1. Lim v.

Lim
2. Mangonon v. CA
3. De Guzman v. Perez
4. Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
5. Del Socorro v Brinkman Van Wilsem
6. Lacson v. Lacson
7. Estate of Ruiz v. CA
8. Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
9. Silva v. CA
10. Imbong v. Ochoa
11. Tonog v. CA
12. Vancil v. Belmes
13. Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
14. Sagala-Eslao v. CA
15. Sombong v. CA
16. Recto v. Trocino
17. Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA
18. Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
19. Santos v. CA
20. David v. CA
21. Espiritu v. CA
22. Perez v. CA
23. Dacasin v. Dacasin
24. Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. Abejar
25. Libi v. IAC
26. Tamargo v. CA
27. Aquinas School v. Inton
28. St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda
Lim v. Lim

Facts:

Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents
Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of
petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her
husband Mariano Lim. Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of ₱6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the minor children with her, after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial
court described "a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of
₱6,000 pendente lite. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability
to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself
sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family
Code of the Philippines). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, their grandchildren. By statutory and
jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is
beyond cavil. Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation
to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation
extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of
lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Mangonon v. CA

Facts:

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil
Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had
moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while
Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their
admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because of the following: i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year, broken down as follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00 Books
1,000.00 Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a total of
US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

Issue: Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support

Ruling:

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second
option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship
between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was
indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as
part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are
now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica
and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any
familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the
amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.
De Guzman v. Perez

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in
the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant.
She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987. Private respondent
and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman with whom he begot two
children.

Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In
1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of
the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided
any other financial support for his son.

In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private respondent accepted a
job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint
overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she reached the point
where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s
continued education thus became uncertain.

Issue: May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in
life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect

Ruling: The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of
any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s
station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her own
parental duties.

Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield himself
from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. However, while
petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against him cannot be
made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides: SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse,
Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. – (a) Any person
who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision
mayor in its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect of child"
punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized
under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the
coverage of RA 7610.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC
G.R No. 189516 June 08, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias
(Colonel
Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September
2000, Edna
and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained
with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost
Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded monthly
support
equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. On February 26, 2003,
Colonel
Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and
pension benefits
in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the
parties as a
compromise agreement. The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006 until AFP
decided not
to honor the agreement between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family. Edna, on
behalf of
herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the
Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support, docketed as F.C.
Civil
Case No. 2006-039.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Colonel Otamias’ legitimate family is entitled for support.
HELD:
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides that the benefits authorized under
this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy,
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to
any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to
any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred
while in
the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other
payment due
such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be
applied to
settle such accountabilities. Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are
exempt
from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the
retiree
has enough funds to support himself and his family.
Del Socorro v Brinkman Van Wilsem

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu
where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Lacson v. Lacson

FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate
daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother
and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month,
they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then
with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to
the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother,
from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea
did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment
memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As
things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas
efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward
occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the
year and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small
amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took
up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in
behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. Maowee
and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support
since 1976. Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the
plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court,
following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward
to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in
arrears.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a third party may furnish a support.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals Article 207 of the Family
Code provides that when the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails
to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support
to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship
between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract an equitable principle
enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. Noel Daban can
rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads: When the person obliged to
support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third
person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support.

Estate of Ruiz v. CA

FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and
his three granddaughters, On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.On June 29, 1992, four
years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz.

ISSUES:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the
funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the
release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the
estate to the executor of the will.

RULING:
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of
the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and
does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of
the real
and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He
cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses
of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject
to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
Facts: Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,
1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she was
already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention. She
filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three
children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife committed
adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife
pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to
receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount
awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which
made the husband appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

Ruling: Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar
her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of such
cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that
the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on
July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979, after the
trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband
could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114742 July
17, 1997

Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children, namely,
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an
understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal conflict began
when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition
was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which
she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of
Silva giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.

The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without the written
consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the
meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with
her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that as alleged by
Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.

Issues: a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights. b) Whether or not the mother has parental
authority over the children.

Ruling: The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon City RTC’s
decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne’s written permission. The Supreme
Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. The Court clarified:
“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility
may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their
offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real,
grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”

The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the Family Code).
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally
protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the father;
no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with
the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent
Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to Holland with her two
children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay child support are distinct and separate. If the mother
and the father of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then
there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking the
court to settle the terms and conditions.

2. Who exercises parental authority and custody, Art. 211, FC

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002

Facts: In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with
Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a
registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.

Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court
granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition
for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial
court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar,
in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.

In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of
Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.

Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is
entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the
law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot
be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple
arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Ruling: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is
created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule
is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from
her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
 For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years
of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference,
but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the
child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be
given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since
it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that
the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in
allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained
in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on
certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties’
respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch
as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over
her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with
her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
VANCIL vs. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19,
2001

Facts: Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen
G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of
Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify
Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Ruling: Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over
that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by
law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions
of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."

Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be the
guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article
214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she
admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she
will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that
there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY G.R. No. 140817
December 7, 2001

Facts: Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on
February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four
(4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was
not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot
two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990.
The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner,
respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced.

After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties
migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years. Sometime in
December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala
Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with
a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City .

On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in
Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are
detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their
neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees
them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead,
they would ride the jeepney in going home from school. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties
to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No.
1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss
and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by
conversion.

The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this
case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy
to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
Issue: Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?

Ruling: The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent
are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2]
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.

The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws.
The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she
is not a Muslim.

Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social
and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical
and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations
of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.

Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father
and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility
over their legitimate children.
SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997

Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica.
Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her
parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her
mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her
mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-
American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by
way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of
having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause
the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?

Ruling: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of
her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 111876
January 31, 1996

Facts: Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir
John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money
to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.

Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty, who had
custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged
that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was
denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
given that the detention was in Caloocan.

Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be their
guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint, filed
an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in quezon city. When
Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed
the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the
child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child
subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the
effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of
the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody.

The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
Ruling: Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”

In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where
“the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the
Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again
that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.

The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor;
(2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and
(3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of
the respondent.

Petition is dismissed.
Recto v. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 7, 2017 (En Banc)
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 174485
July 11, 2007

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which
granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone.

Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City,
while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in
Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati
City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.

Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA
issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be
brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.

Ruling: The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of
the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is
hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO G.R. No. 154994
June 28, 2005

Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite
notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very
often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after
surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of
the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as
provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all
relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.” No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its
bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody,
education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 113054
March 16, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18,
1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,"
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing
on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his
minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family
Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead,
absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by
private respondents.

Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

Ruling: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated
love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present
time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him
and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also
held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the
natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable,
is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christo
pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy
Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's
house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After
this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted
by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On
July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

Issue: Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

Ruling: Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1 of
the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of
Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of
Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her
free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of
him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
 Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the Family Code,
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."

Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child.
The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even
now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld
because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of
her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for
him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent)
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115640
March 15, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a
local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo
and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time,
and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had
to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It
suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be
approved by the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.

Ruling: Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the
custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to
stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior.
PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No. 118870 March
29, 1996

Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse.
After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II
in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she
became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On
January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to
the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip
tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her
with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once
Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come
back immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good
terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s
meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son
even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they
have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order
awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best
interest and welfare.

Issue: Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling: Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child
whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and
apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of
their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody,
and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent
it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of
the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor.” The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years
of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its
reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall
justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated
that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her
of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer
periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously.
Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract
from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children
are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.

Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several
companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a
mother gives to his child.
Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010

FACTS:

1. On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines.

2. The following year respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named
Stephanie.

3. In June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against
petitioner.

4. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

5. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract

(Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie.

6. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 7. Petitioner
claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.

8. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold
the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.

ISSUES:

– Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case

– Whether the agreement or contract is valid

HELD:

Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005.

It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention of jurisdiction
to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent. The
divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction.
Agreement is void

The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil

Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.

II. FACTS:

1. Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void.

2. The divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
3. In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration because petitioner is under the
laws of his nationality, which is American. Hence, the petitioner filed alternative theories for the validity
of the agreement:

> The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from the sole to
joint

> The agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondents

II. ISSUE

– Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit

– Whether the trial curt can enforce the Agreement on joint custody

II. HELD

Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle

Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of the Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was
already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to choose to whom she want to be). Instead of
dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order to settle

Stephanie’s custody. Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and June 23, 2005. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

4. Duties of children, Art. 211, par. 2, FC Filial Privilege Rule, Art. 215. FC

5. Substitute Parental Authority a. When Applicable , Art. 214, 216, 222, FC b. Who may exercise, Art.
216 and 217, FC c. Extent of Authority, Art. 233, FC
Caravan Travel And Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016

Facts:

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita
Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City.[11] A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number
PKM 195[12] was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.[13] To avoid an incoming
vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.[14] Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident,
went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van.[15] Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy
Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.[16] Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left
the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van.[17] Fortunately for Reyes, an
unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.[18]

Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan.[19] Caravan is a
corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours.[20] Bautista was Caravan's
employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.[21]

Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.[22] Despite medical attendance, Reyes died
two (2) days after the accident.[23]

Issues:

First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R.
Reyes' death

Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.

Ruling:

IHaving exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party
in interest in this case.

It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the obligation to pay
damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much
less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who may
recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage
from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor

II

Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict provided in Article 2180,
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's specification that
"[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks[.]

Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or
injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered
owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between
the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.

Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this court stated that
Article 2180 "should defer to"[104] the registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should
be totally abandoned.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article
2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that
the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual
driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry
the costs of moving forward with the evidence.

The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.

Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration[105] of the van that hit Reyes.[106]
The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van.

Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.

Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have
been satisfied arises.

It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by
presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista;
second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.

On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident.

On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks at the time of the accident.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection
and supervision of Bautista.

Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate another's motor vehicle
violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as service
driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.

III

Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was already dropped as a
party is equally unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.

It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.

Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary party—should not have been
dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner
(as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party) could have opted to file
a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.

IV

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded actual damages to respondent.

Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the Certificate, i.e. that she
spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Reyes. Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified
to is not hearsay.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista grossly negligent in driving the
van and concluded that Bautista's gross negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.

As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the negligence of its driver.

For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is justified.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS

Principles:

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered
owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between
the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article
2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that
the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual
driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry
the costs of moving forward with the evidence.

The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the
employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in
relation to that employment.

6. Rights and Duties of persons exercising parental authority, Art. 219-221, FC

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992

Facts: On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound
from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann,
filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set
aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.

Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court
to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Ruling: Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and
knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was
freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992

Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent
and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was
granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but
rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Issues: a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition. b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time.

Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of
the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.
It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil code”.

7. Disciplinary Measures, Art. 223-224, FC

8. Effects of Parental Authority upon property of children, Art. 225-227. FC

9. Termination of Parental Authority, Art. 228, 229, 232, FC; RA 7610

10. Suspension of Parental Authority, Art. 230-231, FC

11. Special parental authority a. Who exercises special parental authority, Art. 218, FC b. When
Applicable c. Extent of special parental authority, Art. 233, par. 2, FC d. Extent of responsibility/liability,
Art. 219, FC
Aquinas School v. Inton, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011

Facts: This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student
and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move
around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School
(Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching
at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. Jose Luis left his seat
and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back
to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin
approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head
on the classmate’s seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the
floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son
Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case
67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to
which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the
Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt
that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in
Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages
of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA
to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling: No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to
provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious
congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the
way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in public schools. Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony
in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no
steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They
showed records, certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that
she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom
evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to
observe her.
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners, vs. JAYSON
MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010

Facts:

While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage
of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader
of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with
magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a
result, thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case in the lower court, his
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson’smother, who was
working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego
her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Jason
and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury
due to the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon
each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.

The trial court orders and holds the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable to pay Jayson. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.

Ruling:

Yes, the court held the same that the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable for the accident. As
found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the concurrent failure of
petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a
good father of a family raised by petitioner St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because
it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers despite an
apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and
secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the
wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools
should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly,
schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and
anticipated dangers. Art. 218. Family Code provides: The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and
responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.