Lejano vs People of the Philippines (2011)
190171
10 Nov 201710 Nov 2017
[G.R. Nos. 176389/176864, 18 January 2011, EN BANC] Criminal Law| Crim Procedure
FACTS:
In 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the
accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges
against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to
reconsider its decision, claiming that it “denied the prosecution due process of law;
seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility;
issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the
miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses.”
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.
RULING:
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused
under double jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.
There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of
the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity
of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds
are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused
its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65.
Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his
pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. He has not specified the violations of
due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly
committed.
Rodriguez vs. Judge Blancaflor, GR No.
March 14, 2011
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson
(arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy
involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to
Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one
Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami),
and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the
arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said
case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said
manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually
withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On
June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of
arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan
and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard
their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear
before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible
involvement in Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative
complaint against Awayan, among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose
of Judge Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case
had already been promulgated.
After the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor
issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of
P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for
contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their
rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront
the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge
Blancaflor’s disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was
further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and
contempt proceedings against them.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the
suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.
Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension
and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that
direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge
Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect
contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper,
however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied,
to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may
be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed
by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the
court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint
hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure
which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners.
Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only
learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order,
requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in
the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was
ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the
administrative complaint against Awayan.
In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to
petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within
a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended
from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend
themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and
counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void,
having violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for
suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct
in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
(6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.
De Leon vs. Atty. Castelo
AC No. 8620 (January 12, 2011)
FACTS:
On April 29, 2010, De Leon initiated an administrative case against Atty. Castelo for
alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the
defendants in the civil action (Civil Case No. 4674MN) in which De Leon intervened. He
alleged that various pleadings were filed for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing. As such, complainant
submits that respondent violated his Lawyer’s Oath and The Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 Castelo, in his comments, explained that the persons who had engaged him as
attorney to represent the Lim family were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; that they were already actively managing the family
business, and now co-owned the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their
parents had executed in their favor; and that they had honestly assumed that their
parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names. Likewise, a Motion for
Substitution of Defendants was filed. Thus, whether Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial.
Also, he assured that he had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification,
for he in fact submitted the death certificates of the Spouses in order to apprise the trial
court of that fact.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent violated the letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the pleadings of the defendants
HELD:
No. A plain reading of the pleadings indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, he
directly stated in his answer and clarification that the Spouses were already deceased. He
was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer
with counterclaim and cross-claim. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not
occasion any action against him as an attorney. Also, since the Spouses were no longer
the actual owners of the affected properties, the fact that they are already deceased is
immaterial.
De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses were no longer living. As
voluntary intervenor, he was charged with notice of all the other persons interested in the
litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in
intervention. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any
dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party.
Court also emphasized that good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is
encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient
delivery and proper administration of justice.
Hence, the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G.
Castelo is dismissed for utter lack of merit.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID v. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, AC. No. 7474, 2014-09-09
Facts:
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No.
2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in
Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant
Judge
Jose L. Madrid. [1] Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as
counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795... be
re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where "he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the...
undersigned."[2]
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca's motion to re-raffle through an order issued on
February 14, 2007
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint[4] in the Office of the Bar Confidant
citing Atty. Dealca's unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the
inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse... incidents between
them.
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and
Recommendation[11] finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints;... and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal
basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,[12] the IBP Board of Governors modified the
recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit
Issues:
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges
and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid
in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling:
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca's arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense
of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or
undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any
taint of... insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca's complaint
against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace
of idealism or... altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited
his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out,[16] his bringing of charges against judges, court...
personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions
or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was
thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment
could be a... substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be
reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them.[17]
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other
disciplinary action.[18] The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the
whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients' propensities to litigate,[20] so
must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court's duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against
judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that... are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things.[21]
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the
Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right
must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.[22] Atty. Dealca's bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel... and his fellow
lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations
against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed
frivolous and unworthy of the Court's precious time and serious consideration.
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04... of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself"
upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary."[31] However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty.
Dealca... be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.[32]
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend
the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes
certain... obligations upon them.[33]
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the
respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise,
the... institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of
a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent
in handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to decide cases
without... fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify
Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating
as a... counsel.[36] The latter's bare allegations of Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility did
not suffice,[37] because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble
role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence... and without fear or favor
should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As such,
Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring orders of the Supreme Court
Rule 11.04, supra. constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a
high degree or irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere
Teresita D. Santeco vs. Atty. Luna B. Avance request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders not “only betrays
A.C. No. 5834 (formerly CBD-01-861). February 22, 2011
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful
Facts: In an En Banc Decision dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent orders which is only too deserving of reproof.”
guilty of gross misconduct for, among others, abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or
and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any
suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful
explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
of five years.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
71, sent a letter-report dated November 12, 2007 to the Court Administrator informing
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein
turpitude, or of any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
she misrepresented herself as “Atty. Liezl Tanglao”. When opposing counsels confronted
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted.
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocar’s letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution dated April 9, 2008,
In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of
required respondent to comment within ten days from notice. Respondent, however,
membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform
failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive
herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves
to comment. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court
the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
issued a Resolution on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect
contempt. Respondent was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Php 30,000.00 which
respondent failed to pay.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Avance should be disbarred.

Held: Respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance is disbarred for gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Rationale: As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a
lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.

We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment.
Sebastian v. Bajar teachers