G.R. Nos.

L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Due Process – impartial and competent court

FACTS
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May
1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique
to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made
by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period
of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must
first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was
gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue
of Javier’s death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated, they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they
will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice
they expect.

Due process is intended to ensure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts
and the pertinent law.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL
RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER
F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause –
Take Over Power – Calling Out Power – Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued
for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided
and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading
to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court
is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in
free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually
a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is
not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again,
that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power
is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact
laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is
not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can
declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after
it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, Respondent.

FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter,
on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of
COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as
COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of
title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of
7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February
2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President
Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement.
True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-
Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered
therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, we
consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts
at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar
and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the exercise of
judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and

d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of
the case

ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4)
years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and
the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-reaching
implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-traditional
suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question

c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment
of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a
prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word “reappointment” as, in
context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served
the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the
full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner.
The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to
appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to
chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third
sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must
conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate
of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of
Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed
by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman
gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure
as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that
in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service
limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of
succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed
Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in
light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would
effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to
the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such
position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such
appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven
(7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of
seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall
only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years
and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily,
the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years
and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
G.R. No. 150477 February 28, 2005

LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner,

vs.
VIOLETA G. VERCELES, respondent.

FACTS:
When respondent migrated to the US w/ her family, she retained her Filipino citizenship.

In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. In 1995, she registered herself as a voter. Between 1993 to
1997, she would travel to the US to visit her children. In 1997, she abandoned her status as a lawful permanent
US resident for the purpose of filing her candidacy for mayor in the 1998 elections. She subsequently surrendered
her alien registration receipt card (“green card”) before the Immigration & Naturalization Service of the American
Embassy. She ran & won as mayor in 1998. She was re-elected in 2001. Petitioner, also a candidate during the
2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto praying that respondent be declared disqualified to hold the position
of mayor & that he be proclaimed instead.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the position of municipal mayor during the
2001 elections

HELD:
Yes. Although respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the status
of a permanent US resident, she nonetheless reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding
of the 2001 elections. By her act of surrendering her green card to the US Embassy in 1998, her intention to
abandon her US residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the
Philippines for good in 1993, she continue living here & only went to the US on periodic visits to her children who
were residing there. Moreover, she was elected mayor in the 1998 elections & served as such for the duration of
her term. Such acts are sufficient to establish that respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely &,
ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her permanent resident. Considering the purpose of the
residency requirement, which is to ensure that the person elected is familiar w/ the needs & problems of his
constituency, there can be no doubt that respondent is qualified having been served as mayor previous to her re-
election.
G.R. No. 179895 December 18, 2008

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner,

vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo
warranto proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification
for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement.
Ong, on the other hand, avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born
citizen. The decision having become final, he caused the corresponding annotation thereof in his Certificate of
Birth. The OSG informed Topacio that it cannot favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition
until the RTC case shall have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of the OSG as being
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto.

HELD:
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action
on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not
deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor
General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the
discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within
the limits set by law. In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the
institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to
him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution
of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything
within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the
matter at hand. It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same
issue of Ong‘s citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the
consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised
petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.
G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in
his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to
invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent
Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and
employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an
absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks
discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:
Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

RULING:
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of
law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157
falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned
his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165109 December 14, 2009

MANUEL N. MAMBA, RAYMUND P. GUZMAN and LEONIDES N. FAUSTO, Petitioners,

vs.
EDGAR R. LARA, JENERWIN C. BACUYAG, WILSON O. PUYAWAN, ALDEGUNDO Q. CAYOSA, JR.,
NORMAN A. AGATEP, ESTRELLA P. FERNANDEZ, VILMER V. VILORIA, BAYLON A. CALAGUI, CECILIA
MAEVE T. LAYOS, PREFERRED VENTURES CORP., ASSET BUILDERS CORP., RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Decision to entertain a taxpayer’s suit is discretionary upon the Court. When the issue hinges on the illegal
disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R. Lara to engage
the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and
flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment. It also ratified the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation which provides
that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the
amount of bonds floated. In addition, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, authorized Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and
execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in an amount
not to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement of his priority projects, including the construction
of the New Cagayan Town Center, to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, Lara issued
the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the planning, design, construction and site
development of the town center project.

Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for Annulment of
Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
respondents (Gov. Lara et al.). The RTC, however, dismissed their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners
have no locus standi to file a case as they are not party to the contract and (2) that the controversy is in the nature
of a political question, thus, the court can’t take cognizance of it.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers
Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question

RULING:
Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers.
No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed
by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and
(2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.

In the case at bar, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of
the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayers’ money, a government support in the amount of P187 million
would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. The governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
to appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. So clearly, the first requisite has been met.

As to the second requisite, the Supreme Court explained that the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking transcendental
importance, paramount public interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed
to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.

It argued that, to protect the interest of the people and to prevent taxes from being squandered or wasted under
the guise of government projects, a liberal approach must be adopted in determining locus standi in public suits.

A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by
the legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated.
A justiciable question on the other hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies wherein
there are rights involved which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is one which is proper to be examined
or decided in courts of justice because its determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative
or executive power. In simple terms, a political question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers to
the legality of the acts complained of.

In the case at bar, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts
complained of. Thus, the Supreme Court found the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review.

Also, in the present case, petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public
respondents. They put in issue the overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond
flotation; the irrevocable assignment of the provincial government’s annual regular income, including the IRA, to
respondent RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and
discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the
construction of the town center.

Thus, the high court said that, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still come within their powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN")

vs.
THOMAS G. AQUINO

FACTS:
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning
trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government organizations,

Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House
Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them
the said copies until the negotiation is completed.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged

Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in
treaties, from the negotiation process

RULING:

Standing
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public
right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the
present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens
and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing
in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.

JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a
matter of public concern xxx
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do
not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.

Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid
limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that “information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards
for the sake of national interest.”
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not
be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the
JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it
appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable
terms in an area of greater national interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v.
Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in
all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is
a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.

Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?
While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those
involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the “informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of
the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat
to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable
in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It
would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without
distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for
the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity
and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated
upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one
significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke
a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper
governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is
being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in
the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process
covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents
rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate
candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of
the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic
negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to
encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations
from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege
seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in
its capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”
And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on
account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation
which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confidential.

Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged
character of the deliberative process.

Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?
In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose “definite propositions
of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

Treaty-making power of the President

xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since
whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by
delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of
Presidential Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the
Executive Department.

xxx

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the
President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested
directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already
inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the
relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in
the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only
to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking
the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the
performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean
that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege
should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to
have waived it.
xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee
and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House
Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then
Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in
abeyance.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce
such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondent’s failure to invoke the
privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.

“Showing of Need” Test

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need” only
means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome
the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of
interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.
xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that
the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely
asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required?
Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a
limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an
information is a matter of public concern.

Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege

xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific
“showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of
public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the
information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must
show that that information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and
reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

FACTS:
In 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won in the presidential elections against her nearest rival, Fernando
Poe, Jr. Sometime in June 2005, dzMM radio station aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation
discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. In a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, a recordings of alleged conversations between President Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano was identified. Then DoJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping
Law. The NTC, on one hand, issued a press release warning radio and television stations that those who will air
the Garci Tapes will face suspension or revocation of their license. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as citizen, filed
a petition to nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez on the grounds that it
violated the freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

ISSUE:
Whether the NTC warning constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

HELD:
When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to
question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the
government action is directed at such citizen.

Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an
indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No society can remain free,
open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even
contentious discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must
zealously safeguard freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom of expression crystallizes
important public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues.
Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of claims and counterclaims, from which the
truth will likely emerge. Freedom of expression allows the airing of social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions
of violence from marginalized groups who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression
provides a civilized way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot
use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:

“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution
commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow
and well-defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
Exceptions:
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories
of expression namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,

advocacy of imminent lawless action, and

danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. The history of press freedom has been a constant struggle
against the censor whose weapon is the suspension or cancellation of licenses to publish or broadcast. The NTC
warning resurrects the weapon of the censor. In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior
restraint on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This
rule has no exception.
G.R. No. 201112 October 23, 2012

ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L.

SUSANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated
Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract
between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods
listed in the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise
the option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with
corresponding canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces
of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its
Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until
March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec did not exercise
the option within the extended period. Several extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until
its final extension on March 31, 2012.

On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the
period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of
the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension Agreement).
Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize
Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith
executed.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions on the grounds that the option period provided
for in the AES contract had already lapsed; that the extension of the option period and the exercise of the option
without competitive public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the Comelec purchased the
machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On the other hand, respondents argue on the
validity of the subject transaction based on the grounds that there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision
of law for it to extend the option period; that the OTP is not an independent contract in itself, but is a provision
contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had already satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA
9184; and that exercising the option was the most advantageous option of the Comelec.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

HELD:
No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to amend
the contract which may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on
the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still retains P50M of the
amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still effective and
not yet terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still be
amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties.
Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a
government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by
RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded
upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same
terms.

The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v.
Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO)
cannot be applied in the present case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not
previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and
purchase of services, their proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Second, the amendment of the
AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against
the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did
not exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new
public bidding would be a superfluity. Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the
Comelec and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of
services under the AES contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject
goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals
already paid would just be one of the government expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future
elections.
G.R. No. 175769-70 January 19, 2009

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE MULTI-MEDIA SYSTEM, INC., CESAR G. REYES, FRANCIS CHUA (ANG BIAO), MANUEL F.
ABELLADA, RAUL B. DE MESA, AND ALOYSIUS M. COLAYCO, Respondents.

FACTS
Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI) is a signal provider which has cable and satellite services. It is providing
its satellite services through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its “Free TV” and “Premium Channels”. The
Free TV includes ABS-CBN, GMA-7, and other local networks. The premium channels include AXN, Jack TV, etc
which were paid by subscribers before such channels can be transmitted as feeds to a subscriber’s TV set which
has been installed with a Dream satellite.
ABS-CBN is a television and broadcasting corporation. It broadcasts television programs by wireless means to
Metro Manila and nearby provinces, and by satellite to provincial stations through Channel 2 and Channel 23. The
programs aired over Channels 2 and 23 are either produced by ABS-CBN or purchased from or licensed by other
producers. ABS-CBN also owns regional television stations which pattern their programming in accordance with
perceived demands of the region. Thus, television programs shown in Metro Manila and nearby provinces are not
necessarily shown in other provinces.

In May 2002, ABS-CBN sued PMSI for allegedly engaging in rebroadcasting and thereby infringing on ABS-CBN’s
copyrights; that the transmission of Channels 2 and 23 to the provinces where these two channels are not usually
shown altered ABS-CBN’s programming for the said provinces. PMSI argued that it is not infringing upon ABS-
CBN’s copyrights because it is operating under the “Must-Carry Rule” outlined in NTC (National
Telecommunications Commission) Circular No. 4-08-88.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PMSI infringed upon the copyrights of ABS-CBN.

HELD:
No. The “Must-Carry Rule” under NTC Circular No. 4-08-88 falls under the limitations on copyright. The Filipino
people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and
entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain
a well-informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth. The very
intent and spirit of the NTC Circular will prevent a situation whereby station owners and a few networks would
have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views
on public issues, people, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed – contrary to the state policy
that the (franchise) grantee like ABS-CBN, and other TV station owners and even the likes of PMSI, shall provide
at all times sound and balanced programming and assist in the functions of public information and education.
PMSI was likewise granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section 4 of which similarly states
that it “shall provide adequate public service time to enable the government, through the said broadcasting
stations, to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming;
promote public participation such as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and
education.
The “Must-Carry Rule” favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable television
companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the
rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs
available to city viewers.
G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner HON. LUIS
MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission, Respondent.

FACTS:

When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on
July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed
Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice
Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P.de Guzman in place of
Celia Leones, and Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG
Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the
respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo
warranto petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued
Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he
cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing
a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments,was officially released (perthe congratulatory
letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the petitioners
appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively
made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same
grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of
personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)recourse to judicial
review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Lis mota
literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents
appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination
of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto against
respondent Urro.
The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show
a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one
at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting)
appointments,unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting
appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the
members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an
institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained
as an office under or within the Executive Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners
acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the
NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed until apprised of the
appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on his
appointment. He cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could
not be removed except for cause.

DENIED