SYLLABUS

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES
and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

Labor Law; Arbitration; Words and Phrases; “Arbitration,” Defined.—In labor law context, arbitration is
the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence
and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding.

Same; Same; Same; Arbitration may be classified as either compulsory or voluntary.—Arbitration may be
classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.

Same; Same; Same; “Compulsory Arbitration,” Explained .—Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby
the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are
compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. The essence of
arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party
whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is
normally appointed by the government.

Same; Same; Same; “Voluntary Arbitration,” Explained.—Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand,
referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective
agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution.

Same; Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies.—
In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include
therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name
and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for their
selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

Same; Same; Administrative Law; The voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasijudicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions
are not appealable to the latter.—In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the settled premise
that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite
time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v.
Romero, et al., this Court ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-
judicial capacity.” Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in
a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC
since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Governmental “Agency” or “Instrumentality,” Explained.—An
“instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental “agency” or
“instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts,
or by which a certain government act or function is performed. The word “instrumentality,” with respect
to a state contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function.

Same; Same; B.P. 129; Jurisdiction; Appeals; The voluntary arbitrator performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls,
therefore, within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.—The voluntary
arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under
the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
“instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are
provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees
Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the
forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the
appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later
adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
should be appealed to the Court of Appeals.—A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator
or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards
and commissions enumerated therein.

Arbitration Law (RA 876); Under the Arbitration Law, the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator is
equated with that of the Regional Trial Courts.—In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special
proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the
Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or
in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within
one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the
award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect,
this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall
henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition. Luzon
Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162, G.R. No.
120319 October 6, 1995

G.R. No. 102976. October 25, 1995.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, respondents.

Actions; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Those who can be parties to a civil action may be broadly
categorized into two (2) groups—i.e., persons, whether natural or juridical, and, entities authorized by
law.—Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action: “Section 1. Who
May Be Parties.—Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action.” Under the above quoted provision, it will be seen that those who can be parties to a civil action
may be broadly categorized into two (2) groups: (a) those who are recognized as persons under the law
whether natural, i.e., biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical persons such as corporations, on
the other hand; and (b) entities authorized by law to institute actions.

Administrative Law; Government Owned and Controlled Corporations; Government Agencies and
Instrumentalities; The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) appears to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines.—Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The
ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is common
knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in
corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at
other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the
personality of the Republic.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “Authority” has been used to designate both
incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.—It is worth noting
that the term “Authority” has been used to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies
or instrumentalities of the Government. Same; Same; Same; Agency; The ISA is an agent or delegate of
the Republic, while the Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply
of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.”—We consider that
the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself
is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as “legal personality.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,
duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed
by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof.—When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof such as e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring
agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance,
in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers,
duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory
provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of
the Republic.

Actions; Parties; Eminent Domain; The expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify
the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.—From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff
in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon the
expiration of ISA’s statutory term was not a ground for dismissal of the expropriation proceedings.—It is
also relevant to note that the non-joinder of the Republic which occurred upon the expiration of ISA’s
statutory term, was not a ground for dismissal of such proceedings since a party may be dropped or
added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court’s own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. In the instant case, the Republic has precisely moved to take over
the proceedings as party-plaintiff.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The Republic may initiate or participate in actions involving its
agents.—In E.B. Marcha Transport Company, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court recognized
that the Republic may initiate or participate in actions involving its agents. There the Republic of the
Philippines was held to be a proper party to sue for recovery of possession of property although the “real”
or registered owner of the property was the Philippine Ports Authority, a government agency vested with
a separate juridical personality. The Court said: “It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals,
the Republic of the Philippines acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the
commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. x x x”

Same; Same; Same; No new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being
substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings—the legislative
authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or standing delegation of authority to the President of
the Philippines to exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the
Government.—While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative
department of the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the
Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation
proceedings. For the legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or standing delegation of
authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent
domain on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court
of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538, G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995

G.R. No. 149179. July 15, 2005.*

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. CITY OF BACOLOD,
FLORENTINO T. GUANCO, in his capacity as the City Treasurer of Bacolod City, and ANTONIO G. LACZI,
in his capacity as the City Legal Officer of Bacolod City, respondents.

Taxation; Tax Exemption; Section 23 of Rep. Act. No. 7925 does not operate to exempt PLDT from the
payment of franchise tax imposed upon it by the City of Davao as ruled in PLDT vs. City of Davao.—In PLDT
vs. City of Davao, this Court has had the occasion to interpret Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925. There, we
ruled that Section 23 does not operate to exempt PLDT from the payment of franchise tax imposed upon
it by the City of Davao.

Same; Same; Even as it is a state policy to promote a level playing field in the communications industry,
Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925 does not refer to tax exemption but only to exemption from certain
regulations and requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission.—On PLDT’s
motion for reconsideration in Davao, the Court added in its en banc Resolution of March 25, 2003, that
even as it is a state policy to promote a level playing field in the communications industry, Section 23 of
Rep. Act No. 7925 does not refer to tax exemption but only to exemption from certain regulations and
requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission.

Same; Same; PLDT’s contention that the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause does not refer to “tax exemption”
but to “tax exclusion” rejected.—In the same en banc Resolution, the Court even rejected PLDT’s
contention that the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause does not refer to “tax exemption” but to “tax exclusion”
and hence, the strictissimi juris rule does not apply, explaining that these two terms actually mean the
same thing, such that the rule that tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax exclusions. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, Inc. vs. City of Bacolod, 463 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 149179 July 15, 2005

G.R. No. 164789. August 27, 2009.*

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., petitioner, vs. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T.
IGNACIO, respondents.

Administrative Agencies; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of
an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that
would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of an action.—The nature of
an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law governing at the time the action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by their
waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature
of an action. Thus, the determination of whether the CGA’s cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of
the HLURB necessitates a closer examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority.

Same; Same; National Housing Authority; Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957 granted the National
Housing Authority (NHA) the “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business.”—PD
No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, was intended to closely supervise and regulate the real estate
subdivision and condominium businesses in order to curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. As one
of its “whereas clauses” states: WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling
and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to
pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers
for value; Section 3 of PD No. 957 granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the “exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the real estate trade and business.” Thereafter, PD No. 1344 was issued on April 2, 1978 to
expand the jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
Same; Same; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); We have consistently ruled that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from
contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a
better place to live in.—The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing
number of cases between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue of the extent of the
HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction. In the cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the HLURB
has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and
the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and
statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

Same; Same; National Housing Authority; Presidential Decree No. 957; The National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree.—The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority
must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, “The Subdivision And Condominium
Buyers’ Protective Decree.” Section 3 of this statute provides: x x x National Housing Authority [now
HLURB].—The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums.—The provisions of PD 957 were intended to
encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing
for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation
of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may
take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest
and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB
which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This
ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.

Same; Same; One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by our regular courts.—Another case—Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA (153 SCRA
399 [1987])—explained the grant of the HLURB’s expansive quasi-judicial powers. We said: In this era of
clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well
nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that ‘between the power lodged in an administrative
body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former’. x x x In general, the quantum
of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling
act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the
exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts, One thrust of the multiplication of
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. [Emphasis
supplied.]

Same; Same; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) does not mean, however, that all cases involving
subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction.—The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB
does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction.
As we said in Roxas v. Court of Appeals (391 SCRA 351 [2002]): In our view, the mere relationship between
the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not
automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344. On
this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations. x x x Note particularly pars.
(b) and (c) as worded, where the HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers. As to par. (a), concerning “unsound real estate practices,” it would appear that
the logical complainant would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and
developers or condominium builders and realtors), and not vice versa.

Same; Same; Same; We held in Pilar Development Corporation v. Villar (505 SCRA 617 [2006]) and Suntay
v. Gocolay (470 SCRA 627 [2005]) that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has no
jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyers or owners.—Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development Corporation v.
Villar (505 SCRA 617 [2006]) and Suntay v. Gocolay (470 SCRA 627 [2005]) that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the wordings of Section
1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by
subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in keeping
with the policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.

Same; Same; Same; The only instance that Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) may take
cognizance of a case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim
to a pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit.—In the
cases of Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc. (337 SCRA 115 [2000]), and Cadimas v. Carrion (567 SCRA 101
[2008]), we upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction even if the subject matter was a subdivision lot since it was the
subdivision developer who filed the action against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell. The only
instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted
as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot
or condominium unit. This was what happened in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip (469 SCRA 424
[2005]), where the HLURB took cognizance of the developer’s claim against the buyer in order to forestall
splitting of causes of action.

Courts; Jurisdiction; We held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over a case where the
conflict involved a subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a number of subdivision lots but was not
himself the subdivision developer.—Obviously, where it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint
that the property involved is a subdivision lot, as in Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
Manila (443 SCRA 497 [2004]), the case falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the HLURB.
Similarly, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (442 SCRA 492 [2004]), we held that the RTC had
jurisdiction over a case where the conflict involved a subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a
number of subdivision lots but was not himself the subdivision developer.

Administrative Agencies; Jurisdiction; National Housing Authority; The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: x x x B) claims involving refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.—From these allegations, the main thrust of the CGA complaint is
clear—to compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property because
the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did not own. In other words, CGA claims
that since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the
property free from all liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of
the payments already made. This cause of action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature: x x x B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Christian
General Assembly, Inc. vs. Ignacio, 597 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 164789 August 27, 2009

G.R. No. 84811. August 29, 1989.*

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Statutory Construction; General Law and Special Law; In case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail as an exception to the former, regardless of the dates of their
enactment.—This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been
held that—The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special
act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and
the other as the law of the particular case. x x x The circumstance that the special law is passed before or
after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as
an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication.

Same; Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Statutes conferring powers on administrative

agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose.—Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally
construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.
Fol-lowing this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained
the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested
in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a
subdivision lot.
Civil Procedure; Decisions; A decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down even on appeal except when the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.—It is settled that any
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on
appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel,
which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion
to dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on
appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision
will entail, to nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; National Housing Authority; Presidential Decree No. 957; Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board; The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving real estate business and practices under Sec. 1, of PD 957.—The applicable law is PD
No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs
of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957.” Section 1 of the
latter decree provides as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A.
Unsound real estate business practices;B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C.
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Italics supplied.) The
language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that “exclusive
jurisdiction” over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional
Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board can award damages as part
of its exclusive power to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by subdivision lot
and condominium unit buyers.—On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is
part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide “claims involving refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.” x x x Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD
No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages
and for attorney’s fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision/condominium buyer
who wins a case in the HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney’s fees,
would be forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the
contemplation of the law. (Italics supplied.) Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 84811
August 29, 1989

G.R. No. 106498. June 28, 1993.*

LOLITA DADUBO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Administrative Law; Appeal; The rule is that the findings of fact of administration bodies if based on
substantial evidence are controlling on the receiving authority.—The petitioner’s challenges are mainly
factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are
controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its
own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and
can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Same; Constitutional Law; Due Process; While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as
much as possible, their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases.—The petitioner’s
invocation of due process is without merit. Her complaint that she was not sufficiently informed of the
charges against her has no basis. While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as
possible, their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. As this Court has held, “the
standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as
the element of fairness is not ignored.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Having been given all the opportunities to be heard, which she fully availed of,
she cannot now complain that she was denied due process.—The petitioner had several opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence that she was not guilty of embezzlement but only of failure to comply
with the tellering procedure. Not only did she testify at her formal investigation but she also filed a motion
for reconsideration with the DBP, then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and later
elevated the case to the Civil Service Commission. Having been given all these opportunities to be heard,
which she fully availed of, she cannot now complain that she was denied due process.

Same; Same; Same; Charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution.—The charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It
is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.

Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which a decision is based applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the
Civil Service Commission.—We must also dismiss the petitioner’s complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-
878 failed to comply with the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which a decision is based. We have held that this provision applies only to courts of justice and not
to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission. Dadubo vs. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA
747, G.R. No. 106498 June 28, 1993