Existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth since to

value anything requires a basis from which we value—thus we must treat others
as ends in themselves and embrace a constitutive metaethic.
Korsgaard 83, Christine M (Prof of Phil @ Harvard University). "Two distinctions in
goodness." The Philosophical Review 92.2 (1983): 169-195. SM//brackets for gendered
language
The argument shows how Kant’s idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important
when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action. he or she
assumption. The assumption is that

supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative
there must be objectively good ends, f or then there are necessary actions and so

necessary ends (G 45-46/427—428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384—385). In order for there to be any objectively
good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve
as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of
inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, “for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not
exist, their object would be without worth” (0 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them.
Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally
valuable thing must be “humanity” or “rational nature,” which he defines as “the power set to an end" (G
56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself

is a “subjective principle of human action.” By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of

conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard
our ends as good. But since “every other rational being thinks of [their] his existence by the
same rational ground which holds also for myself” (G 47/429). we must regard others as capable of
conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end
in itself thus involves making that person’s ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any

rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of
objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to
promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happi- ness of others—the ends that they choose—and, in general, to make the
highest good our end.

This outweighs—all other obligations are contingent and collapse

Engstrom 8, Stephen (PhD, Prof of Phil @ University of Pittsburgh). "Universal
Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge."Academia.edu. N.p., 2008. Web. 11
Aug. 2017.
<https://www.academia.edu/4512762/Universal_Legislation_As_the_Form_of_Practical
_Knowledge>. SM
In addition to the idea of universal legislation as the form of practical cognition, there’s a related idea guiding Kant’s thinking about the constraints of pure practical reason that

exercise of practical reason proceeds

needs to be borne in mind when we consider how they apply in choice and action. Since the

from the universal to the particular, the application of the formula of universal law should
proceed in this direction as well. Thus in attempting to determine what obligations to other persons this principle of universality might support,
we should first consider its application in the most primitive, or fundamental, exercise of
the will, and to do this we will need to consider the most basic practical self-conception
of a particular human person.11 It would be inappropriate, for example, to begin with duties that
presuppose particular relations between the persons involved, such as the ties between citizens, family members, or friends. Such
obligations, important though they are, depend upon specific, contingent conditions of action,
whereas the cases we should consider first are those of duties that attach to us most
fundamentally, merely in virtue of our standing as human persons, or subjects with wills, sharing the
power of practical reason.
Next, violating freedom is non-universalizable because you simultaneously will
the extension and limitation of your own freedom. Thus the standard is
respecting freedom. Prefer the standard: all frameworks presuppose liberty.
People can only be held responsible for unethical actions if they chose to do
them, but choice itself requires that people can pick which actions to take without
threat of force.
Now let’s see how this applies to this topic. I believe that it is never morally permissible
to violate the freedoms of a human being, and the right to know in the resolution forces
us to violate freedoms in order to gain knowledge. Because of this, I bring up…
Human dignity and the ability to maintain self-respect and a coherent
identity require protection of privacy and the right to make claims against
others for its violation.
Corlett 02, J Angelo – philosophy prof @ SDSU – “The Nature and Value of the Moral Right to Privacy” Public Affairs
Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 329-350 [Premier]

But what about the value of the moral right to privacy? As Aristotle averred, we are social animals. But as Nagel cautions, "It is very
im- portant for human freedom that individuals should not be merely social or political beings."58 Moreover, if Feinberg is correct
about the nature and value of rights in general, thento have a right is to have a claim against
someone whose recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing
rules (in the case of legal rights) or moral principles (in the case of moral rights). To have a claim is to have a case meriting
consid- eration. The act of claiming makes for self-respect and respect for others,

and it is this that provides a rights-respecting society with a partial

foundation for human dignity. Feinberg adds that it is insufficient for persons to have rights; they must know
that they possess them.59 Now what Feinberg articulates about rights in general holds for the moral right to privacy in particular.
The moral right to privacy, when re- spected, protects privacy itself. Judith W. DeCew writes about the value of privacy protection in
medical contexts:

Privacy shields us not only from interference and pressures that pre- clude
self-expression and the development of relationships, but also from
intrusions and pressures arising from others' access to our per- sons and
details about us. Threats of information leaks, as well as threats of control
over our bodies, our activities, and our power to make our own choices,
give rise to fears that we are being scruti- nized, judged, ridiculed,
pressured, coerced or otherwise taken advantage of by others. Protection of privacy
enhances and ensures the freedom from such scrutiny, pressure to conform, and exploita- tion. We require this

protection that privacy provides so that as self-conscious beings we can

maintain our self-respect, develop our self-esteem, and increase our ability
to form a coherent identity and set of values, as well as our ability to form
varied and complex relationships with others.60
The loss of legitimate privacy leaves us vulnerable to social harm by
others, often resulting in loss of self-esteem and self-respect, mental
distress, etc. Moreover, Feinberg's view of the value of rights in gen- eral is consistent with Inness's notion of the value of
privacy as acknowledging "our respect for persons as autonomous beings with the capacity to love, care and like."

Contention 1: Harmful Distraction

When candidates are not allowed a degree of privacy, the media has leeway to fixate on
the portion of their lives that really should be kept private. Unfortunately, in the world
today, gossip sells more than complex, factual pieces, so we can make a pretty good
guess which media outlets will gravitate toward. As a result of this obsession, there will
be less necessary articles on actual politics being published, and therefore public
knowledge will decrease.
Focusing on a candidate’s past life trades off with media coverage on candidate’s
positions on issues.
Altman 2016. Altman, Drew. Dr. Altman was Commissioner of the Department of
Human Services for the state of New Jersey under Governor Tom Kean. As
Commissioner, he developed nationally recognized initiatives in welfare reform, school-
based youth services, programs for the homeless, and Medicaid managed care. “Risks
in ‘Full’ Disclosure of Presidential Candidates’ Health Records.” Henry J Kaiser Family
foundation. Sep 13, 2016 https://www.kff.org/other/perspective/risks-in-full-disclosure-
of-presidential-candidates-health-records/ [Premier].
Serving up certain details of any candidate’s health, and past life, in a voracious
social-media environment in which some elements of the media focus on “gotcha!”
journalism and opponents leap to make attack ads has the potential to focus
disproportionate attention on a candidate’s health–rather than a person’s
readiness to govern and her or his positions on major issues. It makes sense that
voters need to know whether candidates have a documented medical problem that
could compromise their ability to serve as president or prevent them from
completing their full term in office. That said, it seems possible to devise a formal
system that both major parties could buy into, ensuring that such information is
produced, rather than imploring individual candidates to produce it themselves. It’s easy
to see the argument for disclosure if a presidential candidate has, say, serious heart
disease or cancer, conditions that could affect one’s ability to serve. Now imagine the
frenzy on social media if a candidate’s medical records indicated an episode of
depression years before, or a STD, or whether a male candidate uses Viagra, or if a
candidate of either gender had been abused. These are points that
understandably involve privacy. Full disclosure would tilt the spotlight to these
issues, probably setting off long discussions on cable news about whether such
issues should even be discussed. Not that long ago, well before the advent of social
media and 24/7 cable news coverage, Thomas Eagleton was forced off the Democratic
ticket after revealing that some of his past treatment for depression had involved electric
shock. Imagine the constant focus on such information today.The New York Times
editorial seemed to suggest that Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton’s ages signify a
special need to know all of their medical records: “Now Americans are deciding
between Mr. Trump, who is 70, and Mrs. Clinton, who is 68. Whoever prevails will have
to deal with round-the-clock demands, so it seems entirely relevant to inquire about their
medical histories and current health.” Well, a healthy 48-year-old president could
drop dead of a heart attack while jogging. It seems not far-fetched to suggest that
unless a candidate has a known debilitating or potentially life-threatening medical
condition, the American people would base their vote on other grounds–and take their
chances on a candidate’s health in office, mindful always of who the vice presidential
nominee is and that person’s ability to serve if needed. John F. Kennedy was the
youngest person ever elected to the U.S. presidency, and he had serious health
conditions. How might his close race against Richard Nixon have been affected
by social media focus on his physical health?
The media inevitably gets worked up about even the smallest things, and when we add
fuel to their fire, they will only get more distracted.
This turns the AFF because:
a) They say that the right to know is a good thing, but affirming actually decreases
the right to know, by either not giving enough information, or creating information
overload, creating an oxymoron
AND
b) This argument is unique to the AFF because I am not arguing that the media is
not already distracted, but only that the AFF builds on this harm.
A ”gotcha” media leads to active cover-ups by politicians. Politicians will then not be
able to focus on policymaking, but will focus on looking good for the media. Intense
scrutiny will make fewer people be willing to enter politics. The most capable will not
stay, only those with a higher tolerance for media intrusion, and a talent for concealment
and spin. This results in worse governance, because the choice of potential leaders is
reduced by the added pressures of losing hope of privacy.
Contention 2: DNA
Advances in genomics will allow the press to use problematic DNA scan
interpretations to sabotage candidates.
Green and Annas 8. Dr. Robert C. Green, M.D., M.P.H., Professor and Mr. George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., Chair.
“The Genetic Privacy of Presidential Candidates” New England Journal of Medicine, 359:21, 2192-2193, 2008
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2925179/ [Premier].

In the wake of the often bitter presidential election, with its emphasis on negative campaigning and intermittent controversies over
the release of candidates’ health information,it is not too soon to begin planning for the next
presidential campaign. By then, advances in genomics will make it more
likely that DNA will be collected and analyzed to assess genetic risk
information that could be used for or, more likely, against presidential
candidates. Since 1972, when George McGovern was forced to replace his vice-presidential running mate, Thomas
Eagleton, after it was revealed that he had been hospitalized for depression, the health status of presidential
candidates has been seen by the press as fair game.1 More recently, historians have
discovered that some presidential candidates, including Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisen-hower, and John F. Kennedy, misled the
public about their health status and that illness may have adversely affected their ability to perform their duties. In this year’s
election, Senator John McCain, who had released extensive medical records in 1999, released an additional 1100 pages of records
but gave reporters only a few hours to review them. President-Elect Barack Obama released an undated one-page “medical
summary” to the press. News organizations pressed for more details, in the belief that the public has a right to know about a
. Although the presence of a
candidate’s risk of future disease as an important indication of fitness for office
disease or health condition is the most salient factor in the prediction of
future health, medicine’s ability to define levels of risk for individuals is
expanding to include family history (a proxy for genetic predispositions to many diseases) and
genetic markers. Family history was used by the McCain campaign, which
highlighted the energy and mental sharpness of McCain’s 95-year-old
mother, in an attempt to counter the notion that McCain’s age might be
associated with diminished vigor or cognitive function. Little was said
about the death of his father and grandfather of heart attacks at 70 and 61
years of age, respectively. By the same token, the Obama campaign
remained silent about the death of Obama’s grandfather from prostate
cancer, which indicates that Obama’s own risk is higher than average.
During future campaigns, presidential candidates could release information
about parts of their own genomes in order to highlight what might be
considered a favorable ethnic background or, if they have already had a
disease such as cancer, to highlight the absence of genes that confer a risk
of recurrence. But in a climate of negative personal and political messages, it is more likely that
persons or groups opposing a candidate will release such information,
hoping to harm his or her chances for election or reelection. Obtaining
DNA, even from a president, would not be very difficult. Sufficient DNA for
amplification and analysis can be obtained from loose hairs, coffee cups,
discarded utensils, or even a handshake. A genome scan assessing hundreds of
thousands or more single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in such a sample could be performed with a commercially available
microarray, or “SNP chip.” Some SNP variants are known to be associated with clinical diseases, and a tremendous number of new
markers are being discovered and reported, although the contradictory evidence regarding some of these associations and the
limited strength of many of them makes interpretation problematic. Would analysis of genetic markers have given us useful
information about McCain or Obama, for example, that would have clarified the implications of their family histories of heart disease
and prostate cancer? Some genes have been found to have significant associations with coronary artery disease — most notably, a
locus on the 9p21 region of chromosome 9. Three regions in the 8q21 region of chromosome 8 have been reproducibly linked to
prostate cancer. Both 9p21 and 8q21 are non-coding regions of the genome, meaning that there are no actual genes there that
code for protein products, but there may be nearby genes that are important, or there may be regulatory sequences in these regions
. These associations have been replicated in
that are important in the expression of other genes

several populations and are probably valid on a population basis, but their
value in providing risk information about a given person is severely limited.
The relative risks associated with the implicated SNP variants at either of these loci would be less than 2, and there are legitimate
But in the world of
questions about whether this degree of increased risk is meaningful on the individual level.

inflammatory accusations and smears that characterize presidential

politics, it would be easy to engage in what might be called “genetic
McCarthyism” by implying that an increased risk of disease is more
substantial than it really is.
Misrepresentation and misinterpretation of genome sequences can be used
as political ammo and sway high stakes elections – reinforces prejudice
and stigma surrounding mental health.
Green and Annas 8. Dr. Robert C. Green, M.D., M.P.H., Professor and Mr. George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., Chair.
“The Genetic Privacy of Presidential Candidates” New England Journal of Medicine, 359:21, 2192-2193, 2008
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2925179/ [Premier].

there is a
Some associations between common diseases and gene markers are reasonably well established. However,

constant stream of less well validated markers being linked to psychiatric

conditions (still the most stigmatizing for presidential contenders) or even personality
traits, which could be used to raise doubts about a candidate in the minds of
an uninformed public. For example, the risk of bipolar disorder is reportedly increased by a gene encoding
diacylglycerol kinase eta (DGKH) and decreased by a particular allele at the SNP rs420259, but both of these findings have had
in the next presidential campaign, someone
limited replication and involve modest effect sizes. Still,

might publish a candidate’s genome and focus on a marker that has been
linked to a psychiatric condition, regardless of how unproven the
association is. Though current genome scans can reveal 1 million SNPs, sequencing is required to reveal many known
mutations and copy-number variants that may be associated with mostly rare diseases. Sequencing an entire human genome has
thus far been an elaborate and costly undertaking, but technological advances are rapidly increasing the speed and decreasing the
Craig Venter and James Watson, have had substantial
cost. To date, only two people,

portions of their genomes published, and their cases illustrate the latitude
for interpretation and the potential for distortion. In his autobiography, Venter noted that he had
one copy of the apolipoprotein E (APOE) ε4 allele conferring an increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease, a variant of the gene for
complement factor H that has been linked to an increased risk of macular degeneration, and longer forms of the serotonin-
transporter gene 5-HTTLPR that might make him more resilient against depression.2 Watson asked that his APOE results be
redacted, but his published genome indicates homozygosity for two devastating diseases, type 1B Usher’s syndrome and
sequence
Cockayne’s syndrome, neither of which the 80-year-old Watson has.3 As these examples show,
information may produce results that are emotionally charged, easily
overinterpreted, or simply wrong by virtue of technical errors, low
sequence coverage, or low-complexity sequencing.4 For the foreseeable
future, the examination of thousands of genes in any genome is likely to
result in large numbers of false positive findings, along with “incidental”
findings of dubious clinical value.5 Thus, when sequence information about individual genomes becomes
available, we will have to contend not only with the statistical issues of replication, effect size, and attributable risk but also with the
Genetic information is easy to
specter of genetic information that is wrong or misleading.

misinterpret and to misrepresent. Nonetheless, its scientific patina will

encourage presidential campaigns to use it to reinforce existing prejudices.
Therefore, we think future presidential candidates should resist calls to disclose their own genetic information. We recommend that
they also pledge that their campaigns will not attempt to obtain or release genomic information about their opponents. Genetics
experts, whether partisan or neutral, must be prepared to speak with the press to explain the nature of genomic information if and
when it becomes public. Though it might be tempting to enact laws that would make it a federal crime to sequence a candidate’s
DNA without consent, we believe that restraint by the candidates, coupled with education of the public, will be a more reasonable
. Using genetic
approach as we enter a medical future based at least in part on personalized genomics

information to disparage opponents has no place in presidential

campaigns. Nonetheless, the threat of genetic McCarthyism provides us with an opportunity to engage in a public dialogue
about the limitations and complexities of using genomic information for decisions about life and health — including voting for our
president.