QUALIFIED TRESPASS TO DWELLING
the lack of permission should not be confused
42 Phil. 69 [G.R. No. L-17332 August 18, 1921]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff and appellee, vs. OLIMPIO DE
PERALTA, defendant and appellant.
FACTS:
On the half month of October 1919, Olimpio de
Peralta succeeded Toledo, former president of
Philippine Marine Union. The latter looking for a
desk glass went to a room of house No. 507 of
Jaboneros Street, which was rented to the said
association and under the privilege of Toledo as
the president of said union. De Peralta entered
the room in question in the morning of the 16th
of the same month, which gave rise to the
information for trespass to dwelling against
Peralta, in which it is alleged that he entered the
room of Toledo against the will of the occupant.
Then a trial proceeded which sentenced the
accused to suffer two months and one day of
arresto mayor ,and a fine of 400 pesetas, and
costs, hence from this, an appeal was taken.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of De Peralta constitutes
the crime of trespass to dwelling?
HELD:
“After a careful study of the testimony given in
the case, we are of the opinion that the accused,
after calling at or near the door, pushed it and
without the permission of the occupants entered
the room with the object of taking away the desk
glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had
expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting the
accused Peralta from entering his room, and the
mere fact that the latter entered it, without the
permission of the occupant, does not constitute
the offense of trespass to dwelling provided for
and penalized in article 491 of the Penal Code. In
order that this crime may exist it is necessary
that the entrance should be against the express
or presumed prohibition of the occupant, and
with.In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as
well as in those of this jurisdiction, it has been
held uniformly that this crime is committed
when a person enters another's dwelling against
the will of the occupant, but not when the
entrance is effected without his knowledge or
opposition.”1 “…"It is not necessary, in the
ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door
of a house or enter it, to obtain previous
permission from the owner who lives in it. With
the utmost good faith may a person, to whom
entrance has not been denied beforehand,
suppose that the owner of the room has no
objection to receiving him in it." And in the
present case it is to be supposed that the
members of the "Philippine Marine Union,"
among them the accused, had something
familiarity which warrants entrance into the
room occupied by the president of the
association, particularly when we consider the
hour at which the act in question happened
(between half past ten and eleven in the
morning), the fact that the door of the room was
not barricaded or locked with a key, and the
circumstance that the room in question was part
of the house rented to said association. For the
reason above stated, the judgment appealed
from is reversed, and the accused Olimpio de
Peralta is acquitted.
[G.R. No. 4655. December 19, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ALEJANDRO DIONISIO AND NICOLAS DEL
ROSARIO, Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
At the hour of 9 o’clock on the morning of the
6th day of January, 1908, the defendants
entered a house situated on Calle Santo Cristo,
in the district of Binondo, in the city of Manila,
by the principal door, which they found half
open; that the lower part of the house was at
that time occupied by a Chinaman, named Lim
Chio Liong, and the upper portion of the house
by a woman named Narcisa de los Santos; that
when the defendants pushed open the door and
passed into the house, no opposition of any kind
whatever was made to their doing so; that they
passed on up the stairway to the room where
Narcisa de los Santos was sitting; that as they
entered the house and passed up the stairs, they
were seen by Lim Chio Liong who offered no
opposition to their entry into the house or to
their going up the stairs, he evidently thinking
that they were visitors of the occupant of the
upper portion of the house, that when they
reached the upper portion of the house, they
were met by the occupant, Narcisa de los Santos,
of whom they made some inquiries as to the
where-abouts of another woman, an alleged
cousin; that they entered into conversation with
Narcisa de los Santos who invited them to sit
down, and that they continued in her rooms for
about two hours; that they made inquiries of her
as to whether or not the Chinamen who lived in
the house smoked opium; that the woman told
them that she did not know, but that, if they
desired so to do, they could wait until the
Chinamen came home and talk to them; that the
defendants told her that they were secret
service men, and desired to make search for
opium; that she offered no opposition and that
they then entered the other rooms on the upper
floor which they searched, and in which they
found some opium and a pipe; that they
questioned the no man as to her name and the
name of the Chinaman who lived there, making
notes of the information furnished, and
threatening to take everybody in the house to
jail; that finally Lim Chio Liong, hearing the noise,
went upstairs, and that when he arrived there,
the defendants demanded of him the sum of P50
under threat that if he did not pay that amount,
he would be taken to jail, and fined P500 in
court; that the Chinamen told them that he had
no money, and tried to escape downstairs; that
they then seized him, and that in the struggle
which ensued, his clothes were torn and his
watch was broken; that as a result of the
disturbance caused by the dispute between the
Chinaman and the defendants, the police
entered the house and arrested both the
defendants and the Chinaman; that the
defendants, while it is true that they had sought
employment as secret service agents, had failed
in their efforts to secure such employment, and
were acting wholly on their own initiative.
The trial court convicted the defendants of the
crime of forcible entry into the dwelling of
another and sentenced both and each of them to
four years, nine months and ten days of presidio
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
We do not think that they warrant a conviction
of the crime of forcible entry into the dwelling of
another. In the case of The United States v.
Pedro Dulfo 1 No. 4133, decided August 10,
1908, we held that "it is an essential element of
the offense under consideration, as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code, that the entry must
have been made without the consent or, more
accurately speaking, against the will of the
occupant of the dwelling house.
In the case at bar, there is no proof whatever of
opposition on the part of the owners of the
house to the entry of the defendants. On the
contrary, the action of the occupant of the lower
part of the house in permitting the defendants to
enter the house and go upstairs without
objection, was at least an implied permission to
enter if there was no objection on the part of the
woman occupying the upper floor of the house;
and her conduct in entering into amicable
conversation with the defendants when they
came upstairs, and later inviting them to sit
down and await the return of other persons
living there, leaves no room for doubt that the
entry of the defendants was not against her will
and that she interposed no objection or
opposition to their doing so.
The accused gained access to the house with the
tacit if not express consent of the occupants, and
it was not until they had been in the house for
more than two hours, and then only after they
attempted to impersonate police officers, that
any objection whatever was made to their
presence.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court are
reversed with the costs of both instances de
oficio.
G.R. No. 8469 September 12, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, vs. DEOGRACIAS PANES,
FACTS:
That on the night of the 18th day of September,
1912, Inocencia Guillan closed the door leading
into her house at about 9 o'clock p.m. and with
her young son retired to her room and her bed
for the night; that her husband was not at home
at that time; that she closed the door for fear
that someone might enter the house. That the
defendant, after the door had been closed in the
manner and for the reasons stated, without the
knowledge or consent of the owner, entered the
house of Inocencia Guillan and once inside said
house, the said accused did with a stick in his
hand awaken and threaten the inmates thereof,
who were asleep, thereby producing a serious
scene and fright among the inmates, who at the
time were all women. The defendant was found
guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and
sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of
three moths of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of
500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay the costs. From
that sentence the defendant appealed and in
this court makes the following assignments of
error:
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
The offense with which the defendant is charged
falls under article 491 of the Penal Code. Said
article provides a punishment for any private
person who shall enter the dwelling house of
another against the latter's will. In order that the
alleged offense shall fall under said article, the
offender must ( a) be a private person; ( b) enter
the house of another; and ( c) enter the house of
another against the latter's will. In the present
case the defendant was a private person and it is
admitted that he entered the house of another.
The only question that remains is did he enter
the house of another against the other's will.
In the case of United States vs. Villanueva (18
Phil. Rep., 215), this court said that: "It is well-
settled general rule that whoever enters the
dwelling of another at a late hour of night, after
the inmates have retired and closed their doors,
does so against their will and in violation of the
provisions of article 491 of the Penal Code.
Under these circumstances, an express
prohibition is not necessary, as such prohibition
is presumed.
In view of the facts established by the record and
of the jurisprudence heretofore announced by
this court, we are forced to the conclusion that
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and
that the sentence of the lower court should be
affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 1491. March 5, 1904. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.
LORENZO ARCEO ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants.
FACTS:
Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company
with his wife, Alejandra San Andres, and his
wife’s sister, Marcela San Andres. On the night of
the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9
o’clock at night, the accused, one of whom was
with a gun and the other two each with a bolo,
entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson
without first obtaining the permission of any
person. It appears from the proof that there was
a light burning in the house at that time the
accused entered, which was immediately put out
by one of the accused. Alejo and his wife had
retired for the night and Marcela was still sitting
up sewing as soon as Marcela had discovered the
accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his
wife and immediately after the accused were in
the house, one of them wounded, by means of a
bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner of the house.
The accused appropriated to their own use a
certain quantity of money, took and carried
away out of the said house toward the fields.
The court found that the defendants were each
guilty of the crime of entering the house of
another, with violence and intimidation, which
crime is punishable under subsection 2 of article
491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of
them to be imprisoned.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court justified in finding that the
accused were guilty of the crime of entering the
residence of another against his will and with
violence and intimidation?
HELD:
We think that it was. We are not of the opinion
that the statute relates simply to the method by
which one may pass the threshold of the
residence of another without his consent. We
think it relates also to the conduct, immediately
after entrance, of him who enters the house of
another without his consent. He who being
armed with deadly weapons enters the
residence of another in the nighttime, without
consent, and immediately commits acts of
violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering
the house of another with violence and
intimidation and is punishable under subsection
2 of article 491 of the Penal Code.
The inviolability of the house is one of the most
fundamental of all the individual rights declared
and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations. No one can enter into the home of
another without the consent of its owners or
occupants.
No one can enter the dwelling house of another,
in these Islands, without rendering himself liable
under the law, he has the express consent of the
owner and unless the one seeking entrance
comes within some of the exceptions dictated by
the law or by a sound public policy.
We find that the defendants are guilty of the
crime of entering the house of another with
violence and intimidation, without the consent
of the owner, with the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum
degree of prision correccional, and the fine
provided for in subsection 2 of article 491 of the
Penal Code should be imposed.

G.R. No. L-507 November 19, 1945
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs.
ANACLETO UY ALMEDA, appellant.
FACTS:
On the morning of November 13, 1940, the
appellant, in company with other persons,
arrived at the house of Honorata Limpo in the
municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna. The
latter was thereupon informed by appellant's
companion, Potenciano Villano, that they were
going to demolish and repair her house, to which
Honorata Limpo objected, specially in view of
the absence of her husband at the time.
Unheeding this opposition, and upon express
orders of the appellant, his companions
Potenciano Villano and Antonio Dysionglo
proceeded to gain entry into the house by means
of two ladders which they placed against the
front wall and to remove some boards and iron
sheets that served to cover the front side.
Appellant's designs were put to a stop, however,
only by the arrival of Honorata's son named
Francisco, who called a policeman to the scene.
Court of First Instance of Laguna, convicted
Anacleto Uy Almeda, of the offense of qualified
trespass to dwelling and sentencing him to
undergo imprisonment for the indeterminate
period of from four months and one day
of arresto mayor to two years, four months and
one day of prision correccional, with the
accessories of the law and one-third of the costs.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes. The appellant tries to exculpate himself by
maintaining that there is absolutely no proof as
to his criminal intent in entering the yard or even
the house of Honorata. Indeed, it is insisted that
he merely wanted to repair said house over
which he was claiming ownership. Appellant
thus pretended to have bought the house for
P70 from the estranged wife of Honorata's son
against whose father he subsequently filed a suit
to recover the premises. This case was however,
decided against him. We are of the opinion that
the alleged ownership is immaterial, for even
supposing that the house belonged to the
appellant, that fact alone did not authorize him
to do anything with or enter the house against
the will of its actual occupant. He could have
invoked the aid of the court for the exercise or
protection of his alleged proprietary rights. What
is intended to be protected and preserved by the
law is the privacy of one's dwelling, and, except
in those cases enumerated in the third
paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal intent inheres in the unwelcome
visit of a trespasser.
[ G .R No. 40512, Mar 03, 1934 ]
PEOPLE v. PERFECTO TAYAG
FACTS:
That at a little after two o'clock on the morning
of September 12, 1933, the said two appellants,
armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to
Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's store, which also served
as his dwelling, located, as aforestated, at No.
325-A, San Marcelino Street, of the City of
Manila. Believing that they were unnoticed, they
proceeded to open one of the doors of the said
store with the tools bolo and screw driver which
they then carried and which, of course, were not
the proper means for that purpose. After they
had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of
the door and upon becoming aware that the
inhabitants of the store had been awakened,
they tried to escape but policemen A. Santos, J.
Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that time had
been watching them, detained and placed them
under arrest. The said policemen found the bolo,
in the possession of the appellant Perfecto
Tayag, and the screw driver, in the possession of
the other appellant Afanasio Morales.
The defendants and appellants Perfecto Tayag
and Atanasio Morales were convicted of
attempted robbery in an inhabited house,
attempted to enter the said house with intent to
rob, according to the allegations of the
information, by means of force and by using a
bolo and a screw driver to force one of the doors
thereof, which were then closed and barred.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes. In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay
there were, at that time, a little more than P40
in cash, which represented the proceeds of his
sales the day before, and merchandise valued at
around P1,000. However, there is absolutely
nothing of record to show that the said
appellants' intention on that occasion was to
commit robbery, or that they somehow knew
that they would find money amounting to P40
therein. In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of
the accused must be proven by means of
competent and conclusive evidence and should
never be based on mere inferences, however
reasonable these may be, particularly when
there still remains, as in this case, a sufficient
indication of the existence of an intention
different from that of committing robbery. It
would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose
that had the appellants succeeded in entering
the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they
would have carried away all the goods therein,
because they would not have been able to do so
by themselves, not having any vehicle at their
disposal.
The act committed by the appellants simply
constitutes the crime of attempted trespass to
dwelling, as defined in article 280, paragraph 2,
of the Revised Penal Code, that is, trespass
committed by means of violence.
GR No. 38417, Dec 16, 1933 ]
PEOPLE v. MARCIANO MEDINA
FACTS:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1932, in
the municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the said accused, Marciano
Medina alias Mariano Medina alias Alejandro
Dola, being a private individual, at night time,
entered the dwelling of Capt. J. H. Davidson
against the latter's will, by forcing his way
through a window protected by wire screens, an
opening not intended for entrance, and once
inside the house, when his presence therein was
detected by the inmates thereof who tried to put
him under arrest, the said Marciano Medina in
resisting arrest and thus be able to escape, with
intent to kill Joseph Davidson, son of Capt.
Davidson, assault, attack and stab with an open
knife said Joseph Davidson.
The accused was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal with "the crime of trespass to
dwelling, with frustrated homicide, and physical
injuries
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
The offense with which the defendant is charged
falls under article 491 of the Penal Code. Said
article provides a punishment for any private
person who shall enter the dwelling house of
another against the latter's will. In order that the
alleged offense shall fall under said article, the
offender must ( a) be a private person; ( b) enter
the house of another; and ( c) enter the house of
another against the latter's will. All of the
requisites pertaining to the said crime are
committed by appellant and thus be held guilty
of the same. For the crime of trespass to dwelling
by means of violence, not more than four years,
nine months, and eleven days of prision
correccional, and a fine of P200 or the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and not less than two years of
prision correccional;
[ GR No. L-6730, Oct 15, 1954 ]
PEDRO GABRIEL v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of April 19,
1949, accused Pedro Gabriel, Avelino Natividad
and Miguel Evangelista arrived at the house,
presented themselves as Meralco light
inspectors to Mrs. Jones who was then on the
stairs of the house with Mariquita and inquired
from the ladies for Sherman Jones. Mrs. Jones
told them to wait on the porch when she entered
the living room, closed the door behind her and
went to the family bedroom where Sherman was
then in the act of changing his clothes. While
Mrs. Jones was inside the bedroom and
informing her husband of the presence of the
Meralco inspectors, accused Gabriel inspected
the electric meter and then shouted to his co-
accused Natividad: "Naty, atras ang contador."
Natividad rushed into the living room and then
entered the bedroom where Sherman and his
wife were talking. Natividad pushed the door of
the bedroom with such force that the said door
brushed aside Mrs. Jones who was then leaving
behind it. Accused Gabriel followed Natividad to
the bedroom and, with the help of flashlights,
both searched for a gadget which they suspected
Sherman used in order to steal electric fluid.
Notwithstanding Sherman's protest of their
intrusion, the two accused continued their
search. Finding that Sherman meant business,
the intruders left the bedroom hastily, boarded
their jeep and went away with the other accused
Evangelista to Sangandaan Street where they
met policeman Pablo Malosido of Caloocan. The
trio requested the policeman accompany them
to Sherman's house in order to explain to him
that they had. no intention to do him any harm.
The policeman accompanied them, but upon
noticing the presence of several Americans in the
house, they left. They noticed later that a truck
commonly known as 6x6 started from Sherman's
house and followed them. They were able to
hide and later went to the municipal building of
Caloocan, at which Sherman and his companions
subsequently arrived to complain. Sherman's
complaint, however, was referred to the police
authorities of Malabon who had jurisdiction over
the case."
The Court of Appeals, convicting the appellants
Pedro Gabriel and Avelino Natividad of simple
trespass to dwelling.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
No. In asking for the reversal of the judgment
below counsel for appellants argue that
inasmuch as the original entry was with the
permission of the occupant of the house and
therefore lawful, nothing that happened
afterwards could "convert the original lawful
entry into an unlawful one." The argument
assumes that appellants entered a dwelling with
the consent of the householder. But the
assumption is gratuitous and unwarranted, the
Court of Appeals having found "that the entry
was against the will of the spouses." That will
was, we think, clearly manifested by the lady of
the house when she told appellants to wait on
the porch and closed the door behind her as she
entered the drawing room. She did not, it is true,
in so many words tell the appellants not to enter.
But when she made them wait outside and shut
the door to the interior of the house, her action
spoke louder than words. The porch is an open
part of the house, and being allowed to wait
there under the circumstances mentioned can in
no sense be taken as entry to a dwelling with the
consent of the dweller.
Counsel contend that appellants are exempt
from criminal liability under the third paragraph
of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, because
"they rendered a service to justice" when, as
Meralco line inspectors, they "followed Mrs.
Sherman Jones to the bedroom" and there found
her husband "hiding a transformer in an
'aparador' " Here again, counsel assume
something which was not believed by the Court
of Appeals, that is, that appellants saw Jones in
the act of hiding a transformer used by him "in
stealing electricity," this claim being
characterized by the court as nothing but a "vain
effort on the part of the appellants to fit the facts
of the case to the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code to the effect that a person who enters a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering service to
justice, is not guilty of trespass." In other words,
the Court of Appeals believed that appellants
merely suspected that there was a transformer
in the house. That alone did not give them the
right to enter the house against the will of its
owner, unarmed as they were with a search
warrant.
It appearing that the judgment appealed from is
in accordance with law and the facts as found by
the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
GRAVE THREATS
[G.R. No. 9444. October 29, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
SOFRONIO DE LA CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Sofronio de la Cruz was charged with having
threatened Dolores Coronel in a letter with
death or the burning of her house unless she
gave him P500, which she must deposit in the
place indicated to her in the letter. This letter
was found by Rafaela Goronel, who was living
with Dolores, in the fence around her house, and
as she was then on her way to church she turned
it over to her neighbor Agustin, Coronel, who
read its contents to Dolores Coronel, an old
woman of 70 years, who became nervous and
uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito
Coronel reported the matter to the municipal
president of Guagua, Pampanga, who went to
Dolores’ house and adopted some precautionary
measures. Upon returning to the town hall he
found a man held under arrest by the
Constabulary. He had him searched to see
whether he was carrying any prohibited thing
and there was found upon him an envelope
inside a pocketbook, and upon the envelope was
written the name of Dolores Coronel. The man
under arrest was Sofronio de la Cruz.
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga
sentenced the defendant, as guilty of threats,
under article 494 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in finding the herein
defendant-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:

No. The crime of grave threat is punishable

under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). It is stated therein that any person who
shall threaten another with the infliction upon
the person, honor, or property of the latter or of
his family or any wrong amounting to a crime.
The threat is considered to be grave if the
offender shall have made the threat demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even
though not unlawful, and that said offender shall
have attained his purpose. The crime shall
likewise be grave threat even if the threat of
infliction of harm upon a person, his honor or
property was not made subject to a condition.
For having made the threat and demanding a
sum of money, even though he did not obtain it,
the penalty should be in the maximum degree,
however, as he made the threat in writing.