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Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
PHILIPPINE
COMPETITION
ACT
Isidore T. Tarol III
WHy
COMPETITION
MATTERs
COMPETITION LAW
10
COMPETITION
in a MARKET
Is GOOD
for the
CONsUMERs
10
Imagine living in a town that has only one store where
people buy everything they need, like food, clothing,
toys, medicines, household supplies, and fuel.
Being the only store, the people have no choice but to
buy from that store. Knowing that it will not lose
customers, the store owner can choose to make a lot of
money by raising its prices.
The store owner can also choose to sell inferior
products as it has no incentive to provide better, more
convenient and effective service.
10
Now, suppose that a second store opens in that same town. To attract
customers, its owner may offer more products at lower prices and better
service. As more residents buy from the second store, the first
store has to compete to keep its customers. Competition intensifies as
more stores open. Each establishment will try to outdo the others to
attract more customers. They will be creative and innovative in the delivery
of services, and they will compete for the loyalty of customers.
In the end, customers benefit from an expanded range of
products and services available at
reasonable prices.
11
Without genuine competition, a handful of products and
suppliers could end up controlling the market through anti-
competitive practices such as fixing prices, restricting
supplies, and abusing a position of market dominance.
PROTECTING
CONsUMERs&
ENTERPRIsEs
14
COMPETITION
MATTERs
to the
POOR
Second, it protects small business owners, including farmers and
other small-scale entrepreneurs, from unfair and predatory
business practices that bigger businesses might implement. A
farmer will be able to sell his
products on fairer terms, and will have more options for purchasing
supplies like fertilizer and equipment.
PROTECTING
COMPETITION
leads to ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENEss
.
Economic competitiveness, on the other hand, is determined by a
country’s business environment. A country’s competitiveness is enhanced
when it fosters an environment that supports the growth of industries;
institutionalizes a fair, transparent and effective legal system;
establishes a level playing field; and, adopts a system that eases the
process of starting a business and doing business.
A
LAW TO
PROTECT
FAIR
MARKET
COMPETITION
A
TO
LAWPROTECT
FAIR
MARKET COMPETITION
After numerous attempts over more than a decade, the Philippine government
finally enacted a comprehensive competition law, the Philippine Competition
Act (Republic Act 10667) in July 2015. Before this breakthrough legislation,
competition policy and law was scattered in about 30 different laws (for
instance, the Philippine Constitution, Revised Penal Code, Consumer and Price
Acts, and sector-specific regulations), with outdated provisions and hardly any
jurisprudence.
A
TO
LAWPROTECT
FAIR
MARKET COMPETITION
Private Entrepreneurial
Quality of Life
Investment Spirit
A
TO
LAWPROTECT
FAIR
MARKET COMPETITION
The Philippine Competition Act (PCA) or R.A. 10667 is the
primary law of the Philippines for promoting fair market competition. It is
based on the premise that efficient market competition is an
effective mechanism for allocating goods and services, and that
safeguards are needed to maintain competitive conditions.
A
TO
LAWPROTECT
FAIR
MARKET COMPETITION
It is a game-changing law that is expected to improve
consumer protection and help accelerate investment and job
creation in the country, consistent with the national government’s
goal of creating more inclusive economic growth.
A
TO
LAWPROTECT
FAIR
MARKET COMPETITION
Anti-competitive conduct and agreements can be challenged
under the law. In effect, the PCA promotes and maintains an
environment where businesses compete based on the quality and
price of their goods and services.
PROTECTING
THE MARKET
fro m
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
PRACTICEs
CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS
International
Local Trade
Trade
Anti-Competitive Agreements and Acts. The law provides for per se
violations, namely:
•Restricting competition as to price, or components thereof, or other terms
of trade; and
•Fixing price at an auction or in any form of bidding including cover bidding,
bid suppression, bid rotation and market allocation, and other analogous
practices of bid manipulation.
KEy PROVIsIONsof the
COMPETITION ACT
Other anti-competitive agreements whose “object or effect of
substantially preventing, restricting or lessening competition” may be
prohibited. The PCC balances the efficiency benefits of the questioned
act against its anti-
competitive implications to determine whether or not such act should be
prohibited.
KEy PROVIsIONsof the
COMPETITION ACT
These include:
—Setting, limiting, or controlling production, markets, technical
development, or investment; and
—Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or purchases,
territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any other means.
KEy PROVIsIONsof the
COMPETITION ACT
They cannot consummate the same without the approval of the PCC. The
PCC is also empowered to
promulgate other criteria (e.g., increased market share in the relevant
market in excess of minimum thresholds) that would trigger this notification
requirement.
KEy PROVIsIONsof the
COMPETITION ACT
Review
Advisory Enforcement
Authority
Philippine Competition Commission
Quasi-Judicial
o Violation of the Act
o Motu propio, complaint or referral by
regulatory agency
o Institute civil or criminal proceedings
o Conduct administrative proceedings and
impose sanctions
o Prohibit anti-competitive mergers and
acquisitions
o Issue injunctions, requirement of
divestment and disgorgement of excess
profits
Philippine Competition Commission
PCC Ch a p te r I II
“Antitrust laws… are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom… as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”
— (United states v. Topco Associates Inc.)
WHAT ARE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs?
Section 14, PCA
38
WHAT ARE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs?
Section 14, PCA
38
WHAT ARE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs?
Section 14, PCA
38
Prohibited Acts
1 Anti-Competitive Agreements
WWW.ALBERTOCAGRA.COM
WHAT ARE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs?
Section 14, PCA
38
WHAT ARE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs?
Section 14, PCA
38
ExAMPLEs OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs INCLUDE:
1 Section 14 (a).
2 Section 14 (a).
6
price fixing
A decision by your industry association to
raise prices by a fixed percentage is a
collective recommendation or concerted
action, which restricts competition as to
price. It is a form of price fixing. You must
independently make all decisions regarding
the selling price of your goods.
6
ExAMPLEs OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs INCLUDE:
1 Section 14 (a).
2 Section 14 (a).
6
Bid-Rigging The following are some examples of bid
manipulation:
ExAMPLEs OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs INCLUDE:
39
ExAMPLEs OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTs INCLUDE:
39
K E Y P R O H I B I T I O N S U N D E R T H E P CA E X P L A I N E D
market sharing
7
CARTELs
& COLLUsIVE
AGREEMENTs
.
A cartel is an organization formed by
competitors in a specific industry to enable
them to set prices and control levels of
production. Instead of competing, members
of cartels cooperate in order to jointly
manipulate the market. They can artificially
increase demand for products by cooperating
to lower supply and raise prices.
40
CARTELs
& COLLUsIVE
AGREEMENTs
40
CARTELs
& COLLUsIVE
AGREEMENTs
45
• Exploitative behavior towards consumers,
customers, and/or competitors — excessive or
unfair purchase or sales prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
• Discriminatory behavior — applying different
pricing or conditions to equivalent
transactions; and
45
• Limiting production, markets or technical
development, to the detriment of consumers —
restricting output or illegitimate refusal to
supply; restricting access to/use
of/development of a new technology.
45
PREVENTING
ABUsE of
DOMINANCE
BEFORE
it OCCURs
Dominance in a market means having a high degree
“ of market
power. Abuse of dominant position is defined by the law as
behavior that would substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen competition.
46
PREVENTING
ABUsE of
DOMINANCE
BEFORE
it OCCURs
“For example, if the largest supplier of bicycles in a market were big
enough, it could temporarily sell at a price that is below its cost. This would
attract more customers to its store, and after some time, cause the
closure of smaller bicycle stores that have lost market share.
46
PREVENTING
ABUsE of
DOMINANCE
BEFORE
it OCCURs
This practice is called predatory pricing. Without safeguards against
predatory pricing, the large bicycle store can eventually drive its
competitors out of business, and then, as a monopoly, raise prices to
exorbitant levels.
46
The PCA does not only punish abuses of dominant position. It also
empowers the PCC to impose rules and obligations designed to prevent
abuses by a player with significant market power in the first place.
Ex-ante (or “before the event”) rules such as these are
considered global best practices.
They are preventive measures that can help big businesses avoid
unintentionally engaging in anti- competitive practices, and
provide safeguards for non- dominant players.
46
Abuse of Dominant Position
Ability to Fix
Prices unilaterally Existence of
Market Share
or restrict supply Barriers
50% or more
Recent Conducts
Market Share Factors
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
When the PCC investigates whether an abuse of dominance
has occurred; or when it is considering the imposition of
special obligations on dominant players, it must first
determine whether the concerned company or player is, in
fact, dominant.
Some of the questions to consider in determining whether a
company has significant market power include the following:
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
•What is the overall size of the company?
•Does the company have control of infrastructure not easily
duplicated?
Example: If an operator owns the local loop (i.e., copper cables to every
household) or a company owns a nationwide mobile network.
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
•Does the company have technological advantages or superiority
compared to other competitors?
Example: If an operator has a large research and development
department and
owns intellectual property rights in, or to, the services; or if an operator
has a superior human capital (i.e. skilled workforce).
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
•Does the market show an absence of or low
countervailing buying power from buyers of the relevant
products/services?
Example: If relatively large customers exist and these customers are able
to demand lower prices by threatening to move to a competitor.
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
48
EVALUATING
DOMINANCE
48
&
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
MERGERs
ACQUIsITIONs
There are M&As, however, that harm competition and can be
disadvantageous to consumers. Anti-competitive M&As
especially those that create companies with dominant market
power could potentially lessen, restrict, or prevent market
competition.
&
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
MERGERs
ACQUIsITIONs
Mergers and acquisitions that substantially prevent, restrict or
lessen competition in the relevant market or in the market for
goods or services are prohibited.
&
ANTI-COMPETITIVE
MERGERs
ACQUIsITIONs
An agreement consummated in violation of this requirement
to notify the PCC will be considered void and may subject
the parties to
an administrative fine of one percent (1%) to five percent (5%)
of the value of the transaction.
Anti-Competitive
Mergers and Acquisitions
Covered Not Covered
Substantially prevent, 1. Gains in efficiencies > effects
restrict or lessen of any limitation on
competition (SPRLC) competition
in the relevant market 2. A party to the merger or
or in the market for acquisition agreement is faced
with actual or imminent
goods or services
financial failure, and the
agreement represents the least
anti-competitive arrangement
among the known alternative
uses for the failing entity’s assets
Anti-Competitive
Mergers and Acquisitions
Compulsory Notification If found anti-competitive
o Transaction value > 1. Implementation
P1Billion prohibited
o 30-day ban on 2. Implementation
consummating prohibited conditionally
agreement
(subject to changes
o Information based on
imposed by PCC)
form prescribed in IRR
o Violation: void 3. Implementation
transaction and fine prohibited until new
o Inaction amounts to agreement reached
approval
Anti-Competitive
Mergers and Acquisitions
Procedure
Pre-
Notification
Notification Proper Action
The Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) has blocked the merger between
the two sugar millers in Southern Luzon—Universal Robina Corporation (URC),
and Central Azucarera Don Pedro Inc. (CADPI) and Roxas Holdings Inc. (RHI).
In a Commission Decision prohibiting the merger issued on Tuesday, PCC found
that URC’s buyout of its only competitor in the sugarcane milling services market
leads to a monopoly in Southern Luzon.
The PCC earlier raised competition concerns on URC’s proposed acquisition of
CADPI and RHI assets. The parties then voluntarily submitted commitments but
these failed to sufficiently address the competition concerns.
Case Study:
“The prohibition prevents this deal from creating a monopoly in the relevant
market that could harm the welfare of the sugar cane planters. It is the duty of the
Commission to prevent the creation of monopolies when applying the merger
control powers conferred on it by the Philippine Competition Act,” PCC Chairman
Arsenio M. Balisacan said.
Both mill operators are in Batangas but the monopoly to be created by the merger
will substantially lessen competition in the sugar milling services market not only
in Batangas, but also in Cavite, Laguna, and Quezon.
Case Study:
The Commission also noted that while the transaction mainly affects sugarcane
farmers in Southern Luzon, the sugar processed from these facilities serve
nationwide demand, including that of Metro Manila.
URC is engaged in a wide range of food-related businesses, including the
production of packed foods and beverages, sugar, agro-industrial products, and
bioethanol. Its mills are located in Batangas, Iloilo, Negros Oriental, Negros
Occidental, and Cagayan. These mills produce raw sugar, refined sugar and
molasses for supply to other URC business segments and third parties.
Case Study:
.On the other hand, RHI owns 100% of the shares of CADPI, which operates an
integrated sugar cane milling and refining plant in Batangas. RHI is also engaged in
the trading of raw and refined sugar, and molasses.
“A merger-to-monopoly deal is among the most detrimental types of business
transactions. The URC takeover removes its only competitor, erodes the benefits of
competition for the sugarcane planters, and leaves market power at the hands of a
single provider in an area,” Balisacan said.
P h i l i PP i n e Com P e t i t i o n AC t
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K E Y P R O H I B I T I O N S U N D E R T H E P CA E X P L A I N E D
criminal penalties
15
K E Y P R O H I B I T I O N S U N D E R T H E P CA E X P L A I N E D
criminal penalties
15
Thank You!