Cayetano vs.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While

ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) Commented [1]:

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself
as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing

for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section
I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and

Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on
the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent
to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that
the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as

commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice
is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140
A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22
A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most

publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history,
not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they
find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients
and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from
it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles,
the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints
are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer
is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting

and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends,
the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and
the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting

and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained

primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as

the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (
Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3)
a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel
for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy
at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors
of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can
be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be

used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise

a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time
when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than
a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino

to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination

of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than
ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank
of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements
contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set

of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure
to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to
the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but
to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists

of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice
by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings
on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much
less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,

may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
FACTS:

Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed as Chairman of the Commission of

Elections. His appointment was contested by Atty. Renato Cayetano citing that
his years of experience cannot be considered that which constitutes the
“practice of law”. Atty. Monsod was a member of good standing in the Bar for
more than ten (10) years. He worked: Commented [2]:

– As a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963);

– As an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970);

– As a Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986);

– As a legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986);

– As Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);

– As a member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987);

– As National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and,

– As a member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the above mentioned activities may be considered to constitute

the “practice of law”.

HELD:

YES. By majority vote.

RATIO:

Definition of “practice of law” by:

Black’s Legal Dictionary: The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent.

Philippine Lawyer’s Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177): The

practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying.
Commented [3]:

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he
had scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified
to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. According Commented [4]:
to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “
does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of
actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed
the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his
right has been questioned formally. Commented [5]:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or
is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the
practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but
also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving
the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions.
Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or Commented [6]:
technical men, which is not the case. Commented [7]:

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ,
- versus -
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 9387

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her

lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case. Commented [8]:

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents
in an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Commented [9]:
(RTC).

In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang

(Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor
of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein,
Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants
Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf,
he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a
Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003. Commented [10]:

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal

was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored
the Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice
of law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because
respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent several times about the status of the appeal,
but despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic], to the damage and
prejudice of the spouses.[4] Commented [11]:

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant

was informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the
RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution. Commented [12]:

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint[5] with the

Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit,
malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in
the amount of ₱350,000. Commented [13]:

Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline

Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint.
In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the outright dismissal
of the Complaint. Commented [14]:

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred

that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005,
he had never met complainant, because it was her husband who had
personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband
despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because
according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three
days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal
because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which was required.[9] Commented [15]:

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to

settle the case. The latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice.[10] Commented [16]:

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing,

respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the
husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received
an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Duigan, he instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru
available means of communication, but to no avail.[11] Thus, when
complainants husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the
Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing
the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO.[12]

In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent
be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28

August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months. Commented [17]:

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the

relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012,
the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15] partly
granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month
suspension from the practice of law. Commented [18]:

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter[16] addressed to then Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint
against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally
imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a
perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that
he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including
complainant and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following
sentence: DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable
Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x.[18] Nowhere does
the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainants husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a

lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be
said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case
that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x[19]

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client

relationship, he also alleges that complainants husband never contacted him
after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this
behavior was very unusual if he really believed that he engaged the formers
services.[20]

Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer,
because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱7,000.

According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim that

he charged ₱7,000 as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the preparation of
the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x.[22]

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship

and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[23] Once a lawyer
agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the client with
competence and diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. Commented [19]:

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants

husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum
of Appeal, because he honestly believed that this was the pleading required,
based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5
January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client
may have believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to know the proper
pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz: Commented [20]:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent
should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said
Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules
applies.[25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice
of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed
cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the
appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the
CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5
of the Code reads:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate

in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence. Commented [21]:

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been

expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able
to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar.
Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that
the reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he did not have
enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case.
The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally
imposed.

Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with

the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was
not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this
fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the
Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of
time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could
come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27] Commented [22]:

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that
he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a
comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order.
He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her
husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed
himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment
he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his
negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the
status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule
18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information. Commented [23]:
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he
was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them.[28] His failure to take
this measure proves his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on
Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code,
a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Commented [24]:

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their
negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary
action.[29]

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer

violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional
conduct for which he should be held accountable.[30]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating

Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent
as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7329 November 27, 2013

SPOUSES DAVID AND MARISA WILLIAMS, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

The Case

This is a complaint1 dated 12 September 2006 filed by complainants Spouses

David and Marisa Williams (Spouses Williams) against respondent Atty. Rudy
T. Enriquez (Atty. Enriquez), a retired judge. The Spouses Williams charge Commented [25]:
Atty. Enriquez of dishonesty. In his 22 April 2008 Report,2 Integrated Bar of Commented [26]:
the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Ronald Dylan P. Concepcion
(Commissioner Concepcion) found that Atty. Enriquez knowingly made
untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against the Spouses Williams
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In its 5 June 2008 Resolution,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the fmdings and recommendation of Commissioner Concepcion and,
in its 26 June 2011 Resolution,4 denied Atty. Enriquez s motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts

Josephine L. Verar (Verar) owned a 13,432-square meter parcel of land Commented [27]:
described as Lot No. 2920, situated in San Miguel, Bacong, Negros Oriental
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19723. Around June
2002, the Spouses Williams bought a 2,000-square meter portion of the
property. The sale was annotated on TCT No. T-19723. Commented [28]:

On 4 December 2002, Atty. Enriquez, representing his clients Desiderio B.

Ventolero (Desiderio), Francisco B. Ventolero (Francisco), Ramon Verar
(Ramon), Martin Umbac (Umbac), and Lucia Briones (Briones), filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Bacong, Negros Oriental, a complaint5
against the Spouses Williams for forcible entry, which was docketed as Civil Commented [29]:
Case No. 390. The Spouses Williams failed to answer the complaint within the
prescribed period. In its 5 May 2003 Decision,6 the MCTC held that:

In the case at bar, the defendant David Williams undisputedly received the
summons and copy of the complaint on February 19, 2003. Pursuant to Section
6, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, defendant had until
February 29, 2003 within which to file an answer to the complaint. But it was
only on March 4, 2003 that said defendant actually filed his Answer. Under
[Section 7], this Court is mandated to render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. Commented [30]:

xxxx

Through co-plaintiff Desiderio Briones Ventolero who has been tilling and
plowing the said parcel of land since time immemorial, plaintiffs have been
exercising the attributes of ownership thereof such as the right to possess,
abuse and enjoy. Said lot is surrounded by a barbed wire fence nailed to
bamboo posts (go-od) to prevent and deter animals from eating the seasonal
corn plants and other improvement introduced therein by plaintiffs.

On May 23, 2002, in the presence of plaintiffs Desiderio Briones Ventolero and
Francisco Briones Ventolero, defendant David Williams, an American national,
without any authority of law and legal basis, destroyed the barbed wire fence
that surrounded the subject property by means of force and violence, by tying
it with a chain attached to his pick-up vehicle and dragged it away. Defendant
also struck and ball-hammered the bamboo posts (go-od) and uprooted them.
Not contented, and motivated by malice, defendant detached the "No
Trespassing" signboard placed in the premises of the lot in question and
handed it over to the Judge in open court. Although shaken with fear, plaintiff
Francisco Briones Ventolero mustered enough courage to approach and ask
defendant David Williams why he destroyed the fence. Williams angrily replied
that he had bought the property.

xxxx

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they had been
in prior possession of Lot 2920 subject of this case. They had been cultivating
the same through plaintiff Desiderio Briones Ventolero since time immemorial
until defendant David Williams, an American national, who claims to have
bought the property, forcibly and violently destroyed on May 23, 2002 the
barbed wire fence that surrounded the subject lot to protect plaintiffs’ seasonal
corn plants and other improvement from stray animals. Since then defendant
Williams and his spouse, Marisa Bacatan, have been occupying a portion of
said Lot No. 2920, thereby depriving plaintiffs of their physical possession and
use thereof. For which reason, they have asked this Court to restore to them
such possession. Commented [31]:

Evidently, the plaintiffs, who had been in prior, peaceable, quiet possession of
Lot 2920, had been ousted therefrom by the defendants through force on May
23, 2002 or within one (1) year from the filing of the Complaint on December
04, 2002. Thus, it behooves this Court to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiffs.7

As a result of the forcible entry suit filed against them, the Spouses Williams
filed the present complaint against Atty. Enriquez, charging him of committing
falsehood and of misleading the MCTC. They alleged that Atty. Enriquez (1)
falsely claimed that the property was covered by an OCT, not a TCT; (2) falsely
claimed that Veran, not Verar, was the registered owner of the property; (3)
falsely claimed that Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and Briones were
the owners of the property; (4) falsely claimed that Veran was not the real
owner but a trustee of Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and Briones; and
(5) fraudulently withheld the pages of TCT No. T-19723 bearing the annotation
of the sale of the 2,000-square meter portion of the property to the Spouses
Williams. Commented [32]:

In his comment8 dated 26 January 2007, Atty. Enriquez prayed that the
complaint against him be dismissed because (1) the Spouses Williams had
filed four other administrative cases against him; (2) Desiderio verified the
complaint he filed against the Spouses Williams; (3) Francisco executed an
affidavit of ownership over the property; (4) the MCTC decided Civil Case No.
390 in favor of Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and Briones; (5) the sale
of the 2,000-square meter portion of the property to the Spouses Williams was
invalid; and (6) the causes of action against him arose from the complaint he
filed with the MCTC which was a privileged communication and, thus,
unactionable. Commented [33]:

In its 21 March 2007 Resolution,9 the Court referred the matter to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Ruling

In his 22 April 2008 report, Commissioner Concepcion found that Atty. Enriquez
knowingly made untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against the
Spouses Williams and recommended that he be suspended from the practice
of law for one year. Commissioner Concepcion stated that:

While respondent enumerates and discusses the merits of the pending cases
filed by or against the complainants herein, the latter [sic] are not the concern
of this Commission. It is unfortunate that he sidestepped the issue of this
administrative case.

xxxx

After comparing the allegations in the complaint which the respondent filed with
the MCTC and the attachments thereto, the following facts come to light:

1. The complaint in Civil Case No. 390 states that Desiderio Briones Ventolero,
Francisco Briones Ventolero, Ramon Verar, Martin Umbac and Lucia Briones
are the lawful owners in fee simple of Lot No. 2920 of the Bacong Cadastre of
Bacong, Negros Oriental. It further claims that Josephine L. Veran in whose
name Original Certificate of Title No. T-19723 was issued is the trustee for all
the other co-heirs/co-owners.

2. However, it is very clear even from the copy of the Transfer Certificate of
Title attached to the complaint that it is Josephine L. Verar who is the owner in
fee simple of the property described in the said Transfer Certificate of Title (not
Original Certificate of Title, as maintained by the respondent) No. T-19723. To
claim a right thereunder under false declarations is indeed actionable.

3.It is likewise clear that respondent did not attach the other pages of the said
TCT to the complaint which could have attested to the fact of purchase by the
complainants of a portion of Lot No. 2920 and which could have proved crucial
in the disposition of the case by the MCTC. The complete copy of the TCT
attached by the complainants in their complaint is very telling in this case.

xxxx

It cannot be denied that respondent knew that Josephine L. Verar was not
merely a trustee of the respondent’s clients but the owner in fee simple; that
the ownership is evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of Title T-19723 and not
by any other Original or Transfer Certificate of Title; and that a 2,000-square
meter portion was validly sold to the complainants herein.

Respondent thus knowingly made untruthful statements in his complaint with

the MCTC. The fact that the complaint was verified by respondent’s clients
does not exculpate the respondent from liability. Commented [34]:
Such misconduct of the respondent is a clear violation of his oath that he will
do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent violated
his oath when he resorted to deception.

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that

respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law
with a warning that similar acts in the future would be dealt with more
severely.10

In its 5 June 2008 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Concepcion and,
in its 26 June 2011 Resolution, denied Atty. Enriquez’s motion for
reconsideration. Commented [35]:

On 10 October 2011, Atty. Enriquez filed with the Court a petition11 for review
dated 19 August 2011 challenging the IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008
and 26 June 2011 Resolutions. In his 19 August 2011 petition, Atty. Enriquez
raised as issues:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. That the Honorable Investigating IBP Commissioner CONCEPCION grossly

erred when he ruled and [sic] pursuant to the JOINT-COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 390, stating "the HRS. OF AUREA
BRIONES" and CIRIACO VENTOLERO are the lawful owners in fee simple of
LOT 2920, though registered in the name of JOSEPHINE L. VERAR under
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-19723, is a "TRUSTEE for all the
other co-heirs/co-owners" x x x;

2. That the Honorable IBP Commissioner CONCEPCION patently erred when

he ruled "To claim a right thereunder FALSE DECLARATION is entirely
actionable." x x x;

3. That [sic] the Honorable IBP Commissioner CONCEPCION patently erred

when he ruled that Petitioner "did not attach the other pages of the said TCT in
[sic] the Complaint which could have attested to the fact of purchase by the
Complainants of a portion of LOT 2920 x x x[;]

4. That the Honorable IBP Investigating Commissioner CONCEPCION patently

erred and without factual and legal basis [sic] when he unilaterally concluded
that the allegations in the "Complaint (CIVIL CASE NO. 390) were false and
that Petitioner knew them to be so. In other words the Respondent (Petitioners
[sic]) MUST HAVE BEEN MOVED BY MALICE or BAD FAITH." x x x[;]

5. That IBP Investigating Commissioner CONCEPCION grossly erred and

falsely concluded that Respondent (Petitioner) "knowingly made untruthful
statement in his Complaint".12

The Spouses Williams filed an opposition13 to Atty. Enriquez’s petition for

review. They prayed that the petition be denied for being filed out of time.

The Issue

The main issue is whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty

warranting his suspension from the practice of law.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sets aside the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The IBP Board of Governors’ 5 June 2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions
did not become final. Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors are only
recommendatory and always subject to the Court’s review. In Ylaya v.
Gacott,14 the Court held that:

We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors
are merely recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final
action from this Court. Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that: Commented [36]:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred,
it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of

law. It exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not
relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are
exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s
recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval.15

In administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Court’s
disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar.
Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. In Anacta v.
Resurreccion,16 the Court held that:

x x x Thus, it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the
disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of
judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s
oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and
which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then
the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority.17

On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams
against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the
Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of
ownership must first be settled. The Spouses Williams alleged that Verar was
the owner of the property and that she sold a portion of it to them. On the other
hand, Atty. Enriquez alleged that Desiderio, Francisco, Ramon, Umbac and
Briones were the real owners of the property and that Verar was only a trustee.
This was precisely the issue in Civil Case No. 390. Unfortunately, the MCTC
was not able to make a definite ruling because the Spouses Williams failed to
file their answer within the prescribed period.

The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not

administrative, case.1awp++i1 In Virgo v. Amorin,18 the Court dismissed
without prejudice a complaint against a lawyer because it could not determine
his fitness to remain a member of the Bar without delving into issues which are
proper subjects of judicial action. The Court held that:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a

respondent to remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the
merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain
whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer
concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going
through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases,
particularly Civil Case No. 01-45798.19 Commented [37]:
The allegations that Atty. Enriquez wrote "OCT" instead of "TCT" but with the
same number T-19723, and "Veran" instead of "Verar," are too trivial to give
rise to administrative sanction. Besides, these mistakes could have been made
inadvertently. Atty. Enriquez's failure to attach the pages of TCT No. T-19723
bearing the annotation of the sale to the Spouses Williams did not prejudice
the Spouses Williams because in forcible entry the issue is the fact of prior
possession, not ownership.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the IBP Board of Governors' 5 June
2008 and 26 June 2011 Resolutions and DISMISSES without prejudice A.C.
No. 7329.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

AC. No. 10912, January 19, 2016

PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ,

Respondent.

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted
and approved the findings and the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer).

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina
T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as
acceptance fees, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Case Title
Acceptance Fees
People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-359) filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite
P 20,000.00
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Rodel Gamboa for qualified theft/estafa (I.S. No.
XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila
P 8,000.00
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas2
P 15,000.00
cralawlawlibrary

On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting,

respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged
the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50,
as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer
appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to
facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to
complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31,
2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant
was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account
Closed."4 Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor
of the check.

In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the
acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of
the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.

In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another
lawyer, Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the
redemption of the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of the
paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the
payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of PI00,000.00 in
order to avoid the interests due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge; and
moral damages of P 300,000.00.

For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las
Pinas City, against him.7

On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on

Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of
respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD
required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite
having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his
answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master of the Las
Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.

Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory

conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her
counsel appeared on the said day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the resetting of
the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the
personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given address.11
Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's mother,12 he
still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move for
the termination of the conference and the submission of the case for report and
recommendation.

On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the

disbarment of respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the
evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the
borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Worse,
respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law
which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct."

On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in

Resolution No. XXI-2014-698.14

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the
entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being
merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to
par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15

The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the
accusations against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to
explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance
to oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons only for
known to him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by
the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward the same for his personal
consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot
indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law
profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the
nobility and honor of the legal profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's
failure or refusal to participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the
Court from determining the full extent of his liability and imposing an
appropriate sanction, if any.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent
lawyer's violation of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of
the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent
lawyer of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of
valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of
pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth
P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it
thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of Rule
16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes
immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from
borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent
lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer
used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the
proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended to subsequently
pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves
detestation was the very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over
his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter's property. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural
tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse.22 The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent
the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.23 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the
borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the
CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.

Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his

representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She
accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon
presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take
steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation,
constraining complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.

Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of
respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the
redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute
grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his
part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers
and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action,25 and
thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession.26 Such
conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is
much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar.27 In this case,
respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he once made upon
admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers
must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."28

As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court

takes heed of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of
the erring person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the Court's plenary
power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the
Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against
respondent lawyer, with a stern warning that a repetition of any of the
infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier
penalty.

Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the
rule that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for
money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order
respondent lawyer to make the payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the
value of which is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding.

As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating

Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"—

As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after

payment of attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the
complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was not
fully explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases
"abandoned" by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the
complainant. This Commission noted that not a single document or order
coming from the court of prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-
Affidavit that would at least apprise this body of what the respondent actually
did with the cases he represented.32cralawlawlibrary

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-

settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary
concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered.
Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court
to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for
damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed
by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer
agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs
an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore
indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only
seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by
the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.35

In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00,

respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which
respondent lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this oversight of
the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from
her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that
respondent lawyer committed abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of
cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the return of the subject
acceptance fees.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of

violating Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING

that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the
personal record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A.C. No. 10868

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in
a pleading merit the penalty of disbarment.

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent
Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature
on the Petition.1 She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-
Tamaray.2

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her
husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray.3 To support her allegation, she attached
the Affidavit4 of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit states:

1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East

Cafe at Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;

2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to

us (Cheryl and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that
Atty. Daquis' husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the
latter and got her services;

3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting
and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to
annul his marriage with Cheryl;

4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother
arrived and shortly after, the group left;

5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went
to McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to
oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.]5 (Emphasis
supplied)

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her

"that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City."6 In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked
her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.7

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's

Office and met Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the
Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.8
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed
by her.9

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was
forged by Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate
appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided in Muntinlupa
City.10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a resident of #9 Daang
Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan."11
She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she
has been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay
Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City... from 2000 till present."12

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.13

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition
states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville
Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]"14 which is the address of her husband's
family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by
Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte
Tamaray.15

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray,
complainant herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-
Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not December 2006.16

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when
she notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied
by Vasco-Tamaray.17 Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint
Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena
(Lorena).18

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-
Tamaray to be a client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis
forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was
provided by Vasco-Tamaray.19

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand
money from Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so.20
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When
Vasco-Tamaray requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was
unable to grant her client's request because she did not have a copy of the
Petition with her at that time.21

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son

with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles
Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/
Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate.22

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position
papers,23 but based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied.24

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the

Complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The
Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-Tamaray should have
questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any
petition, but she failed to do so.25

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.26

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should
be held administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for
complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged
signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of
Canon 15 is dismissed.

By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1,

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her
duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any falsehood in court
as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.27

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was
Leomarte Tamaray's counsel28 but was unable to rebut the other allegations
against her.

Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006,29 but did not
refute30 the statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte
Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer.31 Likewise, respondent admitted that
she met with complainant subsequently,32 but did not refute Maritess
Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to
convince complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul
their marriage.33

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant.34
Yet, there is no explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they
were introduced. It appears, then, that respondent was contacted by Leomarte
Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told
Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was
because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"35

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that
complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a
probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the petitioner
because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the
admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.

In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there

appears to be no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled."36

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never
received any court process because her purported address in the Petition is
the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The Petition states that complainant is "of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09 Daang Hari St.,
Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]"37

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that

Leomarte's residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while
complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila."38
Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were married,
complainant most likely did not receive court processes because she left their
home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As
written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:

P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They
became sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until
1996;

During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she
even sleeps in their house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as
respondent worked in Japan;

Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996.
They had no children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11,
1996;

Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another

woman. As a result, petitioner left their house.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor
that she did not file any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because
during the meeting on March 5, 2007, complainant had no knowledge that the
Petition was filed in her name.40 She obtained a copy of the Petition after the
March 5, 2007 meeting.41

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy,42 this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as

follows:

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal
professions, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's

penalty- depends on the factual circumstances of each case .

....

. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure,
respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also
that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.43

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth
was otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and
complainant.

II

Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she
allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized.44

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged.45

Respondent merely denied complainant's allegation.46

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain

"CVasco."47 The records of this case show that complainant has used two
signatures. In her identification cards issued by the University of the East, she
used a signature that spelled out "CVasco."48 In her Complaint-Affidavit
against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out
"CTamaray."49

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference
in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the
documents50 attached to the records consistently appear to be of the same
height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c."51 Hence, it seems that complainant's
signature on the Petition for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage was forged.

While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's

signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be
used on a petition she prepared and notarized.52 In doing so, respondent
violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
....

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,53 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was
found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of
disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."54 This court discussed that:

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent

transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the
respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his
part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this
country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of
continuing as a member of the Bar.55

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature

on a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on
her part.

Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are:
engaging in a scuffle inside court chambers;56 openly doubting paternity of his
own son;57 hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court;58 harassing occupants of a
property;59 using intemperate language;60 and engaging in an extramarital
affair.61

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a

court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before
courts, in violation of Canon 10.

In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,62 this court discussed the importance of

Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as follows:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting
to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain
the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by
no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity,
and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice."63 (Emphasis supplied)

III

This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the
same case.

The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v.

Alcid, Jr.:64

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection
of the client's interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed
on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the
Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches
to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the
consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also
going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit
of justice[. ]65

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the

legal profession, as discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez:66

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the administration
of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. "67 (Citations omitted)

IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
when she entered her appearance as counsel for complainant68 even though
she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.69 Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.

....

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era:70

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations

wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may
only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary
obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak
and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the
course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree .

....

. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.1âwphi1
Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that
will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of
the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."

The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all
hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of
the client.71

The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in

Hornilla v. Salunat:72

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of

two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.73 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.74 When

the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed
the Petition as counsel for complainant.75 If respondent was indeed engaged
as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as

counsel by complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit
conflict of interest.

On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator
with his report.

(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the
imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue
a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution
shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence
presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if
any.76

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines was given the power to "issue a decision"77 if the lawyer
complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension or
disbarment."78 In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an
interested party filed a petition before this court.79

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the
power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings
and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are recommendatory,
subject to review by this court.80

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of

violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis is DISMISSED.

The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z.

Daquis. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of
Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5582

ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or
Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi
P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the complaints for disbarment filed by
Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly
representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M.
Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March
21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz
(Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his
complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the
said case during regular government hours while employed as Provincial Legal
Officer of Albay City. 3

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD)

engaged Muñoz as retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred
that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its administrator,
the National Electrification Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on
the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel of the NEA-
appointed team which took over the management of ALECO. Moreover,
Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial
and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their retainer
agreement. 4

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction

and Development Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed
ten (10) cases against Sun west on Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as Provincial Legal Officer.
5

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging
in private practice. In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of
disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of interest.6

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been
previously disciplined by the Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized
practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and was meted the penalty of
removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested that
Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Legazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section
7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713.7 Munoz's conviction
has since become final pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004
in G.R. No. 160668.8

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had

requested Governor Al Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to
continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This request was
granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request to
Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P.
Aguirre granted Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in

connection (sic) and that no conflict of interest with your present position as
Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;

2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what
circumstances you can engage in private employment shall be fixed by the
Governor of Albay to the end that it will not impair in any way your efficiency;
and

3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the
cancellation and/or revocation of this authority. 12 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following

conditions upon Muñoz:

a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;

b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided that
the efficiency of the Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;
c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record
considering the limitation already mentioned above; [and]

d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform functions subject

to limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160. 13

Muñoz emphasized that his authority 'to engage in private practice was
renewed by Governor Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in
July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in July 2004. 14

The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The
complaints were then consolidated through the Order dated January 16, 2003
issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the
complaints underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to
Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila.17

In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila
recommended that Muñoz be found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of law for an aggregate
period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner Aguila's
recommendation in a Resolution dated October 22, 2005.20

On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency
and Compassion before the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty
be reduced to one (1) year.21 This appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22

Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency,
Forgiveness and Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the
reduction of the recommended penalty of suspension for four (4) years to one
(1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints for disbarment filed against
him. As an alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted special
limited authority to practice law until all his pending cases are terminated. 24

In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer
from June 1995 to May 2002, he engaged in private practice pursuant to the
three (3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the written
authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims had never
been revoked. Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between
ALECO's old BOD and the NBA management team, since he was engaged as
retained counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams. 25
On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP
for disposition. 26

Acting on Munoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the

recommended period of suspension from four (4) to three (3) years. 27
Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG
denied on December 11, 2008.28

Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint
Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the
additional assertion that the fees he collected from ALECO were contemplated
under their retainer agreement. 29

The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his

DILG authorization.

Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for
his private practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government
officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered
by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five
(5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week.30 The number of required
weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the
department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule. 31

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-
six (86) court appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from
April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely alleged that his private practice
did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working

hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draft
pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz
clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his
private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of
the CPR.

Muñoz should have requested for

authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.
Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed
to have been perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in
good faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his second and
third terms sufficed.

Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which

Muñoz himself cites in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of one's
profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head of
the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules which provides, in part:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case
of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That
if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to
the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee
x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Munoz's
appointment as Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance
thereof.1âwphi1 As a local public official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to
secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his first
term, but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for
unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.

Muñoz represented conflicting interests.

Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc.

v. Pajarillo,36the Court explained the tests to determine the existence of
conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of

two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO
under the management of the old BOD in the following cases:

A. Civil Case No. 10007 -ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA
Project Supervisor and his team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to stop the
election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.

B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as

Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among others, this Petition was
filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of Directors
scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional
emphasis supplied)

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of

the NEA management team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his
advice would be sought with respect to the prosecution of the members of the
old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to alleged
mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board on one hand,
and NEA and its management team on the other, is apparent. By representing
conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Muñoz
violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38

In Catu v. Rellosa,39the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months upon a punong barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an
ejectment case without securing the authority of the Secretary of DILG. In
Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40the Court imposed the penalty of one (1) year
suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required him
to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously represented. In view of
Muñoz's multiple infractions, the Court finds the recommended penalty of
suspension for an aggregate period of three (3) years proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7424

NATIVIDAD R. MUNAR, BENNY O. TAGUBA, REYNALD S. LAMPITOC,

ADELINA A. FARNACIO, ANITA R. DOMINGO, LUZ T. DOMINGO,
EVANGELINE G. VINARAO, MOISES J. BARTOLOME, JR., ROSARIO R.
RAMONES, MERCEDITA G. PIMENTEL, MYRNA A. . CAMANTE, LEONIDA
A. RUMBAOA, NORMA U. VILLANUEVA, ANTONIA M. TANGONAN,
ASUNCION C. MARQUEZ, JULIETA B. MADRID, ESTRELLA C.
ARELLANO, LUDIVINA B. SALES, JEANY M. FLORENTINO, and SHRI B.
VISAYA, Petitioners
vs.
ATTY. ELMER T. BAUTISTA and ATTY. WINSTON F. GARCIA,
Respondents

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the Resolution2 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) passed by
its Board of Governors on June 5, 2008 adopting the Report and
Recommendation3 dated March 27, 2008 of the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner
Hababag) and dismissing the undated administrative Complaint for
Disbarment4 filed on February 1, 2007 by Benny O. Taguba, Natividad R.
Munar, Reynald S. Lampitoc, Adelina A. Farnacio, Anita R. Domingo, Luz T.
Domingo, Evangeline G. Vinarao, Moises J. Bartolome, Jr., Rosario R.
Ramones, Mercedita G. Pimentel, Myrna A. Camante, Leonida A. Rumbaoa,
Norma U. Villanueva, Antonia M. Tangonan, Asuncion C. Marquez, Julieta B.
Madrid, Estrella C. Arellano, Ludivina B. Sales, Jeany M. Florentino, and Shri
B. Visaya (collectively, the petitioners) against Atty. Elmer T. Bautista (Atty.
Bautista), Chief Legal Counsel and Atty. Winston F. Garcia (Atty. Garcia),
General Manager (respondents), both of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), for violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02,5 Canons 16 and 57 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the Attorney's Oath.

Factual Background
The petitioners are public school teachers and members of the GSIS residing
in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao.8 They alleged that sometime in
November 1998, marketing representatives of the GSIS and the San Lorenzo
Ruiz Realty and Development Corporation (SLRRDC), namely Ferdinand
Patajo, Levy Gonzales and Martina Guerrero (Representatives), visited a
number of public schools in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao, and enticed
the teachers to avail of SLRRDC's low-cost housing units in San Lorenzo Ruiz
Subdivision (the Subdivision) located at Marabulig I, Cauayan, Isabela based
on the following representations, to wit: (1) the Subdivision is financed by the
GSIS; (2) the housing units are available to the teachers at the least cost, not
exceeding ₱1,000.00 or ₱2,000.00 monthly, depending on the teacher's
capacity to pay; (3) the monthly amortizations are payable on any convenient
time of the year for the teachers, or after five or 10 years; (4) there are no
processing fees or downpayment; (5) no salary deduction but only direct
payments to the nearest GSIS Branch Office; (6) when the housing units are
ready for occupancy, the teachers will receive a cash gift of ₱3,000.00 for the
installation of water and electricity facilities; (7) that the units are payable until
the teacher-buyer reaches 70 years old; (8) the units may not be foreclosed
until the 10th year for its payment; (9) in case a teacher-buyer is unable to
continue payment, he/she may sell his right to the unit before it is foreclosed;
and (10) that the Subdivision is fully developed with first class amenities that
blends with nature's finest, such as: a) guarded entrance; b) concrete paved
roads; c) perimeter fence; d) street lights and street names; e) shady trees
every three meters; f) centralized water system; g) underground drainage; h)
clubhouse; i) tennis court; j) basketball court; k) children's playground; and l)
one perante orange tree per unit. The Representatives boasted that the
Subdivision will "set the standard of fine living" where the teachers' "dreams
are now a reality."9

The petitioners claimed that they were induced to sign blank forms to
supposedly reserve housing units in the Subdivision and were not given the
opportunity to review its contents due to the Representatives' excuse of being
in a hurry. The Representatives, however, assured them that they will return
with the filled-up forms for the petitioners' inspection and final decision, and
that more GSIS personnel would meet them regarding the housing project and
loan. The petitioners highly relied on the said assurances by signing the blank
forms in contemplation of a good future investment.10

Apparently, none of the Representatives or any person from SLRRDC or GSIS

returned as promised for the supposed further orientation and explanation on
the housing project and loan. Sometime in August 1999, the petitioners were
aghast at their respective salary deductions in the amount of ₱5,000.00
monthly for an alleged housing loan from the GSIS. They complained that the
deduction left them with a measly ₱1,000.00 as "take home" pay. The
petitioners claimed that their signatures in the Authority to Deduct were
forged.11

In October 1999, Elvira Agcaoili of the GSIS Main Office visited GSIS Cauayan,
Isabela to invite the petitioners to a forum and convinced them to go on with
the housing loan on the premise that the GSIS was after their welfare but to no
avail. She agreed to stop the salary deductions against the monthly pay of the
petitioners by cancelling the Deeds of Conditional Sale (DCS). She, however,
told them that it would take six months to do so. It was only in or about August
2003 that the Notices of Cancellation12 were mostly sent to them by the
GSIS.13

In 2004, the petitioners received notices from the GSIS that they still remain
liable to pay for the accrued interests of the principal amount of the housing
loan. To their dismay, the value of the housing loans reflected in their GSIS
records ranged from ₱800,000.00 to more than ₱1,000,000.00 for a house and
lot they allegedly never bought or even saw, much less occupied. They were
also directed to pay the alleged arrears in order to stop the loans from further
escalating in interest and their retirement pay may not be even enough to settle
them.14

On January 19, 2004, Atty. Bautista issued a Memorandum15 regarding the

right of GSIS to retain ownership of the subject housing units and to collect the
purchase price thereof through monthly salary deduction against the
petitioners. In support of the collection enhancement of the GSIS on the matter,
the GSIS Board of Trustees (BOT) passed Board Resolution No. 48.16
Accordingly, Atty. Garcia, as GSIS General Manager, enforced and
implemented the same by effecting salary deductions on the monthly pay of
the petitioners as public school teachers.17

The petitioners claimed that the allowance and implementation of the collection
on arrears on cancelled housing loans are tantamount to double recovery for
the GSIS.18 The respondents ought to know that double recovery is not only
prohibited by law, but it is also against public policy and morals. The
respondents, therefore, committed serious infractions of the profession's
ethical rules and put in question their moral and continued fitness to remain as
members of the legal profession.19

In the Resolution20 dated March 7, 2007, the Court required the respondents
to comment on the complaint.

In compliance, Atty. Bautista commented21 that he rendered a legal opinion

on July 25, 2003, as former Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS Legal Services
Group, upon the request of Arnaldo Cuasay, the Senior Vice President of the
Housing and Real Property Development Group, regarding the issue on
whether the GSIS can collect arrearages on a housing loan with a DCS that
was cancelled vis-a-vis Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6552 or the Maceda Law.22

The legal opinion of Atty. Bautista, in part, reads:

It is clear then that the law expressly recognizes the vendor's right of
cancellation of sale on installments with full retention of previous payments only
in commercial and industrial properties. The law does not provide recovery of
arrearages from the defaulting buyer in case of cancellation of conditional sale
of residential properties. On the contrary, the refund of the cash surrender
value of the payments on the residential property to the buyer is mandated.

The application of said law in the case of Valarao vs. Court of Appeals, x x x,
is also clear when the Supreme Court held that "the rescission of the contract
and the forfeiture of the payments already made could not be effected, because
the case falls under [R.A.] No. 6552 x x x."23

He explained that he needed to re-study the matter because the GSIS was
unable to implement the cancellation of the DCS between SLRRDC and the
borrower/member (herein petitioners) to take possession of the subject
property through ejectment proceedings, or to even recover its investment in
the housing unit. Worse, the awardees of the cancelled housing loans
continually occupied the housing units without paying their amortizations or any
reasonable rental fees.24 Hence, Atty. Bautista issued a new legal opinion
which provided for the collection of arrearages by the GSIS because of its
acquisition of all of SLRRDC's rights in the DCS and the Deed of Absolute Sale
and Assignment (DASA) by legal subrogation under Article 130325 of the Civil
Code. It was also provided therein that allowing the borrower/member to go
scot-free after the cancellation of the DCS would be contrary to the principle of
unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti and at the same time repugnant to the
mandate of the GSIS to ensure collection or recovery of all indebtedness
payable in its favor.26

On March 10, 2004, the GSIS-BOT passed and approved Board Resolution
No. 48, as recommended by the Housing and Real Property Development
Group based on Atty. Bautista's memorandum pursuant to Section 41(a)27 of
R.A. No. 8291,28 which supported the collection of arrearages on the cancelled
housing loans through salary deduction against the petitioners.29

In his Comment,30 Atty. Garcia averred that the disbarment complaint against
him constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of Board Resolution No. 48.
He discussed that a real property developer obtains a loan from the GSIS then
assigns its rights under a DASA in favor of the latter. GSIS would then collect
on the housing loan through monthly amortizations from the member's salary
through monthly deduction. Title to the property would only transfer upon full
payment of the loan.31

To amplify his defense, he explained that the petitioners' non-payment of the

monthly amortizations resulted in the cancellation of the DCS and that such
rampant practice of non-payment prompted the GSIS to devise a policy that
would enhance its collection efforts such as the assailed Board Resolution No.
48, which sought to collect rental fees and not the purchase price of the housing
units that were occupied by the petitioners.32

As General Manager, he averred that it was his ministerial duty to implement

an official act of the GSIS-BOT which, under the law, enjoys a presumption of
validity. He further updated the petitioners that Board Resolution ·No. 48 is no
longer effective because it has already been superseded by Board Resolution
No. 125 which was adopted by the GSIS-BOT on October 4, 2006 which
significantly reduced the amount of the rentals that had to be paid by the
petitioners due to non-accumulation of interests and surcharges in the rentals
due.33 Thus, the complaint for his disbarment is baseless and futile.

In conclusion, the comments of the respondents criticized the petitioners for

resorting to a disbarment complaint as a wrong remedy. Since the issue
circulates on the issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, they opined that the
petitioners should have filed a petition before the GSIS-BOT to question its
validity pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which read:

SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes. - The GSIS shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising under this Act and any other laws
administered by the GSIS.

xxxx

SEC. 31. Appeals. - Appeals from any decision or award of the Board shall be
governed by Rules 43 and 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by
the Supreme Court on April 8, 1997 which will take effect on July 1, 1997:
Provided, That pending cases and those filed prior to July 1, 1997 shall be
governed by the applicable rules of procedure: Provided, further, That the
appeal shall take precedence over all other cases except criminal cases when
the penalty of life imprisonment or death or reclusion perpetua is imposable.

The appeal shall not stay the execution of the order or award unless ordered
by the Board, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court and the appeal
shall be without prejudice to the special civil action of certiorari when proper.

In the Resolution34 dated July 9, 2007, the Court referred the case to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Ruling of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation35 dated March 27, 2008, the IBP-CBD,
through Commissioner Hababag, found no merit in the complaint because the
disbarment suit constitutes an unwarranted and improper collateral attack
against the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which the GSIS-BOT adopted
pursuant to its mandate; that such collateral attack against an official act of the
GSIS-BOT infringes public interest and militates against the legal presumption
on the regularity of performance of an official duty; and, that the petitioners
failed to avail of the remedy of a petition in assailing the resolution's validity
before the GSIS-BOT as set forth in Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8921.
Thus, the dismissal of the complaint was recommended.

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report of Commissioner Hababag through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-267,36
as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint
lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.37

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration38 reiterated the same arguments

raised in their complaint.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration through Board Resolution No. XIX-2011-499,39 as follows:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [the petitioners'] Motion for

Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground
or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-267
dated June 5, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.40

Undaunted by the adverse decision of the IBP, the petitioners filed the instant
petition for review before the Court.1âwphi1

Ruling of the Court

The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.

The petitioners clarify that the instant administrative case is directed against
the fitness of the respondents as members of the legal profession and not
against the validity of Board Resolution No. 48. They asseverate that the
issuance of the memorandum by Atty. Bautista which paved the way for the
passage of Board Resolution No. 48 and its implementation through the
management of Atty. Garcia were in blatant disregard and flagrant violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 5 of the CPR and the Attorney's Oath.
They further argue that the collection of arrears on the supposed housing loans
was a disguised payment of the purchase price of the realties involved and,
that the policy authorizing its collection was a scheme to window-dress the
huge financial losses suffered by GSIS due to mismanagement.

Citing Article 138541 of the New Civil Code, the petitioners put to fore the
restoration of their prior position before the execution of the housing contracts
upon the cancellation of the DCS. This being so, the GSIS cannot legally collect
anything from them anymore as it has retained possession and ownership of
the subject properties.

The contention is untenable.

A careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint would show that the issue
hinges on the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which allowed GSIS to collect
arrears for the cancelled housing loans. As aptly found by the IBP Board of
Governors, the controversy should have been resolved in accordance with the
GSIS Law as set forth in Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which confers
original and exclusive jurisdiction on the GSIS on matters arising therefrom
such as in the instant case. The Court quotes the IBP-CBD Report and
Recommendation, to wit:

The disbarment suit is a[n] unwarranted and improper collateral attack against
the validity of a Board Resolution duly adopted by the GSIS[-BOT] in
accordance with its mandate. The complaint assails the validity of Board
Resolution No. 48.

A collateral attack against the official act of a duly mandated body such as the
GSIS[-BOT], will undermine public interest and will militate against the legal
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed x x x[.]

[R.A. No.] 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997 provides a remedy for [the petitioners].
Herein [petitioners ]/borrowers should have filed a petition before the GSIS[-
BOT] to question the validity of Board Resolution No. 48. x x x.42

It should also be noted that Board Resolution No. 48 was passed to enhance
the collection efforts of the GSIS in view of its fiduciary duty to its members
regarding the GSIS funds. The assailed memorandum issued by Atty. Bautista
was an enhancement of the collection efforts of the GSIS on delinquent
accounts of members who availed of housing loans. The cancellation of the
DCS and the cession of SLRRDC 's rights in favor of GSIS warranted such
collection upon the monthly salaries of the petitioners. There being no
administrative declaration of the resolution's invalidity, it was incumbent upon
Atty. Garcia to implement the same, as GSIS President and General Manager,
in accordance with his mandate under Section 4543 of R.A. No. 8291. Any
disobedience would hold him liable under R.A. No. 301944 and the GSIS
Charter.

As held in Arma v. Atty. Montevilla:45

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the

charges proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer
of the court, he has perfom1ed his duties in accordance with his oath. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case
by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment, this Court has consistently held that only a clear
preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty.
It means that the record must disclose as free from doubt a case that compels
the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of
the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly
demonstrated.46 (Citations omitted)

It is well-settled that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who are at

times maliciously charged, not just by their clients. Regrettably, the failure of
the petitioners to discharge the burden that the acts of the respondents-lawyers
violated Canons 1 and 5, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and the Attorney's
Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant petition.

It should be noted that the focal point of the complaint for disbarment against
the respondents was the collection of arrears against the monthly salaries of
the petitioners to pay off housing loans. The rampant collection problems which
plagued the GSIS from housing loans that were prevalently unpaid by its
members resulted in the influx of receivables and bad debts to the detriment of
the GSIS fund. The scenario geared the GSIS-BOT and the Management to
enhance its collection efforts as a result of which Atty. Bautista issued the
second memorandum regarding the legal right of the GSIS to demand payment
of the arrearages47 from the cancelled housing loans due to delinquency, the
issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, and the implementation of the same
through the management of Atty. Garcia. Clearly, nothing from the acts of the
respondents is deemed a violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR,
its Canon 5, and the Attorney's Oath.

Lastly, the Court commiserates with the sad plight of the petitioners who are
among minimum-income earners highly depending on their wages for their
daily needs. Nonetheless, they still remain liable to pay the arrears indicated in
their GSIS records not only for failing to discharge the burden of proving their
allegations in the complaint but also for resorting to a wrong remedy. Despite
thereof, the new GSIS Board Resolution No. 125 which replaced the assailed
Board Resolution No. 48 is deemed to have given them sufficient leeway from
payment because interests and surcharges will no longer accumulate and put
to a halt, as explained by Atty. Garcia. Therefore, their chances of paying the
balance of the housing loans would become lighter and no longer that
burdensome.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DOROTEO IGOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO, Court

Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers.[1] Arrogating unto oneself, as in this
case, the mantle of a Justice of the Highest Court of the land for the purpose
of extorting money from a party-litigant is an ultimate betrayal of this duty which
can not and should never be countenanced, because [i]t is this kind of gross
and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the
responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and
surely corrodes the respect for the law and the courts without which
government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity.[2]

Complainant Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 141843,

entitled Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al, v. Mactan Shangrila Hotel.[3] In a letter-
complaint dated October 8, 2000,[4] written in the Cebuano dialect and
addressed to the Chief Justice, complainant alleged that while the aforesaid
case was still pending before the Court of Appeals, he tried to look for a person
in the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. Sometime in
July 1999, a friend introduced complainant to a certain Justice of the Supreme
Court. He narrated to the said Justice the history of their case. In turn, the said
Justice asked for and received from him the sum of P20,000.00. However, the
said Justice reminded complainant that he could offer no help while the case
was pending before the Court of Appeals.

In February 2000, they received an unfavorable decision from the Court of

Appeals. Thus, complainant immediately visited the said Justice at his office in
the Supreme Court to inform him of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Justice offered to prepare the petition for review to be filed with the Supreme
Court. Complainant subsequently met the said Justice at the Maxs Restaurant,
where the latter turned over the prepared petition for review. In consideration
therefor, the Justice asked for an additional P20,000.00. Since complainant did
not have that amount of money with him at that time, he undertook to send the
same by courier as soon as he arrives in Cebu. Complainant asked for the said
Justices complete name and address, which he readily gave as: Atty. Gilbert
Soriano, 22 Melon Street, Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City.

As promised, complainant sent the amount of P20,000.00 through the Aboitiz

Express on May 2, 2000. The parcel was received by a certain Alvin Soriano,
who turned out to be respondents son, on May 5, 2000.

Complainant was surprised to learn that on May 31, 2000, this Court denied
the Petition for Review. Accordingly, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which this Court denied with finality on July 31, 2000.

Together with his letter, complainant submitted the following documents:

1. Photocopy of the Petition for Review allegedly prepared by the Justice;[5]

2. Shippers Copy of Prepaid Consignment Note No. E0993783C dated May 2,

2000, addressed to one Atty. Gilbert Soriano of 22 Melon St., Gatchalian
Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City, with telephone numbers 826-1018,
containing cash in the amount of P20,000.00,[6] and sent by one Doroteo Igoy
of Mactan, Lapu-lapu City, with telephone numbers 495-8-49;[7]

3. Letter dated May 5, 2000 of one Atty. Gilbert F. Soriano, addressed to Aboitiz
Express, authorizing his daughter, Christine Soriano, or his son, Alvin A.
Soriano, to receive Parcel No. E0993783C on his behalf;[8]

4. Note dated May 5, 2000, evidencing receipt by one Alvin Soriano of the
package on that date at 11:30 oclock in the morning.[9]
In his comment dated November 6, 2000,[10] Atty. Gilbert Soriano denied that
he was the Justice alluded to. He alleged that his friend, Nic Taneo, introduced
complainant to him because the latter was seeking help regarding a pending
case involving his poor relatives; that complainant requested him to go over
their petition to be filed with the Supreme Court, to ensure that the same would
not be denied on technical grounds; he acceded to the request, after which
complainant told him that he will be sending him a token of gratitude, but he
did not know that it was money.

Respondent further narrated that on May 4, 2000, he received a telephone call

from Aboitiz Express, informing him that complainant had sent him a parcel but
the messenger was unable to locate his given address, and asking him to
execute a letter authorizing anyone in his house to receive the parcel. He
recalled complainants promise of a token of gratitude, so respondent
authorized his children to accept the parcel. He was surprised to find inside the
parcel cash in the amount of P20,000.00. After several days of mulling over
what to do with the money, respondent asked his friend to contact Atty. Rodulfo
Taneo, the counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 141843. Atty. Taneo told him to
hold the money and wait until he arrives in Manila.

Respondent denied giving complainant any assistance other than checking the
formal requirements of the petition for review. He also denied that he
entertained complainant in his office in the First Division of this Court which,
according to him, barely accommodates the staff therein with very little elbow
room. Assuming that complainant was thus accommodated in respondents
office in the First Division, respondent could not have uttered the irresponsible
and degrading statements imputed on him by complainant. Further, respondent
denied having received the amount of P20,000.00 from complainant, arguing
that, as a practicing catholic and active church leader, he can not in conscience
deceive anyone and ask for money.

Respondent likewise denied having demanded for an additional P20,000.00,

countering that complainant merely promised him a token gift for the little help
that he extended, without mention of any amount. In fact, he almost forgot
about that promise, and he remembered it only when he was notified by the
courier service that he had a parcel from complainant. That was almost two (2)
months after the case petition for review was filed with this Court.

In closing, respondent insinuated that if this Court should find that he committed
a misconduct despite his explanation, he shall offer to retire from the service.

On November 16, 2000, complainant wrote another letter to the Chief Justice,
again written in the Cebuano dialect.[11] Complainant averred that respondent
was introduced to him by Engr. William Redoblado as one of the Justices of
the Supreme Court. He only learned that respondent was not a Justice when
they met at the Cebu Mactan International Airport on October 31, 2000.
Respondent offered to return the P40,000.00, but be refused to receive the
same. Instead, he told respondent to just wait for the outcome of the complaint
he filed against him with the Office of the Chief Justice.

In the same letter, complainant provided the following questions and answers,
to wit:

1. What is the name of the Justice of the Supreme Court whom you contacted?

Answer: Atty. Gilbert Soriano.

2. Where did you meet/see him?

Answer: Inside the premises of the Supreme Court.

3. Who was the person who introduced him as Justice?

Answer: Engr. William Redoblado was the one who introduced to me that
Gilbert Soriano is a Justice. I never knew that Gilbert Soriano is not a Justice.

4. Where did you specifically give to the Justice the first P20,000.00?

Answer: At the ground floor of the Supreme Court beside the canteen where
the parking area is located.

5. Who were with you at the Maxs Restaurant when the petition was given to
you?

Answer: Engr. William Redoblado, Leonardo Paquibot, Atty. Rodolfo Taneo,

Atty. Gilbert Soriano and myself (complainant Igoy). Atty. Taneo returned the
petition because it was lacking.

Respondent submitted his comment[12] to the second letter, wherein he

contended that when complainant allegedly gave him the sum of P20,000.00
on July 16, 1999, his case was still pending before the Court of Appeals; hence,
there was then no reason for complainant to approach respondent and give
him money. Moreover, it is unnatural for a person to give money to someone
whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time.
Respondent brands as unbelievable the version that complainant handed the
money to him at the parking area beside the Supreme Court canteen, where
many of the Courts employees and visitors frequently pass. He claimed that it
was not Engr. William Redoblado, but Mr. Taneo who introduced him to
complainant.
Respondent alleged that on October 30, 2000, he informed Atty. Taneo that he
was returning the money he received through Aboitiz Express. He was told by
Atty. Taneo to meet him in Cebu. On October 31, 2000, respondent arrived in
Cebu and met Atty. Taneo and complainant at an eatery near the airport.
Respondent offered to return the P20,000.00 to complainant, but the latter
refused to accept it. Complainant stated that he will withdraw his complaint only
after the Supreme Court decides their case in their favor. Respondent,
however, informed complainant that as a mere employee of the court, he could
not dictate the outcome of the case.

On January 8, 2001, Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under

R.A. 1616, without specifying its effectivity date.[13]

The Office of Administrative Services, to which this case was referred for
evaluation, issued a Memorandum on May 30, 2001, recommending
respondents dismissal from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.

Respondents offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever

penalty may be imposed on him. However, the mere expedient of resigning
from the service will not extricate him from the consequences of his acts. As
this Court pointed out in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:[14]

. . . Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress

for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.

Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court may
proceed with its investigation and mete the appropriate penalty against erring
officers of the court.[15] Resignation should not be used either as an escape
or as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing
administrative sanction.[16]

In recommending the dismissal of respondent from service, the Office of

Administrative Services (OAS) reasoned that:

From the established facts, it is clear that complainant came to see respondent
to plead for help in preparing a Petition for Review. The respondent, on the
other hand, saw it as an opportunity to make the complainant believe that he
has the influence and connections in the court and would be easy for him
(respondent) to help the complainant.

True, as respondent claimed, he was not urged by ulterior motives in preparing

the Petition for Review or at least reviewing the same, but not being his official
duty to do so, his actuation led complainant to believe that it should be for a
fee. It would have been very easy for him to decline the offer of P20,000.00
even if it was gratuitously given if his real intention was merely to help. He knew
for a fact that the petitioners have a counsel who, presumably, knows the
appropriate pleadings to be filed with this Court.

Sec. 7 (D) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Ethical Conduct and Standard for Public
Officials and Employees) specifically provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions

xxx xxx xxx

d. Solicitations or acceptance of gifts Public officials and employees shall not

solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transactions which may be affected by the functions of their office.

Respondent, who is himself a lawyer, should have avoided all the

circumstances in which he might be accused of using his office in the guise of
helping others, for this taints the integrity of the Court.

The denial of the respondent of the receipt of initial payment of P20,000.00

cannot simply overcome the positive assertions of the complainant. If no such
initial payment took place, Atty. Soriano would not have claimed the
subsequent payment through the Aboitiz Express.

The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. To tolerate such acts would open the floodgates
to fraud or graft and corruption to be committed by officials and employees of
the Court.

Likewise, the fact that respondent tried to return the amount to Mr. Igoy after
the Chief Justice required him to comment on the complaint only strengthened
the case against him. Even if the offer to return the money was accepted by
the complainant, it will never exculpate him of his administrative liabilities.
Respondent by his brazen conduct consummated an act that by itself is a
disservice to the administration of justice and an affront of the image of the
court before the public.

It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should

not be used as an easy way to escape administrative liability by a court
personnel facing administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go
scot-free and be simply forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution he
was bound by his oath and The Canons of Legal Ethics to serve with utmost
integrity.

Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished
his record irreparably and under the circumstances, this office believes that
dismissal as a penalty is warranted.

The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendation of the OAS.
Time and again, this Tribunal has emphasized that [t]he conduct or behavior of
all officials and employees of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[17] Their conduct must,
at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum in
order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.[18] Indeed,
Canon 6, Rule 6.02, of the Code of Professional Responsibility states in no
uncertain terms that

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing

facts of this case considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court.
It bears stressing that government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost
fidelity to the public service, for public service is a public trust. As such,
government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations
as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.[19]

The Court could not help but express its great disappointment over the conduct
of respondent who, as a lawyer with twenty-eight (28) years of government
service behind him, should have been among the first to set an example to his
co-employees and fellow civil servants. Instead, he badly tainted the image of
this Tribunal as well as the judiciary. Only recently in In Re: Derogatory News
Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with
Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,[20] this Court said that:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity,
fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair
and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and
conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For theirs is
the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of
the Judiciary.

Respondent should be reminded in this regard that the nature and

responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution, and oft-repeated
in our case law, are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic
sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals, that should be
matched with actual deeds.[21] Those involved in the administration of justice
must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public
service,[22]

In sanctioning errant officers and employees involved in the administration of

justice, the Court has held:

Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it

ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness.
It bears stressing once again that public service requires utmost integrity and
the strictest discipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public
trust that enjoins all public officers and employees, particularly those serving in
the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of dedication often even beyond
personal interest.[23]

All too often, this Court has declared that any act which falls short of the
exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.[24] To reiterate,
public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.[25]

This Court has also ruled that:

Time and again, we have emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility
which court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as
keepers of the public faith. They must be constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. As we have held in the case of Mendoza v. Mabutas
(223 SCRA 411 [1993], citing Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705 [1991]), this
Court condemns and would never countenance such conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[26]

Respondents acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public
in the entire judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he
is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the Highest
Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service
spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has prejudiced the integrity of
the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply disciplinary
sanction on an errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility.
Thus, this Court imposes on respondent the only penalty that he deserves ---
that of dismissal from the service.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is hereby DISMISSED from

the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations. This dismissal shall be
immediately executory.

Further, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE

within ten (10) days from notice hereof why he should not, be DISBARRED. In
the meantime, respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Gilbert Soriano
and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.

RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954
AGAINST,

ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA,

The present administrative case is based on the following facts:

Prelude

Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a

certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court
impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that
called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated with nine (9)
other petitions[1] voicing a similar concern.

On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the

consolidated petitions, effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883.[2]

On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo[3] of
G.R. No. 72954 was entrusted to the Courts Judicial Records Office (JRO) for
safekeeping.[4]

The Present Case

On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter[5] to the
Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished several documents[6]
relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order
to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was
being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made
contributions to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees they paid as
petitioners in G.R No. 72954.[7]
On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed[8] Atty. Teresita Dimaisip
(Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954
for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo.

On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954,
Atty. Dimaisip apprised[9] Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not
be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card[10] of G.R. No. 72954,
Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the
JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned.[11]
The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty.
Salvador Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.[12]

The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by
directing[13] Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent
was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take necessary
measures to secure the return of the said rollo.

Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to
Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum[14] on 13 August 2003. In substance, the
Memorandum relates that:

1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the
respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal
staff of retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it
was by virtue of his confidential employment that the respondent was able to
gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.[15]

2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible
return of the subject rollo.[16] Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent
acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty.
Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of Justice Gancayco.[17]

On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of
G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.[18]
On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed[19] the Office of the
Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report and
recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT submitted
a Memorandum[20] to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be
administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations:

1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20

August 1991.[21] However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of
Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to
remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up their
remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the expiration of
his extended tenure when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13
September 1991.[22]

2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the

subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal
researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a personal agenda.[23]
By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his confidential position for which
he may be administratively sanctioned.[24]

3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no

longer in the employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as
such employee.[25] Nevertheless, an administrative action against the
respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains feasible.[26]

Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution[27]
on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show cause why he should
not be held administratively liable for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and
for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve (12) years.
The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his Respectful
Explanation (Explanation)[28] on 21 January 2004. In the said explanation, the
respondent gave the following defenses:

1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized

anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.[29] Instead, the respondent shifts
the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the tracer card
of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority, took the subject rollo in his
name.[30] Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as the author of such
signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have
belonged to Atty. Banzon.[31]

2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo
just ended up in his box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home
following the retirement of Justice Gancayco.[32] The respondent can only
speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo might have been a
colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the
same was misplaced in his personal box.[33]

3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo,
professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal
papers and effects up until that time when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip
inquiring about the missing rollo.[34] The respondent claimed that after finding
out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately
extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging for its
return.[35]

On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to the

OCAT for initial study. In its Report[36] dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found
the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory.

On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped[37] the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and
recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held by the OBC wherein the
testimonies of the respondent,[38] Atty. Banzon,[39] Atty. Dimaisip[40] and one
Atty. Pablo Gancayco[41] were taken. On 6 August 2007, the respondent
submitted his Memorandum[42] to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his
Explanation.

On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation[43]

to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the
respondent and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking out the rollo
of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely.[44] The OBC, thus,
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year.[45]

Our Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar
circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended
penalty.

The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo

After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances

surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced
that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out
the subject rollo.

The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information:

1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the

rollo,[46] and
2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually
received the rollo from the JRO.[47]

The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he

never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.[48] We
are, however, not convinced.

First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it
was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12)
years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any
plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to what
the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of G.R.
No. 72954.

Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject

rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent
can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been inadvertently placed in
his personal box by another member of the staff of Justice Gancayco.[49]
However, the respondents convenient surmise remained just thata speculation
incapable of being verified definitively.

Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and former

confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not
totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated
12 April 2004:

x x x However, the excuse that the rollo inadvertently or accidentally found its
way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the
fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a Member of
this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise
extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that
only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of
office in this Court has expired.[50]
Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted.
We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent responsible for
borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R.
No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability.

We begin by laying the premises:

1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as

such, can no longer be held administratively sanctioned as an employee.[51]
However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the bar, remains under
the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this Court.[52]

2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his extended tenure
when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.[53] We
must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence,
it may be concluded that for whatever reason the respondent borrowed the
subject rollo, it was not for any official reason related to the adjudication of
pending cases.[54]

3. The respondents unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a considerable

length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing the same. It must
be pointed out that the subject rollo had been in the clandestine possession of
the respondent for almost twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered and
recovered by the JRO.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable.

First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without
the courts consent, is an administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v.
Gadon,[55] this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for the wrongful act of
bringing court records home, thus:

Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-

complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the
records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court employees are, in
the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or documents
outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his
duty of transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case to the appellate
court but he also failed in his duty not to take the records of the case outside
of the court and to subsequently forget about them.[56] (Emphasis supplied)

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business
entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It
presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even abuse
of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as
a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.

As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly

violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).

Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the

practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We consider
the following circumstances in favor of the respondent:
1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed
on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo
worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned.

2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained
confidential despite the finality of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were
disclosed by the respondent.

3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent
cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo.

We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is
also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief

Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her
husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to

submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised
and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was

declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before
the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the
telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988
hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The
hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-
first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings
never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never
moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings
scheduled were sent to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the

Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order
dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the

Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to
support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out
of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family
as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur
with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her
own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and
Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent
Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the
name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which
to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same
time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an

apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from
Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family.
In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent
Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him.
Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus.
The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with

Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his
legitimate family.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from

complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled
with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board.
We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away
the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public,
and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and
upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the
bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held
that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify
that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel,
the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single,
21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son.
Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting
with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged,
respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a

member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred.
He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who
consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years
an adulterous relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which
he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period
of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife,
cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them.
Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the
community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice

of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:

NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws
which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power
of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of
the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting
and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the
"IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was
unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board.
For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent
tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted
by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns:
"The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar"
(Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-
Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled
'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of
the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by
the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and
Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win
over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-
flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she
had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of
absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's
informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of
the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by
some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law
Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were
promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators
and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty.
Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where
they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected
to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged
from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty
votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary
allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself
with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC
(the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election
were held) during a recess x x x."

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's

reports with some embellishments.

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board
of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to
appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to
inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to
recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the
problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental
principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the
choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates,
and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental
assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on
the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in
connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the
House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by
media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and
intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure
of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or
indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand,
and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one.
Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether
the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate

Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to

subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the
Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly
set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air
Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry
them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some
candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the
Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of
the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of
Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said,
on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to
have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing
and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"

character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and
every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall
be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial,
or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor,
officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any
Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of
the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following
acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another
person:

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a

statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-
size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective,

judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well

as the advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote,
or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person;
or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or
promised to any person."

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating

committee, the following violations were established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for

president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April
1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in
April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in
Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon
(t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where
they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP
chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements.
He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their
commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and
distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the
120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty
(40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which
read:

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________

Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and
Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately,
despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election
(t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who
had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July
4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-
2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of
Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest
(Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty.
Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July
3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon
ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the
Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the
DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he
learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol
for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As
Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with
the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was
granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP
elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet,
Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty.
Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary
Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development
projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the
middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that
Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested
the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane.
Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included
Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon
group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n.,
July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their
own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza,
Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas),
Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao),
Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar
G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was
a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him
because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo
nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but
in that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles
said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to
Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp.
77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-
Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3-
Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato
Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p.
161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to

delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the
Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and
Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at
the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe
Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio
Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco,
William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C.
Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge
Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos,
Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita
Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay,
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as
the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the
wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with
the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave
her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr.
Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food,
and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of
P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with
Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65
at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing
money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so
that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her
delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where
she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for
her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July
3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C.
Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella,
Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot
Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero,
Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag
Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July
5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most
of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon
(meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two
of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They
consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher
(but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a
classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29,
39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract
with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He
made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20,
1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.

Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively
of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those
who committed themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula,
John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo
Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra,
Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo
Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit,
Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate

while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he
took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed
at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral
assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho,
Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being
my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma
Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of
the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted
up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113
phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs.
Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the
"action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before
and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the
Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support
them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid
the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of
the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April,
May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000
over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of
legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be
distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as,
the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets
and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They
were printed by his own printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than

those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-
Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on

the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The
election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter,
and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket,
testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls
and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty.
Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or

against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him
to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run
as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp.
137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and
Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to
stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty.
Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting
to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered
a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was
such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who
also withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to
be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court
Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is
a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed
him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989,
pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in
La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant
regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza,
but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him
to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He
declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that
the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the
Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew
about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon
went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of
the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said,
offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine
Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he
was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own
tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of
campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the
chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is
a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces
(Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not
include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the
June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp,
showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta
paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty.
Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's
end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of
the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates

(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter
presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the
national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-
ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting,
either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and
the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members
of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter
presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-
data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some
P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and
lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention
floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary
of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet
delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving
of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some
families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of
some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to
another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political
circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated
the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of
lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not
uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less
than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to
deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office
might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and
to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization
which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical
practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association
of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby
ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby

annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter
No. 287) of the following national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-
Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art.
VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution
dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President

shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board
of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-

Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors
from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on
the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by
the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month
before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following

provision as part of the first paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall

be held prior to any election in an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution
en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these
special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on
June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled
"Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this
Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that
election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any
position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by

the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such
further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER,
BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP
Board of Governors which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering the
Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty, Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED.
Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June
11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the
Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive
Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty.
Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at
the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:

1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C.

Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;

2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy

Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;

3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married

to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April
3, 2008;

4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17,

2008;

5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa

Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the
wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;

7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia
Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;

8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and

Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;

9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona

Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;

10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and
Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on
March 18, 2008;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco

and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;

12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar
and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;

13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and
Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;

14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago,

notarized on April 1, 2008;

15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development

Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;

16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano,

Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March
18, 2008;

17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married
to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2,
2008; and

18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan

and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the

Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while
respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in
Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the
documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did
not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary
who signed them or the documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon
verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain
Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned
on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration was also attached to the letter.3

The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the
latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The
latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty.

Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30,
2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to
be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public
documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and that any
advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be
welcome.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the

Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.5

This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the
letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent
to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009,
respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents
notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry,
he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without
realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court
for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his
secretary from his office.

The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory conference on
September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a
manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his
attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the
parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent
submitted a position paper,9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had
been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on record
dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita
III)as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr.,
dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were not
authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise
not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature on
his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the
attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his
office secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office
secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own
admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an office
secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially
pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent
failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty

which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative
authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and his
disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation
in its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the

IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but
without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover,
he claimed that he only committed simple negligence which did not warrant
such harsh penalty.

On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of respondent stating:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being

no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13

On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for
appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents
by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted
negligence.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the

18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary
while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering
that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any
person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary
public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of
a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his
secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the
secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving
his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach
of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There
is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere
afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act
of what his secretary did.

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who
is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in
his notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the buck to his secretary.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that
for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His experience,
however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible
violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such
prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the
penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to
solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly
affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be
held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.15 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed
upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of
the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary
to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to
practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and
with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize
documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The people who came into his office while he was away, were
clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They
expected that their documents would be converted into public documents.
Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a
mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose
documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a

significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified
to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several
occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general.17

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private

document into a public document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic
instruments would be undermined.18

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the
Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization,
especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal
system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
ADOPTED with MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay
grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial
commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING
that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision
to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be

appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE,

Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which
imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if
existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary
public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice
Rules).2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3

with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1)
usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate,
offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to
the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial
extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also
accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial
registers.7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She
engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices
(ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-
in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared

against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one
Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno
posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the
prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests.9

Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist"
in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In
another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide
referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental
incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these
statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a
lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not
notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the
notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were
superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer
who actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno
falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission
to the Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he
needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite
offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate
their growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries
in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not
personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ
where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and
her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza,
one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should not be held
liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language in his pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for
mandatory conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their
position papers.

In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro
A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively
liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests,
and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial
Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different
offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered
papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."19

However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to
prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his
notarial commission.20

Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that
Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's
defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend
them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to
the retainer of all its lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client
relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not
be held liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title
case is totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed
against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used

intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo
recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another
six months for employing abusive and insulting language.23

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board)
opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the
investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended
penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years
suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011
resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013
resolution.26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended
penalty, and accordingly confirms them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues
that the parties identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete
evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio
Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that
bears his name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration
date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty.
Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his
true information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed
the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register
and was never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended
that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it
appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty.
Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was
admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and
used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number
and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly
on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting

Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us
to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before
his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated
after his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How
this happened is not clear from the evidence before us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining
different notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the
following notarized documents had been irregularly numbered and
entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Document27
Date
Doc. No.
Page
Book
Year
Special Power of Attorney
6/20/05
273
55
18
2005
Secretary's Certificate
10/28/05
226
46
18
2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim
10/31/05
272
55
18
2005
Affidavit of Loss
4/17/06
54
11
25
2006
Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
4/17/06
310
61
25
2006
Petition for Issuance of Owner's Duplicate copy
4/17/06
72
15
25
2006
Affidavit of Parental Consent
4/19/06
461
93
23
2006
Confirmation of Sale
4/21/06
283
56
25
2006
Deed of Absolute Sale
4/27/06
304
60
25
2006
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public
shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in
these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting
of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further
provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any
given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping
several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only
one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically
arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary
public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by
assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must
also personally administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to
execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other
person, other than the notary public, should perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological

sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank
spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to

maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could
accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial
services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his
powers and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office
is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer
who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and
conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial
commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice
Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes."

Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be
held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer
is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.32

Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to
use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when
Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's
services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected
to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented
her family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a
party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other
hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved
Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged
mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's
alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City.
Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally
unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the
time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More
importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno
any confidential information which he acquired while he was still their counsel
in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating
the prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings

The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in

a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any
other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another
case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and
immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing
counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in
particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and
poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the Public
prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an
Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his
words — a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain
from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be
dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the

recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive
language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also
SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her

heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M.
ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B.
TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated
March 17, 1994[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which
reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively,
located in Iloilo City.

The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended

complaint[2] before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of
affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages.

In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis
of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole
surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in
having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the
other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them. Petitioner
and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several
heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10,
1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original
registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that
respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.

To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case,
petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547,
T-4666 and T-52546,[3] which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404,
respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred from
TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of
Tiongco.

After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which,
on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the
notices of lis pendens.[4] All these motions were denied.[5]

On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6] dismissing

petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court
found that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7]on December 17, 1993. As before,

respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens[8] dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994.[9] He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"[10] which
was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.[11] Displaying
remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for
Reconsideration."[12] This time, however, his arguments proved persuasive.
In an Order[13]dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:

In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs.
Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of
a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in
the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof so that the notices
of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by
plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's action
had already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact that the
questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974 so
that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil
and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among
which are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against
defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same deed of adjudication had
already been dismissed with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that
the occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly paying rentals to
herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter
intervening, much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where
defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the true and lawful
owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of
plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of
about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has
torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same
subjected to the harsh effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all
the foregoing considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby
reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the
continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the
defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff
as such rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.

This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14] On March 4,

1994, the public respondent issued an Order[15] reversing himself on the
ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration
of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been
approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the Court of
Appeals.

Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16]

against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent
judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:

Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although

appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter
litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the
appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of
February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and
considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains
a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters
claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose
B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and
the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT
No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is
hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of
lis pendens.[17]

Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY,

WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED
AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT
OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY
THE HEREIN PETITIONER.

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation.[18] The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world
that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[19]

Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20] and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,[21] otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From
these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:

a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; and

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land
or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22]

Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.[23] It is not
necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be
affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[24] or substance,[25] the rule is that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.[26]

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine
of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past
jurisprudence.

Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27] that:

[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary
or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy
that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28] thus:

xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as
well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional
Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the
qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the
Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on
the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The
proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorari
sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is
no discernible special and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional
Trial Court.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information
and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy,
but will require a more strict observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the

judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[29]

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity

on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number
of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.

This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30] Aleria

v. Velez, [31] and Tano v. Socrates.[32] Only the presence of exceptional and
compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule.[33]

Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to

comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is
no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the
Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case
was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[34] we ruled, to wit:

The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is

ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be
sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it
at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also
a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is
not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It
therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with
the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no
questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to
those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. [emphasis supplied]

Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the
same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the
action, including the incidents thereof.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case
will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical language
employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private
respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and the court a
quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a
rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is
not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks
slang English to conceal her faulty grammar,"[35] is impelled by less than less
than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive?
"[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily
available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36] a retired police major described by
respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[37] an unmarried mestizo
with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being houseless[38] who rents a place
on the subject property sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma,
apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by
respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to
skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39] and a "horned spinster and
man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to
molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-
major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated
affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her
back."[40] He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's
Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that
"she happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot
to put one over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private)
by aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass
and audacity.[41] In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage
bureau for her own benefit.[42] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good
will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of
virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."[43]

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character

assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast
with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure the
issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking
absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson
in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to
comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are pertinent:

CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language before the courts.

In Romero v. Valle,[44] we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed

some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he
upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language invites
the disciplinary authority of the court.[45] We are aghast at the facility with
which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the
opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco
v. Deguma, et a1.,[46] we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of
fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco,
Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty.
Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find
a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly:
Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis
pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47]

WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

BASILIO C. GUTIERREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO N.

ZULUETA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM.:

This case pertains to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein

complainant Basilio C. Gutierrez against the herein respondent Atty. Leonardo
N. Zulueta.

On October 13, 1980, the complainant filed with this Court a sworn letter-
complaint dated October 11, 1980 seeking the disbarment of the respondent
lawyer on the grounds of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the legal profession.

The complainant alleges that the respondent lawyer was his counsel in two
cases, namely, a workmen’s compensation case and a civil case filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Sur. The complaint concerns
the latter case. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The complainant filed the said civil case against his former employer, the
Singer Sewing Machine Company. The trial court ruled in his favor. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the said appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court and ruled in favor of the company. It is categorically stated in the said
decision that the complainant did not file a brief. Thus, he maintains that the
case was resolved against him primarily because his lawyer, the herein
respondent, did not file the required brief with the appellate court and such
omission is attributable to the dishonesty of the respondent lawyer.

In support of his contention, the complainant alleges that sometime in August

1976, the respondent lawyer, who was then in Manila, wired him to send the
amount of P400.00 to cover the expenses in relation to the preparation and
printing of the appellee’s brief, and upon receipt of the message, he sent the
said amount to the respondent lawyer through the Philippine National Bank. He
also alleges that he sent a telegram to the respondent lawyer for the purpose
of informing the latter that the P400.00 can be obtained at the Sampaloc,
Manila branch office of the same bank.

It appears that sometime thereafter, the respondent lawyer assured the

complainant that the brief had already been filed in court and that a copy
thereof will be made available to the latter in due time.

It also appears that immediately after the complainant received a copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, he reported the matter to the provincial
governor inasmuch as the respondent lawyer is the provincial legal counsel.
An investigation ensued but the same failed to settle the problem.

As stated earlier, the complainant eventually brought the matter to the attention
of this Court. On April 20, 1981, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

In the investigation that ensued, the respondent lawyer testified that he

received the amount of P400.00 from the complainant for the purpose of
preparing the said brief and that he gave the said amount to his secretary to
cover the expenses to be incurred in such preparation. He also testified that he
had to leave for Pagadian City at that time and that he instructed his secretary
to attend to the filing of the brief. He likewise stated that sometime thereafter,
his secretary assured him that the brief had been filed already. He also said
that he could not furnish the complainant with a copy of the brief inasmuch as
his secretary, for undisclosed reasons, left the office, taking with her his records
and his typewriter. The respondent lawyer admits that he received the
additional amount of P100.00 from the complainant for the purpose of securing
a copy of the brief for the latter. 1

In due time, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its report recommending
therein that the respondent lawyer be found guilty of not having exercised the
due diligence required of a member of the legal profession in connection with
his duties to his clients and accordingly impose upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year. 2

The record of the case undoubtedly discloses that the respondent lawyer failed
to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client,
the herein complainant. The failure of the respondent lawyer to undertake the
necessary measures to submit the required brief certainly caused material
prejudice to the complainant inasmuch as the appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court which was in favor of the latter. chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is
attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible
lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the
pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility,
lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible
members of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by
simply disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence
of the office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.

In sum, therefore, this Court is of the well-considered opinion that the

respondent lawyer failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a
member of the legal profession. His suspension from the practice of law is in
order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonardo N. Zulueta is hereby suspended from the

practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from the date of his receipt
of this resolution. He is advised to henceforth exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients. This decision is
immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration will be entertained. Let copies of this resolution be attached to
his personal record and circulated among the different courts.

SO ORDERED.