related sexual harassment is committed by an
Domingo vs. Rayala (596
SCRA 90)
Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then
Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the
chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and
touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled
her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not
constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist,
there must be a demand, request or requirement of
sexual favor.
Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.
Rulings:Yes.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our
jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines
work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3.Work, Education or Training-related Sexual
Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor
employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment,
sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the
refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a
way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s
rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the
standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision
calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the
be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise
of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken
request for a sexual favor.
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
GR No. 155831, 2008-02-18
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then
Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala
before
Domingo executed an Affidavit... avit narrating...
ta?"
Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni
Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda
ka yata?"... nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at
hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito
habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya
ng diktasyon.
Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa
8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong
bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina
dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga
papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako... para gawin
ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman
Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni
Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa
silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman:
Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa
mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito
ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-
aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako
Chairman:May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes:Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman:Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes:
Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman:Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes:Nainip po.
Chairman:Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kum... pos
mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang
bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang
amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan.
Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko
tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay
na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina
o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.Tumayo na ako
at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at
pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet.
Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni
Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay
binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga... ng
tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na
isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot
ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC
Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi
niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay
nagpasiya... akong isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako
nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang
naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.Noong huling linggo ng
Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si
Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking
palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman:Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes:Sir, wala po.
Chairman:Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes:Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka
live-in.
Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto
ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax
machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-
aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya
ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone... yung kausap ko,
pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan
ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at
ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib
tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni
Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin
ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy.
Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang
kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay
niya at sinabi:
Chairman:Saan na ba tayo natapos?... sinabi:
Chairman:
Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-
didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang
kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-
pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang
bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang
kanang tenga... at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang
kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang
kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes:
Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero
halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil
sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.[
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for
leave of absence and asked to be immediately
transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for
sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7877 in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Committee)... found Rayala guilty of the offense
charged
OP,... through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued
AO 119... concur with the findings of the Committee
as to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala
What aggravates respondent's situation is the
undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of
his position as the superior of the complainant.
Respondent occupies the highest position in the
NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it
was incumbent upon respondent to... set an
example to the others as to how they should
conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that
his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide
them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-
workers treat each... other with respect, courtesy
and cooperation, so that in the end the public
interest will be benefited
What is more, public service requires the utmost
integrity and strictest discipline
CA... r... held that Rayala's dismissal was proper... r.
The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA
6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
CA modified its earlier Decision:
MPOSED upon the petitioner.
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the
penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IM
Issues:
(DOLE).
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Ruling:
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and
was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the
common factual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the
CA. It should be remembered that when supported
by substantial evidence,... factual findings made by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are
accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts.[39] The principle, therefore, dictates that
such findings should bind us.[
Rayala... e insists, however, that these acts do not
constitute sexual haras
He insists, however, that these acts do not
constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did
not allege in her complaint that there was a... to a
higher... position.[41] Rayala urges us to apply to his
case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.
assment, because Domingo did not allege in her
complaint that there was a demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher... position.[41] Rayala urges us to apply to his
case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.[42
We find respondent's insistence unconvincing.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability
is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the
administrative offense, not the criminal infraction,
of sexual harassment.[44] It should be enough
that... the CA, along with the Investigating
Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala's acts strictly by
the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would
still be administratively liable. It is true that this
provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not
necessary that the demand,... request or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo's
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and
tickling her ear,... having inappropriate
conversations with her, giving her money allegedly
for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken
request for a sexual... favor.
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating
and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly
shown by the common factual finding of the
Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the... matter to an officemate
and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of
absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Ra... ayala's invocation of Aquino v. Acosta[46] is
misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is
different from that in the case at bench... h. In
Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now
Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual
harassment.
In her report, Justice Salonga found that "the
complainant failed to show by convincing evidence
that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a
kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso' fashion, were
carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or...
were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear
from the circumstances that most of the kissing
incidents were done on festive and special
occasions," and they "took place in the presence of
other people and the same was by reason of the
exaltation or happiness of the... moment."
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not
obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the
Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as
casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done
during festive or special occasions and with other
people... present, in the instant case, Rayala's acts
of holding and squeezing Domingo's shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made
in the confines of Rayala's office when no other
members of his staff were around.
More importantly, and a circumstance absent in
Aquino, Rayala's acts, as already adverted to above,
produced a hostile work environment for Domingo,
as shown by her having reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a
leave of absence and... requesting transfer to
another unit.
the question of whether or not AO 250 covers
Rayala is of no real consequence.
. The events of this case unmistakably show that the
administrative charges against Rayala were for
violation of RA 7877;
AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as
an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee
in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
leges that the CA er
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding
that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum
We reiterate that what is before us is an
administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus,
whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in
se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as
the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the
removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as
provided by law." Thus, when... the President found
that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than
the penalty provided by law for such offense. As
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first
offense... of either the administrative offense of
sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the
Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the
penalty of dismissal from the... service, a penalty
which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that
Rayala took advantage of his high government
position, it still could not validly dismiss him from
the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[56]
taking... undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as anaggravating circumstance[57] and
where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed.[58] Hence, the maximum penalty
that can... be imposed on Rayala is suspension for
one (1) year.
Principles:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced
"superiority" which is enough to dampen an
employee's spirit and her capacity for advancement.
It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life...
t is not necessary that the demand,... request or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala's claim, it is not
essential that the demand, request or requirement
be made as a condition for continued employment
or for promotion to a higher position.
n. It is enough that the respondent's acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or... offensive
environment for the employee.
EN BANC
[A.M. No.CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002]
ATTY. SUSAN M. AQUINO,
complainant, vs. HON. ERNESTO
D. ACOSTA, Presiding Judge,
Court of Tax Appeals,
respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The present administrative case filed with this Court
originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint[1] of
Atty. Susan M. Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
charging Judge Ernesto Acosta, Presiding Judge of
the same court, with sexual harassment under R.A.
7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and Code of Professional Responsibility.
In her affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged
several instances when respondent judge sexually
harassed her.
On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after
her vacation in the United States, bringing gifts for
the three judges of the CTA, including respondent.
In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her
room and greeted her by shaking her hand.
Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her
on her cheek.
On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on
official leave, he called complainant by phone,
saying he will get something in her office. Shortly
thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand
and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he
embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free
herself by slightly pushing him away. Complainant
submitted the Joint Affidavit[2] of Ma. Imelda C.
Samonte and Anne Benita M. Santos, CTA Tax
Specialists, to prove that respondent went to her
office that day.
On the first working day in January, 2001,
respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could
see him in his chambers in order to discuss some
matters. When complainant arrived there,
respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to
evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to
enter his chambers alone.
Weeks later, after the Senate approved the
proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and
kissed her.
In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent
called complainant, requesting her to go to his
office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the
Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately,
when they reached his chambers, respondent had
left.
The last incident happened the next day. At around
8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked
her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill
on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany
her. The latter agreed but suggested that they
should act as if they met by accident in respondents
office. Ruby then approached the secretarys table
which was separated from respondents office by a
transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in
front of respondent's table and asked him what he
wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent
seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing
at Ruby who was searching for something at the
secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached
Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and
stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby
said she found what she was looking for and left.
Respondent then approached complainant saying,
me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa.
Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant
instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but
respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her
towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away,
then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime,
respondent sat on his chair and covered his face
with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying
and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that
incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a
note[3] stating, sorry, it wont happen again.
In his comment, respondent judge denied
complainants allegation that he sexually harassed
her six times. He claimed that he has always treated
her with respect, being the head of the CTA Legal
Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their professional
relationship.
On the first incident, he explained that it was quite
unlikely that complainant would ask him to go to her
office on such date in order to give him a
pasalubong.
With respect to the second incident on December
28, he claimed it could not have happened as he
was then on official leave.
Anent the third incident, respondent explained that
he went to the various offices of the CTA to extend
New Years greetings to the personnel. He also
greeted complainant with a casual buss on her
cheek and gave her a calendar. In turn, she also
greeted him.
As to the fourth episode, he averred that he and
complainant had been attending the deliberations
of the Bicameral Conference Committee at the
Senate on the bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA. Hence, when the bill was finally approved that
particular day, respondent, in jubilation and in the
presence of other people, gave complainant a
spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not recall
any resentment on her part when he kissed her. She
even congratulated him in return, saying Justice ka
na Judge. Then he treated her to a lunch to
celebrate the event. Respondent recounted several
times when they would return to the CTA in the
evening after attending the committee hearings in
Congress to retrieve complainants personal
belongings from her office. Surely, if he had malice
in his mind, those instances would have been the
perfect opportunities for him to sexually harass her.
As to the fifth incident, respondent alleged that he
did not call complainant to harass her, but to discuss
with her and Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T.
Forteza, Administrative Officer, the health plan for
the CTA officers and employees. The fact that such
meeting took place was confirmed by a Certification
issued by Lozano.[4]
Regarding the sixth incident, respondent narrated
his version as follows: Complainant arrived in his
office past 9 a.m. that day, followed by another
court employee, Ruby Lanuza. He proceeded to
discuss the CTA Expansion Bill with complainant.
Then he went for a while to the rest room. When he
returned, Ruby had already left but complainant was
still there. Forthwith, he remarked that he forgot to
greet her on Valentines Day, the day before. He
approached complainant to give her a casual buss
on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her
arms to cover her face, causing her to lose her
balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from
falling. Her rejection came as a surprise to him and
made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly,
complainant excused herself and left the room.
Stunned at the thought that she might misinterpret
his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology.
Respondent further explained that the structure of
his office, being seen through a transparent glass
divider, makes it impossible for anyone to commit
any improper conduct inside.
In a Resolution dated August 21, 2001, this Court
referred the instant case to Justice Josefina G.
Salonga of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Justice Salonga set the hearing of the case on
November 6, 2001. However, the parties, through
counsel, manifested that they will not be adducing
any further evidence. On November 7, 2001, Justice
Salonga issued an Order directing them to submit
their memoranda simultaneously, after which, the
case shall be considered submitted for resolution.
On January 9, 2002, Justice Salonga forwarded to
this Court her Report on Investigation and
Recommendation, thus:
We find for the respondent.
"The complainant failed to show by convincing
evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting
her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso'
fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious
desires or were motivated by malice or ill-motive. It
is clear under the circumstances that most of the
kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions. In fact, complainant's testimony that she
was sexually harassed on November 21, 2000, is
hardly believable. Notably, complainant declared in
her affidavit-complaint that she brought some
'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from her trip
abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have been
'taken aback' by the respondent's act of greeting her
in a friendly manner and thanking her by way of a
kiss on the cheek. Moreover, it was established that
Judge Acosta was on official leave of absence from
December 26-29, 2000. This was corroborated by
Ricardo Hebia, the driver of respondent judge, in his
Panunumpa (Affidavit) dated March 26, 2001, where
he stated among others, to wit:
xxx
"Corollarily, the joint affidavit of Ms. Santos and Ms.
Samonte attesting to the fact that respondent
dropped by at the third floor of the CTA and greeted
them Happy New Year, even if it true, can not be
given any evidentiary weight. Clearly, they did not
make any categorical statement that they had
witnessed or seen Judge Acosta making sexual
advances on the complainant. Nor did they even
attribute any malicious acts on respondent
constituting sexual harassment.
"In addition, the respondent admitted that when he
handed a calendar and greeted complainant with a
buss, complainant reciprocated by greeting him a
Happy New Year. The allegation of Atty. Aquino that
the respondent merely used the calendars as 'props'
to kiss her on the cheek and that she was singled
out by respondent is not supported by any
convincing evidence. The affidavit of Ms. Aurora U.
Aso and Renelyn L. Larga that Ms. Carmen Acosta
gave them calendars for the office of Attys.
Margarette Guzman and Felizardo O. Consing, is
immaterial and irrelevant, as Judge Acosta had
stated that he handed to complainant Aquino, a
2001 calendar in the course of greeting her with a
buss on the cheek. Said affidavit could not account
for the calendars distributed to the other offices in
the CTA, more specifically, the Legal and Technical
Staff headed by Atty. Aquino.
"Moreover, the claim of the complainant that she
was sexually harassed immediately after the final
reading of the bill anent the expansion of the CTA at
the Senate, can not be accorded great evidentiary
value. The alleged kissing incident took place in the
presence of other people and the same was by
reason of the exaltation or happiness of the
moment, due to the approval of the subject bill.
Quite interesting to note, is that Atty. Aquino
reciprocated by congratulating respondent and
remarking "justice ka na judge" after the latter had
bussed her on the cheek. Complainant even failed to
dispute the fact that after the kissing incident, she
joined Judge Acosta and his driver for lunch at a
seafood restaurant in Luneta. There was even a time
that she allowed the respondent judge to
accompany her to the office alone and at nighttime
at that, to retrieve her car keys and bag when they
returned to the CTA after the hearing at the Senate
on the CTA expansion bill. These acts are not at
square with the behavior of one who has been
sexually harassed, for the normal reaction of a
victim of sexual harassment would be to avoid the
harasser or decline his invitations after being
offended. In fact, this occasion could have provided
the respondent judge with the right opportunity to
commit malicious acts or to sexually harass
complainant, but then Judge Acosta never even
attempted to do so. Undoubtedly, it could be said
that no strained relations existed between Atty.
Aquino and Judge Acosta at that moment.
"Neither can the alleged continuous call of Judge
Acosta on complainant in the morning of February
14, 2001 to see him in his office, be considered as
acts constituting sexual harassment. Atty. Aquino
failed to state categorically in her affidavit-complaint
that respondent demanded sexual advances or
favors from her, or that the former had committed
physical conduct of sexual nature against her. The
telephone calls were attributed malicious
implications by the complainant. To all intents and
purposes, the allegation was merely a product of
her imagination, hence, the same deserves no
weight in law. Indeed, Atty. Aquino's own version,
indicates that she well knew that the purpose of the
respondent in calling her in the morning of February
14, 2001 was to discuss the CTA Health Plan which
was disapproved by the Supreme Court and not for
the respondent to demand sexual favors from her.
This was corroborated by Atty. Margarette Guzman
in her affidavit dated February 28, 2001, attached to
the complainant's affidavit, where she stated:
xxx
"Finally, while Judge Acosta admitted having pecked
Atty. Aquino on her cheek, which was avoided by
the latter, the same was not meant to sexually
harass her. Judge Acosta's act of extending his post
Valentine greeting to complainant was done in good
faith and sans any malice. This is so because
immediately after the complainant had displayed
annoyance to the kissing episode, Judge Acosta
immediately extended an apology by way of a
handwritten note saying that the incident won't
happen again.
"Parenthetically, the undersigned is convinced that
Ms. Lanuza's affidavit that she supposedly
accompanied complainant to respondent's office as
she allegedly had a previous 'bad experience' with
the latter when he was still an Associate Judge, was
merely concocted to add flavor to the baseless
imputations hurled against Judge Acosta. The
accusation is implausible as Ms. Lanuza did not
seem to complain about the alleged bad experience
she had with Judge Acosta or relate it to anyone
until ten (10) years later. It must be stressed that
Ms. Lanuza is a biased-witness who harbored ill
feelings against the respondent, as she was
reprimanded by Judge Acosta for habitual
absenteeism and tardiness in 1996. More
importantly, Ms. Lanuza did not even attest that she
was a witness to the alleged sexual advances of
Judge Acosta.
"In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's
pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be
understood in the context of having been done on
the occasion of some festivities, and not the
assertion of the latter hat she was singled out by
Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on
her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft
of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent
judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the
'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was
corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms.
Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who
stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or
kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on
occasions when they meet each other, like
birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even
Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is
Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa
Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions like
birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet
her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso'
manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked
respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino
was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers. (Annex "8"
to Comment, p. 65, Rollo)
"In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed
transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's
acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were
merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass
complainant was apparent, only that the innocent
acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did
not even relate to anyone what happened to her.
Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone
in all those incidents.[5]
Justice Salonga then made the following
recommendation:
Considering the above, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the administrative complaint for
sexual harassment and violations of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility be DISMISSED and accordingly,
respondent Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta be
exonerated therefrom; that in view of these charges
which might have tainted the image of the Court,
though unsubstantiated they may be, Judge Acosta
is WARNED to refrain from doing similar acts, or any
act for that matter on the complainant and other
female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals,
which in any manner may be interpreted as lustful
advances.[6]
We agree with the findings of Justice Salonga.
Administrative complaints against members of the
judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care,
for proceedings of this nature affect not only the
reputation of the respondents concerned, but the
integrity of the entire judiciary as well.
We have reviewed carefully the records of this case
and found no convincing evidence to sustain
complainants charges. What we perceive to have
been committed by respondent judge are casual
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, nothing
more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, we find
no indication that respondent was motivated by
malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood
his actuations and construed them as work-related
sexual harassment under R.A. 7877.
As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice:
"A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual
conduct or favor and does not fall within the
purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877.
Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:
'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual
Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach,
trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.
a) In a work-related or employment environment,
sexual harassment is committed when:
1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the
refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in
anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect said employees;
2) The above acts would impair the employee's right
or privileges under existing labor laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.'
"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the
elements of sexual harassment are as follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person has authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, or any other person having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor.
"In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder,
complainant did not even allege that Judge Acosta
demanded, requested or required her to give him a
buss on the cheek which, she resented. Neither did
Atty. Aquino establish by convincing evidence that
the busses on her cheek, which she considers as
sexual favors, discriminated against her continued
employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment. In fact, complainant
continued to perform her work in the office with the
usual normalcy. Obviously, the alleged sexual favor,
if there ever was, did not interfere with her working
condition (Annexes "9" - "9-FFF"). Moreover, Atty.
Aquino also continued to avail of benefits and leaves
appurtenant to her office and was able to maintain a
consistent outstanding performance. On top of this,
her working area which, is at the third floor of the
CTA, is far removed from the office of Judge Acosta
located at the fourth floor of the same building.
Resultantly, no hostile or intimidating working
environment is apparent.
evidence; that the testimony of respondent judge
and his witnesses are credible and therefore, should
be given weight and probative value; that the
respondent's acts undoubtedly do not bear the
marks of misconduct, impropriety or immorality,
either under R.A. No. 7877 or the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[7]
Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no
showing that respondent judge demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from
complainant in exchange for favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or
privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877.
Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of
Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
While we exonerate respondent from the charges
herein, however, he is admonished not to commit
similar acts against complainant or other female
employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, otherwise,
his conduct may be construed as tainted with
impropriety.

"Based on the foregoing findings, there is no

sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy Judge Acosta committed the acts complained of;
exists in a working environment; that Atty. Aquino's determination to seek justice for
herself was not substantiated by convincing
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for
what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her
part to come out in the open and accuse her
superior of sexual harassment. However, her
assessment of the incidents is misplaced for the
reasons mentioned above.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ernesto D. Acosta is
hereby EXONERATED of the charges against him.
However, he is ADVISED to be more circumspect in
his deportment.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part. Counsel to respondent was my
former law office.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., on official leave.
AQUINO VS ACOSTAA.M.
No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002
FACTS:In 2000, (Aquino) reported for work after her
vacation in the U.S., bringing gifts for thethree
judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the
afternoon of the same day, he entered herroom and
greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he
pulled her towards him and kissed heron her cheek.
In another occasion, while respondent was on
official leave, he called complainant byphone, saying
he will get something in her office. Shortly
thereafter, he entered her room, shookher hand and
greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he
embraced her and kissed her. Shewas able to free
herself by slightly pushing him away.On the first
working day in 2001, respondent phoned
complainant, asking if she could seehim in his
chambers in order to discuss some matters.
When complainant arrived there,respondent
tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual
attempt.Weeks later, after the Senate approved the
proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of theCTA,
while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other,respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and
kissed her.The last incident: Respondent called
complainant and asked her to see him in his office
todiscuss the Senate bill on the CTA. Complainant
sat in front of respondent's table and asked
himwhat he wanted to know about the Senate bill.
Respondent then approached complainant
saying,“me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa”.
Thereupon, he tried to grab her.
Complainantinstinctively raised her hands to protect
herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled
hertowards him and kissed her. She pushed
him away, then slumped on a chair
trembling.Meantime, respondent sat on his
chair and covered his face with his hands.
Thereafter,complainant left crying and locked
herself inside a comfort room. After that incident,
respondentwent to her office and tossed a note
stating, “sorry, it won’t happen again.”
ISSUE:WON respondent judge could be held guilty
for sexual harassment.HELD:Respondent judge could
not be held guilty for sexual harassment. The
complainant failedto show by convincing evidence
that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a
kiss on thecheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were
carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or
weremotivated by malice or ill-motive. It is clear
under the circumstances that most of the
kissingincidents were done on festive and special
occasions. Notably, complainant declared in
heraffidavit-complaint that she brought some
'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from her
tripabroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have
been 'taken aback' by the respondent's act
ofgreeting her in a friendly manner and thanking her
by way of a kiss on the cheek. Atty. Aquinofailed to
state categorically in her affidavit-complaint that
respondent demanded sexual advances for favors
from her, or that the former had committed physical
conduct of sexual nature against her.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999]
CARLOS G. LIBRES, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION, OSMUNDO G. WAGA,
JR., ANTOINE D. SEVA, PETER J.
LOQUILLANO, SATURNINO P.
MEJORADA and ISIDRO F. HYNSON,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the
decision of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) sustaining the Labor
Arbiters finding that petitioner was validly
suspended by private respondents, as well as the
NLRC resolution denying petitioners motion to
reconsider its decision.
Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer,
was holding a managerial position with National
Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. On 3
August 1993 he received a Notice of Investigation
from Assistant Vice President Isidro F. Hynson Jr., his
immediate superior, requesting him to submit a
written explanation relative to the charge of sexual
harassment made by Susan D. Capiral, Hynsons
secretary, allegedly committed by Libres sometime
in May 1992, and subsequently to answer
clarificatory questions on the matter. The notice also
warned him that failure to file his written
explanation would be construed as a waiver of his
right to be heard. On 14 August 1993 petitioner
submitted his written explanation denying the
accusation against him and offering to submit
himself for clarificatory interrogation.
Subsequently, Hynson Jr. conducted an internal
investigation to which Libres and Capiral were
invited to ventilate their respective sides of the
issue. They readily responded. Thereafter, Hynson Jr.
submitted his report to the Management Evaluation
Committee (MEC).
The MEC, after deliberation, concluded that the
charges against petitioner constituted a violation of
Item 2, Table V, of the Plants Rules and Regulations.
[1] It opined that touching a female subordinates
hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling
other people that Capiral was the one who hugged
and kissed or that she responded to the sexual
advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her
honor.[2] Referring to the Manual of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer in defining sexual harassment,[3] the
MEC finally concluded that petitioners acts clearly
constituted sexual harassment as charged and
recommended petitioners suspension for thirty (30)
days without pay.
On 5 January 1994 petitioner wrote Melchor Q.
Villamor, Vice President for Manufacturing,
requesting reconsideration of his suspension, but
the same was denied. On 12 February 1994 the
suspension order was finally implemented.
Seeking to reverse his misfortune, Libres filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and unjust
discrimination against respondent NSC and its
officers, private respondents herein, before the
Labor Arbiter. Citing the failure of the MEC to grant
him audience despite his offer to answer
clarificatory questions, petitioner claimed denial of
due process. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan
however ruled that due process was properly
observed and that there was a positive finding of
sexual harassment to justify petitioners suspension.
He pointed out that there was no substantial
inconsistency between the narration of complainant
Capiral and petitioner regarding the incident in the
evening of May 1992. The Labor Arbiter found that
aside from a few facts which were controverted by
Capiral in her complaint-affidavit, petitioners
admissions approximated the truth; consequently,
he ruled that the MEC was correct in including that
sexual harassment had indeed transpired. The Labor
Arbiter observed that petitioner should welcome
that his penalty was only for suspension of thirty
(30) days as opposed to termination imposed in
Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts.[4] In this
recourse petitioner maintains that public
respondent grievously erred amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that he committed
sexual harassment justifying his suspension, and in
concluding that he was afforded due process.
Petitioner argues that the issue of sexual
harassment was not adequately considered as he
noted that the finding of the NLRC was made
without proper basis in fact and in law. He maintains
that the NLRC merely adopted the conclusions of
the Labor Arbiter which in turn were simply derived
from the report of the MEC. Petitioner primarily
disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No.
7877, An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful
in the Employment, Education or Training
Environment and for Other Purposes, in determining
whether he actually committed sexual harassment.
He asserts that his acts did not fall within the
definition and criteria of sexual harassment as laid
down in Sec. 3 of the law.[5] Specifically, he cites
public respondents failure to show that his acts of
fondling the hand and massaging the shoulders of
Capiral discriminated against her continued
employment, impaired her rights and privileges
under the Labor Code, or created a hostile,
intimidating or offensive environment.[6]
Petitioner also contends that public respondents
reliance on Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts[7]
was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina
Gonzagas immediate filing of her letter of
resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the
one year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint
against him. He now surmises that the filing of the
case against him was merely an afterthought and
not borne out of a valid complaint, hence, the
Villarama case should have no bearing on the
instant case.
As regards his assertion that he was not afforded
due process, petitioner would point to his demand
for personal confrontation which was brushed aside
by the MEC. He argues strongly that in rejecting his
plea, the MEC clearly denied him an opportunity to
be heard and present his side.
The issues raised in this petition require this Court
to delve into the findings of fact by the public
respondent. We have ruled in a litany of cases that
resort to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only
to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal
rendering them. It does not include an inquiry on
the correctness of the evaluation of evidence, which
served as basis for the labor official in determining
his conclusion. Findings of fact of administrative
officers are generally given finality.[8] Nonetheless,
the Court shall discuss the matter if only to
emphasize that the contentions of petitioner are
definitely without merit.
Petitioner assails the failure of the NLRC to strictly
apply RA No. 7877 to the instant case. We note
however, that petitioner never raised the
applicability of the law in his appeal to the NLRC nor
in his motion for reconsideration. Issues or
arguments must chiefly be raised before the court
or agency concerned so as to allow it to pass upon
and correct its mistakes without the intervention of
a higher court. Having failed to indicate his effort
along this line, petitioner cannot now belatedly raise
its application in this petition.
Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the
time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It
was still being deliberated upon in Congress when
petitioners case was decided by the Labor Arbiter.
As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case
when their application will favor the accused.[9]
Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC
report and the common connotation of sexual
harassment as it is generally understood by the
public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC
had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the
NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner next trains his gun on the reliance by the
NLRC on Villarama and claims it was erroneous. We
rule otherwise and hold that it was both fitting and
appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of
a managerial employee committing sexual
harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the
periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases
did not in any way reduce this case into
insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the
attention of the Court to focus on sexual harassment
as a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas
petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day
suspension by the NLRC, Villarama, in the other case
was penalized with termination. As Mr. Justice Puno
elucidated, As a managerial employee, petitioner is
bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to
live up to his higher standard of responsibility when
he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when
such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his
dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the
right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its
employees from oversexed superiors.[10] Public
respondent therefore is correct in its observation
that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his
application of the law and jurisprudence for which
petitioner must be grateful and not gripe against.
Petitioner further claims that the delay in instituting
the complaint shows that it was only an
afterthought. We disagree. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres
was Capirals immediate superior. Fear of retaliation
and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation
and embarrassment that victims of this human
frailty usually suffer, are all realities that Capiral had
to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not
detract from the truth derived from the facts.
Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of
Capirals allegations. In fact his narration even
corroborated the latters assertion in several material
points. He only raised issue on the complaints
protracted filing.
On the question of due process, we find that the
requirements thereof were sufficiently complied
with. Due process as a constitutional precept does
not always and in all situations require a trial type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person
is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The
essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[11] It is undeniable that petitioner
was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of
the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising
him to submit a written explanation regarding the
matter; that he submitted his written explanation to
his superior, Isidro F. Hynson Jr.; that Hynson Jr.
further allowed him to air his grievance in a private
session; and, that upon release of the suspension
order made by the MEC petitioner requested its
reconsideration but was denied. From the foregoing
it can be gleaned that petitioner was given more
than adequate opportunity to explain his side and
air his grievances.
The personal confrontation with the MEC officers,
which he requested, was not necessary. The parties
had already exhaustively presented their claims and
defenses in different fora. As stated in Homeowners
Savings and Loan Association v. NLRC, litigants may
be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.[12]
Petitioner has been afforded all of the above means
to air his side. Due process was therefore properly
observed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, no grave
abuse of discretion having been committed by
public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission in upholding the suspension of
petitioner Carlos G. Libres as justified and in
accordance with due process. Consequently, its
decision of 28 August 1995 as well as its resolution
of 31 October 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
Star Paper Corp., vs Simbol
(2006) G.R. 164774 Facts:
Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol
on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee
of the company, whom he married. Before marriage,
Josephine Ongsitco the manager advised the couple
that one of them must resign if they decided to get
married pursuant to a company policy to which
Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997 Comia was
hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-
employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000.
Ongsitco likewise reminded them the company
policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella was
also hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga
also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a
married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company
allegedly could have terminated her services due to
immorality but she opted to resign on December 21,
1999.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states
that the company policy was decreed pursuant to
what the respondent corporation perceived as
management prerogative. On appeal to the NLRC,
the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated August 3,
2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the questioned policy violates the
rights of the employee under the Constitution and
the Labor Code?
Held:
The Court ruled on the side of the respondents.
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It
shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
her marriage. It is significant to note that
respondents were hired after they were found fit for
the job, but were asked to resign when they married
a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be
detrimental to its business operations. It must be
reasonable
under the circumstances to qualify as a valid
exercise of management prerogative. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136
of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in
imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company
PT&T vs NLRC
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company)
initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period
from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on
2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked
to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She
indicated in the portion of the job application form
under civil status that she was single although she
had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage,
its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de
Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain
the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was
a reminder about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. She
was dismissed from the company effective January
29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on
November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil
status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective
laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.
It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing,
according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to
all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de
Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed
acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in
the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor
code:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that
a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.”
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions
stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good
morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by
PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and
ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only
for order but also imperatively required.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION VS GLAXO
(2004)
14 Jan 2018
[G.R. No. 162994; September 17,
2004] Constitutional Law| Bill of
Rights| Equal Protection Law
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF
DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.
TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondent.
The case involves the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees
from marrying employees of any competitor
company.
FACTS:
Pedro A. Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as medical
representative. As stipulated in the contract signed
and agreed by Tecson, The Glaxo provides that an
employee is expected to inform management of any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies. If management
perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employee’s
employment with the company, the management
and the employee will explore the possibility of a
“transfer to another department or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic
relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. In
1998,Tecson married Bettsy, whilst constantly
reminded by the District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy
might engender. When Tecson failed to resolve the
conflicting issue, Glaxo offered Tecson a separation
pay or to be transferred from Camarines to Butuan-
Surigao-Agusan sales area to which the former
refused to abide. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a petition
to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) which affirmed Glaxo’s policy as valid. CA
affirmed NCMB’s decision, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees
marrying employees from competitor companies is
valid, and whether said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. In laying down the assailed company
policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company
will gain access to its secrets and procedures. Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests.
The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement
in the interest of fair play.
The company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause. In the contractual provision and
the policy in its employee handbook, Glaxo does not
impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor
companies. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid
is a conflict of interest between the employee and
the company that may arise out of such
relationships.
Petition is denied.