April 5, 2016

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC Respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, CJ.:

Very rarely are concurring opinions and dissenting opinions attached to a minute resolution.
In the instant petitions, the minute resolution that denies the Motions for Reconsideration
accurately reflects the understanding of this Court - that the motions do not raise any new
substantial argument, and that all the issues that the motions raise have already been
passed upon in the 8 March 2016 Decision. Thus, the denial is final, and no new pleading
will be entertained.

Rule 13, Section 6(d) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides that the denial of
a motion for reconsideration may be made by minute resolution in "the absence of a
compelling or cogent reason to grant the motion, or the failure to raise any
substantial argument to support such motion." Rule 2, Section 15 of the same rules
allows the resolution of motions for reconsideration through a minute resolution even when
the opinion of the Court is divided.1 Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc. 2 has explained that6666
minute resolutions "constitute actual adjudications on the mertgits. They are the result
of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court." In these particular
petitions, the entire Court has more than thoroughly deliberated on the issues.

It is helpful to remember the context when the Court issues minute resolutions. Indeed, the
results of such deliberations, even when they are robust and the issues of great import,
need not be in the form of full decisions, as Joaquin-Agregado v. Yamat3states:

The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its
judgment shall be framed. It has long been settled that this Court has the discretion to
decide whether a "minute resolution" should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision
in any particular case. A minute resolution dismissing a petition for review on certiorari
is an adjudication on the merits of the controversy, and is as valid and effective as a
full-length decision.4
Nevertheless, due to the strong feelings expressed by some of our dissenting colleagues,
the Court decided to delay the release of the resolution dismissing with finality the Motions
for Reconsideration and to await submission of their dissents. Some of them may believe
that a minute resolution will not do justice to the motions, but that is their view, and that view
remains a dissenting view. At the same time, I am constrained to issue this Concurring
Opinion to balance what would be expected as vigorous attacks by the minority against the
majority decision.

Had the Decision dated 8 March 2016 been reversed, this Court would have authorized the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to continue to play politics. The Decision and the
concurring opinions were strong indictments of the grave abuse of discretion that infested
the COMELEC's assailed actions "from root to fruits."5The ponente characterized the acts of
COMELEC as bordering on bigotry, and similarly strong language was used by the
concurring opinions on the unfairness and prejudice displayed by the COMELEC towards
petitioner. This Court thus rightly issued strong words of disapproval of the COMELEC's
actions.

The essence of the Motions for Reconsideration and some of the dissents is the complaint
that the majority should have, to a man or woman, decided on the intrinsic qualifications of
petitioner to prevent that question from remaining hanging until the elections. By refusing to
make a final decision disqualifying petitioner, one colleague warns that the Decision will
lead to an "absurd result." It might be important to note that implied in such complaint is the
premise that there are enough votes to support the disqualification of petitioner, should she
win and a quo warranto petition is brought. At best, such thinking is speculative.

What the respondents and some of the dissenters actually rail against, however, is the
Constitution itself. Their main thesis is that a candidate cannot be allowed to run if there is
doubt expressed by a loud minority about her lack of qualifications. One of the dissenters
has even characterized the Court itself as having committed grave abuse of discretion. 6 By
their very words, they have arrogated to themselves a place above the Court. This is
brazenly an attempt at tyranny by a noisy part of the minority. Nothing can be more
destructive of the rule of law.

The Constitution in very clear language has instituted post-election remedies to question the
qualification of an elected president, vice-president, senator, or member of the House of
Representatives. Because this remedy has been designed by the Constitution itself, it is not
the place of the COMELEC to question the wisdom of the Filipino people who ratified a
Constitution that provides such remedies. This Court has no jurisdiction to render inutile a
constitutional provision on the basis of COMELEC's "fear of instability."

Indeed, regardless of the number of justices who have opined that petitioner is a natural-
born Filipino, even if it were a near unanimity, the post-election remedy of quo warranto -
should petitioner indeed win the presidency - will be available to proper parties on proper
grounds. It would thus be a complete academic exercise if We were to entertain the Motion
for Reconsideration of the COMELEC on the ground that this Court must avoid the
consequences of an adverse quo warranto decision against petitioner should she win the
presidency by settling with permanency the issue of petitioner's citizenship. The
Constitution precisely opens up this possibility, and this contingency, we all must respect.
There were 9 votes as against 6 on 8 March 2016 that nullified the COMELEC's assailed
resolutions for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Unless these votes are
reversed, petitioner remains a candidate for president; COMELEC must fully treat her as
such and must stop assailing her candidacy. The words of the Decision are clear:
"Petitioner x x x is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President."7 This fallo of
the Decision has been affirmed by the same 9 votes, while the 6 dissenting votes remain as
dissenting votes.

It is thus misplaced for some in the minority to demand that all the members of this Court
take a position on the intrinsic qualifications of petitioner. The 3 justices who opted not to
take a position on whether petitioner is a natural-born Filipino were and continue to be free
to do so. In the same manner, those who opted to reveal their positions on the matter were
equally free to do so. 8 At the same time, it is not unimportant that 7 out of the 9 already
believe that petitioner possesses the intrinsic qualifications for the presidency as against a
lesser number of the contrary view.

Perhaps it is not foolish to think that the remaining 2 of the 9 - had they been convinced in
their hearts that petitioner is not qualified - could have easily voted against the petitions, and
spared themselves the future dilemma of weighing their position in a possible quo
warranto action. Instead, they opted for the calibrated approach of first exclusively ruling on
the issue of grave abuse of discretion, an approach as proper as that taken by the other 7.

Indeed, the claim made by some that the Court took no position on the citizenship of
petitioner is squarely met by Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution9 and Rule 12,
Section 110 of the Internal Rules, i.e., that a decision is formed from the position of the
majority of the justices who took part and voted on an issue. Since 12 justices took part -
and 3 did not - on the matter of the citizenship of petitioner, it can be rightly said that a ruling
has been made when a group of 7 emerged from the deliberations in favor of petitioner. It is
offensive to the majority's pride of place that some in the minority are trying to belittle the
Decision by saying that since only 7 and not 8 justices declared that petitioner is a natural-
born Filipino, such position produces no legal effect. The reply to such position is simple: we
are 7, you are 5. Seven is a majority in a group of 12. It is time that this reality be accepted.
Whether such majority position will be reversed in a quo warranto petition is a future matter,
but the odds against its happening are quite telling.

Some might say that this defense of the majority position is pre-emption of a future action.
But consider what some are trying to do: nullify a constitutional provision for post-election
contests on electoral qualifications, attack the majority Decision to the point of calling it a
mere ponencia, and transform the dissents into rallying cries against the campaign and
candidacy of petitioner. As I had called out earlier, let the Court stay out of politics.

Had this Court agreed to the proposition that a full resolution instead of a minute resolution
be issued, its promulgation would have been delayed by 1 to 2 weeks. The majority
believes that the nation's interest is best served if the legal controversy over the
COMELEC's actions of preventing petitioner from running for office in May 2016 is
immediately terminated. The candidates must be allowed to move on; the electorate must
no longer be distracted by the skirmishes before this Court. It serves no good purpose for
baseless howls of protest to amplify today's ambient noise. No one is benefited except
those who want to "game" judicial processes for political ends.

The sovereign choice on who will be the next president of the Philippines must be respected
by this Court. Only after this choice has been made may We potentially step in. Needless
to say, the expression of this electoral choice would necessarily affect how this Court will
decide the issues brought before it. That this is the reality designed by the Constitution itself
should have been by now accepted by all mature lawyers and students of the Constitution.
It is an express limitation to this Court's role, that We, its members, must humbly accept.
For the implicit fundamental premise of the Constitution is that while this Court may err on
who should be the rightful leader of this country, the people, on this matter, can never be in
error. That is why this Court must not even indirectly attempt to substitute its will for that of
the electorate; it must remain politically neutral, and so should the COMELEC.

This extended opinion has been made necessary to clarify and summarize the views
expressed by the majority, considering that the Court's ruling is by way of a minute
resolution. This summary will cross-reference the Decision, the various opinions, and the
Motions for Reconsideration in the discussion. This cross-referencing will demonstrate in
part that all the substantial issues raised by the respondents are not new issues - they have
been fully deliberated upon and resolved by the Court.

Why COMELEC's Jurisdiction Must be Limited

A reversal of the Decision dated 8 March 2016 would result m an unconstitutional

amendment of the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET), and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). 11 This Court
has consistently held that the power to rule on the intrinsic qualifications of candidates
belong to courts, not to the COMELEC.12 The COMELEC, at most, only has the power to
rule on the absence or presence of material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is important to recall the three overarching reasons proffered by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his Separate Opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC13explaining why the powers of COMELEC need to be limited. His view was
adopted by a unanimous Court in Fermin v. COMELEC.14

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity
for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be
disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being
sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a
candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be
counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or,
as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning
of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, AgapiLo A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is
contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates
state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which
they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of
false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A.
No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.15

There is a fourth reason I wish to add on why the powers of the COMELEC must be
circumscribed, and one that had been adverted to by Justice Marvic Leonen: the need to
prevent the COMELEC from engaging in politics by eliminating candidates arbitrarily on the
pretext of exercising its powers of administration and enforcement of election laws. The
COMELEC cannot be the judge of who can and cannot run, and at the same time, have the
power to administer the elections and proclaim its winners; and in the case of the president,
have the sole power to transmit the results of the election to Congress.

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, respondents repeatedly insist16 that the COMELEC, in a
Section 78 proceeding, has jurisdiction to declare any candidate ineligible and to cancel
his/her certificate of candidacy without the need for a prior determination coming from a
proper authority.17 Every aspect of this argument has been explored during the oral
arguments, and has been extensively pushed by several of my colleagues in their
dissenting opinions.18 In fact, the COMELEC lifted nine pages from our colleague's
dissenting opinion19 to reargue that the laws, rules, and jurisprudence (especially those
penned by Justice Jose Perez, the ponente of our Decision) do not limit the jurisdiction in
determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of a Section 78 proceeding.

It is necessary to point out that the pronouncement in the Decision dated 8 March 2016 -
that a certificate of candidacy cannot be cancelled or denied due course without a prior
authoritative finding that the candidate is not qualified20 - is not a novel concoction by this
Court. On this score, any claim of judicial legislation on the part of the Court must be set
aside. The ruling is but a restatement of what is clearly set out by the Omnibus Election
Code that a Section 78 proceeding is summary in nature and one that will not delve into the
determination of a candidate's qualifications. As clearly pointed out in the Decision, "[t]he
only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions."21

The power of the COMELEC to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy in a
Section 78 proceeding was granted to it by the legislature on the single ground of false
material representation. It is the fear of partisanship on the part of the COMELEC that made
our lawmakers empower it to reject certificates of candidacy only for the strongest of
reasons, i.e., material misrepresentation on the face of the certificate of candidacy. 22 Any
more than this would open the door for the COMELEC to engage in partisanship and target
any candidate at will. The clear intent was to make the denial of due course or cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC a summary proceeding that would not go
into the intrinsic validity of the qualifications of the candidate, in a sense, even to the point of
making the power merely ministerial in the absence of patent defects.

The implication is that Section 78 cases contemplate simple issues only. Any issue that is
complex would entail the use of discretion, which is reserved to the appropriate election
tribunal.

Contrary to the claim that the recent pronouncement by the Court would wreak havoc on
jurisprudence23recogmzmg COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a candidate's eligibility in
the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it, a study of the cases cited would
easily demonstrate the consistency of the Decision with prevailing jurisprudence.

Tagolino v. HRET24stemmed from a quo warranto petition before the HRET, not a Section
78 petition before COMELEC. The main issue in the case was the propriety of Richard
Gomez's substitution by Lucy Gomez, considering that his certificate of candidacy had been
denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78. Thus, he could not be substituted
because he was not considered a candidate at all. In the case, the Court never made a
pronouncement that the COMELEC had jurisdiction to look into the intrinsic validity of
Richard's qualifications, mainly because the finding that he lacked the one-year residency
requirement was no longer contested by him after the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
ruling of the COMELEC First Division in this regard. The Court made clear, however, that
the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House. As the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied
down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be circumvented and
rendered nugatory. Obviously, this case is not in point on this contested issue.

Talaga v. COMELEC,25 Jalosjos v. COMELEC26and Aratea v. COMELEC27actually involve

proper examples of the recent Court pronouncement on the limits of COMELEC's
jurisdiction, so they in fact contradict private respondents' position.

In Talaga, the cause of Ramon Talaga's ineligibility was the violation of the three-term limit
clearly provided in the Constitution and statutory law. This may fall under the category of a
self-evident fact of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity, and even a judicial admission
especially because Ramon, in his manifestation before the COMELEC First Division, readily
admitted that he was disqualified to run pursuant to the three-term limit rule.

As regards Dominador Jalosjos, his ineligibility was rooted in the fact that he was
perpetually disqualified to run for any elective public office in view of his criminal conviction
by final judgment. In fact, the Court enunciated that COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its
constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if
it does not motu proprio bar those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue
of a final judgment from running for public office. A perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office may properly fall under the category of a self-evident fact of unquestioned
or unquestionable veracity.

Aratea is basically a combination of the disqualifications in Talaga and Jalosjos, because

Romeo Lonzanida was found by the COMELEC to suffer from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment, and committed a violation of the three-term limit
rule.

The private respondents in Sobej ana-Condon v. COMELEC28actually failed to utilize

Section 78. What they filed instead was a petition for quo warranto before the Regional Trial
Court, and the COMELEC took cognizance only over the appeal filed by petitioner therein.
Similarly, this case is not in point.

Ugdoracion v. COMELEC29involved the indubitable fact that petitioner therein was a holder
of a green card, which evidences that one is a lawful permanent resident of the United
States (US). Such status directly contradicted Jose Ugdoracion's declaration in his
certificate of candidacy that he was "not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign
country." The Court also emphasized the applicability of Section 6830 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his
status.

Lluz v. COMELEC31did not involve a Section 78 proceeding, but an election offense in

connection with the alleged misrepresentation of therein private respondent about his
profession.

In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,32the issue was whether the use of a surname constitutes a

material misrepresentation under Section 78 so as to justify the cancellation of a
candidate's certificate of candidacy. There was no pronouncement regarding the Section 78
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, which, notably, refused to make a legal conclusion on the
validity of the marriage of private respondent therein and her entitlement to use the
surname of her husband, because the controversy is judicial in nature.

Miranda v. Abaya33stemmed from a petition to annul the substitution of a candidate whose

certificate of candidacy had been cancelled. There was no issue with regard to the earlier
cancellation of Pempe Miranda's certificate of candidacy due to the violation of the three-
term limit.

The issue in Domino v. COMELEC34was whether the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
excluding petitioner therein from the list of voters of Quezon City and essentially supporting
his contention that he is a voter of Sarangani may preclude COMELEC from making its own
determination of his compliance with the one-year residence requirement to run for public
office in Sarangani. In this context, the Court ruled that there is no res judicata, and that it is
within the competence of COMELEC to independently determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, including
compliance with the residency requirement. Notably, COMELEC found that petitioner failed
to comply with the one-year residence requirement on the basis of his own Voter's
Registration Record dated 22 June 1997 stating that his address is in Quezon City. The
document showed an irreconcilable difference with his statement in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a resident of Sarangani since January 1997.

In Garvida v. Sales,35the Court actually found that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion in (1) taking cognizance of the petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel the certificate of candidacy, which should have been referred to the COMELEC
sitting in Division; and (2) entertaining the petition despite its failure to comply with the
formal requirements of pleadings. At any rate, it is well to emphasize that the COMELEC
found that petitioner therein committed a material misrepresentation on her certificate of
candidacy for the reason that she would have been more than 21 years of age on the day of
the Sangguniang Kabataan elections. This conclusion was gleaned from her birth
certificate, thereby qualifying as a self-evident fact of unquestioned veracity. In the case,
while finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC En Banc, We
eventually declared her ineligible to run for being over the age qualification.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC36did not deal with the jurisdiction of COMELEC under Section 78, but
instead ruled upon COMELEC's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations. Furthermore, the ruling of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying
petitioner therein from running for the office of governor of Sorsogon was based on two final
rulings of this Court37 that he is disqualified for such office by virtue of his alien citizenship.
In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,38the cancellation of Ramon Labo, Jr. 's certificate of candidacy by
the COMELEC was likewise premised on a Decision39 of this Court declaring him not a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as mayor of
Baguio City.

In Aznar v. COMELEC,40Section 78 was only mentioned in connection with the discussion

on the instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate can be
raised. The COMELEC First Division found that the petition was filed out of time because it
was filed beyond the 25-day period from the filing of the certificate of candidacy required
under Section 78. Moreover, it found that there was no sufficient proof to show that Emilio
Osmeña is not a Filipino citizen. It is well to note that what was sought in the case was his
disqualification based on citizenship. There was no allegation whatsoever about a material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.

In Abella v. Larrazabal,41the charge was that Adelina Larrazabal was a resident of Ormoc
City like her husband, who was disqualified precisely on that account from running for
provincial governor of Leyte. The Court did not authorize the COMELEC to rule upon the
intrinsic qualifications of Larrazabal on residence. In fact, the Court only ordered the
COMELEC to hear the case under Section 78 as a more direct and speedy process
available under the law.

It is misleading to claim that the Court did not dispute the COMELEC's capacity to
determine a candidate's qualifications in Maquiling v. COMELEC.42In that case, while the
petition filed was originally denominated as one for denial of due course to or cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy, both the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
treated the petition therein as one for disqualification, and We affirmed.
Luna v. COMELEC43is consistent with, and even bolsters the point that in resolving petitions
under Section 78, the COMELEC may only address simple issues. In Luna, the Court did
mention that the eligibility of Hans Roger Luna may have been impugned through a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the Election Code, but the Court also qualified that the material misrepresentation be "as to
his date of birth or age," which are simple matters not requiring an exercise of discretion on
the part of COMELEC.

The factual scenario in Cerafica v. COMELEC44is similar to that in Luna. The Court ruled
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica did not
file a valid certificate of candidacy for failure to meet the age requirement; hence, she could
not be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. It was pointed out that Kimberly's certificate of
candidacy was considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) were
impugned through a Section 78 proceeding. Absent such proceeding, Kimberly's certificate
of candidacy remained valid and she could be properly substituted by Olivia.

On Statistical Probability and Presumptions

Respondents again45argue that it was erroneous for the Court to have "accepted hook, line,
and sinker"46 the statistics cited by the Solicitor General and to have inserted in
jurisprudence a kind of profiling based on physical appearance.47 They anchor their position
on the dissenting opinions48 of the members of this Court, which they fail to accept as
personal views of the justices that have not been adopted by the majority.

Had respondents read the Decision more carefully, they would have realized that it was
their failure to prove that petitioner's parents were aliens that led the Court to rule for
petitioner on this aspect.49 In focusing on the absence of the identity of petitioner's parents,
respondents neglected to address the factual issue of whether such parents are Filipinos.

The reference to the statistical probability of 99.83% that any child born in the Philippines in
the decade of 1965-1975 is natural-born Filipino - along with the circumstantial evidence
that petitioner was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City and her typical
Filipino features - only reinforces the proposition that petitioner was born to Filipino parents.
The Court did not take the figures as gospel truth.

There is no merit in the allegation that respondents were not given the opportunity to
impeach the statistics, or that they were raised for the first time on appeal. The figures were
presented by the Solicitor General during the oral arguments on 16 February 2016. From
that date, all parties were given a non-extendible period of five days within which to file their
respective memoranda. The failure of private respondents to impeach the statistics even in
their memoranda has resulted in the use by the Court of the same. Petitioner was not the
one who raised such statistics for the first time on appeal. The Solicitor General could not
have raised it earlier, as the Office had only been impleaded when the case reached this
Court. There cannot be any charge of unfairness regarding this matter.

Respondents revive50 their objection to the alleged reliance by the Court on presumptions to
support the finding that foundlings are natural-born Filipino citizens.51 They call our attention
to the dissenting opinions52 of our colleagues. However, it must be stressed that the points
raised in these dissenting opinions have already been considered during our deliberations.
The Decision took notice that presumptions regarding paternity are neither unknown nor
unpracticed in Philippine law, as demonstrated by the devotion of an entire chapter on
paternity and filiation in the Family Code.53

In my Concurring Opinion, I pointed out that Philippine law treats the parentage of a child as
a matter of legal fiction. Its determination relies not on physical proof, but on legal
presumptions and circumstantial evidence. Notably, the Family Code allows paternity and
filiation to be established through methods54 that do not require physical proof of parentage.
Instead of requiring foundlings to produce evidence of their filiation - a nearly impossible
condition - administrative agencies, the courts, and even Congress have instead proceeded
on the assumption that these children are citizens of the Philippines.

As early as 1901, the Code of Civil Procedure55 recognized that children whose parents are
unknown have a right to be adopted. Similar provisions were included in the subsequent
revisions of the Rules of Court in 194056 and 1964.57 Early statutes also specifically allowed
the adoption of foundlings. Act No. 1670 was enacted precisely to provide for the adoption
of poor children who were in the custody of asylums and other institutions. These children
included orphans or "any other child so maintained therein whose parents are
unknown."58 The provisions of Act No. 1670 were substantially included in the Administrative
Code of 191659 and in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.60

In 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8043 to establish the rules governing
the inter-country adoption of Filipino children, which recognized the adoption of a foundling
under Section 861 of the statute. In 1998, the law on domestic adoption of Filipino children
was amended through R.A. 8552, which specifically included the registration of foundlings
for purposes of adoption.

These enactments and issuances on adoption are significant, because they effectively
recognize foundlings as citizens of the Philippines. It must be emphasized that jurisdiction
over adoption cases is determined by the citizenship of the adopter and the adoptee.
In Spouses Ellis v. Republic,62the Court said that the Philippine Civil Code adheres to the
theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's
nationality, citing Article 1563 of the Civil Code. Citizenship is a status governed by this
provision.64

Ellis also discredits the assertion that this Court has no power to determine the citizenship
of a foundling based only on presumptions. When an American couple, the spouses Ellis,
later sought to adopt Baby Rose, the Court presumed the citizenship of the infant for
purposes of adoption. In the 1976 case Duncan v. CFI of Rizal,65We assumed jurisdiction
over the adoption proceedings, and it may be inferred that the child was presumed a
Philippine citizen whose status may be determined by a Philippine court pursuant to Article
15 of the Civil Code.

The assertion that citizenship cannot be made to rest upon a presumption is contradicted by
the previous pronouncements of this Court in Board of Commissioners v. Dela
Rosa66and Tecson v. COMELEC.67
It must be emphasized that ascertaining evidence does not entail absolute certainty. Under
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence must only induce belief in the existence of a fact in
issue. Hence, judges are not precluded from drawing conclusions from inferences based on
established facts. In the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,68the Court stated that "[j]uries must
often reason xxx according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue
existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence."
Clearly, the use of probabilities is enshrined in established legal precepts under our
jurisdiction.

On the Non-inclusion of Foundlings in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution

Respondents reassert69 that the verba legis rule should prevail.70 They echo the
interpretation of our dissenting colleagues that the voting down of the Rafols proposal is
tantamount to a denial of natural-born status, even Filipino citizenship, to foundlings.71

In the Decision dated 8 March 2016, what impelled this Court to look into the intent of the
framers of the 193 5 Constitution was its belief that the non-inclusion of foundlings in the
enumeration of citizens of the Philippines could not have been the result of inadvertence,
patent discrimination against them on account of their unfortunate status, or deliberate
intention to deny them Filipino citizenship.72

In the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, 73 Delegate Roxas emphasized

that international law recognizes the principle that children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens of the nation where they were found. As such, there is no
need to make an express provision treating them separately.

The fact that the account of Delegate Aruego spoke of statutory action in dealing with the
status of foundlings, rather than expressly including them in the enumeration of the 193 5
Constitution, was not lost on the Court. The Decision specifically identified R.A. 804374 and
855275 as the statutory expression recognizing foundlings as among the Filipino children
who may be adopted.

On Foundlings as Natural-born Citizens under International Law

Private respondents reiterate76 their argument that petitioner cannot find support from
international legal instruments and norms for a declaration that foundlings are natural-born
citizens of the state where they were found.77 They emphasize the discussions in the
dissents78 that the acquisition of citizenship by foundlings is not automatic from birth, as a
proceeding is required for the declaration of their unknown parentage.

It is clear that the objection of private respondents on the application of international law to
the status of petitioner springs not from the recognition of foundlings as citizens of the
nation where they were found, but from their recognition as citizens from birth or being
natural-born. However, as explained in our Decision, the grant of nationality as provided
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is geared towards ensuring that no child, foundling or otherwise, would have to
endure being stateless at any point in time.79
Furthermore, following the same line of reasoning adopted in Razon v. Tagitis80that
ratification of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance is not required for the application of its provisions to the Philippines
considering that enforced disappearance violates rights already recognized under the
Constitution, We also went on to emphasize that the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness merely gives effect to Article 15(1) of the UDHR providing that
"[e]veryone has the right to a nationality."81 It bears stressing that the UDHR has already
been interpreted by the Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law binding the Philippines.82 More important, it embodies the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself.83

Again, there is no merit in the repetitive argument that registration of a child as a foundling,
or the purported conduct of a proceeding, effectively amounts to naturalization in
accordance with law. This contention is unacceptable because the term "in accordance with
law" alludes to enabling legislation.84 Hence, naturalization in Section 1, Article IV of the
1935 Constitution does not refer to just any act, but to the specific procedure for
naturalization prescribed by the legislature. Furthermore, registration is not an act
attributable to a foundling,85 in contrast to the Revised Naturalization Law,86 which requires
applicants to personally and voluntarily perform acts to avail of naturalized citizenship.
Lastly, it is possible to register a foundling without any administrative proceedings, if the
registration is done prior to the surrender of the custody of the child to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or an institution.87 If already registered, the administrative
proceeding88 is followed only for the purpose of adoption.

On Reacquisition of Natural-born Status

Repeating their previous arguments,89 private respondents and Valdez allege that the
instant case is not on all fours with Bengson III v. HRET,90 which involved repatriation under
R.A. 263091 of those who involuntarily lost their Filipino citizenship.92 Furthermore, Valdez
extensively reproduced the deliberations on the precursor bills of R.A. 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) and insists93 that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section
394thereof make a clear distinction between those who lost their Filipino citizenship before
the effectivity of R.A. 9225 (reacquisition) and those after (retention). 95 According to him,
reacquisition means the loss of natural-born status while retention means that Filipinos
remain natural-born citizens.96 On the other hand, the dissents also gave their own
interpretations of the law.97

Private respondents and Valdez basically reiterate COMELEC arguments that have already
been sufficiently addressed by the Court in our Decision.98 Bengson III never distinguished
between those who voluntarily and involuntarily lost their Filipino citizenship. It provided, in
general, that "repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality," 99 and that if a
person was "originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino."100 Thus, the strained
differentiation made by private respondents and Valdez has no merit.

As regards the arguments that the deliberations of the legislators clearly show the intent to
equate reacquisition of Filipino citizenship with loss of natural-born status, the same are
without merit. The most that can be made out of the deliberations is that the thinking of the
legislators on the matter was mixed. Thus, the Court pronouncement in Bengson
III, involving the restoration of former status as natural-born Filipino when one is repatriated,
remains good law.

On Petitioner's 10-year Residency in the Philippines

Once again,101 private respondents and COMELEC allege that the earliest possible
reckoning point for reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines by Filipinos who were
naturalized as foreigners can only be upon their reacquisition of Filipino citizenship or by
securing a permanent resident visa.102 This position was also widely supported by the
dissents.103

In Coquilla v. COMELEC,104 Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC,105 and Caballero v.

COMELEC106the Court had no other point from which to reckon petitioners' reestablishment
of domicile in the Philippines other than the date they reacquired their Filipino
citizenship.107 In contrast, petitioner in this case presented overwhelming evidence proving
the reestablishment of her domicile in the Philippines even before her reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship.108

Entry in the Philippines by virtue of a balikbayan or a non-immigrant visa does not prevent a
person from reestablishing domicile here. In Elkins v. Moreno, 109 aliens with a non-
immigrant visa were considered as having the legal capacity to change their domiciles.
In Toll v. Moreno, 110 the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the ruling in Elkins and held
that the ordinary legal standard for the establishment of domicile may be used even for non-
immigrants. The fact that an alien holds a non-immigrant visa is thus not controlling. What is
crucial in determining whether an alien may lawfully adopt a domicile in the country is the
restriction placed by Congress on a specific type of non-immigrant visa. So long as the
intended stay of a non-immigrant does not violate any of the legal restriction,
sufficient animus manendi may be appreciated and domicile may be established. We can
consider these decisions as sufficiently enlightening and persuasive on this Court.

In the case of balikbayans, the true intent of Congress to treat these overseas Filipinos not
as mere visitors but as prospective permanent residents is evident from the letter of the law.
The Philippines' Balikbayan Program does not foreclose their options should they decide to
actually settle in the country.

As stated in the Decision, there are only three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there and an
intention to abandon the old domicile.111 Petitioner's compliance with these requisites was
extensively discussed in the concurring opinions, and summarized below.

To prove her intent to establish a new domicile in the Philippines on 24 May 2005, petitioner
presented the following evidence: (1) school records indicating that her children attended
Philippine schools starting June 2005; (2) Taxpayer's Identification Number (TIN)
Card, showing that she registered with and secured the TIN from the BIR on 22 July 2005;
(3) Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) and Tax Declarations covering Unit 7F and a
parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium, 194 Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila, purchased in early 2005 and which served as the family's temporary residence;
(4) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of petitioner and her husband issued on 1
June 2006, covering a residential lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City in 2006; and (5)
registration as a voter on 31 August 2006.

The enrolment of children in local schools is a factor considered by courts when it comes to
establishing a new domicile. In Fernandez v. HRET, 112 We used this indicium for the
establishment of a new domicile. In Blount v. Boston, 113 the Supreme Court of Maryland
identified location of the school attended by a person's children as one of the factors in
determining a change of domicile. That petitioner's children began their schooling in the
Philippines shortly after their arrival in the country in May 2005 is a fact "duly proven" by
petitioner,114 and considered non-controverted.115

The following facts are also duly proven: that petitioner purchased a condominium unit in
San Juan City during the second half of 2005, and that petitioner and her husband started
the construction of their house in Corinthian Hills in 2006.116 That petitioner purchased the
residential lot in Corinthian Hills is not up for debate. Taken together, these facts establish
another indicium of petitioner's establishment of a new domicile in the Philippines, a criteria
recognized by Philippine jurisprudence.117

Even US courts consider acquisition of property as a badge of fixing a new

domicile.118 In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC,119 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi used acquisition of a new residence as a factor for determining transfer of
domicile.

Securing a TIN Card does not conclusively prove that petitioner is a resident of the
Philippines, because the 1997 Tax Code mandates all persons required under our tax laws
to render or file a return to secure a TIN.120Nevertheless, the significance of the TIN Card
lies in the fact that it lists down the address of petitioner as No. 23 Lincoln St. West
Greenhills, the very same address of her mother, Jesusa Sonora Poe, as reflected in the
latter's affidavit.121 Therefore, the TIN Card, which was issued on 22 July 2005 , corroborates
the assertion that petitioner, upon her arrival in 2005, was then staying at her mother's
home.

Petitioner registered as a voter on 31 August 2006. This speaks loudly of the intent to
establish a domicile in the country. In Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic EC,122 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi considered registering to vote as a factor indicative of the
intent to acquire a new domicile. More importantly, Oglesby v. Williams123treats voter
registration as one of the two most significant indicia of acquisition of a new domicile. In the
Philippine case of Templeton v. Babcock,124 we held that "though not of course conclusive of
acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an important circumstance and, where the
evidence is scanty, may have decisive weight."125

To prove her intent to abandon her old domicile in the US, petitioner presented the following
evidence: ( 1) email exchanges between petitioner or her husband and the property movers
regarding relocation of their household goods, furniture and vehicles from the US to the
Philippines; (2) invoice document showing delivery from the US to the Philippines of the
personal properties of petitioner and her family; (3) acknowledgment of change of address
by the US Postal Service; ( 4) sale of the family home on 27 April 2006.

In Oglesby v. Williams,126 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that plans for removal
show intent to abandon the old domicile. In this case, petitioner submitted email exchanges
showing that the family began planning to move back to the Philippines as early as March
2005. The email indicates that as early as 18 March 2005, petitioner already had plans to
relocate to Manila. It must be stressed that not only household goods would be moved to
Manila, but two vehicles as well-collectively weighing 28,000 pounds.

Petitioner also adduced as evidence the email of the US Postal Service acknowledging the
notice of change of address made by petitioner's husband. Hale v. State of Mississippi
Democratic EC127 utilized change of postal address as a factor for determining the intent to
abandon a domicile.

In Farnsworth v. Jones,128 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina noted, among others, the
failure of the candidate to change his address. It ruled out the possibility that defendant had
actually abandoned his previous residence. The online acknowledgment presented by
petitioner never showed that the address changed to the Philippine address, but it indicates
intent to abandon her old domicile.

In Imbraguglio v. Bernadas129decided by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit,

the court ruled that a candidate established a new domicile by voluntarily selling his home.

The case of Bell v. Bell,130 combined with the Oglesby case, provides that movement of
properties that are valuable indicates intent to abandon the previous domicile. When only
unimportant belongings remain in the old domicile, the intent to abandon the old domicile is
not diminished. In this case, 25,241 pounds of personal property owned by petitioner and
her family were actually moved from the US to Manila, while non-valuable items (books,
clothes, miscellaneous items) were donated to the Salvation Army. 131

In Oglesby, the date of actual transfer was made the reckoning point for the change of
domicile. Applying the rule to this case, it appears that the intent was actualized in 24 May
2005, the date when petitioner arrived in the Philippines, as revealed by her US passport
bearing a stamp showing her entry in the Philippines. The fact that she arrived here for the
purpose of moving back to the Philippines was not denied by COMELEC during the oral
arguments, although it did not recognize the legal implications of such fact.

Petitioner's arrival in the Philippines on 24 May 2005 was definitely coupled with
both animus manendi and animus non revertendi. When we consider all the other factors
mentioned, there can only be one conclusion - petitioner was here to stay for good.
Petitioner's transfer was incremental, but this Court has already recognized the validity of
incremental transfers.132 Even the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Bell v. Bell133recognized
the notion of incremental transfers in a change of domicile. We must remember that
petitioner and her children would have stayed in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months
by 9 May 2016. For nearly 11 years, her children have studied and spent a substantial part
of their formative years here.
The fact that petitioner's husband remained and retained employment abroad in May 2005
and that petitioner travelled to the US using her US passport even after reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not negate petitioner's intent to reside permanently in the
Philippines.

Petitioner and her family could not have been expected to uproot their lives completely from
the US and finish all arrangements in the span of six months. One of the spouses had to
remain in the US to wind up all logistical affairs. That petitioner's husband remained in the
US until April 2006 only showed that the family endured a period of separation in order to
rebuild their family life together in the Philippines. As for her use of her US passport,
petitioner, as a US citizen, was required by law to use her US passport when travelling to
and from the US.134 Notwithstanding her dual citizenship and the abandonment of her US
domicile, she could not have entered or departed from the US if she did not use her US
passport.

Private respondents claim that the Court's ruling renders Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code "patently discriminatory," given that permanent residents in the US must
perform an unequivocal act of waiver of their foreign domicile - such as the surrender of
their green cards - in order to reacquire their domicile in the Philippines, while full-fledged
US citizens would be able to reckon their reestablishment of domicile from the date of their
arrival in the Philippines by mere show of intent.135 They cite Caasi v. CA,136 and argue that
Section 68 provides a higher bar of establishing animus manendi and animus non-
revertendi for Filipinos who are permanent residents in the US, compared to former Filipino
citizens who do not have a permanent resident visa in the Philippines. In other words, they
contend that possession of a permanent resident visa by former Filipino citizens should be
made a requirement for reestablishing a domicile in the Philippines. Further, they argue that
surrender of the US passport should at least be required, pursuant to Japzon v.
COMELEC.137

The argument is flawed. To be clear, Section 68 provides for a ground for disqualification
and a mode to overcome such disqualification. It does not provide for a mode for
reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines by permanent residents or immigrants of a
foreign country.

In Caasi, we treated the candidate's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the US and his possession of a green card attesting to such status as
"conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to
the Philippines."138 This explains the so-called higher bar for Filipinos with green cards, that
is, they must formally surrender their green cards so as to comply with Section 68. Rightly
so, because a green card proves "a resident alien's status as a permanent U.S.
resident."139 Thus, in Gayo v. Verceles,140 We declared that Verceles was no longer a
permanent resident of the US because she had already surrendered her green card even
prior to the filing of her certificate of candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998
elections. Here, We ruled that Section 68 and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code
"both provide that permanent residents or immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified
from running for any local elective position."141
On the other hand, Japzon did not involve the surrender of a US passport. It involved the
application for a Philippine passport, which we considered as a factor indicating the
candidate's reestablishment of his domicile in the country. Besides, a passport by itself
does not prove residence. A passport is a "formal document, certifying a person's identity
and citizenship so that the person may travel to and from a foreign country." 142 It is
"universally accepted evidence of a person's identity and nationality."143 It therefore makes
no sense why the surrender of a foreign passport should be made a requirement for
reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines.

On Intent to Mislead

Reiterating their previous arguments144 and finding support in two of the

dissents,145 respondents urge the Court to revisit its rulings requiring the element of
deliberate intent to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible in a successful Section 78 petition.146 Private respondents restate147 their
argument that any plea of honest mistake or absence of intent to deceive or mislead must
have merit only if such leads to understated qualification, which in tum leads to outright
disqualification, such as the case of Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC.148At any rate, it is
again149 pointed out that the existence of intent to mislead on the part of petitioner is
established by her various overt acts, as shown by her pattern of misrepresentation. 150

It appears ironic that private respondents referred to the element of deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact as a mere judicially crafted construct, yet would argue
vigorously that petitioner should have secured a permanent resident visa in order to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines, another "judicial construct" that they mistakenly
read as coming from Coquilla v. COMELEC.151Private respondents appear to neglect the
fact that since Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,152 the Court has consistently required153 -
save for Tagolino v. HRE,T154- the element of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or
hide a fact in a successful Section 78 petition.

There is no basis for private respondents' position that good faith can only be appreciated
when the mistake leads to an understated qualification. If upheld, this proposition would
render inutile the more important pronouncement in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC that
"[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's
residency qualification requirement."155

The Court cannot take cognizance of the alleged pattern of misrepresentation on the part of
petitioner. The focus of a Section 78 petition is the certificate of candidacy and the
purported false material representation contained therein. Any allusion to the contents of
other documents should only become material when it indubitably proves the falsity of the
material contents of the certificate of candidacy.

On Reyes v. COMELEC

The ponente, Justice Perez, had been criticized for the alleged double standards utilized by
him in the instant case and Reyes v. COMELEC,156 which was also written by him. However,
I do not see any inconsistency mainly because the two cases are not identical.
On citizenship, the two cases diverge on whether there was misrepresentation warranting
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. In Reyes, the circumstances that petitioner
was a holder of a US passport and that she had the status of a balikbayan shifted the
burden of evidence on her. Reyes, however, failed to present any proof to show that she
was a natural-born citizen. The Court explained:

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that
petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this
point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation
that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to
her.157

While Reyes attached to her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, the Court rejected the same:

[P]etitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a
dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.
Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her
desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity." We
cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if
only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC
as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.158

In the present case, respondents relied mainly on pet1t10ner Poe's admission that she was
a foundling. The admission, however, did not establish the falsity of petitioner's claim that
she was a natural-born citizen. Legal presumptions operated in her favor to the effect that a
foundling is a natural-born citizen. Further, she had a right to rely on these legal
presumptions, thus negating the notion of deception on her part.

There is also a distinction with respect to the execution of an oath of allegiance. In this
case, that petitioner executed an oath of allegiance is not up for debate. In Reyes, however,
the Court found that there was no oath of allegiance executed by Reyes that would satisfy
the requirements of R.A. 9225. We rejected the claim of Reyes that she was deemed to
have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen by her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. The Court said:

For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered
compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. o. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-
05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the
Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot
be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

On residence, to establish the requirements of falsity and intent to deceive, private

respondents in this case merely relied on the representation that petitioner previously made
in her 2012 certificate of candidacy for senator. Petitioner, however, has shown by an
abundance of substantial evidence that her residence in the Philippines commenced on 24
May 2005, and that the statement she made in her 2012 certificate of candidacy was due to
honest mistake. Private respondents failed to meet these pieces of evidence head on.
Hence, they failed to discharge their burden of proving material misrepresentation with
respect to residency.

On the other hand, given the finding that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship, she had
effectively abandoned her domicile in the Philippines. Therefore, it was incumbent upon her
to show that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines, but the only evidence
adduced by Reyes to show compliance with the one-year durational residency requirement
in Boac, Marinduque was her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from 18 January 2011 to 13 July 2011, which the Court deemed insufficient to
establish her one-year residency.

There are other points of distinction as well. In Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution
cancelling her certificate of candidacy had become final and executory when she elevated
the matter to this Court. It should be mentioned that when Reyes filed her petition with the
Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of
Finality over its 14 May 2013 Resolution disqualifying her. Hence, there was no longer any
pending case to speak of. In the case of petitioner in this case, the question of whether her
certificate of candidacy should be cancelled is a subsisting issue.

Moreover, in Reyes, We found that her recourse to this Court appeared to be an attempt to
prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and executory judgment. The Court
reasoned that Reyes took "an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance" - while she sought
remedy before the Court, she asserted that it was the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal that had jurisdiction over her.

In sum, Reyes is substantially different from the instant case. Reyes involved a final and
executory order of COMELEC cancelling her certificate of candidacy that was brought
before this Court, apparently in an attempt to prevent enforcement of the judgment. The
present case involved an order cancelling petitioner's certificate of candidacy, which was a
genuine issue timely raised before the Court.

This case involved a candidate who was a foundling, carried a Philippine passport, took an
oath of allegiance, and executed an affidavit of renunciation. Legal presumptions operated
in her favor, making her a natural-born citizen at the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy for president. Reyes involved a candidate who was a former natural-born citizen
but carried a US passport and failed to show proof that she took the requisite oath of
allegiance and affidavit of renunciation. The evidence operated against her, thus
establishing false representation in her certificate of candidacy with intent to deceive.
In this case, petitioner submitted an abundance of evidence showing that she reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines in May 2005, thus fulfilling the durational residence
requirement of 10 years. In Reyes, the candidate submitted only one piece of evidence - her
service as provincial administrator from 18 January 2011 to 13 July 2011, which the Court
deemed insufficient to establish her one-year residency.

On Petitioner as a Nuisance Candidate

Private respondents theorize that a presidential candidate who is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen is a nuisance candidate. According to the theory, allowing such person to run for
president makes a complete mockery of the election process. The electorate is offered
choices that include patently ineligible candidates and is misled to cast votes in their favor.
They claim that the situation will lead to wastage of votes for an ineligible candidate.

It is worthy to note that prior to the various motions for reconsideration filed in this case, not
one of the respondents raised this argument, either in their respective comments,
memoranda, or in the oral arguments. Not even the COMELEC considered this notion. The
"nuisance candidate" argument surfaced only for the first time in one dissenting
opinion,159 which the respondents borrowed and utilized in their motions for reconsideration.

One can easily make short shrift of the "nuisance candidate" argument. In the first place,
the finding that petitioner is a nuisance candidate should have been made by the
COMELEC. Disqualification on citizenship grounds does not make one a nuisance
candidate. Nuisance candidates refer to "persons who file their certificates of candidacy 'to
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by
the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate."'160

As can be gleaned from the definition, the issue is not whether one is qualified; rather,
whether one is a bonafidecandidate. In elections involving national positions, the
1âw phi 1

determining factor is intent, which is manifested by the candidate's "financial capacity or

serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign."161 Petitioner is a leading contender with
highly-publicized financial and other support.

CONCLUSION

"Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the [C]ourt that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law or the
evidence, and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed
upon by the court."162 Nonetheless, our Rules of Court require that a motion for
reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment or
final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making
express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.163 More important, the movant should
be able to point out why the findings or conclusions in the judgment or final order are
contrary to the evidence and the applicable law. 164
These elements of a motion for reconsideration necessarily mean that movants cannot
simply parrot the dissenting opinions of the minority. Not only does it show insufficiency of
the motions, it clearly proves that the matters raised had already been exhaustively
discussed, deliberated and ruled upon by the Court.

All the opinions of the Members of the Court were presented during the deliberations. When
views become dissenting opinions, it is clear that they have failed to express the beliefs of
the majority. The reproduction of these dissenting opinions in a motion for reconsideration
does not produce an exchange of new ideas; consequentially, such does not persuade the
Court to reconsider its position. On the contrary, the rehash of arguments only proves that
the Court did not miss anything important and only reinforces its belief in the soundness of
its conclusions.

WHEREFORE, I vote to deny with finality the motions for reconsideration for raising issues
that have already been passed upon by the Court in its Decision dated 8 March 2016.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Section 15. Form of resolution on motion for reconsideration in cases where the
vote of Members of the Court is divided. - The resolution of motions for
reconsideration, in case the opinion of the Court en bane or Division is divided, may
be by minute resolution specifying the respective votes of the Members.

2 G.R. No. 196358, 21 March 20 12.

3 G.R. No. 18 11 07, 30 March 2009.

4 Id.

5 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 44.

6
Dissenting Opinion (on the denial of the motions for reconsideration), J. Brion, pp.
4, 5, Poe v. COMELEC,G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March 2016.

7
Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March 20 16, p. 45.

8I issued a Concurring Opinion, as well as Justices Velasco, Jr., Jardeleza and

Caguioa. Justice Leonen issued a Separate Concurring Opinion. Justices Carpio,
Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe issued Dissenting Opinions, while J. De
Castro issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
9 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall
be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

10
Section I. Voting requirements. - (a) All decisions and actions in Court en
banc cases shall be made up upon the concurrence of the majority of the Members
of the Court who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues
involved and voted on them.

Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 19 1618, 23 November 20

11

10; Pangilinan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105278, 18 November

1993; Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, 8 December 1988.

12In the following cases, the Court upheld COMELEC's denial of due course to or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy on the basis of matters involving
questions of fact that were either uncontroverted or factual matters that were proven
to be false: Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. I 05111, 3 July
1992; Abella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1007 10 & 100739, 3 September
1991; Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, 19 July
1999; Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 20983 5, 22 September
2015; Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1933 14, 26 February 201
3; Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September
1995; Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013; Dumpit-
Michelena v. Boado, G.R. No. 5 11 Phil. 720 (2005); Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 207900, 22 April 2014; Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 11 71
(2008); Bautista v. COMELEC, 460 Phil. 459 (2003); Ugdoracion,
Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253 (2008); and Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1933
14, 25 June 20 13.

13
3 18 Phil. 329 (1995).

14 595 Phil. 449 (2008).

15Separate Opinion of J. Mendoza, Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 3 18 Phil. 329

(1995).

16 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 7- 13; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 13-32.

Respondents had already raised the same arguments in their memoranda;

17

Memorandum (COMELEC), pp. 25 -39; Memorandum (Contreras), pp. 4-8;

Memorandum (Tatad), pp. 3, 25-33; Memorandum (Valdez), p. 18.

Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 6- 12; Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. 12-
18

20, 75, 87, 91 -94; Dissenting Opinion, J. Del Castillo, pp. 29-30; Dissenting Opinion,
J. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 3-1 2, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March
2016.

19Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 15-23; Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. I 0-18, Poe
v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.

20
Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 21.

21 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 2 1.

Concurring Opinion, CJ. Sereno, pp. 5-9, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-
22

700, 8 March 20 16.

23Cerafica v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 2051 36, 2 December 2014; Maquiling v.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 201 3; Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202,
19 March 20 13; Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804 & 1970 15, 9 October 201
2; Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237 & 193536, 9 October 201 2; Aratea v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012; Sobejana-Condon v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, I 0 August 2012, Ugdoracion v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179851, 18 April 2008; Lluz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, 7 June 2007; Luna v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 165983, 24 April 2007; Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
135886, 16 August 1999; Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 13635 1, 28 July
1999; Domino v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 134015, 19 July 1999; Garvida v. Sales, G.R.
No. 124893, 18 April 1997; Frivaldo v. COMELEC,G. R. No. 120295, 28 June
1996; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105 111 , 3 July 1992; Aznar v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990; and Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. No. 8772
1-3 0, 21 December 1989.

24
G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013.

25 G.R. No. 196804 & 197015, 9 October 201 2.

26 G.R. No. 193237 & 193536, 9 October 2012.

27 G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.

28 G.R. No. 198742, I 0 August 2012.

29 G.R. No. 17985 1, 18 April 2008.

30Section 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which

he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261 , paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

31
G.R. No. 172840, 7 June 2007.

32 G.R. No. 135886, 16 August 1999.

33 G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999.

34 G.R. No. 134015, 19 July 1999.

35 G.R. No.124893, 18April 1997.

36 G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996.

Republic v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 104654, 105715 & 105735, 6 June 6,
37

1994; Frivaldo v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 23, 1989.

38 G.R. No. 105111 , 3 July 1992.

39 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, 1 August 1989.

40 G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990.

41
G.R. No. 87721-30, 21December1989.

42
G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013.

43 G.R. No. 165983, 24 April 2007.

44 G.R. No. 205136, 2 December 2014.

Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 13-16; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 28-29,
45

32-34.

46 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 14.

Respondents had already raised the same arguments in their memoranda;

47

Memorandum (Contreras), pp. 6-8; Memorandum (Elamparo), p. 31.

48
Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, pp. 38-42; Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 27-
28; Dissenting Opinion, J. Del Castillo, p. 67; Dissenting Opinion, J. Perlas-Bernabe,
p. 21, Poe v. COMELEC. G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.
49 See Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 22.

Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 17-18; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 47-48.
50

Respondents had already raised the same arguments in their memoranda;

51

Memorandum (COMELEC), pp. 57, 75-80; Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 32, 60-63;
Memorandum (Tatad), pp. 36, 79-80, 89-90, 130-132, 168.

Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, pp. 26, 42-49; Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp.
52

13-18, Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. 22, 117-120; Dissenting Opinion, J. Del
Castillo, p. 67; Dissenting Opinion, J. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 18-19, Poe v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.

53
Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 22.

54CIVIL CODE, Article 172. These methods include: (1) record of birth; (2) written
admission of filiation; (3) open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or an illegitimate child; ( 4) or other means allowed by the Rules or special
laws.

55
Act 190, Section 765.

Rule 100 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) of the 1940 Rules of Court, Sect ions 3
56

and 7.

57
Rule 99 of the 1964 Rules of Court, Sections 3 and 7.

58
Act No. 1670, Sections 1 and 5.

59 Administrative Code, Act No. 2657, 31 December 1916.

60
Act No. 2711 , Sections 545 and 548.

61Section 8. Who May be Adopted. - Only a legally free child may be the subject of
inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the
following documents must be submitted to the Board:

(a) Child study;

(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;

(d) Medical evaluation /history;

(e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

 (f) Recent photo of the child

62 G.R. No. L-16922, 30 April 1963.

63Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

64 Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Callano, 134 Phil. 901-912 (1968).

65
G.R. No. L-30576, 10 February 1976.

66274 Phil. 1157-1249 ( 1991 ). In this case, the Court utilized a presumption of
citizenship in favor of respondent William Gatchalian on the basis of an Order of the
Bureau of Immigration admitting him as a Filipino citizen.

67
G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, 161824, 468 Phil. 421-75 (2004). Here, a presumption
was likewise made by this Court to resolve issues involving the citizenship of
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. In particular, the presumption that Poe's
grandfather had been a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, from 1898 to 1902,
entitled him to benefit from the en masse Filipinization effected by the Philippine Bill
of 1902.

68
93 Phil. 257 (1953).

69
Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 19-23; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 43-50.

Respondents had already raised the same arguments in their memoranda;

70

Memorandum (COMELEC), pp. 53-63; Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 32-40;

Memorandum (Tatad), pp. 34-35, 75-78.

Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, pp. 10-18, ; Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp.

71

19-21, Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. 18-20, 94-104; Dissenting Opinion, J.

Perlas-Bernabe, p. 20, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.

72 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, pp. 27-28.

73
Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, pp. 25-26.

74 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.

75 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

76 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 24-27.

77 Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 49-60; Memorandum (Tatad), pp. 132- 133.

 Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, pp. 18-38; Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 28-
78

30; Dissenting, J. Brion, pp. 106-117; Dissenting Opinion, J. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 20-
21, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.

79 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 31.

80
Razon v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536 (2009).

81 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 30.

82 Poev. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 30.

83 Poev. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 30.

84
See Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308-374
(2001).

85 Act No. 3752, Section 5, states:

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Births. - xxxx

In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report
to the local civil registrar the place, date and hour of finding and other
attendant circumstances.

86 Commonwealth Act. No. 473 dated 17 June 1939.

Rule 28 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other
87

Laws on Civil Registration (NSO Administrative Order No. 1-93 [1992])

Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, IRR-R.A.
88

8552, Section 5 (1998).

89 Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 63-73; Memorandum (Valdez), pp. 20-22.

90 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001.

Entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons

91

who Lost such Citizenship by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States."

Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 28-32; Motion for Reconsideration for
92

Respondent Amado D. Valdez, pp. 38-61.

93 Memorandum (Valdez), pp. 19-22, 29-36.

94Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _______________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines,
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

95 Motion for Reconsideration for Respondent Amado D. Valdez, pp. 9-19, 31 -37.

96
Motion for Reconsideration for Respondent Amado D. Valdez, pp. 20-30.

Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, p. 55; Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 49-60;

97

Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. I 21-134; Dissenting Opinion, J, Del Castillo, pp. 50-
52, 54-55; Dissenting Opinion, J. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 14-15, Poe v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016.

98 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, pp. 34-35.

99 Bengson III v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633(2001).

100 Bengson III v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633 (2001).

Memorandum (COMELEC), pp. 66-71, 73-74; Memorandum (Contreras), pp. 9-31;

101

Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 13-20; Memorandum (Tatad), pp. 143-147;

Memorandum (Valdez), pp. 23-29.

Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 33-41; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 50-
102

55.

Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 31-65; Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. 40-
103

41, 122-142; Dissenting Opinion, J. Del Castillo, pp. 34-60; Dissenting Opinion, J.
Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 13-17, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March
2016.

104 Coquilla v. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861 (2002).

105 Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.

106 Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015.

107 Poev. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 39.

108 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 22 1697-700, 8 March 2016, pp. 37-40.

109 435 U.S. 647 (1978).

110 284 Md. 425 (1979).

111 Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-700, 8 March 2016, p. 37.

112
Fernandez v. HRET, G.R. No. 187478 (2009).

113
718A.2d 1111 (1984).

114 COMELEC Comment dated 7 January 2016, p. 56.

115
Please see oral arguments cited in the Concurring Opinion, p. 48.

116 COMELEC Comment, page 56.

The 2012 case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC treats acquisition of residential property

117

as a factor indicating establishment of a new domicile.

Oglesby State Election Bd. v. Bayh 521 N.E. 2d 1313 (1988); Farnsworth v.
118

Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182 (1994 ); Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive
Committee ( 168 So. 3d 946 (2015).

119 No. 2015-EC-00965- SCT (2015).

Section 236 (J) of R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997) 11 December
120

1997.

121
Affidavit, p. 1.

122 No. 2015-EC- 00965-SCT (2015).

123 372 Md. 360 (2002).

124 G.R. No. 28328, 2 October 1928, 52 Phil. 130 (1928).

125 G.R. No. 28328, 2 October 1928, 52 Phil. 130 (1928).

126 372 Md. 360 (2002).

127 No. 2015- EC-00965-SCT (2015).

128 114 N.C. App. 182 (1994).

129 968 So. 2d 745 (2007).

130 Pa. Superior Ct. 237 (1984) 473 A.2d I 069.

131 Receipt Nos. 827172 and 8220421, dated 23 February 2006.

132 G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010.

133 473 A.2d 1069 (1984).

US Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 215(b). This provision is echoed in

134

Section 53.l of the US Code of Federal Regulations.

135 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, p. 36-37.

136
G.R. No. 88831, 84508, 8 November 1990, 269 PHIL 237-247.

137 Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, l9 January 2009.

138 Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009.

139 Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 721.

140 492 Phil. 592-604 (2005).

141 492 Phil. 592-604 (2005).

142
Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1156.

Id. citing Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Deagoing Officers 183 (4th ed.
143

1981), p. 1156.

144 Memorandum (Contreras), pp. 37-44; Memorandum (Valdez), p. 16.

Dissenting Opinion, J. De Castro, pp. 43 -45; Dissenting Opinion, J. Brion, pp. 77-
145

79; Dissenting Opinion, J. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 4-12, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
221697-700, 8 March 2016.

Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, pp. 41-47; Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 35-
146

43.

147 Memorandum (Contreras), p. 34.

148 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, p. 42.

149 Memorandum (Elamparo), pp. 73-77.

 150 Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, p. 43-46.

151 434 Phil. 861 (2002).

152 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.

Agustin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207105, 10 November 2015; Jalover v.

153

Osmeña, G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014; Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207900, 22 April 2014; Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February
2014; Talaga v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 786-918 (2012); Aratea v. COMELEC, 696
Phil. 700-785 (2012); Gonzales v. COMELEC, G .R. No. 192856, 8 March
2011; Panlaqui v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 188671, 24 February 2010; Mitra v
COMELEC, 636 Phil. 753-815 (2010); Maruhom v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 179430, 27
July 2009; Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, 24 December
2008; Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253-266 (2008); Fermin v.
COMELEC, 595 Ph il. 449-479 (2008); Justimbaste v. COMELEC, 593 Phil. 383-
397(2008); Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421-755 (2004); Salcedo II v.
COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377-393 (1999).

154
G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013.

155 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995.

156
G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013.

157
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013.

158 Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013.

Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio, pp. 4-5, 54, Poe v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-
159

700, 8 March 2016.

Timbol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206004 (Resolution), 24 February

160

2015. See also Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189034, 12

161

January 2010, 624 PHIL 50-76.

162
Dineros v. Roque, G.R. No. L-38837, 27 February 1979.

163
Rules of Court, Rule 37, Section 2, par. 3.

164 Dineros v. Roque, G.R. No. L-38837, 27 February 1979.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I maintain my dissent.

I reiterate my position that petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares (petitioner)
is indeed a Filipino citizen. However, petitioner is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. In
addition, petitioner fails to comply with the minimum ten-year residency requirement.
Accordingly, petitioner is not eligible to run for President of the Philippines pursuant to
Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.1

This brief discussion focuses only on the voting during the 8 March 2016 Court En
Banc session and the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to determine
initially the qualifications of a candidate in resolving a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2

In the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on 5 April 2016, all Justices maintained
their respective votes and opinions. Thus, the voting on 8 March 2016 has not been
affected by the subsequent voting on 5 April 2016.

No majority

In disposing of the consolidated petitions, nine Justices voted to grant the petitions while six
Justices voted to dismiss the petitions. While a majority of the Court En Banc - nine out of
fifteen Justices - voted to grant the petitions, there is no ruling by a majority on the
citizenship status of petitioner. As admitted by the Chief Justice, only seven Justices voted
to declare petitioner a natural-born Filipino citizen. Five Justices voted to declare petitioner
not a natural-born Filipino citizen. Three Justices, who took part in the deliberations and
voted to grant the petitions, did not have an opinion on the issue of petitioner's citizenship.

The Court En Banc voted as follows during the 8 March 2016 session.

(1) Issue of whether to grant or dismiss the consolidated petitions

As stated by the Chief Justice in her Concurring Opinion of 8 March 2016, 3 the sole issue
that was voted upon by the En Banc was whether to grant or dismiss the consolidated
petitions.

Nine Justices, composed of the ponente Justice Perez, Chief Justice Sereno, Justice
Velasco, Justice Peralta, Justice Bersamin, Justice Mendoza, Justice Leonen, Justice
Jardeleza, and Justice Caguioa, voted to grant the petitions and annul the assailed
COMELEC resolutions that cancelled the COC of petitioner. Six Justices, namely, Justice
Carpio, Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Brion, Justice Del Castillo, Justice Reyes, and
Justice Perlas-Bernabe, voted to dismiss the petitions.
In short, all the fifteen Justices took part in the deliberations and voted on the sole issue
presented for voting - whether to grant or dismiss the petitions.

(2) Issue of whether petitioner complied with the residency requirement

The Court En Banc did not vote on the issue of whether petitioner complied with the
residency requirement. However, in their separate opinions, the Justices expressed their
personal opinions on this issue.

As the Chief Justice noted in her Concurring Opinion of 8 March 2016, seven Justices,
namely, the ponenteJustice Perez, Chief Justice Sereno, Justice Velasco, Justice
Bersamin, Justice Mendoza, Justice Leonen, and Justice Jardeleza, found petitioner a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the 9 May 2016
elections. Six Justices, namely, Justice Carpio, Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Brion,
Justice Del Castillo, Justice Reyes, and Justice Perlas-Bernabe maintained that petitioner
failed to comply with the minimum ten-year residency requirement.

Justice Caguioa, with whom Justice Peralta concurred, stated that he would leave the
resolution of the issues of petitioner's qualifications to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
and would confine his views on the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion when it cancelled petitioner's COC. Justice Caguioa stated that "this Court's
jurisdiction and its exercise neither hinge on nor require a final determination of the
petitioner's qualifications."4

In his Separate Concurring Opinion resolving the motions for reconsideration, Justice
Peralta explained that "[he] then joined Justice Caguioa in his view that the Court should
have limited itself to determining whether grave abuse of discretion attended the finding of
the COMELEC that Poe committed material misrepresentation as to the facts required to be
stated in her [COC], per Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and nothing
more."5Justice Peralta also stated that he "opted to join Justice Caguioa in his view that a
more thorough discussion of and ruling on [petitioner's] qualifications, specifically as to her
natural-born citizenship, as well as her 10-year residency, are premature, the same being
cognizable only after she had been proclaimed as winner of the presidential elections and
through a petition filed in the PET, not in the COMELEC, x x x."6

(3) Issue of whether petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Again, the Court En Banc did not put to a vote the issue of whether petitioner is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. However, in their separate opinions, the Justices expressed their
personal opinions on this issue.

Seven Justices, namely, the ponente Justice Perez, Chief Justice Sereno, Justice Velasco,
Justice Bersamin, Justice Mendoza, Justice Leonen, and Justice Jardeleza opined that
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Five Justices, namely, Justice Carpio, Justice
Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Brion, Justice Reyes, and Justice Perlas-Bernabe considered
petitioner not a natural-born Filipino citizen. Justice Del Castillo refrained from giving an
opinion on the citizenship issue, invoking the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, among
others. Justice Caguioa, joined by Justice Peralta, disagreed with the majority when it
proceeded to rule on the question of petitioner's citizenship. According to Justice Caguioa,
"this Court need not have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen. "7

The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that any case which is heard by the Court en
banc shall be decided by a majority of the members of the En Banc who took part in
the deliberations on the issues and voted on the issues. Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution reads:

2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,

or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en bane, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied)

Section l(a) of Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:

Section 1. Voting requirements.- (a) All decisions and actions in Court en banc cases shall
be made up upon the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the Court who actually
took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them.

Indisputably, a majority vote is 50 percent plus one of the 15-member Court En Banc, which
means that the concurrence of at least eight Justices is required to achieve a majority ruling
if all the fifteen (15) Justices vote, as in the present case.

In any decision or resolution rendered by the Court, one or more members of the Court (En
Banc or Division) may concur wholly or partially, or dissent from the majority opinion, or take
no part in the resolution of the case. Sometimes, one or more Justices concur in part and
dissent in part from the majority opinion.

In this case, during the 8 March 2016 En Banc session, all fifteen members of the Court En
Banc actually took part in the deliberations and voted on the sole issue of whether to grant
or dismiss the petitions. No Justice inhibited himself or herself from voting on this sole
issue.

Eight justices concurred with the ponente to grant the petitions, thus a total of nine Justices
voted to grant the petitions. Six Justices dissented and voted to dismiss the petitions. Five
Justices (Chief Justice Sereno, Justice Velasco, Justice Leonen, Justice Jardeleza, and
Justice Caguioa) wrote concurring opm10ns. Five Justices (Justice Carpio, Justice
Leonardo-De Castro, Justice Brion, Justice Del Castillo, and Justice Perlas-Bernabe) wrote
dissenting opinions. Justice Reyes joined Justice Perlas-Bernabe's dissenting opinion while
Justice Peralta joined Justice Caguioa's concurring opinion. Justice Bersamin and Justice
Mendoza merely affixed their signatures to the ponencia signifying their unqualified
concurrence.
While Justice Caguioa, with whom Justice Peralta joined, concurred with the ponencia to
grant the petitions, he deviated from the majority in ruling on petitioner's citizenship,
resulting in a separate or qualified concurrence. Justice Del Castillo refrained from giving an
opinion on petitioner's citizenship.

In computing the majority vote on the citizenship issue, the Chief Justice inexplicably
excluded Justices Del Castillo, Peralta and Caguioa. To repeat, although Justice Del
Castillo had no opinion on the citizenship issue, he voted on the sole issue presented for
voting. Justice Caguioa, joined by Justice Peralta, also voted on the sole issue presented
for voting, and even submitted a qualified concurrence expressly refraining from issuing an
opinion on the citizenship issue. In his Separate Concurring Opinion on the motions for
reconsideration, Justice Peralta explained that a ruling on petitioner's citizenship and
residency qualifications is premature since the same is proper "only after she had been
proclaimed as winner of the presidential elections and through a petition filed in the PET,
not in the COMELEC, x x x."8 The Chief Justice construed such "silence" on the citizenship
issue on the part of Justices Peralta, Del Castillo, and Caguioa as non-participation and
non-voting.

This is egregious error.

In determining whether there is a majority, the votes of all the Justices who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues and voted on the issues should be counted. All fifteen
Justices of this Court took part in the deliberations and voted on the sole issue presented
for voting - whether the petitions should be granted or dismissed. Consequently, the votes
of all the fifteen Justices, including those of Justices Peralta, Del Castillo, and Caguioa,
should be counted. The Chief Justice cannot validly exclude the three Justices, who took
part in the deliberations and voted on the sole issue presented for voting but had no opinion
on the citizenship issue. Notably, the Chief Justice offered no justification, as there is none,
for excluding the three Justices in determining the majority.

Since there is no dispute that there are only seven Justices who declared that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, there is clearly no majority vote on the issue of petitioner's
citizenship. Seven votes is less than a majority. Accordingly, there is no majority sustaining
petitioner's status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In short, the issue of petitioner's
citizenship remains hanging and unsettled.

This ruling of the majority will lead to an absurd result. The majority allows a presidential
candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be elected to the Presidency. In effect, the
majority wants the Court to resolve the citizenship status of a presidential candidate only
after the candidate is elected. If the winning candidate is later on determined by this Court
not to be a natural-born Filipino citizen, then those who voted for the winning, but later
disqualified, candidate would have utterly wasted their votes. To allow a presidential
candidate to run and be voted for despite the uncertainty of his or her citizenship status
makes a mockery of the electoral process. This is not how the Constitution should be
interpreted - allowing an absurd result to happen.

COMELEC's jurisdiction
On the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, the ponencia posits that "[t]he COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate."9 The ponencia states that "[t]he facts of qualification must beforehand be
established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction."10 The ponencia maintains that this prior determination of a candidate's
qualification may be by statute, by executive order, or by a judgment of a competent court
or tribunal,11 without however identifying which body is a competent authority to resolve
questions on qualifications of candidates.

In essence, the ponencia holds that the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to rule on a
candidate's qualifications prior to the elections in a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. With this ruling,
the ponencia should have logically granted the petitions on the sole ground of the
COMELEC's lack of jurisdiction to determine a candidate's qualifications, without
proceeding to decide the qualifications of the candidate. If the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction, then this Court has also no jurisdiction on appeal to rule on the merits and
decide the qualifications of a candidate. Once the Court rules that the COMELEC is devoid
of jurisdiction, the Court can only annul the decision of the COMELEC. The Court cannot
rule on the merits, that is, decide the qualifications of a candidate, because there is no
COMELEC decision to review on the merits, the annulled decision of the COMELEC being
non-existent.

However, despite ruling that the COMELEC is devoid of jurisdiction,

the ponencia proceeded to rule on the citizenship and residency qualifications of petitioner,
vesting in the Supreme Court the primary jurisdiction to decide the qualifications of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates before the elections. Consequently,
the ponencia declared that "petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections." There is, however, no constitutional or statutory provision
empowering this Court to initially decide the qualifications of presidential and vice-
presidential candidates before the elections. Under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution,12 the jurisdiction of the Court vests only if there is an "election contest," which
means after the elections as held in Tecson v. COMELEC.13In Tecson, the Court expressly
ruled:

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161 634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose."

xxxx

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.

Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two
distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate
from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en bane on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -

xxxx

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would
have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission
on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.14 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Justices Bersamin and Mendoza fully concurred in the ponencia without any qualifications.
Justice Velasco limited his concurring opinion on the citizenship and residency issues
without discussing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, which silence amounts to an
unqualified concurrence in the ponencia with respect to the issue of jurisdiction.

The Chief Justice advanced the view that "Section 78 of x x x the Omnibus Election Code x
x x, does not allow the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of candidates."15 She
maintained that "a Section 78 proceeding must deal solely with 'patent defects in the
certificates' and not the question of eligibility or ineligibility."16 She further declared that the
COMELEC "exceeded [its] limited authority. x x x when it determined petitioner's intrinsic
qualifications, not on the basis of uncontroverted fact, but on questions of law. " 17 However,
noting the "factual milieu of this case and its significance to the upcoming electoral
exercise18 " and the fact that "the dissents have already gone to the intrinsic qualifications of
petitioner,"19 the Chief Justice nevertheless addressed lengthily the citizenship and
residency issues as well.

Justice Leonen maintained that "should the [COMELEC] be allowed to take cognizance of
all petitions questioning the eligibility of a candidate, [t]he provisions of the Constitution on
the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals over election contests would be rendered
useless."20 Justice Leonen further declared that the COMELEC "had no jurisdiction under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to rule on the nature of citizenship of petitioner. " 21
The six dissenting Justices, namely, Justice Carpio, Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Justice
Brion, Justice Del Castillo, Justice Reyes, and Justice Perlas-Bernabe upheld the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to cancel or deny due course to a COC which necessarily
entails a preliminary determination of a candidate's qualifications. While concurring with
the ponencia, Justice Jardeleza asserted that the COMELEC possesses such jurisdiction.

Justice Leonardo-De Castro opined that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to
deny due course to or cancel COCs, and not the electoral tribunals, which exercise
jurisdiction "over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in an election."22 If we were to follow the ponencia's reasoning, "the Court is as good
as amending the [Omnibus Election Code] by deleting Section 78 thereof - there can no
longer be a petition [to deny] due course to or [cancel a] COC because the COMELEC has
now been disallowed to look into the issue of whether or not a candidate has made a false
claim as to her/his material qualifications for the elective office that she/he aspires for. That
a Section 78-petition would naturally look into the candidate's qualification is expected of
the nature of such petition."23

Justice Brion explained that "[i]f we were to follow the ponencia's limitation on the
COMELEC's function to determine Poe's eligibility to become President in a Section 78
proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poe's
citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC
ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum."24

Justice Del Castillo opined that a "petition under Section 78 seeks to cancel a candidate's
CoC before there has been an election and proclamation. Such a petition is within the
Comelec's jurisdiction as it is 'the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies."'25

Justice Perlas-Bernabe, with whom Justice Reyes concurred, stated that based on the
Constitution and jurisprudence, "there is no perceivable restriction which qualifies the
exercise of the COMELEC's adjudicatory power to declare a candidate ineligible and thus,
cancel his/her CoC with the need of a prior determination coming from a 'proper authority.
"'26

Justice Jardeleza stated that "[t]he reason why the COMELEC x x x is allowed to determine
a candidate's constitutional and statutory eligibility prior to the election is not difficult to
fathom."27 There is a "legitimate value in shielding the electorate from an ineligible
candidate."28 Besides, there are fiscal considerations for such a remedy.

In holding that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction to determine in the same cancellation case
the qualifications of a candidate, a view shared by the Chief Justice, Justice Velasco,
Justice Peralta, Justice Bersamin, Justice Mendoza, Justice Leonen, and Justice Caguioa,
the ponencia unceremoniously ignores established jurisprudence29 and unreasonably
restricts the COMELEC's jurisdiction vested by the Constitution.

Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution empowered the COMELEC to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections x x x." Section 2(3),
Article IX-C of the Constitution authorized the COMELEC to "decide x x x all questions
affecting elections, x x x."
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially determine the
qualifications of all candidates and disqualify those found lacking any of such qualifications
before the conduct of the elections. In fact, under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance candidates. To
divest the COMELEC of its power to purge the electoral process of ineligible candidates
renders the COMELEC inutile to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections" and to "decide all questions affecting elections."

In Tecson v. COMELEC,30the Court upheld the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine

preliminarily the eligibility of presidential candidates in a Section 78 proceeding. In
sustaining the COMELEC's jurisdiction, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity the petitions filed directly by Tecson, et al. with the Court since the Court's
jurisdiction over presidential election contests can only be invoked after the elections. The
Court held:

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter's
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

In Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC,31Justice Perez, who was the ponente in that case and the
same ponente in this case, affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine the
qualifications of a candidate in a Section 78 proceeding. In upholding the COMELEC's
cancellation of the COC of Ongsiako Reyes, Justice Perez stated:

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET
has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications, as
well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, with his ponencia in this case, Justice Perez contradicted his own conclusion
in Ongsiako Reyes on the COMELEC's jurisdiction to initially determine the eligibility of
candidates prior to the elections.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of the COMELEC and the electoral
tribunals are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The jurisdiction of
the electoral tribunals can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential,
senatorial or congressional candidates have been proclaimed.32Obviously, this involves an
election contest which contemplates a post-election scenario.

Prior to the elections, any question on a presidential candidate's qualifications must

necessarily be resolved by the COMELEC to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process
and protect the electorate from ineligible candidates. Otherwise, all the nuisance
presidential candidates, who were disqualified by this Court for being nuisance candidates,
should now be allowed to run and their qualifications to run for President can only be
determined after the elections by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Likewise, any
presidential candidate, claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen, regardless of his or her
dubious nationality, can now run for President as his or her citizenship qualification can only
be questioned after he or she wins the elections. This is the inevitable absurd result of the
majority's faulty reasoning.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
This provision reads:

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

2 This provision reads:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be fi led at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

3
In her Concurring Opinion, the Chief Justice stated that " the fallo needed only to
dispose of the grant or denial of the petitions and nothing more." (Page 2 of Chief
Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion)
4 Page 3 of Justice Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.

5 Page 3 of Justice Peralta's Separate Concurring Opinion.

6 Page 5 of Justice Peralta's Separate Concurring Opinion.

7 Page 9 of Justice Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion

8 Page 5 of Justice Peralta's Separate Concurring Opinion.

9
Page 16 of the ponencia.

10 Page 21 of the ponencia.

11
Page 21 of the ponencia.

12
The pertinent provision reads:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

13 468 Phil. 421 (2004).

14 Id. at 460-462.

15 Page 4 of Chief Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion.

16
Page 22 of Chief Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion.

17
Page 22 of Chief Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion.

18 Page 22 of Chief Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion.

19 Page 23 of Chief Justice Sereno's Concurring Opinion.

20 Page 37 of Justice Leonen's Concurring Opinion.

21 Page 46 of Justice Leonen's Concurring Opinion.

22 Page 9 of Justice Leonardo-De Castro's Separate Dissenting Opinion.

23 Pages 9 and I 0 of Justice Leonardo-De Castro's Separate Dissenting Opinion.

24 Page 17 of Justice Brion's Dissenting Opinion.

25 Page 26 of Justice Del Castillo's Dissenting Opinion.

 26 Page 3 of Justice Perlas-Bernabe's Dissenting Opinion.

27 Page 8 of Justice Jardeleza's Concurring Opinion.

28 Page 8 of Justice Jardeleza's Concurring Opinion.[

29In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Brion stated that " [t]he ponencia's conclusion
would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the COMELE's jurisdiction
to determine a .candidate's eligibility in the course of deciding a Section 78
proceeding before it." He listed the cases, thus: Aratea v. Comelec, G.R. No.
195229, 9 October 2012; Maquiling v. Come!ec, G.R. No. 195649, 16 Apri l
2013; Ongsiako-Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June
2013; Cerafica v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205 136, 2 December 2014; Luna v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 165983, 24 April 2007.

30 Supra note l3.

31 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 699 SCRA 522.

32 See BANAT Party List v. COMELEC, 612 Phil. 793 (2009).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Decision dated March 8, 2016 annulled and set aside the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) December 1, 2015 and December 23, 2015 Resolutions in SPA Nos. 15-001
(DC); and, the December 11, 2015 and December 23, 2015 Resolutions in 15-002 (DC), 15-
007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC), which denied due course to and/or cancelled petitioner Poe's
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. Said COMELEC resolutions were declared to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the citizenship qualification of
petitioner Poe failed to get the required majority vote of eight (8) Justices, out of the fifteen
(15) Justices, none of whom inhibited or recused himself or herself from the cases. I am
constrained to refer to the "Decision" penned by Justice Jose Portugal Perez as
his ponencia, considering that not all the grounds adduced in the said ponencia were
concurred in by a majority of the Justices.

After perusing the reasoned and meritorious arguments set forth by the respondents in their
motions for reconsideration1 in this case, I find that compelling reasons e:xist for the Court
to take a second hard look at this case and confront head on the lingering questions raised
against the ponencia's factual and legal underpinnings, instead of dismissing the motions in
a minute resolution.

I, therefore, reiterate my previous dissent and offer here a brief rumination on several
significant points raised in respondents' motions for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction on Cases Involving Qualifications and Eligibility of

Presidential Candidates

I cannot subscribe to the view posited in the ponencia that under the last paragraph of
Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution2 it is this Court alone, acting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, that has jurisdiction on the qualifications and eligibility of
candidates for President (and Vice-President) and only after the elections. It is true that it is
the Court that has sole original jurisdiction on contests relating to the qualifications of the
President elect and the Vice-President elect after the conduct of the elections in its capacity
as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, this Court has jurisdiction to rule on the
qualifications of candidates prior to the elections within the strict parameters of
review under a certiorari petition from a decision of the COMELEC on that same subject of
qualifications or eligibility of candidates, regardless of whether they are candidates for
national or local office. This has been the long standing state of the law and jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction and no justification is offered by the ponencia why the Court should depart
from established doctrine.

The Jurisdiction of the COMELEC to Rule on a Candidate's Qualifications and

Eligibility

One of the most controversial and radical pronouncements in the ponencia is that the
COMELEC is not allowedand is not vested with jurisdiction to make a finding on a
candidate's qualification in Section 78 proceedings except when there is a prior judgment by
a competent court or in case of self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions.

In Respondent Elamparo, et al.'s motion for reconsideration, they rightly contend that there
is no legal basis to consider this pronouncement as a majority decision considering that
nine (9) of the fifteen (15) Justices of the Court found the COMELEC to have jurisdiction to
rule on these qualifications. In addition to the six Justices who dissented from
the ponencia, Justice Caguioa (who is joined by Justice Peralta) and Justice Jardeleza
issued opinions that the COMELEC should rule on these qualifications. According to
Justice Caguioa, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to check the accuracy of the material
representations made in the certificate of candidacy, but added that it also had jurisdiction
to determine the existence of an intent to mislead. Justice Jardeleza's position on this
matter addresses the dire consequences of ruling otherwise:

We have already recognized that a Section 78 petition is one instance - the only instance -
where the qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be challenged before an
election. Although the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the COC is ostensibly
based on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, the
determination of the factual correctness of the representation necessarily affects eligibility.
Essentially, the ground is lack of eligibility under the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office, similar to a petition for quo
warranto which is a species of election contest. "The only difference between the two
proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the COC and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two
grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be
initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results." Put simply, the main
distinction is the time the action is filed. If a person fails to file a Section 78 petition within
the 25-day period prescribed in the OEC, the election laws afford him another chance to
raise the ineligibility of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto.

The reason why the COMELEC, pursuant to a valid law, is allowed to determine a
candidate's constitutional and statutory eligibility prior to the election is not difficult to
fathom. As earlier alluded to, there is legitimate value in shielding the electorate from an
ineligible candidate. In addition, there are sound fiscal considerations supporting this
remedy. These include the more efficient allocation of COMELEC's resources, ultimately
funded by taxpayers' money, and a check on unnecessary campaign spending, an activity
with minimal economic utility. A contrary ruling could lead to the de
facto disenfranchisement of those who voted for a popular but ineligible candidate. The
possibility of a constitutional and political crisis arising from such a result is one we dare not
risk.3

Respondents likewise correctly assert that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in a Section 78
proceeding to make a finding on the presence or absence of a candidate's qualifications
has been repeatedly established in a long line of cases, at the very least, preliminarily,
which glaringly includes the recent Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC4 and Cerafica v.
COMELEC5that are both penned by Justice Perez. Not one of these cases require a prior
finding by a competent authority as to the said qualifications before the COMELEC can rule
on them.

Respondents further elucidate the meaninglessness of the exceptions adduced by

the ponencia with respect to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of
the candidate. If we were to adhere to the ponencia's theory that there is no authorized
proceeding to pass upon the qualifications of candidates for President prior to an election
and that the COMELEC may not pass upon such question unless there is a prior judgment
of disqualification, how then can such a prior judgment of disqualification be secured to
support an action under Section 78? If the competent authority which is supposed to make
a prior finding on said qualifications has not been established by any law or jurisprudence,
there is no way such a prior final determination of ineligibility can be obtained. Notably,
the ponencia of Justice Perez did not identify the competent authority and appropriate
remedy where the citizenship and residence qualifications of petitioner Poe can be
determined prior to the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel her certificate of
candidacy before the COMELEC.

Furthermore, self-evident facts are legally defined as those needing no demonstration or

explanation. All material representations properly covered by Section 78 cannot be self-
evident, according to respondents. They cite as an example a representation as to a
candidate's age which needs proof of the date of birth such as a Certificate of Live Birth.
Thus, I fully agree with respondents that the conditions laid out in the ponencia prior to the
exercise of the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enforce election laws, particularly
laws on qualifications and eligibility of candidates, are unrealistic and ineffectual for their
utter lack of basis in law, rules of procedure and jurisprudence. On this point,
the ponencia of Justice Perez ventured on unprecedented doctrines without any explanation
how they can be applied to the specific issues of citizenship and residence of petitioner
Poe.

In any event, it should be clarified that, notwithstanding the pronouncements made in

the ponencia on this point, a close scrutiny of the votes and separate opinions of the
Members of the Court show that a decisive majority of nine voted to uphold the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications and eligibility of candidates prior to
the elections without the imposition of the above-mentioned preconditions to its exercise of
jurisdiction.

Natural-born Citizenship by Statistical Probability

I also cannot but passionately stress my disagreement from the ruling of the ponencia that
petitioner Poe's citizenship can be established by resorting to the use of statistical
probabilities. While this resort to statistical probabilities could be brushed aside for lack of
legal foundation, I am compelled to point out the absurdity of this ruling, which has been
relied upon to support the natural-born citizenship of petitioner Poe.

As argued by the respondents, the ponencia inappropriately relied on statistical probability

to justify the finding that petitioner Poe is a natural- born Filipino. Statistical probability
cannot be used to directly establish a controverted material fact in issue, more so in an
issue as significant as natural-born citizenship. Justice Perez inappropriately invoked
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court. There is no natural-born citizenship by probability
under the Constitution. Citizenship must be established as a fact. Statistics are not even
matters that may be subject to judicial notice. Most importantly, the statistics cited in
the ponencia are wholly immaterial to the case at bar since they pertained to children born
in the Philippines or children born specifically in the province of Iloilo during the years
between 1960 and 1975, as well as the adult male and female populations of Filipinos and
foreigners in the said province. Anent the statistics cited on the number of children born in
the Philippines, the same should not have been applied to petitioner Poe as there is no
evidence in this case that she was in fact born in this country. As pointed out by the
respondents, petitioner Poe never even alleged that she was born in the Philippines
because her birthplace was admittedly not known to her. All that she alleged was that she
was found in the Philippines with unknown parents.

The ponencia's reliance on statistical probability cannot ever be made a judicial precedent
in deciding future cases involving the natural-born citizenship of a foundling. For sure, the
statistics vary from place to place and across different periods of time. And so the question
to be asked is: what specific percentage of the factors alluded to would be acceptable
before a foundling born in a specific location can be considered a natural-born citizen?
Would it also be 99.83% as ruled in this case or perhaps a specific range of percentage
values? Would 90%-95% be sufficient? Even stretching the illustration further, should we
grant a foundling's claim to natural-born citizenship if there is a 70% probability of being
born to at least one Filipino parent? What if the foundling belonged to the 0.17% or 5% or
10% or 30% of those not born to Filipino parents, which is also a possibility or a probability
that cannot be discounted? Statistical probability is just that - a probability, which the
Constitution never contemplated. Quite apart from the absurd consequences that may arise
from the use of statistics to establish blood relationship or filiation, the ponencia plainly
failed to present a definite standard by which its ruling on the use of statistics can be
applied in similar cases. This is so as it is beyond the ambit of the Court's constitutional
authority or competence to do. Hence, I affirm my previous position on this matter that
statistical probability should not be used to determine natural-born citizenship for its sheer
preposterousness.

Moreover, I am of the same mind as respondents that it is the height of unfairness to

ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC on the basis of the statistical
evidence that was not presented before it. The COMELEC, along with the other
respondents, were not given an opportunity to adequately impeach said evidence, which
was only brought to the attention of the Court during the oral arguments of this case.

No Majority Vote on the Citizenship Qualification of Petitioner

There is undeniable merit to respondents' position that there was no majority vote on the
issue of petitioner Poe's natural-born citizenship. Only seven (7) of the fifteen (15) Justices
of the Court declared her to be a natural-born Filipino citizen. Justice Del Castillo, Justice
Caguioa and Justice Peralta voted to defer making a definitive determination on the issue of
petitioner Poe's citizenship. A vote can take different forms and it is not limited to an
affirmative or a negative vote. The said Justices did not recuse nor inhibit themselves from
voting on the substantive issue of citizenship. Considering that all the fifteen (15) Justices -
not twelve (12) - took part in the deliberations of the issues and voted thereon, it is pure
dissembling to assert that only a majority of seven (7) is required to resolve the issue.

The net effect of the lack of a majority vote on petitioner's citizenship is a decision that
disposes only the issue of whether petitioner may run but nonetheless leaves her natural-
born citizenship still open to question. Verily, the ponencia has no doctrinal value on the
matter of petitioner's citizenship. Any reference in the ponencia on citizenship is obiter
dictum since the primary premise of the ponencia is that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction
to pass upon the qualifications of a candidate for President unless there is a prior
determination of the qualifications of the candidate by a competent authority and/or that the
issue of qualifications should be resolved by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal after the
elections. Ergo, the ponencia could not have ruled on the merits of the citizenship or
residence qualifications of petitioner Poe.

Following the ponencia 's premise, it was premature to pass upon the said qualifications
before the elections. Still, the ponencia went on to rule on the qualifications of petitioner
Poe, which is in direct contradiction of the main proposition relied upon by the ponencia that
the COMELEC and this Court cannot pass upon the qualifications of petitioner Poe before
the elections.
I see no legal or practical purpose for postponing the categorical resolution of this issue until
after the elections since under existing jurisprudence6 where the winning candidate is found
to be disqualified or ineligible to hold office, an election victory will not erase such
disqualification or ineligibility. The delay in the disposition of the citizenship issue will only
invite uncertainty and instability in the conduct of the coming elections.

In sum, I reiterate my previous Dissenting Opinion that petitioner Poe, who was a foundling
with unknown parents is not a natural-born citizen. To hold otherwise as
the ponencia submits is a patent violation of the clear language of the Constitution and
would amount to an unwarranted amendment of the provision of the Constitution on
citizenship. Moreover, petitioner Poe has not complied with the 10-year residence
requirement to run for the highest political office in the land. Her representation that she
was born to Filipino parents when she applied for her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
which became her basis for claiming natural-born citizenship when she filed her certificate
of candidacy was false and was intended to mislead to enable her to avail herself of the
benefits of Republic Act No. 9225 and to be qualified to run for President. The same
conclusion holds true with respect to her representation under oath as to her 10-year
residency, which contradicts her own representations in two previous instances.

I therefore maintain my dissent and vote to GRANT the Motions for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated March 8, 2016.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1Private respondents Estrella C. Elamparo, Francisco S. Tatad, and Antonio P.

Contreras jointly filed an Urgent Plea for Reconsideration on March 21, 2016; while
public respondent COMELEC filed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22,
2016. Amado D. Valdez subsequently filed his own Motion for Reconsideration on
March 29, 2016.

2 The last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution states:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

3 Justice Jardeleza's Concurring Opinion, pp. 8-9.

4
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.

5
G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
 6 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 255 Phil. 934 (1989).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

I.A. The Court's Ruling on Reconsideration

After the Court's main ruling in this case was announced and promulgated, a lot of
questions were raised about the meaning, significance, and impact of our Decision. A
particular question asked was - did the Court declare Grace Poe qualified to run for the
Presidency? A running debate in fact ensued in the media between Chief Justice Ma.
Lourdes A. Sereno and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio on whether the Court,
under the ruling and the Justices' votes, effectively declared Grace Poe a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.

Expectedly, the respondents - Estrella C. Elamparo (Elamparo), Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),

Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras), and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) - filed their motions for
reconsideration, followed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which filed its own.
They raised a host of questions about the Decision - constitutional, substantive, procedural,
statutory, on international law, and even questions on the logic and the reasoning of the
Decision.

No less than the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) expressed its misgivings about the
Court's ruling1 because of the tenor of its dispositive portion and the opinions of the different
Justices.2 Even legal academicians3 and netizens in newspapers and the web, expressed
their concerns.

The Philippine Bar Association (PBA) likewise expressed their "grave concern on the
recent ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court," as the ruling failed "to resolve legal issues
with clarity and certainty such that more questions are raised than answered, the Rule of
Law is not served well." It continued that "worse, when the ruling of the Supreme Court
portends a looming constitutional crisis with the possibility of a person elected by our people
on mere presumption of eligibility, potentially being ousted from office by a majority vote of
the Supreme Court, the resulting mandate is weakened from inception, the balance of
power among the great branches of government is upset, and the contentious issue of
succession comes to fore."4

At the Court's first meeting in Baguio for its Summer Session, one of the items taken up was
the Grace Poe case. In the usual course, the respondent would have been required to
comment on the motions for reconsideration filed. At the very least, a ponente who is
disposed to deny the motions would have issued a resolution explaining the majority's
positions on the issues raised. This approach would have been the most responsible and
rational to take, given the interest that the case has aroused and the fact that the issues
raised were far from insignificant, involving as they do no less than –

• our Constitution, our laws, and their continued integrity;

• the qualifications for the Presidency as the highest office in the land ;

• the Court itself that the public relies upon as the Guardian of the
Constitution and the Gatekeeper in ensuring that grave abuse of discretion does
not exist in the public service and in governance; and, last but not the least,

• the exercise of the sovereignty of our people through the ballot and their right to
have the ultimate say on matters of sovereignty and governance.

Topmost among all these is the Constitution, simply because it is the Contract on which our
nation is founded and governed, and is the ultimate fountainhead of all the powers, rights,
and obligations that exist in this nation; our people themselves promulgated this
Constitution and link with one another and with the rest of the country through it. It should
thus be respected to the utmost, with an owe that is no less than what we owe to the
Filipino nation itself. Issues on presidency come close behind as the President is the leader
on whose mind, heart, and hands may depend the future of the country for the next six
years.

To our surprise (at least, those of us who dissented from the majority's ruling),
the ponente simply recommended to the Court en banc the outright dismissal of the
motions for reconsideration through a Minute Resolution, i.e., a simple resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

We pointedly asked if the ponente would write an extended resolution that would at least
explain the reason/s for the outright denial. The answer was a simple "No," thus, clearly
indicating that the majority was simply banking on force of numbers, although Members of
the majority (not the ponente) reserved the right to write their concurring opinions, after the
dissenting Justices confirmed that they would write theirs. In other words, no extended
ruling and reasoning can be read by the public as a ponencia coming from the Court.

Indeed, this was a very strange stance coming from the Members of a Court whose
Decision has been questioned by different sectors for the confusion it sowed, and whose
avowed mission, among others, is to educate the bench, the bar, and members of the public
on matters of law. It should not be forgotten, too, that the Court has been entrusted with the
care, interpretation, and application of the Constitution.

The least that a responsible and conscientious Court can do when faced with questions
relating to the Constitution is to honor this trust through competent, capable, and principled
performance of its duties, particularly those touching on constitutional issues and its
relationship with the public it serves. That this approach did not take place shall, I am sure,
lead to more questions about the Court.

Under these circumstances, I can only conclude that this Court has not fully discharged its
sworn duty in ruling on this case. I give credit though to the present movants, among them
the COMELEC itself, who, despite the ruling they received from this Court, have been very
careful in their language to describe the errors that they attribute to the majority's ruling.
Their careful use of words, though, could not hide what they felt about the
challenged ponencia: that the Court itself has committed what the Court would call
"grave abuse of discretion" had it been reviewing a lower court ruling in a Rule 65
petition.

I do not and cannot begrudge the movants this feeling as I too feel that the Court has once
again overstepped the bounds allowed us as fallible human beings entrusted with a trust
sacred to the nation. It is in this spirit that I write this Opinion - to do my duty to "settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, " even if this abuse had been committed by the Court itself.

This is not to say that, when so questioned, the Court must always yield to the challenge/s
made, and respond by retracting or retracing our steps. This is not the way of a
responsible magistrate; ours is the duty that calls for a well-considered appreciation of the
exact issues before us, as well as the duty to rule justly and fairly on these issues based on
the evidence before us and on the competent, reasonable, and logical application of law
and jurisprudence, all in accordance with the rule of law.

In a motion for reconsideration situation, this standard simply translates to being ready to
take a hard and careful look at the challenges posed, keeping in mind the role assigned to
us under our constitutional scheme, particularly in an election situation: we are not partisans
with fixed objectives anchored on political self-interests; we are men and women of the
law whose bias, if any, should be for the stability of the nation's laws through their reasoned
and logical interpretation and application. While we may exercise our right to vote in our
country's elections as our individual partisan inclinations direct us, we must rule as
disciplined men and women of the law whose obsession is to collectively guide the
nation as it struggles through the thicket of legal concerns that our nation
perennially faces.

I.B. Brief Background of the Motions for Reconsideration.

These motions for reconsideration started from the petitions for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy (CoC) separately filed by the present movants Elamparo, Tatad, Contreras, and
Valdez (movants). They petitioned the COMELEC for the cancellation of Senator Grace
Poe's CoC based on her allegedly false representation in her citizenship and residency
qualifications; they claimed that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and
has not resided in the country for the required period of ten (10) years.
The COMELEC granted the petiti0ns and cancelled Poe's CoC, prompting Poe to come to
this Court via a Rule 64/65 petition for certiorari on the allegation that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation.

The Court, through the ponencia of Justice Jose P. Perez, granted the petition with the
support of nine (9) Justices and with six (6) Justices in dissent.

Of the supporting Justices, five (5) explained their votes through separate opinions; Justices
Lucas P. Bersamin and Jose C. Mendoza fully joined the ponencia of Justice Jose P. Perez,
while Justice Diosdado M. Peralta did not write his own opinion but merely concurred with
the Separate Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa who joined the grant of the
petition based on the grave abuse of discretion that he saw, but opted not to rule on the
citizenship issue. Thus, all or nine of the majority Justices joined the finding of grave abuse
of discretion, but only seven (or less than a majority) of the 15 justices voted to declare Poe
a natural-born citizen.

Five (5) of the six (6) dissenting Justices wrote their separate dissents, but Justice Mariano
C. del Castillo did not also rule on the citizenship issue (thus, only five [5] Justices dissented
on the citizenship issue). All of the dissenting Justices ruled that the COMELEC had the
requisite jurisdiction to rule on the cancellation of CoC issue, as against the majority's ruling
that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction, as expressed in the ponencia.

My dissent, however, also refuted the ponencia 's declaration that Poe is qualified to be a
candidate for President, under the view that if the majority uniformly ruled that the
COMELEC did not have the jurisdiction to cancel Poe's CoC (so that the COMELEC ruling
was void and carried no legal effect), the rulings the majority might have made on the
citizenship and the residency issues are obiter dicta or non-binding observations.

Beyond this ruling, I now hold in these motions for reconsideration that the Court's
majority did not only err; in fact, they gravely abused their discretion in their ruling
as the ponencia:

(1) grossly misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the applicable
laws on elections, and the rules of procedure;

(2) disregarded and abandoned established jurisprudence without sufficient basis in

law and in reason; and

(3) acted on considerations other than legal in making their ruling. I expound on
these gross errors in the discussions below.

II. THE PONENCIA's GROSSLY ERRONEOUS RULINGS.

The Court, while it is Supreme, has never been intended to be infallible. It is composed of
fallible human beings who can err. It is only "supreme" because there is supposedly no
court higher than the Supreme Court to which its errors may be appealed. Left unwritten in
this limited concept of supremacy is the unavoidable implication that the Court's power is
not absolute, even in its assigned area under the Constitution.
The Court, though Supreme, cannot simply disregard the clear terms of the Constitution and
the laws, or at its whim, change or abandon its past rulings which have become part of the
law of the land, or without reason, refuse to take into account standard norms of
interpretation and application of the laws. These, unfortunately, were what the Court
majority generally did in its ruling in the present case. It acted outside the discretion the
Constitution, the laws, and ordinary reason allow it:

• when it rashly ruled that the COMELEC did not have the jurisdiction to cancel Poe's
CoC and thereafter illogically and unreasonably declared Poe qualified to be a
candidate for the Presidency, the ponenciathereby disregarded:

o the constitutional rule on the nature of the orders and rulings of the
COMELEC and their review, as well as the power of the Supreme Court over
these rulings; and

o the significance of the COMELEC rules on the cancellation of CoCs and the
established jurisdiction on this COMELEC power;

• when it concluded that Poe - an undisputed foundling - is a natural-born Filipino

citizen based on presumptions, on unfounded reading and interpretation of
international law, on circumstantial evidence that had not been admitted, and by
implication from the silent terms of the Constitution; the ponencia thereby:

o disregarded the clear terms of the 1935 Constitution on who are citizens of
the Philippines and read into these clear terms the citizenship of foundlings -
a matter that the Constitutional Convention already expressly rejected;

o disregarded evidentiary rules that should apply;

o misread international law and the treaties/agreements applicable to the

Philippines; and

o misappreciated the Court's ruling in Bengzon v. COMELEC5 through its

superficial and out-of-context application.

• When it ruled that Poe complied with the Constitution's residency requirements:

o By changing the constitutional meaning and requirements of the term

"residence" and disregarding, without sufficient basis in law and reason, the
established jurisprudence on residency;

o by disregarding the nature of the political right that underlie the residency
requirement, in the process disregarding too the terms and effects of a
balikbayan visa;

o by turning a blind eye on the effects and significance of Poe's 2012 CoC for
the Senate, and simply accepting the claim that Poe made an honest mistake
in the representations she made; and
 o by glossing over the "deliberate intent to mislead" aspects of the case in the
representations that Poe made in her current CoC.

To encapsulate the nature and immensity of all these errors, particularly those that made a
mockery of the Constitution and unsettled established rulings, I can only say that the Court's
majority grossly violated the RULEOF LAW, thereby allowing - for the first time since July
4, 1946 - the possibility that one who is not a natural-born Filipino citizen would occupy the
highest government post in the land.

Inevitably, the majority's abrupt and unprecedented reversal of settled jurisprudence has
created problems - both immediate and lasting - which needs to be addressed if this Court
were to be true to its role as the "final arbiter" of legal disputes, whether in government of in
the private sector.

To be sure, the Court has the legal authority to reverse judicial precedents and in the
process introduce new jurisprudence, but it must do so with care and the knowledge that
the doctrines it pronounces become part of the law of the land. That we create
jurisprudence binding upon lower courts and quasi-judicial agencies until reversed or
modified should make us mindful of our role in upholding the rule of law and maintaining the
judicial legitimacy of our decisions.

In this light, I firmly beiieve that judicial precedent should be disregarded only for
strong, compelling reasons grounded on legal considerations. They are part of the
building blocks and mortars that, if unceremoniously and mindlessly removed, can
bring down an edifice.

Sadly, I find that the legal bases used by the majority have been grossly and glaringly
inconsistent as well as inadequate to support its conclusions. These defects will inevitably
impact on the present jurisdiction of the COMELEC, on the cases it has decided, and on the
jurisprudence on the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions.

I am not unaware that the majority may have considered values that allegedly apply to
Poe's case, among them, the need to empower foundlings in their exercise of civil and
political rights reserved for Philippine citizens, and their assessment and belief that Poe is
the best candidate to run the country in the next six years.

Value judgments, however, should never supersede the clear text of the law. Lest we forget
and become derailed by our own personal political assessments and resulting convictions,
our country is run under the rule of law, and not by what we perceive the law should be. It is
our cardinal duty, as Members of the highest Court of the land, to uphold and defend the
ideals of the sovereign Filipino nation as embodied in the Constitution, central to which is an
independent, democratic government ran under the rule of law.

In these lights, many of my arguments shall touch on the Rule of Law to highlight the need
for mindful awareness of the impact of what we say and declare in the decisions we write. I
shall also frontally discuss what I find objectionable in the ponencia as it is only through this
means that we can bring to the public's awareness how we got to where we are now.
 III. DISCUSSIONS

III.A. The Rule of Law.

The rule of law is the cornerstone of Philippine democracy and government. At its most
basic, the rule of law is what it literally purports to be - governance through
established laws, rather than through the arbitrary will of a select few.

In applying the law, the unvarying first step is to determine what is the Court's or any
tribunal's jurisdiction over or authority to intervene in the case; this determination dictates
the approach in the consideration of the case before it. In the course of reviewing a case,
tools of construction may be used, which tools invariably command that above everything
else, what is written in law should be respected and upheld. We then further pursue the rule
of law through the established procedure we observe in the petitions before us, and through
our practice of applying the law to the parties, taking care that its interpretation and
application are even for all persons, regardless of power, riches, or fame they may have.

To adjudicate, particularly on matters that involve the language of the law, knowledge and
facility with the rules of statutory and constitutional construction are a must. This skill directs
us to first look at the text of the law, before resorting to extrinsic aids of interpretation. Thus,
for statutes, the cardinal rule to observe is that "verba legis non est recedendum or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."6 Constitutional construction, on the other
hand, tells us of "verba legis," that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. 7 It is only
when ambiguity in the text cannot be resolved from the examination of the text itself that we
are allowed to look outside, from extrinsic aids of construction, to determine the intent and
real meaning of the rules we interpret and apply.8

I bring these all up as to me, they are the critical elements of adjudication that would have
helped us resolve the present case expeditiously and with certain results.

111.B. The Jurisdiction of the COMELEC

111.B.1. The Ponencia 's Ruling on COMELEC Jurisdiction.

In my original dissent, I painstakingly specified the rulings I objected to and even quoted
the ponencia verbatim lest I be accused of twisting its statements. I summarize
the ponencia 's ruling on the COMELEC's jurisdiction, as follows:

(1) the COMELEC did not have the authority to rule on Poe's citizenship and
residency qualifications as these qualifications have not yet been determined by the
proper authority;

(2) since there is no such prior determination as to Poe's qualifications, there is no

basis for a finding that Poe's representations are false; and

(3) while a candidate's CoC may be cancelled without prior disqualification finding
from the proper authority, the issues involving Poe's citizenship and residency do not
 involve self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity from which the
falsity of representation could have been determined.

To support these rulings, the ponencia argued that the COMELEC lacked the
jurisdiction to cancel Poe's CoC because:

First, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution on the COMELEC's jurisdiction has no specific
provision authorizing it to rule on the qualification of the President, Vice President, Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, while Article VI, Section 17 and Article VII,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution specifically entrusts contest involving the qualifications of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, and of the President and Vice-
President, to the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
respectively.9

Second, Fermin v. Comelec,10 citing the Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec,11 noted that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule."12 This view was
adopted in the revision of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in 2012, as reflected in the
changes made in the 2012 Rules from the 1993 Rules of Procedure.13

The ponencia thus read Fermin and the 2012 Rules of Procedure to mean that there is no
authorized proceeding to determine the qualifications of a candidate before the candidate is
elected,14 and that a CoC "cannot be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that
he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the
falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are
self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions."15

111.B.2. The ponencia 's ruling on the COMELEC's jurisdiction is grossly erroneous.

I disagree with both the results and the approach the ponencia made in ruling on the
COMELEC jurisdiction issue. To my mind, it effectively read a complex issue from one very
narrow perspective and ruled on the basis of that perspective. Worse, its reading of the
law and jurisprudence under its chosen perspective was not even legally correct.

The law, supported by the Constitution and jurisprudence, has empowered the
COMELEC to cancel the CoC of candidates based on their false material
representations in these CoCs. It is this existing basic and established rule that
the ponencia has emasculated.

I shall answer the two points the ponencia raised and in the process discuss the
considerations that a responsible ruling should have made.

III.B.2(a). The required Perspective in Considering the Constitution.

A first consideration that the ponencia missed in considering the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is the cardinal rule in constitutional adjudication that the Constitution should be
read in its totality, not by simply reading specific provisions and coming up with rulings and
conclusions based on these bits and pieces of the Constitution and the laws.

Had the Constitution in its totality been read, the ponencia would have seen that under our
constitutional scheme and structure, the COMELEC is an independent commission - an
agency with a task all its own that it must undertake and deliver to the Filipino people in the
exercise of its reasonable discretion.

Thus, instead of simply quoting Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution and literally
reading it in relation with Article VI, Section 17, the ponente's duty as a magistrate would
have been better served had he looked deeper into the Constitution's power structures and
history, to find out how these provisions interact or were meant to interact with one another.

III.B.2(a)(i). COMELEC v. PET/SET/HRET: A Comparison:

To be sure, the ponencia correctly observed that the qualifications of the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives, as well as those of the President and the
Vice-President, all fall within the jurisdiction of the SET, the HRET, and the PET,
respectively, and that the authority to rule has been withheld from the COMELEC under the
Constitution.

This kind of superficial reading, however, cannot be the end and totality of a comparison
between the COMELEC, on the one hand, and the SET, HRET, and the PET, on the other
hand. The ponencia should have appreciated that this kind of comparison is more than
anything else, an apple and orange comparison that carries very little relevance in
constitutional adjudication.

The COMELEC is tasked with the enforcement and administration of the election laws, and
these tasks end after a winning candidate is proclaimed (at least under the jurisprudence
before Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC16 that the ponente, Justice Jose P. Perez, also wrote
for the Court); the other three agencies, on the other hand, acquire jurisdiction only after
elections, i. e., after a candidate shall have been proclaimed.

III.B.2(a)(ii) Jurisprudence: Ongsiako-Reyes & Others.

Thus, all matters, except only the right to vote and those given elsewhere by law, are within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC before elections.17 This jurisdiction includes the authority
to rule on the cancellation of CoCs filed before it under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC).18 Clearly established jurisprudence has supported the validity of Section 78 by
ruling that the COMELEC indeed has the authority to cancel COCs based on the false
material representation made in their CoCs. A representation on citizenship or residency is
material because they involve the qualifications of the candidate, and any falsity on either
matter is ground for the cancellation of a CoC.

Interestingly, this was the basis of the ponente's own ruling in the Ongsiako-Reyes case
when he upheld the COMELEC's cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes' CoC on the ground
that she was a naturalized American citizen and had not resided in the Philippines for the
requisite period.
In the present case, the ponencia now surprisingly and without any reasonably
acceptable legal basis holds that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on a CoC
cancellation on the basis of citizenship and/or residency. Coming as this ruling does in
a presidential election where an allegedly non-Filipino and survey-leading candidate would
be favored; this is a flip-flop of far-reaching proportions that the ponencia should have fully
explained.

To highlight the immensity of the problem that the ponencia spawned and will spawn in
pending and future election cases, the rule that the Court established in Ongsiako-Reyes
holds:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC
that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to
be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is
filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.19[emphases, italics, and underscoring
supplied]

In Cerafica v. Comelec,20 the Court, again speaking through Justice Jose Perez, held that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate
for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia
Cerafica. Kimberly's CoC is considered valid unless its contents (that includes data on her
eligibility) is impugned through a Section 78 proceeding. As Kimberly's CoC had not
undergone a Section 78 proceeding, then her CoC remained valid and she could be
properly substituted by Olivia. In so doing, the Court quoted and reaffirmed its previous
ruling in Luna v. COMELEC:21

"If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his
certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election
Code."22 (italics supplied]

The ponencia disregarded the following cases - shown in the table below - where the Court
previously recognized the COMELEC's jurisdiction to cancel candidates' CoCs for false
material representation in their eligibility for office.

(Cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 - the year the COMELEC amended its
Rules of Procedure.)
 Case Ponente, Division Ruling

Aratea v. Comelec, Carpio, J. En banc The Court affirmed the Comelec's

determination that Lonzanida has
G.R. No. 195229 served for three terms already and
October 9, 2012 therefore misrepresented his
eligibility to run for office; this,
according to the Court, is a ground
for cancelling Lonzanida's Coe under
Section 78.

Maquiling v. Sereno, CJ, En banc The Court reversed the

Comelec, G.R. No. determination of the Comelec's
195649, April 16, Amado's qualification to run for office
2013 because of a recanted oath of
allegiance, and thus cancelled his
CoC and proclaimed Maquiling as
the winner. The Court, in rev1ewmg
the Comelec' s determination, did not
dispute its capacity to determine
Amado's qualifications.

Ongsiako Reyes v. Perez, J., En Banc The Court affirmed the Comelec's
evaluation and determination that
Comelec, G.R. No. Ongsiako-Reyes is not a Philippine
207264, June 25, citizen and a resident of the
2013 Philippines.

It even upheld the Come lee's

cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" and held that the Comelec
can liberally construe its own rules of
procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases before it.

Cerafica v. Perez, J., En Banc The Court held that the Comelec
Comelec,G.R. No. gravely abused its discretion m
205136 December holding that Kimberly did not file a
2, 2014 valid Coe and subsequently cannot
be substituted by Olivia; in so doing,
the Court quoted and reaffirmed its
previous ruling in Luna v Comelec,
thus:

"If Hans Roger made a material

misrepresentation as to his date of
birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be
 impugned through a verified petition
to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code."

Luna v. Comelec, Carpio, J. En Banc Since Hans Roger withdrew his

certificate of candidacy and the
G.R. No. 165983 COMELEC found that Luna complied
with all the procedural requirements
April 24, 2007 for a valid substitution, Luna can
validly substitute for Hans Roger.
(cited as reference
to its affirmation in Xxx
Cerafrica)
If Hans Roger made a material
misrepresentation as to his date of
birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be
impugned through a verified petition
to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to

deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Hans
Roger. The COMELEC only declared
that Hans Roger did not file a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus,
was not a valid candidate in the
petition to deny due course to or
cancel Luna's certificate of
candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC,
without the proper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Roger's certificate of
candidacy and declared the
substitution by Luna invalid.

Notably, the writers of these tabulated cases, other than Justice Jose P. Perez, are the two
highest ranking Justices of this Court - Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno and
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio. Significantly, Chief Justice Sereno herself
joined the ponencia.

The sad part in the present Grace Poe ruling is that the ponencia did not clearly and
convincingly reason out why the case of Grace Poe should be differently treated. This kind
of treatment gives a mischievous mind the opportunity to ask –
 • why should Grace Poe be differently treated under the law?

• what is so special in her case that the prevailing ruling should be abandoned and
the COMELEC's exercise of authority in elections put at risk without sufficient basis
in law and in reason?

• were the COMELEC rulings under review so strong and difficult to reverse under
the grave abuse of discretion standard, so that the rug had to be pulled under the
COMELEC through the position that it has no authority to undertake the CoC
cancellation?

III.B.2(b) The COMELEC's authority as a Separate and Independent Body.

Likewise interesting to note is that a court's or tribunal's ruling on citizenship, as a general

rule, does not have the effect of res judicata, especially when the citizenship ruling is
only antecedent to the determination of rights of a person in a controversy.23

In other words, the COMELEC can conduct its own inquiry regarding citizenship, separate
from and independently of the proceedings of the PET, SET, or HRET. As a means
necessary in the granted power to cancel CoCs, the COMELEC is given the means to carry
this power into effect, particularly the power, even if only preliminarily and for the purpose
only of the cancellation proceedings, to delve into the eligibility aspect that is at issue.

In the present case, the COMELEC, in order to decide whether Poe's CoC should be
cancelled, should be able to inquire into her citizenship and residency - matters that both
parties fully argued before the COMELEC on the basis of law and their respective
evidentiary submissions. (The Court, too, during the oral arguments on this case, minutely
inquired into the evidence submitted.) Courts, including quasi-judicial agencies such as the
COMELEC, may make pronouncements on the status of Philippine citizenship as an
incident in the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy.

In making its determination, the COMELEC is not bound by the PET, SET, or HRET's
decision since these constitutional bodies are separate and independent from one
another, each with its own specific jurisdiction and issues to resolve. The COMELEC,
as a constitutional body equipped with DECISIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
INDEPENDENCE and tasked to implement election laws, has the authority to determine
citizenship, even if only on a preliminary matter, to determine whether the candidate
committed false material representation in his or her CoC. The PET, SET, or HRET, on the
other hand, are constitutional bodies tasked to resolve all contests involving the eligibility of
the President, the Vice President, the Senators, and the House of Representative Members,
respectively, after their proclamation.

That these bodies have separate, distinct, and different jurisdictions mean -that none of
them has the authority nor the ascendancy over the others, with each body supreme
in its own sphere of authority. Conversely, these bodies have no ascendancy to rule
upon issues outside their respective specific authority, much less the authority to bind other
bodies on matters outside their respective jurisdictions. (The only exception to this
statement would be the PET where the members of the Supreme Court themselves are the
Members, but whether their rulings as PET are doctrinal is not a settled matter.) The
decision of the PET, SET, or HRET, with their specific jurisdictions to resolve contests
involving the qualifications of the President, Vice-President, Senators, or the House of
Representative Members, does not have the authority to bind the COMELEC, another
constitutional body with a specific mission and jurisdiction of its own. Only the ruling of
this Court can have this effect, and only because under the Constitution and by law,
its rulings form part of the law of the land.24

III.B.2(c) The COMELEC and the PET.

III.B.2(c)(i) Their Brie(Histories

The PET was a statutory creation that came into existence in 1957 in response to the
perceived absence of any tribunal that could rule on presidential and vice-presidential
election controversies. It firmly became a constitutional body under the 1987 Constitution
with the Justices of the Supreme Court as Members. Presently, this Court, sitting en bane,
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President.

The grant of jurisdiction to the PET is exclusive but at the same time, limited. The
constitutional phraseology limits the PET's jurisdiction to election contests which can only
contemplate a post-election and post proclamation controversy25 since no "contest" can
exist before a winner is proclaimed. Understood in this sense, the jurisdiction of the
members of the Court, sitting as PET, does not pertain to Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidates but to the President (elect) and Vice-President (elect).

In contrast, the COMELEC was created in 1940, initially by statute whose terms were later
incorporated as an amendment to the 1935 Constitution. The COMELEC was given the
power to decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting
elections.

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, this COMELEC's powers were retained with the
same limitations.

The 1987 Constitution deleted the adjective "administrative" in the description of the
COMELEC's powers and expanded its jurisdiction to decide all questions affecting
elections, except those involving the right to vote. Thus, unlike the very limited
jurisdiction over election contests granted to the Supreme Court/PET, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction, with its catch-all provision, is all encompassing; it covers all questions/issues
not specifically reserved for other tribunals.

The Administrative Code of 1987 further explicitly granted the COMELEC exclusive
jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

Section 78 of the OEC still further refined the COMELEC's power by expressly granting it
the power to deny due course or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of
false material representation. Ex necessitate legis. Express grants of power are deemed
to include all powers that are necessary or can be fairly implied from the express grant, or
are incidental to the powers expressly conferred or essential thereto. This power under
Section 78, therefore, necessarily includes the power to make a determination of the truth or
falsity of the material representation made in the CoC.

The bottom line from this brief comparison is that the power granted to the PET is limited to
election contests while the powers of the COMELEC with respect to elections are broad and
extensive. Except for election contests involving the President or Vice-President (and
members of Congress)26 and controversies involving the right to vote, the COMELEC has
the jurisdiction to decide ALL questions affecting elections. Logically, this includes pre-
proclamation controversies such as the determination of the qualifications of candidates for
purpose of resolving whether a candidate committed false material representation in his or
her CoC.

Thus, if this Court would deny the COMELEC the power to cancel CoCs of presidential
candidates simply because the COMELEC thereby effectively passes upon the
qualifications of a Presidential candidate and on the ground that this power belongs to the
PET composed of the Members of this Court, we shall self-servingly expand the limited
power granted to this Court by Article VII, Section 4, at the expense of limiting the powers
explicitly granted to an independent constitutional commission. The Court would thus
commit an unconstitutional encroachment on the COMELEC's powers.

This seemingly simple constitutional objection is one that the Court should carefully
consider as this is what the ponencia's ruling ultimately signifies.

III.B.2(c)(ii) Jurisprudence on COMELEC-PET Jurisdiction.

In Tecson v. Comelec,27 the Court indirectly affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction over a
presidential candidate's eligibility in a cancellation proceeding. The case involved two
consolidated petitions assailing the eligibility of presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr.
(FPJ): one petition, G.R. No. 161824, invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction under Rule
64 of the Rules of Court over a COMELEC decision in a CoC cancellation proceeding, while
the other, G.R. No. 161434, invoked the Court's jurisdiction as PET.

The G.R. No. 161824 petition, in invoking the Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC's
decision to uphold FPJ's candidacy, argued that the COMELEC's decision was within its
power to render but its conclusion is subject to the Court's review under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court and Article IX, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

In contrast, the G.R. No. 161434 petition argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to
decide a Presidential candidate's eligibility, as this could only be decided by the PET. It then
invoked the Court's jurisdiction in its role as PET, to rule on the challenge to FPJ's eligibility.

The Court dismissed both petitions, but for different reasons. The Court dismissed G.R. No.
161824 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. G.R. No.
161434 was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The difference in the reasons for the dismissal of the two petitions in effect affirmed the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a Presidential candidate's eligibility in a pre-
election proceeding through the medium Section 78. It also clarified that while the
PET also has jurisdiction over the questions of eligibility, its jurisdiction begins only
after a President has been proclaimed.

Thus, the two Tecson petitions, read in relation with one another, stand for the proposition
that the PET has jurisdiction over challenges to a proclaimed President's eligibility, while the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over CoC cancellation proceedings, filed prior to the
proclamation of a President and which may involve the eligibility and qualifications of
presidential candidates.

III.B.2(c)(iii) The Fermin and Romualdez-Marcos Cases.

As its second point in is discussion of COMELEC jurisdiction, the ponencia rhetorically

asks: Can the COMELEC be such judge, referring to the COMELEC as a tribunal with
jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of the President (at page 18 of the ponencia).

The ponencia answers the question by citing the Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,28 which the Court en bane cited in Fermin v.
COMELEC.29

Unfortunately, the ponencia did not fully grasp the legal significance of these cases and the
cited portions when it cited them as authority for the view that there is no "authorized
proceeding for determining before elections the qualifications of a candidate."

• The Fermin Ruling

Had the ponencia fully understood Fermin, it would have realized that this case is not a
direct authority for the proposition he wished to establish. Rather than negate the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in a Section 78 proceeding, Fermin - like Tecson - in fact
recognized the COMELEC's authority in these proceedings. The cited case, too, is not
about a candidate's qualification for the office he is running for, but about a Section 68
petition for disqualification and a Section 78 petition to deny due course or to cancel a CoC
(which was the petition that the COMELEC ruled upon in the present Grace Poe case).

"Disqualification" in the sense used in Fermin referred to Section 68 of the OEC that, in
turn, relate to the commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent
resident status in a foreign country as disqualifying grounds. The term carries the same
sense under Section 12 of the OEC that is based on the declaration of insanity or
incompetence by competent authority or conviction by final judgment of specified crimes.
The Local Government Code (LGC) also carries its own "disqualification" provision that
carries a similar signification.

Fermin further distinguishes "disqualification" from the cancellation of a CoC under Section
78 in terms of grounds (i. e., a statement in the CoC of a material representation ... that is
false) and consequences. "While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC. "
A candidate may be prevented from running for an elective position either because he is
ineligible or he is disqualified from doing so. The remedy before election to prevent a
candidate who is ineligible or who lacks the qualification for running or to become a
candidate is to file a petition for cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.30 The
cancellation, cognizable by the COMELEC, requires that the material representation on
qualification be false. Disqualification, as defined above, requires a prior action or ruling with
respect to the cited ground.

After examination of the cited grounds, the Court in Fermin concluded that the petition
involved in the case was a petition for cancellation of CoC, not a petition for disqualification,
and held that it had been filed out of time. It furthermore ruled that a candidate's ineligibility
(based on lack of residence) is not a ground for a Section 68 proceeding for
disqualification, despite a COMELEC rule including the lack of residence in the list of
grounds for a petition for disqualification.

These were the clear thrusts of Fermin, not the ponencia's partially correct but
misunderstood statement that there is no "authorized proceeding for determining before
elections the qualifications of a candidate." To be sure, Fermin does not divest the
COMELEC of its authority to determine a candidate's eligibility in the course of resolving
Section 78 petitions.

As if looking forward to the possible confusion between a pre-election cancellation (Section

78) and a post-election disqualification (quo warranto under Section 253)
proceedings, Fermin itself clarified this point when it said that:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the
public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be
read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is
filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.31[emphases and italics supplied]

Thus, Fermin in fact affirms that the COMELEC can entertain and rule on a pre-election
proceeding that shall pass on the eligibility or qualification of a candidate through the
medium of a Section 78 proceeding.

This is an implication of Fermin that the ponencia might not have fully grasped.

• The Romualdez-Marcos Ruling

The ponencia also cited the Romualdez-Marcos case, apparently without any prior close
reading, by quoting from the Concurring Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza.

In his Opinion, Justice Mendoza essentially discussed the concept of ineligibility (due to lack
of residence), not the concept of disqualification in the Section 68 sense that is brought "for
the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing
as a candidate for public office,· ... their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the
race either from the start or during its progress.

Justice Mendoza pointed out that "ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from
office."

The cited Concurring Opinion concluded that what was involved in the case was a petition
to declare Romualdez-Marcos ineligible, which was filed before the COMELEC; the petition
was not for the cancellation of her CoC since no allegation of falsity of a material
representation had been made.

The quotation the ponencia cited thus related to ineligibility and should be understood in
that context - the absence of an authorized direct proceeding for determining before
election the eligibility of a candidate for office. The quotation merely explained why this
was so and among the reasons given were the lack of need for a proceeding unless a
candidate wins; the summary nature of a cancellation proceeding which is not suited for a
time-consuming eligibility proceeding; and, the policy under the OEC, of not authorizing any
inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Significantly, the Mendoza quotation did not negate the validity of a CoC cancellation
proceeding and in fact stated that "[O]nly in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

To stress the obvious, what is involved in the present Grace Poe case is a CoC cancellation
proceeding, not the direct ineligibility proceeding that the COMELEC cannot undertake
before elections. To recall Fermin, this direct ineligibility proceeding is available only post-
election and the medium is a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC (or
the PET for the President-elect).

In sum, the arguments and cited quotations in the Grace Poe ponencia are not really
authorities for its claim regarding COMELEC jurisdiction. If they tell us anything at all, they
betray the ponencia's confusion in its use of technical election terms, particularly in the
concepts of "qualifications," "disqualifications" and "ineligibility"

But whatever may be the cause of the ponencia's confusion, the ultimate result should be
the recognition that the conclusion on COMELEC jurisdiction has no solid support
from its cited constitutional provisions and cited jurisprudence.

III.B.2(d) Analysis o(Sections 23 and 25 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Taking off from the quotations from Justice Mendoza in Fermin and Romualdez-Marcos, the
ponencia jumps into his arguments regarding COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to be exact,
Rules 23 and 25 of the 2012 Rules of Procedure. Rule 23 provides:

Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. –

A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any
elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered political party,
organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material
representation contained therein as required by law is false.

A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other
than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate
remedy, shall be summarily dismissed.

To fully understand Rule 23, its statutory basis - Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code -
must be appreciated. Section 78 provides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
[Underscoring supplied]

In these clear terms, the law lays down the rule that the ground for cancellation should be
a FALSITY with respect to a material representation required under Section 74 of the OEC.
What is "material" has been the subject of the ruling of this Court in 1999 in Salcedo II v.
COMELEC where we held:32

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications
for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings
must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section
253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of
the election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be
elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

xx xx

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section

78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It
could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
 xx xx

Thus, the first paragraph of Rule 23 simply confirms what Section 78 of the OEC provides
with respect to the denial of due course or to the cancellation of a CoC. A striking feature of
this Rule is that it does not provide for the limitation that the COMELEC cannot rule
under Section 78 when the representation cited touches on the qualification or
eligibility of a candidate. In fact, the Rule implicitly speaks of eligibility as Section 74 of the
OEC to which Section 78 refers, contains the qualification requirements that a candidate
should state in his or her CoC .

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 23 distinguishes between a Section 78

cancellation proceeding and a disqualification proceeding based on Section 68 and similar
disqualification provisions pointed out above. To avoid the muddling or mixing of the
grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide that petitions that combine or
substitute one remedy for the other shall be dismissed summarily. Thus, the petition for
cancellation can only invoke a Section 78 ground; it cannot invoke a ground for
disqualification which is covered by its own OEC provisions - Section 68 and Section 12 of
the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC.

In contrast with Rule 23, Rule 25 of the 2012 Rules provides:

Section 1. Grounds, - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is

declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny or to Cancel a

Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

At the risk of repetition, the ponencia in this case read Fermin and the 2012 Rules of
Procedure to mean that there is no authorized proceeding to determine the qualifications of
a candidate before the candidate is elected. To disqualify a candidate, there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.''33

Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 25, the above statement from the ponencia is
not totally wrong as it merely paraphrases this paragraph. Where the ponencia grossly
erred was in its ruling, apparently based on its combined reading of Rules 23 and 25, that
a CoC "cannot be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident
facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions."34

By so ruling, the ponencia thereby selectively used part of Rule 23 and combined it with
its selected part of Rule 25, to achieve its desired conclusion. This is a very naughty, if not
outrightly fraudulent, use of legal interpretation.
Read side by side and read in relation with one another, Rules 23 and 25 complement one
another, with one (Rule 23) providing for the Cancellation of CoC, while the other (Rule 25)
providing for Disqualification. These Rules provide that the grounds particular to one cannot
be cited in a petition for the other, under pain of dismissal of the petition filed. In clearer
terms, CoC cancellation petition can only cite falsities in the material representations
mentioned under Section 74 of the OEC, not any ground for disqualification under Section
68 or Section 12 of the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC.

Further compared, it will be noted that the second paragraphs of the Rules' respective
Sections 1 are simply statements that confirm one another and strengthen the distinctions
between CoC cancellation under Rule 23 and Disqualification under Rule 25. In other
words, these paragraphs do not intrude into what each other covers.

Aside from its naughty interpretation, the ponencia apparently went astray when it
misunderstood, under its interpretation of Rules 23 and 25, the Fermin ruling which held
that a candidate's ineligibility is not a ground for a Section 68
proceeding for disqualification, despite a COMELEC rule including the lack of residence
(which is an ineligibility) in the list of grounds for a petition for disqualification. As noted
above, the ruling then characterized the disputed petition as a petition for the cancellation of
a CoC, not a petition for disqualification, and held that it had been filed out of time.

As fully explained therefore, the Fermin ruling and its correct significance were not properly
utilized by the ponencia. Notably, Fermin itself clarified its legal thrusts, as above-quoted, in
a manner that is not easy to misunderstand; thus, the ponencia 's misuse of Fermin is
difficult to excuse or to attribute to an honest mistake in the interpretation of a point of
law. Rather than a mistake, the better description may perhaps be a determined and
overzealous attempt to overcome the cancellation of CoC that the COMELEC ordered.

In these lights, I hold that based on the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC history, and settled jurisprudence,
the ponencia rashly emasculated the COMELEC of its authority to act pursuant to Section
78. As a remedial measure, its power to rule on the falsity of the eligibility or qualification
requirements reflected in candidates' CoC, should be declared intact, unsullied, and be the
starting basis for the consideration of the merits of the present case.

111.B.3. The Height of Illogic: Ruling on review by certiorari that the COMELEC had
no jurisdiction on the cancellation of Grace Poe's CoC, while declaring at the same
time that Poe is qualified to run for President.

A continuing source of wonder in reading the ponencia is how it could rule that the
COMELEC's cancellation of Grace Poe's CoC could be void (because the COMELEC had
no authority or jurisdiction to make the ruling) AND AT THE SAME TIME declare Grace Poe
qualified to run for the Presidency of this country.

Even to a legally unschooled mind, the ruling can be as simple as saying - Wala palang
kapangyarihan ang COMELEC at di pala ito puede magbigay ng kapasiyahan sa certifico
ng kandidatura ni Grace Poe, kaya kandidato pa rin si Grace Poe.
That would not have been a bad reasoning for a legal layman and should at least be a
reasoning track that should not escape the Supreme Court itself. What the consequences
and implications of this reasoning and conclusion, of course, cannot usually be expected
from the ordinary layman as these consequences may already require legal training to sort
out.

The Court should eminently qualify to layout what would happen if indeed the COMELEC
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction, but for the Court to conclude that Grace Poe is qualified
to run for the Presidency although the COMELEC did not have the authority to act and its
decision had been voided, is a leap in logic - a non-sequitur - that equates the lack of
authority to act with the separate question of Poe's eligibility to be a candidate. It is a
conclusion that begs for the sounding of alarm bells about the Court's reasoning and about
the Court itself and its motivations.

By constitutional rule,35 a COMELEC decision is reviewable by the Court only

by certiorari whose procedure is outlined under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. This
manner and mode of review essentially mean that the Court's standard of review is the
presence or absence of jurisdiction, in the latter case, the lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to these jurisdictional defects. 36 This standard is vastly
stricter and narrower than the review on the merits of a case available in an appeal.

To state the most obvious aspect of the Court's power of review, certiorari (under Rule 65)
is limited to jurisdictional grounds (at the very least, grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction), while a review on appeal opens up the merits of the case,
both on factual or legal issues, and an appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) allows a review on
purely legal grounds.

Thus in a Rule 65 review, the Court, if it finds that the tribunal below committed grave abuse
of discretion in its appreciation of the facts or in its reading, interpretation, or application of
the law, simply declares the challenged ruling null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction; it may act, too, on the incidental relief that the petitioner might have
asked for. The Court does not review the merits of the case in order to issue a
rulingon what the correct facts and applicable law should be. As explained by Justice
Herrera, certiorari is a corrective and supervisory remedy that cannot be broadened to
review the intrinsic correctness or merits of the lower tribunal's decision. 37

Of course, in considering whether the tribunal gravely abused its discretion in appreciating
the facts and the law, the Court must necessarily discuss the errors of facts and law made
and on this basis determine if mere error or grave abuse in the exercise of discretion had
intervened. But the Court does not thereby make a binding ruling on the facts and the
law because its enforceable ruling is effectively the nullity of the challenged ruling.

In the present case, Grace Poe notably prayed only for the nullification of the COMELEC
rulings, for incidental reliefs, and "other reliefs, just and equitable." But even the usual
course in the review and consideration of the case from the prism of a certiorari petition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court did not take place.
While the Court majority did indeed find the challenged COMELEC ruling void, its basis
was not the consideration of the COMELEC's findings of facts and law, but its
interpretation that the COMELEC did not have the authority to rule on citizenship and
residency qualifications as these qualifications had not yet been determined by the proper
authorities and do not involve self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
from which the falsity of representations could have been determined. Without these prior
findings, the Court majority reasoned out that the COMELEC had no basis to rule that Poe's
representations are false.

If indeed the problem is the COMELEC's own authority to act, i. e., that it lacked jurisdiction
to rule on citizenship and residency so that its ruling was void, even the layman would ask:

• What was there for the Court to review so that it could make a binding ruling on
citizenship and residency if the COMELEC findings on these issues were null and
void because the COMELEC in the first place had no authority to render a valid
decision?

• Does the Court have the jurisdiction or authority under our laws, on its own, to
pass upon the qualifications or eligibility of candidates before elections?

If not, what then were the citizenship and residency rulings that the Court's majority used as
basis to declare that Poe is qualified to run for the Presidency?

• Would not a COMELEC ruling on citizenship and residency be relevant only to

determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion if the COMELEC
had in the first place the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

• If indeed the COMELEC had no jurisdiction as the ponencia ruled, then

the ponencia's declaration of Grace Poe's qualification was merely an obiter dictum
or an observation with no binding effect.

Consequently, Grace Poe does not now stand as a qualified candidate but simply one
whose CoC was questioned in a proceeding whose results were set aside due to the
decision maker's lack of jurisdiction.

• If this is the case, then the ponencia and this Court have simply given the
Filipino electorate a run-around: we simply gave Grace Poe the opportunity to
run for President, without giving the electorate the assurance that we have
examined her qualifications and found them sufficient.

• If Grace Poe wins and is subsequently disqualified by the PET, would not this Court
be a direct party to the skewing of the results of the 2016 elections? Had her
disqualification been known early on, then those who voted for her could have voted
for their second preferences and the wasted votes for Poe could have made the
difference in the results of the 2016 elections.

These are only some of the questions that the ponencia's illogic raises and many more will
be raised in the discussions below. But to go back to the situation before us, what is clear to
me is that the majority used the wrong law, wrong cases and wrong considerations in
appreciating and ruling on the COMELEC's jurisdiction: it disregarded the Constitution and
the relevant laws, as well as the jurisprudence on Section 78 jurisdiction, thus leaving a
murky legal situation that would prejudice our elections before things can be sorted out.
Why the majority has to so rule given its stretched and flimsy cited bases, only the majority
can answer.

IV. THE NATURAL-BORN CITIZENSHIP ISSUE.

The citizenship controversy centers on Poe's admitted fact that she is a foundling and it is
on this point that the ponencia committed the most grievous errors. To escape the
consequences of this admission, the ponencia had to bank on presumptions, on
unfounded reading and interpretation of international law, on circumstantial
evidence that had not been admitted, and by implication from the silent terms of the
Constitution.

Specifically, the ponencia claimed that:

• Grace Poe's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable;

• Grace Poe is a Filipino citizen by presumption and based on circumstantial

evidence;

• the Filipino citizenship of foundlings can be read from the terms of the 1935
Constitution;

• Philippine laws on adoption support the view that foundlings are Filipino citizens;

• foundlings are Filipino citizens find support from international law;

• the burden of proving the citizenship of a foundling rests with the petitioners
because they were the ones challenging the CoC of Grace Poe.

These claims, in my view, are mostly overstretched interpretations of the Constitution and
the relevant laws and even involve facts that were never admitted into evidence, or were
misleading interpretation of facts. I point them out to set the record straight and to support
my position that the COMELEC, in ruling that Grace Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

IV .A. The Grace Poe Case and the Constitution.

IV.A.I. The Constitutional Provisions.

Consideration of the Constitution in the present case is unavoidable as the core issues
arose under it, specifically under the 1935 Constitution provisions on citizenship (Article IV,
Section 1, the governing law when Grace Poe was born) and the qualifications under the
1987 Constitution for the Philippine Presidency (Article VII, Section 2).
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. [emphases and underscoring
supplied]

On the other hand, Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution under which the 2016
elections will be held, requires:

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of

the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As previously adverted to, the Court has established principles in place in construing and
applying the provisions of the Constitution.38 A first principle to apply when the Constitution
is involved is its textual examination, hand in hand with the rule of giving the text of the
Constitution its ordinary meaning. Only in cases of ambiguity can the Court resort to the
deliberations of the constitutional convention, but can never "vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear."

IV.A.l(a) Disregard of the text of the Constitution.

The ponencia, due perhaps to Grace Poe's admission that she is a foundling (so that an
appeal to the constitutional text would not favor her), not surprisingly, did not focus on nor
examine at all the constitutional text; instead, it went directly to the consideration of the
constitutional deliberations. It thus bypassed and disregarded the best and most accurate
standard in considering Grace Poe's citizenship.

Under its terms and the jurisprudence that has developed, citizenship under the 1935
Constitution is determined through parentage, i.e, through the principle
of jus sanguinis.39 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution likewise distinguishes
between citizenship derived from a Filipino father and citizenship derived from a Filipino
mother.
Thus, it is necessary to determine the citizenship of a person's parents in order to determine
whether he or she is a Philippine citizen. A foundling whose parents cannot be identified
obviously does not fall under the neat listing of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and
cannot thus claim with absolute certainty that he or she is a Philippine citizen. Much less
can he or she claim the character of being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

IV .A.I (b) The Constitutional Command on Citizenship.

In considering Grace Poe's citizenship situation as a foundling running for the Philippine
Presidency, the provision that should not be forgotten is Article VII, Section 2 whose full
terms are also quoted above. The constitutional qualifications for the Philippine Presidency
are couched in the negative; that is, "No person may be elected to the office of President or
Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines... "

This negative phrasing had not been coincidental, but was deliberate, under the
interpretative view that provisions couched in the negative are mandatory and connote an
absolute command. These negative provisions are intended to operate with universal force
and permit no exceptions, and in this sense, command absolute certainty. Thus, when the
Constitution requires that a person be a natural-born Filipino citizen to be able to run for and
become president, it requires absolute certainty of citizenship.

IV .B. Presumption of Citizenship through the Misuse of Statistics

For the above reason, I cannot agree with the ponencia's use of statistics to create
a presumption of Philippine citizenship. (These statistics, incidentally, had not been
marked as evidence, nor were their sources verified.) The ponencia claims that the
statistical probability that Poe could have been born to a foreigner is 99.83%, given that the
total number of foreigners in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 was 15,986, while the total
number of Filipinos at that time was 10,558,278.

This reasoning simply contradicts the absolute command under the Constitution requiring
that our President be a natural-born Filipino. Written in the negative, the provision takes no
chances with regard to the citizenship of the Philippine President; we would not apply this
provision with fidelity if the question of the Philippine president's citizenship is not absolutely
100% certain to be Filipino.

If we were to follow the statistics cited by the ponencia, there were approximately 15,896
recorded foreigners in the Philippines at the time Poe was born. This means that there are
at least 15,896 foreigners who could have possibly fathered or given birth to Poe, a
possibility that, given the absolute command of the Constitution, cannot and should not be
glossed over in the way the ponencia apparently did.

As a last point to consider, these statistics and the arguments alleging the presumption of
Poe's citizenship that can be inferred from these data, had been introduced in evidence only
on appeal before the Court, not by the direct parties to the case, but by the Solicitor General
who had been invited to the oral arguments by the Court.
These circumstances lead me to ask: should the COMELEC now be held responsible for
not considering data and arguments that were never brought in the Section 78
proceedings before it?

IV.C. Appeal to Physical Characteristics: a Desperation Argument to support Poe's

Citizenship.

Additionally, I cannot agree with the argument that Poe's physical characteristics prove her
Filipino roots; her flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes, and oval face
can perhaps identify her to be of Southeast Asian roots, but not specifically of Filipino
parentage. The ponencia conveniently failed to mention that Poe has ivory white skin, a
characteristic mostly found from those bearing foreign ancestry but not from those whose
ancestry is lndo-Malay.

It pains me to realize, too, that we - a people of mixed race - have gone down to the level of
appearances to resolve the constitutional and legal question of who is a citizen of the
Philippines. More painful is the realization that this Court and the ponencia have also gone
down to this level and to appeals to emotions in favor of foundlings to support their legal
argument on Poe's Filipino citizenship. I have not discussed this emotional appeal at all in
this Dissent as I do not want to reduce the issues of this important case to the question of
fairness to foundlings.

IV.D. Analysis of the Terms of 1935 Citizenship Provisions

As I discussed in my original Dissenting Opinion, from among the established modes of

interpretation that this Court has long established and used, 40 not one supports the inclusion
of foundlings among the Filipino citizens listed in the 1935 Constitution. The 1935
Constitution did not expressly list foundlings among Filipino citizens. Using verba legis, the
1935 Constitution limited citizens of the Philippines to those expressly listed. In the absence
of any ambiguity, the second level of constitutional construction should not also apply.

Even if we apply ratio legis, the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention do not reveal
an intention to consider foundlings to be citizens, much less natural-born ones. As
discussed above, the Constitutional Convention rejected the inclusion of foundlings in
the Constitution. If they would now be deemed to be included, the result would be an
anomalous situation of monstrous proportions - foundlings, with unknown parents, would
have greater rights than those born under the 1935 Constitution whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and who had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.

In interpreting the Constitution from the perspective of what it expressly contains

(verba legis), only the terms of the Constitution itself require to be considered. According to
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, items not provided in a list are
presumed not to be included in it.41

In this list, Paragraphs (1) and (2) need not obviously be considered as they refer to
persons who were already born at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution.
Petitioner Poe was born only in 1968. Paragraph (5), on the other hand and except under
the terms mentioned below, does not also need to be included for being immaterial to the
facts and the issues posed in the present case.

Thus, we are left with paragraphs (3) and (4) which respectively refer to a person's father
and mother. Either or both parents of a child must be Philippine citizens at the time of the
child's birth so that the child can claim Philippine citizenship under these paragraphs.42

This is the rule of jus sanguinis or citizenship by blood, i.e., as traced from one or both
parents and as confirmed by the established rulings of this Court.43 Significantly, none of
the 1935 constitutional provisions contemplate the situation where both parents'
identities (and consequently, their citizenships) are unknown, which is the case for
foundlings.

As the list does not include foundlings, then they are not included among those
constitutionally-granted or recognized to be Philippine citizens except to the extent that they
fall under the coverage of paragraph 5, i. e., if they choose to avail of the opportunity to be
naturalized. Established rules of legal interpretation tell us that nothing is to be added to
what the text states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not covered is to be
treated as not covered.44

The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution, in particular of paragraphs (3)
and (4) parentage provisions, on the citizenship of foundlings in the Philippines, in
fact speaks loudly and directly about their legal situation. Such silence can only mean
that the 1935 Constitution did not address the situation of foundlings via paragraphs
(3) and (4), but left the matter to other provisions that may be applicable as discussed
below.

Specifically, foundlings can fully avail of Paragraph (5) of the above list, which speaks of
those who are naturalized as citizens in accordance with law. Aside from the general law on
naturalization,45 Congress can pass a law specific to foundlings or ratify other treaties
recognizing the right of foundlings to acquire Filipino citizenship. The foundling himself or
herself, of course, must choose to avail of the opportunity under the law or the treaty.

To address the position that petitioner Poe raised in this case, the fact that the 1935
Constitution did not provide for a situation where both parents are unknown (as also the
case in the current 1987 Constitution) does not mean that the provision on citizenship is
ambiguous with respect to foundlings; it simply means that the constitutional provision on
citizenship based on blood or parentage has not been made available under the
Constitution but the provision must be read in its totality so that we must look to other
applicable provision that are available, which in this case is paragraph (5) as explained
above.

In negative terms, even if Poe's suggested interpretation via the parentage provision did not
expressly apply and thus left a gap, the omission does not mean that we can take liberties
with the Constitution through stretched interpretation, and forcibly read the situation so as to
place foundlings within the terms of the Constitution's parentage provisions. We cannot and
should not do this as we would thereby cross the forbidden path of judicial legislation.
The appropriate remedy for the petit10ner and other foundlings, as already adverted to, is
via naturalization, a process that the Constitution itself already provides for. Naturalization
can be by specific law that the Congress can pass for foundlings, or on the strength of
international law via the treaties that binds the Philippines to recognize the right of
foundlings to acquire a nationality. There, too, is the possible amendment of the
Constitution so that the situation of foundlings can be directly addressed in the Constitution.

Notably, the government operating under the 1935 Constitution has recognized that
foundlings who wish to become full-fledged Philippine citizens must undergo naturalization
under Commonwealth Act No. 473. DOJ Opinion No. 377 Series of 1940, in allowing the
issuance of Philippine passports to foundlings found in the Philippines, said:

However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality of the
place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law, footnote, p. 57 citing
Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 28 l; Garcia's Quizzer on Private International Law, p.
270) which in this case, is the Philippines. Consequently, Eddy Howard may be regarded
as a citizen of the Philippines for passport purposes only if he desires to be a full-
fledged Filipino, he may apply for naturalization under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535. [emphasis,
italics, and underscoring supplied]

A subsequent DOJ Opinion, DOJ Opinion No. 189, series of 1951, stated:

However under the principles of International Law, a foundling has the nationality of the
place where he is found or born (See chapter on the Conflict of Law, footnote, p. 57 citing
Bluntschli in an article in the Revue de Trait int. for 1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 760; Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281) which in this case, is the Philippines.
Consequently, Anthony Saton Hale may be regarded as a citizen of the Philippines, and
entitled to a passport as such. [italics supplied]

The two DOJ opm10ns both state that a foundling is considered a Philippine citizen for
passport purposes. That the second DOJ Opinion does not categorically require
naturalization for a foundling to become a Philippine citizen does not mean it amended the
government's stance on the citizenship of foundlings, as these opinions were issued to
grant them a Philippine passport and facilitate their right to travel. International law is
cited as reference because they would be travelling abroad, and it is possible that other
countries they will travel to recognize that principle. But for purposes of application in the
Philippines, the domestic law on citizenship prevails, that is, Article IV, Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution. This is why DOJ Opinion No. 377, Series of 1940 clarified that if a
foundling wants to become a full-fledged Philippine citizen, then he should apply for
naturalization under CA No. 473.

In any case, DOJ Opinion No. 189, Series of 1950 cannot be interpreted in a way that would
contravene the 1935 Constitution; most certainly, it cannot amend or alter Article IV, Section
1, of the 1935 Constitution.
IV.E. Misinterpretation of the Constitutional Deliberations

Even if we were to examine the intent of the Constitutional Commission which Grace Poe
and the ponencia cite, its deliberations do not show that they agreed and intended that
foundlings should be considered Philippine citizens. At most, it shows a plurality of opinion
regarding why the proposal that foundlings be accorded Philippine citizenship, was rejected.

The account of Jose Aruego, one of the members of the 1934 Constitutional Convention,
noted that this proposal was primarily rejected because the framers thought that the issue of
the citizenship of foundlings should be governed by statutory legislation. Even the
reference made by the ponencia to Aruego cites:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include
as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a
citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect
that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed
the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion m the Constitution of the proposed amendment.46

In saying this, Aruego also recounted that many, if not most, of the majority of those who
voted against the inclusion of foundlings in the 1935 Constitution believed that the matter of
their citizenship should be governed by statutory legislation because the cases of foundlings
are too few to be included in the Constitution.

If the principles of international law on foundlings were mentioned at all in the constitutional
deliberations, they were cited merely to lend support to the primary reason that the matter
should be governed by statute and was a secondary reason to the majority's decision not to
include foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. But even the resort to
international law at that time was a shaky argument as the Philippines then was not even an
independent country capable of international dealings and bound by international rules.

Notably, too, when the 1934 Constitutional Convention voted not to include foundlings as
Philippine citizens under Article IV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, they also voted not to
give the same status to the illegitimate children of Filipina mothers to foreigners. The
proposal lumped them together and they were both refused citizenship from birth.

Yet, under the ponencia 's view, the Constitution gives foundlings Philippine citizenship from
birth, while the other category of children that had been included in the proposal were
eventually given a lesser, inchoate right to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.

The ponencia's ruling therefore does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based
on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also falsifies what the records
signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers under the 1935
Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher
categorization that the ponencia wants to accord to foundlings who do not enjoy similar
roots.

All these are brought up as they show that the ponencia, even in its direct arguments
on Grace Poe's citizenship, lacks solid legal support. At the most charitable level, it
can only be described to be inherently weak.

IV.F. Misreading of International Law.

In the same way that the ponencia misinterpreted and twisted the Constitution and its
proceedings, as well as the established constitutional jurisprudence, so did it read
international Jaw and the treaties it invoked.

The Court interprets treaties in a similar manner it interprets the Constitution - the text of the
provision in question is harmonized and interpreted with the rest of the treaty. Thus, a
treaty provision is examined in light of the entire treaty in which it is found, taking
care that all of its provisions are given effect.

Notably, the ponencia's application of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC) isolates the provision recognizing every child's right to acquire a nationality,
without considering that these treaties leave it to its signatories the means by which to
comply with its agreement. This is a slanted and selective reading that the Highest
Court in the land - the Supreme Court - should not do for reasons of ethics and self-
respect.

These treaties recognize that the obligations should be complied with within the framework
of a State's national laws. This view is reinforced by the provisions that implement these
treaties.

Article 2 of the ICCPR on this point provides:

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such
laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.

On the other hand, Article 4 of the UNCRC states:

States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such
measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the
framework of international co-operation. (emphasis and italics supplied]

These terms should be cross-referenced with Section 2, Article 7 of the UNCRC, which
provides:
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field,
in particular where the Child would otherwise be stateless. [emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied]

Read together, these ICCPR and UNCRC implementation provisions reveal the
measure of flexibility that they afford to the signatories.47 This flexibility runs from the
absolute obligation to recognize every child's right to acquire a nationality, all the
way to the allowable and varying measures that may be taken to ensure this right.
These measures may range from an immediate and outright grant of nationality, to
the passage of naturalization measures that the child may avail of to exercise his or
her rights, all in accordance with the State's national law.

Further, the right to acquire a nationality is different from the grant of an outright
Filipino nationality. Under the cited treaties, States are merely required to recognize
and facilitate the child's right to acquire a nationality.

The method through which the State complies with this obligation varies and depends on its
discretion. Of course, the automatic and outright grant of citizenship to children in danger of
being stateless is one of the means by which this treaty obligation may be complied with.
But the treaties allow other means of compliance with their obligations short of the
immediate and automatic grant of citizenship to stateless children found in their territory.

This view finds support from the history of the provision "right to acquire nationality" in the
ICCPR. During the debates that led to the formulation of this provision, the word "acquire"
was inserted in the draft, and the words "from his birth" were deleted. This change shows
the intent of its drafters to, at the very least, vest discretion on the State with respect to the
means of facilitating the acquisition of citizenship.

Marc Bussoyt, in his Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,"48 even concluded that "the word ' acquire ' would infer that
naturalization was not to be considered as a right of the individual but was accorded by the
State at its discretion."

Lastly, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) is is not a treaty that
directly creates legally-binding obligations for its signatories.49 It is an international document
recognizing inalienable human rights, which eventually led to the creation of several legally-
binding treaties, such as the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).50 Thus, the Philippines is not legally obliged to comply with
the provisions of the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it recognizes the rights and
values enumerated in the UDHR; this recognition led it to sign both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.51

To be sure, international scholars have been increasingly using the provisions of the UDHR
to argue that the rights provided in the document have reached the status of customary
international law. Assuming, however, that we were to accord the right to nationality under
the UDHR the status of a treaty obligation or of a generally-accepted principle of
international law, it still does not require the Philippine government to automatically grant
Philippine citizenship to foundlings in its territory.

Article 15 of the UDHR provides:

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.

Thus, the language of the UDHR itself recognizes the right of everyone to a
nationality, without imposing on the signatory States how they would recognize or
implement this right.

• Misplaced Use of Generally Accepted Principles of International Law.

The ponencia again appeals to the Constitution, this time to its provision on generally
accepted principles of international law and once more misuses a constitutional provision.
The constitutional provision runs:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.

Using this provision and the generally-accepted principles of international law to include a
means for determining citizenship is inherently inconsistent with sovereign aspect of the
determination of citizenship

I also find the ponencia's reference to international customary law - so it can introduce into
Philippine jurisdiction the presumption that foundlings are born of citizens of the country
where they are found - to be very disturbing. The very nature of generally-accepted
principles of international law is inconsistent with and thus inapplicable to, the State's sole
and sovereign prerogative to choose who may or may not be its citizens, and how the
choice is carried out.

Generally-accepted principles of international law are legal norms that are recognized
as customary in the international plane. States follow them on the belief that these
norms embody obligations that they, on their own, are bound to perform. Also referred
to as customary international law, generally accepted principles of international law pertain
to the collection of international behavioral regularities that nations, over time, come to view
as binding on them as a matter of law.52

Thus, generally-accepted principles of international law are considered binding on a

State because of evidence showing that it considers this legal norm to be obligatory. No
express consent from the State is needed to be bound to the obligation; its binding authority
over a State lies from the inference that most, if not all, States consider the norm to be an
obligation.

In contrast, States have the inherent right to decide who may or may not be its citizens,
including the process through which citizenship may be acquired. The application of
presumptions, or inferences of the existence of a fact based on the existence of other facts,
is part of this process of determining citizenship.

This right is strongly associated with and attendant to state sovereignty. Traditionally,
nationality has been associated with a State's "right to exclude others", and to defend the
territory of the nation from external aggression has been a predominant element of
nationality.53

In its modern concept, sovereignty is described as the confluence of independence and

territorial and personal supremacy, expressed as "the supreme and independent authority
of States over all persons in their territory.54

Indeed, a State exercises personal supremacy over its nationals wherever they may be.
The right to determine who these nationals are is a pre-requisite of a State's personal
supremacy, and therefore of sovereignty.55

It is in this context that Oppenheimer said that:

It is not for International Law, but for Municipal Law to determine who is, and who is not
considered a subject.56

Given that the State's right to determine who may be its nationals (as well as how this
determination is exercised) is inextricably linked to its sovereignty, I cannot see how it can
properly be the subject of state consensus or norm dictated by the practice of other States.

In other words, the norm pertaining to the determination of who may or may not be a
citizen of a State cannot be the subject of an implied obligation that came to
existence because other States impliedly consider it to be their obligation.

In the first place, a State cannot be obligated to adopt a means of determining who may be
its nationals as this is an unalterable and basic aspect of its sovereignty and of its
existence as a State. Otherwise stated, the imposition of an implied obligation on a State
simply because other States recognize the same obligation contradicts and impinges on a
State's sovereignty.

Note that treaty obligations that a State enters into involving the determination of its citizens
has the express consent of the State; under Philippine law, this obligation is transformed
into a municipal law once it is ratified by the Executive and concurred in by the Senate.

The evidence presented by petitioner Poe to establish the existence of generally-accepted

principles of international law actually reflects the inherent inconsistency between the
State's sovereign power to determine its nationals and the nature of generally-accepted
principles of international law as a consensus-based, implied obligation. Poe cites various
laws and international treaties that provide for the presumption of parentage for
foundlings. These cited laws and international treaties, however, have the express
imprimatur of the States adopting the presumption.

In contrast, the Philippines has not entered into any international treaty recognizing
and applying the presumption of parentage of foundlings; neither is it so provided in
the 1935 Constitution. References to international law in the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention - without an actual ratified treaty or a provision expressing this
principle - cannot be considered binding upon the sovereign Filipino people who ratified the
1935 Constitution. The ratification of the provisions of the 1935 Constitution is a sovereign
act of the Filipino people; to reiterate for emphasis, this act cannot be amended by
widespread practice of other States, even if these other States believe this practice to be an
obligation.

In this light, I am also appalled with the way the ponencia used the Philippines'
signature in the UDHR as basis to conclude that the Philippines affirms Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention, a treaty which we did not sign.

In no way can our recognition of the principles found in the UDHR serve as affirmation or
recognition of specific provisions and obligations found in the 1930 Hague Convention. I
find it too much of a stretch to consider that a non-binding recognition of a
principle under the UDHR would also obligate us to a specific treaty provisionin the 1930
Hague Convention and in the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. This is a very irresponsible conclusion that the ponencia made.

To illustrate the vast difference in the language between the two instruments, I have
juxtaposed the two provisions in table form, as follows:

Universal 1930 Hague 1961 United Nations

Declaration of Convention Convention on the Reduction
Human of Statelessness
Rights

- Article 14 Article 2

Article 15. A child whose parents A foundling found in the

are both unknown territory of a Contracting
(1) Everyone shall have the State shall, in the absence of
has the right nationality of the proof to the contrary, be
to a country of birth. considered to have been born
nationality. within that territory of parents
If the child's possessing the nationality of
parentage is that State
established, its
nationality shall be
determined by the
rules applicable in
 cases where the
parentage is Known.

A foundling is, until

the contrary is proved,
presumed to have
been born on the
territory of the State in
which it was found.

That the Philippines has recognized that everyone has a right to nationality does not
translate to a specific obligation to provide citizenship to foundlings under the Constitution.
To reiterate, our recognition of this principle under the UDHR, even if considered binding on
the Philippines, does not bind us to a specific means by which this principle shall be applied
in our legal system. The measure and means of application is still subject to, and must be in
conformity with, the fundamental law governing our country; this is a decision for our
policymakers, not for this Court, to make.

• Legal Nature of Generally-accepted principles of international law.

Generally-accepted principles of international law form part of the law of the land together
with the rulings of this Court. They are likewise established in the same manner and have
the same binding effect as jurisprudence established in the Philippine legal system.

Even if we were to recognize the right to nationality as an international custom (as arguably,
many provisions found in the UDHR are considered to have crystallized into generally
accepted principles of international law, and its inclusion in the UDHR can be considered as
evidence of its status as such), this recognition cannot be an automatic recognition of
presumptions on the parentage of foundlings (as found in the Convention against
Statelessness), or of the citizenship of foundlings (as found in the Hague Convention).

Generally accepted principles of international law are incorporated in the Philippine legal
system through the cases that the Court decides, and form part of the law of the land in the
same way we develop jurisprudence.

Note that our Constitution recognizes that generally-accepted principles of international law
are part of the law of the land. Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides on this
point that:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national

policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations.

In the same manner that treaty obligations partake of the character of domestic laws in the
domestic plane, so do generally accepted principles of international law as they "form part
of the law of the land." This constitutional declaration situates in clear and definite terms the
role of generally accepted principles of international law in the hierarchy of Philippine laws
and in the Philippine legal system.

Generally accepted principles of international law usually gain recognition in the Philippines
through decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, pursuant to the doctrine of
incorporation.57 The Supreme Court, in its decisions, applies these principles as rules or as
canons of statutory construction, or recognizes them as meritorious positions of the parties
in the cases the Court decides.58

Separately from Court decisions, international law principles may gain recognition through
actions by the executive and legislative branches of government when these branches use
them as bases for their actions (such as when Congress enacts a law that incorporates
what it perceives to be a generally accepted principle of international law).

But until the Court declares a legal norm to be a generally accepted principle of international
law, no other means exists in the Philippine legal system to determine with certainty that a
legal norm is indeed a generally accepted principle of international law that forms part of the
law of the land.

The main reason for the need for a judicial recognition lies in the nature of international
legal principles. Unlike treaty obligations that involve the express promises of States to
other States, generally accepted principles of international law do not require any
categorical expression from States for these principles to be binding on them.59

A legal norm requires the concurrence of two elements before it may be considered as a
generally accepted principle of international law: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinio juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).60Implicit in the latter
element is the belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which provides that the ICJ shall apply
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. 61 The material
sources of custom include state practices, state legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties
in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal
questions in the United Nations General Assembly.62

Sometimes referred to as evidence of international law, these sources identify the

substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the state practice
and the opinio juris requirements of international law.

In the usual course, this process passes through the courts as they render their decisions in
cases. As part of a court's function of determining the applicable law in cases before it
(including the manner a law should be read and applied), the court has to determine the
existence of a generally applied principle of international law in the cases confronting it, as
well as the question of whether and how it applies to the facts of the case.
To my mind, the process by which courts recognize the effectivity of gener l principles of
international law in the Philippines is akin or closely similar to the process by which the
Supreme Court creates jurisprudence. Under the principle of stare decisis, courts apply the
doctrines in the cases the Supreme Court decides as judicial precedents in subsequent
cases with similar factual situations.63

In a similar manner, the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the application of generally

accepted principles of international law to the cases it decides are not only binding on the
immediately resolved case, but also serve as judicial precedents in subsequent cases with
similar sets of facts. That both jurisprudence and generally accepted principles of
international law form "part of the law of the land" (but are not laws per se) is, therefore, not
pure confindence.64

As already mentioned, the executive and legislative departments may recognize and use
customary international law as basis when they perform their functions. But while such use
is not without legal weight, the continued efficacy and even the validity of their use as such
cannot be certain. While their basis may be principles of international law, their
inapplicability or even invalidity in the Philippine legal setting may still result if the applied
principles are inconsistent with the Constitution - a matter that is for the Supreme Court to
decide.

Thus viewed, the authoritative use of general principles of international law can only
come from the Supreme Court whose decisions incorporate these principles into the
legal system as part of jurisprudence.

Considering the process by which international customary law becomes incorporated in the
Philippine legal system, I do not agree with the largescale, indiscriminate recognition of
legal principles that the ponencia did in order to arrive at the desired conclusion that
foundlings are Philippine citizens.

In the first place, the right to a nationality, the presumption that the parents of the foundlings
are citizens of the country where they are found; and the presumption that foundlings are
citizens of the country where they are found until the contrary is proven, are all different
concepts that yield different conclusions when applied to the facts of actual cases.

As earlier pointed out, the recognition of the right to a nationality does not mean an
automatic recognition of Philippine citizenship of foundlings; the Philippine government,
through its legislative branch of government, can choose how to recognize this right to a
nationality.

On the other hand, the presumption that the parents of foundlings are citizeris of the place
where they are found (as found in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness) could have bestowed the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen to Poe,
save for the fact that this presumption is antithethical to the distinction made by the 1935
Constitution on citizenship derived from the mother and citizenship derived from the father.

Lastly, bestowing Philippine citizenship to foundlings with no known parents (as found in the
1930 Hague Convention) adds another category to the exclusive list of who are Philippine
citizens under the 1935 Constitution, and effectively amends Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. Lest this fundamental principle escape us, I note that international customary
law, as well as our obligations under treaties cannot contravene the Philippine Constitution;
neither can these be interpreted to modify or amend the sovereign act of the Filipino nation
in enacting the Constitution.

The ponencia, unfortunately, slavishly parroted Poe's line on generally-accepted principles,

thereby potentially making foundling citizens through jurisprudence. Even if its intent was
simply to serve the purposes of Grace Poe, its blind adherence to her self-interested claim
is dangerous for the country; this step can bring us to situations, so far unseen, that could
work to the prejudice of our national interests. Did the ponencia and the majority
recognize this implication at all when it adopted the Poe arguments?

To sum up, all the above considerations both constitutional, international and evidentiary,
cannot convince me that Grace Poe is a candidate who has met the standard of natural-
born citizenship that the Constitution requires. On the contrary, these considerations leave
me with dread on what might be the future role of our Constitution in this country if its terms
can be stretched, even to the point of breaking, by those tasked with its care.

Coming after our EDCA ruling, I characterize the future of the Constitution as a governing
and leveling instrument for all citizens, to be bleak, and bright as a tool for the ends that
those willing to manipulate it.

IV.G. Poe and the Section 78 Proceedings.

IV.G.1. Burden of Proof

A contested issue that surfaced early on in these cases is the question: who carries the
burden of proving that the petitioner is a natural-born Philippine citizen?

Lest we be distracted by the substance of this question, let me clarify at the outset that the
cases before us are petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 (in relation with Rule 65) of the
Rules of Court. In these petitions, the petitioner challenges the rulings/s made by the
respondent pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. Thus, it is the petitioner
who carries the burden of showing that the respondent, the COMELEC in this case,
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Of course, in making the challenged ruling, the COMELEC had a wider view and had to
consider the parties' respective situations at the outset. The present private respondents
were the petitioners who sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC and who thereby
procedurally carried the burden of proving the claim that Poe falsely represented her
citizenship and residency qualifications in her CoC.

I would refer to this as the procedural aspect of the burden of proof issue. The original
petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) - from the
perspective of procedure - carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC
petition, to prove that Poe made false material representations; she claimed in her CoC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen when she is not; she also claimed that she has resided
in the Philippines for ten years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, when she
had not. The original petitioners had to prove what they claimed to be false representations.

Thus viewed, the main issue in the case below was the false material representation, which
essentially rested on the premises of citizenship and residence - is Poe a natural-born
citizen as she claimed and had she observed the requisite qualifying period of residence?

The original petitioners undertook the task on the citizenship issue by alleging that Poe is a
foundling; as such, her parents are unknown, so that she is not a Philippine citizen under
the terms of the 1935 Constitution.

Poe responded by admitting that indeed she is a foundling, but claimed that the burden is
on the original petitioners to prove that she is in fact a foreigner through proof that her
parents are foreigners.

Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the
COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their position and that they
have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of
the 1935 Constitution.

With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove
that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino,
either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments
supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen.

The same process was repeated with respect to the residency issue, after which, the
COMELEC ruled that Poe committed false representations as, indeed, she is not a natural-
born Philippine citizen and had not resided in the country, both as required by the
Constitution.

These were the processes and developments at the COMELEC level, based on which the
present Court majority now say that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for
not observing the rules on the burden of proof on the citizenship and the residency issues.

Separately from the strictly procedural aspects of the cancellation of CoC proceedings, it
must be considered that the petitioner, by filing a CoC, actively represented that she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the office she is
running for.

When this representation is questioned, particularly through proof of being a foundling as in

the present case, the burden should rest on the present petitioner to prove that she is a
natural-born Philippine citizen, a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately prior to the election, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a registered voter. This is the opportunity that the COMELEC gave
Poe to the fullest, and I see no question of grave abuse of discretion on this basis.
From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its
citizens are.65 By conferring citizenship on a person, the State obligates itself to grant and
protect the person's rights. In this light and as discussed more fully below, the list of Filipino
citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusiveand exhaustive.

Thus, this Court has held that any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of
the State.66 In other words, citizenship cannot be presumed; the person who claims
Filipino citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a Filipino.67 It is only upon
proper proof that a claimant can be entitled to the rights granted by the State. 68

This was the Court's ruling in Paa v. Chan69 where this Court categorically ruled that it is
incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the
claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.

The Court further explained that the exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that
are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine
citizen. A person, otherwise disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy
the right or privilege of a Philippine citizen by representing himself to be one.70

IV.G.2. Intent to Deceive as an Element.

In the present case, the private respondents sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC based on
the false representations she allegedly made regarding her Philippine citizenship, her
natural-born status, and her period of residence. These are all material qualifications as
they are required by the Constitution itself.

To determine under Section 78 whether the representations made were false, the
COMELEC must necessarily determine the eligibility standards, the application of these
standards to Poe, and the claims she made i. e., whether she is indeed a natural-born
Philippine citizen who has resided in the Philippines for at least ten years preceding the
election, as she represented in her CoC, as well as the circumstances surrounding these
representations. In relation to Poe's defense, these circumstances relate to her claim
that she did not deliberately falsely represent her citizenship and residence, nor did she act
with intent to deceive.

The element of "deliberate intent to deceive" first appeared in Philippine jurisprudence

in Salcedo III v. Comelec71 under the following ruling:

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not
intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the
provision. [italics supplied]
Salcedo III cited Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec,72 which provided that:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead
to his or her disqualification. [italics supplied]

From Salcedo and with the exception of Tagolino v. HRET,73 the "deliberate intent to
deceive" element had been consistently included as a requirement for a Section 78
proceeding.

The Court in Tagolino v. HRET74 ruled:

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much
less one 's intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough
that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one's
CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition
essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. [emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied)

This statement in Tagolino assumes validity and merit when we consider that Romualdez-
Marcos, the case that Salcedo III used as basis, is not a Section 78 proceeding, but a
disqualification case.

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's Separate Opinion75 in Romualdez-Marcos pointed out that the
allegations in the pleadings in Romualdez-Marcos referred to Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos' disqualification, and not to an allegation for the cancellation of her CoC. This was
allowed at the time, as Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, prior to its
nullification in Fermin v. Comelec,76 had allowed the institution of disqualification cases
based on the lack of residence.

The quoted portion in Romualdez-Marcos thus pertains to the challenge to

Romualdez-Marcos' residence in a disqualification proceeding, and not in a CoC
cancellation proceeding.

The Court held that the statement in Romualdez-Marcos's CoC does not necessarily
disqualify her because it did not reflect the necessary residence period, as the actual period
of residence shows her compliance with the legal requirements. The statement "[t]he said
statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible" should thus be understood in the context of a disqualification proceeding
looking at the fact of a candidate's residence, and not at a CoC cancellation
proceeding determining whether a candidate falsely represented her eligibility.

Arguably, the element of "deliberate intent to deceive," has been entrenched in our
jurisprudence since it was first mentioned in Salcedo III. Given the history of this
requirement, and the lack of clear reference of "deliberate intent to deceive" in Section
78, this deliberate intention could be anchored from the textual requirement in
Section 78 that the representation made must have been false, such that the
representation was made with the knowledge that it had not been true.

Viewed from this perspective, the element of "deliberate intent to deceive" should be
considered complied with upon proof of the candidate's knowledge that the
representation he or she made in the CoC was false .

Note, at this point, that the CoC must contain the candidate's representation, under oath,
that he or she is eligible for the office aspired for, i. e., that he or she possesses the
necessary eligibilities at the time he or she filed the CoC. This statement must have also
been considered to be true by the candidate to the best of his or her knowledge.

Section 74 of the OEC, which lists the information required to be provided in a CoC, states:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he
is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including
its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent;
the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge. [italics and underscoring supplied]

More specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9984 reqmres the following to be contained in
the 2015 CoC:

Section 4. Contents and Form of Certificate of Candidacy. - The coc shall be under oath
and shall state:

a. office aspired for;

xx xx

g. citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized;

xx xx
 k. legal residence, giving the exact address and the number of years residing in the
Philippines x x x;

xxxx

n. that the aspirant is eligible for said office;

xx xx

t. that the facts stated in the certificate are true and correct to the best of the aspirant
's knowledge;

xxxx

The COC shall be sworn to before a Notary Public or any official authorized to administer
oath. COMELEC employees are not authorized to administer oath, even in their capacities
as notary public. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The oath, the representation of eligibility, and the representation that the statements in the
CoC are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge all operate as guarantees from the
candidate that he or she has knowingly provided information regarding his or her
eligibility. The information he or she provided in the CoC should accordingly be considered
a deliberate representation on his or her part, and any falsehood regarding such
eligibility would thus be considered deliberate.

In other words, once the status of a candidate's ineligibility has been determined, I do not
find it necessary to establish a candidate's deliberate intent to deceive the electorate, as he
or she had already vouched for its veracity and is found to have committed
falsehood. The representations he or she has made in his or her CoC regarding the truth
about his or her eligibility comply with the requirement that he or she deliberately and
knowingly falsely represented such information.

IV.G.2(a) Poe had the "Intent to Deceive"

But even if we were to consider deliberate intent to deceive as a separate element that
needs to be established in a Section 78 proceeding, I find that the COMELEC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in concluding that Poe deliberately falsely represented
her residence and citizenship qualifications.

The COMELEC, in concluding that Poe had known of her ineligibilities to run for President,
noted that she is a highly-educated woman with a competent legal team at the time she
filled up her 2012 and 2015 CoCs. As a highly educated woman, she had the necessary
capability to read and understand the plain meaning of the law. I add that she is now
after the highest post in the land where the understanding of the plain meaning of the law is
extremely basic.

The COMELEC thus found it unconvincing that Poe would not have known how to fill up a
pro-forma CoC, much less commit an "honest mistake" in filling it up. (Interestingly, Poe
never introduced any evidence explaining her "mistake" on the residency issue, thus
rendering it highly suspect.)

A plain reading of Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution could have
sufficiently appraised Poe of her citizenship status. Article IV, Section 1 does not
provide for the situation where the identities of both an individual's parents from whom
citizenship may be traced are unknown. The ordinary meaning of this non-inclusion
necessarily means that she cannot be a Philippine citizen under the 1935 Constitution's
terms.

The COMELEC also found that Poe's Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before the BID deliberately misrepresented her status as a former natural-
born Philippine citizen, as it lists her adoptive parents to be her parents without
qualifications. The COMELEC also noted that Poe had been falsely representing her
status as a Philippine citizen in various public documents. All these involved a
succession of falsities.

With respect to the required period of residency, Poe deliberately falsely represented that
she had been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years prior to the May 9, 2016
elections. Poe's CoC when she ran for the Senate in the May 2013 national elections,
however, shows that she then admitted that she had been residing in the Philippines
for only six years and six months. Had she continued counting the period of her
residence based on the information she provided in her 2012 CoC, she would have been
three months short of the required Philippine residence of ten years. Instead of adopting
the same representation, her 2015 CoC shows that she has been residing in the
Philippines from May 24, 2005, and has thus been residing in the Philippines for more
than ten years.

To the COMELEC, Poe 's subsequent change in counting the period of her residence, along
with the circumstances behind this change, strongly indicates her intent to mislead the
electorate regarding her eligibility.

First, at the time Poe executed her 2012 CoC, she was already a high-ranking
public official who could not feign ignorance regarding the requirement of
establishing legal domicile. She also presumably had a team of legal advisers at the
time she executed this CoC as she was then the Chair of the Movies and Television
Review and Clarificatory Board (MTRCB). She also had experience in dealing with
the qualifications for the presidency, considering that she is the adoptive daughter of
a former presidential candidate (who himself had to go to the Supreme Court
because of his own qualifications).

Second, Poe's 2012 CoC had been taken under oath and can thus be considered
an admission against interest that cannot easily be brushed off or be set aside
through the simplistic claim of "honest mistake."

Third, the evidence Poe submitted to prove that she established her residence (or
domicile) in the Philippines as she now claims; mostly refer to events prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, contrary to the established jurisprudence
 requiring Philippine citizenship in establishing legal domicile in the Philippines for
election purposes.

Fourth, that Poe allegedly had no life-changing event on November 2006 (the
starting point for counting her residence in her 2012 CoC) does not prove that she
did not establish legal domicile in the Philippines at that time.

Lastly, Poe announced the change in the starting point of her residency period when
she was already publicly known to be considering a run for the presidency; thus, it
appears likely that the change was made to comply with the residence period
requirement/or the presidency.

These COMELEC considerations, to my mind, do not indicate grave abuse of

discretion. I note particularly that Poe's false representation regarding her Philippine
citizenship did not merely involve a single and isolated statement, but a series of acts -
a series of falsities - that started from her RA No. 9225 application, as can be seen from
the presented public documents recognizing her citizenship.

I note that Poe's original certificate of live birth (foundling certificate) does not indicate her
Philippine citizenship, as she had no known parents from whom her citizenship could be
traced. Despite this, she had been issued various government documents, such as a
Voter's Identification Card and Philippine passport recognizing her Philippine
citizenship. The issuance of these subsequent documents alone should be grounds
for heightened suspicions, given that Poe's original birth certificate provided no
information regarding her Philippine citizenship, and could not have been used as
reference for this citizenship.

Another basis for heightened suspicion is the timing in fact of Poe's amended birth
certificate, which was issued on May 4, 2006 (applied for in November 2005), shortly before
she applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship with the BID. This amended certificate,
where reference to being an adoptee has all been erased as allowed by law, was not used
in Poe's RA No. 9225 BID application.

The timing of the application for this amended birth certificate strongly suggest that it was
used purposely as a reserve document in case questions are raised about Poe's birth; they
became unnecessary and were not used when the BID accepted Poe's statement under
oath that she was a former natural-born citizen of the Philippine as required by RA No.
9225.

That government documents that touched on Poe's birth origins had been tainted with
irregularities and were issued before Poe ran for elective office strongly indicate that at the
time she executed her CoC, she knew that her claimed Philippine citizenship was
already tainted with discrepancies, and that she is not a Philippine citizen under
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution.

IV.G.3. Intent to Deceive in the Residency Issue.

On the residency issue, I find it worthy to add that the information in her 2012 CoC (for the
Senate) complies with the requirement that a person must first be a Philippine citizen to
establish legal domicile in the Philippines. Based on Poe's 2012 COC, her legal domicile in
the Philippines began in November 2006, shortly after the BID issued the Order granting her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on July 18, 2006.

That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling in Japzon v. Comelec,77 a 2009 case requiring
Philippine citizenship prior to establishing legal domicile in the Philippines, indicates Poe's
knowledge of this requirement.

It also indicates her present deliberate intent to deceive the electorate by changing the
starting point of her claimed residency in the Philippines to May 24, 2005 in order only to
qualify under the Constitution's 10-year residency requirement. This, she did despite being
in the Philippines at that time as an alien under a balikbayanvisa.

Under these facts and reasons, could the COMELEC have acted with grave abuse of
discretion? Obviously, if reason would be the norm, it did not.

IV.H. The misreading of the Constitution in Bengzon v. HRET.

The Court in Bengzon held (albeit in a ruling that found no grave abuse of discretion in the
ruling of the HRET78 ) that the repatriation of a former natural-born Filipino who lost his
Philippine citizenship through naturalization as a citizen of another country includes the
reinstatement of his natural-born status.

According to Bengzon, the former natural-born Filipino was repatriated and

was not naturalized into Philippine citizenship. Since there are only two kinds of Philippine
citizens under the 1987 Constitution, i.e., natural-born and naturalized citizens, and
Bengzon's repatriation did not amount to naturalization, then necessarily, he must be a
natural-born citizen. This was clearly a process of reasoning by elimination, an approach
that requires a clear-cut and proper definition of the proffered choices in order to be valid.

Even if Bengzon were a correct ruling, it cannot be applied outright to the case of Grace
Poe in the absence of a prior finding that she is a natural-born Filipino. I believe though that
Bengzon is an incorrect ruling that should now be abandoned in light of the definition of
"natural-born citizen" under the 1987 Constitution and should not be applied at all to the
case of Poe. The Court majority, too, misappreciated the nature and characterization of
repatriation and naturalization viewed from the prism of the Constitution. This view,
by the way, is the material and important view to consider in looking at a constitutional
matter such as citizenship.

Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution defines natural-born Philippine citizens "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."

Two views have been expressed in interpreting the phrase "from birth" used by the
Constitution in defining "natural-born citizens."
The first is that found in Bengzon and in other cases with similar rulings: that "[a] person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof." Even if the natural-born citizen subsequently loses Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country, as long as he or she renounces such foreign citizenship,
he or she will regain such natural-born citizen status.

The second interpretation is that espoused by the minority opinion in Bengzon: that once a
Philippine citizen is naturalized as citizen in a foreign country, he or she loses his or her
natural-born citizen status and may not recover it even under repatriation. Those espousing
this view capitalize on the words "from birth" that the natural-born definition contains.

The word "from" is used as a function word to indicate a starting point: as (l) a point or place
where an actual physical movement has its beginning; (2) something that is taken as a
starting point in measuring or reckoning or in a statement of limits; (3) a starting or focal
point of any activity or movement; a source, cause, means, or ultimate agent of an action or
condition; a ground, reason, or basis.79

In contrast, the word "at" is used as a function word to indicate presence in, on, or near: as
presence or occurrence in a particular place; location, feeling, quality, condition; used as a
function word to indicate age or position m time.80

Thus, "from" implies continuity, i.e., a continuous and uninterrupted period, activity,
movement, etc. that starts or begins from a particular point, time, or place and continues
thereafter; whereas "at" implies a single, specific, or particular point or place, or a specific
event occurring at a particular fixed point or place.

I believe that the second view espouses the true intent of the Constitution. The use of the
word "from" indicates the Constitutional intent to treat "natural-born citizen status" as
a continuing uninterrupted event that begins from birth and continues until the
citizen dies, and implies a continuing relationship between the sovereign State and
its people. This conclusion is truer still when the Constitution's definition of natural-born
citizen is considered with the other provisions which require natural-born citizen status as
qualification for holding key government elective and appointive positions.

The first view treats "natural-born citizen status" as fixed and inchoate, determined solely
from the fact of having been born a Philippine citizen without having performed any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.

In effect, the first view believes that a person's natural-born status is a fixed and unalterable
status. The natural-born citizen status is determined as of the moment of birth, independent
of subsequent events that may have caused the loss of that citizenship in the interim; as
long as natural-born citizen status is fixed at birth, it can never be lost.

This interpretation, however, is fraught with danger, for it would practically allow "natural-
born strangers" to be elected into public office, subject to residency requirements. It must
be noted that "natural-born citizen" status means more than a mere blood relation acquired
from birth; rather, it is a privilege which entitles a citizen to favorable Constitutional
provisions. Concomitantly, it also entails a jealous allegiance to this country for these
privileges to be enjoyed.

The phrase "without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship" should be interpreted likewise as continuing and uninterrupted from birth. The
"without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect" is the characteristic or unique
condition that defines and distinguishes natural-born from naturalized citizen status.

Under this interpretation, the absence of any acquiring or perfecting act must not only be
present at birth, but must continue in order for the Philippine citizen to be a natural-born
citizen. A Philippine citizen who, after having lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country, subsequently reacquires such citizenship through any of the means allowed
under the law is not and is no longer a Philippine citizen who acquired such citizenship
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect it.

From the constitutional perspective, repatriation is a form of naturalization provided by

law, in the same way that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship expedites the
naturalization of foreigners who used to be natural-born Philippine citizens.

Naturalization involves the grant of citizenship to a foreigner, upon his or her compliance
with the requirements for acquiring citizenship.

In the Philippines, the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreigner is governed by CA

63,81 which speaks of three modes that are essentially based on the grounds for the loss of
citizenship:

(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the

disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred
and twenty-seven,

(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a
woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the
marital status; and

(3) By direct act of the National Assembly. [emphases supplied]

Republic Act No. 263082 (RA 2630) subsequently added another category of reacquisition of
lost Filipino citizenship, as follows:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship. [emphases supplied]
Contrary to the Court's conclusion in Bengzon, repatriation is a form of expedited
naturalization provided by CA 63 and RA No. 2630 for former Philippine citizens who
lost their citizenship under particular circumstances. Through these laws, Philippine
citizens who deserted the Philippine armed forces; those who served in the U.S. armed
forces and were subsequently naturalized as U.S. citizens; and women who lost their
citizenship though marriage to a foreigner and who thereby lost their Philippine
citizenship, may reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon the execution of an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines.

Note that CA 63 itself recognizes these people as foreigners, because Section 1 of CA

63 divests them of Philippine citizenship. Section 1 provides:

Section 1. How citizenship may be Lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any
of the following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a
Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with the said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during
the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he
shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political
rights as a Filipino citizen;

xxx

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine

armed forcesin time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted; and

(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. [emphases and italics supplied]
Even RA No. 2630 recognizes that those who avail of its repatriation process are NOT
Philippine citizens, viz:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship. (Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in the eyes of Philippine law, these people lost their Philippine citizenship because of
the overt acts they performed, and, hence, are no longer Philippine citizens. The execution
of an oath of allegiance is the procedure through which they can regain their Philippine
citizenship. That they did not have to go through the tedious process of naturalization
provided under CA 63 is immaterial in determining their status as naturalized Filipinos.

Under these legal realities, the RA No. 2630 process (like the RA No. 9225 process) is
simply a citizenship-acquisition mode that addresses a specific class of foreigners and
non-Filipinos who are required to show their links to the Filipino nation before they may
acquire Philippine citizenship. Presumably, former Philippine citizens who wish to become
Philippine citizens once again already possess these ties, and thus had been provided with
a more expeditious process of citizenship acquisition. In the same manner, a foreigner who
acquires Philippine citizenship through a direct act of Congress would have presumably
been examined by Congress for ties to the Filipino nation.

From this perspective, repatnat10n and citizenship by direct act of Congress are
naturalization processes that differ only from the naturalization of complete foreigners
through the intricacy of the process involved. The first, repatriation, applies to foreigners
who had been former Philippine citizens, and merely require them to execute an oath of
allegiance to the Republic. The second, on the other hand, applies to foreigners who have
secured a legislative grant of citizenship.

These two categories must fall under "naturalization as provided by law" provision of the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions as they cannot fall under any other category in the
Constitution’s listing of who are citizens of the Philippines.

Based on these considerations, the Court's misplaced treatment of repatriation

in Bengzon amounts to an interpretation contrary to the clear words and intent of the
Constitution, as it allows naturalized Philippine citizens to enjoy privileges reserved solely
for natural-born Philippine citizens.

Blindly applying Bengzon to the present case would amount to violating or condoning the
violation of the constitutional provision limiting specified public offices to natural-born
Philippine citizens. We would thereby allow Filipinos who have voluntarily relinquished their
Philippine citizenship for political privileges in another country, to hold positions limited to
natural-born Philippine citizens, despite the reality that undergoing a naturalization process
to reacquire Philippine citizenship contravenes the maintenance portion required to be
considered natural-born as this term is explicitly defined by the Constitution.

The possibility of committing and perpetuating an unconstitutionality, to my mind, is

the strongest and most compelling reason not to follow Bengzon as precedent in the
present case.

V. THE RESIDENCY ISSUE

V.A. The Ponencia's Essential Problems on Residency.

With seeming sincerity and candor, the ponencia holds that "Petitioner's claim that she will
have been a resident for ten (10 years and eleven (11) months on the day before the
2016, is true." To make this claim, Grace Poe computed her "residence" in the Philippines
from May 24, 2005. To support this claim, the ponencia cites "voluminous" evidence
showing that "she and her family abandoned U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines
for good."

I essentially find the ponencia's statement objectionable - hence, the description

"with seeming sincerity and candor" - as the ponencia thereby sought to slide past the
mandated mode of review by the statement that Grace Poe's claim "is true."

V.A.1. Significance of Certiorari as Mode of Review

As heretofore discussed. the constitutionally-imposed mode of review is via a petition

for certiorari, not via an appeal, because the COMELEC is an independent commission and
the Constitution accords its findings, particularly of facts, the highest respect. Unless
therefore grave abuse of discretion can be shown, this Court should uphold the
COMELEC's findings of facts. Poe sought to slide past this mode of review in two ways.

First is via its position that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction to entertain the CoC
cancellation as it pertains to eligibility and no prior findings have been made or shown. This
matter has been discussed in the consideration of COMELEC jurisdiction.

The second way is via the argument the ponencia poses - that Poe's voluminous residency
evidence is undisputed but COMELEC refused to consider that her domicile had been
changed as of May 24, 2005. The ponencia apparently intended to claim grave abuse of
discretion based on the arbitrariness in the COMELEC's refusal.

• COMELEC's Refusal to Consider Poe's Evidence.

In arguing that the COMELEC failed to consider Poe's, the ponencia missed a critical legal
point - that the evidence do not stand by themselves to be nakedly interpreted by the
decision maker. The evidence are appreciated on the basis of the applicable law, hence it
was rash for the ponencia to claim that Poe had been "domiciled" in the Philippines since 24
May 2005 since "domicile" is a legal term that connotes a physical evidence characterized
by the applicable law.
The physical evidence that perhaps had not been disputed is that Poe had "physically
stayed" in the Philippines since May 24, 2005; whether this stay amounted to "domicile" in
the Philippines is another matter as by law and jurisprudence, certain requisites have to be
fulfilled before domicile can be changed or established in a new place. But the failure to
characterize the undisputed stay as "domicile" can in no way be considered grave abuse of
discretion.

• Domicile and How it is Changed.

Two essential questions have to be answered in these regards. The first is what is
residence or domicile and how is it changed. The second question, related to the first, is
when does a foreigner (i.e., a non-citizen of the Philippines) start to be characterized as a
resident for purposes of the exercise of the political rights he or she wishes to exercise,
such as the right to vote and to be voted for.

To recall, Poe became a naturalized citizen of the United States (U.S.) in 2001, ten (10)
years after she married her American husband. When Poe became a naturalized Philippine
citizen, she had abandoned her residence in the Philippines and established a new domicile
in the U.S.

Thus, as Poe stood when she returned to the Philippines in 2005, she was a foreigner
domiciled in the U.S. and who was aspiring to return to Philippine citizenship; she was also
a foreigner who was temporarily in the Philippines but who wanted to stay permanently as a
citizen. These two objectives related to two separate acts and involve two separate
concepts that at some point are related with one another.

In terms of change of domicile, Poe would have to re-establish her domicile in the
Philippines, and this raises the second question: when is stay in the Philippines considered
to be the required residence that satisfies the 10-year residency requirement?

The decided cases on these points - Coquilla v. COMELEC;83 Japzon v. COMELEC;84 and
Caballero v. COMELEC85 - are one in counting the period of legal residence in the
Philippines from the time the candidate reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Poe resists these rulings and insists that she established her legal residence in the
Philippines beginning May 24, 2005, i.e., even before the BID Order, declaring her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, was issued on July 18, 2006.

The ponencia itself distinguished her situation from Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero, on the
position that the candidates in these cases did not prove their legal residence in the
Philippines before acquiring their Philippine citizenship.

In contrast, Poe claims to have sufficiently proven that she established her domicile in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005, or ten years and eleven months prior to the May 9,
2016 elections. That the COMELEC ignored the evidence she presented on this point
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The evidence that Poe submitted, in
the ponencia's own words, included:
" ... petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on May 24 2005 and her return to
the Philippines everytime she travelled abroad; email correspondences starting in March
2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their
household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; email with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records
of her children showing enrolment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for
succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their declarations issued in April
2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging
donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address final settlement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-
up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to
the return of petitioner on May 24, 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until
the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that
the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind
in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home)."

To my mind, the conclusion in Japzon and Caballero is not just based on the evidence that
the candidates therein presented. The conclusion that candidates who reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 may only establish residence in the Philippines after
becoming Philippine citizens reflects the character of the right to establish a new
domicile for purposes of participating in electoral exercises as a political right that
only Philippine citizens can exercise.

Following this line of thought, Poe could only begin establishing her domicile in the
Philippines on July 18, 2006, the date the BID granted her petition for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

Furthermore, an exhaustive review of the evidence Poe presented to support her view
shows that as of May 24, 2005, Poe had not complied with the requirements for
establishing a new domicile of choice. This is discussed as a separate topic below.

• Domicile for purposes of the exercise of rights.

The term "residence" is an elastic concept that should be understood and construed
according to the object or purpose of the statute in which it is employed. We have case law
distinguishing residence to mean actual residence, in contrast with domicile, which pertains
to a permanent abode. Note, however, that both terms imply a relation between a person
and a place.86 determining which connotation applies depends on the statute in which it is
found.

Generally, we have used the term "residence" to mean actual residence when pertaining to
the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations.
Residence, in this sense pertains to a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, or
as the Civil Code aptly describes it, a place of habitual residence. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them or any other provision does not fix the
domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a)
[emphases supplied]

Actual residence for purposes of civil rights and obligations may be further delineated into
residence in the Philippines, or residence in a municipality in the Philippines, depending on
the purpose of the law in which they are employed.87

On the other hand, we generally reserve the use of the term residence as domicile for
purposes of exercising political rights. Jurisprudence has long established that the term
"residence" in election laws is synonymous with domicile. When the Constitution or the
election laws speak of residence, it refers to the legal or juridical relation between a
person and a place - the individual's permanent home irrespective of physical
presence.

To be sure, physical presence is a major indicator when determining the person's legal or
juridical relation with the place he or she intends to vote or be voted for. But, as residence
and domicile are synonymous under our election laws, residence is a legal concept that has
to be determined by and in connection with our laws, independent of or in conjunction with
physical presence.

Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile
of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person
independently of his residence or intention.

Domicile of origin is the domicile of a person's parents at the time of his or her birth. It is not
easily lost and continues until, upon reaching the majority age, he or she abandons it and
acquires a new domicile, which new domicile is the domicile of choice.

The concept of domicile is further distinguished between residence in a particular

municipality, city, province, or the Philippines, depending on the political right to be
exercised. Philippine citizens must be residents of the Philippines to be eligible to vote, but
to be able to vote for elective officials of particular local government units, he must be a
resident of the geographical coverage of the particular local government unit.

To effect a change of domicile, a person must comply with the following requirements: (1)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with such purpose.
In other words, a change of residence requires animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.88

Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the appreciation of

compliance because of the element of intent89 - an abstract and subjective proposition that
can only be determined from the surrounding circumstances. It must be appreciated, too,
that aside from intent is the question of the actions taken pursuant to the intent, to be
considered in the light of the applicable laws, rules, and regulations.

Jurisprudence, too, has laid out three basic foundational rules in the consideration of
residency issues, namely:

First, a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

Second, when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and

Third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.90

These jurisprudential foundational rules, hand in hand with the established rules on change
of domicile, should be fully taken into account in appreciating Poe's circumstances.

• The right to establish domicile is imbued with the character of a political right that
only citizens may exercise.

Domicile is necessary to be able to participate in governance; to vote and/or be voted for,

one must consider a locality in the Philippines as his or her permanent home, a place in
which he intends to remain in for an indefinite period of time (animus manendi) and to return
to should he leave (animus revertendi).

In this sense, the establishment of a domicile not only assumes the color of, but becomes
one with a political right, because it allows a person, not otherwise able, to participate in the
electoral process of that place. To logically carry this line of thought a step further, a person
seeking to establish domicile in a country must first posses the necessary citizenship to
exercise this political right. Philippine citizenship is necessary to participate in governance
and exercise political rights in the Philippines. The preamble of our 1987 Constitution
cannot be clearer on this point:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule
of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution. [emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied]

It is the sovereign Filipino people (i.e., the citizens through whom the State exercises
sovereignty, and who can vote and participate in governance) who shall establish the
Government of the country (i.e. one of the purposes why citizens get together and
collectively act), and they themselves ordain and promulgate the Constitution (i.e., the
citizens themselves directly act, not anybody else).

Corollarily, a person who does not possess Philippine citizenship, i.e., an alien, cannot
participate in the country's political processes. An alien does not have the right to vote and
be voted for, the right to donate to campaign funds, the right to campaign for or aid any
candidate or political party, and to directly, or indirectly, take part in or influence in any
manner any election.

The character of the right to establish domicile as a political right becomes even more
evident under our election laws that require that a person's domicile and citizenship
coincide to enable him to vote and be voted for elective office. In more concrete terms
(subject only to a few specific exceptions), a Philippine citizen must have his domicile m the
Philippines in order to participate in our electoral processes.

Thus, a Philippine citizen who has chosen to reside permanently abroad may be allowed
the limited opportunity to vote (under the conditions laid down under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act)91 but he or she cannot be voted for; he or she is disqualified from
running for elective office under Section 68 of the OEC.92

In the same light, an alien who has been granted a permanent resident visa in the
Philippines does not have the right of suffrage in the Philippines, and this should include
the right to establish legal domicile for purposes of election laws. An alien can reside
in the Philippines for a long time, but his stay, no matter how lengthy, will not allow him to
participate in our political processes.

Thus, an inextricable link exists among citizenship, domicile, and sovereignty;

citizenship and domicile must coincide in order to participate as a component of the
sovereign Filipino people.

In plainer terms, domicile for election law purposes cannot be established without first
becoming a Philippine citizen; these elements must coincide and exist together for the
exercise of participating in governance.

• The right to RE-ESTABLISH domicile in the Philippines may be exercised

only after reacquiring Philippine citizenship.

• Unless a change of domicile is validly effected, one with reacquired Filipino

citizenship acquires the right to reside in the country, but must have a change
of domicile; otherwise, he is a Filipino physically in the Philippines but is
domiciled elsewhere.

Once a Philippine citizen permanently resides in another country, or becomes a naturalized

citizen thereof, he loses his domicile of birth (the Philippines) and establishes a new
domicile of choice in that country. This was what happened to Poe.
If a former Filipino reacquires his or her Philippine citizenship, he reacquires as well the civil
and political right to reside in the Philippines, but he does not become a Philippine
domiciliary unless he validly effects a change of domicile; otherwise, he remains a
Filipino physically in the Philippines but is domiciled elsewhere. The reason is simple:
an individual can have only one domicile which remains until it is validly changed.

In Coquilla,93 the Court pointed out that " immigration to the [U.S.] by virtue of a green card,
which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines."

Thus, Philippine citizens who are naturalized as citizens of another country not only
abandon their Philippine citizenship; they also abandon their domicile in the Philippines.
Again, this was what happened to Poe.

To re-establish the Philippines as his or her new domicile of choice, a returning former
Philippine citizen must thus comply with the requirements of physical presence for the
required period (when exercising his political
right), animus manendi, and animus non-revertendi. These are the requirements that
Poe was required to comply with.

Several laws govern the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Philippine citizens-
aliens each providing for a different mode of, and different requirements for, Philippine
citizenship reacquisition. These laws are Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473; RA No. 8171;
and RA No. 9225.

All these laws are meant to facilitate an alien's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by law.

• CA No. 47394 as amended,95 governs reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by

naturalization; it is also a mode for original acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

• RA No. 8171,96 on the other hand, governs repatriation of Filipino women who lost
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and Filipinos who lost Philippine
citizenship by political or economic necessity; while

• RA No. 922597 governs repatriation of former natural-born Filipinos in general.

Whether termed as naturalization, reacquisition, or repatriation, all these modes fall under
the constitutional term "naturalized in accordance with law" as provided under the 1935, the
1973, and the 1935 Constitutions.

Notably, CA No. 473 provides a more stringent procedure for acquiring Philippine
citizenship than RA Nos. 9225 and 8171 both of which provide for a more expedited
process. Note, too, that under our Constitution, there are only two kinds of Philippine
citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

As RA Nos. 8171 and 9225 apply only to former natural-born Filipinos (who lost their
Philippine citizenship by foreign naturalization), CA No. 473 - which is both a mode for
acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship - logically applies in general to all
former Filipinos regardless of the character of their Philippine citizenship, i.e., natural-born
or naturalized.

The difference in the procedure provided by these modes of Philippine citizenship

reacquisition presumably lies in the assumption that those who had previously been natural-
born Philippine citizens already have had ties with the Philippines for having been directly
descended from Filipino citizens or by virtue of their blood and are well-versed in its
customs and traditions; on the other hand, the alien-former Filipino in general (and no
matter how long they have resided in the Philippines) could not be presumed to have such
ties.

In fact, CA No. 473 specifically requires that an applicant for Philippine citizenship must
have resided in the Philippines for at least six months before his application for reacquisition
by naturalization.

Ujano v. Republic98 interpreted this residence requirement to mean domicile, that is, prior
to applying for naturalization, the applicant must have maintained a permanent residence in
the Philippines. In this sense, Ujanoheld that an alien staying in the Philippines under a
temporary visa does not comply with the residence requirement; to become a qualified
applicant, an alien must have secured a permanent resident visa to stay in the Philippines.
Obtaining a permanent resident visa was, thus, viewed as the act that establishes domicile
in the Philippines for purposes of complying with CA No. 473.

The ruling in Ujano is presumably the reason for the Court's statement that residence may
be waived separately from citizenship in Coquilla. In Coquilla, the Court observed that:

The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived ith r separately, when one
acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same
time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an
immigrant visa under 13[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other
hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as
amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an
alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.99 [underscoring supplied]

The separate waiver refers to the application for Philippine citizenship under CA No. 437,
which requires that the applicant alien be domiciled in the Philippines as evidenced by a
permanent resident visa. An alien intending to become a Philippine citizen may avail of CA
No. 473 and must first waive his domicile in his country of origin to be considered a
permanent resident alien in the Philippines, or he may establish domicile in the Philippines
after becoming a Philippine citizen through direct act of Congress.

Note that the permanent residence requirement under CA No. 473 does not provide
the applicant alien with the right to participate in the country's political process, and
should thus be distinguished from domicile in election laws.
In other words, an alien may be considered a permanent resident of the Philippines, but
without Philippine citizenship, his stay cannot be considered in establishing domicile in the
Philippines for purposes of exercising political rights. Neither could this period be
retroactively counted upon gaining Philippine citizenship, as his stay in the Philippines at
that time was as an alien with no political rights.

In these lights, I do not believe that a person reacquiring Philippine citizenship under
RA No. 9225 could separately establish domicile in the Philippines prior to becoming
a Philippine citizen, as the right to establish domicile has, as earlier pointed out, the
character of a political right.

RA No. 9225 restores Philippine citizenship upon the applicant's submission of the oath of
allegiance to the Philippines and other pertinent documents to the BID (or the Philippine
consul should the applicant avail of RA No. 9225 while they remain in their country of
foreign naturalization). The BID (or the Philippine consul) then reviews these documents,
and issues the corresponding order recognizing the applicant's reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

Upon reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, a person becomes entitled
to full political and civil rights, subject to its attendant liabilities and responsibilities. These
rights include the right to reestablish domicile in the Philippines for purposes of participating
in the country's electoral processes.

Thus, a person who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does
not automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, but is given the option to
establish domicile in the Philippines to participate in the country's electoral process.

This, to my mind, is the underlying reason behind the Court's consistent ruling
in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero that domicile in the Philippines can be considered
established only upon, or after, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
expedited processes of RA No. 8171 or RA No. 9225. For foreigners becoming Filipino
citizens, domicile is a matter of choice, but the choice can be made only by one who has
acquired the right to choose. In other words, only one who has attained Filipino citizenship
can establish his domicile as an exercise of a political right.

To recapitulate, the Court in these three cases held that the candidates therein could have
established their domicile in the Philippines only after reacquiring their Philippine
citizenship.

Thus, the Court in Coquilla said:

In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine
citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this
country.100 [underscoring supplied]

In Japzon, the Court noted:

"[Ty's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under [RA] No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and
he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his
new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the
time he made it his domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 101

Caballero, after quoting Japzon, held:

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as
such.102

In these lights, the COMELEC correctly applied the doctrine laid out in Coquilla,
Japzon, and Caballero in Poe's case, i.e., that her physical presence allegedly
coupled with intent should be counted, for election purposes, only from her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or surrender of her immigrant status. Any
period of residence prior to such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or surrender
of immigrant status cannot simply be counted for Poe as she was at that time an
alien nonresident who had no right to permanently reside anywhere in the
Philippines.

V .A.2. Compliance with the requirements for change of residence

The COMELEC, in its evaluation of the pieces of evidence presented before it, presumably
assessed all these and gave each evidence its own weight and credibility, and reached the
conclusion that Poe had not complied with the required residence period. And this is where
the mode of review, adverted to above, becomes critical, as the question before us is not
whether the COMELEC committed legal errors in its conclusion, but whether its conclusion
had been reached with grave abuse of discretion.

On certiorari, the ponencia concluded from these submitted evidence presented in Poe 's
petition to the Court to be sufficient to show that she had establish her residence in the
Philippines for more than ten years.

Was it grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC to conclude that Poe had not
yet complied with the ten-year residence period at the time she filed her CoC?

I found then, as I still do now, that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
concluding that Poe has not yet complied with the ten-year residence requirement and
materially misrepresented her compliance in her CoC.

The evidence Poe submitted in establishing her residence may have shown
her animus manendi - or intent to remain in the Philippines - but does not establish
her animus non-revertendi, or intent not to return in her current domicile, i. e., the U.S.
As discussed above, a person must show that he or she has animus non-revertendi, or
intent to abandon his or her old domicile. This requirement reflects two key characteristics
of a domicile: first, that a person can have only one residence at any time, and second,
that a person is considered to have an animus revertendi (intent to return) to his current
domicile.

Thus, for a person to demonstrate his or her animus non-revertendi to the old domicile, he
or she must have abandoned it completely, such that he or she can no longer entertain any
animus revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This complete abandonment is
necessary in light of the one domicile rule.

In more concrete terms, a person seeking to demonstrate his or her animus non-
revertendi must not only leave the old domicile and is no longer physically present there, he
or she must have also shown acts cancelling his or her animus revertendi to that place.

Such showing is necessary as a person who simply leaves his or her domicile is considered
not to have abandoned it so long as he or she has animus revertendi or intent to return to it.
We have allowed the defense of animus revertendi for challenges to a person's domicile
because he or she has left it for a period of time. We held that a person's domicile, once
established, does not automatically change simply because he or she has not stayed in that
place for a period of time.

Applying these principles to Poe's case, as of May 24, 2005, her overt acts may have
established an intent to remain in the Philippines, but do not comply with the
required animus non-revertendi with respect to the U.S., the domicile that she was
abandoning.

On May 24, 2005, Poe and her family's home was still in the U.S. as they sold their
U.S. family home only on April 27, 2006. They also officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of their change of their U.S. address only in late March 2006. Lastly, as of this
date (May 24, 2005), Poe's husband was still in the U.S. and was a U.S. legal resident.

Taken together, these facts show that as of May 24, 2005, Poe had not completely
abandoned her domicile in the U.S.; she had not established the necessary animus non-
revertendi.

Note, too, that Poe's travel documents between May 24, 2005 and July 18, 2006
strongly support this conclusion. During this period, she travelled to and from the
Philippines under a balikbayan visa with a fixed period of validity, indicative that her stay in
the Philippines during this period was temporary.

While it is not impossible that she could have entered the Philippines under
a balikbayan visa with the intent to eventually establish domicile in the Philippines, her
return to the U.S. several times while she was staying in the Philippines under a
temporary visa prevents me from agreeing to this possibility.
On the contrary, Poe's acts of leaving the Philippines for the U.S. as an American citizen
who had previously stayed in the Philippines under a temporary visa is an indication of
her animus revertendi to the U.S., her old domicile.

Notably, between Poe's arrival on May 24, 2005 and her acquisition of Philippine
citizenship, Poe made four trips to and from the U.S. in a span of one year and two months;
this frequency over a short period of time indicates and supports the conclusion that she
had not fully abandoned her domicile in the U.S. during this period.

Additionally, during this time, Poe continued to own two houses in the U.S., one purchased
in 1992 and another in 2008 (or after her reacquisition of the Philippine citizenship. 103 While
such acquisition is not prohibited because Poe was a dual Filipino-American citizen, the
ownership of these houses, considered together with her temporary visa in travelling to the
Philippines from May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006, did not negate her animus revertendi to the
U.S., i.e., as of May 24, 2005, she had not yet completely abandoned the U.S. as her
domicile.

In these lights, I do not think that it had been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Comelec to apply Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero in holding that a balikbayan visa is not
indicative of animus non revertendi. As with the candidates
in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero, the evidence Poe presented had not been sufficient to
show animus non reveretendi as she was only holding a balikbayan visa.

To reiterate for the sake of clarity, at the time Poe claims to have established her residence
in the Philippines, she still had properties in the U.S., including her family home. They also
officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of their change of their U.S. address only in late
March 2006. She was also still an alien, a temporary visitor in the Philippines under
a Balikbayan visa, and thus could not have been a resident.

Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it considered Poe's
evidence and concluded that Poe had not yet establish her animus non-revertendi as of her
claimed date of May 24, 2005.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

If different sectors of our society have shown concern about the Court's ruling in this case,
they have every reason for alarm. This case involves, not simply a town councilor or a small
town mayor, but the Presidency of the Republic whose stay in office cannot be uncertain,
facing as we do potential problem situations both from within and outside the country.

The ruling, too, may affect the results of the coming election as this development shall
surely affect the people's choice of candidate. A worse effect, that we can hope will not
transpire, is a Poe electoral victory and continuing and pestering problems and uncertainty
about the final electoral outcome.

On a lesser scale perhaps, many problems also lurk, both immediate and practical, directly
involving the COMELEC's jurisdiction in Section 78 proceedings. The most immediate of
these is the impact of the emasculation of the COMELEC on the pending cases or on those
that have not yet reached finality before the COMELEC.

To restate what happened, following the ponencia's pronouncements, the COMELEC was
divested of its capability to determine the eligibility of candidates as part of its function to
resolve whether there had been a false material representation in his CoC. Hence, the
decisions it rendered in this capacity would have been rendered without jurisdiction.

Considering the timing of the release of our decision in Poe Llamanzares v. COMELEC, the
new doctrine the ruling represents could affect the Section 78 cases pending
reconsideration before the Comelec, as reversals of these decisions based on the lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is a very real possibility.

Notably, the COMELEC has already printed close to 50 million ballots as of April 2, 2016.
Section 78 cases pending reconsideration before the COMELEC, which prior to the Poe-
Llamanzares ruling could have been dismissed summarily, could now be granted. If this
would be the case, how then, could the names of these candidates be included in the CoC?

In the long term, the ponencia's impact on the COMELEC's jurisdiction would even be more
insidious. Section 78 would in effect be an almost impotent remedy, as the requirement of a
finding of a "prior competent tribunal" or a "self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions" would make access to this remedy almost
impossible.

Note, for instance, that a Section 78 petition can only be filed within a short time period as
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide:

Section 2. Period to File Petition. - The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the
last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days from the
time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the petition xxx

Given this short time period, I do not think a competent tribunal's finding could be readily
available as the basis for filing a Section 78 petition.

Furthermore, it should be considered that Poe's representation regarding her residency in

her 2012 CoC was actually a self-evident fact whose veracity cannot be questioned, as it
came from Poe herself. However, despite this admission, the ponencia still opted not to
consider this self-evident fact, and instead required the COMELEC to look into the truth of
Poe's subsequent claim of residence in her 2015 CoC.

Under this kind of reasoning, I cannot find a situation where the "self-evident fact" pointed
out by the ponenciawould be able to fit in to a Section 78 proceeding. That the defense of
good faith or honest mistake (as in the present case) is readily available to candidates
raises the standard of indubitability of the self-evident fact to the point of being impossible to
determine.

In other words, if we were to require petitioners to provide a self-evident fact or a judicial

confession to establish false material representation, and at the same time allow the
respondent-candidates the defense of good faith, we would be requiring petitioners to
present an unquestionable fact that candidates can just deny or feign lack of knowledge of,
as in the present case with Poe's honest mistake defense.

All these would not be easy to sort out. In the meanwhile, life goes on, hopefully with bliss
despite the uncertainties that this Court has injected into our electoral exercise and in the
power of a supposedly independent commission.

For all the above reasons, particularly the almost total lack of legal and factual basis of the
challenged ponencia, I vote to grant the motions for reconsideration.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
See the following website a1ticles: " IBP: SC failed to resolve the heart of Poe's
case" in www.mb.com/ibp-sc-failed-to-resolve-the-heart-of-poes-case; "IBP Raises
Questions on Poe SC Ru ling" in www.tribune.nel.ph/headlines/ibp-raises-guestions-
on-poe-sc-ruling; '·Supreme Court Resolved Nothing on Poe, says IBP" in www.
Malay.com.ph/business-news/news/supreme-court-resolved-nothing-poe-says-ibp:
"SC did not rule on Poe's Eligibility" in www.manilatimes. net/sc-did-not-rule-on-
poes-eligibility/25 1046/

2Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2016; Manila Times, April 7, 2016; Manila
Bulletin, April 7, 201 6

3 Tribune, April 2, 2016

4
See: "More lawyers score SC for letting Poe run" in
newsinfo.inquirer.net/777752/more-lawyersscore-sc-for-letting-poe-run.

See also: "SC Ruling on Poe hints looming constitutional crisis-lawyer's group;

5
G.R. No. 142940, May 7, 2001.

6 Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630 (2010).

7 J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970).

8In Chavez v. De Venecia, 460 Phil. 930 (2003), the Court summarized the long
established principles in construing and applying the Constitution:
 First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.

Finally , ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as

a whole. Xxx

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no o ne provision

of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered
alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

xxx

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear, Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens w hose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers
understanding the reof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

9
See pp. 17- 18 of the ponencia.

10 595 Phil. 449 (2008).

11 G.R. No. 11 9976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.

12 See p. 19 of the ponencia.

13 See p. 20 or the ponencia.

14 See pp. 20 - 21 of the ponencia.

15 Ibid.

16 G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.

See Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1997 Constitution, the Administrative Code of
17

1987, and Section 78 (as well as Section 69) of the OEC.

18Sec.78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [emphases and underscoring
supplied]

19 595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).

20
G.R. No. 2051 36, December 2. 2014.

21
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007.

22 Supra note 24.

See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 473 (2009). See also Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
23

Commissioner of Immigration, No.L-21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367;

Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-23446, December 20, 1971, 42 SCRA
561, 565; Board of Commissioners (CJD) v. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May
31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 877-878.

24 Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 8.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA
25

277; Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23,
2010, 635 SCRA 783.

26 Art. VI, Sec. 17.

27
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277.

28
318 Phil. 329 (l 995).

29
595 Phil. 449 (2008).

30 Id. at 465-467.
31 Id.

32 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.

33
See pp. 20 - 21 of the ponencia.

34 Ibid.

35 See Article lX-A. Section 7 which states.

Each Commission shall decided by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

36See Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. See also Mendoza v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 108308, October 15, 2009; J. Brion Dissenting Opinion
in People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009, citing Heirs of Hinog v.
Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460; and San Miguel Foods,
Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. laguesma, 263 SCRA 63, 84-85 (1996).

37 Oscar Herrera, Remedial Law lll, p. 306 (2006).

38
Supra, al page 11.

See Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952); Tecson v. Comelec, 463 Phil. 421 (2004);
39

and Tan Chong v. Sec. of Labor, 73 Phil. 307 (194).

As discussed at page 9, Jurisprudence has established three principles of

constitutional construction: first, verba legis non est recedendum - from the
words of the statute there should be no departure; second, when there is
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima - the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted based on the intent of the framers; and third, ut magis valeat
quam pereat - the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

41Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088,
October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 649.

This is also the prevailing rule under Section 1(2), Article IV of the 1987
42

Constitution.
43Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 73 Phil. 307 (1941); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52
(1952); Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil 421 (2004).

A. Scalia and B. Garner. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012
44

edn.), p. 93.

45 CA No. 473.

See p. 26 of the ponencia, citing 1 Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
46

Constitution 209 (1949).

47See: M. Dellinger. "Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The Deprivation

of Democratic Rights by Nation States Not Recognizing Dual Citizenship" 20 Journal
of Transnational Law & Policy 41, 61 (2010-2011).

See: M. Bussuyt. "Guide to the"Travaux Preparatoires" of the International

48

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1987).

49See: Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 104,

al 577.

50See: J. von Bernstorff. "The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in
International Law" 19(5) European Journal of International law 903, 913-914 (2008).

See: Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 50-51 (2008) and
51

Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra Note 104 at 577.

. J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16,
52

2014, 735 SCRA 208, 209; citing E. Posner and J. L Goldsmith, "A Theory of
Customary International Law" (1998). See also Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536,
600-605 (2009).

53
See: K. Hai lbronner. "Nationality in Public International Law and European Law,"
EUDO Citizenship Observatory, (2006). Available at http:Ueudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/chapter1 Hailbronner.pdf

See: P. Weiss. "Nationality and Statelessness in International Law" Sijthoff &

54

Noordhoff International Publishers B. V., (1979).

55 Ibid.

56
I. Oppenheim, International Law 643 (8th ed. 1955).

57 See CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2.

See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque Ill,
58

561 Phil. 386, 399 (2003), at 399.

59 See: M. Magallona, supra note 111, at 2-3.

60 Razon v. Tagitis, supra note 119, at 601.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1) (b ). Available

at http://www.icjcij.org/documents/?pl=4&p2=2

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra
62

note 115, at 61 399.

63
Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676, 687 (2009).

64 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 2 in relation to CIVIL CODE, Article 8.

Alexander Marie Stuyt, The General Principles of Law as Applied by International

65

Tribunals to Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction (2013), p. 101.

66 Gov. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451 (2009).

67 Ibid.

J. Bernas SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary,

68

1st edition p 987), p. 500, citing Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 ( 1958).

69 Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815 (1967).

70 Ibid.

71 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.

72 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 326.

73
706 Phil. 534 (2013).

74 Id. At 551.

75 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 392-400.

76 595 Phil. 449 (2008).

77 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.

78
This signifies that the HRET ruling could have been legally incorrect but was left
untouched by the Court because the error did not amount to a grave abuse of
discretion, see Bengzon v. HRET, supra Note 1 at 651-652, and Romy 's Freight
Service v. Castro, 523 Phil. 540, 546 (2006).
79Webster's Third New International Dictionary of The English Language Unabridged
(1993), p. 9 13.

80
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of The English Language Unabridged
(1993), p.136

81 Section 2 of CA 63.

82Otherwise known as "An act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by

persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission
in, the Armed Forces of the United States, promulgated on June 18, 1960.

83
434 Phil. 86 1 (2002).

84 596 Phil. 354 (2009).

85 G.R. No. 209835, September 22. 2015.

86
See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995).

87Thus, for purposes of determining venue for filing personal actions, we look to the
actual address of the person or the place where he inhabits, and noted that a person
can have more than one residence. We said this in light of the purpose behind fixing
the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions, which is to provide rules meant
to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant,
not only to one or the other of the courts of justice.

88 Limbona v. Comelec, 578 Phil. 364 (2008).

89See Abella v. Commission on Elections and larazzabal v. Commission on

Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167
(2009).

See Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil. 167 (2009) and Jalosjos v. Comelec, 686
90

Phil. 563 (2012).

91
See: Sections 4, 5, 6 & 8 of R.A. No. 9189.

92Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an

immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elec tive office
under this code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in acco rdance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

93 434 Phil. 861 (2002).

 Entitled "An Act To Provide For The Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship By
94

Naturalization, And To Repeal Acts Numbered Twenty-Nine Hundred And Twenty-

Seven And Thirty-Four Hundred and Forty-Eight", enacted on June 17, 1939.

CA No. 63, as worded, provides that the procedure for re-acquisition of

Philippine citizenship by naturalization shall be in accordance with the
procedure for naturalization under Act No. 2927 (or The Naturalization Law,
enacted o n March 26, 1920), as amended. CA No. 473, however, repealed
Act No. 2927 and 3448, amending 2927.

Entitled "An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization", enacted on June
95

16, 1950.

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO

96

HAVE LOST T HEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND

OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS. Approved on October 23, 1995.

Prio r to RA No. 81 71 , repatriation was governed by Presidential Decree No.

725, enacted on June 5, 1975. Paragraph 5 of PD No. 725 provides that:
" 1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. 'Note that
the repatriation procedure under PD No. 725 is similar to the repatriation
procedure under Section 4 of CA No. 63.

97 See Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. lt pertinently reads:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:

xx xx

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied]

98 G.R. No. L-22041 , May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 147.

99 434 Phil. 861, 873-875 (2002).

 100 434 Phil. 861, 873 (2002).

101 596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009).

102 G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015.

In her Memorandum, Poe admitted to owning two (2) houses in the U.S. up to this
103

day, one purchased in 1992 and the other in 2008. She, however, claims to no
longer reside in them. Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

(Associage Justice Diosdado M. Peralta)

On March 8, 2016, the Court rendered a Decision with a dispositive portion that reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit: 1.dated 1 December

2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

The Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled
Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SP A No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.

3.dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4.dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

On March 18, 2016, respondents Estrella C. Elamparo, Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P.

Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez jointly filed an Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, arguing
that: 1) the Court erred in declaring Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares a qualified
candidate; 2) the Court erred in declaring that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
did not have jurisdiction; 3) the Court erred in declaring Poe a natural-born citizen by
statistical probability, presumption, and as a measure of equal protection of law/social
justice; 4) the Court erred in ruling that foundlings are natural-born citizens under the 1935
Constitution and International Law; 5) the Court erred in declaring that re-acquisition of
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 vested natural-born status upon Poe; 6) the Court
erred in holding that Poe complied with the ten (10)-year residence requirement; and 7) the
Court erred in declaring that there was no intent to mislead as to Poe's natural-born status
and residency.

On March 29, 2016, respondent Valdez filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration on the
following grounds: 1) the clear and unequivocal language used by the legislature in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9225 does not allow reacquisition of natural born status consistent with
the Constitution; 2) R.A. 9225 requires acts to acquire and perfect Philippine citizenship,
unlike natural-born citizenship under the Constitution; 3) the doctrine in the case of Bengson
was not abandoned; and 4) the ponente fell hook, line, and sinker to the gross
misrepresentation of petitioner Poe when he said that there is "consistent jurisprudence on
repatriation statutes in general and R.A. 9225 in particular."

After a careful perusal of the motions for reconsideration, I find that respondents essentially
reiterated the very same issues previously raised and discussed before the Court.

As earlier discussed in the concurring opinion of Hon. Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa,
the Court's limited review jurisdiction via petition for certiorari simply imply that Our review is
confined to the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
in its issuance of the assailed rulings while, at the same time, We are ever mindful of the
doctrine that findings of fact of the Commission when supported by substantial evidence
shall be final and non-reviewable.1 A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in
character; certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of
judgment, particularly in the findings or conclusions of the quasi-judicial tribunals like the
COMELEC or the lower courts.2
The principles above suggest strictness and limitations, but when the case is exceptional
such as the one at bar, wherein grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's appreciation
and evaluation of the evidence before it is apparent, then it is proper occasion for this Court
to act, because in such cases "the Court is more than obliged, as it is then its constitutional
duty, to intervene; for when grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising
from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction." 3 Thus, in all
instances, the Court's careful choice is between a sparing exercise of certiorari powers -
when grave abuse of discretion or defects in jurisdiction are apparent - and a healthy
deference to the the COMELEC's findings - when review is clearly uncalled for.

In the light of such limited jurisdiction, I then joined Justice Caguioa in his view that the
Court should have limited itself to determining whether grave abuse of discretion attended
the finding of the COMELEC that Poe committed material misrepresentation as to the facts
required to be stated in her Certificate of Candidacy (COC), per Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), and nothing more. Anent that issue, Our review should have been
limited to the same issue resolved by the assailed resolutions now before this Court, which
was whether there was commission of "material misrepresentation/s" or the making of "false
material representation/s" in petitioner's COC. Resolving the same involved the simple
establishment of three elements: (1) that a representation is made with respect to a material
fact, (2) that the representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to mislead, misinform or
hide a fact which would render the candidate ineligible or deceive the electorate. 4 And the
standard of proof for the same, with the COMELEC acting as a quasi-judicial body, is
merely substantial evidence.5 Jurisprudence has long defined substantial evidence as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 6

As already pointed out by Our other colleague, Hon. Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,
as to the facts of a presidential candidate's lack of qualifications, or whether the COMELEC
is empowered to deny or cancel a COC based on that reason, the Commission may do so
only if such fact is patent on the face of the COC and is indubitable. 7 Otherwise, the
COMELEC's duty to accept and receive the certificate is ministerial.8 This is because our
Constitution (under Article IX-C, Section 2 [2]) empowers the COMELEC to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.9 But the Constitution does
not authorize the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of the President or Vice President,
the same being the exclusive office of this Court acting as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) (under Article VII, Section 4), whose powers, additionally, are exercised only
after the election's winners have been proclaimed, either through an election protest or a
proceeding for quo warranto.10 A contest before any of the electoral tribunals (including the
PET) implies a post-election, post-proclamation proceeding.11

For the above reasons, I opted to join Justice Caguioa in his view that a more thorough
discussion of and ruling on Poe's qualifications, specifically as to her natural-born
citizenship, as well as her 10-year residency, are premature, the same being cognizable
only after she had been proclaimed as winner of the presidential elections and through a
petition filed in the PET, and not the COMELEC, with the precise purpose of contesting
what she had stated as her qualifications.
Nevertheless, COMELEC's patent disregard of procedure, the law on evidence, and basic
fairness in its failure and refusal to appreciate Poe's evidence, which resulted in it ordering
the cancellation of her COC, are also easily demonstrable through the case records as
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; indeed,
the fact that the COMELEC clearly overlooked facts which tend to prove that Poe did not
deceive or mislead the electorate in filling up her COC or that the COMELEC overstepped
its bounds by ruling on Poe's qualifications as a candidate for president is patent not only in
the records, but in the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC itself, which clearly supports
the Court's finding of grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC's part and the reversal of
the latter's rulings. Stated differently, the COMELEC, in grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of its jurisdiction, erroneously granted the prayers of
respondents to deny due course or cancel Poe's COC despite their inability to establish by
substantial evidence that petitioner's material representations were false and that such were
made with the intention to deceive or mislead the electorate.

For the above mentioned reasons, I vote to DENY the Motions for
Reconsideration WITH FINALITY.

Footnotes

1
Varias v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010.

2
INC Ship management v. Moradas, G.R. No. 178564, January 15, 2014.

3
Supra note I.

Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 201 5; cited in J.

4

Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion; Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 11 72, 1

185; Maruhom v. COMELEC, 6 11 Phil. 501 , 512.

5
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 5; Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19326 1, April
24, 201 2; Adap v. COMELEC, 545 Phil. 297 (2007); Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil.
354 (2009).

6
Id.; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

7
Cipriano v. Comelec, 479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004).

8
Batas Pambansa Big. 881, OMNIB US ELECTION CODE, Sec. 76.

9CONSTITUTlON, Arc. IX-C, Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise

the following powers and functions :

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests

involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement

agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizen's arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to

political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with t he
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election

spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidates.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employer it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
 (9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

10 Id at Art. VII, Sec. 4 xxx

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

I join the denial of the motions for reconsideration of the March 8, 2016 Decision where the
Court held that the assailed COMELEC resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when they cancelled the certificate of candidacy of. Mary Grace Poe as she did
not commit a material misrepresentation in executing it.

This position, notwithstanding, I am expressing my reservation on the issue of residency.

The Court should not in this case make a definitive ruling on the matter, as it should be
tackled and resolved by the Presidential- Electoral Tribunal, the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect in appropriate
cases,

Nevertheless, I share the view of the my esteemed colleague Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe that the Court's interpretation of the COMELEC's jurisdiction under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 1 Salcedo II v.
COMELEC2 and other succeeding cases should be abandoned. In those cases, it was held
that the statement in a certificate of candidacy "[b]ecomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible."3 A reading of the said provision, however, reveals
that there no requirement of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, to wit:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. xxx

Indeed, Section 78 does not require that there be an intention to deceive for a certificate of
candidacy to be denied due course or be cancelled. 'The intent of a candidate with respect
to a petition to deny due course to or cancel a candidacy is immaterial: A candidate's
material representation in his certificate of candidacy should be determined by fact or law
and not measured by his/her claim of good faith. Otherwise, the COMELEC would become
impotent in petitions under Section 78 because a questioned candidate can effortlessly
evade scrutiny by simply invoking his good faith. It will defeat the COMELEC's power to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" and to "[d]ecide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections."4

Nevertheless, the abandonment of the doctrine under Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

and Salcedo II v. COMELEC should be prospective in application. A sense of fairness
dictates that those who relied on the Court's interpretation of .Section 78 in the past,
including the petitioner herein, should not be prejudiced by its reversion. In Morales v. Court
of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,5 where the condonation doctrine was reversed,
.the Court cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines." The Court added therein that "while the future may
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
respected."

Accordingly, a candidate can still claim that he has no deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact from his/her certificate of candidacy.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
318 Phil. 329 (1995).

2 37 1Phil.377 (1999).

3 Supra note 1, p. 380.

4 Article IX, C, Section 2, Constitution.

5 G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

REYES, J.:

I maintain my position that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions, which directed the cancellation of Grace Poe's
Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Grace Poe committed material misrepresentation in her
COC in two instances: first, when she stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; and,
second, when she indicated that she had been a resident of the Philippines for at least 10
years immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections.

I.

In order for a certiorari action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
prosper, it is imperative for the petitioner to show that the respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion, which amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law."1

"A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly
rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct. In other
words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds."2 The writ of certiorari is available when the following indispensable
elements concur: (1) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) that there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 3

Given the foregoing guideposts, it escapes me how the majority could have concluded that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. The
COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election; it has the authority to decide all questions affecting
elections, save those involving the right to vote.4 One of the powers granted to the
COMELEC, relative to the conduct of an election, is to deny due course to or cancel a COC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) on the ground of material
misrepresentation:

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

"The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for

elective office."5 The majority essentially posits that while the COMELEC has the power to
rule on whether a candidate committed material misrepresentation on his qualifications
indicated in the COC, it nevertheless has no authority to rule on the qualification per se
absent any declaration by a final judgment of a competent court on the qualification of the
candidate.
The majority's reasoning is flawed. If COMELEC has the power to determine whether a
candidate materially misrepresented his qualifications in the COC, it necessarily has the
power to rule on the qualifications of the candidate. The express and broad constitutional
grant of power to the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws indubitably
includes all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.6

There exists no cogent and acceptable reason to deny the COMELEC the power to rule on
the qualifications of the candidates. Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity to deny the
COMELEC the power to rule on the qualifications of the candidate considering that it can,
under Section 78 of the OEC, inquire into the qualifications of the candidate for purposes of
determining whether there is material misrepresentation in the COC.

Thus, if a candidate for President indicates in his COC that he is an American citizen and
that he had been a resident of the Philippines for only nine (9) years, following the majority's
logic, the COMELEC would be powerless to prevent the candidate from participating in the
elections; the candidate did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.

To stress, the power of the COMELEC to rule on the qualifications of a candidate prior to
election stems from the Constitution's broad and general grant of power to the COMELEC
to enforce and administer election laws, even in the absence of any declaration by a final
judgment from a competent court.

II.

Contrary to the majority's ruling, even if Grace Poe adduced evidence to show that she
honestly believed herself to have the requisite qualifications to run for President, such fact
would still not absolve her from liability for misrepresentation in her COC. In cases of denial
due course to or cancellation of COC, it is enough that the candidate indicated in his COC a
false material representation.

Section 78 of the OEC is plainly worded, mandating that a COC may be denied due course
or cancelled on the ground that a "material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false." Section 74 of the OEC enumerates the contents of the
COC. Nowhere in Section 78 of the OEC is it required that there be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact from the electorate, which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.

In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al.,7 the Court stressed that
"the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare
significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's dec aration of a
material qualification in the COC be false."8

Indeed, the lack of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the
electorate should not be allowed as a defense in a proceeding for the denial of due course
to or cancellation of a COC. Otherwise, it would be quite easy for the candidate to feign
good faith and evade the consequence for material misrepresentation in the COC. It should
be stressed that what is at stake here are the qualifications of candidates for elective
government posts. The qualifications of candidates should not be easily bargained away by
the mere expedient of claim of good faith.

III.

Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines xx x." On the other hand,
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution enumerates who are considered citizens of the
Philippines:

SEC. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Further, Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]atural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Accordingly, natural-born Filipino citizens
under the 1935 Constitution are limited to those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines since, among those enumerated, they are the only ones who do not need to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The aforementioned constitutional prov1s1ons are clear and unequivocal. It is a cardinal

rule that constitutional provisions that are clear and free from ambiguity need no further
construction, and will be enforced as written. In such cases, there is no room for the Court
to interpret, liberally or otherwise, lest we be accused of supplanting our personal biases in
lieu of the sovereign's will enshrined in the Constitution.

The relevant facts of this case are simple and unequivocal: Grace Poe is a foundling found
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968; her biological parents, to date,
are still unknown. Grace Poe has not established that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
since she failed to present proof of a blood relation to a Filipino father.

The 1935 Constitution did not include "foundlings found in the Philippines" among those
who are considered citizens of the Philippines. There is, thus, no reason to consider them
as such. It is a settled rule of construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which can be formulated in a number of ways.
One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum.9 Since the 1935 Constitution expressly limited
those who are considered citizens of the Philippines, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to include foundlings.

The majority's ruling points out that Grace Poe's natural-born Filipino citizenship is
demonstrable, statistically probable, and, considering the circumstantial evidence
presented, plausible.

With due respect, the Court has no business dealing with demonstrability, probability, and
plausibility when the Constitution has already defined with exactitude who are considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. It bears stressing, at the risk of being repetitive, that only
those who can establish a direct blood relation to a Filipino father can be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution.

No amount of abstractions or lengthy justifications can blur the fact that foundlings are not
among those enumerated as citizens of the Philippines, much more natural-born Filipino
citizens. Moreover, what is at stake here is the citizenship eligibility of a candidate seeking
the highest position in the land. The Court cannot leave this matter to demonstrability,
probability, and plausibility, especially when the Constitution demands certainty.

The majority's resort to international law to establish that Grace Poe is a natural-born
Filipino citizen is likewise improper. The international conventions and the general principles
of international law cited by the majority do not categorically state that foundlings found in
the Philippines should be considered natural-born Filipino citizens or, at the very least,
Filipino citizens. More importantly, international conventions and treaties are on the same
plane as domestic statutes; they cannot supplant the clear edict of the Constitution.

Accordingly, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Grace Poe
materially misrepresented that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The COMELEC
correctly applied the provisions of the 1935 Constitution in resolving the issue.

IV.

It bears stressing that the conclusion that Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen in the
Court's Decision dated March 8, 2016, penned by Justice Jose Portugal Perez, was
concurred in by only six other Justices.10 The two other Justices' (Justices Diosdado M.
Peralta and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa) findings were confined to the jurisdictional issue
of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; thus, they did not categorically rule on the status of Grace Poe's citizenship.

On the other hand, out of the six Justices who dissented from the majority opinion, it is
noticeable that Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo did not make a categorical ruling on the
citizenship of Grace Poe.

Thus, as pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his Dissenting
Opinion, what is clear and undeniable is that there is no majority vote from this Court that
holds that Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether foundlings
found in the Philippines are considered natural-born Filipino citizens has not been resolved
by a majority vote from this Court.

I also disagree with the majority's finding that Grace Poe met the required period of 10-year
residence in the Philippines. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
candidate for President must have been "a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding [the] election."

Grace Poe, in attesting in her COC that she had been a resident of the Philippines for 10
years and 11 months before the date of the May 9, 2013 election, seeks to tack her period
of residence in the Philippines from May 24, 2005 - the date she went back to the
Philippines supposedly to stay here for good. Grace Poe presented various pieces of
evidence, such as school records of her children, purchase of real property, and registration
as a voter, to show her intent to change her domicile from the United States to the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

It should be pointed out that Grace Poe lost her Philippine domicile when she was
naturalized as an American citizen on October 18, 2001. In order to reacquire her Philippine
domicile, she must show: (1) residence or bodily presence in the Philippines; (2) an
intention to remain here; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile, i.e., the United
States. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.11

When Grace Poe went back to the Philippines on May 24, 2005, she did so under a
Balikbayan visa-free entry pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6768,12 which allows a
Balikbayan a visa-free stay in the Philippines for a limited period of one year. As pointed out
by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in his Dissenting Opinion, having availed of the benefits
of R.A. No. 6768, Grace Poe's stay in the Philippines from May 24, 2005 was merely
temporary; her stay was not impressed with animus manendi, i.e., the intent to remain in or
at the domicile of choice for an indefinite period of time.

To my mind, the earliest time from which Grace Poe could have tacked her period of
residence in the Philippines is only on July 7, 2006 - the date when she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 or the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003." Taking an Oath of Allegiance
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 is indicative of animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi.

Thus, the COrvIBLEC did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in ruling that Grace Poe
committed material misrepresentation when she indicated in her COC that she had been a
resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months on the day before the May 9, 2016
elections.

VI.

The Philippine Constitution is the embodiment of the will of the sovereign Filipino people; it
symbolizes our hopes and aspirations. In mandating that no person may be elected as
President unless he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the Constitution demands that Filipinos
be led by one of our own. The Constitution demands that the President be unquestionably a
natural-born Filipino citizen. The determination of the status of the citizenship of a person
seeking the highest position in the land cannot be left to statistical probability and
circumstantial evidence.

The 10-year residency requirement, on the other hand, aims to ensure that the prospective
President would have a deeper understanding of the plight of the Filipinos. The Constitution
seeks to avoid a President who, after having observed the country's situation from afar,
would lead the country without actually and personally experiencing the problems plaguing
the country.

The majority's ruling ran roughshod over the mandatory and fundamental requirements
prescribed by the Constitution for those seeking the Presidency. The requirements under
Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution cannot and should not be supplanted by the
magistrates' biases. The duty of this Court is to uphold the letter of the Constitution, not to
interpret it according to our whims and caprices.

ACCORDINGLY, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission
on Elections, I vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration and DISMISS the petitions
for certiorari filed by petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Spouses Aduan v. Chong, 610 Phil. 178, 185 (2009).

2
Ysidoro v. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, et al. , 681 Phil. 1, 16 (2012).

3
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, et al., 671 Phil. 320, 336 (2011).

4 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article IX-C, Section 2(1) and (3).

5 Bautista v. COMELEC, 460 Phil. 459, 488 (2003).

6See Maruhom v. COMELEC, 387 Phil. 491, 513 (2000), citing Loong v. COMELEC,
365 Phil. 386, 420 (1999).

7 706 Phil. 534 (2013).

8 Id. at 551.

9 See Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 477 Phil. 141 , 156 (2004).
 Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Associate Justices Presbitero J.
10

Velasco, Jr., Lucas P. Bersamin, Jose Catral Mendoza, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and
Francis H. Jardeleza.

See Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331,
11

349, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC, 430 Phil. 754, 770 (2002).

AN ACT INSTITUTING A BALIKBAYAN PROGRAM. Approved on November 3,

12

1989.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I maintain my vote. I concur that the Motions for Reconsideration must be denied with
finality.

Following the grant of the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari of Senator Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares in G.R. No. 221697 and G.R. Nos. 221698-700, public
respondent Commission on Elections filed its Motion for Reconsideration, and private
respondents Estrella C. Elamparo, Antonio P. Contreras, Amado D. Valdez, and Francisco
S. Tatad filed an "Urgent Plea for Reconsideration." This notwithstanding, private
respondent Amado D. Valdez still proceeded to file his own Motion for Reconsideration.

The Commission on Elections argues that there is neither factual nor legal basis for the
ruling that petitioner is a qualified candidate for President. There is no Supreme Court
majority that found that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Among the fifteen (15)
Justices who took part in the deliberation, only seven (7) voted that petitioner is natural-
born. The other five (5) Justices voted that petitioner is not a natural-born Filipino citizen,
while three (3) voted not to rule on the issue of citizenship. 1

Based on this tally, the Commission on Elections concludes that there is no majority vote
validating petitioner's Presidential run, as required by Article VIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution and Rule XII, Section l(a) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC (Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court):

1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or, in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en bane, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en bane, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of the
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.

….

A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, Rule XII, Section 1. Voting requirements. - (a) All decisions and
actions in Court en bane cases shall· be made upon the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Cou.rt who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues
involved and voted on them.

The Commission on Elections points out that there was no concurrence of the majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations of the issues and voted thereon.. 2

Further, according to the Commission on Elections, this Court's decision to leave the matter
of citizenship eligibility for resolution later after elections would only lead to a mockery of our
elections. Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship to run and be elected
President may cause chaos and anarchy.3 This Court should re-deliberate the issue of
citizenship and see to it that only the Constitution, law, and jurisprudence become the
overriding factors and considerations for its decisions.4

The Commission on Elections also argues that this Court effectively ruled against the
Commission on Elections' exercise of its power to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections
is, thus, "unduly emasculate[d]," with its powers and functions "rendere[d] illusory."5

Ironically, this Court relied on Fermin v. Commission on Elections6 and Tecson v.

Commission on Elections,7 which affirmed the Commission on Elections' power under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.8Citing the Dissenting Opinion of Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion, the Commission on Elections argues that this Court disregarded the
several cases where it ruled that the Commission on Elections has the power to determine
a candidate's eligibility as an integral part of its power to determine false material
misrepresentation.9

The Commission on Elections assails the finding that petitioner's blood relationship with a
Filipino was "demonstrable."10 This Court cannot rely on statistics as statistics does not
establish bloodline. This was not substantial evidence, but merely speculative
evidence.11 Statistics cannot be the basis of a finding that the Commission on Elections
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy.

On the issue of determination of material misrepresentation, the Commission on Elections

cites Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bemabe's Dissenting Opinion stating that it is enough
that the misrepresentation refers to a material qualification. 12 The eligibility of a candidate is
not determined by his or her good faith, but by law.13

Furthermore, the Commission on Elections argues that the import of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention Deliberations was misconstrued by this Court. A reading of the deliberations
would show that foundlings were never intended to be included among those who are
considered Filipino citizens.14

Lastly, the Commission on Elections points out that petitioner did not comply with the
residency requirement for President under the Constitution.

Private respondents bewail how this Court "unconstitutionally strip[ped]"15 the Commission
on Elections of its powers in delineating the extent of its competence in Section 78 petitions.
They maintain that it has jurisdiction to make findings on petitioner's
qualification.16 Paradoxically, they insist that it was an error for this Court- while reviewing
the Commission on Elections' actions-to make findings on petitioner's actual citizenship
status and residence in the Philippines and thereby conclude that, in respect of these, she
possesses the qualification for President.17 They not only assail these findings and
conclusions but also intimate their own impressions and conclusions on how this Court
voted on these matters.18

Private respondents maintain that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen. They find fault in
this Court's invocation of the Constitution's social justice underpinnings,19 reference to
statistical tools,20 and appreciation of the common normative thread in international
instruments.21 As they did in the original proceedings before the Commission on Elections
and in the preceding episodes before this Court, they capitalize on the Constitution's silence
on the specific matter of foundlings and reiterate their claim that lack of knowledge as to a
foundling's biological parents is fatal to their status as natural-born citizens.22 In addition,
they claim that petitioner's acts to re-acquire Philippine citizenship, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9225, militate against her natural-born status.23

As to petitioner's residence, private respondents maintain that her reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship only on July 7, 2006 belies compliance with the ten-year residency requirement.
They harp on a supposedly "uniform and consistent"24 jurisprudence--Coquilla v.
Commission on Elections,25Caballero v. Commission on Elections,26 and Reyes v.
Commission on Elections27- "to the effect that the earliest possible reckoning point for the re-
establishment of domicile in the Philippines can only be upon re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship."28 They continue to rely on petitioner's return to the Philippines as a "balikbayan"
as supposedly belying domicile in the Philippines.29

Private respondents also continue to insist that intent to deceive or mislead is not a
requirement in Section 78 petitions. However, they posit that even if this were not a
requirement, petitioner still showed through her actions a deceptive animus. 30

The basic issues borne by the consolidated Petitions pertained to the Commission on
Elections' grave abuse of discretion in cancelling petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for
President in the May 9, 2016 elections. This overarching issue entailed an examination of
the extent of the Commission on Elections' jurisdiction and competence in petitions to deny
due course to or to cancel certificates of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Related to this was the matter of whether a candidate's deliberate intent to
deceive is a necessary element for the cancellation of his or her certificate of candidacy.

With respect to petitioner, the issue was whether she made a material misrepresentation in
her Certificate of Candidacy in declaring that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen and that
she has satisfied the requirement of ten-year residence in the Philippines. Ruling on the
matter of her citizenship required an evaluation of her status as a foundling whose biological
parents are unknown, as well as of her status as one who, years ago, was naturalized an
American citizen, but eventually re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9225. These, in turn, called for a consideration of burden of proof and of fundamental
principles-as contained and expressed in the Constitution, in domestic law, and in binding
international mechanisms-that animate the determination of citizenship of marginalized
individuals like foundlings. This also entailed an appraisal of the official acts of certain
government organs that have previously made statements on petitioner's citizenship, in a
milieu devoid of the present day's partisanship. Evaluating her residence required a
meticulous consideration of her actions beginning 2004, in light of the settled principles
governing residence in the context of election laws.

The constitutional, statutory, and jurisprudential foundations for my position on these points
were fully explained in my Concurring Opinion. I do not see the need to reiterate what has
been adequately passed. The Motions for Reconsideration failed to aver any sufficiently
compelling reason to deviate from what this Court has already decided.

The Commission on Elections' insistence that the vote of this Court should lay to rest all
issues regarding petitioner's qualifications is a misguided view of the availability of remedies
to all voters, a misunderstanding of the difference between Certiorari on the one hand
and Quo Warranto on the other, or an attempt to have the Constitution amended so that this
Court would not be the "sole judge of election contests relating to ... qualifications for
President."31

A decision on these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari questioning the Commission on

Elections' exercise of discretion under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code does not
legally bar any voter from challenging the "election, returns, and qualifications" 32 of the
President in an election contest before this Court. Nine (9) Justices addressed the question
as to whether the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction or, if it did have jurisdiction,
whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion. That was what was required by the
remedy invoked by petitioner. Nine (9) of the Justices agreed that the Petition should be
granted with the consequence that the resolutions of the Commission on Elections be
annulled and vacated, thus providing no obstacle for petitioner's candidacy. How each of us
arrived at that conclusion is fully explained in our concurring opinions.

That "chaos and anarchy" may result because this Court may, after the elections, declare
petitioner as not qualified relies on several premises that I cannot accept.

First, that the seventh paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution does not exist;
Second, that the electorate, composed of the People exercising their fundamental sovereign
function, cannot make their own evaluations of the meaning of the Constitution as well as of
who, among the candidates, has the better qualifications to run for President;

Third, that only the position presented by the movants and six (6) of the Justices make
sense. The opinion of nine (9) of the fifteen (15) Justices of this Court are so patently
unreasonable and not supported by the Constitution, by law, and by jurisprudence; and

Lastly, that this Court, acting on an election contest or a quo warranto action, should any be
filed, will act in a particular way in the future.

To predict "chaos and anarchy" as the Commission on Elections does in its Motion for
Reconsideration, therefore, is to caricature and simplify the extended opinions expressed by
the Justices of this Court who did not agree with the Commission. Worse, the evil that the
Constitution sought to avoid by not endowing it with unbridled power to determine the
qualification of a candidate has come to pass. It is not unreasonable to fear that the
Commission is now partial against a candidate for the elections for President. Its actuations
can easily be misinterpreted as participating in the partisan voices of those who are
supporting a different candidate for the elections.

In 1928, Edward L. Bernays-the intellectual guru that inspired the propaganda machinery of
Nazi Germany, did "public relations" for a host of companies, and softened the media for
f:urposes of supporting the coup in Guatamela, among other countries33 -published a book
entitled Propaganda. In chilling and disturbing detail he opens his book, as follows:

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen
mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of
our country.

We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by
men [and women] we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our
democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this
manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.

Our invisible governors are in many cases, unaware of the identity of their fellow members
in the inner cabinet.

They govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas
and by their key position in the social structure. Whatever attitude one chooses to take
toward this condition, it remains a fact that in almost every act of our daily lives, whether in
the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are
dominated by the relatively small number of persons-a trifling fraction of our hundred and
twenty million- who understand the mental processes and social patters of the masses. It is
they who pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and
contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.
It is not usually realized how necessary these invisible governors are to the orderly
functioning of our group life. In theory, every citizen may vote for whom he [or she] pleases.
Our Constitution does not envisage political parties as part of the mechanism of
government, and its framers seem not to have pictured to themselves the existence in our
national politics of anything like the modem political machine. But the American voters soon
found that without organization and direction their individual votes, cast, perhaps for dozens
or hundreds of candidates, would produce nothing but confusion. Invisible government, in
the shape of rudimentary political parties, arose almost overnight. Ever since then we have
agreed, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, that party machines should narrow down
the field of choice to two candidates, or at most three or four.

In theory, every citizen makes up his [or her] mind on public questions and matters of
private conduct. In practice, if all [people] had to study for themselves the abstruse
economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would find it impossible
to come to a conclusion about anything. We have voluntarily agreed to let an invisible
government sift the data and high-spot the outstanding issues so that our field of choice
shall be narrowed to practical proportions. From our leaders and the media they use to
reach the public, we accept the evidence and the demarcation of issues bearing upon public
questions; from some ethical teacher, be it a minister, a favorite essayist, or merely
prevailing opinion, we accept a standardized code of social conduct to which we conform
most of the time.

In theory, everybody buys the best and cheapest commodities offered him [or her] on the
market. In practice, if everyone went around pricing, and chemically testing before
purchasing, the dozens of soaps or fabrics or brands of bread which are for sale, economic
life would become hopelessly jammed. To avoid such confusion, society consents to have
its choice narrowed to ideas and objects brought to its attention through propaganda of all
kinds. There is consequently a vast and continuous effort going on to capture our minds in
the interest of some policy or commodity or idea.

It might be better to have, instead of propaganda and special pleading, committees of wise
men [and women] who would choose our rulers, dictate our conduct, private and public, and
decide upon the best types of clothes for us to wear and the best kinds of food for us to eat.
But we have chosen the opposite method, that of open competition. We must find a way to
make free competition function with reasonable smoothness. To achieve this, society has
consented to permit free competition to be organized by leadership and propaganda.

Some of the phenomena of this process are criticized-the manipulation of news, the inflation
of personality, and the general ballyhoo by which politicians and commercial products and
social ideas are brought to the consciousness of the masses. The instruments by which
public opinion is organized and focused may be misused. But such organization and
focusing are necessary to orderly life.34

I reject the premise that propaganda is necessary to shape meaningful social

consciousness in a democracy. With every bone in my body, I refuse to accept that our
People should forever be malleable through the maintenance of a political economy of
ignorance.
Yet, it is during elections that those who are part of our "invisible government" thrive. They
attempt to shape opinion by giving incomplete information. Press releases may be
characterized by partisan simplification of complex issues of citizenship and residence.
Public relations are enhanced when they color speculative outcomes with strident voices or
hysteria about a future with "chaos and anarchy." The public is treated as a passive subject,
vulnerable only to dominant sources of media and information. The prize is not a strong and
informed sovereign People; rather, it is the statistics of powerful pollsters prior to elections.

Lawyers and lawyers' groups may serve as witting or unwitting pawns to this tendency
when they fail to present a balanced but critical view of the opinion of this entire Court. True,
it will take patience and an open mind to wade through all the arguments packed in more
than six hundred pages of op1mon. Diligence and patience, however, is fundamental to a
mature democracy.

In deciding these consolidated Petitions, we have endeavored to be transparent and legible

because we were all aware of the possible repercussions of our Decision. The lengthy
opinions were, to my mind, a tribute to our strong fighting faith that our People can empower
themselves by taking the time to read and analyze the various reasons why each of us
came to our Decision. After all, a critical and informed view is the mark of an empowered
sovereign.

Reality is complex, nuanced, and layered with many dimensions. Understanding is always
possible, but it only comes about with patience, diligence, and a great deal of respect and
understanding for the other standpoint. Each of us can come to our own decision based on
our own premises and in light of our own consciences and reasons. That the conclusion is
not what one expects should not be the sole basis to conclude that the contrary opinion is
unreasonable, illogical, or brought about by some malevolent motive.

Otherwise, we allow Bernays' "invisible government" to hold sway over the democracy we
are all hoping to meaningfully shape.

I respect the eloquent dissents by some of my colleagues. I have perused the Motions for
Reconsideration. Yet, I still see no reason to deviate from my earlier conclusions.

I maintain my vote.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY WITH FINALITY respondents' Motions for

Reconsideration as the basic issues in this case have been passed upon in our March 8,
2016 Decision. In view of this denial with finality, no further pleadings must be allowed and
entry of judgment must be made in due course.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 COMELEC Motion for Reconsideration, p. 7.

2 Id. at 8.

3 Id. at 11.

4 Id. at 12.

5 Id. at 13.

6 595 Phil. 449 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].

7
468 Phil. 42 1 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

8 COMELEC Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 13-14.

9
Id.at19.

10 Id. at 28.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 35.

13 Id. at 40.

14
Id. at 44 and 47.

15 Private respondents' Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, p. 9.

16 Id. at 7.

17 Id. at 3-4.

18 Id. at 4-7.

19 Id. at 13- 19.

20 Id.

21
Id. at 24- 27.

22
Id. at 19-24.

23
Id. at 28-32.

24 Id. at 33.
25 434 Phil 861 (2002) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

26 G.R. No. 209835, September 22. 2015 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

27 G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

28 Private respondents' Urgent Plea for Reconsideration, p. 33.

29 Id. at 38-40.

30 Id. at 4 1-47.

31
CONST., art. VII, sec. 4, par. (7).

32 CONST., art. VII, sec. 4, par. (7).

See, for instance, Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime

33

Change from Hawaii to Iraq (Times Books, New York: 2006) and the BBC
Documentary, Century of Self.

34
Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda 9- 12 (1928). Gender bias corrected. Analogous
situation in the Philippines.