PART I.
TORTS
I. Quasi-Delict (Articles 2176-2194,
NCC)
a.1. Nature, Scope and Coverage
Article 2176, NCC – Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this
Chapter
 Elcano vs Hill (gunshot-crime committed
by a minor)
Held:
1. The concept of culpa aquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or
negligent
2. A separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the victim does not recover
damages on both scores
 GashemShookat vs CA (breach of promise
to marry)
Held:
1. A breach of promise to marry per se
is not an actionable wrong.
2. Damages pursuant to Article 21 may
be awarded not because of promise
to marry but because of fraud and
deceit behind it.
3. Such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or policy
 Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. vs CA (canteen
owner; adulterated beverages)
Held:
1. Liability for quasi-delict may still
exist despite the presence of
contractual relations such as act
which breaks the contract.
 Taylor vs Manila Electric Company (loss
of an eye and other injuries of a minor
who is more mature than the average boy
of his age)
Held:
1. When the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
plaintiff’s own act, which contributed
to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot
recover damages for the injury
 Navida et.al vs Dizon et.al. (inquiries
sustained from DBCP-chemical used to
kill worms ; workers in banana
plantations)
Held:
1. Tort is not strictly a criminal act;
territoriality does not apply
a.2. Requisites
Article 2176, NCC
 Child Learning vs Tagorio (child locked
inside the comfort room)
Held:
1. In every tort case filed under Article
2176 of the NCC, plaintiff has to prove
the preponderance of evidence: i. the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; ii.
the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and iii.
The connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
b. Quasi-delict distinguished from:
b.1. Culpa Criminal
 Barredo vs Garcia and Almario (head on
collision between Malate Taxicab and
carretela resulting to the death of
Faustino Garcia)
Held:
1. Differences between crimes under
the Penal Code and the culpa
aquialiana/quasi-delict:
a. Penal Code-crimes affect the
public interest while quasi-delict
are only of private concern
b. Penal Code-punishes or corrects
the criminal act while quasi-
delict by means of
indemnification, merely repairs
the damage
c. Penal Code-punished only if
there is a penal law clearly
covering them while quasi-delict
include all acts in which any kind
of fault or negligent intervenes
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 2. The separate civil action lies, the
employer being primarily and
directly responsible in damages
 Joseph vs Bautista
 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs
People of the Philippines (truck
transporting products of San Miguel
Corporation collided with a Nissan Pick-
up; usually evading damaged road)
Held:
1. Liability of employer under Art. 2176
in relation to Art. 2180 of the NCC for
the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is DIRECT and PRIMARY,
subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
2. Enforcement of the judgment under
the NCC against the employer does
not require the employee to be
insolvent since the nature of the
liability of the employer with that of
that employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors is solidary.
3. Under Art. 103 of the RPC, it provides
that an employer may be held
subsidiarilly and civilly liable for
felony committed by his employee in
the discharge of his duty.
4. The liability under the RPC attaches
when the employee is convicted of a
crime done in the performance of his
work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly
respond to the civil liability adjudged.
 Sps. Santos et.al. vs Pizardo et.al. (vehicle
collision between Viron Transit Bus and
Lite Ace Van)
Held:
1. In case of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an
action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under the RPC and an
action for quasi-delict under the Civil
Code.
2. An act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the
offender: 1. Civil liability ex delicto
under Art. 100 of RPC and 2.
Independent civil action
3. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject
to the caveat under Art. 2177 of the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against
double recovery under the rules
 Manliclic vs Calaunan (collision between
Bus and Owner-Type Jeep; Manliclic was
acquitted of the criminal liability)
Held:
1. The extinction of civil liability
referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111
refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Art. 100 of the RPC,
whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasidelict
only and not as crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused.
 Lumantas, MD vs Calapiz (emergency
appendectomy led to damaged urethra)
Held:
1. It is axiomatic that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
2. The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charge does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.
b.2. Quasi-delict distinguished from Culpa
Contractual
 Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs Feb Mitsui
(Properties owned by Sony; hijacked)
Held:
1. In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only
needs to establish the existence of the
contract and the obligor’s failure to
perform his obligation.
2. In quasi delict must clearly establish
the defendant’s fault or negligence
because this is the very basis of the
action.
 Ochoa vs GS Transport
 Gutierrez vs Gutierrez (vehicular
accident; bus and automobile
Held:
1. In culpa contractual, The head of a
house, the owner of an automobile,
who maintains it for the general use
of his family, is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children,
whom he designates or permits to
run it, where the car is occupied and
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 being used at the time of the injury
for the pleasure of other members of
the owner’s family than the child
driving it.
 Philippine School of Business
Administration vs CA (stabbing incident
to a student done by non-members of the
school’s academic community but
elements from outside the school)
Held:
1. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides
that the damage should have been
caused by pupils or students of the
educational institution.
2. A contractual relation is a condition
sine qua non to the school’s liability.
The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently on the contract
unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Art. 21 of
the Civil Code.
3. The rules on quasi delict do not really
govern between the PSBA and
Bautista because there is a contract
between them. However, this does
not prevent the court from
determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.
Liability from tort may exist even if
there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may also be a
tort.
 Air France vs Carrascoso (Civil Engineer
having a first class round trip ticket from
Manila to Rome but was asked to vacate
his seat for a white man who has the
better right)
Held:
1. Although the relation of the airline
and the passenger is contractual both
in origin and nature, nevertheless the
act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.
 Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science
and Technology (a student who was not
allowed to take the final examinations
due to non-payment of a ticket for fund-
raising activity)
Held:
1. Generally, liability for tort arises only
between parties not otherwise bound
by a contract. An academic
institution, however, may be held
liable for a tort even if it has existing
contract with its students, since the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
act that violated the contract may
also be a tort.
 Manila Railroad Co. vs La
CompaniaTransantlantica (damage of
bailers owned by petitioner)
Held:
1. Quasi-delict is exclusively concerned
with cases where the negligence
arises in the absence of agreement.
 Calalas vs CA (passenger of a jeepney
seated on a wooden stool as an extension
seat bumped by an Isuzu truck)
Held:
1. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because
it is the basis of the action.
2. In breach of contract in culpa
contractual, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor failed to comply his
obligation.
 Construction Development Corp vs
Estrella (vehicular accident of a bus and
tractor truck of the petitioner)
Held:
1. Employer is liable for the acts of its
employees. An action based on quasi-
delict may be instituted against the
employer for an employee’s act or
omission – the liability for the
negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to
the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the
employee.
II. ACT OR OMISSION
 Gaid vs People (reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide; student)
Held:
1. Negligence has been defined as the
failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
2. The elements of simple negligence:
are (1) that there is lack of precaution
on the part of the offender; and (2)
that the damage impending to be
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 caused is not immediate or the
danger is not clearly manifest.
3. The standard test in determining
whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or
property of another is this: could a
prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually
pursued?
 Dyteban vs Jose Ching(three-vehicle
accident: Joana Paula Bus, Nissan Pick Up
and Prime Mover wrongfully parked at
the National Highway)
Held:
1. Negligence is defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.17
2. The test by which to determine the
existence or negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant indoing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary person
would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
3. The test of negligence is objective. We
measure the act or omission of the
tortfeasor with that of an ordinary
reasonable person in the same
situation.
 Daywalt vs Corporacion de PP
AgustinosRecoletos (sale of land which is
452 has. but turned out to be 1,248 has.)
Held:
1. Whatever may be the character of the
liability, if any, which a stranger to a
contract may incur by advising or
assisting one of the parties to evade
performance, he cannot become more
extensively liable in damages for the
nonperformance of the contract than
the party in whose behalf he
intermeddles.
2. The damages ordinarily recoverable
against a vendorfor failure to deliver
land which he has contracted to
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
deliver is the value of the use and
occupation of the land for the time
during which it is wrongfully
withheld.
 Picart vs Smith (automobile and a
frightened pony on a bridge)
Held:
1. The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation?If
so, the law imposes a duty on the actor
to refrain from that course or to take
precaution against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is the constitutive f act in
negligence.
2. Where both parties are guilty of
negligence, but the negligent act of one
succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who
has the last reasonable opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do
so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
3. The plaintiff was riding a pony on a
bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he
improperly pulled his horse over to the
railing on the right. The driver of the
automobile, however, guided his car
toward the plaintiff without diminution of
speed until he was only a few feet away.
He then turned to the right but passed so
closely to the horse that the latter being
frightened, jumped around and was killed
by the passing car. Held: That although
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in
being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable
for the legal damages resulting from the
collision, as he had a fair opportunity to
avoid the accident after he realized the
situation created by the negligence of the
plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that
opportunity; while the plaintiff could by
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 no means then place himself in a position
of greater safety.
 R Transport vs Yu (hit and run by a bus;
different registered owner and actual
owner)
Held:
1. Verily, foreseeability is the
fundamental test of negligence. It
is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man
would not do.
2. Once negligence on the part of
the employee is established, a
presumption instantly arises that
the employer was remiss in the
selection and/or supervision of
the negligent employee. To avoid
liability for the quasi-delict
committed by its employee, it is
incumbent upon the employer to
rebut this presumption by
presenting adequate and
convincing proof that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
3. The liability of the employer for
the negligent conduct of its
subordinate is direct and primary,
subject only to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
4. The Supreme Court (SC) has
consistently been of the view that
it is for the better protection of the
public for both the owner of
record and the actual operator to
be adjudged jointly and severally
liable with the driver
5. The principle of holding the
registered owner liable for
damages notwithstanding that
ownership of the offending
vehicle has already been
transferred to another is
designed to protect the public
and not as a shield on the part of
unscrupulous transferees of the
vehicle to take refuge in, in order
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
to free itself from liability arising
from its own negligent act.”
 Umali vs Bacani (Alcala Electric Plant; 3
year old boy who was electrocuted)
Held:
1. An electric plant company which fails
to use ordinary foresight in taking
necessary precaution to eliminate tall
banana plants which when blown by a
moderate wind could trigger danger,
vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after a
storm and foresecable damage to its
lines that could endanger life and limb
did not cut off electric power from its
plant; and which, after being made
aware, thru one of its employees, that
a live wire had been cut by the action
of the storm, did not take precaution
to prevent anybody from approaching
the live wire, is negligent and liable for
damages for death of 3½ year old boy
who went to the place where live wire
is located and got into contact with it.
2. Where negligence of electric utility
plant was proximate cause of death of
child, parental negligence in allowing
the child to go to place where fallen
live wire was located is merely
contributory.
3. Negligence of employee is presumed to
be negligence of his employer who may
escape liability only by proof that it
exercised diligence of good father of
family to prevent damage not only in
selection of employees but in
adequately supervising their work.
 Civil Aeronautics Administration vs CA
(Ernest E. Simke-an honorary consul
general waiting for his future son-in-law
and slipped over an elevation at MIAA)
Held:
1. Failure of the CAA to have the
dangerous elevation repaired in order
to eliminate existing hazards
constitutes such negligence as to
warrant a finding of liability based on
quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the
Civil Code.
2. Applying the test formulated in Picart
vs. Smith (37 PHIL 809) private
respondent is not guilty of
contributory negligence because he
could not have reasonably foreseen the
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 harm that would befall him
considering the circumstances. Even if
the private respondent had been
looking where he was going, the step
in question could not easily be
noticed because of its construction.
 Rakes vs AG & P (a laborer of the
defendant transporting iron rails from a
barge in the harbor that accidentally slid
in rails, caught the plaintiff and broke his
leg and was amputated up to the knee)
Held:
1. In order to enforce the liability of an
employer for injuries to his employee,
it is not necessary that a criminal
action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative
primarily chargeable with the
accident. No criminal proceeding
having been taken, the civil action
may proceed to judgment.
2. The negligence of the injured person
contributing to his injury but not
being one of the determining causes
of the principal accident, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but only
in reduction of his damages. Each
party is chargeable with damages in
proportion to his fault.
 Associated Bank vs Tan (depositor of
Associated Bank that deposited a post-
dated check in his account and issued
several cheques to his creditors but
eventually dishonored due to non-
sufficiency of funds)
Held:
1. The degree of diligence required of
banks is more than that of a good
father of a family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their
depositors is concerned; The standard
applies, regardless of whether the
account consists of only a few hundred
pesos or of millions.
 Pacis vs Morales (17-yo died due to
shooting incident happened inside a gun
store in Baguio City)
Held:
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
1. A higher degree of care is required of
someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character,
such as dangerous weapons or
substances.Such person in possession
or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent
any injury being done thereby. Unlike
the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous
weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
2. A gun store owner is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety
and should have known never to keep
a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others.
 SD Martinez vs Buskirk (carromata
occupied by said plaintiff with her child
and overturned it, severely wounding
said plaintiff by making a serious cut
upon her head, and also injuring the
carromata itself and the harness upon the
horse which was drawing it.
Held:
1. A coachman or driver, who had
driven the horses composing his team
for a considerable time, during which
the animals had shown no disposition
to become unruly, left his team as
usual and was assisting in unloading
the wagon when the horses bolted
and running into the plaintiffs'
carriage caused personal injuries to
the plaintiff and damage to the
vehicle. It was further shown that, to
leave teams under like circumstances
and to assist in unloading the wagon,
is the custom of drivers in the city
and that the custom is sanctioned by
employers.
2. That acts, the performance of which
has not proven destructive or
injurious and which have been
generally acquiesced in by society for
so long a time as to have ripened into
a custom, cannot be held to be
unreasonable or imprudent and that,
under the circumstances, the driver
was not guilty of negligence in so
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 leaving his team while assisting in
unloading his wagon.
 Ylarde et. Al. vs Aquino et.al. (digging
incident done by male students of an
elementary school)
Held:
1. It is only the teachers and not the
principal or head of an academic
school who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students. In
a school of arts and trades, it is only
the head of the school who can be
held liable. Under Section 2180 of the
Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of
school children should be held liable
for negligence in his supervision over
them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any
injury on their persons.
2. A teacher who stands in loco
parentis to his pupils should make
sure that the children are protected
from all harm in his company.
3. Excavation should not be placed in
the category of school gardening,
planting trees, and the like as these
undertakings do not expose the
children to any risk that can result in
death or physical injuries.
4. In determining whether or not
reckless imprudence exists, the
degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity
of the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held
to the same degree of care as an
adult, but his conduct should be
judged according to the average
conduct of persons of his age and
experience.
 Phil Hawk Corp vs Vivian Tan Lee
(vehicular accident resulting the death of
the respondent’s husband and physical
injuries to her – motorcycle, passenger
jeep and a bus)
Held:
1. Foreseeability is the fundamental test
of negligence—to be negligent, a
defendant must have acted or failed to
act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized
that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected
to a general but definite class of risks.
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
2. Whenever an employee’s negligence
causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a
presumptionthat the employer failed
to exercise the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection or
supervision of its employees.
3. The Court upholds the finding of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is liable to respondent,
since it failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its bus
driver, Margarito Avila, for having
failed to sufficiently inculcate in him
discipline and correct behavior on the
road. Indeed, petitioner’s tests were
concentrated on the ability to drive
and physical fitness to do so. It also
did not know that Avila had been
previously involved in sideswiping
incidents.
 Regala vs Carin (story of two adjacent
neighbors where one decided to renovate
his house and asked permission from the
other that he will bore a hole through a
perimeter wall)
Held:
1. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity; it is different from
the negative idea of negligence in that
malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or ill will.
2. While the Court harbors no doubt
that the incidents which gave rise to
this dispute have brought anxiety and
anguish to respondent, it is
unconvinced that the damage
inflicted upon respondent’s property
was malicious or willful, an element
crucial to merit an award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.
 Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carriers
(story of a blind owner of a gasoline
station)
Held:
1. Standard of conduct is the level of
expected conduct that is required by
the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances
of the person, time and place.25 The
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 most common standard of conduct is
that of a good father of a family or
that of a reasonably prudent
person.26 To determine the diligence
which must be required of all
persons, we use as basis the abstract
average standard corresponding to a
normal orderly person.27
2. However, one who is physically
disabled is required to use the same
degree of care that a reasonably
careful person who has the same
physical disability would
use.28 Physical handicaps and
infirmities, such as blindness or
deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a
reasonable person must act. Thus, the
standard of conduct for a blind
person becomes that of a reasonable
person who is blind.
3. We note that Francisco, despite being
blind, had been managing and
operating the Caltex station for 15
years and this was not a hindrance
for him to transact business until this
time. In this instance, however, we
rule that Francisco failed to exercise
the standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind. First,
Francisco merely relied on the
identification card of Bacsa to
determine if he was authorized by
CBCI. Francisco did not do any other
background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco
already expressed his misgivings
about the diesel fuel, fearing that they
might be stolen property,29 yet he did
not verify with CBCI the authority of
Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third,
Francisco relied on the receipts
issued by Bacsa which were
typewritten on a half sheet of plain
bond paper.30 If Francisco exercised
reasonable diligence, he should have
asked for an official receipt issued by
CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to
Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s
invoice, does not show that CBCI
authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel
fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco
failed to exercise the standard of
conduct expected of a reasonable
person who is blind.
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
 Hazing as Negligence-Villareal vs People
(Hazing at Ateneo de Manila School of
Law)
Held:
1. Reckless
imprudence or negligence consists of
a voluntary act done without malice,
from which an immediate personal
harm, injury or material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on
the part of the person committing
it.241 In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the
actor.242In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from
which an injury or material damage
ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill.243 Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate,
and the danger is not openly
visible.244
2. The test245 for determining whether
or not a person is negligent in doing
an act is as follows: Would a prudent
man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes on the doer the duty to
take precaution against the
mischievous results of the act. Failure
to do so constitutes negligence.246
3. As we held in Gaid v. People, for a
person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required
varies with the degree of the danger
involved.247 If, on account of a certain
line of conduct, the danger of causing
harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound
to be very careful, in order to prevent
or avoid damage or injury.248 In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not
much care is required.249 It is thus
possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence
that may be required of an individual,
“from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort.”250 The duty
of the person to employ more or less
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 degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular
case.251
III. Damage to Another
IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT
OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE
 Tison et.al. vs Sps Pamasin (vehicular
accident between the tractor trailer and a
jitney, the driver’s license of the tractor
driver is prohibited as to restriction
imposed by the LTO)
Held:
1. A causal connection must exist
between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of
the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury
or that it substantially contributed
thereto.
2. Negligence, consisting in whole or in
part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a the relation betweenthe omission and
contributing cause of the injury.28
3. Controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo
v. Court of Appeals29 where we
reiterated that negligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient
in itself in establishing liability for
damages
 Ocean Builders vs Sps Cubacub (an
employee with chicken pox; immediate
cause of death as cardio-respiratory
arrest and the antecedent cause as
pneumonia)
Held:
1. To successfully prosecute an action
anchored on torts, three elements
must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2)
breach (3) injury and proximate
causation.—At the onset, the Court
notes that the present case is one for
damages based on torts, the
employer-employee relationship
being merely incidental. To
successfullyprosecute an action
anchored on torts, three elements
must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2)
breach (3) injury and proximate
causation.
2. Proximate cause is that which, in
natural and continuous sequence,
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces injury, and without
which, the result would not have
occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or
failure to act, whenever it appears
from the evidence in the case that the
act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage, and
that the injury or damage was either
a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or
omission.
a. DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
 Fernando vs CA (story of emptying a
septic tank in Agdao Public Market in
Davao City)
Held:
1. To be entitled to damages for an
injury resulting from the negligence
of another, a claimant must establish
the damage. He must prove under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
that the defendant’s negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury.
2. Proximate cause has been defined as
that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have
occurred.
 Dyteban vs Ching ((three-vehicle
accident: Joana Paula Bus, Nissan Pick Up
and Prime Mover wrongfully parked at
the National Highway)
Held:
1. Proximate cause is that cause acting
first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as natural and
probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have
Page 9
 reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably
result therefrom. There is no exact
mathematical formula to determine
proximate cause. It is based upon
mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.
Plaintiff must, however, establish a
sufficient link between the act or
omission and the damage or injury.
That link must not be remote or far-
fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury must be
a natural and probable result of the
act or omission.
 Bataclan vs Medina (burst tires of the bus;
overturned bus and eventually got
burned when people came closer holding
torches)
Held:
1. The proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result
therefrom.
2. When a vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with
lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the
passenger, but most probably by the
driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it wasvery dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with
them; and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available, they
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
had to use a torch the most handy
and available; and what was more
natural, than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from
them, That the proximate cause of
the death of B was the overturning of
the vehicle thru the negligence of
defendant and his agent.
3. The burning of the bus wherein some
of the passengers were trapped can
also be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through the driver and
conductor who were on the road
walking back and forth. They should
and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and
soaked the area in and around the
bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over
a large area, can be smelt and
detected even from a distance. That
the failure of the driver and the
conductor to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the
bus, constitutes negligence on the
part of the agents of the carrier under
the provisions of the Civil Code.
 Manila Electric Corp. vs Rermoquillo
(repair of a media agua said to be in a
leaking condition; cause of death
electrocution)
Held:
1. To us it is clear that the principal and
proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any
precaution, such as looking back
toward the street and at the wire to
avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter's length of 6
feet.
2. Where it is shown that the death of
the deceased was primarily caused by
his own negligence, the company
could not be held guilty of negligence
or as lacking in due diligence. To hold
the latter liable in damages for the
Page 10
 death of the deceased, such supposed
negligence of the company must have
been the proximate and principal
cause of the accident. But in the case
at bar, the act of the deceased in
turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet with his hands
was the proximate and principal
cause of the electrocution, therefore
his heirs cannot recover.
3. A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause
and the injury, a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such act or
condition is the proximate cause.
 Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Co. (loss of an eye and other injuries
of a minor who is more mature than the
average boy of his age)
Held:
1. Under all the circumstances of this
case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not,
properly speaking, "attributable to
the negligence of the defendant," and,
on the other hand, we are satisfied
that plaintiff's action in cutting open
the detonating cap and putting a
match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and
of the resultant injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore, is not civilly responsible
for the injuries thus incurred.
 Sanitary Steam Laundry vs CA (This case
involves a collision between a Mercedes
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary
Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which
caused the death of three persons and the
injuries of several others; collision
between a truck and a privately-owned
Cimarron van caused the death of three of
the van’s passengers. The petitioner
therein, the owner of the truck, argued
that the driver of the Cimarron was
committing multiple violations of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code40 at
the time of the accident. Among these
violations: the Cimarron was overloaded
at the time of the accident; the front seat
of the van was occupied by four adults,
including the driver; and the van had only
one functioning headlight)
Held:
1. The proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of petitioner’s
driver. As the trial court noted, the
swerving of petitioner’s panel truck
to the opposite lane could mean not
only that petitioner’s driver was
running the vehicle at a very high
speed but that he was tailgating the
passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
2. It has not been shown how the
alleged negligence of the Cimarron
driver contributed to the collision
between the vehicles. Indeed,
petitioner has the burden of showing
a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. He must show that the violation
of the statute was the proximate or
legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in
part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.
Petitioner says that “driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one
functioning headlight during
nighttime certainly increases the risk
of accident,” that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight,
there was “decreased visibility,” and
that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded “decreased [its]
maneuverability.” However, mere
Page 11
 allegations such as these are not
sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged
negligence was the contributing
cause of the injury.
 Mercury Drug vs Baking (story of
Diamicron and Diamicron –sleeping
tablet; resulted to vehicular accident)
Held:
1. The vehicular accident could not have
occurred had petitioner’s employee
been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s
prescription. Without the potent
effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet,
it was unlikely that respondent would
fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in a collision.
2. It is thus clear that the employer of a
negligent employee is liable for the
damages caused by the latter. When
an injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee, there instantly arises
a presumption of the law that there
has been negligence on the part of the
employer, either in the selection of
his employee or in the supervision
over him, after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his
employee.6 Here, petitioner’s failure
to prove that it exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable
for damages caused by the latter.
 BPI vs Suarez (lawyer who issued BPI
checks that were dishonored; DAIF-
DAUD)
Held:
1. The erroneous marking of DAIF,
which BPI belatedly rectified, was not
the proximate cause of Suarez’s
claimed injury, the Court reminds BPI
that its business is affected with
public interest.
2. In the present case, Suarez failed to
establish that his claimed injury was
proximately caused by the erroneous
marking of DAIF on the checks.
3. There is nothing in Suarez’s
testimony which convincingly shows
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
that the erroneous marking of DAIF
on the checks proximately caused his
alleged psychological or social
injuries. Suarez merely testified that
he suffered humiliation and that the
prospective consolidation of the titles
to the Tagaytay properties did not
materialize due to the dishonor of his
checks,24 not due to the erroneous
marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence,
Suarez had only himself to blame for
his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful
transaction with his client as these
were directly caused by the justified
dishonor of the checks. In short,
Suarez cannot recover compensatory
damages for his own negligence.25
 Ramos vs COL Reality (vehicular collision;
Toyota and Ford Expidition; ongoing
construction in the area)
Held:
1. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz.:
Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. If the
master is injured by the negligence of a
third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own
servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superior’s action against the third person,
assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law
to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah
Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was
the proximate cause of the accident, and
thus precludes any recovery for any
damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.
Page 12
  Vallacar Transit vs Catubig (vehicle
collision due to overtaking of a
motorcycle to a slow moving truck but
traversed by a bus on its opposite
direction)
Held:
1. RTC concisely articulated and aptly
concluded that Catubig’s overtaking
of a slow-moving truck ahead of him,
while approaching a curve on the
highway, was the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision
which led to his own death.
2. The presumption that employers are
negligent under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code flows from the negligence
of their employees.32 Having
adjudged that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision
resulting in Catubig’s death was his
own negligence, and there was no
fault or negligence on Cabanilla’s
part, then such presumption of fault
or negligence on the part of
petitioner, as Cabanilla’s employer,
does not even arise. Thus, it is not
even necessary to delve into the
defense of petitioner that it exercised
due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Cabanilla as its
employee driver.
b. DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED
NEGLIGENCE
 Tison vs Pomasin (vehicular accident
between the tractor trailer and a jitney,
the driver’s license of the tractor driver is
prohibited as to restriction imposed by
the LTO)
Held:
1. Driving without a proper license is a
violation of traffic regulation. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal
presumption of negligence arises if at the
time of the mishap, a person was violating
any traffic regulation. However,
in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,27 we held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic
regulation. It must be proven that the
violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or
that it substantially contributed
thereto.Negligence, consisting in whole or
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the
injury.28 Likewise controlling is our ruling
in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals29 where
we reiterated that negligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a traffic
statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages.In the
instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer
driver’s restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon
was able to sufficiently explain that the
Land Transportation Office merely erred
in not including restriction code 8 in his
license.
 Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai (vehicle collision
between Mercury car owned by the
petitioner and a Cadillac and a carretela)
Held:
1. There is no doubt at all that the
collision was directly traceable to
Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that
he must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
The next question is whether or
not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the
Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the
driver. The applicable law is Article
2184 of the Civil Code, which
reads:"ART. 2184. In motor vehicle
mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the
use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving
or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding two
months."
2. If the causative factor was the
driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise
held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence.
3. The basis of the master's liability in
civil law is not res-pondeat
superior but rather the relationship
of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the
servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by
Page 13
 him, reflects his own negligence if he
fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.
4. The test of imputed negligence under
Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a
great degree, necessarily subjective.
Car owners are not held to a uniform
and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their
own cars and instead hire other
persons to drive for them precisely
because they are not trained or
endowed with sufficient discernment
to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed
by the different situations that are
continually encountered on the road.
What would be a negligent omission
under the aforesaid Article on the
part of a car owner who is in the
prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not
necessarily so on the part, say, of an
old and infirm person who is not
similarly equipped.
5. The law does not require that a
person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either
in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he
may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his negligence, within the meaning of
Article 2184, is his omission to do
that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order
to avoid the accident. And as far as
perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a
maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the
law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners
who, by their very inadequacies, have
real need of drivers' services, would
be effectively proscribed.
 Kapalaran Bus Line vs Coronado (bus and
a jeepney)
Held:
1. Immediately before the collision, the
bus driver was actually violating the
following traffic rules and
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
regulations, among others, in the
Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended: x xx Thus, a legal
presumption arose that the bus
driver was negligent, a presumption
Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.
2. The liability of an employer under Art.
2180 is direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the negligence of the
latter.
3. In requiring the highest possible
degree of diligence from common
carriers and in creating a presumption
of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness
of their drivers
 Mendoza vs Soriano (Soriano hit by a
Tamaraw FX-failed to maintain safe speed
and the driver did not aid the victim)
Held:
1. The circumstances that the victim was
thrown five meters away after he was
hit and that the vehicle stopped only
some 25 meters from the point of
impact support the conclusion that the
vehicle was overspeeding—under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a motor vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating traffic regulations.
2. The records show that Macasasa
violated two traffic rules under the
Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. First, he failed to maintain a
safe speed to avoid endangering lives.
Both the trial and the appellate courts
found Macasasa overspeeding. The
records show also that Soriano was
thrown five meters away after he was
hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped
only some 25 meters from the point
of impact. Both circumstances
support the conclusion that the FX
vehicle driven by Macasasa was
overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the
vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano,
the accident victim, in violation of
Section 55, Article V of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
While Macasasa at first agreed to
bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled
the scene in a hurry. Contrary to
Page 14
 petitioner’s claim, there is no
showing of any factual basis that
Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s
wrath. What remains undisputed is
that he did not report the accident to
a police officer, nor did he summon a
doctor. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a motor
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating
traffic regulations.
3. While respondents could recover
damages from Macasasa in a criminal
case and petitioner could become
subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as
owner and employer, is directly and
separately civilly liable for her failure
to exercise due diligence in
supervising Macasasa. We must
emphasize that this damage suit is for
the quasidelict of petitioner, as owner
and employer, and not for the delict
of Macasasa, as driver and employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
employers are liable for the damages
caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned
tasks. The liability arises due to the
presumed negligence of the
employers in supervising their
employees unless they prove that
they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
4. We agree that the Court of Appeals
did not err in ruling that Soriano was
guilty of contributory negligence for
not using the pedestrian overpass
while crossing Commonwealth
Avenue. We even note that the
respondents now admit this point,
and concede that the appellate court
had properly reduced by 20% the
amount of damages it awarded.
Hence, we affirm the reduction of the
amount earlier awarded, based on
Article 2179 of the Civil Code which
reads: When the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant’s lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.
 Anonuevo vs CA (an injured cyclist of
damages from the driver of the car which
had struck him)
Held:
1. The fact that there has long existed a
higher degree of diligence and care
imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of a
motor vehicle, leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the
qualification under Article 2185
exists precisely to recognize such
higher standard. Simply put, the
standards applicable to motor vehicle
are not on equal footing with other
types of vehicles.
2. If the very injury has happened which
was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation
of the statute will be deemed the
proximate cause of the injury.
3. To prove contributory negligence, it is
still necessary to establish a causal
link, although not proximate, between
the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury.
 Filipinas Synthetic Fiber vs Delos Santos
(Galant Sigma burst into flames and
burned to death beyond recognition all
four occupants of the car from a collision
with a shuttle bus)
Held:
1. Under the New Civil Code, unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
Apparently, in the present case,
Mejia’s violation of the traffic rules
does not erase the presumption that
he was the one negligent at the time
of the collision.
2. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is
Page 15
 direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee.
c. RES IPSA LOQUITOR
 Maao Central & Co. vs CA (an employee
riding on a company’s cargo train and
derailed causing injury and subsequently
death of the victim)
Held:
1. At any rate, the absence of the fish
plates—whatever the cause or
reason—is by itself—alone proof of
the negligence of the petitioner. Res
ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was
described recently in Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, thus:
Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.
2. Contributory negligence has been
defined as “the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care
on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the
defendant’s negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.” It has
been held that “to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and
body.” There is no showing that the
caboose where Famoso was riding
was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite
warnings or signs of impending
danger.
 FF Cruz & Co vs CA (manufacturing
company adjacent to the defendants
residence; burned)
Held:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
whose application to the instant case
petitioner objects to, may be stated as
follows: Where the thing which
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care.
2. The facts of the case likewise call for
the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course
of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible
material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and
lubricants for machinery may be
found thereon. It must also be noted
that negligence or want of care on the
part of petitioner or its employees
was not merely presumed. The Court
of Appeals found that petitioner
failed to construct a firewall between
its shop and the residence of private
respondents as required by a city
ordinance; that the fire could have
been caused by a heated motor or a
lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol
were used and stored in the shop;
and that workers sometimes smoked
inside the shop.
3. Even without applying the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure
to construct a firewall in accordance
with city ordinances would suffice to
Support a finding of negligence.
4. In the instant case, with more reason
should petitioner be found guilty of
negligence since it had failed to
construct a firewall between its
property and private respondents’
residence which sufficiently complies
with the pertinent city ordinances.
The failure to comply with an
ordinance providing for safety
regulations had been ruled by the
Court as an act of negligence
 US vs Crame (motorcycle and one George
Coombs-private army)
Held:
1. Where, in a criminal prosecution
against the driver of an automobile
for running down and injuring a
Page 16
 pedestrian crossing a street, it
appeared that at the time the injury
was produced, the injured person
was where he had a right to be, that
the automobile was being driven on
the wrong side of the street, and no
warning was given of its approach, it
was properly held that there was a
presumption of negligence on the
part of the driver and that the burden
of proof was on him to establish that
the accident occurred through other
causes than his negligence.
2. The beggar has the same right to the
use of the streets of a city as has the
man with his automobile. Each is
bound to the exercise of ordinary
care for his own safety, and the
prevention of injury to others, in the
use thereof.
 Africa vs Caltex (fire broke out at Caltex
Service Station and burnt several
neighboring houses)
Held:
1. Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care.
2. The gasoline-station, with all its
appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and
spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The person who knew or
could have known how the fire
started were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is
a fair and reasonable inference that
the incident happened because of
want of care.
 Layugan vs IAC (security guard and a
part-time helper-bumped by an Isuzu
truck while his parked truck is on the
road)
Held:
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
1. Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do; "(T)he
failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury."
2. The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
3. Res ipsa loquitur: This doctrine is
stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
4. Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for
itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was
negligent, which arises upon proof
that instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control,
and that the accident was one which
ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence.
5. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence
whereby negligence of alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from
mere fact that accident happened
provided character accident and
circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of
negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged
wrongdoer.
Page 17
 6. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur"
the happening of an injury permits an
inference of negligence where
plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality under
exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence
was such that in the ordinary course
of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
7. The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can
be invoked when and only when, under
the circumstance involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily
available; The doctrine of Res ipsa
loquitur as a rule of evidence is
particular to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
8. The presumption of negligence on the
part of the master or employer is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted; It may
be overcome by proof that the
employer exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection
or supervision of his employees.
 Perla Compania de Seguros Inc vs Sps
Sarangaya (fire accident in a building
from the engine of the car)
Held:
1. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means “the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself.” It
relates to the fact of an injury that
sets out an inference to the cause
thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The
doctrine rests on inference and not
on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition
of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence
when direct evidence is lacking. The
doctrine is based on the theory that
the defendant either knows the cause
of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff, having no knowledge
thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms. In such
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
instance, the plaintiff relies on proof
of the happening of the accident alone
to establish negligence.
2. The test to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act,
use reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person
in the same situation would have
employed? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
3. To sustain the allegation of
negligence based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, the following
requisites must concur:
a. the accident is of a kind
which does not
ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
b. the cause of the injury
was under the exclusive
control of the person in
charge and
c. the injury suffered must
not have been due to any
voluntary action or
contribution on the part
of the person injured.17
 Carmen, Jr. vs Bacoy (stolen jeep for a
joyride; bumped a motorcycle that caused
the death of Sps Del Carmen)
Held:
1. Under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, “[w]here the thing that
caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants; and
the accident, in the ordinary course of
things, would not happen if those
who had management or control used
proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence—in the absence of a
sufficient, reasonable and logical
explanation by defendant—that the
accident arose from or was caused by
the defendant’s want of care.” Res
ipsa loquitur is “merely evidentiary, a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience, since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff
of, the burden of producing a specific
proof of negligence.” It “recognizes
that parties may establish prima
facie negligence without direct proof,
Page 18
 thus, it allows the principle to
substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the
accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
create an inference or presumption of
negligence and thereby place on the
defendant the burden of proving that
there was no negligence on his part.”
The doctrine is based partly on “the
theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it while the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and is
therefore compelled to allege
negligence in general terms.”
2. The requisites of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur as established by
jurisprudence are as follows: 1) the
accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; 2) the cause of the injury
was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge and 3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.
3. The registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was
being driven on the highways or
streets.
 Solidum vs People (an anesthesiologist
who is part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull
through operation conducted on a three-
year old patient born with an imperforate
anus)
Held:
1. Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated
as “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” The doctrine res
ipsa loquitur means that “where the
thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.” It is simply “a
recognition of the postulate that, as a
matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in
the absence of some explanation by
the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the
superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the
mere occurrence of the accident
itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.”
2. In order to allow resort to the
doctrine, therefore, the following
essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was
of a kind that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that
caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person
charged; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of
the person injured.
3. Negligence is defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand,
consists of voluntarily doing or failing
to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such
act. Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the
RTC was primarily based on his
failure to monitor and properly
regulate the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald by
overdosing at 100% halothane.
Page 19
 4. An action upon medical negligence —
whether criminal, civil or
administrative — calls for the
plaintiff to prove by competent
evidence each of the following four
elements, namely: (a) the duty owed
by the physician to the patient, as
created by the physician-patient
relationship, to act in accordance
with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; (b) the
breach of the duty by the physician’s
failing to act in accordance with the
applicable standard of care; (3) the
causation, i.e., there must be a
reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act
or omission and the resulting injury;
and (4) the damages suffered by the
patient.
5. In the medical profession, specific
norms or standards to protect the
patient against unreasonable risk,
commonly referred to as standards of
care, set the duty of the physician to
act in respect of the patient.
Unfortunately, no clear definition of
the duty of a particular physician in a
particular case exists. Because most
medical malpractice cases are highly
technical, witnesses with special
medical qualifications must provide
guidance by giving the knowledge
necessary to render a fair and just
verdict. As a result, the standard of
medical care of a prudent
physician must be determined from
expert testimony in most cases; and
in the case of a specialist (like an
anesthesiologist), the standard of
care by which the specialist is judged
is the care and skill commonly
possessed and exercised by similar
specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard
of care may be higher than that
required of the general practitioner.
6. The standard of care is an objective
standard by which the conduct of a
physician sued for negligence or
malpractice may be measured, and it
does not depend, therefore, on any
individual physician’s own
knowledge either. In attempting to fix
a standard by which a court may
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
determine whether the physician has
properly performed the requisite
duty toward the patient, expert
medical testimony from both plaintiff
and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately
determines the standard of care, after
listening to the testimony of all
medical experts.
7. In criminal prosecutions, the civil
action for the recovery of civil
liability that is deemed instituted
with the criminal action refers only to
that arising from the offense charged.
It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC
and the CA could have adjudged
Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for
the damages despite the obvious fact
that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not been charged
along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila
void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
8. Ospital ng Maynila could be held
civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched
here. The conditions for subsidiary
liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied
with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng
Maynila must be shown to be a
corporation “engaged in any kind of
industry.” The term industry means
any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially
one that employs labor and capital,
and is engaged in industry. However,
Ospital ng Maynila, being a public
hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in
charitable and humanitarian
work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital
ng Maynila was engaged in industry
for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown
to be an employee of Ospital ng
Maynila acting in the discharge of his
Page 20
 duties during the operation on
Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the
hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did
not happen here), the execution
against him was unsatisfied due to his
being insolvent.
 Rosit vs Davao Doctors Hospital (a patient
who figured an accident had fractured
jaw; the doctor used bigger screws
instead of the small ones)
Held:
1. GR: To establish medical negligence,
the Supreme Court (SC) has held that
an expert testimony is generally
required to define the standard of
behavior by which the court may
determine whether the physician has
properly performed the requisite duty
toward the patient.
2. We have further held that resort to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an
exception to the requirement of an
expert testimony in medical
negligence cases may be availed of if
the following essential requisites are
satisfied: (1) the accident was of a
kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused
the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
D. BURDEN OF PROOF
 Alano vs Magud-Lagmao (story of an 18-
yo found at Cubao Overpass, brought to
the hospital, pronounced brain dead and
vital organs were extracted and given to
various recipients)
Held:
1. It is respondent’s failure to adduce
adequate evidence that doomed this
case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, 678
SCRA 583 (2012), “[i]n civil cases, it is
a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of
evidence. The parties must rely on
the strength of their own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
defense offered by their opponent.”
Here, there is to proof that, indeed,
the period of around 24 hours from
the time notices were disseminated,
cannot be considered as reasonable
under the circumstances. They failed
to present any expert witness to
prove that given the medical
technology and knowledge at that
time in the 1980’s, the doctors could
or should have waited longer before
harvesting the internal organs for
transplantation.
 BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo (This case
involves a claim for damages arising from
the death of a motorcycle rider in a
nighttime accident due to the supposed
negligence of a construction company
then undertaking re-blocking work on a
national highway.)
Held:
1. Burden of proof is the duty of a party
to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. It is basic that
whoever alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it because a mere
allegation is not evidence. Generally,
the party who denies has no burden
to prove. In civil cases, the burden of
proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on
either side. The burden of proof is on
the plaintiff if the defendant denies
the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by
the Rules of Court, but it may rest on
the defendant if he admits expressly
or impliedly the essential allegations
but raises affirmative defense or
defenses, which if proved, will
exculpate him from liability.
2. Negligence, the Court said in Layugan
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167
SCRA 363 (1988), is “the omission to
do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do, or
as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(t)he
failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person,
Page 21
 that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.’” In order that a
party may be held liable for damages
for any injury brought about by the
negligence of another, the claimant
must prove that the negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury. Proximate cause is
defined as “that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not
have occurred.”
V. DEFENSES
a. COMPLETE DEFENSE
a.1. Plaintiff’s Own Negligence
 Paulan vs Sarabia
 Fe Cayao-Lasam vs Ramolete (defendant
underwent “raspa”
Held:
1. Contributory negligence is the act or
omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the
person injured, which, concurring
with the defendant’s negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in
deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. Where the
immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s
own act, which contributed to the
principal occurrence as one of its
determining factors, he cannot
recover damages for the
injury. Again, based on the
evidence presented in the present
case under review, in which no
negligence can be attributed to the
petitioner, the immediate cause of
the accident resulting in Editha’s
injury was her own omission when
she did not return for a follow-up
check up, in defiance of
petitioner’s orders. The immediate
cause of Editha’s injury was her
own act; thus, she cannot recover
damages from the injury.
 BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo (This case
involves a claim for damages arising from
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
the death of a motorcycle rider in a
nighttime accident due to the supposed
negligence of a construction company
then undertaking re-blocking work on a
national highway.)
Held:
1. Based on the evidence adduced by
the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot
be fairly ascribed to the company
considering that it has shown its
installation of the necessary warning
signs and lights in the project site. In
that context, the fatal accident was
not caused by any instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the
company. In contrast, Balbino had the
exclusive control of how he operated
and managed his motorcycle. The
records disclose that he himself did
not take the necessary precautions.
As Zamora declared, Balbino
overtook another motorcycle rider at
a fast speed, and in the process could
not avoid hitting a barricade at the
site, causing him to be thrown off his
motorcycle onto the newly cemented
road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation
report corroborated Zamora’s
declaration. This causation of the
fatal injury went uncontroverted by
the Lanuzo heirs.
2. Moreover, by the time of the accident,
the project, which had commenced in
September 1997, had been going on
for more than a month and was
already in the completion stage.
Balbino, who had passed there on a
daily basis in going to and from his
residence and the school where he
then worked as the principal, was
thus very familiar with the risks at
the project site. Nor could the Lanuzo
heirs justly posit that the illumination
was not adequate, for it cannot be
denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was
equipped with headlights that would
have enabled him at dusk or night
time to see the condition of the road
ahead. That the accident still
occurred surely indicated that he
himself did not exercise the degree of
care expected of him as a prudent
motorist.
EXCEPTION TO COMPLETE DEFENSE:
Page 22
  Taylor vs Manila Electric (loss of an eye
and other injuries of a minor who is more
mature than the average boy of his age)
Held:
1. The owners of premises, therefore,
whereon things attractive to children
are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressly or impliedly
permitted to enter or upon which the
owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, "must calculate
upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner
of the premises cannot be heard to
say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his
express permission he is a trespasser
to whom the owner owes no duty or
obligation whatever. The owner's
failure to take reasonable precautions
to prevent the child from entering his
premises at a place where he knows
or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about or to
which their childish instincts and
impulses are likely to attract them is
at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and Where the Child
does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to guard the child against
injury from unknown or unseen
dangers, placed upon such premises
by the owner, is clearly a breach of
duty, a negligent omission, for which
he may and should be held
responsible, if the child is actually-
injured, without other fault on its
part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his
express invitation or permission. To
hold otherwise would be to expose all
the children in the community to
unknown perils and unnecessary
danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they
might naturally and reasonably be
expected to enter.
 Hidalgo Ent. Vs Balandan (ice plant
factory; tanks were not provided with any
kind of fence; 8-yo boy; bath in one of the
tanks, sank to the bottom and died)
Held:
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
1. Doctrine of attractive nuisance - One
who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails
to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.
2. The principal reason for the doctrine
is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so
enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this'
attractiveness is an implied invitation
to such children.
3. DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO
SWIMMING POOL OR WATER
TANK.—The attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its
location.
a.2. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
 Afiliada vs Hisole and Hisole (gored by a
carabao and later died)
Held:
1. LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL
FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS
CARETAKER.—Under article 1905 of
the Civil Code, the owner of an animal
is not liable for injury caused by it to
its caretaker.
2. In the present case, the animal was in
the custody and under the control of
the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one
of the risks of the occupation which
he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the
consequences.
 Ilocos Norte vs CA (electrocuted; storm)
Page 23
 Held:
1. While it is true that typhoons and
floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held
responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the
victim’s death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner’s
negligence that death took place. x x x
Indeed, under the circumstances of
the case, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to
the general public” . . . considering
that electricity is an agency, subtle
and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must
be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty
of exercising this high degree of
diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to
be” (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55
Phil. 427). The negligence of
petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability
by arguing that the victim’s death was
solely due to a fortuitous event.
“When an act of God combines or
concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would
not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission”
 Calalas vs CA ((passenger of a jeepney
seated on a wooden stool as an extension
seat bumped by an Isuzu truck)
Held:
1. We find it hard to give serious
thought to petitioner’s contention
that Sunga’s taking an “extension
seat” amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many
victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding
an overloaded ferry. This is also true
of petitioner’s contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event
which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. This requires that the
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
following requirements be present:
(a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor’s will; (b)
the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as
to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the debtor did not
take part in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
 Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes
(Amay Bisaya – being thrown out of the
party as he was uninvited)
Held:
1. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko
contend that pursuant to the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot
be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the
process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”
The doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria (“to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers
to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated
by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case
at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule
and shame.
2. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable
as its liability springs from that of its
employee.
a.3. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE;
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING NEGLIGENCE;
Page 24
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERED PERIL;
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
 Picart vs Smith (Smith (automobile and a
frightened pony on a bridge)
Held:
1, Understanding of the "last clear
chance" rule of the law of negligence as
particularly applied to automobile
accidents. This rule cannot be invoked
where the negligence of the plaintiff is
concurrent with that of the defendant.
Again, if a traveller when he reaches the
point of collision is in a situation to
extricate himself and avoid injury, his
negligence at that point will prevent a
recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact
that the negligent act of the defendant
succeeded that of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval of time, and that at
that moment the plaintiff had no
opportunity to avoid the accident.
Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule
is applicable. In other words, when a
traveller has reached a point where he
cannot extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert the injury, his
negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the
proximate cause of the injury and will not
preclude a recovery.
 Allied Bank vs BPI (post-dated check in
the amount of P1M)
Held:
1. The doctrine of last clear chance,
stated broadly, is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to
the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine
necessarily assumes negligence on
the part of the defendant and
contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, and does not apply
except upon that assumption. Stated
differently, the antecedent negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the
defendant, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Moreover, in situations where the
doctrine has been applied, it was
defendant’s failure to exercise such
ordinary care, having the last clear
chance to avoid loss or injury, which
was the proximate cause of the
occurrence of such loss or injury.
2. Contributory negligence is conduct
on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own
protection.” Admittedly, petitioner’s
acceptance of the subject check for
deposit despite the one year postdate
written on its face was a clear
violation of established banking
regulations and practices. In such
instances, payment should be refused
by the drawee bank and returned
through the PCHC within the 24-hour
reglementary period. As aptly
observed by the CA, petitioner’s
failure to comply with this basic
policy regarding post-dated checks
was “a telling sign of its lack of due
diligence in handling checks coursed
through it.”
 Pantranco vs Baesa (passenger jeepney
collided with Pantranco; picnic to
celebrate the wedding anniversary –MAY
FOREVER Te! –bleh)
Held:
1. The doctrine applies only in a
situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so,
is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence
of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37
Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s
Lumber and Hardware, et al. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia
Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May 18, 1989]. The
subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury to
plaintiff becomes the immediate or
Page 25
 proximate cause of the accident
which intervenes between the
accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the
plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance
doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it
may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim for damages.
2. Contrary to the petitioner’s
contention, the doctrine of “last clear
chance” finds no application in this
case. For the doctrine to be
applicable, it is necessary to show
that the person who allegedly had the
last opportunity to avert the accident
was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an
accident or injury if he does not know
or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case,
there is nothing to show that the
jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger. When he saw at a
distance that the approaching bus
was encroaching on his lane, he did
not immediately swerve the jeepney
to the dirt shoulder on his right since
he must have assumed that the bus
driver will return the bus to its own
lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite
direction.
3. The speed at which the approaching
bus was running prevented David Ico
from swerving the jeepney to the
right shoulder of the road in time to
avoid the collision. Thus, even
assuming that the jeepney driver
perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it. This Court
has held that the last clear chance
doctrine “can never apply where the
party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
or should have been discovered” [Ong
v. Metropolitan Water District, supra].
 People’s Lumber vs IAC (truck and
jeepney – Calibo (jeepney’s driver)-from a
drinking spree)
Held:
1. The evidence not only acquits
Zacarias of any negligence in the
matter; there are also quite a few
significant indicators that it was
rather Engineer Calibo’s negligence
that was the proximate cause of the
accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman
Dimaano at the scene of the collision
and later confirmed in his written
statement at the police headquarters
that the jeep had been “zigzagging,”
which is to say that it was travelling
or being driven erratically at the time.
The other investigator, Patrolman
Jose Esparcia, also testified that
eyewitnesses to the accident had
remarked on the jeep’s “zigzagging.”
There is moreover more than a
suggestion that Calibo had been
drinking shortly before the accident.
The decision of the Trial Court
adverts to further testimony of
Esparcia to the effect that three of
Calibo’s companions at the beach
party he was driving home from
when the collision occurred, who,
having left ahead of him went to the
scene when they heard about the
accident, had said that there had been
a drinking spree at the party and,
referring to Calibo, had remarked:
“Sabi na huag nang mag drive . . .
pumipilit,” (loosely translated, “He
was advised not to drive, but he
insisted.”)
2. Even, however, ignoring these telltale
indicia of negligence on the part of
Calibo, and assuming some
antecedent negligence on the part of
Zacarias in failing to keep within his
designated lane, incorrectly
demarcated as it was, the physical
facts, either expressly found by the
Intermediate Appellate Court or
which may be deemed conceded for
lack of any dispute, would still
absolve the latter of any actionable
Page 26
 responsibility for the accident under
the rule of the last clear chance.
3. Both Drivers, as the Appellate Court
found, had had a full view of each
other’s vehicle from a distance of one
hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles
were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per
hour. The private respondents have
admitted that the truck was already
at a full stop when the jeep plowed
into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners’
imputation that they also admitted
the truck had been brought to a stop
while the jeep was still thirty meters
away. From this facts the logical
conclusion emerges that the driver of
the jeep had what judicial doctrine
has appropriately called the last clear
chance to avoid the accident, while
still at that distance of thirty meters
from the truck, by stopping in his
turn or swerving his jeep away from
the truck, either of which he had
sufficient time to do while running at
a speed of only thirty kilometers per
hour. In those circumstances, his duty
was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the
truck to swerve and leave him a clear
path.
 De Roy vs CA (The firewall of a burned-
out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter)
Held:
1. This Court likewise finds that the
Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court’s decision holding
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of
the Civil Code, which provides that
“the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.”
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
2. Nor was there error in rejecting
petitioners argument that private
respondents had the “last clear
chance” to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate
the tailoring shop and, therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should
be disregarded, since the doctrine of
“last clear chance,” which has been
applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
 PLDT vs CA (jeep ran over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by
PLDT)
Held:
1. The above findings clearly show that
the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to
his injuries and those of his wife but
goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of
its determining factors, and thereby
precludes their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were
known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondents. By
exercising reasonable care and
prudence, respondent Antonio
Esteban could have avoided the
injurious consequences of his act,
even assuming arguendo that there
was some alleged negligence on the
part of petitioner.
2. The presence of warning signs could
not have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations
on the site. The private respondents
already knew of the presence of said
excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents
to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the
jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. As opined in some
quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning
signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only
when the doing of the said omitted
act would have prevented the injury.
It is basic that private respondents
Page 27
 cannot charge PLDT for their injuries
where their own failure to exercise
due and reasonable care was the
cause thereof. It is both a societal
norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of
caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed
on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there. It
was his negligence that exposed him
and his wife to danger, hence he is
solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
 Ong vs MCWD
 Echevara vs Ramos (vehicular accident)
Held:
1. The doctrine of last clear chance
applies to a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, but the
defendant—who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so—is made liable for
all the consequences of the accident,
notwithstanding the prior negligence
of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine
does not apply where the party
charged is required to act
instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered.
2. In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and
Benigno Valdez failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent man would have
taken to prevent the vehicular
accident. Since the gross negligence
of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable
negligence of Benigno Valdez were
the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, respondents cannot recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of
the Civil Code.
 Philippine National Railways vs Vizcara
(jeep and the train)
Held:
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
1. Both courts ruled that the petitioners
fell short of the diligence expected of
it, taking into consideration the
nature of its business, to forestall any
untoward incident. In particular, the
petitioners failed to install safety
railroad bars to prevent motorists
from crossing the tracks in order to
give way to an approaching train.
Aside from the absence of a crossing
bar, the “Stop, Look and Listen”
signage installed in the area was
poorly maintained, hence, inadequate
to alert the public of the impending
danger. A reliable signaling device in
good condition, not just a dilapidated
“Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is
needed to give notice to the public. It
is the responsibility of the railroad
company to use reasonable care to
keep the signal devices in working
order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence. Having
established the fact of negligence on
the part of the petitioners, they were
rightfully held liable for damages.
2. The doctrine of last clear chance
provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in point of time
than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom.
Stated differently, the rule is that the
antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude recovery of
damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence. To reiterate, the
proximate cause of the collision was
the petitioners’ negligence in
ensuring that motorists and
pedestrians alike may safely cross the
railroad track. The unsuspecting
driver and passengers of the jeepney
did not have any participation in the
occurrence of the unfortunate
incident which befell them. Likewise,
Page 28
 they did not exhibit any overt act
manifesting disregard for their own
safety. Thus, absent preceding
negligence on the part of the
respondents, the doctrine of last clear
chance cannot be applied.
a.4 EMERGENCY RULE
 Valenzuela vs CA (lancer parked and
bumped by Li)
Held:
1. One will have to suspend disbelief in
order to give credence to Li’s
disingenuous and patently self-
serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will
have no difficulty applying the brakes
to a car traveling at the speed claimed
by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal
metropolitan throroughfare like
Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had
ample time to react to the changing
conditions of the road if he were
alert—as every driver should be—to
those conditions. Driving exacts a
more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological “fight or flight”
mechanisms are at work, provided
such mechanisms were not dulled by
drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in
a manner which would have avoided
the accident could therefore have
been only due to either or both of the
two factors: 1) that he was driving at
a “very fast” speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under
the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have
diminished his responsiveness to
road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than
be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes.
2. Courts have traditionally been
compelled to recognize that an actor
who is confronted with an emergency
is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses of
humanity when placed in threatening
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
or dangerous situations and does not
require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from
persons confronted by unusual and
oftentimes threatening conditions.
Under the “emergency rule” adopted
by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals, an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much
time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.
3. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a
point which is both convenient for
her to do so and which is not a hazard
to other motorists. She is not
expected to run the entire boulevard
in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark street or alley where she
would likely find no one to help her. It
would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency
(simply because the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking
zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety
and to other motorists.
 Orix Metro Leasing vs Mangalinao (A
multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death
of all the passengers in one vehicle,
including the parents and a sibling of the
surviving orphaned minor heirs,
compelled the latter to file an action for
damages against the registered owners
and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks
that collided with their parents’ Nissan
Pathfinder (Pathfinder)
Held:
1. The ‘Emergency Rule’ invoked by
petitioners will not apply. Such
principle states: [O]ne who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
Page 29
 he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own
negligence. Considering the wet and
slippery condition of the road that
night, Antonio should have been
prudent to reduce his speed and
increase his distance from the
Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would
be improbable for him to have hit the
vehicle in front of him or if he really
could not avoid hitting it, prevent
such extensive wreck to the vehicle in
front. With the glaring evidence, he
obviously failed to exercise proper
care in his driving.
a.5 PRESCRIPTION
 Capuno vs Pepsi (vehicular accident)
Held:
1. An action for recovery of damages
based on a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four years.
2. AN action based on a quasi-delict is
governed by Article 1150 of the Civil
Code as to the question of when the
prescriptive period of four years shall
begin to run, that is, “from the day
(the action) may be brought,” which
means from the day the quasi-
delict occurred or was committed
3. The institution of a criminal action
cannot have the effect of interrupting
the institution of a civil action based
on a quasi-delict.
b. INCOMPLETE PARTIAL DEFENSE
b.1. DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
 NTC vs De Jesus
 Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf ((a laborer of the
defendant transporting iron rails from a
barge in the harbor that accidentally slid
in rails, caught the plaintiff and broke his
leg and was amputated up to the knee)
Held:
1. The negligence of the injured person
contributing to his injury but not
being one of the determining causes
of the principal accident, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but only
in reduction of his damages. Each
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
party is chargeable with damages in
proportion to his fault.
 Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad ((loss
of an eye and other injuries of a minor
who is more mature than the average boy
of his age)
Held:
1. When the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiff's own act, which contributed
to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot
recover damages for the injury.
 Banal & Enverso vs Tacloban Electric
House & House Plant (accident after a
procession; daughter died)
Held:
1. Although the trial judge made the
findings of fact herein before
outlined, he nevertheless was led to
order the dismissal of the action
because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from
this point that a majority of the court
depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child
had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the
child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling
into a ditch filled with hot water. The
doctrines announced in the much
debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Paciftc Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,
359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced.
The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its
strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.
 Jarco Marketing Corp. vs CA (the daughter
of the defendant was pinned by the bulk
of the store’s gift-wrapping
counter/structure)
Held:
Page 30
 1. Anent the negligence imputed to
ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they
are incapable of contributory
negligence. In his book, former Judge
Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our
jurisdiction, a person under nine
years of age is conclusively presumed
to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption
from criminal liability obtains in a
case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment.
Since negligence may be a felony and
a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a
child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment
or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over nine but under
fifteen years of age is a rebuttable
one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine
years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
 Napocor vs Casionan (pocket miner)
Held:
1. Negligence is the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers
injury. On the other
hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard which he
is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory
negligence when the party’s act
showed lack of ordinary care and
foresight that such act could cause
him harm or put his life in danger. It
is an act or omission amounting to
want of ordinary care on the part of
Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms
the person injured which, concurring
with the defendant’s negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury. The
underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence.
If indeed there was contributory
negligence on the part of the victim,
then it is proper to reduce the award
for damages. This is in consonance
with the Civil Code provision that
liability will be mitigated in
consideration of the contributory
negligence of the injured party.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code is
explicit on this score: When the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
2. ; It was held that to hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.
3. In this case, the trail where Noble was
electrocuted was regularly used by
members of the community. There
were no warning signs to inform
passersby of the impending danger to
their lives should they accidentally
touch the high tension wires. Also, the
trail was the only viable way from
Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble
should not be faulted for simply
doing what was ordinary routine to
other workers in the area.
 Cadiente vs Macas (15yo HS student
standing on the shoulder of the road was
bumped by Ford Fiera)
Held:
1. The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a
Page 31
 plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled
to recover damages in full, but must
proportionately bear the
consequences of his own negligence.
The defendant is thus held liable only
for the damages actually caused by
his negligence.
2. In this case, records show that when
the accident happened, the victim
was standing on the shoulder, which
was the uncemented portion of the
highway. As noted by the trial court,
the shoulder was intended for
pedestrian use alone. Only stationary
vehicles, such as those loading or
unloading passengers may use the
shoulder. Running vehicles are not
supposed to pass through the said
uncemented portion of the highway.
However, the Ford Fiera in this case,
without so much as slowing down,
took off from the cemented part of
the highway, inexplicably swerved to
the shoulder, and recklessly bumped
and ran over an innocent victim. The
victim was just where he should be
when the unfortunate event
transpired.
3. Cimafranca, on the other hand, had
no rightful business driving as
recklessly as she did. The respondent
cannot be expected to have foreseen
that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile
speeding along the cemented part of
the highway would suddenly swerve
to the shoulder, then bump and run
him over. Thus, we are unable to
accept the petitioner’s contention
that the respondent was negligent.

Sugaree 

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms Page 32