Framework

I negate the resolution

I value morality since ought denotes a moral obligation
The value criterion is maximizing expected well being
the impossibility to attain knowledge of every outcome or abuse leaves
means the best way to make decisions in the public sphere is by
maximizing general well-being
Goodin 95 – Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social
Sciences at the Australian National University (Robert E., Cambridge University
Press, “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy” pg 63)
there is something special about the situation
My larger argument turns on the proposition that

of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more
precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding
their situations
with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and

that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a
more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public
officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very
special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of
private individuals will usually have more complete information on the
things,
peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that
alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in
contrast, at [are] relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their
choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know
are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen
most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But
that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the
utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and
averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each
alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will
be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge
of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained
for that.
This comes first: the resolution refers to an action taken by the US, so
frameworks must be centered around it. Abstract theories about morality
fail to guide action because political actors like the U.S. government have
different obligations than individuals.
 Contention 1 – Fill in
Withdrawing US presence causes Chinese military to fill in since they
would still want military aid
Jennifer Rubin 14, Washington Post blogger, "Cut all foreign aid? That would be
‘dumb’ and dangerous," 10/16/14, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-
turn/wp/2014/10/16/cut-all-foreign-aid-that-would-be-dumb-and-dangerous/ TR
The idea that other governments will fill the gap is both wishful thinking and
dangerous, given that other actors such as Russia or China would then become more
influential and acts in ways contrary to our interests and values. It is also nonsensical to imagine that
private donations can fill the gap. Even with a huge upturn in private giving for emergency relief (e.g. Haiti) from 17 percent to 32 percent between 2006 and 2010, the lion share
of funds still come from the government.

Paul often bemoans the treatment of Christians in Muslim or Communist countries. He should therefore reconsider his stance. “I have no doubt that some of it, especially under
[President] Obama, is wasted or misspent,” Elliott Abrams, former deputy national security adviser, remarks on economic aid. “But other parts constitute America’s support for
courageous people struggling to protect religious freedom and human rights in places from Cuba to Uzbekistan to Venezuela to North Korea, Russia, and China.” He observes,
“Those people are our natural allies and are fighting for what we believe in, and abandoning them is not only morally wrong but strategically dumb. They are risking life, limb,
and prison to worship God freely and exercise their God-given rights. Should we really abandon them?”

we would not provide any military assistance for countries to

On the military side,

defend themselves against current or future aggression or to combat terrorism. No military aid for Israel, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Jordan, Ukraine or any other ally. It would also eliminate aid to groups, such as the Kurds, who are fighting the Islamic State. This might be a libertarian dream

come true, but, in fact, it is a recipe for encouraging international aggression and
damaging U.S. influence in the world. A former Defense Department official tells me via e-mail, “On national security, the fact is
that foreign aid often serves as a means to promote good will with potential partners,

even if it doesn’t really help their economy. But that good will helps America secure things like basing rights,

overflight privileges, and other forms of access for our military. All those are essential things for
executing military missions.”
None of this argues against reform of aid programs. To the contrary, conservatives have been forceful
proponents of rethinking aid to United Nations groups, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which act in ways contrary to

our national interests, and of usingaid as an instrument of American power. (Mitt Romney, now regarded as a sage on
foreign policy, strongly advocated for foreign aid, properly monitored, on this basis.) Moreover, the ability to freeze and reduce aid can be a powerful

incentive for countries to change behavior, but so can the promise of increased aid in exchange for cooperation and
reform. Eliminating foreign aid in the short or long term would have horrendous humanitarian

and national security consequences. It seems to represent a pre-9/11 mindset that we can wall ourselves off from international
dangers. Terrorism and epidemics such as Ebola should tell us differently.

foreign aid has nothing to do

Paul bristles at the term “isolationist,” preferring a less discredited term such as “non-interventionist.” But

with military intervention — and actually can be used to quell brushfires before they
require U.S. action. But cutting off aid to other countries as a goal is the personification of isolationism and reflects a
determination to recede from the world and thereby lessen our international
influence. It is a message to the rest of the world — and especially to the poor, sick and persecuted — that the United States cares nothing for them. You have to
wonder why Paul advocates it so incessantly.
This turns any reason the aff says military assistance is bad. Even if the
U.S. providing military aid has some bad effects, allowing other countries
such as China to fill in which is worse for two reasons.
1: Increased Chinese military aid increases political repression and is
worse for human rights abuses – studies prove
Roudabeh Kishi 15, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Geography at the
University of Sussex, Clionadh Raleigh, "Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States,"
March 2015, www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLED_Working-
Paper_Chinese-Aid-paper_final.pdf TR
Our findings support our hypotheses that Chinese aid impacts conflict in Africa,
specifically by increasing the ability of the state to engage in violence. We find a

statistically significant and positive effect of Chinese aid flows on state conflict events: an increase in Chinese

aid, normalized as a proportion of a state’s GDP, leads to increased state violence against
civilians and to a larger number of battles between state forces and competitors. We
do not see a similar statistically significant effect when examining
‘traditional’ aid flows. Furthermore, we find no statistically significant support for an effect of Chinese aid flows when
rebel behavior is isolated from general political armed violence or considering the number of conflict actors taking up arms against
the state (see Table 3).

While the literature on ‘traditional’ aid flows contends that aid impacts conflict through fueling rebellion – making the ‘prize’ of state
rents more attractive to insurgents – we find that the effect of Chinese aid is not through the
attraction of ‘state capture’. Chinese aid impacts state violence as a
function of its unconditionality, which make aid flows highly fungible; it is
typically directed towards bolstering the central state, and regimes can use these aid resources to

repress competition. This is arguably more difficult to do with ‘traditional’ and

conditional aid flows. State violence against challengers and civilians
increases as regimes seek to secure their authority. Increased actions against civilians and
militias operating throughout the state do not constitute large conflict operations, but these actors

overwhelmingly experience repression and abuses by the state. States that

receive high and increasing levels of Chinese aid may falter on a democratizing
and human rights agenda. Yet, these effects may be both direct and indirect, as states may balance the effects
of traditional and Chinese aid in their actions.

2: U.S. military assistance programs can be reformed and modified in the

future to increase accountability in authoritarian regimes, whereas Chinese
military assistance programs are unlikely to change or be influenced.
 Contention 2 – Non-lethal military assistance
Military Medical Civil Action projects, or MEDCAPs improve community
health and support HIV treatment in developing nations.
Miles and Malone 13 – Shana Miles, Medical Doctor @ Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Joseph L. Malone, Medical Officer, CDC
Resident Advisor and Advisor to President's Malaria Initiative, 2013
(“Perspectives From Ethiopia Regarding U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance:
How to Build a Better Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP)” Military Medicine,
Volume 178, December 2013, PDF available through EBSCO) TR
The U.S. Government has rapidly increased support for health programs (USG)

in Africa often requiring the participation of many governmental and

over the last decade,

nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners.'" In 2010, most of the USG's approximately $350 million of annual global health assistance to Ethiopia was managed by either the U,S,

USG-
Agency of International Development (USAID) or the U.S, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This was composed of about 60 health projects that were impl emented mostly by NGOs, These costly

supported health projects supported HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, spanned most districts in Ethiopia and

and maternal-child health issues . One of the consequences of these expansive USG-supported global health programs is that despite many obvious basic health needs in Ethiopia, it

medical civil action projects MEDCAPs)

takes significant effort at the U.S, Embassy to ensure coordination and non-duplication of effort among NGOs, For decades, (

have been a part of the U.S, military's cooperative engagements with many
developing countries ,"* and the authors' experience in Ethiopia from 2009 to 2013 suggests that such projects might continue to be beneficial to the USG and to Ethiopia, Recent military guidance requires
medical civil action projects (MEDCAPs) in Africa to plan to provide for sustainability and to be approved by the U.S. Ambass ador and to be coordinated and sustained through USAID.*

The unexpected delays and non-approvals of several proposed MEDCAPs in recent months in Ethiopia prompted the authors to describe the current health situat ion from an interagency perspective and include suggestions on how to plan MEDCAPs that have a

this would lead to the development of

higher probability of ultimately being approved and completed successfully in Ethiopia. Ideally,

sustainable capacities and other positive outcomes. Given the expected

constraints of global health budgets in the next several years the host ,^

government and other USG agencies and health partners might expect, and
increasingly appreciate, carefully planned MEDCAPs that could add value
to other USG-supported global health and humanitarian assistance
projects .

Absent US military assistance, these programs would cease to exist,

exacerbating the already extreme impact of HIV/AIDS in developing nations
Letcher 8 – Major Kenneth W. Letcher, Brigade Support Battalion Support
Operations Officer Trainer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
California, Brigade Support Battalion Support Operations Officer Trainer at the
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, 553rd Combat Sustainment
Support Battalion commander, U.S. Army, 2008 (“HIV/AIDS: A Nontraditional
Security Threat for AFRICOM,” US Army Command and General Staff College,
2008, PDF, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485701) TR
In addition to the catastrophic effects that HIV/AIDS inflicts on the infected
individual, HIV/AIDS negatively affects several layers of a given community
by affecting the human capital of that population. First and most personally, HIV/AIDS
negatively affects the household through increased spending on
healthcare.41 This increased spending is associated with a loss of income due to illnessrelated absence from work or the inability to work. As a result of the
effects of HIV/AIDS, families transition priorities and spending habits away from

education and other necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing

towards direct means to provide income to the family to offset HIV/AIDS
monetary necessities.42
The community and region are also affected by high prevalence rates
because the increased mortality rates that accompany HIV/AIDS results in a younger, less skilled labor force. The youth of
this labor force leads to reduced productivity, because the work force has less knowledge and work experience.43 Additionally, workers will take more time off to help tend to

AIDS, as it kills off young adults

infected members of their family; this lost time at work also contributes to reduced productivity.44 From a governmental standpoint,

between the ages of 15 to 49, weakens the tax base of a community or region, which

negatively impacts the money available to a government for public

expenditures, for example, education, healthcare for both AIDS and non-AIDS-related matters, and the military.45 In addition to killing mostly young adults,
AIDS deprives the next generation from resources vital to their transition
into the economy. Specifically, “children lose the love, care guidance, and
knowledge of one or both parents, which plausibly weakens the transmission of
knowledge and capacity from generation to generation.”46

Furthermore, a lack of military involvement would render MEDCAPs

programs that aren’t removed ineffective
Miles and Malone 13 – Shana Miles, Medical Doctor @ Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Joseph L. Malone, Medical Officer, CDC
Resident Advisor and Advisor to President's Malaria Initiative, 2013
(“Perspectives From Ethiopia Regarding U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance:
How to Build a Better Medical Civil Action Project (MEDCAP)” Military Medicine,
Volume 178, December 2013, PDF available through EBSCO) TR
There are certainly some unique challenges and complexities in working in
Ethiopia on global health projects, but many of the issues raised about
MEDCAPs in this article may also be applicable to similar projects in other
countries. Our goal in sharing these experiences is to emphasize and
illustrate the value of the involvement of health care providers during the
initial planning phase of MEDCAPs and highlight the importance of
communication with other USG organizations and NGOs. To provide the greatest
impact, the skills of U.S. military medical assets should be integrated from
the early planning stages of MEDCAP assessment and planning. The
military medical assets should also receive training or exposure to the local
culture and health care system to increase effectiveness. The varied
background and practice of our military medical personnel lends itself to
participation in these humanitarian activities. Assessments of the local
medical capabilities that are required during the MEDCAP nomination
process can be and might be expected to be, shared with other partners
(i.e., CDC, USAID). Realizing the capabilities and standards of public hospitals
and other health care delivery sites in the host nation can provide for a more
accurate assessment of the needs and potential sustainable projects at the site.
The proper selection and execution of sustainable MEDCAPs can be a
powerful tool in garnering the confidence and trust of these host nation
populations. Military medical professionals and others conducting
MEDCAP assessments and submitting proposals can likely increase the
speed of MEDCAP project approval and implementation by following some of
these suggestions and by avoiding some of the recent issues that delayed or
prevented project implementation of several recently nominated MEDCAP
projects.
General
 T/ Aid allows for influence
Military aid empirically leads to increased regime democracy and transition
to democratic ideals
Axelrod 11, [Matthew Craig Axelrod The Lauder Institute, University of
Pennsylvania] April 2011 “Aid as Leverage? Understanding the U.S.-Egypt
Military Relationship” https://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Axelrod.pdf SLHS-RR
The U.S.
In the end, it was not foreign leverage that brought about political reform in Egypt, but domestic political action.

Government’s belief that the Egyptian army could arbitrate a critical

rupture in Egyptian politics proved correct in February 2011, when in response to weeks of
popular demonstrations and regime intransigence, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi ushered
President Mubarak from power. Tantawi now serves as the head of the The Supreme Council of the
Egyptian Armed Forces, Egypt’s current ruling body. A policy of continued U.S. military
assistance to Egypt seems to have been validated, as the U.S. maintained a
strong partner for several decades, and at ―the moment of truth‖ the
Egyptian military stepped in on the side of the people rather than on the
side of a repressive regime. But the picture is not entirely clear. On the one hand the new military
leadership has stated that it will honor its political commitments abroad,
meaning its durable peace with Israel.39 Indeed, Israeli leaders have even expressed satisfaction in
upgraded border security measures.40 More importantly, the military has also stated its

intentions to preside over a democratic transition.41 But on the other hand there have been
disturbing allegations that the Egyptian military has adopted some of the repressive practices of the deposed regime, including
The only thing that is clear is that the Egyptian military is no
detentions and torture.42
longer dissociated from politics. As the transition period continues to
progress, the U.S.-Egypt military and strategic relationship will enter a new
phase. Understanding its benefits, and its limitations, will aid in
restructuring and balancing the relationship.
 T/ Military Aid reduces chances of war
US military aid reduces the likelihood of war – best statistical models
prove.
O’Mahony et al 18, O'Mahony, Angela, Miranda Priebe, Bryan Frederick,
Jennifer Kavanagh, Matthew Lane, Trevor Johnston, Thomas S. Szayna, Jakub
P. Hlavka, Stephen Watts, and Matthew Povlock, U.S. Presence and the
Incidence of Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. Paperback
ISBN/EAN: 9780833097972 DOI: 10.7249/RR1906
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/
RAND_RR1906.pdf SLHS-RR
Findings on U.S. Troop Presence and Interstate Conflict Behavior This section presents the results of our statistical analysis of U.S.
U.S. troop
forward troop presence and interstate conflict behavior. Our main findings indicate that, on average,

presence was associated with a lower likelihood of interstate war

occurrence but a higher likelihood of low-intensity MID occurrence. In addition to these overall relationships, we also
present findings that depend on a state’s strategic relationship with the United States. States hosting larger U.S. troop deployments
larger
were more likely to be the target of high-intensity militarized disputes initiated by U.S. adversaries. In contrast,

deployments of U.S. troops abroad were associated with fewer militarized

disputes initiated by allied states. The following sections discuss these findings in more detail.32 U.S.
Troop Presence Near Potential Target States Is Associated with a Lower Likelihood of Interstate War U.S. forward
troop presence near, but not in, potential target states is associated with a
lower risk of interstate war. The solid black line in Figure 4.3 plots the predicted probability of an interstate war
occurrence as the number of U.S. troops not engaged in combat near a potential target state increases. The dashed gray lines
represent the 95 percent confidence interval around the point prediction. Taken together, these three lines represent the possible
That is, at the minimum
overall predicted relationship between U.S. nearby troops and interstate war occurrence.
value of nearby U.S. troops, our models predict with 95 percent confidence
that the probability of an interstate war could be as little as about 0.10
percent or over 0.60 percent. These results suggest a deterrent effect of
U.S. forward troop presence. On average, states are less likely to be the target of an interstate war when there
is a large U.S. troop presence nearby.33 In interpreting these results, it is important to emphasize the rarity of interstate war. Even in
state pairs with no U.S. nearby troops, the likelihood of interstate war in a given year remains roughly 0.4 percent. What our models
show is that the presence of large numbers of nearby U.S. troops makes a rare event even less likely. Still, these results may be
substantively important, considering the immense strategic and political costs that can be associated with interstate war. This
. U.S.
finding, which captures an average effect across all state types, could be capturing several potential mechanisms
forward troop presence could be deterring adversary states from attacking
U.S. partners, although our limited ability to consistently identify potential adversaries limits our ability to test this directly,
as will be discussed in greater detail below. This average effect could also reflect a restraining

influence that the United States is having on U.S. partners. Finally, the
apparent deterrent effects of U.S. forward troop presence could be
reflecting a general stabilizing effect that makes all states, including those
that are neither U.S. allies or adversaries, less likely to initiate conflict. U.S.
Troop Presence Near Potential Initiator States Is Associated with a Lower Likelihood of Interstate War Similar to the previous
finding, large numbers of U.S. troops near potential initiator states are also associated with a reduction in the already low likelihood
that such states will initiate an interstate war. While this reduction is associated with a substantial increase in U.S. troop presence in
 the strategic consequences of this
our models, measured in the tens or hundreds of thousands,

reduced risk may be very important. As before, in interpreting this result it is important to begin by noting
that interstate war is rare, occurring in roughly 0.35 percent of state pairs in a given year even when no U.S. troops are nearby, as
shown in Figure 4.4.

[methodology]
Our Approach to Statistically Modeling Interstate Conflict This section discusses our empirical modeling approach—how we operationalize U.S. troop presence, how we construct our universe of cases (strategically relevant state pairs), how we model the risk of
interstate conflict, and control variables that help isolate the effect of U.S. troop presence on conflict. U.S. Troop Presence While we have collected data on and reviewed trends in different aspects of U.S. troop presence over time and by region, we focus primarily
on U.S. troop presence in our statistical analyses, looking secondarily at the effects of military assistance and alliances. We do so for conceptual and data availability reasons. Conceptually, U.S. troop presence is the most flexible and important aspect of U.S. troop
presence. The United States can move forces more quickly than it can establish new agreements or construct new infrastructure, and putting U.S. lives on the line is one of the clearest ways to demonstrate U.S. commitment to a country or a region. With regard to
data availability, we cannot reliably estimate U.S. basing over time. Moreover, due to the high correlation between U.S. troop presence and U.S. bases, it is difficult to disentangle their individual effects. 34 U.S. Presence and the Incidence of Conflict To address key
distinctions highlighted in our review of potential relationships between U.S. troop presence and the incidence of conflict, we assess the effects of U.S. troop presence while taking into account two key characteristics: where troops are located and whether they are
actively involved in combat. Where Are U.S. Troops Deployed? We define two types of troop locations for our models of U.S. tr oop presence. “Incountry” troops are U.S. forces that are deployed inside a given state, while “nearby” troops are U.S. forces that are
deployed in neighboring or proximate states. In Figure 4.1, we illustrate how U.S. troops could affect the calculations of a hypothetical State A that is considering aggression against State B. Those troops located in State B are defined as the “in-country” troops.
Those troops located in States C and D are “nearby” troops, as they are located proximate to State B but not inside it. We calculate an aggregate measure of U.S. troop presence near State B by weighting the number of U.S. troops in all other states by th eir
distance from State B. The weighting scheme also accounts for variations in the speed that such troops can be moved within a given region.1 Are U.S. Troops Engaged in Combat? To focus our analysis on the effects of U.S. troop presence on the incidence of
conflict, we exclude troops that are already engaged in combat, counterinsurgency, or stability operations from our calculations of the total number of U.S. military personnel in or near a given country. We do so for two reasons. First, troops that are already engaged
in combat cannot be redeployed easily, and thus are less likely to act as a deterrent elsewhere. Second, including troops already engaged in conflict in statistical models examining the relationship between U.S. troop presence and conflict would bias the results—
suggesting a stronger relationship between troop presence and conflict than may exist. For example, while U.S. troops may affect the likelihood of conflict, they also deploy in response to conflict. By excluding troops that have depl oyed to participate in conflict, we
can better isolate the effect of the deployment of U.S. troops on conflict rather than vice versa. When troops participating in counterinsurgency, combat, and stability operations shift to a different activity, such as a deterrent or advisory capacity, they are then
counted in our nearby and in-country troops presence metrics. State Pairs with a Potential for Conflict Our analysis focuses on the set of states that could realistically engage in interstate conflict in a given year. Due to data availability, our analysis focuses on the
period 1951–2007. Within this time period, the set of cases includes all state pairs, known as dyads, for which we assessed that a potential aggressor state likely had the military capability to initiate conflict against a potential target state. We used what is known as
a directed dyad, treating each of the two states in the pairing separately as a potential initiator of conflict and as a potential target of conflict. For example, in a dyad of South Korea and North Korea, there are two directed dyads. In the first, South Korea is the
potential initiator and North Korea is the potential target. In the second, North Korea is the initiator and South Korea is the potential target. The broadest set of directed dyads would involve every possible pair of states. However, because we are interested in the
possibility of armed conflict, we focus our analyses only on those dyads in which that outcome could reasonably take place.2 Limiting our analyses only to relevant dyads removes pairs of states, such as a dyad involving Finland and Djibouti, for which armed conflict
between the parties is not feasible given the states’ military capabilities and the distance between them. Our relevant dyads therefore aim t o include only cases in which State A has the capability to project power against State B. We include two categories of dyads
that meet these criteria. First, we assume that all states have the potential to initiate armed conflict against their immediate n eighbors. We therefore include two directed dyads for each pair of contiguous states.3 Second, since more powerful states can project
military power well beyond their borders, we include unidirectional dyads between these more powerful states and all other st ates in relevant regions. That is, we include a dyad that reflects the potential for the United States to initiate an interst ate conflict against
Afghanistan, but not vice versa. Our list of powerful states in each region draws on prior RAND research that estimated the c apabilities of states across geographic regions and identified those states that possessed at least 10 percent of the military capabilities in
each region.4 Table 4.1 provides the list of regional powers identified in this manner.5 In total, our models assessed interstate conflict behavior among 61,861 state pairyears covering the period between 1951 and 2007.6 Steps Toward Interstate Conflict Our
hypotheses focus on the potential link between U.S. forward troop presence and the occurrence of interstate conflict in the international system. In our statistical analysis, we consider not just higher-intensity interstate conflicts or wars, but also lower-intensity
disputes or militarized behavior. We take this approach for three main reasons. First, more-violent interstate conflicts are often the result of escalation from low-level disputes between states.7 For example, the 1999 Kargil War followed a series of lower-level hostile
exchanges between India and Pakistan. Given their potential for escalation, studying these lower-level disputes can offer information about the risk of war in the international system.8 Second, these lower-level disputes happen far more frequently, making them
more amenable to statistical analysis than higher-intensity interstate wars, which have become rare in the post-1946 period.9 Finally, even if they do not escalate to war, these lower-level disputes can have important consequences of their own, such as arms races
and regional tensions that limit international cooperation.10 Operationally, our models focus on how U.S. forward troop presence affects the likelihood that a state initiates a militarized interstate dispute (MID).11 MIDs include wars and armed conflicts between
states, as well as a wide range of militarized activities short of war, such as verbal threats, nonviolent displays of force, and other more limited uses of force.12 We examine the incidence of MIDs among state pairs at varying levels of intensity. Figure 4.2 provides a
visual representation of this taxonomy. We analyze the incidence of all MIDs as a means of measuring the overall presence of potential hostility in a state pair, and we also analyze two subsets of MIDs, based on the hostility level of the dispute. These include the
incidence of low-intensity MIDs (including threats and nonviolent displays of force in state pairs)13 and high-intensity MIDs (including uses of force, such as attacks and seizures, and higher-level interstate conflicts). Finally, we also examine the incidence of
interstate wars (violent engagements that involve significant fatalities, which are a subset of high-intensity MIDs) as a separate subset of highintensity MIDs.14 Controls to Isolate the Effect of U.S. Troop Presence on Interstate Conflict U.S. forward troop presence
decisions may themselves be affected by the likelihood of conflict in state pairs, complicating attribution of cause and effect in the relationship between U.S. troop presence and interstate conflict behavior.15 For example, the United States is more likely to have a
larger forward presence where it has significant interests or where these interests face significant threats. For example, the United States has traditionally worried about a single hostile power dominating industrial Eurasia. During the Cold War, therefore, the United
States maintained a large presence in Europe and Japan, areas with substantial economic capability that could be threatened by the powerful Soviet military. In another example, although Europe remained a major U.S. national securit y interest after the Cold War,
the fall of the Soviet Union led to a lower level of threat, and therefore, the United States reduced its troop numbers in Europe. Because the United States may put forces where it thinks they are needed most— in areas where competition and war are most likely or
where the stakes are high—it can be difficult to isolate the effect of U.S. troop presence on conflict. From an analyti cal perspective, if U.S. forward presence is correlated with increased conflict, it may be becaus e the United States deploys more forces to conflict-
prone areas, or that the U.S. forward presence itself shapes the risk of conflict. Moreover, other tools of U.S. influence, including alliance commitments and overall U.S. military power, may also affect the conflict behavior of U.S. friends and allies.16 To better isolate
the independent effect of U.S. troop presence, we include additional variables to try to control for these other aspects of U.S. involvement. Our statistical models control for the following conditions: 1. the overall size of the U.S. military force 2. the extent of U.S.
interests in a given state or region 3. the risk of interstate conflict in the state pair in question. First, our models control for the overall size of the U.S. military force in an effort to distinguish between the effects of the localized size of U.S. forces and the global size of
U.S. forces.17 We also include a control for years that took place after the Cold War, when U.S. military hegemony has been the greatest. Sec ond, to account for the extent of U.S. interests in a state, we include the presence of a U.S. alliance and the level of U.S.
military assistance in each state.18 Both defensive alliances and military assistance indicate a U.S. willingness and interest in defending a given state, providing a similar effect as the forward positioning of U.S. military forces. As discussed previous ly, alliances and
military assistance are both aspects of U.S. presence. Including them in our statistical models allows us to better understan d the independent effect that forward troop presence may have, although, as we will see in the intrastate conflict models discussed in Chapter
Six, these other aspects of presence may have independent effects on conflict as well. Third, our models control for a number of factors that could affect the likelihood of militarized disputes or conflict in a given state pair. Drawing on previous RAND research and
an extensive review of the academic literature, we include five indicators most likely to affect the conflict behavior of state pairs:19 presence of a territorial dispute • presence of a mutual defensive alliance • lack of dyadic democracy (i.e., one or both states are
nondemocracies) • minimum level of state wealth • balance of military capabilities in a state pair. Territorial claims are of ten a flashpoint of militarized conflict, especially when contested territory is highly prized by states.20 To operationalize the increased risk of
conflict in the presence of a territorial contest, we include a variable indicating the presence of a contested higher-salience territorial claim within a state pair.21 States that share a mutual defensive alliance are much less likely to take up arms and engage in
militarized conflict against each other.22 As such, we include an indicator for the presence of a mutual defensive alliance agreement in a state pair.23 Similarly, given that consolidated democracies are much less likely to fight one another, we include an indicator of
whether both states in a state pair are governed by democratic regimes.24 In addition, pairs of wealthy states have historically shown a diminished risk of conflict.25 As such, we include the minimum GDP per capita value between the two states in the pair.26 War
and conflict have generally been found to be more common when states have similar military capabilities. In these situations, states are more likely to miscalculate about their bargaining leverage and the prospects for victory in the event of war.27 To account for the
greater risk of conflict when states approach military parity, we control for the balance of military capabilities for each state pair.28 Statistical Modeling Approach To properly assess the relationship between U.S. forward troop presence and interstate conflict
behavior, our statistical models need to take into account characteristics of the data and the contextually specific nature of the relationship between U.S. troop presence and the incidence of conflict. The four most important of these issues that affected our modeling
approach are briefly discussed below. Binary Dependent Variables Since our statistical models concern the incidence of MIDs, which are binary events (a militarized dispute either occurred between the two states or did not), we utilize logit regressions for binary
dependent variables. Logit models are designed to account for the distinct characteristics of binary data.29 Identifying Different Types of Actors A key challenge to empirically testing the theoretical mechanisms linking U.S. forward presenc e and interstate conflict is
identifying the extent to which each country is a partner or potential adversary of the United States. The causal pathways developed in the previous chapter consider the effects of U.S. forward presence on specific actors, such as ally and adversary states.
However, there is no agreed-upon system for identifying the strategic relationship of all states in the international system with the United States. Given the lack of consensus on these measures, our main statistical models b egin by assessing the average effect of
U.S. forward presence on all states rather than differentiating by state type. Additional models attempt to account for different types of actors in the international system. In general, it is easier to identify states that are close allies of the United States (for example,
members of NATO) than it is to identify potential adversaries. For example, while Soviet Bloc states during the Cold War seem logical to include as potential adversaries, Iraq in 1990 and Afghanistan in 2000 would not necessarily have been easy to identify, and
the United States went to war with both states in the following years. Time Lags Data on U.S. forward troop presence and MID occurrence are annual, which can complicate the attribution of c ause and effect. The occurrence of a MID between two states may lead
the United States to strategically move U.S. troops near one or both states. From a statistical standpoint, that could incorrectly make it appear that increases in U.S. troop presence led to the incidence of a MID, when in fact the causal arrow points in the opposite
direction. To account for this problem, we lag variables of U.S. forward troop presence by one year. Interstate hostilities may also be related to many of our risk factors of interstate conflict. For instance, militarized conflict in a state pair may lower the GDP of one
state or prompt a shift in that country’s regime type. Failing to account for this circular relationship may lead analysts to identify erroneous relationships among risk factors of conflict and the incidence of hostilities. As such, we lag our control variables as well, such
that our models analyze the effects of the prior year’s value of each variable on the likelihood of conflict in the observation year.30 Ind ependence of Observations Statistical regression models assume that all of the observations they consider are independent of one
another and experience the same rate of the observed behavior of interest, in our case conflict initiation. Our observations, directed dyad years, do not meet these criteria. There are repeated observations of state pairs, some of which may be more conflict-prone
than others, across time. Moreover, conflict in one year may make conflict the next year more likely. Failing to correct for the clustered nature of conflicts can lead statistical models to identify statistically significant relationships where they may not actually exist. To
correct for these potential complications, our statistical models use clustered robust standard errors and include controls f or temporal dependence.31