In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova.

Gumaua,
an ex-PC aided Cordova as he even sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance,
Gumaua’s house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial law is being imposed at that time,
Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then
petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction
against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the AFP and Military Commission No.
2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of respondent
Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals
cannot try civilians if civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of
their jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is entitled even
during Martial Law to his constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.

HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect.
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law is valid. That the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus.
That the President of the Philippines, “as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator
of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial
law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and
social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a
worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including
highly developed countries . . .” . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the
period of martial law, can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only
members of the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for specified offenses including
kidnapping.

And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio
Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the
time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that
petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of
petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with
the two other accused who are members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos.
8.

In 1993, Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero, and Luisa Miraples were accused of illegal
recruitment. It was alleged that they represented themselves as the incorporators and
officers of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.; that Ricorn is a
recruitment agency for seamen; that Garcia is the president, Botero is the vice-
president, and Miraples (now at large) is the treasurer. It was later discovered that
Ricorn was never registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
that it was never authorized to recruit by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). Botero and Garcia were convicted. Botero appealed.
In his defense, Botero averred that he was not an incorporator; that he was merely an
employee of Ricorn in charge of following up on their documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Botero is a mere employee of Ricorn.

HELD: No. It was proven by evidence that he was introduced to the applicants as the
vice president of Ricorn. When he was receiving applicants, he was receiving them
behind a desk which has a nameplate representing his name and his position as VP of
Ricorn.

But Ricorn was never incorporated? How will this affect his liability in the crime illegal
recruitment?

Under the law, if the offender is a corporation, partnership, association or entity, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership,
association or entity responsible for violation. In this case, even if Ricorn was not
incorporated, Botero and his cohorts are estopped from denying liability as corporate
officers of Ricorn. Section 25 of the Corporation Code provides that “All persons who
assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable
as general partners for all the debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a
result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such ostensible corporation is sued
on any transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any tort committed by it as such,
it shall not be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate personality.”