Criminal Law 2
He contended that penalty should be
TITLE III. Crimes Against Public Order
Art. 134 – Rebellion or insurrection
1. People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 (Resolution), [July
18, 1956], 99
PHIL 515-583)
FACTS:
Hernandez was charged with rebellion as being members of the PKP a
Communist Party which was then engaged in an armed rebellion against
the government of the Philippines. He was charged with complex crime
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hernandez contended that
rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson and robbery.
ISSUE:
Is the contentions of Hernandez correct?
RULING:
YES. Court ruled that murder, arson and robbery are mere ingredients of
the crime of rebellion. Rebellion constitutes only one crime. It is
substantial that an action to overthrow the government by means of
rebellion must be evident. Membership is not considered a criminal act of
conspiracy unless transformed into an action of controversy, in the case
at bar we find this of no binding.
Hernandez Doctrine – rebellion cannot be complexed with common
crimes such as killings or/and destruction of property committed in the
occasion and in the furtherance thereof
2. People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, [October 23, 1956], 100
PHIL 90-124)
FACTS:
Geronimo, a member of the CPP, HUKS was charged with complex crime
of rebellion with murders, robberies and kidnaping. Defendant
feloniously ambush, attack, assault and fired upon soldiers of the
Philippine constabulary. Has committed robbery of the Treasury Vault
and killed a barrio lieutenant. He was then found guilty and was
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
sentenced with life imprisonment.
prison mayor for in his opinion there is no complex crime of rebellion.
ISSUE:
Is Geronimo guilty of the crime charged in the information?
RULING:
NO. All the overt acts charged in the information were committed for
political ends or in furtherance to the rebellion. Those were done for the
furtherance of the felonious intent. If it is done without political
motivation, it may be considered as a separate offense but it does not
appear in the present case for the constituted acts and intent are related
to commit rebellion and is done in in preparation and furtherance of
rebellion. The common crimes committed were necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, and those overt acts are essential
ingredients of the single crime of rebellion (People vs Hernandez).
Hence Geronimo is guilty of the rebellion and not of the complex crime in
the information.
3. People v. Cruz, 3 SCRA 217
Paterno Cruz and Benito Cruz of "rebellion with robbery with homicide,"
and appellant Fermin Tolentino of "rebellion with arson, with murder and
robbery. Benito Cruz together with a band of men staged a raid by the
HUKs in the province of Bataan, more particularly in the Makabulos
massacre and has committed multiple crimes of arson, robbery and
murder on civilians and even to the Philippine constabulary.
ISSUE:
Whether Benito Cruz et al is guilty of the crime charged of complex
crime of rebellion with robbery and homicide
RULING:
NO. It has been held as stated in the brief for the Government,
appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion (People vs. Nava, L-9483,
January 30, 1960; People vs. Hernandez, 52 Off. Gaz., 4612), inasmuch
as the information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed
to them were performed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion
and in furtherance thereof.
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Following the Hernandez Doctrine, Benito Cruz is guilty only of simple
rebellion. For the crime of rebellion constitutes only that of a single
crime.
4. Carino v. People, 7 SCRA900
FACTS
In an information dated April 28, 1952, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the accused was charged with the crime of rebellion
with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, for having, as a high
ranking officer and/or member of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known as the
Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 others who were
charged with the same crime in other criminal cases then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government and disrupting its activities. Acts pf rebellion were
committed in conspiracy with other members of the communist party.
Accused provided accommodation for the night, giving cigarettes to the
members of communist and helping in opening of bank accounts to the
members of the communist party.
ISSUE
Carino contended that his acts does not constitute him as an accomplice
to the crime of rebellion.
RULING
NO. Carino’s acts were not that of rebellion. Article 8 provides that an
accomplice is one who cooperate in the execution of the offense by
simultaneous or previous acts relating to the previous acts: 1. Take part
in the execution of the crime, 2. Cooperated with the intention of
supplying aid in the execution of the crime. CA held that the acts
constituted acts of cooperation and contributed to some extent in the
promotion of rebellion. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court held otherwise.
The sending of food supplies and cigarettes does not prove intention to
help in committing rebellion. Neither is the opening of the bank accounts
for the work of petitioner is an officer of the bank which is a part of his
function as an employee.
These acts do not carry or prove any criminal intent of helping the
HUKS. This does not precisely conclude that the performed criminal
intent of helping in the execution or the carrying out of rebellion or
insurrection.
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Therefore, the judgement is reversed and Carino is absolved from the
charge contained in the information.
5. Buscayno v. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273
FACTS:
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias
Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as
"PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities.
It was alleged that as ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arms, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
and the New People's Army, constituting an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government by force or placing it under the control of an
alien power.
It was alleged that on or about February 4, 1972 and for some time prior
or subsequent thereto the ninety two accused as officers and leaders of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New
People's Army, and as conspirators rose publicly and took up arms
against the government in Navotas, Rizal and elsewhere in the
Philippines for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof
or of its armed forces by organizing the Karagatan Fishing Corporation
and operating the M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms
and ammunition for the CPP and NPA as in fact war materials and
armanents were landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela on July 2,
1972 from Communist China and were used against the army.
Buscayno contended that rebellion is an element for the crime of
subversion and held the defense of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Buscayno is correct with his contentions that rebellion is
an element of subversion
RULING:
NO. The contention is not correct because subversion does not
necessarily include rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is a crime against
national security. Rebellion is a crime against public order.
Rrebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, Philippine territory or any part thereof, or
any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
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Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Rebellion is distinct from participation or membership in an organization
committed to overthrow the duly constituted government (People vs.
Hernandez, 120 Phil. 191, 220).
In the instant case, the rebellion charge against the petitioners
embraced the acts committed by them on or about February 4, 1972 and
during the period from August, 1973 to February, 1974. The subversion
charge against Buscayno involved his acts committed in 1965, 1967,
1969, 1970 and 1971. The subversion charge against the Sison spouses
referred to their acts committed in 1968 and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto. The common denominator of the rebellion and
subversion charges is that the petitioners committed overt acts as
alleged communists or leftists. The overt acts in the two charges are
different.
Rebellion is an offense that has existed in the Penal Code for a long
time. It may be committed by non communists without collaborating
with the agents of an alien power. In contrast, the crime of subversion
came into existence when the communists sought to dominate the world
in order to establish a new social economic and political order
6. Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
FACTS
Enrille was charged with rebellion with murder and was detained for the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November
29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. He then filled for a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE
Enrile contested to maintain the Hernandez as applying to make rebellion
absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
RULING
YES, Enrile was favored. The primary ruling of the Court, which is that
Hernandez, remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
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unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. The plaint of
petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in
the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled
that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on
the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan
Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read
as charging simple rebellion only.
Supreme Court low pitched the Congress that there is an apparent need
to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or
to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the
umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The
Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the
law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly
seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
7. People v. Romagosa, G.R. No. L-8476, [February 28, 1958],
103 PHIL 20-27)
This appeal is related to the case of People vs. Federico Geronimo alias
Comdr. Oscar, et al., G.R. No. L-8936, decided by this Court on October
23, 1956 (100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz. No. 1, 68).
Herein appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David was, in all information
filed by the Provincial Fiscal, accused in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnappings, under three counts that are the last three of the five
counts charged against Federico Geronimo, et al., in said case No. G.R.
L-8936, supra:
That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto and continuously up to the present time in the province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court and in other municipalities, cities and provinces and other parts of
the country where they have chosen to carry out their rebellious
activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or
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members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or
otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed
force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) having come to
an agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and
therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves with
all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315,
14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case number 19166 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other members, officers
and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others whose identities
and whereabouts are still unknown, acting in accordance with their
conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, and mutually helping one another,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help support,
promote, maintain, direct and/or command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or
the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly and take
arms against the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose of
removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws thereof, as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) pursuant to such
conspiracy, have risen publicly and taken arms against the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines to attain said purpose, by then and
there making armed raids, sorties, and ambuscades, attacks against the
Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the Army
Patrols and other detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as
a necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed
wanton acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnappings and
planned destructions of private and public property and plotted the
liquidation of government officials, to create and spread disorder, terror,
confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose, among which are follows to wit:
1. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality
of, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks
under Commander Rustum raided the house of one Nemesio
Palo, a Police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and as a
result, said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and
once captured with evident premeditation, treachery and intent
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
to kill, stab, shot and cut the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby
causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio Palo.
2. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita,
Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico
Geronimo alias Commander Oscar ambushed and fired upon an
Army Patrol headed by CPL Bayrante, resulting in seriously
wounding of PFC Pancracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta, a
civilian.
3. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San
Fernando, Camarines Sur, Abundio Romagosa, one of a group of
four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar with evident
premiditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one
Policarpio Tipay, a barrio lieutenant.
As in the case of Federico Geronimo, appellant Romagosa, upon
arraignment, entered a plea of guilty to the information. In view of the
voluntary plea of guilty, the prosecution recommended that the penalty
of life imprisonment be imposed on the accused, on the ground that the
charge being a complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, the penalty provided for by law is the maximum of the most
serious crime which is murder. Counsel for the accused, on the other
hand, argued that the proper penalty imposable upon the accused was
only prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the
natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged
against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion.
On October 13, 1954, the lower court rendered judgment finding
accused Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000; to
indemnify the heirs of the two persons killed named in the information,
in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
From the judgment accused Romagosa appealed to this Court, insisting
that there is no crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, and that he should have been convicted only of simple
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rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison mayor in its minimum
period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty.
The question of whether there is a complex crime of rebellion with
murder, robbery, and kidnapping under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, is exactly the same question raised and decided in the cases of
People vs. Hernandez, et al., * 52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5506, and People
vs. Geronimo, supra. None of the members of this Court has found
reason to change his respective stand on the matter as expressed in the
Geronimo case, wherein the majority of this Court held that where the
crimes of murders, robberies, and kidnappings are committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the rebellion charged, they are absorbed
by, and form part and parcel of, the rebellion, and that therefore, the
accused can be convicted only of the simple crime of rebellion.
Consistently with that precedent, we hold that the lower court erred in
holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the
penalty for such crime.
As in the Geronimo case, there is the further question of whether, in
view of appellant's plea of guilty to the information, he should be
deemed to have admitted the commission of the simple crime of
rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other separate crimes, if any of the
counts of the information charges crimes independent of and not
constituting essential acts or ingredients of the rebellion charged. As
already stated, the three counts of the information against herein
appellant Romagosa are exactly the same as the last three of the five
counts charged against Federico Geronimo (G.R. No. L-8936). As ruled
the majority in the preceding case, the first count under the present
information (the third count against Geronimo) does not charge
appellant's participation and can not, therefore, be taken into
consideration in this case; the second (the fourth count against
Geronimo) alleges essential act of rebellion and is absorbed by that
crime; while the third (the fifth count against Geronimo) charges the
murder of one Policarpio Tipay, a barrio lieutenant, which killing, though
committed within the jurisdiction of the lower court, does not appear to
be related to the rebellion and hence constitutes an independent offense
in itself.
The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view
express in the Geronimo case that by his plea of guilty, appellant has
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
admitted the commission of the independent crime of murder alleged in
count 3 of the information, the averment that said crime was
perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a mere conclusion and
not a bar to appellant's conviction and punishment for said offense,
appellant having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information
on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Therefore, appellant
must be held guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate
offenses, simple rebellion and murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that
appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David is convicted of the crimes of
simple rebellion and murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his
plea of guilty, appellant is sentenced for the rebellion: to suffer 8 years
of prison mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000 (without subsidiary
imprisonment pursuant to Article 38 of the Revised Penal Code), and for
the murder: to an indeterminate sentence of not less than 10 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum and not more than 18 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio
Tipay in the sum of P6,000 solidarily with Federico Geronimo, alias
Commander Oscar, (G.R. No. L-8936), and other adjudged guilty of
having participated in the slaying of said deceased; and to pay the costs.
So ordered.
8. People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13981, [April 25, 1960],
107 PHIL 659-664)
Facts:
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. The accused filed a motion to
quash on the ground that the crime with which he is charged is already
alleged as a component element or ingredient of the crime of rebellion
with which he was charged in Criminal Case No. 16990 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
already absorbed in the crime of rebellion?
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Held:
YesThe Court held that, "any or all of the acts described in Art. 135,
when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends
described in Art. 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and
cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves; and
cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under Art.
48 of the code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion"
(People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., 68), the conclusion is
inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the
present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it
further now would be to place him in double jeopardy.
9. People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, [April 28, 1993])
Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged
together of shooting Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died
while performing duties. Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes
entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had
presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the
promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the prosecution
had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez
died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously.
He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to
approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers
were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of
members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying
to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions,
while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a
grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and
subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live
ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought
to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and
Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every
page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed
by him. However, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-
judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his
Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in
the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Appellant also claims that
the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of
admitting such a serious offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of
the deceased and participated in the act of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of
rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay
the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads
a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove
that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he
was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving
instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the
command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the
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resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc.
Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
10. Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 &
175013, [June 1,
2007], 551 PHIL 313-338)
FACTS:
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a "State of National
Emergency", police officers arrested Beltran without a warrant and the
arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was
arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an (first) inquest at
the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition based on a
speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on the
occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.
A second inquest was conducted by the DOJ, this time
for Rebellion. The inquest was based on two letters implicating Beltran,
San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged
foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government supposed to be carried
out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a
"tactical alliance."
The RTC indicted Beltran and San Juan as leaders/ promoters of
Rebellion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran
rebellion (NO)
HELD:
There is no probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –
by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or
multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.
None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged
presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him
a leader of a rebellion. Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP,
which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP
does not constitute rebellion. Likewise, attendance in meetings
to discuss plans to bring down a government is a mere
preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion.
11. People vs. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo
while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay
Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss.
On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of
murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the
decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was
confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a
member of the New People’s Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
for
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder,
instead of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the
crime of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of
rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a
common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible
imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude
towards political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved,
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the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership
in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by
and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered
no contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact,
there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as
offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A
was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated
September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.
Art. 134-A – Coup d’etat
- Gonzales v. Abaya, 498 SCRA 445, 476 (concurring opinion of
Callejo, J.)
Indeed, the service-connected punitive acts defined and penalized
under the Articles of War are sui generis offenses not absorbed by
rebellion perpetrated, inter alia, by the officers and enlisted
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or coup
d’etat. This is so because such acts or omissions are merely
violations of military discipline, designed to secure a higher
efficiency in the military service; in other words, they are purely
disciplinary in their nature, and have exclusive regard to the
special character and relation of the AFP officers and enlisted
personnel. Laws providing for the discipline as well as the
organization of the AFP are essential to the efficiency for the
military service in case their services should ever be required.
"Deprive the executive branch of the government of the power to
enforce proper military regulations by fine and imprisonment, and
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
that, too, by its own courts-martial, which from time immemorial
have exercised this right, and we at once paralyze all efforts to
secure proper discipline in the military service, and have little left
but a voluntary organization, without cohesive force." 8
It bears stressing that for determining how best the AFP shall
attend to the business of fighting or preparing to fight rests with
Congress and with the President. Both Congress and this Court
have found that the special character of the military requires
civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility
in dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and morale. In
construing a statute that touches on such matters, therefore, courts
must be careful not to circumscribe the authority of military
commanders to an extent never intended by Congress. Under these
and many similar cases reviewing legislative and executive control
of the military, the sentencing scheme at issue in this case, and the
manner in which it was created, are constitutionally unassailable. 9
Officers and enlisted personnel committing punitive acts under the
Articles of War may be prosecuted and convicted if found guilty of
such acts independently of, and separately from, any charges filed
in the civilian courts for the same or similar acts which are
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, under special penal laws
or ordinances; and prescinding from the outcome thereof.
At this point, it is well to have a basic understanding of the Articles
of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, which was essentially
copied from that of the United States, which, in turn, had been
superseded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Our Articles
of War has since been amended by Republic Act Nos. 242 and
516.
The Articles of War is the organic law of the AFP and, in keeping
with the history of military law, its primary function is to enforce
"the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree
of military efficiency." The following commentary is enlightening:
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 8
History points out the fact that nations have always engaged in
wars. For that purpose, bodies of men have been organized into
armed forces under a commander-in-chief who, through his
subordinate commanders, enforces the highest form of discipline in
order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency.
Victory in battle is the ultimate aim of every military commander,
and he knows that victory cannot be attained, no matter how
superior his forces may be, in men and materials, if discipline
among the rank-and-file is found wanting. For, "if an Army is to be
anything but an uncontrolled mob, discipline is required and must
be enforced." For this reason, in order to set an effective means of
enforcing discipline, all organized armies of the world have
promulgated sets of rules and regulations and later, laws as
embodied in the articles of war, which define the duties of military
personnel and distinguish infractions of military law and impose
appropriate punishment for violation thereof. 10
Every officer, before he enters in the duties of his office,
subscribes to these articles and places himself within the powers of
courts-martial to pass on any offense which he may have
committed in contravention thereof. 11
It is said that conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman is a
uniquely military offense. 12 In order to constitute the said offense,
the misconduct must offend so seriously against the law, justice,
morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace, socially or as a man,
the offender, and at the same time must be of such a nature or
committed under such circumstances as to bring dishonor or
disrepute upon the military profession which he represents. 13 The
article proscribing conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
has been held to be wholly independent of other definitions of
offenses, and the same course of conduct may constitute an offense
elsewhere provided for and may also warrant a conviction under
this provision; it is not subject to preemption by other punitive
articles. 14
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
The administration of military justice under the Articles of War has
been exclusively vested in courts-martial whether as General
Courts-Martial, Special Courts-Martial or Summary Courts-
Martial. 15 Courts-martial pertain to the executive department and
are, in fact, simply instrumentalities of the executive power,
provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief to
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy, and enforcing
discipline therein. 16
As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, "the military
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society. It has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of
its own during its long history. The differences between the
military and civilian communities result from the fact that it is the
primary business of armies and navies to fight or ready to fight
wars should the occasion arise." 17 Further, the US Supreme Court
quite succinctly stated that "the military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian." 18
I wish to emphasize, however, a caveat: not all service-connected
punitive acts under the Articles of War may be prosecuted before
the courts-martial independently of a crime defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code against the same accused based on
the same set of delictual acts. Congress may criminalize a service-
connected punitive offense under the Articles of War.
A review of the deliberations in the Senate or the Report of the
Conference Committee of Senate Bill 1500 will readily show that
coup d’etat was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code in Article
134-A precisely to criminalize "mutiny" under Article 67 of the
Articles of War and to penalize the punitive act of mutiny, under
the Articles of War as coup d’etat. Article 67 of the Articles of
War reads:
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 9
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. – Any person subject to military law
who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes, or joins in
any mutiny or sedition in any company, party, post, camp,
detachment, guard, or other command shall suffer death or such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
- Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, [August 10, 2006], 530
PHIL
189-255
FACTS:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received
intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with high-powered
weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their
aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the
AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent
negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them
to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay
down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises
of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the
authorities. RTC held that the acts committed by petitioners are not
service oriented and that they are not to be court martialed. Hence,
respondents raised the suit invoking that these acts are service oriented
and is triable by a court martial and is not absorbed by the crime of coup
d ‘etat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can be court martialed.
RULING:
YES. RA 7055 is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general
rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like
coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried
by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the
offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried
by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception,
i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by
the proper civil court. The second paragraph of the same provision
further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited
to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable
by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts
and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military
personnel.
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer,
member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second
lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. We hold that the offense
for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This
is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055.
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the
alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Obviously, there is no
merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before
the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because
the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11,
2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance
of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,".
The doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Further, the doctrine applies only if
the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A.
7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case. The Court has never
suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense
charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge
pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the
offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in
Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 10
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that herein respondents have
the authority in convening a court martial and in charging petitioners
with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Art. 135 – Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat
-Amnesty and Pardon: Effects and difference
- People v. Patriarca, Jr., G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000
The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.
Facts:
Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo
Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He
was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a
certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case
No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled
"Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who
Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes
Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article
of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his
application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board
concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the
accused-appellant?
Held:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason
or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach,
the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective.
It serves to put an end to the appeal.
Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No.
2773 while Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed
Art. 136 – Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat,
rebellion or
Insurrection
- People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90
FACTS:
Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. The accused are
ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it
alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s
convoy and ending where Geronimo killed PolicarpioTipay a Barrio
Lieutenant. In sum the information charges Geronimo of the crime of
rebellion complexed with the crime kidnapping, murder and robbery.
Geronimo pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The case was
appealed the SC via automatic review, raising the sole question of
whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of
rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 11
ISSUES:
Whether or not the information for murders, robberies and kidnapping is
absorbed in the crime of Rebellion?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as in treason, where both intent and
overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the
coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence
described in the first paragraph of Article 135. That both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without
either of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by
the absence of any penalty attached to Article 134. It follows, therefore,
that any or all of the acts described in Article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive
ends described in Article 134, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct
crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the
rebellion itself, and cannot be considered as giving rise to a
separate crime that, under Article 48 of the Code, would
constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
Not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime
of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the
killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit,
without any political motivation, the crime would be separately
punishable and would not be absorbed by the rebellion.
Conceding the absence of” a complex crime of rebellion with
murders, etc., still, by his plea of guilty, the accused-appellant
has admitted all the overt acts described in the information; and
that if any of such acts constituted an independent crime within
the jurisdiction of the lower court, then the averment in the
information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the
rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to
appellant’s conviction and punishment for said offense, he
having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information
on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.
DECISION:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the
accused convicted for the simple (noncomplex) crime of rebellion under
article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder;
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-
appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of
prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary
imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion;
and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor and
not more than 18 years of reclusión temporal; to indemnify the heirs of
PolicarpioTibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs. So ordered.
- People v. Hernandez, 11 SCRA 223
FACTS:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants G.R. No. L-6026) the
charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez et. Al.,G.R. No. L-6026) the charge
is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings; the accused are
Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed
but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado
V. Hernandez, the following: (1) that he is a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or
Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist
publication, as well as other publications of the Party; (3) that he held
the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations; etc.
ISSUES
Whether or not Hernandez was guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion?
RULINGS:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Congress of Labor Organization
(CLO) had no function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the
members for the uprising that would come. It was only a preparatory
organization prior to a revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of
the CLO, therefore, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion,
where after the party had decided to go underground he refused to do
so, preferring to engage in what they considered the legal battle for the
cause.
Membership in the Communist Party per se was not punishable as
conspiracy to commit rebellion before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1700
in 1957, unless coupled with action or advocacy of action of rebellion.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 12
The giving of speeches favoring Communism will not make the speaker
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion in the absence of evidence that
his audience then and there agreed to rise up in arms to overthrow the
government
Where it was not shown that the contributions received by the accused
from Communist Party members were received around the year 1950
when the Central Committee of said Party agreed to go underground and
support the Huk rebellion, it is held that the accused cannot be found
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
- People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72
FACTS
Jose Lava, being then high ranking officers or otherwise members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) of which the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB) otherwise or formerly known as the
Hukbalahap (Huks), with the primordial objective of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and of its armed force, the HMB, was to
overthrow the Philippine Government by armed struggle was caught by
the Philippine constabulary for his criminal acts consisting of attacks
against Philippine Constabulary, murders, robberies, kidnapping, arson
which indicted by the trial court the complex crime of the complex crime
of rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons, enumerating therein
eight counts regarding specific acts of murder, robbery and arson and
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Lava, the appellants also contend that the informations against them
charge more than one offense.
ISSUE
Should the trial court decision stating that Lava is guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons be modified?
RULING
Yes. The appeal of Lava should be upheld. The question, of whether or
not a person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, arson, robbery and/or other common crimes, is
now settled. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, etc., et al., the Court
held that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common
crimes. The accused in the Hernandez case were charged, as are
appellants in the instant cases, "with the crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons, and robberies.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Court has held that acts of murder, arson, robbery, physical injuries, etc.
are absorbed by, and form part and parcel of, the crime of rebellion if
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the rebellion charged.
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat,
one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion
for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission
of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the past,
convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with murder".
What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion
published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of
simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes
peace officers. (U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil.
509; U.S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155).
Hence, the decision appealed from is modified. Appellant, Jose Lava is
found guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of simple
rebellion and is sentenced of prision mayor, and a fine of P20,000, with
the accessories provided by law.
Art. 137 – Disloyalty of public officers or employees
- People v. Ravidas, 4 Phil. 271
FACTS:
The complaint in this case charges the defendants with the crime of
insurrection.
The counsel for the Government in this case prays for the acquittal of
both defendants, as "it is not proven", he says with respect to
AlejoRavidas, " that he permitted or encouraged insurrection or engaged
in the same by abetting them directly or indirectly." The only fact
disclosed by the evidence adduced in the case is that AlejoRavidas knew
that there were insurgents in a place called Manila, jurisdiction of the
town of Agusan, of which he was municipal president, and his duty as
such president required him to report this fact to the senior officer of the
province, but he did not do so, nor did he take any steps toward
pursuing or denouncing the insurgents or to protect the people from
their probable depredations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of the crime of insurrection?
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 13
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held thatAct No. 292 of the Civil Commission
defines and specifies the acts which shall be punished as insurrection,
but among those acts the silence of the defendant as regards the
existence of some insurgents in a certain place is not enumerated;
however reproachful the silence of the defendant may be, it does not in
itself constitute the crime of insurrection.
There being no evidence showing that the defendant had promoted,
encouraged, or aided any insurrection or that he in any way participated
in the same, he can not be punished for the crime of insurrection.
The fact that the defendant sold rice in great or small quantities to
persons who afterwards appeared to be insurgents is not in itself
conducive to criminal liability; and therefore that fact alone cannot make
the defendant guilty of the crime of insurrection, if it is not shown that
he sold the rice to the insurgents knowing that they were such and with
the deliberate purpose of aiding the insurrection.
, the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
Art. 139 – Sedition
- People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 17755, March 4, 1922
FACTS:
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the
Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of the city of
Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance.
Convicted in the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and
they want to inflict revenge for the following reasons:
(1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a
member of the household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly
abused by the said policeman.
(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police
and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread
among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to
his original duties while Macasinag was declared dead. There were also
rumors that the said shooting was ordered.
On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary
escaped their barracks through a window (the saw out the window
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups
under the command of their sergeants and corporals. They attacked
some Manila policemen in these specific instances:
(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and
killed an American Policeman and his friend.
(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing a
death and wounding most of the passengers.
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain
William E. Wichman(asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed
together with Saplala
ISSUE:
Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and
Sedition Law?
RULINGS:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that sedition, in its more general sense, is
In order or there to be a violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No.
292, it is not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and
the offended party a public functionary.
The declaration of the trial court that there was a conspiracy between
the accused in the instant case held not to constitute reversible error. It
is incontestable that all the defendants were imbued with the same
purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city
of Manila.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a
criminal act, each is responsible for all the acts of the others done in
furtherance of the common design; and "the result is the same if the act
is divided into parts and each person proceeds with his part unaided."
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to
be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their
acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part
of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that
same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were
engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 14
- U.S. v. Nery, G.R. No. 1989, [January 23, 1905], 4 PHIL 158-
160
The defendant in this case was charged with the crime of sedition and
was tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
After hearing the testimony in the case and the arguments of the
counsel for the State and the defendant, the court found that the
evidence was not sufficient to support the charge of sedition, but did find
that the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of a violation
of section 1 of Act No. 619, and sentenced him to five years de presidio
and to pay the costs.
The evidence shows that the defendant, in the month of February, 1903,
was a Constabulary soldier, and was stationed in the pueblo of San Jose,
in said province; that the Constabulary were attacked by the band of
Felipe Salvador, called "Santa Iglesia," composed of about one hundred
armed persons; that at the time of the attack the defendant was acting
as corporal of the guard; that the band was armed with firearms, bolos,
and clubs; that the object of the said band was to capture the arms of
the Constabulary; that when the said band retired from the attack the
said defendant retired with them; that he was the only member of the
Constabulary who was captured or went away with said band; that later
the accused was captured in company with said band of Felipe-Salvador.
The defendant offered no defense whatever.
The evidence adduced in this case clearly fails to show that the
defendant was guilty of the crime of sedition, as defined in section 5 of
Act No. 292 of the Commission, and the question is whether or not a
Court of First Instance, where a person is charged with the crime of
sedition, can find the defendant guilty of the crime defined in Act No.
619, an act entitled "An act to promote good order and discipline in the
Philippines Constabulary."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Act No. 619 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any member of the Constabulary who begins, excites, causes, or joins
in any opposition or resistance to, or defiance of, any superior authority
in the Constabulary with intent to usurp, subvert, or override the same,
or who, being present, does not use his utmost endeavor to suppress all
such opposition, resistance, or defiance, or who, having knowledge of
any such opposition, resistance, or defiance being intended, does not,
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
without delay, give information thereof to such superior authority, shall
be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not exceeding
ten years, or both."cralaw virtua1aw library
Act No. 619 is an act to promote good order and discipline in the
Philippines Constabulary. Section 1 of said act punishes the members of
the Constabulary who in any way manifest or excite or join in any
opposition or resistance or defiance of "any superior authority in the
Constabulary" with intent to usurp, subvert, or override such authority;
or who, being present, does not use his utmost endeavor to suppress
such opposition or resistance or who does not give information to such
"superior authority"
Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission, creating the punishment for the
crime of sedition, was enacted for the purpose of punishing resistance to
the lawful authority and laws of the Government
Act No. 619 is purely disciplinary in its operation, enacted for the
purpose of preserving the loyalty and obedience of the members of the
Constabulary to the "superior authority in the Constabulary." The offense
created by Act No. 619 is not a cognate offense to the crime of sedition.
When a person is charged in a complaint with a crime under the
provisions of General Orders, No. 58, and the evidence does not show
that he is guilty of the crime charged, but does show that he is guilty of
some crime or other lesser offense, the court may sentence him for the
other lesser offense, provided the lesser offense is a cognate offense
and is included in the complaint with the court.
An offense against the "superior authority in the Constabulary" is not a
cognate offense to an offense against the sovereignty or laws of the
State and the court could not under a complaint for sedition, defined in
section 5 of Act No. 292, find the defendant guilty of the crime defined
in section 1 of Act No. 619. Therefore the sentence in this case is
reversed and the provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to present a
complaint against the defendant for a violation of the provisions of Act
No. 619 of the Philippine Commission within ten days after this cause is
received by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of said province. The
clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija is
hereby directed, upon receipt of this decision, to give the fiscal of said
province immediate notice of the foregoing decision.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 15
- U.S. v. Abad, G.R. No. 976, [October 22, 1902], 1 PHIL 437-
441)
FACTS:
The defendant has been convicted of section 14 of Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission of which punished those who have
breached the oath of allegiance to the United States.
The defendant was a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the
benefit of the proclamation of amnesty as long as the offence is one
mentioned in the proclamation.
The offence charged was that the defendant denied the existence of
certain rifles to an officer of the United States Army, which have been
concealed during his time of surrender.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant convicted of violation of oaths of
allegiance, is entitled of the amnesty provided in the proclamation?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the violation of oaths of allegiance,
and kindred crimes provided for in Act 292, United States Philippine
Commission, are included in the general terms "treason and sedition" as
used in the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.
The acts, therefore, by which the offense of violation of oaths of
allegiance, as defined in section 14 of Act No. 292, is committed, is not
necessarily identical, although it may be in particular cases, with that by
which the technical crime of treason or that of sedition is committed.
DECISION:
We hold, therefore, that the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance,
being one of the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in
the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the proclamation.
The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation, and upon
filing in this court the prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the
court below with directions that he be discharged. So ordered.
- U.S. v. Lapuz, G.R. No. 1222, [January 21, 1905])
In a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija among others, Mateo Lapus, Bonifacio Bautista, Rufino
Ordoñez, Victorino Manalang, and Pedro Bautista were charge with the
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
crime of sedition. The complaint alleged that on the night of June 3,
1902, a band composed of about four hundred men, among whom were
the accused, armed with guns, revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs,
raided the town of Cabiao; that said band went through the streets of
the town firing shots, yelling, and frightening the inhabitants thereof;
that some of said band went to the house of the municipal president,
while others raided several houses, taking captive sixty or seventy of the
inhabitants thereof, among whom were Roman Isip Torres, Victorino
Natividad, Braulio Rico, Gregorio de los Reyes, Eugenio Manalo, Antonio
Crespo, Antonia de los Reyes, Brigido Sigua, Eustaquio Tecson, and
others whose names are not known; that they roamed about the streets
of the town threatening and intimidating the people; that when the
invaders left the town they took and carried their captives away with
them; that some of them were conducted to a place called Patatan, and
others to that of Libutad on the Chico River, where they were detained
by their captors until about noon of the next day, when they were
released.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Some members of the band, among them the chief, Domingo Cunanan,
told the prisoners that the latter were often found in the justice court,
and that they were loaning money at usurious terms to their farm
laborers, and when the latter were unable to pay the loan they
compelled their children to work for them as servants; that if the wealthy
landowners continued oppressing the poor they would not stop
disturbing the towns, because the law must be equally applied to rich
and poor; that if they (the band) were then to comply with the orders of
Felipe Salvador, chief of the association called "Santa Iglesia", to which
they belonged, all the prisoners would be killed at once. They further
stated that there were many members of the said association. These
facts are proven by the testimony of several witnesses and by residents
who had been sequestrated by said band. One of the witnesses,
Gregorio Reyes, stated that he was beaten with a club by the accused
Rufino Ordoñez because he begged the later to release his master,
Genaro Albina, who was unable to walk.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
It is also proven by the testimony of witnesses that the above-mentioned
association called "Santa Iglesia", to which the said Felipe Salvador
belongs, was organized for the purpose of performing acts of hatred and
vengeance against the authorities and the wealthy people in the towns,
as occurred to the residents of the town of Cabiao, in which were put in
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 16
practice and execution acts tending to such political-social
ends.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition provided for in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of section 5 and punished by section 6 of Act No.
292 of the Civil Commission. The appellants were members of an illegal
association and had publicly and tumultuously attacked the town of
Cabiao and roamed over its streets, firing shots, yelling, and threatening
the residents with death, and thereby frightening them. They performed
acts of violence on the persons of the president and other residents of
the town, against the law and the supreme authority and with political-
social purposes. For these reasons the acts performed by the defendants
constitute sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections of Act No. 292.
The crime of sedition was consummated, even though the object of the
defendants was not realized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The liability of the defendants as principals in the aforesaid crime of
sedition appears fully proven by the testimony of several residents who
witnessed the invasion of the town. The witnesses identified the accused
as members of the band which entered the town and committed the acts
complained of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The municipal president of the said town, Jose Crespo, and the justice of
the peace, Francisco Crespo, affirmed the statement made by the
witnesses for the prosecution. The president said that while they were
hidden in a bamboo thicket they head that the malefactors were looking
for him, as well as for other wealthy residents; that, as they failed to find
him in his house, they took and carried away his rain coat, cap, belt, and
clothes; that they destroyed the lock of the door of the house and tore
his boots; that they did not succeed in carrying away the arms of the
force had taken refuge in the parish house of the town. The justice of
the peace added that when he heard the sound of a bugle and the shots
he tried to go to the town hall, but he could not on account of the
sudden attack made by a great number of members of the "Santa
Iglesia" association; that he had been informed that they were looking
for the president, the police, and the wealthy residents of the
town.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Constabulary inspector Cayetano Canda asserted that, according to
some information obtained by him, the members of the said association,
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
called "Santa Iglesia" as well as "Gabinistas," whose chief was Felipe
Salvador, purposed the extermination of the military forces; the public
officials, and the landowners. This assertion is confirmed by the
Constabulary inspector Richard Kavanaugh, who stated that the chief of
the band which attacked the town of Cabiao on the evening of June 3
was Domingo Cunanan, and that his followers contemplated punishing
the wealthy people and the public officials - the former for the abuses
they were said to have committed and the latter because they were not
doing them justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The five defendants pleaded not guilty. Their exculpation, to the effect
that they did not take part in the crime of sedition, has not been proved.
The evidence adduced in the case against them is not rebutted; they
must necessarily be found guilty as principals in the crime of
sedition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The accused who were acquitted can not be the object of this
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing considerations it is the opinion of this court that
the judgment below should be sustained in so far as the same applies to
Mateo Lapus, Rufino Ordoñez, Bonifacio Bautista, Victorino Manalang,
and Pedro Bautista, each of whom is sentenced to four years'
imprisonment, to pay a five of $1,500, and one-tenth of the costs. This
case to be remanded to the court of origin with a certified copy of this
decision and of the judgment which shall be rendered in compliance
herewith. So ordered
- People v. Hadji, G.R. No. L-12686, [October 24, 1963], 118
PHIL 1089-
1099)
Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Sulu for different crimes in various
cases, to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple
injuries; and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et
al., for kidnapping with murder and attempted murder.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 17
The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the
trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which
the accused, Kamlon, was found guilty and sentenced to the death
penalty. A co-accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still at large at the time
the lower court rendered its judgment.
In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated
that the trial judge recommended the commutation of the penalty
imposed to life imprisonment, The trial judge based his recommendation
upon his finding that the defendant agreed to surrender principally
because he was made to believe by the authorities "that he would be
paroled." In the words of the decision of the lower court, "If the
Constabulary officers concerned did not promise any condition to Kamlon
for his surrender, said officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas
Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that Kamlon's parole would be
respected or be enforced after all outlaws had surrendered. In one word,
the officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon in double
talk. They were not frank.
The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following
factual findings:
One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein
defendant, together with two other armed companions, Ulluh and
Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected were
responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the
defendant. The search ended when the defendant and his companions
chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the
vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening to
kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his companions
seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that
time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made
known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and, although
Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or responsibility for the
disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their
protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following
day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, they were brought to the
market place and, in a store, they were made to sit on chairs, one beside
the other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to
the roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied to the roof,
Kamlon leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing
him instantly. Kamlon then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead
man whereupon Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as he was
bidden.
Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta
by the shore and paddled out far into the sea. When he returned, he no
longer had with him his gruesome load.
Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he
imposed on Jamalul Alling. Instead, Ajibun was conducted back to
Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged
participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial"
must have caused Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its end, he
was merely told to raise the sum of P105.00 as fine and thereafter he
was set free.
The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court
was denied, disavowed and disputed by the defendant. He offered an
entirely different version of the killing. According to Kamlon, the
deceased was shot to death, not by him, but by some relatives of a
woman who, on that occasion, Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were
attempting to abduct.
The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be
established by the sisters, Bariha Imam Habilul and Muhayla Iman
Habilul, who testified that one day they went to take a bath at a
watering place some 100 brazas from where they were living. While
washing their clothes at the same place and gathering water in bamboo
tubes, Bariha suddenly heard Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run
away. I am being embraced and held by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla
made the outcry because Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the
nearby bushes suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla and pulled
her towards the eastern part of the place, a sitio called Buhangin
Mahaba. Upon hearing the scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran away but was
able to see Ajibun and Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 18
Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor
were her uncle, Adu, and some other men-folk of the village, Biteng,
Tanji and Uttung, who forthwith armed themselves with guns and went
after Ajibun and Jamalul.
Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force
Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun went inside the vinta and pulled the hands
of Muhayla as Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an effort to place her
on board. Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by
pushing the vinta, and while being engaged in this struggle, she heard
her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla, duck;" Muhayla ducked by dropping herself
on the sea, face downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water, she
heard bursts of gunfire coming from the place where Adu had given out
his order.
After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit
Jamalul who fell on the water almost falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired
upon, but he was able to paddle himself away out to the sea.
We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted
by the trial court. While the defendant had indeed insisted that the
prosecution version was false and untrue, he has failed to demonstrate
to this Tribunal exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such
fallacy and untruth obtain. This case has resolved itself into a question of
who among the witness at the trial were telling the truth. We can hardly
hold ourselves in a better position to answer that than the trial judge
who had his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and
just conclusion. While we have merely the records to guide Us by, the
trial judge saw the witnesses, heard them speak, watched them move.
He was, therefore, in the far advantageous position of being able to
discriminate more competently than Us the prevaricators among the
witnesses from those who testified the truth. Consequently, as the
evidence on record sufficiently attest to the findings of the lower court,
We shall not disturb the same.
The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened
between the actual commission of the crime charged and the filing of the
same in the trial court — a period of 21 months — attests to the
unreliability of the prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who
testified for the government did actually witness the defendant commit
the murder, they would have forthwith reported the incident to the
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
authorities and this case would have been filed sooner. It is vigorously
impressed on Us that the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for
the prosecution.
We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised.
Although it is true that undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions
speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's claim, the same
observation cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long though it
may be, was imposed on the government by causes over which it has no
control. In the premises and as explained by the Solicitor General's
Office, "the incident took place 15 days before the last military
operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected were in the grip
of fear and felt no other than for their personal safety. The witnesses
could have preferred to remain in silence of what they knew against
Kamlon in the hope, however, that with the military operations about to
be set afoot, retributive justice would catch up with Kamlon and his
henchmen that they might perish in the battle."
The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the
defendant that, by the doctrine enunciated in the cases of People v.
Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v. Geronimo, 53 O.G. No. 1,
p. 68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping
with murder in spite of the fact that said acts of violence were
committed in furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in this latter
crime."
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to
uphold the defendant's claim that acts of violence like murder and
kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez
and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that
legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion
and not sedition.
Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the
rule of stare decisis, We deem ourselves unfree at the moment to
disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, and
People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case,
this Court held:
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 19
 It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the
same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order;
murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed
against the existence of the State, the authority of the
government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a
crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad
[1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the
raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at
common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion
unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign,
with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and
murder are perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they
may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses
com nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the
information are different. The gist of the information for sedition
is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in
order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object
of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the
police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several
places in the city of Manila; that gist of the information in the
murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together,
illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded
three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries
were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and
the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes
under the first information. (Emphasis supplied)
And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the
government's theory that the crime committed was rebellion complexed
with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, but rather
sedition and the said common crimes, We proceeded to convict the
defendants therein of the said crime of sedition and the common crimes
of murder, frustrated murder, etc. The dispositive portion of this last
cited case read: "In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. . . ."
Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the
treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and
independent acts separable from sedition.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us
that the herein defendant missed a very significant point. When We held
in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed
by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in
furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information
and, for that reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been
committed for political ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no
allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of
any such motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that
the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by
personal vengeance."
There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of
record before this Tribunal hands down Its judgment on appeal. The
defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had been
convicted for rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries
in Criminal Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon
after his conviction, however, he was extended a conditional pardon by
the late President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the
pardon, namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest
constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the
authorities in the surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow
himself to be visited by any authority of the Government and allow him
to question him freely; and (4) that he would cooperate with the
Government in the surrender and apprehension of wanted persons in
Luuk.
Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon
brazenly violated the same. He did not only fail to report regularly to the
authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate
government agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these
lawlessness and defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted into
the various criminal prosecutions enumerated at the start of this
decision, including this one on appeal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the findings
and judgment of the lower court. The crime committed is kidnapping
complexed with murder. We find the death penalty as well as the
indemnity in the amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law
and affirm the same with costs against the defendant.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 20

- People v. Perez, G.R. No. 21049, [December 22, 1923], 45
PHIL 599-608)
saac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato
Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the
morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became
engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-
General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with
a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt
of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted
thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question
presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It
reads in translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac
Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on
political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with
knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his
functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence,
said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the
presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following
phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong
gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can
saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in
English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the
prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to
the first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal
president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of
Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended a bad
administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the
independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not
obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be
cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written
statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution,
corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood
that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and
cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place
on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But
they endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and
one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the
Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to
blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful
manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-General
should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he
stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the
Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into account that
above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls
everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill
that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install the government
we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that
it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made
use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out
in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law
recurs as to the crime of which the accused should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256
of the Penal Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found
in his decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 21
addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that
article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the
accused was charged with having uttered the following language: "To
hell with the President of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr.
Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was
eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial, the appellate
court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is still in
force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused
was charged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine
Senate and its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In
this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three
members of the court holding that article 256 was abrogated completely
by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines, and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the
effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written
defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the
facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the
Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the
Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a
pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who
retain a contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can
muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of
article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the
Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and must be
enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act
No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the
Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of
article 256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in
this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and
Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
words of the accused did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult,
a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the
community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed
primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the
State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The
offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this
character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority.
Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace
or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it
does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the
subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs.
Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must
not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the
foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of
liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious . But when
the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition
must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws,
and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et
seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United
States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government,
instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather
to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the
Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could
easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 22
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President
of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of
the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the
President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the
Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-
General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines
and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General
is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr
[1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by
Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly
to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or
who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or against the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or
make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to
disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in
performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or
incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb
the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices
from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by
imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made
a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and
done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section
8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section
8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based
upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation
of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the
defendant stands charged is that described by the facts stated in the
information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may be
found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in
the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the
body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof
presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9;
De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided
by the Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish
the accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be
possible. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr.
Chief Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an
outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading
of the two articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond
the "exuberant expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression
of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452,
456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character
that they suggest the query whether their superlative vilification has not
overleapt itself and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto
Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our own sense of humor is not
entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts
should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive
flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt
with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on
these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No.
292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is
affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of
the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1
day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 23

- People v. Tahil, G.R. No. 28166, [November 2, 1928], 52 PHIL
318-322)
The appellants, Datu Tahil and Datu Tarson, were convicted in the Court
of First Instance of Sulu of the crime of rebellion, Datu Tahil being
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of $10,000, and
Datu Tarso to five years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of $5,000, with
sudsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in regard to Datu Tarson.
Having encountered certain difficulties in the collection of the land and
the personal cedula taxes among the resident of Patikul, due to their
refusal to make this payment, the provincial governor of Sulu, Carl
Moore, turned the matter over to Lieutenant Angeles of the Constabulary
for the purpose of employing such means as he might consider
convenient to overcome these difficulties. Datu Tahil, then the third
member of the provincial board of Sulu, being amongst those who
refused to make this payment, Lieutenant Angeles tried and succeeded
in having a conference with him, in which Datu Tahil suggested that he
return the following day because he would call meeting of his people at
his house in Liang in order to discuss the matter with them. Lieutenant
Angeles went to Datu Tahil's house the day following this meeting and
found about 70 persons present. After Lieutenant Angeles has explained
to all the importance of the Government's collecting the land tax, Datu
Tahil took several of those present into a room for a secret conference,
after which he informed Lieutenant Angeles that he, personally, had no
objection to paying the tax, but the others asked time to do so.
Lieutenant Angeles said that he would inform Governor Moore of it and
left.
When Lieutenant Angeles returned to Patikul, Moro Pasingan, who had
attended the conference as a secret agent of the Government informed
him that the extension requested for the payment of the land tax was
nothing more than a pretext to gain time in order to construct a fort.
Indeed, a few days after, the construction of a fort was commenced on a
hill at a strategical location. After the construction of the fort Datu Tahil
gathered his people therein, including Datu Tarson who was one of
those who refused to pay the tax and who attended the conference.
Then the propaganda started to extend the movement, and they tried to
attract those who were in the Government service. The principal purpose
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
of the movements was to obtain the abolition of the land tax and
besides, other pretentions in connection with the attendance of children
at school, the privilege of carrying arms and the removal of certain
provincial officials, amongst whom, Governor Moore, with the threat that
if their request were not granted, they would oppose the Government by
forcible means. Datu Tahil made them all, including Datu Tarson, take an
oath on the Koran to this effect. From then on they took turns in
guarding the fort and its surrondings under the orders of Datu Tahil,
who always carried a rifle and a revolver. Lieutenant Angeles upon being
informed of this state of affairs reported it to Governor Moore, and the
latter, in turn, endorsed the matter to the provincial fiscal.
About the middle of January, 1927, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint
against Datu Tahil and his followers charging them with sedition, and the
proper warrant of arrest was issued on the 15th. Governor Moore,
however, did not wish to proceed on this warrant of arrest and tried to
persuade Datu Tahil and his followers to desist from their intention,
using the influence of other prominent Moros to this end. Governor
Moore even tried to have a conference with Datu Tahil for the same
purpose, but was unsuccessful because he was informed that they
intended to attack him.
On January 30th, when Governor Moore had given up all hopes of
obtaining any results from his efforts, he delivered the warrant of arrest
to Commander Green of the Constabulary of its compliance. The
following day Commander Green with a group of soldiers, stationed
themselves about 50 meters in front of the fort where he found a red
flag flying and demanded the surrender of Datu Tahil. He did not receive
any reply to his intimation, and, in turn, a group of armed Moros
appeared at the left flank of the Constabulary soldiers in the act of
attacking them, but were repelled. It was again intimated that Datu Tahil
surrender, but again no answer was received, and then a larger group of
Moros appeared in an aggressive attitude, being likewise repelled. For
the purpose of frightening the Moros, the Constabulary soldiers fired the
stoke mortar, which caused the defenders of the fort to flee, leaving the
Government forces in possession thereof, where they found only the
bodies of those who had been killed in this affray.
Some days after this Datu Tahil surrendered to the authorities and, while
in jail, had a conference with Governor Moore in which he stated that
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 24
Commander Malone of the Contabulary was to blame for everything, as
he had induced them to rebel against the Government.
The appellants allege in their defense that the construction of the fort
and the meetings which took place therein were only for the purpose of
discussing their grievances against the Government in order to present
and submit their claims through peaceful means. This allegation,
however, is not supported by the evidence. Datu Tahil, himself, admits
that he in fact did swear his followers on the Koran, although he says
that the very purpose of this was in order that they would not oppose
the Government but would present their grievances through peaceful
means. But, if this were the purpose of the oath, the necessity of taking
it is not understood. The said Datu Tahil admits in an affidavit having
committed all of these acts against the law, constructing the fort in order
to oppose the Government, because Commander Malone had
encouraged him to do so, promising to furnish arms and ammunition,
and visiting the fort from time to time while it was in the course of
construction. We do not believe that Datu Tahil, as he stated during the
trial, signed this affidavit without having been informed of its contents.
Furthermore, this supposed inducement of Commander Malone, aside
from being no excuse for the commission of the crime, was emphatically
denied by Datu Tahil.
At any rate, for the purpose of the present case, suffice it to say that
upon its being intimated to Datu Tahil that he surrender with the object
of complying with a judicial warrant of arrest against him and his
followers, he resisted this order by means of force, thus preventing the
officer charged with this duty from performing it. This already constitutes
a crime.
In regard to Datu Tarson, it appears that he was one of those who took
an oath on the Koran to oppose the Government by force; that he took
part in all the activities of the movement, assisting in the construction of
the fort; that in the day preceding the incident he was in the fort; and
while he left in the afternoon, he returned early the following morning
and was found in the fort when the Government forces appeared.
The facts proven, however, constitute the crime of sedition, defined in
section 5 of Act No. 292, and not of rebellion according to section 3 of
the same law, the acts committed being limited to preventing the
Government officials, throught force, from complying with their duties in
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
connection with the judicial order, the enforcement of which was
entrusted to them. lawphi1.net
In our opinion, the crime committed is that of sedition, and the fine
imposed upon Datu Tahil is therefore reduced to $5,000 and that
imposed upon Datu Tarson to $2,500, the judgment appealed from
being affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against the
appellants. So ordere
Art. 141 – Conspiracy to commit sedition
- U.S. v. Planas, G.R. No. 6867, December 23, 1911
FACTS:
That the defendant, MaximinoPlanas, was the president of the town of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, duly elected, qualified, and acting as much on
during all the dates and times mentioned in the complaint. That on the
3d day of September, 1910, the said MaximinoPlanas called together the
policemen of the said town of Bambang and ordered to surrender their
arms and join the insurrection and kill some American persons.
The defendant was found guilty of the crime of conspiring to commit
sedition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit the
crime of sedition?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under the facts, as stated in the
opinion, Held: That the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit the
crime of sedition, as defined by section 7 of Act No. 292.
As repeatedly held by this court, when no objection is made in the court
below to the sufficiency of the complaint, such an objection will not be
considered when made for the first time on appeal.
DECISION:
After a careful reading of the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause and brought to this court, we are of the opinion that the findings
of fact made by the lower court are in accordance with such evidence,
and show that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond
peradventure of doubt, and that the sentence imposed. by the lower
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 25
court is in accordance with the law. (Sec. 7, Act No. 292.) The sentence
of the lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed
Art. 142 – Inciting to sedition
- Espuelas v. People, G.R. No. L-2990, December 17, 1951
FACTS:
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as
if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form
the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing
on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation. Not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter,
wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation
of which letter or note containing scurrilous libel against the
Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the said crime?
RULINGS:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the essence of seditious libel is its
immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to
redress the evils which press upon their minds.
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators,
and which reveals a tendency toproduce dissatisfaction or a feeling
incompatible with the digposition to remain loyal to the government, is a
scurrilous libel against the Government.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and
submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism
should be specific and therefore constructive specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government; it must be reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up.
DECISION:
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being
no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the
decision will be affirmed with costs.Moreover, the subject of this
prosecution does not reveal personal malice or hatred. Except for the
"Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words coming from a babe's mouth,
did not have the weight or chance to sway the listeners, the article was
but a statement of grievances against offlcial abuses and misgovernment
that already were of common knowledge and which more influential and
responsible speakei's and writers had denounced in terms and ways
more dangerous and revolutionary.
- Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano
Primicias, manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent
Manila City Mayor, ValerianoFugoso, to compel the latter to issue a
permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov
16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful
public meeting”. However, the respondent refused to issue such permit
because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on
the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a
disruption of public order.” Respondent based his refusal to the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 26
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the respondent refusing the issuance
of the permit due to seditious character of the meeting were correct?
RULINGS:
No. The Supreme Court held thatas there is no express andseparate
provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly at any streets or public places, the
provision of section 1119 of said Ordinance to the effect, among others,
"that the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public
places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the
Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the
streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such
parade or procession," may be applied by analogy to meeting and
assembly in any street or public places.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the
permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the
part of the losing groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches
will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities,
which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a
peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt
that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of
the permit cannot be given any consideration. It does not make comfort
and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official
action. It enables the Mayor to refuse the permit on his mere opinion
that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the
instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of viewson
national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will U' doubtedly
prevent such eventualities. (Hague vs. Committee on Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 496; 83 Law. ed., 1423.)
DECISION:
But the Court asserts that if the meaning of section 2434 (m) is what
this Court said in the Evengelista-Earnshaw case, then that section is
void. I do not think that that provision is void—at least not yet. Until it is
invalidated in the proper case and in the proper manner, the mayor's
authority in respect of the issuance of permits is to be measured by
section 2434 (m) and by the municipal. Ordinance in so far as the
ordinance does not conflict with the law. The validity of that provision is
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
not challenged and is nowhere in issue. It is highly improper, contrary to
the elementary rules of practice and procedure for this Court to say or
declare that that provision is void. Moreover, Article VIII, section 10, of
the Constitution provides that "all cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in
banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Court." Only seven
members voted in favor of the resolution
Art. 143 – Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly
and similar
Bodies
- People v. Alipit, 44 Phil. 910
The information herein is as follows:
That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna, Philippine Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit and
Victorio D. Alemus, being the municipal president and the chief of police
respectively of the said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully, unlawfully,
maliciously and acting under a previous agreement and conspiracy
entered into between themselves and assisting and cooperating with
each other, after the accused Exequiel Alipit had fired his revolver in the
air, enter the session room of the municipality building of Cabuyao
wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was holding a meeting
presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa, and once in said
room, the aforesaid accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus,
abusing their authority as municipal president and chief of police
respectively, the former with a revolver in his hand, and both using
violence and intimidation not only upon the person of said vice-president
Manuel Basa, but also upon those of the councilors present at the
aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable motive or legal authority
and by means of force, arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa and
compelled him to submit himself to the arrest against the latter's will and
over his protest and that of each and everyone of the councilors and
took him to the jail of the municipal building of Cabuyao, the accused
Victorio D. Alemus taking at the same time possession of all the papers
concerning the meeting that was being held by the municipal council of
Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in interrupting and
dissolving the aforesaid meeting.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 27
After the usual proceedings, the trial court found the defendant guilty of
coercion through illegal detention and sentenced them, under articles
497, in connection with article 89, of the Penal Code, to five months of
arresto mayor and fine of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, the accessory penalties and costs. From this
judgment the defendants appealed, assigning eleven errors which raise
these points, to wit, the illegality of that meeting of the municipal
council; the fact of the vice-president presiding over it; the finding of the
trial court that the act committed by the accused constitutes coercion;
and the conviction of the accused Victorio D. Alemus, who, according to
the defense, acted by virtue of an obedience due another; and from this
defendants conclude that the appellants should have been acquitted.
The Attorney-General asks for the affirmance of the judgment.
From the record the following antecedents appear:
The accused Exequiel Alipit had been elected municipal president of
Cabuyao, Laguna. Agustin Dedicatora and others petitioned the
Executive Bureau not to confirm said election, because said president-
elect was a minor. The matter was referred by the Executive Bureau to
the provincial board of Laguna for investigation. The provincial board in
turn transmitted the papers to the municipal council of Cabuyao, which
proceeded to make an investigation, three meetings having held for the
purpose, which were presided over by president Alipit, who left the chair
to vice-president Manuel Basa as soon as the aforesaid investigation
came up for discussion.
On the 30th of May, 1920, the municipal council held an extraordinary
meeting which was presided over by vice-president Basa because the
hour fixed had come without the president being present. While the
meeting was being held, the accused Victorio Alemus, then the chief of
police of that municipality, entered the room, saying that he had an
order from the president to arrest vice-president Basa. Basa answered
that he had not committed any crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the
councilors present, succeeded in persuading the chief of police to wait
until the meeting was over. A few minutes thereafter president Alipit
arrived at the municipal building and after taking one of the revolvers in
the police office, fired a shot in the air, entered immediately the room
where the meeting was being held and said in a loud voice to the chief
of police who was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the vice-
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
president. The chief of police obeyed the order, holding the vice-
president by the arm and taking him to the jail, president Alipit following
them with the revolver in his hand.
Shortly afterwards, councilor Delfino asked president Alipit if they could
continue the meeting to the end, to which Alipit answered: "Whoever
dare continue holding the meeting will be arrested." the councilors then
dispersed, leaving the premises. Alipit ordered the taking of the books
and documents used in the meeting and went to Calamba where he
asked and obtained from the Constabulary three armed soldiers to
protect him against any possible attack from the vice-president Basa. By
his order, the three soldiers watched vice-president Basa and held him
incommunicated in the jail until about two o'clock in the evening, when
he was released by the provincial governor who had come there.
One of the points whereupon great stress is laid by the appellants is that
that meeting of May 30, 1920, was unlawful. The evidence shows that
that special meeting of the council was called at the instance of two
councilors and that notices had been prepared for all the members of the
council, although those addressed to the municipal president and some
councilors were not delivered to the addresses.
There were five councilors present at the meeting in question, who
constituted a quorum, with vice-president Manuel Basa as chairman. The
record shows that the president, as well as the other councilors, was
absent from the municipality when an attempt was made to deliver to
them the notice of that meeting, the notices to the councilors who were
in Manila having been placed in the hands of Agustin Dedicatora who
was coming to Manila. In American jurisprudence it is a doctrine
frequently followed that where the members of a council are absent from
the municipality, the necessity of notice is dispensed with. (Russell vs.
Wellington, 157 Mass., 100; Lord vs. City of Anoka, 36 Minn., 176.)
But it must be noted that the question here is not concerned with the
legality of any resolution adopted by the council at that special meeting.
The question is whether or not that meeting of the council in which there
was a quorum of the absence or inability of the municipal president on
account of the absence or inability of the municipal president (or of both
causes) was a meeting the disturbance and interruption of which should
be punished. This is, in our opinion, the point at issue in this case.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 28
The legality of that meeting is attacked on the ground of lack of notice to
some members of the council. Nobody has the right to dissolve, through
violence, the meeting of a council under the present of the existence of
such a legal defect which was not apparent, but required an
investigation before it could be determined. Any stranger, even if he be
the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal police, must
respect the meeting of the municipal council which for the time being, at
least, raises the presumption that no defect exists to render it illegal.
That meeting of the municipal council was entitled too this respect on
the part of the defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective
as to them. Let it not be said that the presumption of legality did not
operate as to the accused Exequiel Alipit for the reason that he did in
fact receive no notice of said meeting. The law (sec. 2220,
Administrative Code) does not require personal services of the notice; it
is sufficient if the same be left in the domicile of the member of the
council. Besides said president Alipit was personally interested in the
matter to be transacted in the meeting, and so the notice sent to him
was, according to the witness, Dominador Delfino, as if it were to a party
respondent. Said accused Alipit could not take part in the determination
of the matter as a member of the council.
It is universally recognized that it is improper and illegal for a
member of a municipal council to vote upon any question
brought before the council in which he is personally interested. .
. . When the council is acting in a quasi judicial capacity, for a
member to pass upon a question in which he is interested
renders the judgment void, even if his vote was not necessary to
a decision. Thus the action of the common council of a city in
determining an election contest according to the weight of
conflicting evidence is judicial in its nature, and a contestant is
disqualified to sit as a member of the council in the
determination of the contest. His participation makes the
proceedings invalid even if the decision reached did not depend
upon his vote. (19 R. C. L., 897 and cases cited.)
We find no valid excuse, exempting the defendants from the criminal
responsibility arising from the acts committed by them. With regard to
the accused Victorio Alemus, it is no valid justification for him to have
acted by virtue of an order received from is coaccused, because said
order was unlawful..
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
We find no error in the judgment appealed from, except as regards the
denomination of the crime and the imposition of the penalty.
The information charges the accused with the crime of coercion and the
trial court found them guilty of arbitrary detention as a means to commit
coercion. We are of the opinion that the law violated by the accused is
Act No. 1755, which in its section 1, says:
Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts
to prevent the meeting of the Philippine Commission or the
organizing or meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any
Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter
established, or the meeting or organizing of any provincial board
or municipal or township council, and any person who willfully
disturbs the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or
in Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter
established, or any provincial board or municipal or township
council, while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly
conduct in the immediate view or presence of any such body
tending to interrupt the proceedings of such body or to impair
the respect due to its authority, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not
more than five years, or by both, in the discretion of the court.
And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the
accused may, and must, be convicted of a violation of said section 1 of
this Act and punished accordingly.
Regard being had of the gravity of the act committed, as well as the
respective condition and position of the accused, Exequiel Alipit is hereby
sentenced to three years' imprisonment and Victorio Alemus to one
years' imprisonment, with the costs against them. The judgment
appealed from being thus modified, the defendants are found guilty of a
violation of section 1 of Act No. 1755 and punishable with the penalty
thereby provided. So ordered
Art. 144 – Disturbance of proceedings
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 29
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004||| (Decena v. Malanyaon,
A.M. No. RTJ-
02-1669 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 00-961-RTJ] (Resolution), April
14, 2004, 471
PHIL 52-65
Art. 145 – Violation of parliamentary immunity
Martinez y Festin v. Morfe, G.R. No. L-34022, [March 24, 1972],
150 PHIL 809-
828)
FACTS:
The question raised in this case is the scope to be accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of
the peace.
Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista are facing criminal
prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document
before the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis of the case against him was
his statement under oath that he was born on June 20, 1945 instead of
June 20, 1946. On the other hand, Bautista was charged for violation of
the Revised Election Code. Bautista was accused to be in violation of
Section 51 of the RPC when he gave and distributed free of charge food,
drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings. Thus, the petitioners, as
delegates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention invoke what they
consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the RPC penalizing a public
officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, “arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed
a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision
mayor.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent judges in the case at
bar, disputed such a contention on the ground that the constitutional
provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an
exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an
immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE: Whether Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that immunity
from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and
breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against
the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort.
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the RPC or
any special statute.
Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible to prosecution.
There is a full recognition of necessity to have members of Congress,
and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested
fall under the category of “breach of peace,” therefore, they cannot
invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.
Art. 146 – Illegal assemblies
Alonto v. Enrile, G.R. No. 54095, [July 25, 1980], 187 PHIL 509-
518
It is a noteworthy feature of this application for a writ of habeas corpus
that when, presumably, the attention of the President of the Philippines
was invited to a possible unfairness being committed that may give rise
to a question of denial of equal protection where all other individuals
arrested on the same occasion had been freed, he acted expeditiously.
The temporary release was ordered, hence imparting a moot and
academic aspect to the matter.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 30
It was alleged in the petitioner that Ahmad Alonto, Jr. was, on November
30, 1979, one of those along with 179 other Muslim youths assembled in
front of the Quirino Grandstand in Luneta, Rizal Park, Manila, for the
purpose of discussing matters of common interest to all followers of
Islam, more specifically, as they may be affected by government policies.
1 It was then set forth that military personnel carrying out the
instructions of respondent Minister of National Defense, placed them
under arrest and brought them for confinement in the detention
premises of Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan Taguit, Rizal. 2 It was then
mentioned that Alonto, Jr., a grantee of a fellowship to pursue post
graduate studies as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
the University of the Philippines, Los Baños, majoring in Community
Development, 3 was not under investigation, much less indicted for any
offense. The petition was not filed until after the lapse of 203 days, but
still no charges of any nature whatsoever had been filed against him. 4
Moreover, on December 15, 1979, "respondent Minister of National
Defense issued an order releasing from military custody one hundred
fifty-five (155) of the original group of detainees" and subsequently
twenty-four (24) more, thus leaving Alonto, Jr. as the sole individual
arrested on that occasion remaining in detention. 5
The version of respondents, as could be expected, was quite different.
They justified his detention for having taken part in "an illegal assembly
and demonstration at the Luneta on November 30, 1979, without the
necessary permit," purportedly to voice their support to the stand of the
Iranians against President Jimmy Carter of the United States. 6 It was
the refusal to disperse, there being no permit, that led, accordingly, to
their being arrested and thus confined at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
Metro Manila, "pursuant to Commitment Orders dated December 1, 1979
issued by Lt. Col. Julian A. Alzaga, PC Metrocom Staff Judge Advocate,
who found, after investigation, that they committed the crime of illegal
assembly ..." 7 Thereafter, an arrest, search and seizure order against
Ahmad Alonto, Jr. and the other persons detained was issued by
respondent Minister of National Defense. 8 It was then set forth that "for
purely humanitarian considerations, it appearing that majority of the
detainees are students of various universities/colleges in Metro Manila,
all the others except the leader of the demonstration, Ahmad Engracia
Alonto, J.," were released. 9 In their prayer for dismissal of the petition
for the writ, reliance was ultimately placed on the issuance of an arrest,
search and seizure order, which had the effect, so it was contended, that
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
the persons arrested would remain in detention until otherwise ordered
released by the President or the Minister of National Defense. 10
The petition was filed on June 23, 1980. The next day was a holiday for
Metro Manila. The next session en banc did take place on June 26, 1980,
on which occasion this Court issued the writ, respondents being ordered
to make a return on or before July 1, 1980, with the hearing set for
Thursday, July 3, 1980. Accordingly, the parties were heard and the
matter argued. Thereafter, the petition was submitted for decision.
Then came on July 15, 1980, this Manifestation signed by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 11 It reads as follows: "1. Upon orders of
the President, petitioner Ahmad Alonto, Jr. was temporarily released
from detention at 11:00 in the morning on July 11, 1980 and entrusted
to the custody of his brother, Albert Alonto; 2. With this development,
the petition for habeas corpus seeking the release of petitioner from the
custody of respondent has become academic." 12
The prayer was for the petition being dismissed for being academic.
There is justification for such a plea.
This is the the first occasion that a petition of this character has been
rendered moot and academic after the person detained was released.
Herrera v. Enrile 13 is the first of such decisions. Certainly, it reflects
credit on the Executive that a plea for freedom is accorded the most
serious consideration and that the policy pursued in case of doubt is one
of according it deference. It may be understandable if uner the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly could have been susceptible to an interpretation
that removed such gathering from the mantle of constitutional
protection. Zeal in the performance of their function could thus explain if
it did not fully justify the arrest of persons whose acts could have been
equivocal in character and thus possibly violative of the Revised Penal
Code provision on illegal assemblies. Considering, however, that the
prosecuting arm of the government has been quite alert in the discharge
of its responsibility, it is desirable that the civil process be resorted to. At
any rate, it would not be redundant to reiterate that the response of the
President, once his attention was called, is indeed gratifying. Thus the
writ of habeas corpus has once again proven its worth. 14
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic
Art. 147 – Illegal association
People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 36278, [October 26, 1932], 57
PHIL 375-380
Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto G. Manahan, Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano
P. Balgos, Enrique Torrente, Urbano Arcega, Catalino Monroy, Francisco
Rafael, Sotero Senson, Remigio Tolentino, Dominador B. Reyes, Emilio S.
Juan, Alberto Santos, Juan Lagman, Andres Santiago, Angel Mesina,
Felipe Cruz, Maximo M. Gutierrez, Dominador J. Ambrosio, Cenon
Lacanienta, Mateo del Castillo, Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto
David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, and Liboro Natividad were
accused in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila of a crime
against the fundamental laws of the State, it being alleged in the
information as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior
thereto, the above named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously affiliate to, compose and become members of, the so-
called Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista sa
Pilipinas), an illegal association, whose principal purposes and objects
are to bring about, by the use of force, the downfall of the present form
of government and establish in place thereof another patterned after the
Soviet Government of Russia and run by those affiliated to and in
sympathy with said association; to incite a revolt of the laboring class,
advocating and urging struggle between said laboring class and the so-
called capitalists, and other similar objects tending to combat the
fundamental basis of the present social order and alter the regularity of
its functions and to the commission of violations of the existing laws,
which above-mentioned association was formed and organized without
the local authorities having been informed of its aforesaid objects and
purposes as well as of the by-laws thereof; and that at the time and
place hereinabove mentioned, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and
in utter disregard of the notice or warning given by the authorities that
they could not hold any meeting anywhere, the said accused assembled,
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
gathered and congregated under the name and auspices of the
Katipunan ng mga Anak pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of the
Sweat of the Philippine Islands), another association having the same
illegal aims and purposes as the said Communist Party of the Philippines,
at El Retono Building, in said City of Manila."
After trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception
of Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban,
Jose Ilagan, Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were
acquitted.
Thereafter the convicted accused appealed to this court.
The accused were charged with the crime of illegal association in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila in that on or about the 30th
day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the said accused
affiliated to, and became members of, the so-called Communist Party of
the Philippines whose principal purposes and object were to bring about
by force the downfall of the present form of government and establish in
its place another patterned after the Soviet Government of Russia, and
to incite a revolt of the laboring class.
After the trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the
exception of Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo
Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who
were acquitted.
It appears that the appellants, Evangelista, Manahan, Capadocia,
Torrente, Arcega, Monroy, Rafael, Senson, Tolentino, Reyes, San Juan,
Santos, Lagman, Santiago, Mesina, Cruz, Gutierrez, and Ambrosio,
presented themselves as candidates of the Communist Party for different
offices — insular, provincial and municipal — in the last elections; that
the accused Mariano P. Balgos, Cenon Lacanienta and some of those
who campaigned for their candidacies as members of the Communist
Party, delivered speeches at several meetings of the Communist Party,
advocating the ideas and principles of the said Communist Party and
urging the laborers to join it.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 32
It also appears that the appellant Enrique Torrente appears in the
newspaper known as Titis, an organ of the Communist Party, as the
editor thereof.
The appellants have not denied being members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines; on the contrary, Crisanto Evangelista admitted
expressly at the trial that he was affiliated to the said party. As witness
for the defense, he testified that the objects and purposes of the
Communist Party of the Philippines are set out in its constitution and by-
laws which purposes and objects, according to said constitution and by-
laws, are to overthrow the present form of government by any means
necessary, especially armed revolution.1awphil.net
The appellant, Catalino Monroy, admitted having gone to Russia as
delegate of the Kapisanan nang mga Anak pawis to the Red
International Labor Union Congress.
From the foregoing it is clear that the twenty appellants herein are or
were members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, for all of them,
with the exception of Balgos and Lacanienta, presented themselves as
candidates in the last general elections as communists, and said Balgos
and Lacanienta, as well as many of those mentioned, delivered speeches
at several meetings held under the auspices of the said Communist
Party, advocating communism and urging the laborers to affiliate to the
said party. If any one of these appellants were not a member of the
Communist Party, it would have been very easy for him to deny it, but
no one has so done.
The principal defense set up by the appellants is that the Communist
Party of the Philippines is not an illegal association in that it preaches
only a social but not an armed revolution, but a mere reading of the
constitution of the Communist Party will show that such a pretense is
obviously useless. Neither is there any merit in the appellant's argument
that communism is not prohibited in any part of the civilized world. And
as to the validity of the law prohibiting communism, the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the law of California prohibiting the display
of the communist red flag as a sign inciting sedition and disorderly
opposition to the government.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the
appellants is clearly illegal. Article 188 of the Penal Code, as substituted
by article 24 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897 (Alcubilla,
Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says that
illegal associations are those the object of which is against public morals,
to commit some crime, or to attack the fundamental basis of the social
order or alter the regularity of its functions. Now, according to appellant
Crisanto Evangelista and the constitution and by-laws of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, the purpose of the party is to incite class
struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful means or
by armed revolution; therefore the purpose of the party is to alter the
social order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition. An
association having such an object must necessarily be illegal (decision of
Oct. 8, 1884, of the Supreme Court of Spain, 7 Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531-
532.) The report submitted by Secretary Hughes to the Senate of the
United States, as well as that made by Hamilton Fish, after an
investigation of communism, leads to the same conclusion, namely, that
force and violence are inseparable from communist programs.
The last point made by the appellants is relative to the penalty imposed.
The trial court imposed the penalty of confinamiento for the period of
eight years and one day, as provided by paragraph 5, article 190 of the
old Penal Code, as substituted by article 26 of the Royal Decree of
September 12, 1897, in connection with articles 28 and 114 of the same
Code. The appellants contend that this is erroneous because the Revised
Penal Code has eliminated this kind of penalty. But there is no merit in
this argument, because the act took place under the sanction of the old
Code, and the penalty of confinamiento, therein provided for, is lighter
than that provided by the new Code in its article 147, which is prision
correccional and arresto mayor and fine.
Art. 148 – Direct assaults
1. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, [July 28, 2010], 640
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 33
Factual Antecedents
On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct
Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:
That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the
morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously intimidate one
Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary
School while in the performance of official duties and functions as such
which acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the
person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The Prosecution’s Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were
public school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo,
Cebu. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time
material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia
confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a
"sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed
her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of
Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary
area", as shown by a medical certificate5 issued by a doctor in the Bogo
General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal
pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28,
1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was
diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate6 was issued.
The Defense’s Version
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain
from calling her son names, so that his classmates will not follow suit.
However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and
kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma
against the wall.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia
of the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The
Issues
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is
liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto
menor minimum of ten days.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner
can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information
charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.12
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he
waives his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and throws
the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our
concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to
correct any error, even if unassigned.13
The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and
penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision
reads as follows:
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 34
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition,
or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when
the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed.1avvphi1
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense
against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance.14
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more
common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his
agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties,
or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
4. That there is no public uprising.15
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in
the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with
paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who
are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia
was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma
of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the
efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia
followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her
against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma’s fall to the
floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in
authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who
shall be deemed as such. –
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of
such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).16
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The
appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial
court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of
direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the
time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a
private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the
moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her
official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a
seat so that they could talk properly, 17 but Lydia refused and instead
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 35
unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly
situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and
violently pushing her against a wall divider while she was going to the
principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.
The prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of
direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force
she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional
abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the
proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of
Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented
to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in
the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct
consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. 18 It was therefore vital for
the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish
a link, if any, between Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s abortion. Without
her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault
on Gemma’s abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a
hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days
after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to
prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a
direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days
after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her
testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the
result of other factors.
The Proper Penalty
Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by
law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00, when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority.19 Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee
since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in
authority.1avvphi1
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 20 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate
term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, and the maximum of which is that
properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
PHIL 109-120,G.R.
No. L-28574. October 24, 1970.
2. People v. Villaseñor y Cordero, G.R. No. L-28574, October 24,
1970
FACTS:
In 1964, he was detailed as field sergeant of a twenty-four-hour duty,
which detail was recorded in the police blotter. At about eight o'clock in
the evening of April 26, 1964, Sergeant Madla, together with patrolmen
Serafin Sebua and Lope Jimena, was patrolling the market place of Boac.
They were seated in a row with their backs to and near the wall of the
Salvo drugstore.
While the three were conversing between 8:00 and 8:30 that evening,
the accussed suddenly appeared about three feet in front of them with a
drawn gun, asked Sergeant Madla whether he was still mad at him, and
lately fired four shots at Madla before the latter could reply and before
anyone of them could do anything fearing that they might be hit,
policemen Jimena and Sebua ran away, with patrolman Sebua seeking
cover in a refreshment parlor. Patrolman Sebua heard three more shots.
Thereafter, he saw the accused fleeing towards the direction of the
Municipality of Mogpog. After the accused had gone, patrolman Sebua
and Jimena returned to the place of the incident, and Sergeant Madla
lying on his back drenched in his own blood.The accused expressly
waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant have the knowledge that the victim is in person in
authority?
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 36
RULING: No.
As correctly mandated by the defense and the Solicitor General, the
crime of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority has not
been established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The record is
bereft of any proof even remotely suggesting that the accused herein
knew that the victim was then performing his official functions as police
sergeant. The victim was not in uniform at the time. As shown by
pictures,the deceased was then wearing dark pants and a polo shirt
tucked inside his waistline. While the deceased then had his service
firearm buttoned inside its holster hanging by his right waist, and was
then with two of his policemen, these facts alone do not indicate that he
was then in the performance of his police duties. And there is no
showing that the accused appellant personally knew of the entry in the
police blotter that deceased was then on twenty-four-hour duty as field
sergeant. Much less is there proof that the assault on the victim was
provoked, or by reason of an act performed, by the victim in his official
capacity.
3. People v. Vibal, Jr. y Uayan, G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the
prosecution in this wise:
On May 10, 2005, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Wilfredo
Almendras, together with PO2 Binmaot and PO2 Erwin Rivera, and two
(2) other civilian escorts, was with Mayor Leon Arcillas at the 2nd floor of
the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. The police officers were
assigned as security escorts of the Mayor. Mayor Arcillas was then
solemnizing marriages. The ceremony ended at around 10:00 o'clock in
the morning. The Mayor then proceeded to the Office of the Commission
on Audit (COA) located at the same floor. While they were going out of
the room where the ceremony was conducted, PO3 Almendras noticed
that they were being followed by two (2) young kids. After spending a
moment in the COA office, the group then proceeded to the Office of the
Mayor. On their way to said Office, gunshots were fired on them. PO3
Almendras was not able to pull out his gun since there was a rapid fire
coming from their front and back. He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor
sustained gunshots wounds. The three (3) fell to the ground. While on
the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots before he felt
dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
hospital.
At that time, SPO1 Victoriano Peria, received a call from an unknown
caller reporting that a shooting incident took place inside the Municipal
building.
Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw Mayor Arcillas bloodied and
being carried out by several men and was put inside the vehicle. In the
second floor, he saw PO2 Erwin Rivera lying near the door already dead,
while the other victim PO3 Almendras was brought to the hospital.
The team searched the whole building of the City Hall for possible
apprehension of the culprits, but to no avail. Thus, Regional Director
P/Chief Supt. Jesus Versoza created a special investigating task force
composed of the NBI, CIDG, Regional Intelligence Unit, SOCO and
Laguna Investigation Division to conduct an investigation to ascertain the
identity of the assailants.
During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told SPO1 Peria
that accused-appellants Vibal and David were his companions when the
killing transpired. Refrea pointed to them as the gunmen. After knowing
from Refrea the identity of accused-appellant Vibal, SPO1 Peria asked his
whereabouts. He came to know that accused-appellant Vibal was
presently detained at the Trece Martirez. SPO1 Peria, together with the
other policemen visited Vibal, and when asked about his participation on
the shooting incident, he at first denied his participation, but later on
admitted to his participation.
With respect to the identity of accused-appellant David, they came to
know that he was detained at GMA, Cavite.
In his investigation, SPO1 Peria was able to ascertain that Vibal, David
and Refrea were members of the gang called Royal Blood Gangsta.
Dr. Roy A. Camarillo, the medico-legal officer of the Regional Crime
Laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, conducted the
autopsy of the cadaver[s] of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera. Based from
the medico-legal report, Mayor Arcillas sustained three (3) gunshot
wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots in his head. PO2 Rivera,
on the other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on the nape and
chest, the latter being the fatal one that caused the death of the victim.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 37

PO3 Almendras was examined and found to have fracture at the left
forearm and weakness of the right hand.3
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, relates its version of the facts in this
manner:
On 10 May 2005 at 10:00 o'clock a.m., accused ARNOLD DAVID was at
Tanay, Rizal, where he has been staying since October 2004 as
requested by his father because he was accused of murder in a gang
war that happened at GMA, Cavite. He was then arrested on 19
December 2006 in connection with a case in GMA, Cavite, where he was
brought somewhere blindfolded. On 2 January 2007, SPO1 Peria arrived
and showed him photographs of the gang, but he denied he was in
these. He denied knowing Cipriano Refrea, Jr. prior to his arrest,
knowing only the latter at the police station.
Accused HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. likewise denied participation in the
incident that happened on 10 May 2005. He claimed that on that date, at
10:30 o'clock a.m., he was at GMA, Cavite, with his family, including his
sister, LORELYN CORONEL, and did not leave until afternoon. In
February 2006, he was arrested and detained at the Cavite Provincial Jail
in relation to prior cases. In December 2006, SPO1 Peria visited him and
asked about the death of Reynaldo Cesar, to which Vibal denied. SPO1
Peria later took Vibal's photograph and left. He was visited again by
SPO1 Peria and asked if he had any participation in the death of Mayor
Arcillas. Again, Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria once again visited Vibal, this
time with PO3 Almendras. The latter asked Vibal if he knew him, but
Vibal could not answer as he was sick at the time. He was again
photographed. In January 2007, he was again visited by SPO1 Peria and
PO3 Almendras, who were now with Cipriano Refrea, Jr. and who was
asked to point at Vibal. Another photograph was taken of Vibal. Prior to
this meeting, Vibal did not know who Refrea was.4
The Court's Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
adduced by the parties, the Court finds this appeal to be absolutely
without merit.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things:
(1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the
crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the
accused is the perpetrator of the crime.11 When a crime is committed, it
is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even
if the commission of the crime is established. 12 Apart from showing the
existence and commission of a crime, the State has the burden to
correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts must be proved by
the State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of its evidence and
without solace from the weakness of the defense.13
Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable
doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of
his life, liberty or even property. As every crime must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove, with the same
quantum of evidence, the identity of the culprit. It is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused
has been positively identified.
In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that the
identification of appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based on the
recognition of PO3 Almendras was clear, worthy of credence and has
met the requirements of moral certainty. The Court agrees, and finds no
cogent reason to disturb this conclusion of the RTC as affirmed by the
CA.
The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive
identification by PO3 Almendras, pinpointing to appellants Vibal and
David as the perpetrators of the gruesome killing of Mayor Arcillas and
PO2 Rivera and who inflicted gunshot wounds upon him. PO3 Almendras
vividly recounted before the RTC the appellants' respective positions and
participation in the shooting incident, having been able to witness closely
how they committed the crime, more so because the crime happened in
the morning when conditions of visibility are very much favorable. He
had a close and unobstructed view of the incident and was able to take a
good glimpse and recognize the faces of the gunmen as the same two
young males he saw earlier in the day following his group. Hailed to the
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 38
witness stand, PO3 Almendras stuck to the essentials of his story, and
without any hesitation, pointed to Vibal and David as the two culprits,
which thus eliminated any possibility of mistaken identification.
Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant for
seeing the faces and features of their attackers, and remembering them
Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and
thus, was a person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras
were agents of a person in authority. There is no dispute that all of the
three victims were in the performance of their official duties at the time
of the shooting incident. Mayor Arcillas was inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall
officiating a mass wedding, and thereafter, while he was walking along
the hallway from the COA office to his office, he was shot and killed.
Victim PO2 Rivera and private complainant PO3 Almendras were likewise
performing their duty of protecting and guarding Mayor Arcillas at the
time of the shooting incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the
victims inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall clearly showed their criminal intent
to assault and injure the agents of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct
Assault with murder or homicide.23 Here, treachery qualified the killing of
Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also attended the
shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is treachery when the following
essential elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or
forms of attack employed by him.24 The essence of treachery lies in the
suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring the commission of the offense without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 25
In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and without a
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2
Rivera and PO3 Almendras were absolutely unaware of the imminent
deadly assaults, and were for that reason in no position to defend
themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who were armed
with guns, suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor Arcillas,
PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the three victims. The gunshots
that came from the front of the victims were fired by Vibal, while those
that came from behind them were fired by David. 26 Said manner of
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
attack clearly revealed appellants' deliberate design to thereby ensure
the accomplishment of their purpose to kill or injure the three victims
without any possibility of their escape or of any retaliation from them.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the appellants.
They were synchronized in their approach to shoot Mayor Arcillas and his
group. The concerted efforts of the appellants were performed with
closeness and coordination, indicating a single criminal impulse - to kill
the victims. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.27 The ascertainment of who
among appellants actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims
already becomes immaterial. Where conspiracy has been adequately
proven, as in the present case, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 28
4. People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, [September 19,
2000],
FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of
which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation
of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294;
and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following
information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30)
policemen proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the
search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from
the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant
who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the
second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 39
noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the Honorable Filemon O. Juntereal (now deceased) then presiding judge of
roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back respondent court, after summarizing in his "decision" the testimonies of
of his house after a brief chase. the prosecution and defense witnesses expressly held in his "decision"
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s that.
house. Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils
inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. "This case need not be decided on the merits of the respective
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the contentions of the prosecution and the defense. No attempt will be made
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates. on this point.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license
to possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to "Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in
carry firearms. the information that the offended party was an agent of a person in
authority and that such fact was known to the accused. The absence of
ISSUE: such allegation is fatal in this case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as
an aggravating circumstance. and issued his verdict above quoted that the information charges no
offense at all.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who The trial judge correctly cited People v. Austria, 94 Phil. 900, in support
shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, of his action, but failed to follow the correct procedure indicated therein
“unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or of simply dismissing the information for failure to charge an offense, so
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of that the fiscal could properly file a valid information charging the
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating offense.
circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an Private respondents failed to comment on the petition despite their
aggravating circumstance. counsel having requested an extension of time to do so, which expired
on September 18, 1975.

The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1915 duly observed

5. Velbes y Aquino v. People, G.R. No. 213747 (Notice), [October
that" (I)t is patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the
22, 2014
merits. There is want of factual finding upon which their conviction or
acquittal could have been based."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ||| People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, G.R. No. L-
41045
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal’s contention, the
(Resolution), November 28, 1975, 160-A PHIL 959-962
information was deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of
the crime of direct assault that the accused had knowledge of or knew
the position of authority held by the person attacked, viz. that of a barrio
The petition filed by the provincial fiscal of Quezon on behalf of the
councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority under Article
People seeks a review on certiorari of the "decision" of respondent court
152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978). 1
dated June 17, 1975, acquitting private respondents as accused in the
information filed against them for direct assault upon an agent of a
What was held in People v. Balbar, 21 SCRA, 1119, 1123, cited by the
person in authority "not for any other reason than the fact that the
fiscal is that it is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused
information under which they are being tried charges no offense at

CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 40
knew the position of authority, held by the offended party, in that case a
public school teacher, then engaged in the performance of her official
duties, and that it is not necessary to allege further that the accused also
knew that such position was that of a person in authority, since "this is a
matter of law" thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the
accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in
the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person
in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not
that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant’s
status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article
3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether
civil or penal (De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta v. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency,
policy and necessity." (emphasis furnished)
Since the "decision" of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the
information for failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on
the merits with factual findings as per the trial judge’s own disavowal, it
is patent that the fiscal’s proper course is not the present petition but the
refiling of a valid information against respondents-accused, as herein
indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling
of a valid information against respondents-accused as hereinabove
indicated.
Art. 152 – Persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority
1. U.S. v. Alvear, G.R. No. 11941, [December 7, 1916], 35 PHIL
626-630
Each of the five appellants in this case, two of whom are women, was
convicted in the court below of the crime of atentado contra los agentes
de la autoridad (assault upon agents in authority) and sentenced to one
year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to
pay a fine of five hundred pesetas.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
The prosecution undertook to prove that a Constabulary sergeant and a
soldier, who were duly provided with a search warrant, entered the
house where the accused were arrested for the purpose of searching for
opium; that immediately upon entering the house, the sergeant
proceeded to read the search warrant to those whom he found within;
that the occupants of the house fell upon the two soldiers, violently
assaulted them, snatched the search warrant from the sergeant while he
was reading it, threw the soldier out of one of the windows, and only
desisted from their assault upon the sergeant when a uniformed
Constabulary soldier, armed with a gun, who had been left on guard
outside, came up into the house and arrested the participants in the
assault.
The accused and their witnesses testifying for the defense swore that
the two police officers entered the house in plain clothes; that the
moment they entered one of them seized and held one of the accused
women, at the same time drawing and brandishing a revolver, while the
other threw himself upon another of the accused who was sitting in a
chair near by; that the woman cried loudly for help; that her son and
some others came to her rescue; that a fight followed, which was
terminated by the arrival of a uniformed Constabulary soldier who put
the accused under arrest; that they did not know that the two
Constabulary soldiers who first entered were police officers until the
uniformed Constabulary soldier appeared on the scene; and that when
they saw him and learned that the men who had entered the house in
plain clothes were police officers, they promptly surrendered and offered
no further resistance.
The witness for the prosecution and for the defense contradict each
other in practically every detail of their accounts of what occurred,
except that all of the witnesses agree that the two Constabulary soldiers
entered the house in plain clothes; that immediately thereafter a violent
altercation arose; and that all of the accused promptly surrendered and
offered no further resistance when the third Constabulary soldier in
uniform came up into the house and put them under arrest.
Upon a careful examination of all the evidence of record we think that
there is at least a reasonable doubt that these accused knew or had
reason to know that the two Constabulary soldiers who first entered the
house in plain clothes were police officers until the third soldier entered
in uniform.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 41
 grounds to believe, that the person assaulted was a police officer acting
The police officers claim that they read, or at least began to read a in the performance of his duties as such. (U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.
search warrant immediately after they entered the house; but upon the Rep., 488.)
whole record, and having in mind the fact that they entered the house in
plain clothes evidently for the purpose of surprising the occupants, we The judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants should be
think the weight of the evidence tends to disclose that whatever may reversed, and they should be acquitted of the crime with which they are
have been their intentions as to the reading of the search warrant, they charged in the information and their bail exonerated, with the costs of
attempted, before disclosing their authority to enter the house, to both instances de officio. So ordered.
compel the occupants to stay still, lest they might conceal or get rid of
the opium for which the search was made; that to this end they used [G.R. No. 39275. December 20, 1933.]
physical force and threats with a revolver against two of the accused, Prior amendment of Article 152
one of whom was a woman; that the cries of the woman brought her
son and others to her rescue; and that as a result the fight was 2. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 39275, [December 20, 1933], 59
precipitated before the police officers had time to make themselves PHIL 163-173)
known as such.
In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
A conviction of the grave offense of atentado (assault upon or resistance the provincial fiscal thereof filed an information against the herein
offered to persons in authority or their agents) cannot be sustained in appellee, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
any case in which a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused
knew or ought to have known that the persons assaulted or resisted "The undersigned provision fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of the crime
were in fact persons in authority or their agents; provided that the of assault upon a person in authority committed as
assault or resistance offered would have been justifiable in the event follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
that the persons assaulted or resisted had not been persons in authority
or their agents. (Art. 1, Penal Code.) "That on or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said accused,
That these accused assaulted and resisted the police officers who Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil of the teacher Iluminada Tinio, did then
entered the house in plain clothes is not denied; but the assault and and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack and lay hands upon
resistance would have been wholly justifiable if these men had been her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada Tinio on one of her cheeks,
what they seemed to be to the occupants of the house; that is to say, while she was engaged in the performance of her duties as such teacher
two strangers, who without lawful authority had entered the house and and while she was within the premises of the high school building
physically assaulted the first man and woman they found there, at the exercising the functions inherent in such capacity."cralaw virtua1aw
same time threatening their victims with a revolver if they moved or library
gave an alarm.
Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the trial
The exemption from criminal liability which is extended to anyone who court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged
acts in defense of his own person or rights from unlawful aggression, therein did not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light
under article 8 of the Penal Code must be held to include one who felony. The present appeal was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of
assaults or resists a police officer under circumstances which would setting aside the order of dismissal in question.
justify the assault or resistance, if the person assaulted were not a police
officer in the lawful performance of his duties, when it further appears The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as alleged
that the person making the assault did not know, and had no reasonable in the said information really constitute the crime of assault upon a

CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 42
person in authority or at least an assault upon an agent of authority, or
any other grave or light felony.
The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases of
People v. Villacenda (G.R. No. 32596, promulgated April 26, 1930, not
reported); People v. Lagrimas (G.R. No. 33529, promulgated April 8,
1931, not reported); and People v. Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a
question similar to the one under consideration was discussed and
decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the information constitute
an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.
In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and affirming
two of the judgments rendered by the courts a quo, really held that the
acts committed by the defendants therein constituted the crime of
assault upon a public officer and, therefore, they should be sentenced to
the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old Penal Code. The reason
for such doctrine is base on the fact that the said article, as explained in
the case of People v. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last paragraph of
the preceding article shall be imposed upon those who shall have
employed the force or the intimidation mentioned in No. 1 of article 249
for the object indicated in No. 1 of article 229 or who shall have placed
hands upon persons coming to the assistance of authority or upon its
agents or upon public officers."cralaw virtua1aw library
Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the decisions
in the three cases were promulgated and the acts complained of therein
had been committed long before the present Revised Penal Code went
into effect, it was necessary that the defendants and appellants in the
aforesaid cases be convicted of the crimes with which they had been
charged and sentenced later to the penalty prescribed in the afore-cited
article. The reason is obvious because said acts constituted a violation of
the article in question, as held by this court.
However, the truth is that said article 251 was not fully reproduced in
the Revised Penal Code as shown by article 149 thereof. The article in
question now reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon an person
who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to
the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission
of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It will be noted that the Legislature suppressed and omitted all reference
to public officers in the article just cited, which necessarily conveys the
idea that it did not intend to make the same applicable to cases of
assault upon public officers who are not persons in authority or agents
thereof. And there cannot be the least shadow of a doubt that a teacher
is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase, as employed
in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a directly vested
jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the ground that, as
has been held in the case of United States v. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472),
wherein Viada was cited in support thereof, agents of authority are only
those persons who, by direct provision of law, or by appointment by
competent authority, are charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property, and those who come
to the aid of persons in authority.
It is true that Viada said that by implication and in accordance with the
final section of article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code, which corresponds
to the aforesaid article 251 of our old Penal Code, it may be affirmed
that for the purposes of said article, public officers are also entitled to be
considered as agents of authority. However, such consideration was due
to the fact that assault upon public officers was penalized likewise in the
said article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code.
A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does not
possess the necessary requisite therefor prescribed by law. Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code defines a person in authority as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the case of
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 43
United States v. Smith (39 Phil., 533), so as to include only persons who
perform some of the functions of the Government of the Philippine
Islands and who, according to the aforesaid article, are directly vested
with jurisdiction. By "directly vested jurisdiction" is meant "the power or
authority to govern and execute the laws, particularly the authority
vested in the judges to administer justice, that is, to try civil or criminal
cases or both, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the
law" (Escriche, Rational Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, p.
1154); and "authority" as well as "directly vested jurisdiction" are two
things which should be conferred by law.
The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department and
the bureaus and offices dependent on it, for the purpose of exercising
the executive functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands, is
silent with regard to powers had or which may be had by high school
teachers, in defining those vested in functionaries of the aforesaid
offices. The Code in question only defines the duties and powers of the
Director of Education and of the division superintendents. Nothing is said
about principals, except that their authority should be determined by the
Director of Education, and much less about high school teachers. The
powers granted to the said Director of Education and division
superintendents are very limited and are not for purposes of government
nor execution of any law, but only as provided for in section 910 et seq.
of the aforesaid Code.
There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority not
only on the grounds already stated but also because the distinction
between the two may be inferred clearly from the very provisions of
article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. After defining less serious physical
injuries, the law provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender’s parents,
ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons
in authority, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, provided that, in the case of persons in authority, the
deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such persons."cralaw
virtua1aw library
If the Legislature had not intended to exclude teachers from the
category of persons in authority or agents thereof, it would have omitted
them from the enumeration of those against whom the act, as defined
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
therein, may be committed and for which a heavier penalty is provided.
There is no question that a teacher is a public officer inasmuch as it is an
actual fact that he performs part of the public functions of the
Government. Furthermore, the same ruling has been established in the
afore-cited cases of Villacenda, Lagrimas and Tacud. However, this
cannot be construed to mean the every public officer is at the same time
an agent of authority.
Commenting on articles 263 and 264 in connection with article 416 of
the Spanish Penal Code, which correspond to articles 249, 250 and 401,
respectively, of our old Penal Code and from which articles 148, 149 and
203 of the Revised Penal Code had been taken, with slight alterations,
although assault upon public officers has been omitted in the latter
Code, Groizard has said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Are public officers agents of persons in authority? If not, may they be
the subject of assault although they are not included in article 263 which
describes and defines said crime? And if they should be so, in the case
stated in the last paragraph of article 264, shall it be understood that
may also be, in all the cases relative to persons in authority and their
agents as stated in article 263? To decide these questions, it is necessary
to know beforehand who are public officers. Article 416 defines them as:
those who, by direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment
by competent authority, take part in the performance of public functions.
From the above-cited provision, it follows that ever agent of authority is
a public officer but not every public officer is an agent of authority. The
officers of a ministry and those of provincial governments are public
officers inasmuch as they perform functions intended for the
preservation and government of the State, yet in spite of it, they are not
persons in authority nor agents thereof. They are not persons in
authority on the ground that they are not directly vested with jurisdiction
either individually or as members of some court or public corporation.
They are not agents of authority because, as subordinate officers, they
are not charged with the task of executing the orders of any such
person. This important difference should be borne in mind so as not to
mistake offices for functions.
"The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of
authority or upon public officers defines the difference between one and
the other. Therefore, an agent of authority cannot be confused with a
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 44
public officer when the legislator himself speaks of them separately.
"Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of authority, it
seems that, generally speaking, they cannot be the subject of the crime
of assault, as defined in article 263, on the ground that said article
considers assault as only those acts committed upon persons in authority
and their agents, it being silent with regard to public officers.
"It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the generic
doctrine of article 263 and the specific statement of article 264 relative
to penalty. It is true that if there can never be any crime of assault upon
mere public officers for want of one of the essential requisites thereof as
stated in article 263, neither can the last paragraph of article 264,
relative to public officers, have any application even if the guilty parties
lay hands on them. Yet, what can we do? There is conflict in the law and
it is useless to pretend not to notice it." (Groizard, Penal Code, vol. 3, p.
468.)
It is for the specific purpose of clarifying the law and eliminating such
conflict that the Legislature suppressed the phrase "public officers" in
enacting article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, which is a reproduction
of the afore-cited article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code. It therefore
becomes clear that the crime of assault cannot be committed against a
public officer unless he is a person in authority or agent thereof at the
same time.
For further elucidation of the matter, it was held in three decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain: one of May 7, 1874, another of November 16,
1889, and the other of October 8, 1901, that a teacher of a public
primary school, a professor in a higher school for teachers, and
instructors in public primary schools, are public officers. (Jose Garcia and
Romero de Tejada, Penal Monographs on Assaults upon Persons in
Authority and Their Agents, Resistance and Disobedience, p. 80;
Alcubilla, Dictionary of Spanish Administration, vol. I, p. 742; and Viada,
Revised Penal Code of 1870, Fourth Supplement, p. 281.)
The afore-cited reasons show that a teacher in neither a person in
authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore,
the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the performance
of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in
authority nor an agent thereof.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
There is no question that the acts complained of, as alleged in the
complaint, constitute light felony, whether they be considered under the
provisions of article 359 (Slander by Deed), or of article 266
(Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code. However, inasmuch as the
complaint does not alleged the motive of the defendant in maltreating
the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the fact that
the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in
accordance with the law to consider the aforesaid acts as merely
constituting light felony as defined and penalized in the said article 266,
with the third aggravating circumstance. In such case, the trial court
lacks jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the penalty therefor as
prescribed by law.
Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the doctrine laid
down in the case of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga v. Rosauro (G.R. No.
39289) 1 , for we had it before us in considering the case at bar. The
truth is that there is no similarity between the former and the present
case on the ground that although the crime alleged therein was "direct
assault upon a person in authority" and the offended party therein was a
public elementary school teacher acting in the performance of his duties
as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in the body of the complaint
that the defendant therein gravely intimidated and threatened said
teacher. There is no question that, in accordance with the provisions of
article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, the jurisdiction to try cases of
grave threats belongs to Courts of First Instance by reason of the
penalty prescribed therein. Prescinding from the title of the offense
stated in the information under consideration, it is observed from the
allegations contained in the body of said pleading that the crime
committed is slight in nature, the trial of which falls under the jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace court.
Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of dismissal
appealed from is in accordance with the law and should therefore be
sustain
Art. 155 – Alarms and scandals
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 45
Caliwan v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 183270, [February 13, 2009], 598
PHIL 962-970)
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the Office of the
Secretary of Justice are as follows:
Rufina Caliwan presents her evidence as follows: On September 4, 2004,
at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while she was singing inside her
house and hosting a party on the occasion of her birthday, stones were
thrown on the roof of her house coming from the direction of SPO4
Mario Ocampo’s house, her neighbor. She reported the incident to the
barangay officials, which called the parties for conciliation. However, the
Ocampos refused to appear at the barangay hall. In the evening of that
date, Rhodora Pasilona and Ofelia Ocampo, presumably irked by her
complaint in the barangay, shouted at her defamatory words like
"pokpok, puta, bobo, sira ulo, tarantada" in the presence of her guests,
who were still attending the party. Days later, and after the dismissal of
the Ocampo’s complaint filed before the DECS against her, SPO4 Mario
Ocampo would make it a point to intercept her whenever she passes by
in front of their house. With threatening looks, he usually places his hand
in the position of drawing his service firearm.
The Ocampo’s, on the other hand, gave their version of the incident as
follows: At about 10:30 in the morning of the (sic) September 4, 2004,
they noticed the loud voices, laughing and singing of Rufina Caliwan and
her guests, which they later came to know was due to her on going
birthday celebration. SPO4 Mario Ocampo was on duty at the police
precinct at that time. Despite the fact that they were being disturbed by
the noise, they did not anymore reacted (sic) to it just to avoid any
misunderstanding with Rufina Caliwan. Around 10:30 in the evening of
the same day, Rufina Caliwan went out of her house with her visitors.
Apparently drunk, she suddenly shouted the following: "Hoy bumaba
kayong lahat dyan. Anong gusto nyo, barilan o bugbugan? Tama ang
sabi ni Dahlia na mga inggetera kayo. Mga pangit kayo. Mga putang ina
nyo. Masama ang mga ugali nyo. Bukas paglabas nyo pagpapatayin ko
kayo." To prevent any untoward incident, they just waited when Rufina
Caliwan went inside her house and just reported the matter to the
barangay. A conciliation proceeding was set by the barangay regarding
the matter on October 14, 2004 at the barangay hall of Barangay 201
Kalayaan Village. After the conciliation proceedings, Ofelia Ocampo and
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
Rhodora Pasilona were about to go home at about 12 noon, when Rufina
Caliwan suddenly assaulted Rhodora Pasilona, while uttering "Tarantada,
Putang ina mo. Hayop kang bata ka!" The barangay officials who were
present witnessed the whole incident. Rhodora Pasilona, thereafter, went
to the Pasay City General Hospital to seek medical attendance for the
injuries she sustained.71avvphi1
The charges and counter-charges being interwoven were consolidated
and investigated jointly. In its February 24, 2005 Resolution, 8 the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, through Assistant City Prosecutor
Eva C. Portugal-Atienza, recommended the dismissal of the complaint
filed by petitioner for lack of evidence, and recommended that petitioner
be charged with light threats and slight physical injuries. Two separate
Informations for light threats and slight physical injuries were filed
against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a
Resolution9 dated March 2, 2006 finding a prima facie case and/or
probable cause for the offense of light threats against SPO4 Mario
Ocampo, and for the offenses of grave oral defamation and slight
physical injuries against Ofelia Ocampo and Rhodora Pasilona, and
consequently ordered the filing of corresponding informations against
the respondents.10 The DOJ also ordered the dismissal of the rest of the
charges, as well as the withdrawal of the Informations for light threats
and slight physical injuries against petitioner.11
Consequently, a Motion for Withdrawal of Information12 was filed seeking
the withdrawal of the Informations charging petitioner with light threats
and slight physical injuries.
However, the motion was denied by the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 47,13 in its Order dated June 6, 2006,14 thus:
A perusal of the records and a careful evaluation of the factual
allegations in the information including the supporting documents
attached thereto will show that there exists probable cause to continue
with the proceedings of the case. The matters raised by the accused are
evidentiary in nature which should be properly threshed out in a full
blown trial. The findings of the Department of Justice is not a rubber
stamp for the court to follow.
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 46
xxxx
As correctly pointed to by the private prosecutor, the instant motions
failed to comply with the three-day notice rule provided for under
Sections 4 and 5 (Rule 15) of the Rules of Court. These motions are
considered litigated motions as the rights of the private complainant may
be clearly impaired, hence they cannot be heard ex-parte. As the
requirement for notice was not followed, the same is fatal and the
motion is just a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City which granted the petition, thus:
WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TO THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE
MOTION FILED WAS DEFECTIVE, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO
THE RIGHTS OF THEREIN NAMED ACCUSED.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
The petition lacks merit.
The charges against petitioner are light threats 17 and slight physical
injuries,18 to which the applicable rule is the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. Section 19 thereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this
Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case
and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the
Court.19 The word "interlocutory" refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. 20
Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not
terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be
done before it is finally decided on the merits.21
The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court is an
interlocutory order. Similar to an order denying a motion to dismiss, an
order denying a motion for withdrawal of information is interlocutory as
it does not finally dispose of the case nor does it determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties as regards each other.
The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being
interlocutory and the case falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court erred in taking cognizance
of the petition for certiorari despite the clear prohibition in Section 19.
Indeed, as held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Estoque,22 there can be no mistaking
the clear command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure and judges have no option but to obey. When the
law is clear, there is no room for interpretation.
Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, petitioner could ventilate her
defenses before the Metropolitan Trial Court during the trial of the case.
In the event that the Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision is adverse to her
cause, she could avail of the remedy of appeal as provided in Section 21
of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. 23
The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. 24 It was
conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases. Respect
for the Rule on Summary Procedure as a practicable norm for the
expeditious resolution of cases like the one at bar could have avoided
lengthy litigation that has unduly imposed on the time of the Court. 25
We need not discuss whether the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in
denying the Motion for Withdrawal of Information because to entertain
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 47
said issue would, in effect, give due course to the prohibited petition for
certiorari. Suffice it to say that although the institution of criminal actions
depends on the sound discretion of the fiscal, once a case is filed in
court, it can no longer be withdrawn or dismissed without the court’s
approval. Moreover, while the Secretary of Justice has the power to alter
or modify the resolution of his subordinate and thereafter direct the
withdrawal of the case, he cannot, however, impose his will on the
court.26
Indeed, once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition
of the case, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests on the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The determination of the case is within the court’s
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which has the option to grant or deny the same.
Art. 156 – Delivering prisoners from jail
Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175457 & 175482, [July
6, 2011], 669 PHIL 32-
59
FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman against herein
petitioners Ambil and Apelado, then governor of Eastern Samar and
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar ,respectively, for allegedly
ordering and causing the release from the Provincial Jail of detention
prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim in violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the allegations in the
Information reasoning however that Adalim’s transfer was justified
considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed
by his detention at the provincial jail. After trial, the Sandiganbayan
found them guilty of the offense charged.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners?
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
HELD: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is
beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As
to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head
of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as
Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall
exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which
had exclusive original jurisdiction over them – the Sandiganbayan
Art. 157 – Evasion of service of sentence
1. Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, [December 18,
2002], 442
PHIL 442-448)
Facts:
Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978
Election Code. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. During the execution of judgment on October 14,
1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of
arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never
apprehended. 10 years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had
already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed
Held: No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the
prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it
shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 48
sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by
final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means
unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even
before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already
in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because
he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to
appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner
who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to
those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor. (
2. Alvarez y Cortes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-1809,
[January 23, 1948],
80 PHIL 43-52)
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the
Director of Prisons on the ground that he is being illegally detained in the
New Bilibid Prisons, notwithstanding the fact that the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the recommendation of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner on December 23, 1946,
absolute pardon of the crime of murder which he committed and of
which he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on June 5,
1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case no. 70022.
The Director of Prisons, in his return, which according to section 13, Rule
102, is considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint,
alleges that the petitioner, while serving the sentence of reclusion
perpetua for the crime of murder above mentioned, escaped from prison
on October 21, 1945, and for said evasion he was prosecuted and
sentenced on March 22, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
case no. 73820, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional; that on April 8, 1946, the petitioner again
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
escaped and evaded the service of the same sentence, and for the
second evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on August 20, 1946,
to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
in case No. 14862 by the Court of First Instance of Rizal; and that on
May 24, 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearm, convicted and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in case No. 74312, to six (6) months of imprisonment, and to pay
a fine of three hundred pesos (P300), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Under the commitment orders issued by the respective Courts of First
Instance in said cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, the petitioner is
confined in the New Bilibid Prisons to serve a total of six (6) years, four
(4) months and twenty-one (21) days of imprisonment, commencing
with the date of his pardon of the crime of murder above mentioned.
The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double
jeopardy in case No. 14683 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where
he was prosecuted again for the first evasion of sentence of which he
had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
case No. 73820; but petitioner did not set up said defense, and was
convicted on August 8, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
case No. 14683 and sentenced two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional. And petitioner could also have
successfully alleged the same defense in case No. 74311 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time
for the evasion of which the petitioner had already been convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in case No. 14862; but the petitioner did
not set up said defense, and he was convicted on May 16, 1946 by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 74311 and
sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional. As the petitioner has not yet completed the service of the
total penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of
imprisonment, to which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862,
and 74312, it is not necessary for us to decide now whether or not he
has to serve also the sentences rendered in the above mentioned cases
Nos. 14683 and 74311.
The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of
sentence have not been affected by the absolute pardon granted to him
remitting the unserved penalty to which he was finally sentenced for the
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 49
crime of murder; because petitioner was convicted of evasions of service
of sentence before the pardon and while he was serving said sentence of
conviction for murder, which was then still in full force.
Petition is therefore denied. So ordered.
3. People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, [November 26, 1948], 82
PHIL 172-179)
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with evasion of service of sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and
ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of
100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment
rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-
4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits
made against him and commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from
that decision with the following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused
evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said
Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are
imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text of said article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the
Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory of the
appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is
controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads
thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con
prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . .
.
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal
Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text
governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General
impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a
deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the
liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been adopted in the
case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968)
wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General
that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering
deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty
when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified
by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades
the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited
area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 50
provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of
service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish
text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of
final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of
Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
4. Alvarez y Cortes v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-1809,
[January 23, 1948],
80 PHIL 43-52)
Art. 159 – Other cases of evasion of service of sentence
- People v. Ponce de Leon, 56 Phil. 386
This is an appeal taken by the Government, represented by the
Attorney-General, from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, dismissing the information filed against
the accused Miguel Ponce de Leon y Ballesteros, for the violation of a
conditional pardon.
On March 13, 1923 the appellee was found guilty of parricide by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and sentenced to three years of
banishment from within a radius of 25 kilometers from the Roman
Catholic Church in Santa Ana. On February 16, 1924 His Excellency the
Governor-General pardoned him on condition that he should never again
be guilty of any misconduct. A few weeks later the appellee was
introduced by Captain Panopio to Godofredo Dancel of the Governor-
General's Office, indicating thereby that he accepted the conditional
pardon. On October 6, 1928 the appellee was charged with the violation
of section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code of illegal possession
of a number of cartridges and a chip for an automatic pistol, and having
pleaded guilty, was sentenced to pay a fine of P25.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
On June 7, 1930, Assistant Fiscal F.B. Albert, of the City of Manila,
revived criminal case No. 40135 of said court and filed an information
against the appellee charging him with the violation, as aforesaid, of the
conditional pardon granted him and by him accepted, praying the after
the proper investigation he be compelled to serve the unexpired portion
of the penalty of banishment. After due hearing, the court dismissed the
information on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to order the remedy
sought by the prosecution. The Government, represented by the
Attorney-General, appealed.
This appeal raises two question: First, whether the decision is applicable;
and second, whether the court had jurisdiction to order the appellee to
serve the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment inasmuch as
he had violated the condition of his pardon.
Act No. 1524 which provides the manner of enforcing the conditions
imposed by the Governor-General in the exercise of his power to grant
conditional pardons, does not establish the right to appeal from the
order or judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance denying or
dismissing a petition for the enforcement of said conditions. For this
reason counsel for the appellee contends that the judgment from which
the Attorney-General has appealed is not open to such a recourse. But
section 44 of General Orders, No. 58 as amended by section 4 of Act No.
2886 recognizes the right of the Government to appeal from others
sustaining a demurrer or dismissing a complaint or information. Of
course there is no question that no appeal can be taken from an order
dismissing an information, when the accused is thereby acquitted or set
at liberty. Inasmuch as the law cited above is silent with reference to
appeals by the State, we see no good reason why the general provisions
of section 44, General Orders, No. 58, should not also applicable to the
order in question. The ground upon which rest the principle prohibiting
an appeal from a judgment or order of acquittal, is that the accused is
placed in double jeopardy of conviction for one and the same offense.
This fundamental reason does not exist in the present case: the appellee
was not placed in double jeopardy of conviction for one and the same
offense, for what the prosecution sought was that he be compelled to
serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of banishment from which
he had been relieved by a conditional pardon. In case it is finally decided
that he must serve out the unexpired portion of the penalty of
banishment, he is not sentenced to a new penalty or found guilty of the
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same crime of which he was convicted, but he is merely restored to the
status in which he was before being pardoned.
With reference to the second question, we find that section 4 of Act No.
1524 is applicable. It reads as follows:
SEC. 4. If the Court shall find from said investigation that one or
more of the conditions of such pardon, heretofore or hereafter
grated, has been violated by the person so pardoned, the court
shall order the recommitment and confinement of such person in
the proper prison for the unexpired portion of his original
sentence. Such order of the court shall be sufficient authority to
the custodian of any public prison designated therein to receive
and safely keep the body of the person so conditionally
pardoned during the unexpired potions of his original sentence.
In dismissing the information presented in this case, the court relied
upon the phrase employed in the law, "shall order the recommitment
and confinement of such person." It was argued that since the appellee
could not be reimprisoned because he had been sentenced to
banishment, the law was inapplicable and the court had no jurisdiction to
grant the fiscal's petition. We are convinced that the legal precepts and
legislative intention have been misinterpreted. What is meant in that
section is that if the investigation shows the accused be recommitted or
confined with a view to serving that portion of his sentence which has
remained unextinguished on account of the conditional pardon. Of
course, if the penalty imposed is not commitment but banishment, for
example, he will not be ordered to suffer or serve imprisonment, but
merely that period of banishment from which he was relieved by his
acceptance of the conditional pardon. To place another interpretation
upon the law would be to thwart its purpose which is, as we have said,
to enforce the conditions of the pardon, as its very title clearly declares,
and to restore the accused to the same status in which he was before
the pardon.lawphil.net
In United States vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 202), this court said:
The defendant accepted the conditional pardon and thereby
secured his release from imprisonment. Having accepted the
conditional pardon, he is bound by its terms. The record shows
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
that he had been guilty of misconduct after his conditional
pardon. By such misconduct, he forfeit his pardon and his right
to liberty thereunder. When a pardoned person violates the
conditions of his pardon, he is left in the exact situation in which
he was when the pardon was granted, and the original sentence
may be enforced against him.(Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard [U.S.]
307; Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark., 321; 30 L.R.A., 736; 54 Am. St.
Rep., 209; Kennedy's Case, 135 Mass., 48; Ex parte Marks, 64
Cal., 29.)
If the condition of the pardon upon which the accused secures
his release from imprisonment has been violated by him, after
his release, the pardon thereby becomes void and the petitioner
may be arrested and compelled to undergo so much of the
original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his
release. (Ex parte Alvarez vs. State of Florida, 50 Fla., 24; 111
Am. St. Rep., 102; Fuller vs. State, 122 Ala., 32; 45 L.R.A., 502;
Ex parte Marks, supra; State vs. Horne, 7 L.R.A. [N.S.], 719.)
The law is well settled that where the criminal accepts the
pardon he accepts it subject to all its valid conditions and
limitations, and will be held bound to compliance therewith. ( Ex
parte Alvarez vs. State of Florida, supra.)
If the purpose of the action taken by the prosecution was but to restore
the appellee to the status he was in before receiving and accepting the
conditional pardon, and if the principal penalty imposed upon him in the
criminal case for parricide was banishment and not imprisonment, it
stands to reason that he must now extinguish the unexpired portion of
the former penalty, and not of any other penalty to which he has not
been sentenced. And to this end, there is no doubt that Courts of First
Instance have plenary power and jurisdiction, under said section 4, Act
No. 1524.
Our attention has been called to the fact that the procedure established
by Act No. 1524 cannot be followed in cases where the condition was
violated after the period of the defendant's sentence had expired. In
view of the provisions of Act No. 1524, we believe this objection has no
legal weight. This law contains no exception or limitation of the time
within which the action provided for may be instituted, and we do not
see how the objection can stand. Of course, we do not mean to apply
Compiled by: Justice Merzy Page 52
this decision to a case where the offense has already prescribed by
express provision of the law.
On forfeiture of a pardon by a breach of its conditions, a convict
becomes liable to serve the balance of his unexpired term,
although the time for which he was sentenced has expired, the
essential part of the sentenced being the punishment, and not
the time when it shall begin and end. (State vs. Horne, 52 Fla.,
125; 42 S., 338; 7 L.R.A. [N. S.], 719; [rehden 52 Fla., 143; 42
S., 714]; State vs. Yates, 183 N.C., 753; 111 S.E., 337.) (46 C.J.,
1203.)
Wherefore the appealed judgment is reversed, and let the accused
Miguel Ponce de Leon y Ballesteros serve the period of banishment to
which he was sentenced and which remained unextinguished by reason
of the conditional pardon granted him, with the costs of this instance
against said appellee. So ordered.
- Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272
ACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon
and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for
the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec
Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory
as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
CRIMINAL LAW 2 Case Digests Midterm
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his
pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of
his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive
of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict
or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to
determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have
been violated. To no other department of the Government [has] such
power been intrusted.
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