GAME THEORY 5 cfu

11 November 2017

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /8 Ex. 2: /10 Ex. 3-7: /10 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
Given the following bi-matrix game, where a, b are real parameters
 
(2, 0) (3, 0) (a, 7)
 (4, b) (4, 4) (1, 3)  ,
(13, 0) (2, 6) (0, 0)

1. find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies for different values of a, b ∈ R;

2. find for which values of a and b one outcome can be found with elimination of strictly dominated strategies;
3. find the best reaction of the second player to the strategy (p, 21 , 12 − p) of the first player.
Answer of exercise 1

1. The Nash equilibria in pure strategies are the outcome (4, 4) if b ≤ 4 and (a, 7) if a ≥ 1.

2. There is a unique outcome with elimination of dominated strategies if a < 1 and b < 4.

3. If the first player plays x = (p, 12 , 21 − p), the second player gets 2b from the first column, 5 − 6p from the
second one and 7p + 23 from the last one. Then his best response is:
7
If p < 26

(1, 0, 0)
 if b > 10 − 12p
BRII (x) = (q, 1 − q, 0) if b = 10 − 12p

(0, 1, 0) if b < 10 − 12p


7
If p > 26 
(1, 0, 0)
 if b > 14p + 3
BRII (x) = (q, 0, 1 − q) if b = 14p + 3

(0, 0, 1) if b < 14p + 3


7
If p = 26 
88
(1, 0, 0)
 if b > 13
BRII (x) = (q − 1, q2 , 1 − q1 − q2 ) 88
if b = 13
 88
(0, q, 1 − q) if b <

13
 Exercise 2
Consider the following cooperative game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3} and

v({i}) = 0 ∀i ∈ N, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 2,

v({2, 3}) = a, v(N ) = 5.

1. Say when the game is super-additive;

2. Say when the game is convex;
3. Say when the core is non-empty;
4. Draw a picture of the core for a = 4;
5. Find the Shapley value.
Answer of exercise 2

1. A game is super-additive if v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for any A, B such that A ∩ B = ∅. This game is
super-additive if a ≤ 5.

2. A game is convex if v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for any A, B. This game is convex if a ≤ 3.

3. The core is non empty if a ≤ 5.

4. If a = 4 the core is the convex set generated by (0, 2, 3), (0, 3, 2), (1, 3, 1), (1, 1, 3).

5. The Shapley value is ( 7−a 8+a 8+a

3 , 6 , 6 ).
Ex. 3 — How many (non trivial1 ) perfect information games exist such that the first player has two strategies and
the second one 24 strategies? Why?

There are 4 games with different structures in which the first players has 2 strategies and the second one 24.
If player I has 2 strategies, then he only has two moves at the beginning. Player II instead can have 24 moves after
only one of I choice, or 12 and 2 moves, or 8 and 3, or 6 and 4 as described by the following games.
I I I I

II II II II II II II

Ex. 4 — Solve the following zero sum game  

4 3
 1 4 .
2 1

The optimal strategies are {( 34 , 41 , 0), ( 14 , 43 )} and the value of the game is 13
4 .

Ex. 5 — Given the weighted majority game [q; 1, 1, 3, 3] find q such that the core of the game is non-empty.

The core is non empty iff there is at least one veto player, thus if 6 ≤ q ≤ 8.

Ex. 6 — Consider the matching problem with set of men M = {Andrew, Bart} and set of women W = {Catherine,
Danielle}. Provide an example of a preference profile for players such that there is a unique stable matching.

For instance, if Andrew prefers Catherine and Catherine prefers Andrew there is a unique stable set.

1
Non trivial means that each non terminal node has at least two children
Ex. 7 — Solve the following game using backward induction.
I

a b
II N
c d 1/4 3/4
N II
(2,1) (3,2)
1/3 2/3 e f

(3,4) (2,4) (-1,3) (1,0)

The optimal strategies are {a, de} and the expected outcome is ( 37 , 4).

Theory Question

1. Definition of the core;

2. Nonemptyness of the core for simple games;

3. The LP formulation of the nonemptyness of the core and the dual formulation.
 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
11 November 2017

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /8 Ex. 2: /10 Ex. 3-7: /10 Theory: /7.

Theory Question
1. Definition of the core;
2. Nonemptyness of the core for simple games;
3. The LP formulation of the nonemptyness of the core and the dual formulation.
Answer
1. The core is the solution C : G(N ) → Rn such that
n
( )
X X
C(v) = x ∈ Rn : xi = v(N ) ∧ xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N
i=1 i∈S
P
The conditions i∈S xi ≥ v(S) state that all coalitions are satisfied withPthe utility distribution of the players
belonging to it (since together they could not do better), the condition ni=1 xi = v(N ) states feasibility and
efficiency at the same time.

2. Let v be a simple game. Then C(v) = ∅ if there is no veto player (VP). If there is at least a veto player the
core is the convex polytope with extreme points the vectors (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) where the 1 corresponds to a VP
ProofPIf there is no veto player, then for every i N \ {i} is a winning coalition. Suppose (x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ C(v),
then j6=i xj = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Summing up the inequalities:
n X
X n
X
xj = (n − 1) xj = n
i=1 j6=i j=1

a contradiction since nj=1 xj = 1. Conversely, any imputation assigning zero to all the non-veto players is in
P
the core, as it is easy to see, since v(S) = 1 implies that all VP belong to S

3. Given a game v, consider the following LP problem

n
X
min xi (1)
i=1
X
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N (2)
i∈S

The LP problem (1),(2) has always a nonempty set of solution C. The core C(v) is nonempty and C(v) = C
if and only if the value of the LP is v(N )

The LP problem (1),(2) associated to the core problem has the following matrix form

minhc, xi :
Ax ≥ b
where c, A, b are the following objects:
c = 1n , b = (v({1}), v({2}), v({3}), . . . , v(N ))
and A is a 2n − 1 × n matrix with the following features
 (a) it is boolean (i.e. made by 0’s and 1’s)
(b) the 1’s in the row j are in correspondence with the players in Sj

From duality theory we know that the dual of the problem takes the form
 P
 max S⊆N λS v(S)
λ ≥0
 PS
S:i∈S⊆N λS = 1 f or all i
Since the primal does have solutions, the fundamental duality theorem states that also the dual has solution,
and there is no duality gap. Thus the core C(v) is nonempty if and only if the value V of the dual problem is
such that V ≤ v(N ). It follows:
C(v) 6= ∅ if and only if every vector (λS )S⊆N fulfilling the conditions

λS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ N and
X
λS = 1 f or all i = 1, . . . , n
S:i∈S⊆N

verifies also: X
λS v(S) ≤ v(N ).
S⊆N

Then if you want you can add further considerations they are welcome!
 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
16 January 2018

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /9 Ex. 2: /8 Ex. 3-7: /10 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
Given the following zero sum game  
2 5
 6 1 ,
b 3

1. Find the conservative value of the players in pure strategies;

2. find the optimal mixed strategies and the value of the game if b = 3;
3. find the optimal mixed strategies and the value of the game if b = 5;
4. find the optimal mixed strategies and the value of the game if b = 4.
Answer of exercise 1

1. The conservative values are 

3
 if
vI = b if vII = 5

2 if


2. If b = 3 the optimal strategies are {( 58 , 38 , 0), ( 12 , 12 )} and v = 27 .

3. If b = 5 the optimal strategies are {( 25 , 0, 35 ), ( 25 , 35 )} and v = 19

5 .

4. If b = 4 the optimal strategies are {( 41 + x, x, 34 − 2x), ( 12 , 21 )} with x ∈ [0, 83 ] and v = 72 .

In the following picture the three different cases are represented.

1 p
 Exercise 2
Consider the following cooperative game (N, v), where N = {1, 2, 3} and

v(i) = 0, v({1, 2} = v({1, 3}) = 5, v({2, 3}) = 4, v(N ) = 10

1. Find the extreme points of the core and draw a picture of it;
2. compute the Shapley value;
3. compute the nucleolus of the game.
Answer of exercise 2

1. The extreme points of the core are (6, 0, 4), (6, 4, 0), (5, 5, 0), (0, 5, 5), (5, 0, 5).

2. The Shapley value is ( 11 19 19

3 , 6 , 6 ).

3. The nucleolus is (4, 3, 3).

Ex. 3 — Given the nim game (8, 10, 4, 5), show that this is an N -position and describe the starting winning move
or moves of the first player.
Answer
The nim sum is 0011, thus this is an N -position. The first player has one winning move: to take 1 from 10 so that
the other player has (8, 9, 4, 5) that is a P -position.

Ex. 4 — Write an example of game in extensive form with two players such that player one’s strategies are T, B,
player two’s strategies are L, R and the Nash equilibria of the game are (T, L) and (B, R).
Answer
The following tree satisfies the conditions if a, b, c, d, e are real numbers such that c > a and a > e.
I

T B

II
(a,b)
L R

(c,d) (e,d)

Ex. 5 — Find the Nash equilibria of the two players game defined by (X, Y, f, g) where X = Y = [0, 1] and

f (x, y) = 3xy + y − 2x + 1 g(x, y) = 2y − x − 4xy

Answer
The best reply functions of the two players are
 
2 1
x = 1
 if y > 3 y = 0
 if x > 2
BRI = x ∈ [0, 1] if y = 2 BRI = y ∈ [0, 1] 1
3 if x = 2
 2
 1
x=0 if y < y=1 if x <
 
3 2

The Nash equilibrium is ( 12 , 32 ).

Ex. 6 — Use the properties of the Shapley value to efficiently calculate it in the game (N, v) where v(S) = |S|2 +1
for any S ⊆ N and S 6= ∅.
Answer
2
All players are symmetric, the Shapley value satisfies symmetry and efficiency and thus it is σi (v) = n n+1 for any
player, where n = |N |.

Ex. 7 — Suppose there are four friends: Ann, Bea, Cathy, Desi that have to share two bedrooms (with two beds
in each). Find a preference for each girl over her friends such that this matching problem does not have a stable
solution. Find another example of preference profile such that there is at least one stable solution.
Answer
There is not a stable solution if, for instance, the preferences are the following:

B:C>D>A
C:D>B>A
D:B>C>A
A : ...

There is a stable solution if Cathy’s first preference is Desi and Desi’s first preference is Cathy, for instance.
 Theory Question

1. Definition of Nash equilibrium

2. Definition of correlated equilibrium

3. Relation between Nash and correlated equilibria

 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
February 7, 2018

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /9 Ex. 2: /8 Ex. 3-7: /10 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
Given the following game  
(1, 10) (2, 0) (8, b)
 (2, 0) (0, 1) (a, 2)  ,
(4, 0) (1, 20) (0, 4)

1. find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies;

2. find all values of a, b such that the player at the strategy profile [( 31 , 13 , 13 ), ( 12 , 0, 12 )] have the same expected
value;
3. find the best response of player I to the strategy ( 13 , 13 , 13 ) of the second one;
4. find all the Nash equilibria of the form {(p, 1 − p, 0), (q, 0, 1 − q)} and for a = 0 and b = 0;
Answer of exercise 1

1. The Nash equilibria in pure strategies are (8, b) if b ≥ 10 and a ≤ 8 and (a, 2) if a ≥ 8.

2. If they play x = ( 31 , 31 , 31 ), y = ( 12 , 0, 21 ), the expected values for the two players are f (x, y) = 15+a
6 and
g(x, y) = 16+b
6 . They are equal if a = b + 1.

3. The best reply for player I is 

(1, 0, 0)
 if a < 9
BRI = (p, 1 − p, 0) if a = 9

(0, 1, 0) if a > 9


4. There is a Nash equilibrium of the form {(p, 1 − p, 0), (q, 0, 1 − q)} if the following holds

10p = 2(1 − p) ≥ 1 − p q + 8(1 − q) = 2q ≥ 4q

These conditions imply q = 0 and there is not a Nash equilibrium of that form (because BRI (0, 0, 1) = (1, 0, 0)
but BRII (1, 0, 0) = (1, 0, 0) 6= (0, 0, 1)).
 Exercise 2
Consider the weighted majority game with N = {1, 2, 3} and v = [10; 3, 8, 5].
1. List the winning coalitions;
2. find the core of the game;
3. find the Shapley and the Banzhaf values.
Answer of exercise 2

1. The winning coalitions are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, N .

2. Player 2 is a veto player, the core is (0, 1, 0).

3. The Shapley value is ( 61 , 32 , 16 ) and the Banzhaf value is ( 14 , 34 , 14 ).

Ex. 3 — Consider the following matching problem with Men={x, y, z} and Women={A, B, C} and the following
preferences:
A x B x C, A y C y B, A z B z C
x A y A z, y B x B z
Find the preferences of woman C such that the men and women visiting algorithms last the same number of days.
Answer
The men visiting algorithm lasts 2 days and does not depend on the preferences of C. If the women visiting algorithm
is applied it lasts 2 days when the preferences of C are x > z > y

Ex. 4 — Provide an example of a game with two players in strategic form such that there is a unique correlated
equilibrium.
Answer
For instance, there is a unique correlated equilibrium if there is only one equilibrium in dominant strategies, such as
in the prisoner dilemma.

Ex. 5 — What is the condition of super additivity for a TU-game? Find a such that the following game is super
additive:
v({i}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = a, v({2, 3}) = 1, v(N ) = 2

Answer
A game is super additive if v(A ∪ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) for any A, B such that A ∩ B = ∅. This game is never super
additive since v({2, 3}) = 1 < v({2}) + v({3}).

Ex. 6 — Find the optimal strategies and the value of the following zero sum game
 
4 3 1 4
.
2 2 3 5

Answer
The optimal strategies are {( 31 , 32 ), (0, 13 , 32 , 0)} and the value of the game is 73 .

Ex. 7 — Solve the following game.

I

a b
II N
c d 1/4 3/4
N II
(2,1) (3,2)
1/3 2/3 e f

(3,4) (2,4) (-1,3) (1,0)

Answer
The optimal strategies are a, de and the expected outcome is ( 73 , 4).
 Theory Question

1. Describe the type of solutions one can get starting from the Zermelo theorem

2. provide examples of these types of solutions

3. prove the Bouton theorem for the Nim game

 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
July 4, 2018

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /8 Ex. 2: /8 Ex. 3-7: /12 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
Each node in the graph below contains a treasure with gold coins which are worth va = 100, vb = 50, vc = 100, vd =
150, and ve = 200 respectively. Player 1 can choose either node a or b, while player 2 can chose any of the nodes
c, d or e. Each player gets the coins closer to her location, whereas equidistant nodes are shared equally among both
players.

d b

e a

1. Model the situation as a normal form game, write down the payoff matrices.
2. Find all possible Nash equilibria in pure and/or mixed strategies.
3. Show that this game is equivalent to a zero-sum game.
Answer of exercise 1

1. The payoff matrix is the following

 
(325, 275) (225, 375) (200, 400)
(225, 375) (200, 400) (275, 325)

2. There is only one Nash equilibrium that is {( 35 , 14 ), (0, 34 , 14 )}.

3. This is a zero-sum game since players are dividing the same amount. The following zero sum game has the
same equilibria of the previous game  
25 −75 −100
−75 −100 −25
 Exercise 2
In a committee of 7 people there are two veto players, and the majority is obtained with at least other two joining
the veto players.
1. Show that the situation can be described as a weighted majority game.
2. Find the Shapley value of the players.q
3. Find the Banzhaf value of the players.
4. Describe the core of the game.
5. Find the nucleolus of the associated game.
Answer of exercise 2
Suppose that the veto players are players 1 and 2.

1. The situation can be described, for example, as the weighted majority game [10; 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].

2. In a simple TU-game v the Shapley value of a player i is given by

X (|A| − 1)!(n − |A|)!
σi (v) =
n!
A∈Ai

where the sum is over all the coalitions A that contain i, A is winning, and A \ {i} is not winning.
For a non-veto player i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7} the sum is over all subsets A that contain i as well as the 2 veto players
and exactly one other non-veto player j different from i. There are exactly 4 such sets (one for each non-veto
player j 6= i), and moreover all these sets have exactly 4 elements |A| = 4, so that

3!(7 − 4)! 1
σi = 4 · = for all i = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
7! 35
Now, for the veto players we know by symmetry that their Shapley values satisfy σ1 = σ2 , and since the sum
of all the Shapley values is equal to the value of the full coalition v(N ) = 1 it turns out that

1 3
σ1 = σ2 = (1 − 5 · 35 )/2 = .
7
3 3 1 1 1 1 1


Thus the Shapley value is 7 , 7 , 35 , 35 , 35 , 35 , 35 .

3. To compute the Banzhaf value we must only count the number of coalitions A ∈ Ai and divide by 2n−1 = 26 .
For a non-veto player i ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7} we get

|Ai | 4 1
σi (v) = 6
= 6 = .
2 2 16
Now, for a veto player i ∈ {1, 2} we have that
Ai consists of all subsets that contain both veto players and
at least 2 non-veto players. Now, there are 52 = 10 such subsets that contain exactly 2 non-veto players,
5 5 5




3 = 10 containing 3 non-veto players, 4 = 5 containing 4 non-veto players, and 5 = 1 containing all 5
non-veto players, so that
|Ai | 10 + 10 + 5 + 1 26 13
σi (v) = 6 = 6
= 6 =
2 2 2 32
13 13 1 1 1 1 1


and the Banzhaf value is 32 , 32 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 .

4. Since players 1 and 2 are veto players, the core is given by

C(v) = co{(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)}.

Therefore, by symmetry, we get that the nucleolus is ν(v) = ( 12 , 12 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).

Ex. 3 — Given the zero sum game
 
2 3 0
 −1 4 1 
1 0 −2

1. Reduce the game by iteratively eliminating strictly dominated strategies.

2. Find the optimal strategies of the players and the value of the game.
Answer
1
The optimal strategies are {( 4 , 0, 4 ), ( 2 , 2 , 0)} and the value of the game is 12 .
3 1 1

Ex. 4 — Suppose that in a finite two person game weakly dominated strategies are deleted. Prove that a Nash
equilibrium can be still found for the original game

Ex. 5 — Provide an example of a TU-cooperative game in which the Shapley value of all players is equal to 1.
Provide another example of a TU-cooperative game in which the Shapley value of all players is equal to 1 and in
which there are 4 players and the core of the game is (1, 1, 1, 1).
Answer
An example of a game that satisfies both conditions is for instance the game with n players such that v(S) = |S|
for any S 6= ∅.

Ex. 6 — Consider the chomp game 2×4 represented in the figure. Prove that the only
5 6 7 8
winning starting move for player I is to take the square with the number 8.
1 2 3 4
Answer
Taking a square below is a losing move since it leaves a rectangle to the second player.
If the first one takes 7, the second can win taking 4. If the first one takes 6, the second can win taking 3. If the
first one takes 5, the second can win taking 2.
Since in the finite chomp game player I has a winning strategy, the first winning move is to take 8.

Ex. 7 — Write the the following game in strategic form and find all the correlated equilibria.
I

II II

(2,1) (1,3) (0,1) (3,2)

Answer
The strategic form is  
(2, 1) (1, 3)
(0, 1) (3, 2)
(3,2) is a Nash equilibrium with strict dominating strategies, thus it corresponds to the unique correlated equilibrium
of the game.
 Theory Question
Consider a general zero sum game

1. define the conservative values of the players;

2. describe the connections between the Nash equilibria and the existence of optimal strategies and the value of
the game;

3. write a linear programming formulation for finding the optimal strategies of the players.
 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
July 17, 2018

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /8 Ex. 2: /8 Ex. 3-7: /12 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
A guard is trying to catch a burglar in a museum with 6 rooms connected as in the map below. The guard will
catch the burglar if they happen to be either in the same room or in contiguous room. In that case the guard gets
a payoff of 1 and the burglar -1. Otherwise the guard gets -1 and the burglar 1.

B D

A F

C E

1. Find the (weakly) dominated strategies for the players.

2. Write the matrix of the game ignoring dominated strategies.
3. Write a mixed equilibrium for the players.
 Exercise 2
Consider the airport game (sharing costs) with three players. 1Km runway costs c1 , 2Km’s runway costs c2 and
the three km’s runway costs c3
1. Find c1 , c2 , c3 in such a way that the first company pays 1.000, the second one 2.000 and the third one 3.000

2. Find the core of the game

Ex. 3 — Find a two player 2 × 2 game in which there are exactly two equilibria (in pure and/or mixed strategies).

Ex. 4 — Find all equilibria of the following zero sum game:

 
1 1 2
1 3 1

Ex. 5 — Find the core and the nucleolus of the following game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, v(∅) = 0 and
(
1 if {3, 4, 5} ∈ S and |S| ≥ 4
v(S) =
0 otherwise
Ex. 6 — Consider the following game in extensive form. Find the optimal strategies and the outcome obtained by
using backward induction.
I

a b
N II
1/3 2/3 e f
II II
(3,2) (2,3)
g h i l

(3,1) (3,2)(1,2) (5,1)

Ex. 7 — Ann, Beth, Carol and Donna are going on holidays together and should decide how to share the two
available double room. They have the following preferences about their possible roommate:

Ann : Beth > Carol > Donna

Beth : Donna > Ann > Carol
Carol : Ann > Donna > Beth
Donna : Carol > Beth > Ann

List all the possible solutions and find if there exists a stable one.
 Theory Question

1. Explain the idea of correlated equilibrium;

2. Show that no strictly dominated strategy can be played with positive probability at a correlated equilibrium;

3. Show with an example that this is no longer true with a weakly dominated strategy;

4. Prove that the set of correlated equilibria of a finite game is nonempty.

 GAME THEORY 5 cfu
September 3, 2018

Surname: Name: Matricola:

Points:
Ex. 1: /7 (2+2+3) Ex. 2: /7 (3+1+3) Ex. 3-9: /14 Theory: /7.

SOLVE THE EXERCISES AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS USING ONLY THESE PAPERS

Exercise 1
Suppose a TU game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3} is such that C(v) = co {(2, 0, 2), (0, 2, 2), (2, 2, 0)}
1. Write the TU game.
2. Show that it is convex.
3. Find the Shaley value, the Banzhaf value, and the nucleolus.
 Exercise 2
Two players must show one or three fingers, and say a figure at the same time. They must try to guess the sum
of the fingers shown. If both guess right or wrong the result is a tie, otherwise who guess correctly wins from the
other a number of the euros equal to the sum of the two numbers said by the players.
1. Write the game in matrix form.
2. Prove that it is a fair game.
3. Find all Nash equilibria.
Ex. 3 — Find, if possible, a, b ∈ R such that the game
 
(2, 1) (a, 0)
(1, 7) (3, b)

has infinite Nash equilibria.

Ex. 4 — Consider the Nim game G=(1, 2, 4, x, y). Find the probability that, throwing two dices and putting x, y
as in the faces shown by the dices, the second player wins.

Ex. 5 — Consider the following extensive form game between players I and II.

I II I II I II (100,100)

(0,0) (-1,2) (4,1) (3,x) (99,5) (98,101)

Find the solution by backward induction when x = 6.

Ex. 6 — Find the solution of the game above for all possible real values of x.
Ex. 7 — Given the finite game:  
(2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 6)
(0, 8) (3, 9) (0, 0) (1, 0)
Find the N.E. in pure strategies. Bonus Find, if any, one equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Ex. 8 — There are ten parties. A decision, to pass, needs the vote of Party 1, of at least one between Parties 2
and 3, and at least 3 among players 4 . . . 10. Write this as a weighted majority game.

Ex. 9 — On the table there are 49 cards. The players, at their turn, can take either 5 or 6 cards. The player
leaving the other with no moves wins. Who wins and why?
 Theory Question 1
Consider the problem of matching women and men

1. Prove the existence algorithm when the number of men and women is the same and for everybody somebody
is better than alone.

2. Prove that the women visiting is the best for the women.

3. Explain the idea of stable matching when the number of men and women is different and somebody could like
to stay alone rather than matched to someone.