Rule 7 PDF

Civil Procedure | 2019 | USJ-R Law
RULE 7- PARTS OF A PLEADING
Sec. 1. Caption
Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15, 2000
Sec. 2 FACTS:
Petitioners were the registered owners of a 225-square meter parcel of land located in Antipolo, Rizal and the
same property was mortgaged to Florencio and Nestor Carlos in the amount of P150,000.00.
About a year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to P500,000.00 and fearing foreclosure of the
property, petitioners asked their son-in-law, herein private respondent Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in
redeeming their property. Private respondent delos Reyes agreed to redeem the property but because he
allegedly had no money then for the purpose he solicited the assistance of private respondent Josefina Cruz, a
family friend of the delos Reyeses and an employee of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of private
respondent Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Land Bank, using the subject property
as collateral.
It was further agreed that out of the proceeds of the loan, P500,000.00 will be paid to the Carloses as
mortgagees, and any such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital gains tax, expenses for the
cancellation of the mortgage to the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz, and registration of a mortgage in
favor of Land Bank. Moreover, the monthly amortization on the housing loan which was supposed to be
deducted from the salary of private respondent Cruz will be reimbursed by private respondent delos Reyes.
Eventually, Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses, informing them that Cruz’s loan had
been approved and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
229891 in the name of Josefina Cruz. The mortgage was discharged.
Now, sometime in 1993, petitioners notified private respondent delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the
property but the offer was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and
damages with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner averred that the deed was merely a formality to meet the
requirements of the bank for the housing loan, and that the real intention of the parties in securing the loan was
to apply the proceeds thereof for the payment of the mortgage obligation.
Furthermore, they alleged that the deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties, and that the
transaction was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage, considering that the price of the sale was
inadequate considering the market value of the subject property and because they continued paying the real
estate taxes thereto even after the execution of the said deed of sale.
1
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. They decided that (1) the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated October 21, 1992 did not reflect the true intention of the parties, and (2) the transaction entered
into between petitioners and Cruz was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage, considering that
the price stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale was insufficient compared to thevalue of the property,
petitioners are still in possession of the property, and petitioners had continued to pay the real estate
taxes thereon after the execution of the said deed of sale.
CA reversed the above decision, finding that private respondents were denied due process by the refusal of the
trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz
was one of absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. Also, the Court of Appeals found petitioners’ action
for reformation unmeritorious because there was no showing that the failure of the deed of sale to
express the parties’ true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. It also
held the RTC decision to be constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based. Thus, petitioner brought the case to Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale or of equitable mortgage.
RULINGS:
The true arrangement between petitioners and private respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage. Based on the
provision found under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, the Court finds that the true intention between the parties
for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the property in question but merely to
secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be
immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the Carloses.
Also, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated as a complaint for reformation filed before the RTC
of Antipolo, Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners’ action for reformation unmeritorious because there
was no showing that the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties’ true intention was because of mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. Indeed, under the facts of the present case, reformation may not be
proper for failure to fully meet the requisites in Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because as the evidence
eventually bore out the contested Deed of Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the true agreement between
the parties but was merely to comply with the collateral requirements of Land Bank. However, the fact that the
complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of
instrument should not preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in
fact an equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been the
subject of arguments and evidence of the parties. Thus, SC held that it is not the caption of the pleading
but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
Sec. 2. The body.
The body of the pleading sets forth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief
prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
2
(a) Paragraphs. - The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered as to be
readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be
done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings.
(b) Headings. - When two or more causes of action are joined, the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the
words "first cause of action," of the second by "second cause of action," and so on for the others. When one or
more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be
prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of action" and so on;
and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced
by words to that effect.
(c) Relief. - The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other
relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated.
Sec. 2 The body
Phil. Charter v. PNC Corp., G.R. No. 185066, October 2, 2009

Facts:
PNCC is engaged in the construction business and tollway operations. On October 16, 1997, PNCC conducted a public
bidding for the supply of labor, materials, tools, supervision, equipment, and other incidentals necessary for the
fabrication and delivery of 27 tollbooths to be used for the automation of toll collection along the expressways.Orlando
Kalingo (Kalingo) won in the bidding and was awarded the contract.
On November 13, 1997, PNCC issued in favor of Kalingo Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 71024L for 25 units of
tollbooths for a total of P2,100,000.00, and P.O. No. 71025L for two units of tollbooths amounting to P168,000.00. These
issuances were subject to the condition, among others, that each P.O. shall be covered by a surety bond equivalent to
100% of the total down payment (50% of the total cost reflected on the P.O.), and that the surety bond shall continue in
full force until the supplier shall have complied with all the undertakings and covenants to the full satisfaction of PNCC.
Kalingo, hence, posted surety bonds Surety Bond Nos. 27546 and 27547 issued by the PCIC.
To illustrate, the PCIC surety bonds are in the amounts corresponding to down payments on each P.O., as
follows:
Surety Bond No. Purchase Order Units Total Cost Surety

Covered Amount (equivalent
to 50% down
payment)
Bond No. 27547 P.O. No. 71024L 25 P2,100,000 P1,050,000
3
Bond No. 27546 P.O. No. 71025L 2 P 168,000 P 84,000

Both surety bonds also contain the following conditions: (1) the liability of PCIC under the bonds expires on
March 16, 1998; and (2) a written extrajudicial demand must first be tendered to the surety, PCIC, within 15 days from
the expiration date; otherwise PCIC shall not be liable thereunder and the obligee waives the right to claim or file any
court action to collect on the bond.
PNCC released two checks to Kalingo representing the down payment of 50% of the total project cost, which
were properly receipted by Kalingo.[9] Kalingo in turn submitted the two PCIC surety bonds securing the down payments,
which bonds were accepted by PNCC.
On March 3, 4, and 5, 1998, Kalingo made partial/initial delivery of four units of tollbooths under P.O. No.
71024L. However, the tollbooths delivered were incomplete or were not fabricated according to PNCC
specifications. Kalingo failed to deliver the other 23 tollbooths up to the time of filing of the complaint; despite
demands, he failed and refused to comply with his obligation under the POs.
On March 9, 1998, six days before the expiration of the surety bonds and after the expiration of the delivery
period provided for under the award, PNCC filed a written extrajudicial claim against PCIC notifying it of Kalingos default
and demanding the repayment of the down payment on P.O. No. 71024L as secured by PCIC Bond No. 27547, in the
amount of P1,050,000.00. The claim went unheeded despite repeated demands. For this reason, on April 24, 2001, PNCC
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaluyong City a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Kalingo
and PCIC.[10] PNCC's complaint against PCIC called solely on PCIC Bond No. 27547; it did not raise or plead collection
under PCIC Bond No. 27546 which secured the down payment of P84,000.00 on P.O. No. 71025L.
The RTC, by Decision of October 31, 2005, ruled in favor of PNCC and ordered PCIC and Kalingo to jointly and
severally pay the latter P1,050,000.00, representing the value of PCIC Bond No. 27547, plus legal interest from last
demand, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The trial court made no ruling on PCICs liability under PCIC Bond No. 27546, a claim that was not pleaded in
the complaint.
On appeal, the CA, by Decision[11] of January 7, 2008, held that the RTC erred in ruling that PCIC's liability is
limited only to the payment of P1,050,000.00 under PCIC Bond No. 27547 which secured the down payment on P.O. No.
71024L.
The appellate court held that PCIC, as surety, is liable jointly and severally with Kalingo for the amount of the
two bonds securing the two POs to Kalingo; thus, the CA also held PCIC liable under PCIC Bond No. 27546 which
secured the P84,000.00 down payment on P.O. No. 71025L.
Issue:
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PCIC SHOULD ALSO BE HELD LIABLE UNDER BOND
NO. 27546, COLLECTION UNDER WHICH WAS NOT SUBJECT OF RESPONDENT PNCC's COMPLAINT FOR
COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY;
4
Held:
The issue before us calls for a discussion of a courts basic appreciation of allegations in a complaint. The
fundamental rule is that reliefs granted a litigant are limited to those specifically prayed for in the complaint; other
reliefs prayed for may be granted only when related to the specific prayer(s) in the pleadings and supported by the
evidence on record. Necessarily, any such relief may be granted only where a cause of action therefor exists, based on
the complaint, the pleadings, and the evidence on record.
Each of the surety bonds issued by PCIC created a right in favor of PNCC to collect the repayment of the bonded
down payments made on the two POs if contractor Kalingo defaults on his obligation under the award to fabricate and
deliver to PNCC the tollbooths contracted for. Concomitantly, PCIC, as surety, had the obligation to comply with its
undertaking under the bonds to repay PNCC the down payments the latter made on the POs if Kalingo defaults.
Liability on a bond is contractual in nature and is ordinarily restricted to the obligation expressly assumed therein. We
have repeatedly held that the extent of a surety's liability is determined only by the clause of the contract of suretyship
and by the conditions stated in the bond. It cannot be extended by implication beyond the terms of the contract.
The records reveal that PNCC complied with the written claim provision, but only with respect to PCIC Bond No.
27547. PNCC filed an extrajudicial demand with PCIC informing it of Kalingos default under the award and demanding
the repayment of the bonded down payment on P.O. No. 71024L. Conversely, nothing in the records shows that PNCC
ever complied with the provision with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546. Why PNCC complied with the written claim
provision with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27547, but not with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546, has not been explained by
PNCC. Under the circumstances, PNCCs cause of action with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546 did not and cannot exist,
such that no relief for collection thereunder may be validly awarded.
Hence, the trial courts decision finding PCIC liable solely under PCIC Bond No. 27547 is correct not only
because collection under the other bond, PCIC Bond No. 27546, was not raised or pleaded in the complaint, but for
the more important reason that no cause of action arose in PNCCs favor with respect to this bond.Consequently, the
appellate court was in error for including liability under PCIC Bond No. 27546.
Section 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a
general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant
the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party;[23] the
inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy
sought,[24] if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.[25]
We find PNCCs argument to be misplaced. A general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable appearing on a
complaint or pleading normally enables the court to award reliefs supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by the
facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed
for in the complaint. We cannot, however, grant PNCC the other relief of recovering under PCIC Bond No. 27546
because of the respect due the contractual stipulations of the parties.
5
As already discussed, this provision is the law between the parties on the matter of liability and collection under
the bond. Knowing fully well that PCIC Bond No. 27546 is a matter of record, duly proven and susceptible of the courts
scrutiny, the trial and appellate courts must respect the terms of the bond and cannot just disregard its terms and
conditions in the absence of any showing that they are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. For its failure to file a written claim with PCIC within 15 days from the bonds expiry date, PNCC clearly waived its
right to collect under PCIC Bond No. 27546. That, wittingly or unwittingly, PNCC did not collect under one bond in favor
of calling on the other creates no other conclusion than that the right to collect under the former had been
lost. Consequently, PNCCs cause of action with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546 cannot juridically exist and no relief
therefore may be validly given. Hence, the CA invalidly rendered judgment with respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546, and its
award based on this bond must be deleted.
Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
S FACTS:
Respondents obtained a loan of P45k from petitioner payable in 6 months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
their 202sqm property located in Valenzuela and covered by TCT.4When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint. Respondents
were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). They filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon
motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. RTC
granted petitioner’s Complaint. petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did not interpose a
timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC’s Decision.
Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, claiming that not all of them
were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their
co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside
and a new trial be conducted. RTC ordered15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17, 2000
Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged
property,16 which the RTC granted. Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside
Execution Sale19 dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and
that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly
interest.
On May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5%
monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment
Obligation. petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari23under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On
August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision24 declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5%
monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing
the rate of interest to 12% per annum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed grave and serious error and misapprehension of law and the facts when it granted
respondents’ petition for annulment of judgment of the decision of the RTC
6
RULING:
No. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to
annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be
set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or
for lack of due process of law. Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of
relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must
provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Sec. 3. Signature and address
Navarro v. Jarson Development, G.R. No. 142627, January 28, 2008

DOCTRINE: It is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the court of a change of his address.
NATURE: The first case seeks to nullify the decision of the CA denying the Najarros’ Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The second
case sought to nullify the Resolution of the CA granting the Najarros’ Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment.
G.R. No. 142627

FACTS: Mariano and Estrella Najarro are the registered owners of a residential building constructed on Lot 1394-C of the Banilad Friar
Lands in Cebu City.
Ramon, Ma. Dulce, Carmel, and Stella Maris, all surnamed Najarro, are the legitimate children of spouses Najarro and are the
registered co-owners of Lot 1394-C.
Jarson Development Corporation (JDC) is a corporation registered and existing under Philippine laws. It is engaged in the business,
among others, of acquiring and managing real estate, buildings and other structures. Among its projects is the development of
Richmond Plaza, a 12-story commercial building located adjacent to the lot co-owned by the Najarros.
Jose Mabugat and Engineer Eliseo Galang are the project designer and the project engineer, respectively, of the Richmond Plaza
project.
When JDC started excavation and construction works on the project, it caused slippages or cave-ins of soil on the land of the Najarros
causing cracks on the wall and floor of their residential building. The occurrence rendered the place unsafe for human habitation so the
Najarros left the building.
7
Subsequently, a conciliation meeting was held between the Najarros and Mabugat. During the meeting, Mabugat assured the Najarros
that JDC will repair their building and restore the foundation of the soil that caved-in and pay damages in case of any defect in the
construction of their building.
However, Mabugat later wrote to the Najarros that the ―wet and loose condition‖ of their soil was the cause of the damage to their
properties, thus, JDC refused to compensate them.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Building Official issued a Stop-Work Order to JDC because their on-going excavation works violated the
Building Code and greatly affected the safety of the adjacent residents, including the Najarros. However, JDC continuously refused to
comply with the said Order.
Najarros: They filed a petition for injunction with damages against respondents.
But, before the start of the hearing, the parties agreed to dispense with the issue of injunction in exchange for JDC’s reconstruction of
the Najarro’s damaged residential building and to completely restore the foundation of the soil that caved-in to its original condition.
RTC: It issued an Order reflecting the said agreement. Later, after the pre-trial conference, it also issued a pre-trial Order stating that
the only issue left to be resolved in the case is whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages in accordance with their
complaint and the defendants in accordance with their counterclaim.
Najarros: They filed a motion for execution of the RTC’s Order reflecting the agreement specifically to order JDC to reconstructed their
damaged building and restore the soil of their land.
RTC: The Najarros’ motion was denied on the ground that the Order will only be executed after the case shall be decided.
Subsequently, it conducted a trial to determine only the issue of damages.
Later, it decided in favor of the Najarros, ordering JDC to pay damages and do the restoration to the building and to the land.
JDC: It appealed with the CA.
Najarros: While the appeal was pending, it filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
CA: It affirmed the decision of the trial court with some modification to the amount. But, it denied the Najarros’ motion for execution
pending appeal.
Najarros: They filed a Motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision on their motion but was denied, hence this petition.
HELD: THE PETITION HAS BECOME MOOT IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:
1. The Najarros filed a Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment. JDC filed their Opposition to it alleging that their counsel did not
receive a copy of the Decision of the CA.
2. The CA rendered a Resolution granting the Najarros’ Motion and declared its Decision affirming the trial court’s ruling and awarding
of damages to the Najarros as final and executory and ordering that such judgment be entered in the book of entries of judgments.
G.R. No. 172750

FACTS: In this subsequent case, JDC and Mabugat, as petitioners, assailed the CA Resolution declaring its aforementioned Decision
as final and executory. They contend that they did not receive a copy of the Decision, hence, it did not attain finality as against them.
However, the CA found copies of the Notice of Judgment and its Decision sent through registered mail to JDC’s counsel at his office.
According to JDC’s counsel, his legal secretary failed to include the instant case in the inventory of his cases. As a result, he failed to
inform the court of his change of address, and consequently, he was not able to receive a copy of the CA’s resolution, and thus, failed
to file a motion for reconsideration. This is then why the Najarros’ Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment was granted.
HELD: DENIED AND MOOT

The subject matter has already attained finality of judgment, thus, the SC cannot rule or entertain it anymore.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Sec. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
address which should not be a post office box.
xxx
Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges scandalous or indecent
matters therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.
Sec. 4. Verification
Jacinto v. Gumaru, G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014

FACTS:
On December 6, 2004, a Decision was rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo Gumaru, Jr. and against petitioner
Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. Petitioner and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). However, the appeal was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or surety
bond. Thus, the December 6, 2004 Decision became final and executory. a Writ of Execution was issued in the labor
case. By virtue of such alias writ, real property belonging to petitioner was levied upon, and was scheduled to be sold at
8
auction on June 27, 2008 or July 4, 2008. The Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying petitioner’s Extremely Urgent Motion
to Lift and Annul Levy on Execution. Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s June 26,2008 Order to the NLRC, which, set
aside the same. Petitioner went up to the CA on certiorari, assailing the November 28, 2008 and July 27, 2009
Resolutions of the NLRC. the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, which denied and dismiss the petition.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that a verification signed by counsel constitutes adequate and
substantial compliance under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; verification is merely a
formal, and not jurisdictional, requisite such that an improper verification or certification against forum-shopping is not a
fatal defect. Petitioner attached a copy of an Affidavit. attesting that he caused the preparation of the CA Petition, and that
he read the contents of the CA Petition and affirm that they are true and correct and undisputed based on his own
personal knowledge and on authentic records. In said Affidavit, petitioner further certified that he has not commenced any
other action or proceeding, or filed any claims involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any
Division thereof, or in any other court, tribunal or agency; to the best of his knowledge, no such other action, proceeding,
or claim is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or in any court, tribunal or
agency; if there is any other action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he will state the
status thereof; if he should thereafter learn that a similar action, proceeding or claim has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or in any court, tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly report the fact within five days from notice thereof. Petitioner explained further that he was out of the country,
and could not return on account of his physical condition, which thus constrained him to resort to the execution of a sworn
statement in lieu of his actual verification and certification as required under the Rules. Petitioner likewise ratified Atty.
Daos’s acts done on his behalf relative to the labor case and the filing of the CA Petition, and implored the appellate court
to reconsider its November 5, 2009 Resolution and excuse his procedural oversight in respect of the improper verification
and certification in his CA Petition.
Respondent contends that with the dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition by the CA, it is for all intents and purposes
deemed to have never been filed, and thus may not be corrected by resorting to a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
Respondent reiterates the view taken by the CA that certiorari under Rule 65 is a prerogative writ that is not demandable
as a matter of right.
ISSUE:
whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE SUBJECT PETITION
RULING:
The Court finds that the Petition has become moot and academic.
It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he may execute a special power of attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already
reflected above respecting noncompliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
9
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action
or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. H,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.30 (Emphasis supplied)
However, while the Court takes the petitioner's side with regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification and the
certification against forum shopping, it nonetheless appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. In a May 24,
2011 Manifestation, respondent informed this Court that the judgment award has been satisfied in full. The petitioner does
not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor case is now deemed ended. "It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been
fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all."And "when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes
beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the
obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces
to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.
Mahinay v. Gako, G.R. No. 165338, November 28, 2011

Facts:
-These consolidated petitions pertain to a legal tug-of-war between persons trying to wrest possession of a coveted
Torrens certificate of title, and its collateral effect to the judge who heard their case.
- Constantina H. Sanchez, Josefina H. Lopez and Susan Honoridez are the registered owners (the owners) of a 406-square
meter parcel of land known as Lot 5 located in Cebu City and covered by TCT No. 117531.
-On July 25, 1994, Mahinay filed a complaint for specific performance (docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16335) against the
owners and one Felimon Suarez (Suarez), to compel them to convey Lot 5 to him.
-In said complaint, Mahinay alleged that in an earlier casehe filed against the owners, the parties therein arrived at a
Compromise Agreement wherein the owners gave him preferential right to buy a 200-square meter portion of Lot 5 on
condition that he will withdraw said case. On February 8, 1993, the trial court thus issued a Judgment based on said
Compromise Agreement.
-On November 9, 1993, however, the owners sold the entire Lot 5 to Suarez for ₱300,000.00 without first offering the
same to Mahinay. According to Mahinay, said transaction violated his preferential right to buy as he was willing and
capable of buying the property. To bolster his claim, Mahinay attached to his second complaint the February 8, 1993
Judgment in the earlier case and a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1993 between the owners and
Suarez.
-During the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-16335, Mahinay filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion informing the
RTC that he caused the annotation of an adverse claim and then a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 117531 on August
17, 1994.
-In traversing Mahinay’s allegations, the owners asserted that they did not violate Mahinay’s preferential right to buy as
the transaction between them and Suarez was actually an equitable mortgage, and not a sale. In support of their
10
defense of equitable mortgage, the owners averred that they remained the occupants and registered owners of Lot 5
and that TCT No. 117531 has always been in their possession. With regard to the execution of the alleged Deed of
Absolute Sale, the owners explained that Suarez merely imposed the same as one of the conditions before granting the
loan application. To prove their theory of defense, the owners submitted an Acknowledgement Receipt dated
September 1, 1994 wherein Suarez declared that no sale between him and the owners actually pushed thru and a letter
dated September 20, 1994 wherein the owners asked the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the refund of the capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes they earlier paid.
-Mahinay riposted, postulating that the Deed of Absolute Sale he attached to his Complaint sufficiently confutes the
owners’ defense of equitable mortgage. Besides, the owners and Suarez failed to deny under oath the authenticity and
due execution of said Deed of Absolute Sale.
-On June 7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision debunking the owners’ theory of equitable mortgage. It held that the
notarized documents Mahinay presented, particularly the Deed of Absolute Sale, outweigh the owners’ evidence
consisting of private documents.
-The owners and Suarez moved for reconsideration.
-On November 22, 1996, however, the RTC denied the same.
-Unhappy, they appealed to the CA.
-Finding no reversible error therefrom, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in a Decision25 dated December 29, 2000,
which became final and executory on February 8, 2001.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is, correct in its observation that Sorensen’s verification is insufficient.
Ruling:
The rule requiring certain pleadings to be verified is embodied in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. It is intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations contained in the pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been
11
made in good faith. A pleading may be verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition
and that the same are true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic records, or based both on
their personal knowledge and authentic records. While the rule gives the pleaders several ways of verifying their
pleading, the use of the phrase personal knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal signification and the
pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of these phrases fancifully. Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi teaches us when
to properly use authentic records in verifying a pleading:
"[A]uthentic" records as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the
allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on
the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal
knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition before the CA that at the pre-trial conference respondent
admitted having received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference. Hence,
petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.
In her CA petition, Sorensen questioned the September 1, 2006 and September 18, 2006 Orders of Judge Gako which
respectively granted Mahinay’s Reiteratory Motion and denied her Motion for Reconsideration. In addition to said
Orders and Motions, and to support the allegations in her petition, Sorensen also attached copies of the August 12, 2005
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 153762 and other material portions of the records of Civil Case No. CEB-16335. Quite
obviously, Sorensen had no participation in the preparation and execution of these documents although they constitute
the main bulk of her evidence. Hence, it was necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification that the allegations in her
petition are true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on the information she gathered
from authentic records. The CA is, therefore, correct in its observation that Sorensen’s verification is insufficient.
Nonetheless, the Rules and jurisprudence on the matter have it that the court may allow such deficiency to be
remedied. In Altres v. Empleo, this Court pronounced for the guidance of the bench and the bar that "non-compliance x
x x or a defect [in the verification] does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of justice may be served thereby."
Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving Sorensen’s petition for certiorari as
the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive rights.
No circumstances were present in Sorensen’s petition which would warrant the liberal application of the rules to serve
the needs of justice.
Vallacar v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2012

Topic : PARTS OF PLEADING; Verification
12
Doctrine : The requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is
intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer
or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the
verification. As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same.
Facts :
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit
bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus
driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent’s husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way
home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy
Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve
at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by
crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus
driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig
and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was
thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double
homicide before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the
Province of Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a Resolution on
December 22, 1994, dismissing the criminal charge against Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla
was not criminally liable for the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, because there was no
negligence, not even contributory, on Cabanilla’s part.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on July 19, 1995 a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the total amount of ₱484,000.00,
for the death of her husband, Catubig. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable
because the latter’s employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus
which collided with Catubig’s motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the
vehicular collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole
negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed
the opposite lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the
dismissal of respondent’s complaint for not being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of
action, as there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision
of its employee driver.
Petitioners counterclaim was dismissed for lack of merit.

13
So, Jocelyn, petitioner, appealed to CA asserting that respondent’s complaint for damages
should be dismissed for the latter’s failure to verify the same. The certification against forum
shopping attached to the complaint, signed by respondent, is not a valid substitute for
respondent’s verification that she "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records."Petitioner cited
jurisprudence in which the Court ruled that a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as
an unsigned pleading, which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue :
Whether or not, petitioner’s complaint for damages should be dismissed for failure to verify
the complaint.
Ruling :
In the case at bar, the Court find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright
dismissal of respondent’s complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964
Rules of Court was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 6. Verification.—A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person
verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own
knowledge.
Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief,"
shall be deemed insufficient.
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The foregoing provision was
carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading."
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which became effective on May 1,
2000. It now reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
14
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides
that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that "except when otherwise
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit." No such law or rule specifically requires that respondent’s complaint for damages
should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate against forum shopping,
the two are different.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,21 we already pointed out that:
A party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the
party’s failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the
petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleading may sign the verification.
Here, it was stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law
or rule specifically requiring the same.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.
Therefore, the Court find no procedural defect that would warrant the outright dismissal of
Jocelyn’s complaint.
15
Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012

Topic : PARTS OF PLEADING; Verification
Doctrine : If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so,
the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction
over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Facts :
This is a petition to reversed and set aside the decision of the CA dismissing the petition before
them.
Respondent Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc,
Manila. This land is occupied by Galiga from 1979 to 1993 with a lease contract. Salvador
alleged that she bought the land from Galiga who represented the owner.
Angeles then sent a letter to Salvador demanding that Salvador to vacate the property. Angeles
then filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC of Manila.
The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was one Rosauro
Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October12, 1994, alleging therein
that he was respondent’s attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document
attached to the complaint to prove Diaz’s allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted
to him. This prompted petitioner to raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper, the issue of
Diaz’s authority to file the case.On December 11, 1995, more than a year after the complaint
was filed, respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent’s (herein
petitioner) PositionPaper,4 a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA)5 supposedly
executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz. However, said SPA was executed only on
November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have
been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there
was no certification from the Philippine ConsulateGeneral in San Francisco, California, U.S.A,
that said person is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court
cannot give full faith and credit to the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence, no
evidentiary weight or value can be attached to the document designated as an SPA dated
November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been authorized by
respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.
MTC rendered its decision in favor of Angeles. Salvador filed an appeal saying that Angeles had
not authority at the time of the filing of the suit. RTC denied the appeal. Petitioner elevated the
case to the CA, but CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this present petition.
Issue :
16
Whether or not the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to
represent a plaintiff in filing an action is valid.
Ruling :
In the case of Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, “the Court categorically stated that, if a
complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.” This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippine Shipping, Inc. v.
Kemper Insurance Company, where the Court went on to say that,”in order for the court to
have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties.”
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound
by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid
complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of respondent.
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this
case and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the
very merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court’s
jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
Estel v. Diego, G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012

Facts:
The present petition originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego . with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental
Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered into a contract of sale of a 306 –square-meter parcel of land
with petitioner. around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner, together with her two grown-up sons and five
other persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot, after which they entered its premises and then cut and
destroyed the trees and plants found therein; respondent Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. witnessed the incident but found
himself helpless at that time
MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material allegations in the
Complaint contending that respondents were never in physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession of
the subject lot. the agreement she entered into with the wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the
subject lot had been abrogated
MTC dismissed defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim and ordering the defedants to vacate the premises of the
land.
17
RTC affirmed the decision, CA also affirmed the decision of RTC
Issue: Whether or not a verification should be based on personal knowledge or authentic record and not simply upon
“knowledge, information and belief.”
Held:
Petitioner also avers that the complaint states no cause of action because the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping accompanying the complaint are defective and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned
pleading. As to the verification, petitioner contends that it should be based on respondent's personal knowledge or on
authentic record and not simply upon "knowledge, information and belief."
The Court does not agree.
Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge,
information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading
A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule. Respondents
confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal
knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate
the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the
complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
Spouses Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
On January 26, 1999, respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint for collection of money with prayer for preliminary injunction against the petitioners.
The verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to the complaint were signed by Francisco R. Ramos
(Ramos), then BPI Assistant Vice-President and Mindanao Region Lending Head.
On April 22, 1999, the petitioners moved to dismiss BPI’s complaint on the ground that there was a pending action for
foreclosure proceedings before the RTC of Ozamis City, filed by BPI against Philcompak,. The RTC found that the
present complaint and the pending action for foreclosure proceedings involved different causes of action; hence, the RTC
4
denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On May 26, 2008, the petitioners filed another motion to dismiss, this time, on the ground that there had been a fatal
defect in the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to BPI’s complaint. They argued that the
verification and certification did not state or declare that Ramos was filing the subject complaint in a representative
18
capacity or as an authorized officer of BPI; nor did it state that Ramos was authorized by BPI’s Board of Directors to file
the complaint through a board resolution made specifically for the purpose.
9 10
The RTC denied the petitioners’ second motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The
11
petitioners assailed these orders of denial in the petition for certiorari they filed with the CA.
12
In a decision dated February 26, 2010, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ certiorari petition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the assailed decision but the CA denied their motion, hence, the filing of the present petition for review on
13
certiorari with this Court.
ISSUES:
a. whether the CA gravely erred when it affirmed the RTC in not dismissing BPI’s complaint against the petitioners
due to the alleged lack of authority of Francisco R. Ramos to file the BPI complaint and sign its attached
verification and certification against forum shopping;
b. whether the Special Power of Attorney and Corporate Secretary’s Certificate that BPI belatedly submitted
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements under the rules on verification and certification.
RULING:
We note that, at the time the complaint against the petitioners was filed, Ramos also held the position of Assistant Vice-
President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was then the highest official representing the bank in the Northern Mindanao
23
area. This position and his standing in the BPI hierachy, to our mind, place him in a sufficiently high and authoritative
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint, to justify his authority in filing
the complaint and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. Whatever is lacking, from the strictly
corporate point of view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although belatedly) issued the appropriate SPA.1âwphi1
In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are not
24
jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good
25
faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-compliance with the verification requirement does not
26
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample
knowledge of the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
27
made in good faith or are true and correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping is required based
28
on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to purse simultaneous remedies in different for a. While the
certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a defect in the certification could be cured by its subsequent
correction or submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons, or on the ground of "substantial compliance.
Swedish Match v. Treasurer, v. G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013
IMPORTANT FACTS:
On 20 October 2001, petitioner paid business taxes in the total amount of P470,932.21. The assessed amount was based
on Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, as amended by Ordinance
Nos. 7988 and 8011. Out of that amount, P164,552.04 corresponded to the payment under Section 21.
Assenting that it was not liable to pay taxes under Section 21, petitioner wrote a letter dated 17 September 2003 to herein
respondent claiming a refund of business taxes the former had paid pursuant to the said provision. Petitioner argued that
payment under Section 21 constituted double taxation in view of its payment under Section 14.
On 17 October 2003, for the alleged failure of respondent to act on its claim for a refund, petitioner filed a Petition for
Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with Section 196 of the Local Government Code of 1991.The
petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-108163.
19
On 14 June 2004, the RTC, Branch 21 of Manila rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 03-108163 dismissing the Petition
for the failure of petitioner to plead the latter’s capacity to sue and to state the authority of Tiarra T. Batilaran-Beleno (Ms.
Beleno), who had executed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
In denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC went on to say that Sections 14 and 21 pertained to taxes of a
different nature and, thus, the elements of double taxation were wanting in this case.
On appeal, the CTA Second Division affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the Petition for Refund of Taxes on the ground that
petitioner had failed to state the authority of Ms. Beleno to institute the suit.
The CTA En Banc likewise denied the Petition for Review, ruling as follows:
In this case, the plaintiff is the Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. However, as found by the RTC as well as the Court in
Division, the signatory of the verification and/or certification of non-forum shopping is Ms. Beleno, the company’s Finance
Manager, and that there was no board resolution or secretary's certificate showing proof of Ms. Beleno’s authority in
acting in behalf of the corporation at the time the initiatory pleading was filed in the RTC. It is therefore, correct that the
case be dismissed.
ISSUE: (Related to the topic RULE 7, SEC. 4 VERIFICATION)
Whether Ms. Beleno was authorized to file the Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC
HELD:
YES. Ms. Belino was authorized to file the Petition for Refund of Taxes with the RTC.
Anent the procedural issue, petitioner argues that there can be no dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting within her authority
when she instituted the Petition for Refund before the RTC, notwithstanding that the Petition was not accompanied by a
Secretary’s Certificate. Her authority was ratified by the Board in its Resolution adopted on 19 May 2004. Thus, even if
she was not authorized to execute the Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification
by the board of directors retroactively applied to the date of her signing.
On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner failed to establish the authority of Ms. Beleno to institute the
present action on behalf of the corporation. Citing Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (PAL v. FASAP), respondent avers that the required certification of non-forum shopping should have been
valid at the time of the filing of the Petition. The Petition, therefore, was defective due to the flawed Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, which were insufficient in form and therefore a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Consequently, a verification signed without an authority from the board of directors is defective. However, the requirement
of verification is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading and non-compliance does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or, it may act
on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may
be dispensed with so that the ends of justice may be served.
A distinction between noncompliance and substantial compliance with the requirements of a certificate of non-forum
22
shopping and verification as provided in the Rules of Court must be made. In this case, it is undisputed that the Petition
filed with the RTC was accompanied by a Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Ms. Beleno,
although without proof of authority from the board. However, the Supreme Court finds that the belated submission of the
20
Secretary’s Certificate constitutes substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure.
Clearly, this is not an ordinary case of belated submission of proof of authority from the board of directors. Petitioner-
corporation ratified the authority of Ms. Beleno to represent it in the Petition filed before the RTC, particularly in Civil Case
No. 03-108163, and consequently to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of the
corporation. This fact confirms and affirms her authority and gives Supreme Court all the more reason to uphold that
authority.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping
Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014 (Supra.)
FACTS
4
On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and
Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural land.
The decision became final and executory and Barbara's successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de
Martinez and Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.
They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject
property.
According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner
in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996.
Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of
5
the Local Government Code of 1991.
As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners.
Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of the
petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land.
THE RTC’S RULING
6 7
In its December 14, 1999 order, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier order,
denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation of the land be
returned to the respondents.
The RTC found that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee disqualified in
accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for having falsified the tax
declaration they redeemed the property with.
21
THE CA’S RULING
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners filed an action for specific
8
performance against the City Government of Butuan.
According to the petitioners, they acquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they redeemed it
9
from Tuazon. The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.
The CA, after legal analysis, similarly concluded that for being disqualified to bid under Section 89 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, Tuazon never obtained ownership over the property; much less transmit any proprietary rights
to the petitioners.
Clearly, the petitioners failed to establish any clear and unmistakable right enforceable by the injunctive relief.:
ISSUE
ARE THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?
THE COURT’S RULING
YES!
The petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. We agree with the CA that the petitioners committed forum shopping when
they filed the specific performance case despite the pendency of the present case before the CA.
26
In the recent case of Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v. Matilde S. Palicte, the Court laid down the three ways forum
shopping may be committed:
1) through litis pendentia — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet;
2) through res judicata — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved; and
3) splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers — the
ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata.
"The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
27
judicata in the other."
Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed.
28
Cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the land when they
bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon.
22
This ownership is the petitioners’ basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the property.
On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the
petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the petitioners’ ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from
the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon.
While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is different from what was prayed for in
the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves as the basis for the reliefs remains the same — the
petitioners’ alleged ownership of the property after its purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum shopping of the third kind-splitting
causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers.
As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different,
29
so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues."
Similarly, the CA correctly found that the petitioners and their counsel were guilty of forum shopping based on litis
pendentia.
Not only were the parties in both cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also
identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged.
The cause of action in the specific performance case had already been ruled upon in the present case, although it was
still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the specific performance case-for the City Government
of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners - had been indirectly ruled upon in the present case when
the R TC declared that no certificate of sale could be issued because there had been no valid sale.
Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010

Facts:
Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage over the 500-square meter lot and its improvements in favor of China
Banking Corporation as security for a loan. However, Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the real
estate mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale, private respondent Landheights Development Corporation
emerged as the highest bidder for the subject property.
Sometime in April 1998, Landheights filed w ith the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an "Application for Possession of
Real Estate Property Purchased at an Auction Sale. The title of the property was consolidated in favor of Landheights. On
March 13, 2000, Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the subject property, filed a verified complaint for
ejectment against Mediserv before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). The MeTC of Manila rendered a
decision in favor of Landheights. Aggrieved, Mediserv appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila. The RTC decide in
favor of the petitioner.
Accordingly, Landheights filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, w hich however dismissed the Petition. It
states that it appears that the written authority of Dickson Tan to sign the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint and answer, are not attached to the petition.
Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently submitted a Secretary’s Certificate
executed by its Corporate Secretary, Ms. Polly S. Tiu, stating that the Board of Directors affirms the authority of Mr.
Dickson Tan to file the Petition for Review. On March 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting
Landheights a new period of ten (10) days within which to correct and rectify the deficiencies in the petition.
23
On April 1, 2003, Mediserv filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the March 19, 2003 Resolution be set aside
and the December 12, 2002 Resolution, which dismissed the petition, be reinstated. On even date, Landheights filed its
Manifestation of Compliance.
On September 16, 2003, the appellate court issued resolution reinstating the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring that the subsequent submission of Secretary’s Certificate stating that the
Board of Directors allowed Mr. Tan to file the Petition for Review curred the defect on the certification of non-forum
shopping?
Ruling:
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to
submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum
shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
However, in certain exceptional circumstances, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the
filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allow ed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the
petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and certification against
non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit
certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circum stances or compelling
reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the
granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that Landheights has substantially complied with the
verification and certification requirements. We have held in a catena of cases with similar factual circumstances that
there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of the secretary’s
certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
In the present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tan’s authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted
24
to the Court of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the petition itself, is
in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it more in accord with substantive justice that the
case be decided on the merits. It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there
may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold two parcels of land for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to respondent
Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale. They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of
the deed and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for
registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on the
shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking
instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the
parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.
Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance,
injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97. Javellana prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling
materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a
final deed of sale in his favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint
did not state a cause of action The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action
against her due to her not being bound to comply w ith the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party
thereto; that there w as no evidence show ing the payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration
of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that
his claim of paying the balance w as not credible. Javellana moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, which the RTC gave due course to, and the
records w ere elevated to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259).
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455) to assail
the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari,17 finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding
that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,18 reversing and setting aside the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with
law.”
25
Now, Petitioner appeal to SC on the ground that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455) to assail the orders of the RTC that w ere the subject matter of his appeal pending in
the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259). She posited that, even if the CA’s decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the
RTC’s dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the
action had already prescribed
Issue:
Whether or not Javellana committed forum shopping when she filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that RTC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in CA while pending appeal on the Civil Case No. 79-M-97 in CA?
Ruling:
No forum shopping was committed.
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking
and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is
identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and w here a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum
shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the tw o cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and
must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives w ere sought.
In this case, forum shopping does not exist because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different
objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case
No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course
by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject
property and from proceeding w ith the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly
determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate
attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize
considering that the appeal w as a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, w hereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt w ith an
independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable
ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
26
Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan, G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner accepted her appointment and assumed the position of Dean of the College of Physical Therapy. In the school
year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in the number of enrollees from a total of
1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only 20 students enrolled for school year 2004-2005.
Due to the low number of enrollees, respondent decided to freeze the operation of the College of Physical Therapy
indefinitely. Respondent’s President Dr. Rafaelita Pelaez-Golez wrote petitioner a letter dated March 16, 2005 informing
her that her services as dean of the said college will end at the close of the school year. Thereafter, the College of Physical
Therapy ceased operations on March 31, 2005, and petitioner went on leave without pay starting on April 9, 2005.
Subsequently, respondent’s Executive Vice President, Dr. Mariano M. Lerin, through Dr. Glory S. Magdale, respondent’s
Vice President for Academic Affairs, sent petitioner a letter dated April 27, 2005 instructing petitioner to return to work
on June 1, 2005 and report to Ma. Chona Palomares, the Acting Dean of the College of Nursing, to receive her teaching
load and assignment as a full-time faculty member in that department for the school year 2005-2006.
In reply, petitioner informed Dr. Lerin that she had not committed to teach in the College of Nursing and that as far as she
can recall, her employment is not dependent on any teaching load. She then requested for the processing of her separation
benefits in view of the closure of the College of Physical Therapy. She did not report to Palomares on June 1, 2005.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal. LA found that petitioner was not illegally
dismissed because petitioner’s assignment as full-time professor in the College of Nursing was not a demotion tantamount
to constructive dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC, NLRC reversed LA’s decision holding the petitioner was illegally
dismissed. Respondent, Liceo de Cagayan, filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared that petitioner’s
transfer to the College of Nursing as full-time professor but without diminution of salaries and without loss of seniority
rights amounted to constructive dismissal because there was a demotion involved in the transfer and because petitioner
was compelled to accept her new assignment.
Petitioner further alleged that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping when it failed to inform the apellate court of
the pendency of the complaint for breach of contract which it filed against the petitioner before the RTC.
ISSUES : W/N Respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
RULING:
No.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case
While there is identity of parties in the two cases, the causes of action and the reliefs sought are different. The issue raised
in the present case is whether there was constructive dismissal committed by respondent. On the other hand, the issue in
the civil case pending before the RTC is whether petitioner was guilty of breach of contract. Hence, respondent is not
guilty of forum shopping.
27
Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000
Facts:
On December 14, 1994, private respondent Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner Digital
Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig city. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, as well as petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Revised
Circular No. 28-91, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Said circular requires the petition filed before the
Court of Appeals to be accompanied by a sworn certification against forum shopping, signed by petitioner himself.
Petitioner’s certification was signed by counsel; the petition was, thus, dismissed. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal and submitted a sworn certification against forum shopping duly signed by one of its
senior officers. The motion was, however, denied, with the Court of Appeals stating that "In the present case, absent any
compelling reason for petitioner’s failure to comply, at first instance, with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, the
Court cannot therefore, accept its subsequent compliance.
Petitioner contends that in the case of a corporation as petitioner, the certification against forum shopping may be
signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with knowledge of the required facts. The authorized person may be
anyone authorized by the corporation, not necessarily an officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the counsel
of record has the authority to execute the certification on behalf of the corporation, particularly considering that under
the Rules of Court, counsel’s authority to represent his client is presumed. No written power of attorney is required for
counsel to appear for his client.
ISSUE: W/N the certification of non- forum shopping may be signed by the counsel?
RULING:
No. The reason the certification against forum shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is because
only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in
different courts or agencies.
We disagree with petitioner that a corporation cannot possibly hope to comply with the requirement laid down by
Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity and not a natural person. If this were so, then it would have
been impossible for a corporation to do anything at all. Needless to say, this is the reason why corporations have
directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions with others. The same is true for the certification against forum
shopping. It could easily have been made by a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation. That petitioner did
not in the first instance comply with the requirement of revised Circular No. 28-91 by having the certification against
forum shopping signed by one of its officers, as it did after its petition before the Court of Appeals had been dismissed, is
beyond our comprehension.
In the recent case of Spouses Valentin Ortiz and Camilla Milan Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, et al., 299 SCRA 708, 711-712
(1998), we ruled that "Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration, petitioners here
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice."
28
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed by
one of its officers.
Spouses Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters. Rosemarie lives with her husband, petitioner
Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario resides in New York, U.S.A. The present controversy stemmed from an
investment agreement between the two sisters, which had gone sour along the way.
On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint before the RTC of
Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and Rosemarie Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at
the exchange rate of P38.30 per dollar. The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, alleged that
Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said
amount to be deposited in a savings account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be
earned therefrom would be given to Rosario’s son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance.
In accordance with her agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie gave Manolito his monthly allowance ranging from P2,000 to
P4,000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. However, sometime in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000
and for an accounting. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so.
In January 1999, Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written demand for her
US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit.
On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 on the following grounds: (1) the lack of
allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance with Article 151[5] of
the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being premature in the absence of previous earnest
efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was defective, having been executed by an
attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff, as required by Rule 7, Section 5[6] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: WON the certification against forum shopping was valid.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent in the instant case is already a resident of the United States, and not of the Philippines. Hence,
it was proper for her to appoint her daughter, Grace Galvez, to act as her attorney-in-fact in the Philippines. The Special
Power of Attorney granted by the respondent to her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, categorically and clearly authorizes
the latter to do the following:
1. To ask, demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any person natural, juridical and/or corporation
in the Philippines;
2. To file criminal and/or civil complaints before the courts of justice in the Philippines to enforce my rights and
interest[s];
3. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s], to make stipulations, adjust claims, to settle and/or enter into
Compromise Agreement[s], to litigate and to terminate such proceedings; [and]
4. To sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the above purposes.
From the foregoing, it is indisputable that Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact of the respondent, was duly authorized and
empowered not just to initiate complaints, whether criminal or civil, to enforce and protect the respondent’s rights, claims,
and interests in this jurisdiction, but is specifically authorized to sign all ―papers, documents, and pleadings‖ necessarily
connected with the filing of a complaint. Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which extended the requirement of
a certification on non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, the aforementioned papers and documents, which Grace Galvez
was authorized and empowered to sign, must necessarily include the certification on non-forum shopping. To conclude
29
otherwise would render nugatory the Special Power of Attorney and also render respondent’s constitution of an attorney-
in-fact inutile.
Forum shopping ―occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels
he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.‖ In our jurisdiction, it has taken the form of filing multiple petitions or
complaints involving the same issues before two or more tribunals or agencies in the hope that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. There is also forum shopping when, because of an adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The rationale against forum shopping is that
a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Thus, the rule proscribing
forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases
before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and
save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue. It is in this light that we must look at the propriety and
correctness of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Grace Galvez on the respondent’s behalf. We have
examined said Certificate and find that under the circumstances, it does not negate but instead serves the purpose of the
rule against forum shopping, namely to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the ―petitioner or principal party‖
himself. The rationale behind this is ―because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies.‖ However, the rationale does not apply where, as in
this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who instituted the action. The Special Power of Attorney in this instance was
constituted precisely to authorize Grace Galvez to file and prosecute suits on behalf of respondent, who was no longer
resident of the Philippines but of New York, U.S.A. As respondent points out, it is Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact for
her, who has actual and personal knowledge whether she initiated similar actions or proceedings before various courts on
the same issue on respondent’s behalf. Said circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the attorney-in-fact, and
not the respondent, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that there has been proper compliance with the rule proscribing forum
shopping. As we previously held concerning Administrative Circular No. 04-94:
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot
be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with
its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is now incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Rule 7, Section 5. It is
basic that the Rules ―shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.‖Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping
to accompany every initiatory pleading, ―should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.‖
COA v. Paler, G.R. No. 172623, March 10, 2010

FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision dated December 20, 2005
and resolution dated April 27, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90360.
Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the Technical Support Service of
the Commission on Appointments. On April 8, 2003, he submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days -
from August 1,2003 to November 14, 2003. In a memorandum dated April 22, 2003, Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of
Technical Support Service, submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Paler's
application.
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for the United States on June 8, 2003,
without verifying whether his application for leave (for August 1 - November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.
30
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll
of employees effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with Section
63, Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Paler's son received the letter on September
23, 2003.
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the ground that it was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period. The denial was received by Paler's son on March 18, 2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision dated September 16, 2003 per
resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004.
The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CSC per resolution No. 050833 dated June
23, 2005.
This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July 28, 2005 and was no longer
entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed with modification CSC resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004 and
resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in the assailed resolution dated April 27,
2005.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON Commission Secretary has the authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman.
RULING: Authority to File Petition
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and
headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer
or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification. With regard,
however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or
any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized
by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is
nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation of his lack of
authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments presented before the CSC and CA. It
does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this Court to deviate from the rulings of both tribunals.
31

Rule 7 PDF

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Rule 7 PDF

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Civil Procedure | 2019 | USJ-R Law

RULE 7- PARTS OF A PLEADING

Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15, 2000

Sec. 2. The body.

(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated.

Sec. 2 The body

Phil. Charter v. PNC Corp., G.R. No. 185066, October 2, 2009

Surety Bond No. Purchase Order Units Total Cost Surety

Bond No. 27546 P.O. No. 71025L 2 P 168,000 P 84,000

Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

Sec. 3. Signature and address

Navarro v. Jarson Development, G.R. No. 142627, January 28, 2008

G.R. No. 142627

G.R. No. 172750

HELD: DENIED AND MOOT

Jacinto v. Gumaru, G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014

Mahinay v. Gako, G.R. No. 165338, November 28, 2011

-The owners and Suarez moved for reconsideration.

-Unhappy, they appealed to the CA.

Vallacar v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2012

Petitioners counterclaim was dismissed for lack of merit.

SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,21 we already pointed out that:

Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012

Estel v. Diego, G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012

MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining Order

RTC affirmed the decision, CA also affirmed the decision of RTC

The Court does not agree.

Swedish Match v. Treasurer, v. G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013

ISSUE: (Related to the topic RULE 7, SEC. 4 VERIFICATION)

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping

Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014 (Supra.)

petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land.

THE RTC’S RULING

THE CA’S RULING

ARE THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?

THE COURT’S RULING

"The requisites of litis pendentia are:

Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

No forum shopping was committed.

Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan, G.R. No. 193857, November 28, 2012

ISSUES : W/N Respondent is guilty of forum shopping.

Spouses Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004

Issue: WON the certification against forum shopping was valid.

COA v. Paler, G.R. No. 172623, March 10, 2010

Hence, this petition

RULING: Authority to File Petition

S-ar putea să vă placă și