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access to Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology
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Now this principle can only be the following: since universal natural laws
have their basis in understanding, which prescribes them to nature
(though only according to the universal concept of it as a nature), the par-
ticular empirical laws must, as regards what the universal laws have left
undetermined in them, be viewed in terms of such a unity as [they would
have] if they too had been given by an understanding (even though not
ours) so as to assist our cognitive powers by making possible a system of
experience in terms of particular natural laws.10
250
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In fact, in various places in the Introductions, Kant suggests that the prin-
ciple of the purposiveness of nature is necessary for the formation of
empirical concepts, the classification of ‘natural forms’ into genera and
species, the unification of empirical laws into a system (theory construc-
tion), the formulation of empirical laws in the first place, and the attribu-
tion of necessity to such laws.25
253
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while our way of grasping this fit requires that we devise a concept of
the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws. Meanwhile, in the
second Introduction Kant says that the principle of reflective judge-
ment is ‘the basis for the unity of all empirical principles under higher
though still empirical principles’.37 This, too, could suggest a distinc-
tion between levels at which purposiveness operates, insofar as the
power of judgement is the basis for the hierarchy of laws.
The purposiveness of nature at its general level takes up the task
of the Copernican revolution. If knowledge claims are to be legiti-
mated, it must be established that concepts are capable of applying
not only to intuitions in general, but, in particular, to empirical intu-
itions. This development of Kant’s argument was established in the
Principles.38 It now transpires that understanding cannot go out into
nature, that is, the concepts are not applicable at the empirical level,
unless there is a further reflective principle of judgement. The final
legitimation of the validity of the categories, first attempted in the
‘Transcendental Deduction’, is only brought to fruition in the
Introductions to the third Critique.
Kant most frequently presents the purposiveness of nature for our
judgement in its more specific sense as the systematicity of nature in
its empirical laws. As Allison says, if there is a distinction between
two levels of purposiveness, there is also a continual slippage bet-
ween them.39 Allison says this makes the task of establishing a link
between the purposiveness of nature and aesthetic judgements
extremely difficult. However, I have suggested that it is possible to dis-
tinguish the general question of purposiveness from its specification,
even if the former cannot be fully stated in isolation from the latter.
The distinction between the two levels of purposiveness is crucial
for making sense of the link Kant draws between the purposiveness of
nature and judgements of taste. But a further clarification is necessary
if I am to establish this.
257
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this ordering capacity with ‘mere cognition’ for the reason that even
the most everyday experience would be impossible without such
ordering [der gemeinste Erfahrung ohne sie nicht möglich sein
würde].64 This must mean that we tend to conflate the empirical
ordering of nature, which at one stage in our development led to plea-
sure, with the transcendental structure of cognition, which does not.
Kant suggests that we need something that helps us focus on the pur-
posiveness of nature.65 In the absence of a characteristic pleasure in
purposiveness, we lack awareness of the latter’s distinctive status. The
title of the next section reinforces this insight, for Kant now turns to
what he calls ‘the aesthetic presentation of the purposiveness of
nature’.66 While he does not say in so many words that aesthetic pre-
sentation counts as exemplary of the reflective principle, it is clear
that this is the function it plays. Aesthetic judgements are singular
instances of something that is generally invisible to us. The beautiful
is, as Kant says in the fourth Moment of the ‘Analytic of Taste’, ‘an
example of a universal rule that we are unable to state’.67 In the
Introduction, this rule is identified as the principle of the purposive-
ness of nature for judgement at its formal level. At this level the prin-
ciple can only be exhibited in an exemplary fashion in a particular
case: it cannot be stated in a general proposition. My claim is that
taste is exemplary only of the general level of formal purposiveness.68
The possibility of cognition is encapsulated in one aesthetic
instance, insofar as this particular object, while not under our epis-
temic scrutiny, nevertheless reveals itself as open to the subjective cog-
nitive activity necessary for cognition. It thus displays the subjective
side of knowledge. But we cannot generalise from this case to con-
clude that all nature is like this, as would be necessary if beauty were
to exhibit systematicity. First, all objects are not beautiful and,
second, there are phenomena that defy our cognitive ambitions.69 At
best, aesthetic judgement can suggest but not prove that it is as if
nature were systematic for our judgement. Thus, aesthetic judgements
are not based on the systematicity of nature for our judgement, as the
latter is strictly heuristic for the furthering of our cognitive projects.
But now we need to look more closely at the stronger claims,
namely, that the ‘Analytic of Beauty’ counts as an exposition, a deduc-
tion and an exhibition of the purposiveness of nature and that this is
proved in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.70 Aesthetic judge-
ments have as their ground the principle of judgement, which rests on
the subjective conditions of cognition. The harmony such judgements
display is a special case of the cooperation of the faculties necessary
263
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When an object is given in experience, there are two ways in which we can
present purposiveness in it. We can present it on a merely subjective basis:
as the harmony of the form of the object (the form that is [manifested] in
the apprehension (apprehensio) of the object prior to any concept), with
the cognitive powers – i.e., the harmony required in general to unite an
intuition with concepts so as to produce a cognition.78
264
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The general fit between mind and world is not merely inferred: it
is experienced in a particular phenomenon. In contrast, the system-
aticity of nature in its empirical laws could only be inferred from a
particular instance. Thus, aesthetic judgements, far from being
grounded in empirical systematicity, indirectly support the latter by
exhibiting the initial conditions of cognition in an empirical applica-
tion.
The singularity of the object under inspection reveals the general
possibility of cognition, but it does not do so as an explicit proof or
demonstration.86 What we get is a snapshot or intimation of the
general purposiveness between mind and world. A singular judge-
ment about this particular instance does not reveal the order of nature
in general. But it does show us that this object, at least, is conducive
to cognition.87 This encourages us in a cognitive hope that nature in
general may also fit with our subjective faculties. Moreover, it
reminds us that experience offers us evidence for such a fit. This sup-
ports the project of cognition and reveals the educative influence of
aesthetics.88 But it is still the case that the purposive fit between mind
and world can only be proven, if it can be proven at all, in the course
of experience itself. It is often put in question and sometimes we are
faced with the contrary insight that there is no harmony between
mind and world. This is only to be expected, for the fit between mind
and nature is strictly a presupposition, and a priori knowledge is a
task, not a mere fait accompli. Having the capacity to introduce
formal structure into the material given is only a necessary and not a
sufficient condition of experience. A priori cognition requires a mate-
rial given and in this sense counts as an anticipation, not simply an
achievement. It is crucial that aesthetic synthesis remains incomplete
or indeterminate and that no concept completes the synthesis.89 Only
thus is the very process of synthesis necessary for cognition in general
available for reflection and it is this that gives rise to the pleasure char-
acteristic of an aesthetic judgement. The peculiar capacity of aesthetic
judgements for presenting the possibility of cognition must be a
fragile one and, as such, the presentation counts as a deduction of the
principle of purposiveness only insofar as it offers an exemplary exhi-
bition of the possibility of cognition. The specific nature of this exhi-
bition will be explored in the next chapter.
It could be objected, however, that while the a priori conditions of
cognition are anticipatory and that even though the formal condition
of empirical knowledge – that is, the principle of reflective judgement
– also so qualifies, it is not the case that empirical knowledge per se
266
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that there is a way of linking the sys-
tematicity of empirical nature to aesthetic judgement via a more
general conception of purposiveness that refers us back to the general
project of the Copernican revolution. I have argued that grasping the
duality within purposiveness, that is, its relational status, reveals how
it is necessary for Kant’s epistemological project. General purposive-
ness is never directly proven, but it is exhibited and as if in a snapshot
in an experience of beauty. In an aesthetic judgement we experience
the subjective conditions of cognition as the cooperation of the fac-
ulties, that is, the subjective side of the Deduction, while at the same
time seeing how a particular empirical object could be determined
by the categories of the understanding. Yet what we actually experi-
ence is not the determination of an intuition under a concept, but the
free play between the faculties of intuition (or imagination) and
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Notes
1. I had already argued this in my article ‘The Technic of Nature: What is
Involved in Judging?’; see especially pp. 184, 186–7. This was first pre-
sented at a colloquium on the Critique of Judgement at Cérisy-la-Salle
in 1993. See, also, Allison KTT, p. 169 and my discussion of the
‘Deduction’ in Chapter 5 (pp. 193–201).
2. CJ, AA 251′. See discussion in final section of this chapter, pp. 260–8.
3. For a discussion of the difficulty of establishing Kant’s view on the rela-
tion between empirical systematicity and the determination of empiri-
cal knowledge, see my ‘Technic of Nature’, p. 180; for a positive
conclusion on the matter, see p. 187. For a perceptive comment on the
gap between transcendental principles and their empirical instantiation,
see Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics,
p. 39. Although reflective judgement allows for the applicability of the
categories, the latter never coincide with their application.
4. CJ, AA 209′, AA 179–80.
5. AA 186 ff; 211′ ff.
6. Kant calls these intrinsic and relative teleological judgements, respec-
tively. For the distinction between these, see AA 378.
7. AA 232′.
8. The phrase is at AA 192, in the title of Section VIII. The confirmation
that teleological judgement counts as logical comes at AA 193. This is
one reason why I prefer to use ‘formal purposiveness’ to refer to the
order that is necessary for any empirical nature whatsoever. Allison, in
contrast, principally uses ‘logical purposiveness’ for the order of empir-
ical nature. See Allison, KTT, pp. 6, 32–3, 169, 354–5 note 11. The
other reason for my preference is that we will see that both judgements
concerning the systematicity of nature and aesthetic judgements display
formal purposiveness according to Kant. Retaining this convergence at
the level of nomenclature makes it easier to go on to make sense of the
substantive link between these two types of reflective judgement.
Admittedly Kant’s own usage is not consistent and he also refers to the
formal purposiveness of nature as logical. See, for instance, CJ AA 219′.
9. Allison, KTT, pp. 38–9.
10. CJ, AA 180.
11. CPR, B 165; see also A 127/8.
12. At CJ, AA 181/2, Kant says that the principle of the purposiveness of
nature is transcendental insofar as it concerns ‘only the pure concept of
objects of possible empirical cognition in general and contains nothing
empirical’. This is contrasted at AA 181 with a metaphysical principle
that establishes the conditions for further determination of the emp-
irically given at the a priori level. The latter is the realm of the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The principle of pur-
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30. AA 183.
31. AA 183/4.
32. Allison, KTT, p. 63. Allison treats the formal or logical purposiveness
of nature as identical to the systematicity of empirical nature. In this,
he agrees with Christel Fricke, see Kants Theorie des reinen
Geschmacksurteils, p. 109. However, unlike Allison Fricke sees a way
of making sense of the link between aesthetic judgements and system-
aticity. She argues that the purposiveness without purpose displayed in
aesthetic judgements reveals the general conditions of the application of
schemata at the empirical level. See p. 115. Düsing gives a similar
account of the relation in which purposiveness without purpose stands
to empirical synthesis in his Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, see
p. 81. I agree that aesthetic judgements display the conditions of empir-
ical synthesis, while insisting with Düsing against Fricke that it is nec-
essary to identify a general level of purposiveness. Meanwhile in
contrast to Düsing, it is my view that purposiveness is principally an aes-
thetic, rather than a teleological, concept.
33. Ibid., p. 63.
34. For a more extended version of this argument, see Hughes 2006a.
35. CJ, AA 202′.
36. AA 202.
37. AA 180.
38. See Chapter 6, pp. 221–9.
39. Allison, KTT, p. 63.
40. CJ, AA 232/3′.
41. See Chapter 4 (pp. 124–6), for an account of the relation between intu-
ition and imagination that explains why the latter can stand for the
former.
42. See Allison, KTT, p. 365, referring to Christel Fricke, Kants Theorie des
reinen Geschmacksurteils, pp. 109–11. Fricke holds that the purpo-
siveness discussed in the third moment of the Analytic is the same notion
of systematic organisation introduced in the Introductions. Fricke con-
cludes that Kant’s position, as it stands, is incoherent. Allison insists that
the two discussions do not deal with the same issue.
43. Allison, KTT, p. 64. See Chapter 5 (p. 198) where I cited this passage.
44. CJ, AA 220′.
45. AA 232′.
46. AA 220′.
47. Howard Caygill, Art of Judgement, p. 316. See also Howard Caygill, A
Kant Dictionary, pp. 387–8.
48. Though, as Kant says, for the sake of understanding, which (as we have
seen) could not operate at the empirical level without the power of
judgement. See pp. 249–55.
49. AA 221′.
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50. See my ‘Technic of Nature’ p. 184, where I claim that the two forms of
reflective judgement are different modes of access to the same principle
of judgement. This is close to Allison’s position (see Allison, KTT,
p. 64), although he would disagree with my further claim that the pur-
posiveness of nature reveals the subjective conditions of cognition.
51. See my discussion of the ‘Dialectic of Taste’ in Chapter 8 (pp. 299–302).
At AA 246, Kant states: ‘Independent natural beauty reveals to us a
technic of nature that allows us to present nature as a system in terms
of laws whose principle we do not find anywhere in our understanding:
the principle of a purposiveness directed to our use of judgment as
regards appearances.’ This strongly supports those readings, such as my
own and Fricke’s, that insist on the continuity between discussions of
purposiveness in the Introductions and the main body of the text.
52. CJ, AA 251′. Kant’s claim that the Analytic will provide a deduction of
taste could be seen as evidence for the position that Section 21 counts
as a first attempt at a deduction pace Allison. See Chapter 5
(pp. 189–94).
53. AA 247′.
54. AA 193.
55. See above, p. 258.
56. For a more positive account of Kant’s attempt to connect aesthetic
judgement and the purposiveness of nature, see Douglas Burnham,
Kant’s Philosophies of Judgement, p. 161. Referring to CJ, AA 300,
Burnham brings out how beauty counts as a trace (Spur) or hint (Wink)
of purposive action. See also Burnham, p. 164, where he says that
beauty ‘is not merely the ‘image’ but the symbol of the empirical system
of laws, of the immanent lawfulness of nature’.
57. See Ameriks’ helpful review of Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.
58. Moreover, Makkreel reads cognition as imposing form on matter. See
discussion in Chapter 4, p. 157.
59. See Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, pp. 249–55.
60. See discussion in Chapter 4, p. 159.
61. CJ, AA 220–1′.
62. See Chapter 4 (pp. 151–6) on synthetic process and my discussion of the
significance of the introduction of the power of judgement in Chapter 5
(pp. 194–201).
63. CJ, AA 187.
64. AA 187. Kant’s phrasing here is rather confusing, compounded by his
referring to three feminine nouns, Faßlichkeit, Einheit and Lust.
However, I take it he must be saying that our being able to grasp nature
and its unity in its division into genera and species, not the pleasure once
associated with this ability, is necessary for experience. This interpreta-
tion is supported not only by the fact that he could hardly claim that
something that is no longer the case is necessary, but also that he goes
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69. On the first issue, see Chapter 8 (pp. 284–90). I intend to argue else-
where that the sublime is a symbol of the limitation on our will to know.
70. CJ, AA 251′, 193 and 247′, respectively. See above, p. 261.
71. See Chapter 4 (pp. 152–6) where I first suggested this.
72. See pp. 255–7.
73. AA 287. See Chapter 5, p. 195.
74. AA 287. See Chapter 4 (pp. 151–6) on synthetic process.
75. AA 189–90.
76. AA 190.
77. Guyer, ‘Formalism and the Theory of Expression in Kant’s Aesthetics’.
I discuss this problem in Chapter 8 (pp. 280–4).
78. AA 192.
79. Compare AA 220′. See discussion on pp. 259–60.
80. AA 193. I have removed Pluhar’s emphasis, which is not in the original
text.
81. AA 187–8.
82. In general, exhibition (Darstellung) consists in placing beside a concept
an intuition corresponding to it, see AA 192. See Pluhar’s note to AA
233. In this case the concept does not subsume the intuition under it. It
is for this reason I speak of an exemplary exhibition.
83. AA 190. See also AA 249′.
84. AA 190. See also AA 192.
85. AA 192. He says, specifically, that judgements of the sublime do not
display this characteristic of judgements of taste.
86. See Chapter 8, pp. 284 and 295.
87. This reveals that aesthetic experience is educative in the sense that it
encourages our cognitive exploration of the world. But it is not didac-
tic, because the insight and encouragement it gives is only ever exem-
plary. We are encouraged to pursue ‘cognition in general’, but we are
given no rules for that task.
88. Although I am mostly here concerned with the pre-cognitive status of
aesthetic judgement, this is not incompatible with the position that aes-
thetic judgement also plays a post-cognitive role in encouraging the
development of our knowledge. One way in which Kant suggests this is
in saying that an aesthetic judgement involves the ‘quickening’ of our
cognitive powers; see AA 222. Makkreel’s account is extremely helpful
in this regard. See discussion in Chapter 4, pp. 158–60.
89. See Chapter 4 (pp. 151–6) on synthesis in process. See Chapter 8
(p. 283) on indeterminacy of aesthetic form.
90. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Book 4, Aph. 324.
91. See extensive discussion of this in Chapter 5.
92. The bridge between understanding and reason would have to be strictly
propadeutic. That is, the harmony between intuition and understanding
in aesthetic judgement can serve as a symbol for the possibility of the
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