LAWS ON BOUNCING
People v. Holzer
CHECKS
1. ESTAFA THRU ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK
[Art. 315, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep.
Act 4885]
a. Coverage - When drawer is notified by the payee,
holder or drawee bank, of the dishonor of the check
drawn by him for insufficiency of funds, his failure to
make good the check within 3 days from such notice will
constitute prima facie estafa. (Art. 315, RPC)
b. Defects in the Provision - There are two "defects" in
the RPC provisions which make conviction for estafa
difficult for issuance of bouncing check:
(1) Article 315 provides that there can be no estafa
without deceit:
ILLUSTRATION:
(i) A shops at supermarket, buys groceries worth
f*1,000.00, and pays with an unfunded check and goes
home with the groceries. The check is dishonored for
lack of funds. Is there estafa? YES, when A received the
goods, there was deceit (pretending that check was
good) in order to obtain the goods and thus cause
damage to the supermarket.
(ii) On the other hand, if grocer, knowing A, allows him to
pay on a later date, granting then only credit on the
goods, and after a few days A pays with a check that
eventually bounces, A is not liable for estafa, as the
check was issued in payment for a pre-existing debt. To
constitute deceit, the taking of the goods must be
simultaneous with the payment through a rubber check.
People v. Sabio
86 SCRA 568 (1978)
(a) Payment of a pre-existing debt with a bouncing check
is not a crime under Revised Penal Code.
b) Issuance of the bouncing check simultaneously with the
incurring of debt is when estafa is committed, because
the deceit was used to obtain credit.
People v. Reyes
228 SCRA 13 (1993)
To constitute estafa under Art. 315(2) of RPC, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of the defraudation - it should
be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud.
(2) Assuming there is evidence of deceit, R.A. 4885
provides for "prima facie" estafa, whereas Its penal
counterpart, Art. 315 requires proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt:
336 SCRA 319 (2000)
In view of the amendment of Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC by
R.A. 4885, the following are no longer elements of estafa
through the issuance of a check:
(a) knowledge of drawer that he has no funds in
the bank or that funds deposited by him are not
sufficient;
(b) failure to inform the payee of such circumstance.
c. Elements of Estafa by Issuing a Check - The crime
of estafa under Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC has the following
elements:
(a) Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(b) Insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) Damage to the payee thereof.'
(1) Element of Postdating or Issuance of Check:
People v. Chua
315 SCRA 326 (1999)
Postdating of checks simply means that on the date
indicated the checks would be properly funded, not that
the checks should be deemed as issued only then, and
therefore such argument cannot be taken to mean that
the checks were deemed "issued" in payment of a pre-
existing obligation.
People v. Hernando
317 SCRA 617 (1999)
Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of
postdating or issuing a check is payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such,
it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of
fraud.
People v. Reyes
454 SCRA 635 (2005)
Check Need Not Be Negotiable Instrument - It is not
essential that the check by which estafa was committed
has to be a negotiable instruments under NIL:
"Negotiability is not the gravamen of the crime of estafa
through bouncing checks - it is the fraud or deceit
employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check
that is penalized."
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(2) Elements of Damage and Deceit (Defenses):
Chua v. People
484 SCRA 161 (2006)
Accused's defense is that she issued the unfunded
checks as collateral for the goods she got is not worthy
of credence.
Seller would not have parted with her goods in exchange
for bum checks. It was likewise contrary to ordinary
human experience and to sound business practice for
the accused to issue so many unfunded checks as
"collateral" or "by way of accommodation."
As an experience business-woman, accused could not
have been so naive as not to know that she could be
held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.
People v. Juliano
448 SCRA 370 (2005)
Damage and deceit are essential elements of the
offense of estafa and must be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or
simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check. The
fact that the accused no longer deposited the amount
necessary to cover the first check within the required
period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
deceit against her, for complainant's own act of
accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the
first check to the accused meant that complainant was
no longer holding the accused liable for the payment
under the said first check.
People v. Panganlban
335 SCRA 354 (2000)
As with all other forms of estafa, element of fraud or bad
faith is indispensable. The fraudulent intentions of
accused must be shown to exist at the time of the
issuance and postdating of check or prior thereto. Where
such fact of fraud is not ably proven, and the inability to
make good on the check may have been occasioned by
unforeseen business reverses after the obligation had
been taken out, there can only be civil liability but no
conviction for estafa.
Pacheco v. Court of Appeals
319 SCRA 595 (1999)
In the absence of the essential element of deceit, no
estafa is committed. Where complainant knew that
drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank at the
time the check was issued to him, there is no estafa
through bouncing checks. Awareness by complainant of
the fictitious nature of the pretense cannot give rise to
estafa by means of deceit.
(3) Element of Insufficient Funds:
Dy v. People
571 SCRA 59 (2008)
Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient
funds—the prima facie presumption of deceit arises only
when a check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. Clearly, the estafa punished under
Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC is committed when a check is
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or
closed account, and not against uncollected deposit.
d. Principal by Indispensable Cooperation
People v. Gulion
349 SCRA 610 (2001)
An accused could still be held liable for estafa under Art.
315(2)(d) even if he is not the owner of the checking
account in question if it is shown that he conspired with
the other accused by knowingly signing the latter's
checks to ensure the payee's inability to encash said
checks. Good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by
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postdating a check.
Ladonga v. People
451 SCRA 673 (2005)
To be held guilty as a co-princjpal by reason of
conspiracy, accused must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. Mere presence when the check was issued
does not necessarily lead to an inference of complicity.
Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to furtherance of the
common design and purpose.
e. Estafa and Bouncing Checks Are Separate
Offenses
People v. Reyes
228 SCRA 13 (1993)
A single act can give rise to several offenses, such as
estafa and violation of B.P. 22.
Uy v. Court of Appeals
276 SCRA 367 (1997)
Estafa and violation of B.P. 22 are two different offenses
having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to
acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of
each crime has to be satisfied. In estafa, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense and have
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to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction; on the other hand, the elements of deceit and
damage are neither essential nor required for violation of
the B.P. 22.3
Lim v. People
340 SCRA 497 (2000)
Unlike in estafa, under B.P. 22 one need not prove that
the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that
there was damage; the damage done is to the banking
system.
Ong v. People
56S SCRA 253 (2008)
Although paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) of Art. 315 of RPC
have a common element - false pretenses or fraudulent
acts - the law treats estafa under par. 2(d) by postdating
a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Under
par. 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor,
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed,
and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to
determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to
comply with a promise, no estafa can be deemed to
exist.
(1) But Only One Civil Liability Arising:
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada
464 SCRA 338 (2005)
While the single act of issuing a bouncing check may
give rise to estafa and violation of B.P. 22, the same
involves only one civil liability for the offended party
since he sustained only a single injury.
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada
464 SCRA 338 (2005)
The possible single liability arising from the act of issuing
a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the B.P 22
prosecution, and both remedies are simultaneously
available to such party, there can be no forum shopping.
The Rules do not require the necessary inclusion of a
civil action in a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22
precludes the institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to
the issuance of the same check. But a recovery under
one remedy bars that under the other - obviously
stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment.
Chieng v. Santos
531 SCRA 730 (2007)
When mortgage-creditor files a criminal case for violation
of B.P. 22 against the mortgage-debtor, he is deemed to
have already availed himself of the remedy of collection
suit, and following the rule on alternative remedies, he is
barred from subsequently resorting to an action for
foreclosure.
(2) Standing to Sue on a Bounced Check:
Tarn Wing Tak v. Makaslar
350 SCRA 475 (2001)
A person who is neither a payee nor a holder of a bad
check has no personality to sue or a cause of action
against the drawer.
2. BOUNCING CHECKS LAW [Batas Pambansa Big. 22]
Violago v. Hon. Pano
146 SCRA 323 (1986)
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) is constitutional as a
valid exercise of police power.
Lozano v. Martinez. Recuerdo v. People
395 SCRA 638 (2003)
Punishment under B.P. 22 does not amount to
imprisonment for non-payment of debt, for what is being
punished is the issuance of a bouncing check, and all
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issues on constitutionality of the law have long been
settled.
Recuerdo v. People
395 SCRA 638 (2003)
The contention that B.P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one
which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of
which is, the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt, fails, for under the law every
element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial
court to warrant a conviction.
a. Purpose of Bouncing Checks Law - Bouncing
Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking
account user.
Griffith v. Court of Appeals
379 SCRA 94 (2002)
B.P. 22 was devised to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking
account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage
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those who seek to enrich themselves through
manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the
law.
Cueme v. People
335 SCRA 795 (2000)
B.P. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the
proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of
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daily business and to avert not only the undermining of
the banking system of the country but also the infliction
of damage and injury upon trade and commerce
occasioned by the indiscriminate issuances of such
checks.
Mitra v. People
623 SCRA 673 (2010)
The purpose of B.P. 22 in declaring the mere issuance
of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.
Rosario v. Co
563 SCRA 239 (2008)
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is designed to prevent damage to trade,
commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deletious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him-
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by
punishing offenders and deterring others.
Meriz v. People
368 SCRA 524 (2001)
B.P. 22 does not concern itself with what might actually
be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention
being to instead ensure the stability and commercial
value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency.
It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to
determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or
the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an
appropriate application of the legislative enactment can
be made.
Lim v. People
390 SCRA 194 (2002)
The increase in penalty in P.D. 818 is to effectuate the
repression of an evil that undermines the country's
commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a
necessary precaution to deter people from issuing
bouncing checks.
b. Nature of Offense
Ambito v. People
579 SCRA 69 (2009)
The gravamen of B.P. 22 offense is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check (a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment). It is not the
nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as
a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-
existing debt - is malum prohibitum. 7
Lunaria v. People
570 SCRA 572 (2008)
The lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused is
irrelevant. The law has made the mere act of issuing a
worthless check a malum prohibitum. The gravamen of
the offense under this law is the act of issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment, not the non-payment of the
obligation.
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Ong v. People
346 SCRA 117 (2000)
What B.P. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which the check was
issued; it is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes, nor the terms and conditions of its
issuance. Thus, the contention that the checks were
issued merely to guarantee payment of obligation is
hardly a defense, since the mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum and is punishable
under B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the
offense are properly proved. 9
Dico, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
305 SCRA 637 (1999)
Although a check is issued as an evidence of debt and
not intended for encashment, it would have the same
effect like any other check when it bounces under B.P.
22, since the mere act of issuing an unfunded check is a
malum prohibitum, the mischief of circulating unfunded
checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of
such checks but to society in general, and the business
community, in particular.
Ibasco v. Court of Appeals
261 SCRA 449 (1996)
Offense Transitory or Continuing - The offense under
B.P. 22 is a continuing offense and may therefore be
prosecuted within the territory where any of the elements
have been committed, i.e., where the check was made,
drawn or issued. 10
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 Lim v. People
368 SCRA 436 (2001)
Criminal Offense for Each Issuance of Bounced Check -
Each act of drawing and issuing of a bounced check
constitutes a violation of B.P. 22. The rule that there is
only one offense when the offender is moved by one
criminal intent cannot apply because the offense if
malum prohibitum where malice or criminal intent is
immaterial.
c. Two Types of Offenses Covered by Law
Bautlsta v. Court of Appeals
360 SCRA 618 (2001)
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that B.P. 22 penalizes two
distinct acts:
(a) Making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank; and
(b) Having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of 90 days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonoured by the
drawee bank.
In first offense, drawer knows that he does not have
sufficient funds to cover the check at time of its
issuance. While in second offense, drawer has sufficient
funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient
funds or maintain credit within 90 days from the date
appearing on the check. In both instances, offense is
consummated by the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in first offense is worthless at the
time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient
funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time.
While that involved in second offense is good when
issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with
drawee bank when issued. Under first offense, the 90-
day presentment period is not expressly provided, while
such period is an express element of the second
offense.11
(1) When Endorser Liable under B.P. 22:
Bautista v. Court of Appeals
360 SCRA 618(2001)
Endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable
under B.P. 22, even though the presumption of
knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence
that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the
insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing
deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was
intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to
foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also
prove such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of
failure to present check for payment within 90 days from
the date started is that there arises no prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But
the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through
other evidence.
(2) When Foreign Checks Covered by Law:
De Villa v. Court of Appeals
195 SCRA 722 (1991)
Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn or issued
in the Philippines though payable outside the
Philippines, are covered by B.P. 22. In addition, the
determinative factor in determining venue is place of
issuance of check.
d. Elements of Offense
Navarro v. Court of Appeals
234 SCRA 639 (1994)
Under the provisions of B.P. 22, an offense is committed
when the following elements are present:
(a) Making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
(b) Knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(c) Subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonorfor the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Dy v. People
571 SCRA 59 (2008)
\Element of "Issuance" - Sec. 191 of NIL defines
"issuance" as the first delivery of an instrument,
complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder.
Delivery denotes physical transfer of the instrument by
the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey
title to the payee and recognize him as a holder.
Therefore, for purposes of the B.P. 22, even if the
checks were given to the payee in blank, this alone did
not make their issuance invalid.
Ambfto v. People
579 SCRA 69 ( 2009 )
Element of "Notice' - Under B.P. 22, the prosecution
must prove not only that the accused issued a chock
that was subsequently dishonored - it must also
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establish that the accused was actually notified that the
check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within
5 banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the
holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for its payment Procedural due process
dearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent
to and received by the accused. The notice of dishonor
of a check, which must in writing, may be sent to the
drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the
check, or the offended party either by personal delivery
or by registered mail.
Azarcon v. People
622 SCRA 341 (2010)
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of
the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can
ensure. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the
offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be
in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check
will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the
prosecution.
Dy v. People
571 SCRA 59 (2008)
Element of 'Insufficient Fund" - Uncollected deposits
are not the same as insufficient funds - the prima fade
presumption of deceit arises only when a check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. To be
liable under Sec. 1 of B.P. 22, the check must be
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, withouty any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment Like Art 315 of RPC. B.P. 22 also speaks
only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of
uncollected deposits.
(1) Making, Drawing, Issuance of Check:
Lim v. Rodrigo
167 SCRA 487 (1988)
"Dei/very" contemplated must be to the person who
takes the bad check as a holder, which covers either
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in
possession thereof, or bearer thereof. Venue of the
offense lies at the place whether the check was
executed and delivered to the payee, and the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation is delivery
thereof to payee.
Dico v. Court of Appeals
452 SCRA 441 (2005)
A postdated check cannot be dishonored if presented for
payment before its due date.
Ngo v. People
434 SCRA 522 (2004)
Law does not require that payee of a check be the same
as the obligee of the obligation in consideration for which
the check has been issued.
Alonto v. People
445 SCRA 624 (2004)
Since identity of check enters into first essential element
of offense, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues
a check on account or for value, and date thereof
involves its second element, namely, that at the time of
issue that maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she
did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is
a violation of the accused's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the offense charged where
there is a variance between the dates of the check as
alleged in the Information (14 May 1992) and as
indicated in the documentary evidence presented and
marked as exhibit (5 April 1992).
Josef v. People
476 SCRA 417 (2005)
By admitting that the originals were in his possession
and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured
whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution's
evidence.
(2) Presumption as to Value In Issuance of Check:
Ongson v. People
466 SCRA 656 (2005)
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for
valuable consideration, which may consist either in some
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service
given, suffered or undertaken.
(3) Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds:
Vergara v. People
450 SCRA 495 (2005)
To be liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough that the
check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of
funds; it must be shown also beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused knew of the insufficiency of funds at the
time the check was issued.
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Lee v. Court of Appeals
448 SCRA 455 (2005)
If the knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be
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actually absent or inexistent, the accused should not be
held liable for the offense defined under Sec. 1 of B.P.
22.
Uy v. Court of Appeals
276 SCRA 367 (1997)
Although violation of B.P. 22 is a transitory or continuing
offense and such being the case, the person indicted
may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense
was in part committed, nevertheless, the element of
knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he
has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having
sufficient funds must be simultaneous to the issuance of
the instrument.
Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras
237 SCRA 724 (1994)
Although malice and intent in issuing a worthless check
are immaterial; nevertheless, knowledge is an essential
element of the offense of B.P. 22. Absence of knowledge
by the drawer of the issuance of the check and the fact
of its dishonor would entitle the accused to acquittal.
(4) Presumption of Knowledge:
Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals
403 SCRA 300 (2003)
Presumption that issuer had knowledge of insufficiency
of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved
that issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within 5 days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay
amount of check or make arrangement for its payment.
Failure of prosecution to prove that issuer was given the
requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her
acquittal."
Ongson v. People
466 SCRA 656 (2005)
Presumption or prima facie evidence cannot arise, if
such notice of nonpayment by drawee bank is not sent
to maker or drawer, of if there is no proof as to when
such notice was received by drawer since there would
simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. 18
Marigomen v. People
459 SCRA 169 (2005)
Procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of
dishonor of a check be given the signatory - the absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused
an opportunity to prelude a criminal prosecution. If
drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice
of dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the
employee or officer who drew or issued the check for
and in its behalf.
Bautista v. Court of Appeals
360 SCRA 618 (2001)
The 90-day period is not among the elements to
constitute the offense of bouncing check. Sec. 2 of B.P.
22 is clear that a dishonoured check presented within
the 90-day period creates a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential
element of the offense. Since knowledge involves a state
of mind difficult to establish, the statute creates a prima
facie presumption of the existence of this element from
the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check that
subsequently bounces. Prima facie evidence denotes
evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to
establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption
of innocence to warrant a conviction.
Wong v. Court of Appeals
351 SCRA 100 (2001)
That the check must be deposited within 90 days is
simply one of the conditions for the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise.
Lim v. People
340 SCRA 497 (2000)
Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that
the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present; if not rebutted,
it suffices to sustain a conviction.
(5) Necessity of Notice of Dishonor:
Cabrera v. People
407 SCRA 247 (2003)
Since payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor is a
complete defense regardless of the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution, it must be presupposed,
then, that the issuer received a notice of dishonor and
that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for
its payment.'9
Rigor v. People
442 SCRA 450 (2004)
Notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to drawer or
maker by drawee bank, holder of the check, or offended
party either by personal delivery or by registered mail -
the notice of dishonor to maker of a check must be in
writing.
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Meriz v. People .
368 SCRA 524 (2001)
Inaccuracy of description of dishonored checks in the
written notice of dishonor is not a fatal defect, especially
7
when accused acknowledged non-payment upon receipt
of the notice, since there is nothing in the law, that
prescribed the contents of a notice of dishonor except
that the same be in writing as opposed to a mere oral
notice.
Caras v. Court of Appeals
366 SCRA 371 (2001)
Presentation of lawyer's demand letter to issuer of the
notice of dishonor of the check without presentation of
evidence that would establish actual receipt does not
establish the required notice of dishonor and would be
fatal to the cause. Absence of any notice of dishonor
personally sent to and received by the accused is a
violation of due process.
Ting v. Court of Appeals
344 SCRA 551 (2000)
For B.P. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice.
It is a general rule that, when service of a notice is
sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the
conditions on which the validity of such service depends
had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to
establish the fact of service. To illustrate, receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not prove
themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order
to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
21
(6) On Post-dated Checks:
Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
328 SCRA 447 (2000)
When postdated checks had been issued, they are
deemed issued under B.P. 22 not on the date therein but
on the date actually issued; and when the presumption
of knowledge under the law has been rebutted, and
there is no evidence presented to show that at the time
of actual issuance, the drawer had knowledge that his
deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to
cover them when the check is presented for
encashment.
People v. Dizon
336 SCRA 54 (2000)
Situation of Co-Accused - A co-accused cannot be
presumed to have knowledge of the non-existence or
insufficiency of funds in bank account of her co-accused
at the time the latter issued postdated checks. Such
legal presumption applies only to drawer or issuer.
Without evidence showing how such co-accused
participated in the defraudation of another by the
issuance of unfunded checks in payment of an
obligation, conspiracy cannot be appreciated against
her.
(7) Payment Within Five-Day Period:
Ting v. Court of Appeals
344 SCRA 551 (2000)
For liability to attach under B.P. 22, it is not enough that
the prosecution establish that a check was issued and
that the same was subsequently dishonored, but must
also prove that issuer, at the time of check's issuance,
had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or
credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its
presentment. The presumption that the issuer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into"
existence only after it is proved that issuer had received
notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment. The full payment of
the amount appearing in the check within five (5)
banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete
defense."
Tan v. Philippines Commercial International Bank
552 SCRA 532 (2008)
Payment is a complete defense that would lie regardless
of the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. However, only a full payment at the time of
its presentment or during the 5-day grace period could
exonerate one from criminal liability under B.P. 22 and
that subsequent payments can only affect the civil, but
not the criminal liability.
King v. People
319 SCRA 654 (1999)
B.P. 22 provides that the presumption does not arise
when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes
arrangement for its payment "within five banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee." Verily, B.P. 22 gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check
and thus avert prosecution. Thus, in order to create the
prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the
insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she
received a notice of dishonor and within five banking
days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check
or make arrangement for its payment. 22
People v. Reyes
228 SCRA 13 (1993)
Accused's failure to take advantage of 5-day grace
period offered by B.P. 22 will raise prima facie inference
of deceit consisting of false pretense or fraudulent act.
8
(8) Subsequent Dishonor of Check:
Ongson v. People
466 SCRA 656 (2005)
The reason for dishonor as stamped in the dorsal portion
of the checks is prima facie presumptions of such
dishonor and the reasons therefor. It is not required,
much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present
the bank's representative to testify on the dishonor of the
checks."
Wong v. Court of Appeals
351 SCRA 100 (2001)
To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application,
i.e., presumption of knowledge on the part of the maker
or drawer of the insufficiency of his funds, the statutes
provide that such presumption shall not arise if within 5
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of
the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of
the check. However, nowhere in said provision does the
law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank
account for only 90 days; that the check must be
deposited within 90 days is simply one of the conditions
for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
fund to arise; it is not an element of the offense; and
neither does it discharge the drawer from his duty to
maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable period pursuant to Sec. 186 of NIL, which
under current practice is 6 months or 180 days.
People v. Gullon
349 SCRA 610(2001)
Where what was stamped on the check is "DAUD"
meaning drawn against uncollected deposits, the bank
may still honor the check at its discretion in favor of
favored clients, in which case there would be no violation
of B.P. 22.
Domagsang v. Court of Appeals
347 SCRA 75 (2000)
There is deemed to be prima facie evidence of
knowledge on the part of maker, drawer, or issuer of
insufficiency of funds in or credit with drawee bank of the
check issued, if the dishonoured check and the maker or
drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with
the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has
created the prima facie presumption evidently because
"knowledge" which involves a state of mind, would be
difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold,
however, when maker, drawer or issuer of the check
pays the holder the amount due thereon or makes
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank
within 5 banking days after receiver noticed that such
check has not been paid by the drawee bank.
(9) Need to Present Original Checks in Evidence:
Gutierrez v. Palattao
292 SCRA 28 (1998)
To establish a person's culpability under B.P. 22, it is
indispensable that the checks he or she issued for which
he or she was subsequently charged, be offered in
evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged
is the act of knowingly issuing a check with insufficient
funds.
(10) Complainant's Testimony Alone Would Suffice:
Tadeo v. People
300 SCRA 744 (1998)
Prosecution under B.P. 22 may present only the
complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
offense charged, and such sole testimony to identify the
dishonored checks and unless rebutted, the prosecution
may rely on such presumption to establish that element
of the offense charged. It is for the accused to rebut the
presumption provided for under the law, disputable as it
is.
. Rejected Defenses under B.P. 22
(1) Surrounding Circumstances:
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola
591 SCRA 466 (2009)
The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonoured
checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
B.P. 22.
(2) Lack of Consideration:
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola
591 SCRA 466 (2009)
The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the
issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a
prosecution under B.P. 22.
( 3 ) Underlying Transaction Did Not Materialize:
Lim v. Court of Appeals
251 SCRA 408 (1995)
Facts: Accused issued seven bounced checks to cover
orders made from complainant. Accused's defense was
that he ordered stop-payments because the goods
delivered were not those specified, and that there was
sufficient funds to pay the checks. He also alleged that
RTC Malabon had no jurisdiction since the checks were
issued, received by the collectors, and dishonoured by
drawee bank in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no
evidence was given to support the proposition that they
knew that their checks were insufficiently funded.
Held: Positions have no merits. Gravamen of the offense
9
is knowingly issuing a worthless check. Thus, a
fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the
drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such checks in full
upon presentment. Another essential element is
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonoured for the same reason had not the drawer
without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Although checks were delivered to collector in Kalookan
City, nevertheless they are deemed to have been issued
and received by the private complainant in Navotas
because collector was not the person who could take
the checks as a holder, i.e., as payee or indorsee
thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.
Under Sac. 191 of NIL the term "issue" means the first
delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person
who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term
"holder" refers to the payee orindorsee of a bill or note
who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof.
Abarquez v. Court of Appeals
408 SCRA 500 (2003)
The averment that one issued the checks as advance
payment but only on the condition that there be proper
reconciliation of the books of account is not a valid
defense against B.P. 22 conviction.
(4) No Bad Faith nor Malice on Part of Issuer, Maker,
Drawer:
Josef v. People
476 SCRA 417 (2005)
Gravamen of B.P. 22 offense is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The mere
act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
The law does not make any distinction between checks
issued in payment of an obligation and those merely to
guarantee that obligation; nor does the law consider
important whether or not malice and intent attended the
issuance of the check.24
(5) Afo Checking Account; or Account Has Been
Closed:
Ruiz v. People
476 SCRA 476 (2005)
Gravamen of the offense is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and
putting them in circulation. The law includes all checks
drawn against banks. The law includes the making and
issuing of a check by one who has no account with a
bank, or where such account was already closed when
the check was presented for payment. There is every
reason to penalize a person who indulges in the making
and issuing of a check on an account belonging to
another with the latter's consent which account has been
closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank.
(6) Check Issued Merely as Guarantee:
Que v. People
154 SCRA 160 (1987)
Allegation that issuance of a check was a mere
guarantee is not a valid defense under B.P. 22, which
applies whether the check is issued as deposit or
guaranty and not as payment. 25
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
233 SCRA 301 (1994)
Even when check is issued as a mere evidence of debt,
though not intended to be presented for payment has the
same effect of an ordinary check, and if it is deposited
and it bounces, it would be a violation of B.P. 22, since
the mere issuing of a worthless check is malum
prohibitum. Cross checks or restricted checks are
negotiable instruments within the coverage of B.P. 22.*'
(7) Usurious Interest Rates Being Charged:
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Jacinto
626 SCRA 315 (2010)
The invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of
the guilt of respondents in criminal cases under B.P. 22.
The Court has consistently declared that the cause or
reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in
determining criminal culpability under B.P. In several
instances, we have held that what the law punishes is
the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose
for which it was issued or terms and conditions relating
to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other
elements of the offense are property proved.
(8) Prior Knowledge of Payee of Insuffiency of
Funds:
Lee v. Court of Appeals
448 SCRA 455 (2005)
Knowledge of payee that drawer did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank at the time of the check was
issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element
of the offense under B.P. 22."
CONTRA: Lee refers to the ruling in Yu Oh v. Court of
Appeals, 403 SCRA 300 (2003), that there is no violation
of B.P. 22 if the complainant was actually told by the
10
drawer that he has no sufficient funds in the bank at the
time of the issuance of the check. The Yu Oh obiter is
wrong since it was based on a supposed ruling in
Eastern Assurance v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 73,
79 (2000), and reading of which contains no such ruling
nor anything about bouncing checks.
(9) Signatory Mere Corporate Officer:
Llamado v. Court of Appeals
270 SCRA 423 (1997)
Corporate officer who signs the check that bounced is
liable under B.P. 22, even when such officer was not
involved in the negotiation for the transaction resulting in
the issuance of the check.
Lao v. Court of Appeals
274 SCRA 572 (1997)
An employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs
blank corporate checks - with the name of the payee and
amount drawn to be filled later by another signatory -
and, therefore, does so without actual knowledge of
whether such checks are funded, may not be held liable
for violation of Bouncing Checks Law, when checks so
signed are dishonored due to insuffiency of funds. Under
B.P. 22, a notice of dishonor sent to the main office of
the corporation cannot constitute a valid notice to the
corporate signatory who signed the check in blank and
who holds office in a separate branch and who had no
actual knowledge thereof.
Vaca v. Court of Appeals
298 SCRA 656 (1998)
Officers and owners of a company cannot escape
criminal liability under B.P. 22 on the ground that
preparation of company checks is responsibility of
company accountant and all they do is sign the checks,
and they merely rely on the word of accountant that
there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the
checks.
They cannot feign ignorance of insufficiency of funds;
while it may be true that it was the company's
accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the
fact remains that they are the owners and officers of the
company and under Sec. 1, "Where the check is drawn
by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act." The situation is not
the same as in the case of Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274
SCRA 572 (1997), where the accused was a mere
employee who merely countersigned checks in blank for
the company, and she did not have anything to do with
the issuance of checks and who in fact did not know to
whom the checks would be issued.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
448 SCRA 455 (2005)
Doctrine Not Applicable to Personal Checks - The
doctrine that a mere employee tasked to sign checks in
blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks
and not to personal checks even when issued for a sole
proprietorship business.
(10) Novation of Incipient Criminal Liability:
Salazar v. J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corp.
634 SCRA 95 (2010)
Novation is never presumed, there must be an express
intention to novate. The creditor's acceptance of another
check, which replaced an earlier dishonored check, does
not result in novation where there was no express
agreement to establish that the debtor was already
discharged from his liability.
Seares v. Salazar
345 SCRA 308 (2000)
Pendency of an amicable settlement is not a valid
excuse in not deciding a case within the reglementary
period because it is a settled rule that a criminal case
once filed in court cannot be amicably settled. The
payment of the civil liability does not extinguish the
criminal actions since what is being punished is not the
accused's failure to pay his obligation but the issuance
per se of the checks which subsequently bounced or
were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.
Llamado v. Court of Appeals
270 SCRA 423 (1997)
The "novation theory" under which an incipient criminal
offense is converted into an ordinary civil obligation
cannot apply where the offer to pay by the debtor,
though accepted by the creditor, was actually an empty
promise meant only to delay the filing of the criminal
case for issuance of bouncing check. [CLV: Ergo valid if
agreement is sincere.]
(11) Stay Order in Corporate Rehabilitation
Proceeding Prevent the Payment of the Corporate
Check:
Rosario v. Co
563 SCRA 239 (2008)
The filing of a case under B.P. 22 is not a "claim" that
can be enjoined within the purview of P.D. 902-A on stay
order. True, although the conviction of the accused for
the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparaton
or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious
11
act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for
violation of B.P. 22 is a criminal action, the purpose of
which is to punish the mere issuance of a bad check,
rather for its nonpayment.
Payment as Valid Defense under B.P. 22
(1) Valid Defense When Done within 5-day Period
After Notice of Dishonor:
Abarquez v. Court of Appeals
408 SCRA 500 (2003)
Prima facie presumption that drawer has knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the
issuance or on the presentment for payment, of the
check may be rebutted by payment of the value of the
check either by the drawer or by the drawee-bank within
five banking days from notice of the dishonour given to
the drawer. The payment thus becomes a complete
defence regardless of the strength of the evidence
offered by the prosecution. Payment of the value of the
check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within
5 banking days from notice of dishonor given to the
drawer is a complete defense. 28
(2) After 5-Day Period: Receipt of Payment and
Delay in Prosecution:
Griffith v. Court of Appeals
379 SCRA 94 (2002)
When two criminal cases are filed based on two
bounced checks, which were corporate checks that the
corporation failed to fund for a valid reason duly
communicated to the payee, and that the value of the
checks were fully recovered by the payee more than two
years prior to the filing of the criminal cases, then the
conviction and sentencing of the accused cannot be
upheld without running afoul of basic principles of
fairness and justice. While we agree with the private
respondent-payee that the gravamen of violation of B.P.
22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are
dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find
if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose
of and reason for the law Ratione cessat lex, et cessat
lex. The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding
the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense
under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.
(3) Payment of Check Should Properly Be
Pleaded as Defense; Principles, Compensation
and Set-off:
Tan v. Mendez, Jr.
383 SCRA 202 (2002)
The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check
a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for
being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act of
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.
Thus, even if there had been payment, through
compensation or some other means, there could still be
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. We find that no
reversible error was committed by the courts a quo in
finding petitioners guilty of violation of B.P. 22.
In their defense, petitioners principally rely on the
principle of compensation or offset under the civil law to
avoid criminal prosecution. Essentially, they argue that
they could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22
because the amount covered by the subject check
issued by respondent as remittances of ticket sales for
petitioners' bus company.
As found by the trial court, petitioners' defense of
compensation is unavailing because petitioners did not
clearly specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991
which dishonored check is being offset. Applying Art.
1289 in relation to Art. 1254 of the Civil Code, the
unencashed checks amounting to P66.839.25 should
have been applied to eadier dishonored check
amounting to P235.387.33 what is more onerous than
the subject check amounting to only P58.237.75.
Interestingly, the accused never alleged compensation
when they received the demand letter, during the
preliminary investigation, on or before trial by filing a
motion to dismiss. Moreover, if indeed there was
payment by compensation, accused should have
redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary
course of business. There is no evidence on record that
they did so. [CLV: Ergo, if compensation and set-off
valid, they prevent the arising of criminal liability under
BP 22.]
g. Other Successful Defenses
(1) Varying of Critical Dates:
Ongson v. People
466 SCRA 656 (2005)
Where the date of the check and the amount thereof as
stated in the information vary from the exhibits submitted
by the prosecution, the accused should be acquitted,
because such inconsistencies violate his constitutional
12
right to be informed and violation of the requirement of
due process.
(2) Denial of Issuance of Checks:
Chiang Hla Min v. Court of Appeals
355 SCRA 608 (2001)
A person who denies issuing certain checks puts into
question ne genuineness and authenticity of the
signatures appearing thereon, and it is he who has the
burden of proving that those signatures were forgeries.
(3) Complainant Took Check as Part of the
Commission of Wrong:
Magro v. Court of Appeals
210 SCRA 471 (1992)
There is no violation of B.P. 22 where the drawer issues
the check to cover the required warranty deposit given
by the complainant herself to enable the drawer to
import equipment in case where such drawer never took
out the warranty deposit; where the payee turned out to
be the financier herself who was the wrongdoer; and the
complainant was told by the drawer from the beginning
that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank.
(4) When Stop-Payment Was to Protect Against
Complainant's Wrongful Act:
Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
328 SCRA 447 (2000)
When drawer who has previously issued postdated
checks for amortization on purchase price of a
townhouse, and developer/ seller has defaulted on his
obligations to complete the project, then when drawer
closed his account to avoid having to issued a "stop-
payment order" to prevent the developer/seller for
encashing the checks, this would not be a violation of
B.P. 22, since action was made in compliance with Sec.
23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payment until such time as
the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligation to the
buyer. This exercise of a statutory right to suspend
installment payments is a valid defense against a
purported violation of B.P. 22.
(5) Closing of Account Upon Advise of Bank:
Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
328 SCRA 447 (2000)
When the closing of account is shown to be for
insufficiency of funds, but was shown to have been
made upon advice of drawee bank, to avoid payment of
hefty bank charges each time drawer issued a "stop
payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated
checks, said evidence would contradict the prima facie
evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, but
establishes the drawer's state of mind at the time of the
issuance of the postdated checks that he definitely had
no knowledge that his funds or credit would be
insufficient when the checks would be presented for
encashment.
6) No Authority to Receive Check:
Carino v. De Castro
553 SCRA 688 (2008)
Checks issued to a person who was not authorized to
collect and receive the same are without valuable
consideration and are also considered issued for a non-
existing account.
h. Conviction for Issuance of Bouncing Check
(1) Effected on the Accused:
Villaber v. COMELEC
369 SCRA 126 (2001)
Conviction under B.P. 22 "imports deceit ... [and]
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character
of a person" – a drawee who issues an unfounded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals. Ctearty, in People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA
692 (1990), We did not make a distinction whether the
offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer nor did it declare
that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when
cornrriitted by a member of the Bar but not so when
committed by a non-member. We made no
pronouncement in Rosa] Urn v. People, 340 SCRA 497
(2000). which reiterated the ruling in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), that with the deletion of
the prison sentence for violation of B.P. 22. the offense
no longer involves moral turpitude.
Moreno v. Araneta
457 SCRA 329 (2005)
The act of issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment is a manifestation of
moral turpitude.*
(2) Fine Adjudged Instead of Imprisonment - In line
with such philosophy, the Supreme Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 giving notice to all
courts and judges "to henceforth take note of the
foregoing policy for violation of B P 22" to impose
instead of imprisonment, the penalty of fine of double the
amount of the check. However, the Court subsequently
issued in February 2001, an amendment Administrative
13
Circular 13-2001, notifying judges that they may still
impose jail terms to offenders of B.P. 22:
The judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case ... impose imprisonment
[which otherwise] would depreciate the seriousness of
the offense, work violence on the social order, or
otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice. The
"peculiar circumstances" would include bad faith on the
part of the issuer and whether he had previously issued
bounced checks.
Yap v. First e-Bank Corp.
601 SCRA 250 (2009)
Yap obtained a loan from the Bank secured by a third-
party real estate mortgage, plus the issuance of six post-
dated checks.
When the checks were deposited on due dates, they all
bounced and for which the Bank brought a criminal case
for violation of B.P. 22. During the pendency of the
criminal case, the Bank commenced extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Yap seeks to
suspend the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
ground that under SC Administrative Circular 57-97
foreclsoure remedy was deemed waived with the filing of
the criminal case for bouncing checks.
Held: Adm. Circular 57-97 provides for the rules and
guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases
under B.P. 22 which provides: "1. The criminal action for
violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized," which has been institutionalized as Sec.
1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The alternative
remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection suit
are not barred even if a suit for B.P. 22 is filed earlier,
unless a judgment of conviction had already been
rendered in the B.P. 22 case finding the accused debtor
criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of
the checks. In this case, no judgment of conviction
(which could have declared the criminal and civil liability
of the accused) was rendered because the accused
move for the provisional dismissal of the case.
Hence, the private complainant could have still
foreclosed on the mortgaged or filed a collection suit.
Lunaria v. People
570 SCRA 572 (2008)
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, authorized the non-
imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22
cases. The Court has not decriminalized B.P. 22
violations, nor have removed imprisonment as an
alternative penalty. The lack of criminal intent on the part
of the accused is irrelevant:
Lunaria v. People
570 SCRA 572 (2008)
Issuance of worthless checks manifest a lawyer's low
regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken
when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem.
Josef v. People
476 SCRA 417 (2005)
The imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains
entirely within the sound discretion of the judge trying the
case, based on his assessment of the offender and the
facts.
Ongson v. People
466 SCRA 428 (2005)
Courts are vested the discretion to determine, taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstance of each case,
whether the imposition of fine would serve the interest of
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the
imperatives of justice. Whether there is neither proof nor
allegation that the accused is not a first time offender,
imposition of the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment
is proper.
Tan v. Mendez, Jr.
383 SCRA 202 (2002)
We note that accused had exerted efforts to settle their
obligations. The fact of returning the un-encashed
checks to respondent indicates good faith on the part of
accused. Absent any showing that accused acted in bad
faith, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in this
case is proper.
Negrampa v. People
386 SCRA 412 (2002)
Accused cannot avail himself of benefits under Adm.
Circular 2-2000 where he manifested utter lack of good
faith or wanton bad faith, such as when he issued the
postdated checks even though he had no more account
with the drawee bank, having closed it more than four
years before.
Ong v. People
346 SCRA 117 (2000)
In the light of the ruling in the recent cases of Vaca v.
Court of Appeals and Rosa Lim v. People, We
deemed it best in the instant case, to limit the penalty for
violation of B.P. 22 to payment of a fine. Following our
rationale in the aforesaid cases, We believed that it
would best serve the ends of criminal justice, if in fixing
the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Sec.
1(1), the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
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deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of
with due regard to the protection of the social order. the amount of each.

There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery

i. Civil Aspect Deemed Included in Filing of Criminal
Action for Bouncing Checks
Ricaforte v. Jurado
532 SCRA 317 (2007)
The fine that may be imposed by the court is not
awarded to the private complainant - it is imposed as a
penalty and not as a payment for a specific loss or injury.
Bax v. People
532 SCRA 284 (2007)
The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where
such acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases.
against the corporation be pursued even as the B.P. 22
case against the signatory remains extant. First, the
possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount
of the check in both the B.P. 22 case and in the civil
action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that
should not be permitted.
As a matter of equity, petitioner should be exempted
from paying filing fees in an action versus the
corporation. The period of prescription to file such action
should run from the finality of the decision.

Cheng v. Sy
592 SCRA 155 (2009)

The criminal action under B.P. 22 includes the

corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the
checks. The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and
B.P. 22 cases against the respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation
to litigate separately, or has not instituted the
corresponding civil action to collect the amount and
damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is
deemed instituted with the criminal cases.

Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing v. Asia Dynamic

Electric
465 SCRA 454 (2005)

Under the revised Rules, the criminal action for violation

of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action, which is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. The pendency of the civil
action before the court trying the criminal case bars the
filing of another civil action in another court on the
ground of litis pendentia.33

Gosiaco v. Ching
585 SCRA 471 (2009)

B.P. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory

of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the
corporation for the amount represented from the check.
The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from
the wrongful act of signing the check despite the
insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil
liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very
obligation covered by the check or the consideration for
its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be

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