RULE 80 Section 3 of Rule 79 provides that the probate court must cause notice

through publication of the petition after it receives the same. All

subsequent orders are VOID. The court, in this case, did not cause notice
PEDRO DE GUZMAN V JUDGE ZOSIMO ANGELES AND HONORIO AND before action on the motions of the private respondent.
ELAINE DE GUZMAN What is a Special Administrator: A special administrator has been
GR No. 78590, June 20, 1988 defined as a representative of the decedent appointed by the probate
court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
FACTS: administrator is appointed.
No unavoidable delay was apparent to justify the appointment of a special
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) administrator prior to the publication of the petition.
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of MANOLITO de As argued by the petitioner “since the position of special administrator is
Guzman. a very sensitive one which requires trust and confidence, it is essential
On May 22, 1987, private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession that the suitability of the applicant be ascertained in a hearing with due
over 5 vehicles registered under the name of MANOLITO but in the notice to all oppositors who may object precisely to the applicant’s
possession of petitioner (father of deceased). After a few postponements, suitability to the trust”
hearing was set for June 15, 1987.
On May 28, 1987, private respondent filed a motion to appoint (her) as SC set aside the RTC Orders.
Special Administratrix of the Estate of MANOLITO. The motion was set
for hearing on June 5. The court directed that all parties be notified.
Petitioner was not given notice of the order.
On June 5, lower court granted the motion to be appointed as Special
Administratrix.
On June 8, lower court issued another order ordering the sheriffs to assist
ELAINE (spouse) for the preservation of the assets of the estate. This led
to a confrontation between Petitioner and respondent in relation to the 5
vehicles.
Petitioner then filed this petition to the SC to annul the June 5 and 8
Orders.
Petitioner argues that the appointment of a special administratrix
constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made without giving
petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate
in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person
even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested
parties

RULING:

RTC of Makati acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon filing of the
petition since the required jurisdictional facts were complied with.
However, the court’s jurisdiction over interested persons is another thing.
 DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS V. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO AND
FLORENCIA AVILA PARRENO
G.R. No. 193161; August 22, 2011
DOCTRINE:
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator
of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the
directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to
reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a
regular administrator is appointed
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila. Florentino Manungas
died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was
survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the
administratrix. A Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas.
RTC appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial
Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt. Engracia
Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer and damages with the MTC.
The spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the period.
Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore
possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the
spouses Salinas to the RTC which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
MTC. On appeal to this Court.
Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor before the RTC. He
alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an
heir of Engracia Manungas.
The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño
alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate
of Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an
heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas
or her estate
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. He added that Parreño was
not fit to become a special administrator having already been fined by the
court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas’
property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreño is
a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
RTC ordered the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the
Special Administrator. Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC
to the CA. which reinstated Parreño as the special administrator of the
estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner,
Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of
Florencia Parreño as special administrator. (NO)
RULING:
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator
is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore,
be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving
the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would
ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would
effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion
and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint
a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the
deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of
Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino
Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long
been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
 DALISAY OCAMPO V. RENATO OCAMPO
G.R. No. 187879. July 5, 2010
DOCTRINES:
1. A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire
estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement.
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative
of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules
of Court.
2. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators—the probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are the wife and children of Leonardo Ocampo (+). Leonardo
and his siblings, herein respondents are the legitimate children and only
heirs of Sps. Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate. Vicente
and Maxima left several properties, mostly in Binan, Laguna and they left
no will and no debts.
2. Five months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings, “In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps.
Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado and Leonardo Ocampo.” It was
alleged that, upon the death of Vicente & Maxima, respondents and
Leonardo jointly controlled, managed and administered the estate of their
parents. Under such, Leonardo had been receiving his share of 1/3 of the
total income generated from properties of the estate. However, when
Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of
the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition also prayed for
settlement of estate of Vicente and Maxima and estate of Leonardo and
appointment of administrator to apportion, divide and award the two
estates among lawful heirs of decent.
3. Respondents contend that petition was defective as it sought judicial
settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They argued that
settlement of estate of Leonardo was premature. They prayed that they
be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente &
Maxima without posting a bond.
4. Petitioners nominated the Binan Rural Bank to serve as special
administrator pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of letters
of administration. Then the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special
joint administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, and required them
to post a bond of P200k each.
5. Respondents insisted that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be
appointed as administrator. They also asserted their priority in right to be
appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima,
whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not
even a legal heir.
6. RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix,
substituting her with Erlinda. Petitioners reiterated that respondents, as
joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory
of the income and assets of the estate.
7. Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrator’s
Bond.
8. Eight months after the appointment of respondents as special joint
administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the
Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment
of Regular Administrator. They cited an alleged fraudulent sale by
respondents of a real property for P2.7M which the latter represented to
petitioners to have been sold only for P1.5M and respondents’ alleged
misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to
cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.
9. RTC granted petitioner’s motion for failure of respondent to post the
required bond and to submit an inventory of the properties and of an
income statement of the estate. Melinda was appointed as regular
administratrix.
10. CA ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’
appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their
motion for exemption from bond and for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix. MR of petitioner was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking respondents’
appointment as joint special administrators. NO
RULING:
The Court disagrees with CA that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first
resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond,
ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators’ bond is a pre-requisite to
respondents’ entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office.
As early as Oct. 2005, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond
should they be assigned as joint special administrators. However, this was
effectively denied by RTC when it designates Renato and Dalisay as special
administrators and enjoins them to post a bond of P200k each. This was reiterated
when RTC substituted Dalisay with Erlinda.
The RTC rightly did so when it revoked the appointment for failing to post their
administrator’s bond and to submit inventory and accounting as required of them,
tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. This was, again, a denial of
respondent’s plea to assume their office sans a bond. The administration bond is
for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator,
whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the
obligations incumbent upon, him.
Biñan, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration
in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The
appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET
ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate
under the same administrator’s bond she had posted. The trial court is
directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the
regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No
costs.

Based on the facts, respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits
generated from the properties of the decedents’ estate, yet they still failed to post
their respective administrators’ bonds despite collection of the advances from their
supposed shares. What is more, respondents’ insincerity in administering the
estate was betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale discovered by petitioners.

Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked
the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being
grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special
administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the
appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.

Re: designation of Melinda as regular administratrix

Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix improper

and abusive of its discretion. Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of
administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-
administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the special
administration.

However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs,
Court take into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated
March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of P200k by virtue of which,
Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed
an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate. These acts clearly manifested her
intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’ estate, but her
appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending the
proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only
unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardo’s estate, which is not
subject of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated

December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
VICTORIO REYNOSO AND JUAN REYNOSO V. VICENTE SANTIAGO, JUDGE OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, PIA REYNOSO, AGUSTINA
REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-3039, December 29, 1949
FACTS:
1. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso apply for a writ of mandamus to compel
Judge Vicente Santiago of the Court of the First Instance of Quezon to order
the opening of a testate estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo in the place
of special intestate proceeding No. 2914, and to appoint Victorio Reynoso as
executor of the decedent's last will and testament.
2. On April 29, 1947, Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo
presented an application in the Court of the First Instance of Quezon for the
administration of the property of the deceased, application which was
docketed as intestate proceeding No. 2914.
3. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse
and eldest son respectively, opposed the application and filed a document,
which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a
counter petition for its probate.
4. Upon trial the court rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on the appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the court below, found the will
authentic and drawn with all the formalities of Law.
5. Thereafter Victorio Reynoso And Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in
special proceeding No. 2914 and another under a separate and new docket
number (3107) and with a different title (Testate Estate of the deceased
Salvadora Obispo ). The first prayed that the special administrator, Meliton
Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No.
2914, be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds
of coprax, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and to
render an accounting within a reasonable time, it also asked for the closing of
the intestate proceeding. The other petition prayed that the estate be
administered and settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio
Reynoso be appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and testament.
It also contained a prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him
to the new executor of the properties that came into possession including the
proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.
6. The two petitions were decided separately by Judge Santiago on April
20,1949. With respect to the opening of another expediente, His Honor
believed that the proposed change or substitution was " not only unnecessary
but inconvenient and expensive." An intestate proceeding like special
proceeding like special proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should and
should be converted into a testate proceeding in the same original
expediente(DOCUMENT) without the necessity of changing its number, name
or title.
ISSUE: Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued
and a new proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted. NO
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The petition for the constitution of a separate proceeding for
the administration of the estate under the will is denied. The petition for the appointment
of a regular administrator is granted subject to the provision of section 6 Rule 79 in the
selection of the person to be appointed. Without costs.
As to the appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator the court
said that action on the petition should be withheld for the time being, because of the
pendency on appeal of a case in which the special administrator in special proceeding
No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant. It
involves the question whether an extensive parcel of coconut land is conjugal property
or the exclusive property of the husband.
On this feature of the second petition we disagree with the respondent judge. If one
other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will
not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named
to represent the estate in the suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the
executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give
notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator
who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the
same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of the claims."
The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with reference to the land within the
spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.
Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in
accordance with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special
administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or
some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the
appointment of an albacea(EXECUTOR), there is no valid reason for the further
retention of a special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is
necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important
duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can not
perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be
accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.
But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as administrator we do not
and cannot of course decide in a petition for mandamus. While the surviving spouse is
entitled to preference in the appointment (section 6, Rule 79), circumstances might
warrant his rejection and the appointment of someone else. Mandamus lies where the
duty is specific and ministerial. It does not lie where judgment or discretion is exercised
in the performance of the act. Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to command
the court below to appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to
appoint.
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA JEAN, DANIEL,
MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all surnamed CASTILLO v. DOLORES
LACUATA-GABRIEL
G.R. No. 162934; November 11, 2005
FACTS:
1. In 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in
Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable inheritance
consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.
2. A little over a month after Crisanta’s death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago
Vda. de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City.
3. She alleged, among others, that to her knowledge, her daughter died
intestate leaving an estate with an estimated net value of ₱1,500,000.00
and that such estate was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent
son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She
prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga,
Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her share
of the estate of her daughter after due hearing. However, the RTC
appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
4. Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo
Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed
Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.
5. After 9 months, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be
the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention. Resolution on this motion was, however, held in abeyance
pending some incidents in the CA.
6. Thereafter, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y.
Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an
alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He
alleged that he discovered his mother’s will on October 25, 1989 in which
he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as
alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a
brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or
1986. On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
7. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. RTC issued an Order
dismissing the intestate proceedings. Mariano Yanga, Jr. questioned the
dismissal of the intestate proceedings before the appellate court via a
petition for certiorari.
8. In 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special
administrator of his mother’s estate.
9. Then, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael,
and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a Motion praying that they be
substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda, who died
in 1990.
10. In 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a
"Manifestation and Motion" where she informed the probate court of her
husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place
of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of
Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged that she had a bachelor’s degree in
law and had worked for several years in a law office.
11. The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They
averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriel’s next of kin, let alone the
lawful wife of the late Roberto/
12. Thereafter, Bena Jean filed a "Motion for Appointment as Administrator of
the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel" praying that she be appointed
administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
13. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of Mariano Yanga, Jr.
14. Then the lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a
bond of ₱200,000.00. The probate court merely noted the motion for
substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were "mere
strangers to the case" and that their cause could better be ventilated in a
separate proceeding.
15. The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider. The probate court denied.
16. The said heirs then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
a temporary restraining order or/and preliminary injunction against
Dolores and the probate court. They prayed, among others, that Bena
Jean be appointed as the regular administratrix of Crisanta Gabriel’s
estate/
17. CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the probate court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Dolores as special administratrix.
ISSUE:
WON the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that it is Section 1, Rule 80
and not Section 6, Rule 78 of the rules of court which is applicable in this case. NO
RULING:
1. The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
probate court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
executor or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the
parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.
2. Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. – When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including
 an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided Resolution of March 26, 2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
and executors or administrators appointed.

3. Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court.
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

4. As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint

respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-
Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted son,
Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties. However,
pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the
respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much stake
in Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s will is allowed probate. It needs to
be emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which
is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in the
decedent’s estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the
estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties
in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the preference
of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason,
justice, equity or legal principle.

5. The petitioners’ strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of

Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies
to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled that
the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrators.

6. On the plea of the petitioners for this Court to appoint their co-petitioner,
Bena Jean Castillo, as the regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta
Yanga-Gabriel, the matter should be addressed to the probate court for
its consideration. It is not for this Court to preempt the discretion of the
probate court and appoint a regular administrator in the present action.
FLORA DE GRACIA REGNER VDA DE DAYRIT VS. HON. JOSE RAMOLETE
(PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI CEBU, BRANCH III), ATTY. CASIMIRO
MADARANG, ATTY. VICENTE JAYME
GR No. L-59935, September 30, 1982
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Flora married Norberto Dayrit in 1934. She alleged that he did
not bring any property into the marriage; that she brought a vast estate of
paraphernal properties inherited from her parents; that her husband
managed those by tolerance and that out of the fruits thereof, they
acquired some conjugal assets. Norberto abandoned her in 1972.
2. In 1981, Norberto died leaving a Will naming respondent Atty. Jayme as
executor. Atty. Jayme than filed Special Proceedings for probate of the
Will and praying that he be appointed Executor, and before admission of
the Will to probate, as Special Administrator. Flora and their adopted
daughter, Lydia Dayrit, opposed Jayme’s appointment alleging that Flora
was better qualified to manage the estate. Flora likewise prayed for the
disallowance of the Will and that the proceedings be converted into
intestacy.
3. Petitioner Flora was appointed by the Probate Court, presided by
respondent judge, as Special Administrator, without bond. This was
opposed by Atty. Jayme on the ground that Flora merely submitted a token
list of properties.
4. The court directed Flora to render an accounting of her administration. It
also ordered to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in the name of
the Estate all her cash receipts from conjugal properties. Flora prayed for
the reconsideration of the latter order.
5. Probate Court granted an exparte Motion of respondent Atty. Jayme
ordering that the Bank of America and the City Bank, both in the United
States, be informed that the deposits in said banks being in custodia legis,
no withdrawals should be allowed without Court approval. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration alleging that all said deposits were her
paraphernal properties.
6. Probate Court then revoked the Order granting Flora Letters of Special
Administration on the grounds that Flora had shown interest adverse to
many valuable properties of the Estate, the compelling need to preserve
the estate properties from further unauthorized disbursements and other
dispositions, and for the protection of creditors. Respondent Atty.
Madarang (nephew of Flora, also her former counsel) was appointed in
her stead, with a bond of P10,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court can take the special administration of the
husband’s estate away from the widow.
RULING:
We gave due course to this Petition.
[Doctrine] Without delving into the other questions raised, which are unnecessary
for the resolution of the principal issue, it is our considered opinion that inasmuch
as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration
of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary
interests. Justice and equity also demand that opposing sides in a probate
proceeding be adequately represented in the administration of the decedent's
estate.
And this, despite the distrust and animosity allegedly pervading the relationship
between petitioner and respondent Atty. Madarang, for it is expected that the
Probate Court will be on hand to resolve conflicts that may arise, the paramount
consideration always being the best interests of the estate.
As in the case of Corona vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-59821, promulgated on
August 30, 1982, the Special Administrators are reminded that while they may
have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the
supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work in the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement,
and that whatever differences there may be between them shall be ironed out fairly
and objectively for the attainment of that end.
WHEREFORE, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, is hereby ordered,
in Special Proceedings No. 4004R pending before it, to appoint petitioner Flora de
Gracia Regner Vda. de Dayrit as co-Special Administrator, without bond, who shall
act as such jointly with Atty. Casimiro R. Madarang, Jr., the other Special
Administrator, on all matters affecting the estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 LUIS L. CO V. RTC JUDGE RICARDO R. ROSARIO, ELIZABETH RACHEL
CO, ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM, GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN
CO, EDWARD CO AND THE ESTATE OF LIM SEE TE
G.R. No. 160671; April 30, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint
or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated
in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without
grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.
FACTS:
1. The RTC appointed petitioner Luis L. Co (LUIS) and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as
the special administrators of the estate of the Luis’s father, Co Bun Chun.
Luis’s appointment was however set aside so he nominated his son Alvin
Milton (ALVIN) who was then appointed as special co-administrator.
2. Almost four years thereafter, the RTC revoked and set aside Alvin’s
appointment reasoning that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the
trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability
or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been
beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even
if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to
doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and
confidence.
3. Luis filed an MR which was denied. So he filed a petition with the CA which
affirmed the revocation. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration
and earliest settlement.
3. In this case, of Alvin’s removal as special co-administrator is grounded on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent
and gross capriciousness pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or
despotism.
4. In revoking Alvin’s appointment, the RTC considered the fiduciary nature
of the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree of
trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. Burdened with the
criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents against him,
and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself in these
proceedings, Alvin’s ability and qualification to act as special co-
administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall
of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances.
5. Without condemning him as guilty, the RTC merely declared that it is more
consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that he, who
is already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for
falsification in other fora be relieved of his duties and functions as special
administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.
6. As a final note, this prolonged litigation on the simple issue of the removal
of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the RTC promptly
appointed a regular administrator. The RTC is thus directed to proceed
with the appointment of a regular administrator as soon as practicable.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the CA decision
is AFFIRMED.

W/N the revocation of Alvin’s appointment was valid in view of the pendency of the
criminal cases against him – YES/NO.

RULING:

1. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make

his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principles.

2. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once

the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is
justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest
 DORA ANDERSON V IDONAH PERKINS
GR L-15388; January 31, 1961
DOCTRINES:
1. The special administrator may be authorized to sell the personal estate of
the decedent even if it is not perishable property. His authority is not
limited to the sale of perishable property. His function is to preserve not
only the property of the decedent's estate but also its value. Hence, he
may be empowered to sell personal property which is not perishable.
2. The sale of the alleged personal estate of the deceased husband cannot
be authorized where his widow claims that some of the items thereof are
conjugal or are her own personal property. The conjugal partnership must
first be liquidated and the issue of ownership adjudicated.
limited to the sale of perishable property. His function is to preserve not
only the property of the decedent's estate but also its value. Hence, he
may be empowered to sell personal property which is not perishable.
2. The function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed.
3. The sale of the alleged personal estate of the deceased husband cannot
be authorized where his widow claims that some of the items thereof are
conjugal or are her own personal property. In this case, no liquidation of
the conjugal property has been conducted. The conjugal partnership must
first be liquidated and the issue of ownership adjudicated.

FACTS:

1. Arthur was married to Idonah. Upon Arthur’s death, Dora (probably

Arthur’s sister) filed for the probate of his will.

2. Enrile was appointed as special administrator. He later filed a petition

seeking authority to sell some of Arthur’s effects left by deceased on the
ground that such effects were deteriorating both physically and in value,
and to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might
be obtained in their dispositions.

3. The court required a specification of the properties to be sold, but Enrile

merely submitted a copy of the inventory of personal properties in estate
and marked with red pencil, with the statement that said items were too
voluminous to enumerate.

4. Idonah filed an opposition to the proposed sale on the ground that most
of the properties to be sold were part of the conjugal prop of her and
Arthur, and that under the RoC, only goods and chattels that are
perishable may be sold.

5. Trial court allowed the sale. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the special administrator has the authority to sell property in the estate
that are not perishable.

RULING:

Yes, he has the authority.

1. The special administrator may be authorized to sell the personal estate of

the decedent even if it is not perishable property. His authority is not

RULE 81
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO,
AND LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR. V. RENATO M. OCAMPO AND ERLINDA
M. OCAMPO
GR No. 187879; July 5, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties
and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay
the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and
at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory
within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond
is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s
estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory
of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to
his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when
required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor
or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive
them.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Dalisay, Vince, Melinda, and Leonardo, Jr. are the surviving
wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo, who died on January 23,
2004.
2. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato and Erlinda are the
legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima
Ocampo, who died intestate in1972 and in 1996, respectively.
3. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan,
Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.
4. Five months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings, entitled “In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate
of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo
M. Ocampo,” in the RTC of Binan Laguna.
5. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima,
respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and
administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance,
Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the
total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when
Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of
the properties to the exclusion of petitioners.
6. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima
and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the
lawful heirs of the decedents.
7. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as
special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.
8. The RTC denied respondents’ opposition to the settlement proceedings
but admitted their counter-petition (appointment as an administrator).
9. In their Comment, petitioners argued that, since 2002, they had been
deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the
appointment of respondents as special joint administrators would further
cause injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further
delay, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the
subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay.
10. The RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of
the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of
P200,000.00 each.
11. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that Dalisay was
incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate,
considering that she even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo
when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended that petitioners’
prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as special administrator was already
deemed abandoned upon their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank to act
as special administrator of the estate.
12. The RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix,
substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that
respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners
did not contest this Order and even manifested in open court their desire
for the speedy settlement of the estate.
13. Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’
Bondon, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special
administrators without the need to file an administrators’ bond due to their
difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since
petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the
appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it would be to
the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring
unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums.
14. RTC revoked the appointment for failure to pay the bond.
15. Hence, this certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON Respondents should be required to pay the bond. YES
RULING:
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of
the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer
the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to
 account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the
probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More
specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on
the faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s estate
requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory
of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as
received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to
the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them.
2. Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the
heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to
perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent
upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of
the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included
among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a
qualification for the office of administration.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special
administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is
REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular
administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special
administratrix of the estate under the same administrator’s bond she had posted.
The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the
appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial
partition. No costs.
 LUZON SURETY COMPANY V. PASTOR QUEBAR AND FRANCISCO KILAYKO
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-appellant, Luzon Surety Company, issued two administrator bond in
the amount of P 15,000 each in behalf of the defendant-appellant Pastor
Quebar. (He was the administrator in 2 Testate Proceeding).
a. In such agreement, Quebar and Kilayko agreed that as
consideration, they agreed to be bound to pay P300 monthly for 12
months.
2. From August 9, 1954 to Augusto 9, 1955, the defendants paid a total of P609
for premiums and documentary stamps.
3. On June 6, 1957, the CFI of Negros Occidental approved the amended
Project of Partition and Accounts of Defendant-appellant.
4. On May 8, 1962, Luzon demanded from the defendants the payment of the
premiums and documentary stamp from August 9, 1955.
5. On Oct. 1962, the defendants filed a motion for cancellation and/or reduction
of bonds on the ground that “the heirs of these estate have already received
their respective shares.
a. The court subsequently ordered for the bonds to be cancelled.
6. Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a
total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. The
defendants-appellants refused to pay the said amount of P4,872.00.
7. On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. During the pre-trial, the parties presented their
documentary evidences and agreed on the ultimate issue -- "whether or not
the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that
they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were
cancelled.
8. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff stating that the defendants are liable
under the terms of the Indemnity Agreement, notwithstanding that they have
no expressly sought the renewal of these bonds because the same were in
force and effect until they were cancelled by order of the court. The renewal
of said bonds is presumed from the fact that the defendants did not ask for
the cancellation of the same; and their liability springs from the fact that
defendant Administrator, Pastor Quebrar, benefitted from the bonds during
their lifetime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent-administrator is liable to pay the demand for payment
of premiums for the bond.
RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up
a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It
is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust
(Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that
of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called
upon to perform in the course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111
NY 531, 19 NE 94), it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect
the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship.
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to
do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project
of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be
of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and statement of
accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar
did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for adminis-tration is for the purpose
of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses (Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears
that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity
Agreements by non-payment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the
administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability
under the Administrator's Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and
purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of the
creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate.
The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and
not as a condition (Woodfin vs. Asheville Mutual Insurance Co., 51 N.C. 558); for the
payment was not made a condition to the attaching or continuing of the contract
(National Bank vs. National Surety Co., 144 A 576). The premium is the
consideration for furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same
subsists for as long as the liability of the surety shall exist (Reparations
Commission vs. Universal Deep-Sea Fishing Corp., L-21996, 83 SCRA 764, June 27,
1978). And in Arranz vs. Manila Fidelity and Surety Co., Inc. (101 Phil. 272), the
premium is the consideration for furnishing the bond or the guaranty. While the liability
of the surety subsists the premium is collectible from the principal. Lastly, in Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama (107 Phil. 891), it was held that "the one-year
period mentioned therein refers not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely
to the payment of premiums, and, consequently, does not affect at all the effectivity or
efficacy of such bond. But such non-payment alone of the premiums for the
succeeding years x x does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity
of the counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in the contract
making such non-payment of premiums a cause for the extinguishment or
termination of the undertaking. xx xx There is no necessity for an extension or
renewal of the agreement because by specific provision thereof, the duration of
the counter-bond was made dependent upon the existence of the original bond."
 HELD:
RULE 84 IN RELATION TO RULE 81
Section 714, provides, among other things, that when the personal
estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts and charges of
SINFORO BUENAVENTURA AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
administration without injuring the business of those interested, and when
JUAN BUENAVENTURA, DECEASED AND TIMOTEO DEL ROSARIO V.
the testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment
TOMAS B. RAMOS, ET. AL. of debts and charges against the estate, the court, on application of the
G.R. No. 18034; September 2, 1922 executor or administrator, with the consent and approbation, in writing, of
the heirs, devisees, and legatees, residing in the Philippine Islands, may
DOCTRINE: grant a license to sell, for that purpose, in lieu of personal estate, if it
clearly appears that such sale of real estate would be beneficial to the
There are two cases under which an administrator may sell real and personal person interested, and will not defeat any devise of land, in which case
estate of a deceased person. The conditions are (a) when it is necessary to pay the assent of the devisee shall be required.
the debts and charges against the estate, and (b) when it is made to appear to the There are two cases under which an administrator may sell real and
court that it will be beneficial to the heirs and those interested in the estate. personal estate of a deceased person. The conditions are (a) when it is
necessary to pay the debts and charges against the estate, and (b) when
FACTS: it is made to appear to the court that it will be beneficial to the heirs and
those interested in the estate.
Sinforoso Buenaventura, administrator, presented a petition in the Court
In the present case there was no allegation or showing, nor any attempt
of First Instance, asking permission to sell a certain fishery belonging to
to make it appear, that there were any debts or charges against the estate
the estate of Juan Buenaventura, deceased.
of Juan Buenaventura, which make it necessary to sell the real estate of
The petition for permission to sell said fishery alleged that it was in bad
that estate.
condition; that the estate was unable to make the necessary repairs; that
The heirs having become the absolute owners of the property of the
he heir of the estate were poor and without adequate and necessary
ancestor, and there being no debts or obligations against the same which
funds; that the heirs were numerous and that in order to make the
existed at the time of the death of the ancestor, it is a matter of no
necessary repairs in said fishery, it was necessary to sell and to divide the
importance to the administrator or to any other person, that the property
proceeds among the heirs.
is in a state of bad repair.
The heirs of the estate of Juan Buenaventura presented an opposition to
The repair or improvement of the property is for the heirs after having
the said motion of the administrator. The court denied said petition.
become the absolute owners of the same, and is a question solely for their
Notwithstanding the strong opposition presented by the heirs to the said
consideration. In absence of debts or obligations against the estate at the
petition of the administrator the judge, granted said petition
time of the death of the ancestor, the heirs, as absolute owners, may
The defendants excepted to the order, authorizing the sale of the fishery, manage and control the same without interference on the part of the
upon the ground that said order was illegal and for the further reason that administrator.
all of the heirs of the estate of Juan Buenaventura were opposed to said
sale, except the administrator, and for the further reason that the reason Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is hereby REVOKED, and it is hereby
given for the sale of the fishery were not sufficient in law to justify the said
ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered, revoking the judgment appealed
order of the court.
from and absolving the defendants from all liability under the complaint.
The administrator reported to the court that he had received two offers to
buy said fishery. The defendants presented their opposition to the
confirmation of the sale as requested by the administrator, presenting
many reasons in support of their opposition.
Notwithstanding the strong opposition presented by the heirs and
defendants, the judge authorized the sale and directed that the same be
sold to the said Timoteo del Rosario.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred when it ordered the sale of the said property.
(YES)
 SILVERIO, JR V COURT OF APPEALS, NELIA SILVERIO-DEE
GR No. 178933
DOCTRINE:
Even an administrator cannot take possession of the property without an order
from the intestate/probate court.
RULING:
FACTS:
This case is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing two CA
resolutions that lifted/annulled/set aside the TRO and notice to vacate.
Petitioner was the son of the deceased BEATRIZ and previous
administrator of the estate.
Originally, it was SILVERIO Senior (Senior) who filed the petition for
settlement of estate and was appointed administrator. However, in a 2005
order, the court removed Senior as administrator and appointed JUNIOR
(present petitioner) in his place. This order was opposed by private
respondent.
Pursuant to the 2005 order, Junior filed an Urgent Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Any Person to occupy/stay/use real estate properties
involved in the intestate estate of the Late Beatriz SILVERIO, without
authority from this Honorable Court.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC ordered NELIA (respondent) to vacate the
Makati Property within 15 days from receipt of order. Her motion for
reconsideration was denied in a December 12 Order.
ISSUES:
Are the December 12 RTC Orders interlocutory and not subject to appeal?
YES
Was there grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the Writ of Execution
and Notice to Vacate? YES
The RTC Orders are interlocutory because they are not determinative of
the case which is to finally settle the estate and partition the shares to the
heirs. Until a partition is made, heirs only have an inchoate right over the
properties.
This must also be viewed under the context that the subject property
is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the
courts. Section 2 of Rule 84 provides that the administrator may only
deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court
Once an action for settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the
properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. Not
even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of
the estate without prior authority from the court.
NELIA’s purported authority to possess the property was never approved
by the court. She never had real interest over the specific property.
Supreme Court set aside the CA decision and reinstated the RTC Orders
(Writ of Execution + Order to Vacate)

The December 12 Order also removed junior as administrator of the

estate and reinstated senior. Junior’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. The RTC also ordered the sale of some properties (including the
Makati property) to partially settle the estate tax and other penalties.

NELIA filed a Notice of Appeal. This was opposed by Junior because it

was filed 10 days beyond the reglementary period. RTC denied the appeal
of NELIA. RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution for the sale of the
property and a notice to vacate for NELIA.

The CA granted NELIA’s petition for certiorari with TRO and injunction.
On July 6, CA annulled and set aside the previous orders of the RTC (writ
of execution and notice to vacate)

Hence, junior filed this Rule 65 case with the SC

 INTESTATE ESTATE OF RAFAEL JOCSON DECEASED. CONCEPTION
JOCSON DE HILADO VS. JESUS R. NAVA
GR No. L-46249, October 18, 1939

DOCTRINE:

The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validly be
entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without
the court's previous authority. Thus, the court had no power to annul or invalidate
the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the
person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect.

FACTS:

Administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael

Jocson, executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease
period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate, at a
stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. The contract was entered into without
the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings.

Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings, praying

that the administratix be required to explain certain details in the matter of
said lease; and in reply to the answer filed by said administratrix to lease
the lands compromised in the contract to the highest bidder at public
auction.

Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set
aside, it is having been issued without jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract
of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention

RULING:

The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validly be
entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without
the court's previous authority. Thus, the court had no power to annul or invalidate
the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the
person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect.