owned 266 of Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.”s shares when the factual finding
Initial Hearing.
of the IBP Committee showed that the Cordons owned 1,711 out of 1,750 shares. Also,
Balicanta”s actions were done without the approval of the corporation”s Board of
RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud and dismissed the petition
Directors. It was also never explained why the Cordons, despite holding around 90% of
for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of RTC,
the company”s outstanding stock, were never participated in any of the corporation”s
ruling that Roxasí failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not
actions.
merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a
judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this petition.
These fraudulent acts should not be permitted to continue, especially from the member
of the bar. The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature.
Balicanta can”t hide behind the corporation”s separate juridical personality because he
ISSUE: W/N there is actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corporation to warrant the
reopening and the setting aside of the registration decree
HELD: Yes. Only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a
judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and
reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529)
is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law.
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the RTC only the following
names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found
that the some words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of
the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.
However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently-worded application for the
petition to review the application of the Roxas; where in instead of PROVINCIAL
ROAD, the name ROXAS appeared. The discrepancy which is unexplained appears
intentional.
The Roxas family has also been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through
their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that the subject land was
unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject
property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such
possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the
property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the
property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior
to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could
have been made facilely.
Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and representation of Roxasí interest
in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration.
Lastly, while publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component
of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all
persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings
may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that
publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant
in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion
that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of
respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that
Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents
executed by Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the
penmanship of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well
as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark
Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been
ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should
state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
15. Re: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
A.M. P-06-2177 | June 27, 2006
Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found guilty of
gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in
his custody. She was fined P10k. Since his malfeasance prima facie contravened
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court
ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an
officer of the court. In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a
timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained,
however, that he kept the money in the court’s safety vault and never once used it for
his own benefit.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction,
although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in
judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA
Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the
forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in
unlawful conduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does
not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it.
Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to
bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
16. CHUA v. MESINA
A.C. 4904 | Aug. 12, 2004
Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged
respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross
professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother. Respondent's
mother defaulted in paying a loan that she obtained in a bank, thus respondent
convinced complainants to help her mother in paying the said obligation, to which the
complainants acceded. It was agreed among them that in consideration for the act of
complainants, the property which they are leasing will be transferred to their name. The
complainants complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of sale concerning
such property was executed.
However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent instructed
complainants to execute another deed of sale which will be antedated 1979,
wherein the capital gains tax was not yet in effective. Subsequently, after the execution
of the deed of sale, respondents instructed his clients [complainants] to execute a
simulated deed of sale which will reflect that the property was re-conveyed to his
mother.
Respondent later went to the house of complainants and got the owners certificate of
title of the said property which is still under the name of her mother. He promised to the
complainants that he will process the transfer of the property to their name. Years
passed, but respondent never returned the said title to the complainants.
Meanwhile, another lessee filed a criminal case against the complainants and
respondents for falsification. He claims that he was also given the promise that the
property will be offered to him before it will be sold to another, but respondents sold it
to complainants without offering it to him. Because of the foregoing circumstances,
complainants filed an administrative case against respondent.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to
promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants
reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent persuaded his own clients, the Chua spouses,
into turning over to him the owner’s copy of his mother’s title upon the
misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his
mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.
That the signature of “Felicisima M. Melencio” in the 1985 document and that in the
1979 document are markedly different is in fact a badge of falsification of either the
1979 or the 1985 document or even both.
CANON 5
1. DE ROY v. CA
G.R. 80718 | Jan, 29, 1988
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to
the death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior
hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De
Roy’s counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled
that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: W/N Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of a counsel as a lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
B.M. 850 | Aug 8, 2000
*Revised Rules*
CANON 12
1. PEOPLE v. JARDIN
G.R. L-33037-42 | Aug 17, 1983
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor
of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of
public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for
preliminary investigation. The accused moved to postpone the investigation four times
but the accused and his counsel failed to appear every time. Inspire of their absence,
the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, the six
information’s were filed against the accused before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City.
The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967. On the records it was show that from May 9,
1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August
16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement
filed at the instance of the accused. When the arraignment of the accused was called
on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on
the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense
during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first
reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. Accused moved to postpone many
times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for
15 days to file memorandum.
The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating fiscal filed a manifestation
before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits
of the same be set. The court transferred the case to new branch of CFI Quezon
without acting on manifestation. Arraignment date was set but more postponements
was filed at the instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation again. Arraignment
finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked for trial to
be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another postponement.
ISSUE: W/N the acts of the accused and his counsel obstruct the administration of
justice.
HELD: Yes. An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause.
For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him. Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many
forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action
not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the accused,
would be dismissed. asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows
his client did not commit, advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from
prison prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other
party and compel him to submit out of exhaustion and filing multiple petitions or
complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false expectation of
getting favorable action.
2. CABAGUI v. CA
G.R. L-38377 | Oct 15, 1975
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on a third petition for
review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming petitioner’s conviction of the crime
of malversation of public funds, as filed on November 13, 1974 by his attorney,
Eugenio M. Millado, with address at Koronadal, South Cotabato, ordered that said
petition be expunged from the records and required―Atty. Eugenio Millado to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice hereof why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for trifling with the Court by filing this third petition despite previous
resolutions of this Court.
In its previous Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first two petitions filed by
respondent Millado on behalf of the same petitioner, the Court had dismissed
the second petition (filed on March 18, 1974) by respondent Millado in the guise of a
new petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction but which merely raised again the
same questions in his first petition (filed on January 9, 1974) seeking to set aside
petitioner’s conviction for malversation of public funds, by decision of the court of first
instance of Misamis Oriental dated June 20, 1963 as affirmed with modification by the
Court of Appeals’ decision dated June 8, 1973, for alleged lack of jurisdiction and
praying for reversal of the conviction or for a reduction of his criminal liability by finding
appellant-petitioner guilty of technical malversation only for the amount of P1,161.65.
Said first petition had been denied on January 15, 1974 by virtue of the petition having
been filed late by 4 months and 25 days beyond the last date for filing which fell due
since August 15, 1973.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent Millado is guilty of violating Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of gross
negligence in not having complied with a show cause resolution and of abusing the
right of recourse to the Court by filing multiple petitions for the same cause in the false
expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the adverse action
of the other division. The Court deems his suspension from the practice of law since
February, 1975 as sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with the warning that
the commission in the future by respondent of the same or other infractions shall be
dealt with severely.
3. CASALS v. CUSI, JR.
G.R. L-35766 | July 12, 1973
Upon the filing of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution resolved, without giving due
course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from
notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter alia
from proceeding with the hearing of the case pending before it below.
Despite notice and order of the court, Atty. Delante, as counsel for respondents, had
repeatedly failed to file the required comment, specifically, he failed three (3) times to
file it.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Delante violated his duties to the court.
HELD: Yes. A lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great
detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the
submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. Three (3)
months suspension.
4. ROXAS v. CA
G.R. 139337 | Aug 15, 2001
Petitioner, Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January
16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s application for
support pendente lite. The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente
lite were the subject of G.R. No. 139337 entitled “Ma. Carminia C. Roxas v. Court of
Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas” decided by this Court on August 15, 2001. The
Decision in said case declared that “the proceedings and orders issued by the trial
court in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment
of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered
null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping
regarding the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523
which involves the same parties.” The assailed orders for support pendente lite were
thus reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing the main case.
On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an Order dated October 11,
2002 directing private respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per
month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. On February 11,
2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was
even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion
to reduce support and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the
children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-arrears. Petitioner’s motion for
partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005.
In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated
May 16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal therefrom had been brought by the
parties or the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her
appeal is “from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the
decision in the main case”, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for
partial reconsideration. By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the
appeal on the ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May
16, 2005 which had long become final and executory. The CA further noted that
petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
ISSUE: W/N the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
HELD: No. Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory
aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce
support which was granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was
denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained
unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final
orders assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.
An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to
be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is
considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution
is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to
its directive, as what petitioner suggests.
Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed
by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what
transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private
respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to
comply with the order granting support pendente lite. A few years later, private
respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own
motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in
arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support
pendente lite.
Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable. The remedy against
an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in
questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was
correctly dismissed by the CA.
5. NATIONAL BANK v. UY TENG PIAO
G.R. L-35252 | Oct 21, 1932
Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations
at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9,
1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June 1,
1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the
clerk of the court within three months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to
pay, the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law and the
proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.
The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were
auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer. On
February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latter’s right to redeem
one of the proper ties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one
Mariano Santos for P8,600.
The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was credited
to the account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the lots amonted to
P 11, 300. On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of
the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent
per annum. The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to
redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would not
collect from him the balance of the judgment.
The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its
officer, a certain Mr. Pecson. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. W/N PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2. W/N a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case
HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the
defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants
that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr.
Pecson was authorized by the bank through its board of directors or persons
authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and witness
in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would be preferable if
the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they are
to testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from the active management of
the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.
The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum
of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be
reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant
6. BERBANO v. BARCELONA
A.C. 6084 | Sept 3, 2003
Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-in-fact for
their pending casevwith the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty.
Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for
a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty.
Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya).
After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty.
Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told
Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release of Atty. Daen the
next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700
by asking from relatives who were with her.
There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty.
Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice.
Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check for P24,000;
and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000.
Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’s nephew while
Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them
that he could not secure Atty. Daen’s because the check had not been encashed.
By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. For failure to
deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance, Berbano filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner
Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to
return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the
Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the
Commissioner’s findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law
for 6 years.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and
remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office
have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members
of the bar.
Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the
finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in
not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his
contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling
reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioner’s judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of
promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the
legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections
with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the
first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming
a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty.
Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.).
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has
the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money,
which will allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12).
7. SEBASTIAN v. BAJAR
A.C. 3731 | Sept 7, 2007
Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the DAR who
represented Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which raised the same
issues. Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of a land owned by Sebastian’s spouse and
sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case
against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to
residential. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the
payment of disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as
counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order.
RTC dismissed this due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar again filed
another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DAR Adjudication Board which
raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. Manuel S.
Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar
(respondent) for “obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final
decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme
Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and
reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts
and dilatory tactics.”
The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the complaint lodged
against her. After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally submitted her
Comment which was alleged to not confront the issues raised against her. The Court
required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and was later ordered to show cause
why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for such failure.
The Court referred the case to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that
Bajar be
“SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical
Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the
basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility
rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law.”
However, Bajar continued to practice law despite the decision claiming that she did not
receive a copy of the order.
ISSUE: W/N Bajar violated Canon 12.
HELD: Yes. Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues
despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court is beyond the bounds of the law. Respondent abused her right of
recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed
cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the
finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues.
The Court held that “an important factor in determining the existence of
forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties litigants by the
filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
Indeed, “while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
expense of truth and administration of justice.” It is evident from the records that
respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the
Ejectment case.
In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders.
Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an
utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not
disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
8. HEGNA v. PADERANGA
A.C. 5955 | Sept 8, 2009
Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10 years
but during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation,
stealth and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed
a shop for which he filed a forcible entry case.

Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to vacate the leased
premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation. When
the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of
the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable
settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint
alleging that he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001
which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff.
Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar confidant for “deliberately
falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice.” He also filed
criminal charges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for
falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony and
perjury. His grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of
Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didn’t reflect any change of ownership & (3)
the Notarial Register Book showed tampering and erasures.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of prima facie evidence
of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderanga’s defense alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING
purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner and
that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to correct mistakes so that
entries will speak the truth.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light of the
letter handwritten by Respondent’s clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and
forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if
indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties. In addition, there
were several instances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offering settlement
and it was only when he denied them that he received the Third Party Complaint.
ISSUE: W/N there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty.
Paderanga.
HELD: Yes. Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which
constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year
suspension. His non-registration of the sale transaction so it would not appear in the
records of the BIR, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land
Registration Office so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and
transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his children’s name, and
avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.
He violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; and likewise violated the Lawyer’s Oath,
which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not
consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the
standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The
act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per
se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to
emulate.
9. PLUS BUILDERS v. REVILLA
A.C. 7056 | Feb. 11, 2009
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of
Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the
tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere
tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated
all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights
over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to
have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention
to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for
temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of
the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of
action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision
dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and
experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him
by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were
valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo
de Guzman, et. al.
He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client
relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et.
al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to
listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent
candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They
maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession
of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the
action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients
respecting the subject property.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Atty. Revilla is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the
less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather
commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as
an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation,
however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is the criterion
that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by
impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
10. FIL-GARCIA v. HERNANDEZ
A.C. 7129 | July 16, 2008
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA for a sum
of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the denied
resolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the day before
the expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a
mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the
canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the
limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for Extension, this time, because he
fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time, thus asking for
20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse that
because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time to
conclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the
request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the appeal.
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for Extensions were
denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the resolution denying the
appeal all together. However, instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to
forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly
angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE: W/N Hernandez is liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to
violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his disbarment.
HELD: Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each motion will
be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of the Court's
action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly
referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate
attempt to salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some other
unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be granted.
Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course
but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's
action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do
so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but
himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the client and
ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the
services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he received a copy
of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent humbly admitted
his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case.
11. DE ESPINO v. ATTY. PRESQUITO
A.C. 4762 | June 28, 2004
Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the Court Administrator Alfredo
Benipayo for "having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to
honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of
P763,060.00" against Atty Pepito C. Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the
respondent entered into an agreement for a purchase of land by the latter from the
former. The price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by
installments. Respondent issues post dated checks as payment. Respondent then
entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the
subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development, with a portion of the
land retained by respondent for his own use. The land was eventually titled in the name
of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
The 8 post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made
repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died
in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the
value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous pleas remained unheeded,
she filed the complaint in June 1997.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had
employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally
false and baseless.
Respondents claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not encash the
checks until the right of way problem has been resolved. In addition, respondent claims
that the balance would be offset with the cost he incurred when he defended Mr.
Espino’s son in a criminal case.
ISSUE: W/N respondent failed to act with candor and fairness towards complainant.
HELD: Yes. Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1)
there was an agreement between respondent and complainant’s late husband for the
sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with
said agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land
sold had an existing road-rightof- way.
The responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he
was entitled to legal compensation. Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a
breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8 dishonored checks, respondent’s
indifference to complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a
member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards
complainant and her late husband, first by allowing the 8 checks he issued to bounce,
then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file
this complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with
dilatory tactics.
12. ATTY. VAFLOR-FABROA v. ATTY. PAGUINTO
A.C. 6273 | March 15, 2010
Complainant filed for the disbarment due to the allegations that respondent: promoted
or sued a groundless, false or unlawful suit, and gave aid and consent to the same;
disobeyed laws of the land, promoted disrespect for law and the legal profession; did
not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleague and engaged in harassing tactics against opposing counsel; violated Canon
19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law; and
ruined and damaged not only the Gen. Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc.
(GEMASCO, INC.) but the entire water-consuming community as well.
ISSUE: W/N respondent may be disbarred from the violations of Canons 1, 8, 10, 19,
and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. IBP found that respondent is guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath as well
as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code. The Court also noted that respondent
previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the
Code. It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways, calling for a
more severe penalty this time.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against
complainant, he violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall “not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the
same. Likewise, When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the
complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court’s subsequent show
cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that “A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
13. BUGARING AND RBBI v. HON. ESPANOL
G.R. 133090 | Jan. 19, 2001
During the hearing of the case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one
operating a video camera who was taking photos of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring, was making manifestation to the effect that he
was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in
contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite – Diosdado Concepcion
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not in fact
instruct his assistant to take photos and added that the reason they had with them a
camera was because they had just come from a function. Counsel sent out his
assistant after the Court took exception to the fact that although proceedings are open
to the public and it being a court of record, the situation at hand is an abuse of
discretion of the court since the court was not asked for permission to do so.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he
needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Barzaga to
represent him, the case was allowed to be called again. On second call, Atty. Bugaring
started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in
spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a
written pleading for his client. The court declared him out of order.
After serving his sentence and paying the fine, he filed for a declaration of said order
to be null and void. He argued that he was never in contempt of court given that 1) he
always addressed it with respect by using the phrase “your Honour please” and 2) he
was merely carried away by his emotions in espousing the case of his client.
ISSUE: W/N RTC erred in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court.
HELD: No. In light of Atty. Bugaring defense of being polite and using the phrase “your
Honour please” during the proceedings, the court ruled that his deference to the court
in consistently addressing respondent judge as “your Honour please” is belied by his
behaviour therein:
1. Veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (in violation of
Rule 11.03, Canon 11)
2. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent Judge was partial in
favour of the other party (in violation of Rule 11.04, Canon 11)
3. Behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to maintain order in the
proceedings (in disregard of Canon 1)
4. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the
time was making representation in behalf of the other party, was rudely
interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further a word in edgewise
(in violation of Canon 8 and Canon 22)
5. Refusal of petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (in violation of Section 1,
Article III, 1987 Constitution and Canon 18, and Canon 12)
Regarding counsel’s argument of being carried away in an effort to espouse the case
of his client, the CA stated that: “A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client’s cause – he should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert
every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice”
14. SAMBAJON, ET AL. v. ATTY. SUING
A.C. 7062 | Sept. 26, 2006
Sambajon, et al. are parties to a previous labor case in which the Atty. Jose Suing is
the counsel of their employer Microplast, Inc. A judgment in favor of them was
rendered by the Labor Arbiter and a writ of execution was issued against Microplast,
Inc.
In the meantime, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case insofar as the seven
complainants are concerned on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims
purportedly signed and sworn to by them.
Four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims,
denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
having received the considerations therefor. They subsequently filed an administrative
complaint alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and
Manuel Rodil, ―frustrated‖ the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting
before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. A Complaint seeking the disbarment
of Atty. Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility was also filed.
During the administrative hearings before the IBP Commissioner, it was apparent that
Atty. Suing was coaching his client to prevent himself from being incriminated. It was
also revealed that the Release Waiver and Quitclaims allegedly signed were not the
same documents originally presented to the employees to be signed.
ISSUE: W/N the acts of Respondent Atty. Suing is an act arguably violative of the
Lawyers’ Code of Ethics
HELD: Yes.
Diligence is ―the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm
of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or
withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice
of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or
that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias.
In the case at bar, not only did Atty. Suing try to coach his client or influence him to
answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him. His client contradicted
Atty. Suing’s claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he prepared was not
the one presented at the Arbiter’s Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not
involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the
execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to
obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.
While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an
investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his
character.