In re Galang

Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the
1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam notebooks
of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled
the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar.

Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the
respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or
re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.
Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears
that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). The issue is WON
Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar?

Held: It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo’s well-
studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in
the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do
in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner.

Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Rule 7.01 – A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
• While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the
utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
• The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA and Mariwasa Manufacturing

GR No. 110571 | Oct. 7, 1994 | J. Mendoza

Facts:
Motion for Reconsideration.

P First Lepanto contends that Circular No. 1-91 (rules governing appeals to CA) cannot be deemed to have
superseded Art. 82 of EO 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (providing direct appeals to SC)
because the Code is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts, while
the circular is a rule of procedure the SC promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power.

Issue: WON the CA has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments – YES

Held:
The main decision from which this MR stems is affirmed.
Historical timeline:
1) Judicial review of decisions of the BOI was originally provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1981
− Art. 78 provided that all appeals shall be filed directly with the SC
2) Art. 78 was amended by BP 129
− Sec. 9 granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction to CA over decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies
3) Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 was promulgated on July 17, 1987
− Right to appeal from decisions of BOI was again granted to SC
4) 1987 Constitution took effect
− Art. VI, Sec. 30 provided that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of SC… without its advice and concurrence.”
− This provision is intended to give the SC a measure of control over unnecessary burden
placed before it

Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code increases the appellate jurisdiction of SC by providing for
direct appeals to SC from decisions of the BOI. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence
of the SC, it never became effective; thus, it cannot have amended BP 129, Sec. 9.

There is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As
already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of Sec. 9 of BP 129 is to provide uniform
appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the
exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.

MR denied.

In Re: Cunanan (1954; Diokno; Original Action in the Supreme Court)

• This concerns RA 972 or the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.

• Rules of Court 127, sec. 14 states that those who obtained a general average of at least 75%,
with at least 50% in any subject, after taking the bar exam, shall be admitted to the Bar.
• On June 21, 1954, Senate Bill 371 became the Bar Flunkers Act of 1954. It became a law
without the signature of the President, who earlier vetoed Senate Bill 12 (substantially similar
to SB 371) upon advice of 7 members of the Supreme Court.
• After approval, unsuccessful postwar candidates, those whose examination papers were still
pending, and those who wanted to have grades reconsidered filed petitions.
• 1094 stood to be benefied by the law.

THE BAR FLUNKERS ACT OF 1954

• Section 1 of the RA 972 modified the passing grade from 1946 to 1955.

Year/s Passing grade

July 4, 1946-1951 70%
1952 71%
1953 72%
1954 73%
1955 74%

- Every fraction with the value of at least 1/2 was to be considered as 1 (i.e. ½=1).
 • Section 2 provided that those who obtained an average of at least 75% after the July 4, 1946
examinations in any subject in any bar exam would be considered as haing passed such
subject and that the grade would be included in the computation of the average in any
subsequent exams s/he might take.

ISSUE: Is it constitutional?

HELD: No. It is not within the powers of the legislature to enact such a law. Moreover, the law in
this case creates arbitrary methods infringing upon constitutional principles.

RATIO:
• The author of the law himself admitted that those who took the exams during the post-war
period suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation, but public
interest demands adequate preparation and efficiency from the legal profession.
• There was no case where the validity of a similar case was sustained.
• The disputed law is not legislation. It is a judgment revoking rules promulgated by the
Court.
• The Constitution does not confer on Congress and the Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning admission to the pracice of law. Exclusive power belongs to the Court.
• Another question is, what is the motive for this classification? Substantial difference was not
proven. Article 2 permits partial passing at indefinite intervals, which is violative of Sec. 21 (1),
Art VI of the Constitution then in force. Since it’s inseparable from Art. 1, it annuls the whole
law.

IN SUM:
1. The Tribunal is deprived of the opportunity to determine who’s prepared to be members of the
Bar because the law is a judgment revoking Court decision on 810 petitions.
2. Congress patently exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement rules on
admission to the Bar.
3. Section 2 is not embraced in the title of the law.
4. The passing marks proposed for years 1953-1955 exams are still valid.
5. The passing mark proposed for years 1946-1954 is invalid; hence the corresponding petitions
are denied.
6. Those who, in 1953, obtained a mark of at least 71.5% passed.

SHIGENORI KURODA v. RAFAEL JALANDONI et al. , 83 Phil. 171 (1949)

FACTS
Shigenori Kuroda was the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943 to
1944. He was charged before a military commission which was organized through Executive Order No. 68. In his
case, two American Attorneys who were not authorized by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to practice law;
namely Melville Hussey and Robert Port, were appointed as prosecutors representing the American Commander in
Chief. Kuroda challenges the participation of these American attorneys on the ground that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether American lawyers may participate in a case under a military commission when they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines
RULING
Yes. American lawyers may participate in a case under a military commission. The military commission is a
special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil court.
There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice laws in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in
military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even
possessed of legal training.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Facts:
1. Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces covering 1943-1944 in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and
other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was
establish under Executive Order 68.
2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the
military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds
that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes).
3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the
two US prosecutors – Atty. Melville Hussey and Atty. Robert Port -- cannot practice law
in the Philippines.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional
2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
3. Whether or not Atty. Melville Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to practice law
profession in the Philippines
HELD:
1. Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try
Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art.
2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is
in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation
of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on
the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by
the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
2. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been
equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is
charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special
military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed
by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law
3. As to the participation of the two US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of
interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which
petitioner was being charged

Omico Mining & Industrial Corp. v. Vallejos

G.R. No. L-38974. March 25, 1975.

Antonio, J.

FACTS:

While petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint filed by then CFI Judge Catolico was pending resolution
by the trial court, the latter filed a petition to declare petitioners in default alleging that seven months
had lapsed since summons was served on petitioners. The court granted the petition. Petitioners filed
their notice of appeal to the Supreme Court after their motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

WON judges can engage in private practice of law.

RULING:

No. The inhibitory rule embodied in Section 25 of Rule 138 makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers
to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties. These objectives are dictated by a sense of
moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.

SYNOPSIS
While petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint filed by then CFI Judge Catolico was
pending resolution by the trial court, the latter filed a petition to declare petitioners in
default alleging that seven months had lapsed since summons was served on petitioners
and that petitioners' motion was a "useless piece of paper" as the notice of hearing was
fatally defective because it was addressed to the clerk of court. The court granted the
petition, received ex parte the evidence of Catolico, rendered judgment thereon against
petitioners, and on motion of Catolico, directed the issuance of a writ of execution.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal to the Supreme Court after their motion for
reconsideration was denied; but, because of the impending execution of the judgment by
default, they filed the instant petition assailing the order of default, the reception of
evidence ex parte, and the judgment by default as having been made with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Supreme Court ruled that the notice of hearing addresses to the clerk of court stating
the time and place of hearing with a notation that a copy thereof has been sent through
registered mail to Catolico's counsel, who, as per certification of the post office, actually
received the notice one day before the day set for the hearing of the motion, was not
defective; and because petitioners were incorrectly declared in default while their motion
to dismiss was still pending resolution, the holding of the trial of the case on the merits, in
their absence, without notice to them of the date of the hearing, was a denial of due
process. Reiterating a previous ruling, the Court further ruled that even if an appeal is open
to petitioners, certiorari is allowed where the appeal is no longer an adequate and speedy
remedy as the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Petition granted.

People vs. Villanueva

14 SCRA 109 (1965)

FACTS:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same
case was represented by City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered
on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance
of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of law.

RULING:

No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant
City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Thus,
the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who is
a relative. Decision affirmed.

A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975

CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO, complainant,

vs.
MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAY, respondent.
Facts:

Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of

irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the object of a
deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of
Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-
officio notary public, on January 25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors
owned only one-third undivided portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned
two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from
the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their behalf with the
vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of
P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00.
Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. Forthwith a
complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the pendency of
the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw P3,500.00 she had deposited
with him as she was then in need of money, but no action was taken by respondent.

Issue:
WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides in part: All
provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of sessions applicable to courts of
first instance shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the latter may, after office hours and with the
permission of the district judge concerned, engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice
of law ...

Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, Mrs. Añonuevo,
and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case. Respondent's claim is belied, however, by the active
interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal
advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo
Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property
from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of
Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question. (d) When his attempts at an
out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591 for which he
was issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees. (e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at
the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who made an appearance for
that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of respondent's presence so that the Order dictated
on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but
also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal advice to
clients or persons needing the same, etc.

The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of
possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is
retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are
expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing
the interests of a party litigant.

ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC., NEGROS
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and NICOLAS CONCEPCION, respondents.

(G.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939)

Facts: The respondents, during the time the legal services are claimed to have been rendered by the
petitioner, were operating automobile lines in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, Nicolas
Concepcion, was at the time the president, general manager, and controlling stockholder of these two
transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion engaged the professional services of the
petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of Manila. The employment was for the purpose of
obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the line
operated by the respondent transportation companies. At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it
appears that the respondent transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges up
to December 31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-seventh of their gross income up to that date,
and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges were detrimental to the transportation
business of the respondent if not remedied in time. The herein petitioner accordingly took steps to obtain
first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund of P50,000 of
toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros.

Believing that the suppression of tolls on the Bago and Malogo bridges could not be effected, the petitioner
filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and Communication, asking for the reduction of toll charges
over the eleven (11) bridges in Occidental Negros.

The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the transportation companies' petition and urged the
provincial board of Occidental Negros to act favorably. The provincial board, however, declined to follow
the suggestion. The Secretary of Commerce and Public Works warned the provincial officials by sending
them a communication. By reason of this communication, the provincial board, on March 7, 1934, with the
conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a resolution reducing the tolls for 2-ton trucks or more, the only
kind of motor vehicles operated by the respondents, from P1.20 to P0.50 on one bridge, and from P1.20
to 0.40 on the other. And on April 10, 1935 "upon authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the
Department of the Interior" the provincial board refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from
the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc., and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to
be applied to future payments for tolls by said companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the
respondents have been benefited with an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months. The trial court
awarded him P10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to P3,500.

Issue: How much is the reasonable amount to which the petitioner is entitled?

Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the lawyer The following are the circumstances to be considered in determining the
compensation of an attorney: the amount and character of the services rendered; the labor, time, and
trouble involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and experience called for in the performance of the
services; the professional character and social standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether
or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a
much a larger fee when it is to be contingent that when it is not. The financial ability of the defendant may
also be considered not to enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation, but to determine whether
or not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the services rendered, or as as incident in
ascertaining the importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation.

The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing with the authorities
concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers submitted in evidence, for he appears to have
had various conferences with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Secretary of the
Interior, the Secretary of Labor and the Insular Auditor, and had otherwise taken steps to secure the
objectives of his clients. The respondents in their brief insinuate that the services of the petitioner were
unsolicited and unauthorized. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals, upon the proof submitted,
concluded that the employment of the petitioner was duly made and solicited by the president and manager
of the respondent corporations, and such finding cannot be disturbed. "It is elementary that an attorney is
entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client . . . That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith
trying to serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his
services. . . ."

The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but the intention and
promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And in any case, whether there is an
agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their
professional services.

No hard and fast rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what is or what is not
a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case.

We have noted in the beginning that the services here were rendered in a case of an administrative nature.
But that does not alter the application of the proper rule:

Professional services, to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation, are as legitimate as services
rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury that the claim presented or the defense
set up against a claim presented by the other party ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases
require advocates; and the legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to receive
compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal, if they are free
from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness.

As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of the toll of the
bridges in the said province, the respondents were benefited with an economy of P78,448. The refund to
the said corporations of the amount of P50,000 is a great relief and enhancement of their business. Facts
and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of the petitioner is
P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which the petitioner had already received.

Cayetano vs. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Ponente: Justice Paras

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:

“There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent possessed the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years
Held/ Ratio:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.

The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice
of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the
practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The
court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers
nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because
of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them.
These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman.

The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

IN RE: EDILLON

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in thesense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be amember of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity?

Held: No. All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

SYNOPSIS
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to
the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent's name from its
Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership
therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein
(Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled 􀀷nancial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
are valid exercise of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a
lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory
measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution
and held as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions
of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP
By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An
"Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar
is an of􀀷cial national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes suf􀀷cient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE

POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed
with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an of􀀷cer of the Court.
The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. The expression"affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE

PHILIPPINE BAR. —The Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved
on September 17, 1971,authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see 􀀷t," it did so in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court
in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May
4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order

to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental
principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from
all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY

POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, "(Sec.
5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A

LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
of􀀷cial national organization for the well-de􀀷ned but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
bene􀀷ciaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT
PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR
VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and
quali􀀷cations of its of􀀷cers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. The very burden
of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a
lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a
ground for disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.

Tejan v Cusi
January 31, 2016
Fahima Abobakar

In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority
of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case
No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member
of the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was
required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed
or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition
in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false.

At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety
of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent
Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject matter
thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the
administrative case in view of the latter’s conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at
the same time. The oral motion was denied.

Petitioner’s thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear
and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because
jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in
courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of
first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules
of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.

Petition is bereft of merit.

When it appears by acts of misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the
trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the
enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited.
The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to
investigate and suspend members of the bar.

Section 28, 29 and 30 of the Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable in the
case at bar.

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be
the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the
conduct of its own officers.Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to
institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment
of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears
that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to
show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an
officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney.

The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 8 of Rule 139 refers to complaints
referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule
138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation
themselves, subject toanother and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event
of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension
and the statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of
Rule 138, the Supreme Court “shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make
such order revoking or extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office
as such, as the facts warrant.”

WHEREFORE, the present petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner.

A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974

JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,

vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p

FACTS:
In a civil case for annulment of a sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against Sps. Alcala
on the ground that one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, herein respondent
represented sps. Alcala. Trial Court rendered judgement rescinding the contract of sale on the
ground that Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of the lot in question and that
it has been occupied by one Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers for a number of years already.
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed
to inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to
complainants' house to serve a writ of executionissued in said case. Totally caught by surprise,
Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478. The
deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was decided
on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19,
1963, and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on
motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
 spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for
having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they lost their right
to appeal from said decision. The court denied it for failure to show that they indeed suffered
damages.
Complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment against their former counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not disbarment is proper.

HELD:
For indifference, loyalty and lack of interest of respondent in handling complainant's
defense.
The evidence proving existence of lot offered by sps. Alcala which respondent allegedly
failed to present was rendered unnecessary for the commissioner appointed already reported
that the lot existed but the same was in the possession of other persons. The fact that the
plaintiff, Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that
respondent attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.

For gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his
clients of the decision in the civil case.
Petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage by the
failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 since the
decision rendered was fair and justified. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his
clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters
of professional employment"
The correctness of the decision in the civil case is no ground for exonerating respondent
of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of
malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of
negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give timely
notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not result in
any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not
disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme penalty
of disbarment.
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended to
protect the administration of justice.
Act of respondent manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest
expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's
inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.

GUILTY only of simple negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants,
and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, s. HON. NICANOR
J. CRUZ,

FACTS:
On April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against
Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.
College of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to render
legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C, Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila,
as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.

Whether or not Malana and Lucila can represent their friend Cantimbuhan despite being senior
law students

HELD:

Yes. A non-member of the Philippine Bar—a party to an action is authorized to appear in court
and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent
or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be
aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the
private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila.

The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he
wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether
he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor,
with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control
Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal

HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORP. vs PAGALILAUAN

GR No. L-62909 1989

Facts:

Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant” and
received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which
gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the
corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4,
1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled
that Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence,
this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner

corporation and Aban.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his
former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years
backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should
reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination
benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's
fees.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private
corporation or even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the
determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon
four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee;
(2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal;
and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct.
Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor.

In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the
petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees
and also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees
which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that
petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important,
exercised control over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met
the four standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer
relationship.

Ramos VS Rada 65 SCRA 179 (1975)

Facts: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte

He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
government…

Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on December 15, 1972
as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were
foreclosed by the corporation. His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative
complaint against Rada which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.

Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment. It was not indicated that
his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger,
nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.

Issue: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII

Held: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of Civil Service
Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand. The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which
do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation,
it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and to
award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being connected with a private
undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to the Government service. His
connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written
permission from proper government authority.

Beltran Jr. vs. Abad, 132 SCRA 453 (BM 139)

31
JUL
FACTS:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations. His
subsequent practice of law was questioned and complained by the President of Philippine
Trial Lawyers’ Association, Inc. Respondent explained that:

– He had already paid for the Bar Admission Fee;

– He was notified of the oath-taking by the Supreme Court and signed the Lawyer’s
Oath by one clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidante;

– He participated Annual General Meeting of IBP Quezon City, and paid his statement
dues and was included as a voting member for officers and directors – also conferred to
him a certificate of Membership in Good Standing from IBP QC Chapter;

– The Supreme Court never issued any order in the striking of his name in the roll of
attorneys, and paid his dues and PTR;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was sentenced fine and imprisonment for twenty five (25) days.

RATIO:

Respondent should know that the circumstances which he narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right (or privilege) to practice law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.

He was found in violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing – x x x:

xxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

xxx

From which respondent cannot further deny.

CARMEN E. BACARRO, Complainant,

vs.
RUBEN M. PINATACAN, Respondent.
Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Legal Ethics: Good Moral Character

Facts:
(promise of marriage) This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral
turpitude and immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie
Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of respondent's betrayal, her family suffered shame,
disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit
to become a member of the Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even
admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship
with each other, does not justify him for disqualification to the practice of law.

Issue:
WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case involving his
good moral character

Holding:
Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has
legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan
as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that
he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a
new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership
in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal
obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ratio:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant
must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high
moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer)
is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an
example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean
living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing
the Bar examinations.

In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS:
1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
1. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.
2. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be
erased from the roll of attorneys
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his
third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma
1. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
2. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the
second charge is clearly meritorious:
 i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from
the Arellano University in April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College,
in his school records.

ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing
pre-law requirements? NO.

HELD:
STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS
LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
1. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby
showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
2. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required
pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations
iii. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
2. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.

A.C. No. 3056. August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.
RENOMERON, Respondent.

FACTS:
Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), filed an
administrative case against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to
the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment
(in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
V&G complied with the desired requirements, however, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending the compliance of the former with their “special conditions”,
which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the
question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in
favor of the registrability of the documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the registration thereof
but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted
in his previous denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by
the Court for his malfeasance as a public official?

HELD:
The Court ruled that Renomeron may be disciplined by the Court as public official for his
misconduct constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). As the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers
expeditiously and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest
in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts
or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue
"only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista
vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA
269).
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron was disbarred from the practice of law and his name was
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.