St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 57:3-4 (2013) 479–501

Ecclesiology and Globalization:

In Search of an Ecclesiological Paradigm
in the Era of Globalization
(After the Previous Paradigms of the
Local, Imperial, and National)
Pantelis Kalaitzidis

The 20th century has been aptly characterized by both Orthodox and
non-Orthodox theologians as “the century of ecclesiology,”1since
during this century theology seemed to focus first and foremost
on ecclesiology, i.e., the question of the identity and nature of the
Church, as well as its constitution, administration, and structure.
Apart from some notable individual contributions, the Orthodox
have contributed rather little to the discussion on ecclesiology. As
one contemporary Orthodox theologian has observed:
Today, however, ecclesiology is conspicuous by its absence
from our contemporary Orthodox theology. It does not
even feature as a course in the teaching programs of Ortho-
dox Schools. In spite of the survival here and there by God’s
grace of a genuine and deep ecclesial life in parishes and
monasteries over the centuries, generations of theologians
have graduated from our Schools of Theology with only a
vague idea of the possibility of an ecclesiological enriching
of theology […] Discussions of ecclesiology, especially in
Greece, are still in their infancy.2

1 See, for example, O. Dibelius, Das Jarhhundert der Kirche (Berlin, 1927); Ioannis N.
Karmiris, Orthodox Ecclesiology (Dogmatics, Section V) (Athens, 1973), 7 [in Greek];
Kallistos Ware, Orthodox Theology in the Twenty-First Century, in “Doxa & Praxis:
Exploring Orthodox Theology” series (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2012), 15–22.
2 Nikolaos Loudovikos, Church in the Making: An Apophatic Ecclesiology of Consub-
stantiality, tr. Norman Russell, “Twenty-first-century Greek Theologians” series
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, under publication).

479

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 479 1/9/2014 9:26:34 PM

 480 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

However, despite the stunted discussion on ecclesiology within the

Orthodox world, I think we can safely say that the constitution,
administration, and overall structures of the Church have never been
immune to the broader socio-political and cultural developments
of each particular place and time, nor to their relationship with
the world and history. So if the ecclesiological self-understanding
of the Orthodox Church has its roots in the early Church’s
perspective and experience of the eucharist, the bishop, catholicity,
and conciliarity, then the Church’s subsequent ecclesiological
structure and constitution were decisively influenced, first, by the
meeting between the (Roman/Byzantine) empire and later, during
the modern era, by the prevalence of the principle of nationalities.
In our era, which has been characterized by the emergence and
consolidation of pluralism and democracy, as well as the increase
of globalization and the consequent dissolution of boundaries
and barriers, it is clear that the Orthodox are in an awkward
position ecclesiologically, but they also seem unable or unwilling
to acknowledge the need for a new ecclesiological paradigm that
is compatible with the current socio-political and cultural context.
The Orthodox appear to readily accept adapting or imbuing our
ecclesiology with imperial structures or ethno-theological concerns,
but are incapable of reflecting on the inevitable implications of
globalization in the area of ecclesiology.
In this paper, after presenting the three ecclesiological paradigms
or “layers” of the canonical tradition (local, imperial, national),
according to the great Russian theologian of the diaspora Fr
Alexander Schmemann, I will examine the challenges posed
by globalization to our ecclesiological self-understanding and
constitution, focusing particularly on the resilience of national
ecclesiology—including, of course, its handmaiden, nationally-
based autocephalous churches—as well as on the difficulties and
dilemmas confronting a post-national ecclesiology.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 480 1/9/2014 9:26:35 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 481

The Three Ecclesiological Paradigms According to Fr

Alexander Schmemann
After the intense, primarily Greek, reactions to the proclamation
of the autocephalous “Orthodox Church in America” (the former
Russian Metropolia), Fr Alexander Schmemann penned an extensive
article entitled, “A Meaningful Storm,”3 in which he distinguished
three types of ecclesiological paradigms and (“hierarchical”)
relationships between the churches, or what he called the three
“layers” of the canonical tradition: the local, the imperial, and the
national. He correlated these types to specific historical periods and
their respective cultural and political forms, as well as their models
of church-state relations. Thus, the local ecclesiological paradigm
was identified with the pre-Constantinian period in which the
early Christian communities were scattered throughout the Roman
oikoumene, the imperial ecclesiological paradigm with the Roman/
Byzantine Empire, and the national ecclesiological paradigm with
the emergence of nationalism during the Enlightenment and the
creation of nation-states.
According to Schmemann, the first type or level of our canonical
tradition is characterized by the ecclesiology of the local church,
as well as by the variety, diversity, unity, and interdependence
of the local churches/dioceses, which display no signs of one
church/diocese submitting to another, or being subordinate to
the jurisdiction of another. According to Schmemann, the nature
of this unity and interdependence of the churches was in no way
“jurisdictional.” It was, rather, a unity of faith and life, an unbroken
continuation of the Tradition guided by the Holy Spirit (p. 91). As
Schmemann noted, in the ancient ecclesiastical tradition, the basic
point of reference for ecclesiology was always the local church (i.e.,
the community gathered around the bishop and its clergy), which
was a complete church, and not some “superior” or “independent”
bodies such as the patriarchates, autocephalous or autonomous
churches, etc. (p. 91). Schmemann, of course, hastened to clarify
3 See Alexander Schmemann, “A Meaningful Storm,” in his Church World Mission
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1979), 85–116.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 481 1/9/2014 9:26:35 PM

 482 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

that this did not imply “the absence of hierarchy and order” (p. 91).
But “primacy” and “order,” according to this Russian theologian
of the diaspora, did not mean subordination to a “jurisdictional”
principle, since, as he reminds us, the famous 34th Apostolic Canon
(“The bishops of all peoples should know the first among them and
recognize him as the head […]”)4 relates this primarily to the Holy
Trinity, which has “order” but certainly no “subordination” (p. 92).
According to Schmemann:
This order in the early canonical tradition is maintained by
the various levels of primacies, i.e., episcopal and ecclesiasti-
cal centers or focuses of unity […]. The function of primacy
is to express the unity of all, to be its organ and mouthpiece.
(p. 92).
The first level of primacy in the early Christian communities was
expressed at the provincial level, with metropolitans or provincial
synods, with the metropolitan as their head. The second level refers
to a wider geographical area: the “Orient” with Antioch, Asia with
Ephesus, Gaul with Lyons, etc., and its content was chiefly doctrinal
and moral. As Schmemann observed:
The churches of any given area usually “look up” to the
church from which they received their tradition and in times
of crisis and uncertainty gather around her in order to find
under her leadership a common solution to their problems.
And the third level refers to a universal “center of unity,” a universal
primacy, which was, however, not always the same, since it obviously
began in Jerusalem but soon thereafter shifted to the Church of
Rome (p. 92).
The initial paradigm and model for the relationship and
interdependence between the early Christian churches was altered
and “complicated,” according to Schmemann, by the Church’s
4 Metropolitan of Pergamon John Zizioulas’s interpretation of this canon, which fol-
lows the geographical rather than the national criterion, is worth noting; see Johannes
D. Zizioulas, “Church Unity and the Host of Nations,” in K. C. Felmy, Kirchen im
Kontext unterschiedlicher Kulturen: Auf dem Weg ins dritte Jahrtausend. Aleksandr
Meń in memoriam (1935–1990) (Göttigen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), esp.
99–102.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 482 1/9/2014 9:26:35 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 483

reconciliation with the Empire and their alliance or “symphony”

in the framework of a Christian oikoumene, which resulted, at the
ecclesiological level, in “a progressive organizational integration
of the Church’s structures into the administrative system of the
empire.” Here, the Russian theologian ultimately proved much
more “Byzantine” and maybe even more “Greek” than one would
expect. Somewhat surprisingly, Schmemann hastened to note
that the Church’s integration into the empire and the imperial
institutions—this second ecclesiological paradigm or the entire
second “level” of the canonical tradition that he terms “imperial”
and which stems from this integration—cannot be considered, from
an Orthodox perspective, as a “passing accident,” since it constitutes
an integral part of our tradition. This is why, in Schmemann’s
words, “the Orthodox Church cannot reject Byzantium without
rejecting something belonging to her very substance” (p. 93). For
if the first ecclesiological paradigm, the local, is an expression
of the Church’s essence, then the second paradigm, the imperial,
expresses the historicity of the Church, i.e., its relationship with
the world. However, on the basis of the principle of “in the world,
but not of the world,” Schmemann correlates the first paradigm to
the “unchanging” and the second to the “changing.” The Church
is a permanent reality of the Christian faith, whereas the empire
is not. “But inasmuch and as long as this empire, this ‘Christian
world,’ is a reality, the Church not only accepts it de facto but enters
into a positive and in a sense even an organic relationship with it,”
without, however, bestowing “on anything in this world the same
essential value as the one the Church possesses” (pp. 93–94).
According to Schmemann, the “jurisdictional” dimension of
the Church and its life is rooted in this second, imperial paradigm
or canonical “level,” to which he attributes the articulation and
systematization of “jurisdictional” ecclesiology and the distinction
between ecclesiastical offices (patriarch, metropolitan, archbishop,
bishop, etc.), i.e., the organization of the Church’s life and the local
churches’ relationships with and around the great ecclesiastical and
imperial centers (pp. 94–95). For Schmemann, this “jurisdictional”

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 483 1/9/2014 9:26:36 PM

 484 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

level—although completely justified and necessary in its own sphere

of application—should not be confused with what is essential, since
the Church accepts jurisdictional “authority” not according to its
essence, which is “not of this world,” but according to its presence
“in the world” and its relationship with it (p. 94). Schmemann sees
the role and function of the Patriarch of Constantinople within the
Byzantine oikoumene, i.e., as the Ecumenical or “imperial” Patriarch,
as the most indicative example of the Church’s integration into the
organizational structure of the Empire and this new “jurisdictional”
order (p. 96). It would be a mistake, however, to assume, on this
basis, that Schmemann sought to challenge the primacy of the
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Later in the same article,
he hastens to disabuse critics of the misconception:
Personally I have spent too much of my theological life
“defending” the universal primacy of the Patriarch of
Constantinople to be accused of any “anti-Constantinop-
olitanism.” This primacy, its necessity for the Church, its
tremendous potential for Orthodoxy, I once more solemnly
confess and affirm here. This primacy, however, to become
again “what it is,” must be purified of all ambiguities, of all
non-essential “contexts,” of all nationalistic connotations,
of the dependence on anything—in the past, present and
future—which is not the Church and only the Church (pp.
115–16).
This last remark leads us to what Schmemann regarded as
our tradition’s third historical “level,” the third ecclesiological
paradigm, the form and content of which related neither to the
local church of the ancient tradition, nor to the imperial tradition,
but to the new reality that arose from the gradual dismantling of
Byzantium—combined, of course, with extrinsic factors such
as the Enlightenment. The emergence of the “Christian nation,”
which Schmemann refers to as the national “level” or paradigm,
“added a new dimension, but also a new complexity, to Orthodox
ecclesiology” (p. 97).
There is no need to rehash here the historical analysis which was
already capably offered by the previous presenters in this conference,

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 484 1/9/2014 9:26:36 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 485

nor to repeat the theological critique of ecclesiastical nationalism,5

elements of which critique appear clearly also in Schmemann’s
analysis. I believe, however, that it will be useful to review some
of Schmemann’s basic positions regarding this latter period under
consideration, because of its direct bearing on our current problem.
Let us, therefore, look more closely at Schmemann’s words:
From that complex process there emerged the idea of a
Christian nation—with a national vocation, a kind of corpo-
rate “identity” before God. What is important for us here is
that only at this stage in the history of the Eastern Church
there appeared the notion of “autocephaly”—which, if not
in its origin […], at least in its application, is a product not
of ecclesiology, but of a national phenomenon. Its funda-
mental historical connotation is thus neither purely eccle-
siological, nor “jurisdictional,” but national. To a universal
empire corresponds an “imperial” church with its center in
Constantinople: such is the axiom of the Byzantine “impe-
rial” ideology. There can therefore be no political indepen-
dence from the empire without its ecclesiastical counter-
part or “autocephaly”: such becomes the axiom of the new
Orthodox “theocracies.” “Autocephaly,” i.e., ecclesiastical
5 I have devoted many of my scholarly publications to a theological critique of ecclesi-
astical nationalism. Cf. for example, Pantelis Kalaitzidis, “The Temptation of Judas:
Church and National Identities,” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 47 (2002):
357–79; “The Church and the Nation in Eschatological Perspective,” in the collected
volume P. Kalaitzidis, ed., The Church and Eschatology, The Volos Academy for Theo-
logical Studies, Winter 2000–2001 Program (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2003), 339–73 [in
Greek; English translation forthcoming in the series: “Doxa & Praxis: Exploring Or-
thodox Theology,” Geneva: WCC Publications]; “La situation actuelle du patriarcat
de Jérusalem: un néocolonialisme ecclésial?,” Service Orthodoxe de Presse (SOP), mai
2005, pp. 24–26; “Christianisme identitaire et nationalisme religieux,” in Atelier cul-
turel “Dialogue des peuples et des cultures.” Actes de la Conférence de Paris du 13 au
15 septembre 2006, Conférence organisée par le Ministère français des Affaires étrangères,
avec le concours de la Plate-forme des organisations non-gouvernementales Euromed,
vol. II, [Paris, 2007], 47–50; “La relation de l’Eglise à la culture et la dialectique de
l’eschatologie et de l’histoire,” Istina 55 (2010): 7–25; “Orthodoxy and Hellenism in
Contemporary Greece,” SVTQ 54 (2010): 365–420; “Greek religious nationalism fac-
ing the challenges of evangelization, forgiveness, and reconciliation” (in common with
Nikolaos Asproulis), in Semegnish Asfaw, Alexios Chehadeh, Marian Gh. Simion.
eds., Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2012), 68–89.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 485 1/9/2014 9:26:36 PM

 486 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

independence, becomes thus the very basis of national and

political independence, the status-symbol of a new “Chris-
tian nation” (p. 98).
Schmemann did not fail to then note that negotiations regarding
“autocephaly” were conducted by the respective state rather than
the church; in fact, the Russian Church itself played almost no part
in the negotiations that led to its autocephaly in the 16th century
(p. 99).6
Schmemann continued his analysis by noting
that this new “autocephalous” church, as it appears in
Bulgaria and later in Russia and in Serbia, is not a mere
“jurisdictional” entity. Its main implication is not so much
“independence” (for in fact it is usually totally dependent
on the state) but precisely the national church, or, in other
words, the church as the religious expression and projection
of a nation, as indeed the bearer of a national identity (p. 99).
Somewhat paradoxically, however, Schmemann seems to accept
this concept of the “Christian nation” in the third “level” of our
canonical tradition, stating:
There is no need to consider this as a “deviation”—in merely
negative and disparaging terms. In the history of the Ortho-
dox East, the “Orthodox nation” is not only a reality, but in
many ways a “success”; for in spite of all their deficiencies,
tragedies and betrayals, there indeed were such “realities”
as “Holy Serbia” or “Holy Russia,”7 there truly took place a
national birth in Christ, there appeared a national Christian
vocation—and, historically, the emergence of the national
church, at a time when the ideal and the reality of the universal
Christian empire and its counterpart, the “imperial” church,
were wearing thin, was perfectly justified (p. 99).
“What is not justified, however,” Schmemann concluded,

6 The same thing happened, mutatis mutandis, with the nationally-inspired autoceph-
alies of the Balkan churches in the 19th and 20th centuries.
7 For a critique of such an understanding of “Holy Orthodox Nations,” see Pantélis
Kalaitzidis, “La relation de l’Eglise à la culture et la dialectique de l’eschatologie et de
l’histoire,” Istina 55 (2010): especially 15ff and 18ff.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 486 1/9/2014 9:26:36 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 487

is to confuse this historical development with the essential

ecclesiology and, in fact, to subordinate the latter to the
former. It is when the very essence of the Church began to
be viewed in terms of this nationalism and reduced to it,
that something which in itself was quite compatible with
that “essence” became the beginning of an alarming eccle-
siological deterioration (p. 99).
In the rest of his article (pp. 99–116), Schmemann, responding to
the Greek reactions to the Russian Church’s grant of autocephaly to
its former Metropolia in the USA (with the title: Orthodox Church
in America/OCA), sharply criticized Greek-speaking Orthodoxy’s
obsession with Byzantium, its inability to understand and accept
developments in the Orthodox world after the fall of Byzantium,
and the Greek “imperio-ethnic” ecclesiological conception, which
has its roots in Byzantine theocracy and the enhanced role of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople within the Ottoman millet system
of “religion-nations.”
Fixation on the Past and the Challenge of Globalization
Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with Schmemann’s
extremely interesting analysis, it is evident that our author, although
he lived and theologized in a multicultural society like America, did
not foresee the developments that globalization would bring, nor
the challenge posed by post-national societies. He described the
three “levels” of the canonical tradition, the three ecclesiological
paradigms—the local, imperial, and national—, severely criticizing
the last paradigm as well as the paradoxical and unnatural mixture
of the imperial and national paradigms, but he was unable to
address the rapid developments which, I believe, had already started
to unfold in the America of the 1970s.
As we now know, however, globalization and the reality of
multicultural societies—with the osmosis of peoples, cultures, and
religions—has brought the church and theology face to face with
new challenges, chief of which are pluralism and religious diversity,
which add new dimensions to the discussion about ecclesiology.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 487 1/9/2014 9:26:37 PM

 488 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

The emergence and consolidation of various forms of otherness

(national, racial, religious, ideological, social, age-based, etc.) in
the lives of people and societies led to the loss of homogenized
social and religious spaces and the radical transformation
of traditional, closed societies. The paradoxical postmodern
coexistence or “interpenetration” of otherness and identity, the
local and the universal, coupled with economic development,
the information revolution, abrupt geopolitical changes and the
attendant population movements have brought about radical
transformations and mixtures of populations and cultures that
point toward a “continual passage, overcoming, erosion, or even
the ultimate elimination of borders in the pursuit of ‘a world
without borders.’”8This geographical dimension of globalization,
however—which is central to this issue—also presupposes a process
of sociological order, namely the dramatic condensation and
contraction of space and time, which implies a series of rapid and
far-reaching qualitative transformations of many facets of human
life. Anthony Giddens9 calls this a “remote interaction,” which
was made possible by the development of new, so-called “high”
technology, and its applications in the field of transportation and
communication; in other words, by humankind’s new ability to
shrink distances and subvert our relationship to space and time as
we had previously known it.10 Naturally, this had a direct impact
on the relationship between religion—particularly the Church—
and the political/constitutional concept of the geographical
and national “territory,”11 the structure of the Church and its
8 Antonios Papantoniou, “Globalization, Postmodernity, Multiculturalism,” Indiktos
20 (2006): 84 [in Greek].
9 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990),
63.
10 Antonios Papantoniou, “Globalization, Postmodernity, Multiculturalism,” op. cit., 83.
See also Roland Robertson, Globalization, Social Theory and Global Culture (Lon-
don: Sage, 1992); David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodemity (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989); G. Picco et al., Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilizations (New York:
Seton Hall University, 2001); Zygmunt Bauman, “After the Nation-state—What?,” in
Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
11 On this issue, see these extremely interesting and penetrating works: Bertrand Badie,

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 488 1/9/2014 9:26:37 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 489

constitution, and the discussion about the ecclesiological paradigm

in the era of globalization.
We Orthodox, however, instead of beginning to think about these
issues, have continued to seek solutions solely in the paradigms of
the past, which we often equate with the very truth of the Church
itself. We Orthodox identify so much with Byzantium and its
culture that the Empire’s demise in 1453 appears to have opened
an incurable wound. From that date onwards, we Orthodox have
behaved like orphans. We have had the greatest difficulty overcoming
this historical trauma. We have faced insurmountable obstacles in
trying to find our footing outside the context of the Empire and
monarchy by divine right. We are perpetually nostalgic for this
bygone pre-modern form of political organization, in the place of
which the Great Powers, in the 19th century, gave us the Balkan
monarchies, to which we hastened to attribute a metaphysical or
even sacred dimension, as well as messianic expectations.
At the ecclesiological level, we Orthodox (at least some of us)
seem to have become fixated on the form of the Pentarchy, which
functioned in the theocratic framework of the multinational
Byzantine Empire and which presupposed the communion of local
churches, administratively and hierarchically organized around
the major imperial and metropolitan centers of Old Rome, New
Rome/Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. To
this scheme, some have added the autocephalous Church of Cyprus,
which was recognized by an ecumenical council, while others have
displaced Old Rome in favor of the Church of Russia on the basis
of the thinly-veiled claim to be the “Third Rome.” Many Orthodox,
however, with the same ease with which they accept and assume the
form of the Pentarchy, just as easily also accept and in fact consider
self-evident Orthodoxy’s fragmentation into a plethora of individual
national churches, which are often in conflict with one another,
and which somehow co-exist, each with its own jurisdiction, in

La fin des territoires: essai sur le désordre international et sur l’utilité sociale du respect
(Paris: Fayard, 1995); Pierre Manent, Métamorphoses de la cité: essai sur la dynamique
de l’Occident (Paris: Flammarion, 2010).

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 489 1/9/2014 9:26:37 PM

 490 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

the so-called “diaspora.” This study in contradictions represents “a

blatant denial of all that learned Orthodox delegates to ecumenical
gatherings were at the same time proclaiming to be the ‘essence’ of
Orthodoxy as the True Church and the Una Sancta.”12
To be clear, I am not able, nor do I intend, to lay out in this paper
an ecclesiological paradigm for the age of globalization. I would
like only to expound a few thoughts and to raise the prospect of a
post-national ecclesiology, a line of thinking which presupposes to
a degree—without repeating—the previous discussions here at this
conference, particularly the papers by Professor Paul Meyendorff,
Fr Gregorios Papathomas, and Metropolitan of Pergamon John
Zizioulas, on the impasses caused by national jurisdictions in the
diaspora, the principle of territoriality, the question of primacy, and
the connection between the local and the universal, or ecumenical,
Church. I would even be so bold as to suggest that this paper
continues, to some extent, where His Eminence stopped when
he posed the question of whether ecclesiastical nationalism could
survive in the postmodern era, and whether the potential spread,
with globalization, of transnational configurations could undermine
the very structure of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches.13
The Church as an Icon of the Eschaton in History and
Ethnocentric Ecclesiology
We theologians, when we are asked to speak about such topics,
very often expound wonderful theological syntheses and analyses,
but just as often fail—or refuse—to extrapolate the implications of
our theological positions. We maintain, for example—correctly—
that the Church is a spiritual homeland, a spiritual race, in which
every kind of division (race, language, culture, gender, social class)
is overcome, and where we are inaugurated sacramentally into
the mystery of unity in Christ and the brotherhood of divided
12 Alexander Schmemann, “A Meaningful Storm,” op. cit., 86.
13 On the issue of the resilience of national churches in connection with the question
of the resilience of national borders in the era of globalization and European unifica-
tion, see Grigorios D. Papathomas, “Face au concept ‘d’Eglise nationale,’ la réponse
canonique orthodoxe: L’Eglise autocéphale,” L’année canonique 45 (2003): 168.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 490 1/9/2014 9:26:37 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 491

humanity. That the Church is a new people, a new nation, not

identified with any other people, race, or earthly nation, and that
what characterizes it is not blood ties nor enslavement to physical
characteristics, but—beyond or even before all biological and social
predeterminants—the free, personal response to the call of God,
the free participation in the Body of Christ and the life of grace.14
We also argue that Christians always had a strong sense of being a
nation apart, the new Israel, the new people of God (1 Peter 2:9), a
third race, neither Jews nor Greeks, since Christians, as the apologist
Aristides put it, “trace their origin from the Lord Jesus Christ.”15Or
to recall again the words of Florovsky:
There is, after Christ, but one “nation,” the Christian nation,
genus Christianum—in the ancient phrase, tertium genus—
i.e., precisely the Church, the only people of God, and no
other national description can claim any further Scriptural
warrant: national differences belong to the order of nature
and are irrelevant in the order of grace.16
14 See Georges Florovsky, “On the Veneration of Saints,” in idem, Creation and Redemp-
tion, Volume 3 in the Collected Works of Georges Florovsky (Belmont, MA: Nordland,
1976), 201–2: “In Holy Christening the one to be enlightened leaves ‘this world’
and forsakes its vanity, as if freeing himself and stepping out of the natural order of
things; from the order of ‘flesh and blood’ one enters an order of grace. All inherited
ties and all ties of blood are severed. But man is not left solitary or alone. For accord-
ing to the expression of the Apostle ‘by one Spirit are we all baptized,’ neither Scyth-
ians nor Barbarians—and this nation does not spring through a relationship of blood
but through freedom into one Body.” For a more detailed exposition of this line of
thought, see my article, “The Church and the Nation in Eschatological Perspective,”
in the collected volume: Pantelis Kalaitzidis, ed., The Church and Eschatology, The
Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Winter 2000–2001 Program (Athens: Kastani-
otis, 2003), 339–73 [in Greek; English translation forthcoming in the series: “Doxa
& Praxis: Exploring Orthodox Theology,” Geneva: WCC Publications].
15 Aristides, Apology 15.1. See also Georges Florovsky, “Antinomies of Christian His-
tory: Empire and Desert,” in: idem, Christianity and Culture, Volume 2 in the Col-
lected Works of Georges Florovsky (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1974), 69–70; idem, “Le
Corps du Christ vivant. Une interprétation orthodoxe de l’Eglise,” in  G. Florovsky
et al., eds, La Sainte Eglise Universelle (Neuchâtel-Paris: Delachaux & Nestlé, 1948),
55–57.
16 Georges Florovsky, “Revelation and Interpretation,” in idem, Bible, Church, Tradi-
tion: An Eastern Orthodox View, Volume 1 in the Collected Works of Georges Floro-
vsky (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1972), 35; idem, “Le Corps du Christ vivant. Une

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 491 1/9/2014 9:26:38 PM

 492 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

Yet how is all this translated into the contemporary ecclesiastical

and ecclesiological context? Are we, really, the third race, which has
been inserted into history, or, perhaps, does our national identity take
precedence, determining our attitude toward ecclesiological issues?
If the Church, “through the abundance of grace and the free gift”
(cf. Rom 5:17), constitutes a spiritual race and a spiritual homeland,
can it at the same time turn back to the “shadow of the law” (cf.
Heb 10:1) and the bondage of nature, identifying with a particular
nation and serving the objectives of an earthly, worldly country?
And as legitimate as these objectives may be, can they constitute
the core of ecclesiastical preaching, marginalizing the primary
ecclesiastical events and, above all, the eschatological dimension?
Is it not precisely because of the eschatological dimension that
otherwise commendable patriotism—that which refers to nations
and earthly countries—recedes and is relativized, since eschatology
introduces an entirely different evaluative criterion? What’s more, is
this not the spirit of that which St Gregory Naziansen claimed with
stunning boldness and clarity?
My friend, every one that is of high mind has one Coun-
try, the Heavenly Jerusalem, in which we store up our Citi-
zenship [….] And these earthly countries and families are
the playthings of this our temporary life and scene. For our
country is whatever each may have first occupied, either as
tyrant, or in misfortune; and in this we are all alike strang-
ers and pilgrims, however much we may play with names.17
Of course, the ultimate transcendence of nations is a meta-
historical, eschatological event. We are not talking, then, about
abolishing nations, since then we would be talking about abolishing
history. However, because the Eschaton has broken into history,18

interprétation orthodoxe de l’Eglise,” op. cit., 55–57.

17 Gregory Naziansen, Against the Arians and Concerning Himself (Oration 33, Chap-
ter XII), PG 36, 229A. Translated into English by Charles Gordon Browne & James
Edward Swallow from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 7, ed.
Philip Schaff & Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co.,
1894).
18 See, among others, Savas Agouridis, Time and Eternity (Eschatology and Mysticism)

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 492 1/9/2014 9:26:38 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 493

and because we can speak, in the Orthodox perspective, about an

inaugurated eschatology,19 then the issue of transcending nations has
already begun. If eschatology refers only to life after death or life
after the Second Coming, then the overcoming of nations is a purely
meta-historical event. But if the Eschaton has already begun with
the Resurrection of Christ and Pentecost, then the overcoming of
nations for the sake of unity in Christ has to begin to take place now,
even if only in part. And if the Church is an icon of the Eschaton
in history, then shouldn’t this partial, proleptic, and gradual
overcoming of nations somehow be reflected in the ecclesiological
structures and paradigms? In that case, is the Orthodox Churches’
current dominant ecclesiological structure of nationally-based
autocephaly compatible with the Church’s eschatological nature
and identity? And is it compatible and consistent with the current
socio-cultural context of globalization, which—whether we like it
or not—seems poised to spread everywhere?
The Search for an Ecclesiological Paradigm in the Era of
Globalization and Post-nationalism
Many historians speak today about nations, especially in their
Balkan version, as “imagined communities,20 i.e., as constructions
and later manifestations.21 Regardless of whether one agrees

in the Theological Teachings of John the Theologian (Thessaloniki: Pournaras, 1964),

3, 53 [in Greek]; Petros Vassiliadis, “What the Church Hopes for from Theology,”
Ἐκκλησιαστικὸς Κήρυκας [Church Herald] 7 (1995): 202–3 [in Greek].
19 Georges Florovsky, “The Patristic Age and Eschatology: An Introduction,” in idem,
Aspects of Church History, Volume 4 in the Collected Works of Georges Florovsky (Bel-
mont, MA: Nordland, 1975), 64; idem, “Le Corps du Christ vivant. Une interpréta-
tion orthodoxe de l’Eglise,” op. cit., 30–31; idem, “Revelation and Interpretation,”
op. cit., 36.
20 This term originated in Benedict Anderson’s classic work, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
21 Especially with regards to Greece, see, among others, the continuation of this discus-
sion in Paschalis Kitromilides’s article, “‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of
the National Question in the Balkans,” in the collected volume by Thanos Veremi,
Paschalis Kitromilides, et al., National Identity and Nationalism in Modern Greece
(Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1997), 53–131 [in
Greek]. The counterargument to this type of approach is represented, indicatively, by

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 493 1/9/2014 9:26:38 PM

 494 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

or disagrees with this approach, no one can deny the empirical

reality that various ethno-cultural and ethnic groups today live
in multiracial, multicultural societies. The question, then, is:
What will the Orthodox Church do? Will it continue with its
current ecclesiological scheme, which considers these imagined
“constructions” self-evident? But even if one accepts the reality
and resilience of nations and borders,22 can one continue to ignore
the ethnic diversity and heterogeneity within a country or national
church? Of whom, for example, does the Orthodox Church in
Greece today consist? Exclusively Greeks? Or perhaps a few others
of ethnically Orthodox origins, who for one reason or another have
chosen to live in Greece? How would the principle of territoriality
and the local church be applied in this case? Does it have any
meaning here? Is the Orthodox Church in Greece to be identified
with Orthodox Greeks? Is the local church to be identified with
the national church, or do they ultimately conflict, since, in the
perspective of the local church, all the Orthodox of a specific place
should be actively involved in it, while in the case of the national
church, those who are ethnically “other” are often marginalized or
forced to create separate parishes on a national or ethno-cultural
basis, yet with the blessing and approval of the dominant national
church? Is it, perhaps, time to revisit the basis for the constitution
of the church? Is it national or local? Does it separate the faithful
on the basis of their language and ethno-cultural identity, or does
it unite them on the basis of their common Orthodox faith? To
borrow Schmemann’s framework and terminology, is it perhaps
time—in the face of globalization, multiculturalism, and the
broader economic, political, and post-national configurations23—

Nikos G. Svoronos’s study, The Greek Nation: The Origin and Formation of Modern
Hellenism (Athens: Polis, 2004) [in Greek]. Antonis Liakos, in his book, What Did the
People Who Wanted to Change the World Think of the Nation? (Athens: Polis, 2005),
not only criticizes Svoronos’s perspective on the Greek nation, but also connects the
appearance of nations in modernity more broadly with the idea of social change.
22 See, characteristically, Regis Debray, L’éloge des frontières (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).
23 On the post-national political configurations, see, among others, Jürgen Habermas,
The Post-National Constellation, tr. Max Pensky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 494 1/9/2014 9:26:39 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 495

to talk about a fourth “level” of our canonical tradition, a fourth

ecclesiological paradigm, since the current one, which is nothing
but a corrupted and largely outdated version of the unnatural
combination of the imperial and national, seems to be inadequate
for the current ecclesiastical and political situation?
As Fr Grigorios D. Papathomas points out, the problem is that
the national Church, poorly prepared to meet the challenges
of modern times and especially the events of the immediate
past (from the 1990s onwards), lacks leaders who are prop-
erly educated theologically, and has no idea of its role within
a modern, free, and pluralistic society, whether it be Europe
or the globalized world.24
We Orthodox often invoke the 17th canon of the Fourth
Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon and the 38th canon of the
Quinisext Ecumenical Council in Trullo, as well as St Photius’
later formulation (“The church […] normally follows the changes
of political administration”), to explain why the Church and
ecclesiastical institutions in general conform to the political
schemas and broader political changes. I am forced to skim over,
due to lack of space, my view that the aforementioned canon
does not simply introduce the principle of linking the Church
with politics, or necessitate that the Church conform to political
changes, but that it actually contains the seeds of what could be
considered an early form of contextuality. Focusing on the present
paper, I am compelled to ask what the faithful implementation of
this ecclesiastical canon would look like in the current context of
globalization, with the gradual dissolution of all kinds of borders
(national, geographical, cultural, etc.), and the transcendence of
nation-states in favor of broader configurations, such as the European
Union, from which I will draw my examples?
Of course, in this respect, much depends on the final outcome
of the ongoing European project: i.e., whether the conservative
German policies, which currently dominate, will roll back the
24 Grigorios D. Papathomas, “Face au concept ‘d’Eglise nationale,’ la réponse canonique
orthodoxe: L’Eglise autocéphale,” op.cit., 155.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 495 1/9/2014 9:26:39 PM

 496 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

progress made toward European unity, or whether the pro-European

forces will succeed in pushing for more Europe, and more freedom,
solidarity, and social cohesion. The question, in other words, is
whether the genuinely pro-European forces will reshape their
European vision to make it not only more humane, more hopeful,
and more appealing to all peoples and nations, but also to make it
better able to integrate and creatively assimilate ethnic, cultural, and
religious diversity, cultivating a political, cultural, and institutional
environment within the unity that does not nullify uniqueness
and diversity.25 If, therefore, the path toward European unity is not
derailed by Germany’s current short-sighted policies, and if, within
the next few decades, we have a Europe that stretches from the
Atlantic to the Ukraine, with a common currency, common foreign,
economic, and monetary policies, a further deepening of European
institutions and the acquis communautaire, and the inclusion of
Turkey in one form or another, then the canon that says “The church
[…] normally follows the changes of the political administration”
takes on a completely different meaning for the Orthodox Church’s
canonical organization and ecclesiological paradigm. Of course, the
presupposition and inviolable condition for this perspective is no
longer to see Orthodoxy as an exclusively Balkan or Middle Eastern
affair, for the Orthodox to really and sincerely take a stake in the
European project, and to stop looking at Europe as simply a way
to raise money, recognizing that it is not enough for the Orthodox
Churches to simply open offices in Brussels.

25 On the problems, failures, and prospects of the European project, see, among others,
the text of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, Europe: The Faltering Project,
tr. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Maldin, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 47–105. For a
critique of the German-led European economic policy and an analysis of the pros-
pects of emerging from the crisis, see the text of Habermas’s recent lecture at the
Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) entitled, “Democracy, Solidarity, and the
European Crisis” (www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/
jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis). See also a
critique of the same issue, from a theological perspective, in Pantélis Kalaitzi-
dis, “Ethique évangélique et politique de dette dans l’Europe post-chrétienne,” in
Christine Mengès-Le Pape, ed., La dette, les religions, le droit (Toulouse: Presses de
l’Université Toulouse 1-Capitole, forthcoming).

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 496 1/9/2014 9:26:39 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 497

In 1985, just four years after Greece’s entry into the European
Economic Community (1981), when Greece was politically and
ideologically dominated primarily by the Left, while theology
was at the apex of its anti-westernism—led by the neo-Orthodox
and certain theologians from the generation of the 1960s, most
characteristically Christos Yannaras—John D. Zizioulas, now
Metropolitan of Pergamon, wrote a seminal article entitled, “The
European Spirit and Greek Orthodoxy,” in which he fervently
supported Europe and a European future for both Orthodoxy and
Hellenism.26 As far as I can tell, Orthodox clerics, intellectuals,
theologians from other traditionally Orthodox countries, such as
Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and even Russia and Belarus,
expressed similar views about the relationship between their
countries and Europe.
Now, one could reasonably wonder: what is the relationship
between the Orthodox countries’ views on Europe and the intra-
Orthodox discussion about canonical and ecclesiological issues,
as well as the discussion about a new ecclesiological paradigm
appropriate to today’s context? I think the key is to be found in
contextuality and the principle of covariation (συν-μεταβολὴ)
between the ecclesiastical and the political. And, today, this
principle has two different perspectives/applications: either a
deeper nationalist frenzy and a greater identification of the church
with the state and the nation, as we are seeing particularly in the
case of the largest, most populous, and powerful Orthodox nation;
or a more or less transnational perspective, such as that employed
today especially by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,
which is largely disengaged—although not completely—from
governmental and national entanglements, a perspective closer to
the ecumenical spirit of Orthodoxy and seemingly more compatible
with the inevitable and inexorable process of globalization.27
26 John D. Zizioulas, “The European Spirit and Greek Orthodoxy,” Efthini 163 (1985):
332–33 [in Greek].
27 On the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople facing the challenges of global-
ization, see also Nicolas Kazarian, “Orthodoxie et mondialisation: Une résistance
en mouvement: Etude des paradigmes grecs et russes,” in Christophe Grannec &

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 497 1/9/2014 9:26:39 PM

 498 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

As historians and sociologists have repeatedly observed, the

development of nationalist tendencies are frequently a symptom
of the repression or suppression of nationalist sentiments, which,
when they find an opportunity, often burst out in immature
expressions. If we extrapolate this axiom from the political and
national to the ecclesiastical and ecclesiological, then, after critically
examining the apparent instrumentalization of Orthodoxy and the
role of the individual Orthodox Churches in the awakening of
national sentiments and the formation of national identities, what
we should really wonder is: as understandable and possibly even
legitimate as these movements for autocephaly after liberation from
the Turkish yoke may be, is it now not time for Orthodox peoples
and Orthodox nations, after this phase of immaturity and national
zealotry, to revisit the nation’s role in the life of the Church, as
well as the question of national autocephalies in light of the new
reality that seems to be dawning with the gradual integration of the
Orthodox countries into the European Union? In other words, after
our national revolutions and after supposedly achieving national
independence and, often, the resulting ecclesiastical independence,
after playing with fire and inextricably binding religion and
nation, Orthodoxy and nationalism, is it perhaps not time to
reexamine our positions on all these issues, even those associated
with national autocephalies, which appear to be sacrosanct to the
national and state version of Orthodoxy? Otherwise, one is forced
to wonder when this continual demand for autocephaly will stop,
which paradoxically seems to grow apace with the reverse process
of globalization. Which new nations and states will be granted
ecclesiastical autocephaly, and which won’t? Where will this strange
balkanization and nationalization of the Orthodox Church stop?

Bérengère Massignon, eds., Les religions dans la mondialisation—Entre accultura-

tion et contestation (Paris: Karthala, 2012), 140: “L’Eglise de Constantinople à la
différence des propositions de son homologue moscovite, ne se définit pas tant en
opposition à la mondialisation qu’elle ne tente de lire ce phénomène planétaire à
la lumière de sa propre histoire. Ainsi la globalisation peut-elle aussi être abordée
comme la question de ‘l’universel’ qui, dans le langage théologique s’apparenterait à
l’œcuménicité.”

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 498 1/9/2014 9:26:40 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 499

The short answer is that it won’t, unless we disconnect autocephaly

from the nation and state and connect it instead to the ecclesiological
models of the early Church, since, according to Schmemann,
the first level of primacy is usually that of a “province,” i.e.,
a region in which all bishops, together with the metropol-
itan, take part in the consecration of the bishops of that
region, and meet twice a year as synod. If we had to apply
the notion of “autocephaly” to the early Church it should be
properly applied to this provincial level, for the main mark
of “autocephaly” is precisely the right to elect and to conse-
crate bishops within a given region (p. 92).28
I am not an expert in canon law, but this must have been the function
of the autocephaly given to the Church of Cyprus by the Third
Ecumenical Council in 431. What is certain, in any event, is that,
in the ancient Church, according to Schmemann, autocephaly was
purely ecclesiological and was not intended in any way to contribute
to the formation of national identity or the recognition of a nation,
as has usually been the case since the 19th century.29 Nor, certainly,
28 The Byzantine canonist Balsamon (12th c.) appears to have reached the same conclu-
sion in his commentary on the 2nd canon of the First Council of Constantinople,
when he noted that “formerly all the Metropolitans of provinces were themselves
the heads of their own provinces, and were ordained by their own synods” (English
translation from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series II, Vol. 14, ed. by P. Schaff
and H. Wace [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1899], 177).
See also Fr John Meyendorff ’s comments in his The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox
Church (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1982), 225–26, 243–44.
29 “The equation of religious unity with political unity and later with national iden-
tity became the raison d’être for autocephaly in the Orthodox world. Especially with
the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century, to be a nation meant to have
a church of one’s own, and to be entitled to one’s own state. By contrast, subject
peoples, such as Macedonians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, were described as
‘lacking a true history’; they were said to speak the ‘dialects’ of other ‘historical’ na-
tions and were denied the right to have their own autocephalous churches,” Pedro
Ramet, “Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern
Christianity: An Introduction,” in idem, ed., Eastern Christianity and Politics in the
Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 4–5. See Victor
Roudometof, “Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses
and Institutional Disputes,” Sociology of Religion 69 (2008): 67–91. On the link be-
tween autocephaly and the construction of national identities in the Balkans, see also
the remarks by Nicolas Kazarian, “Orthodoxie et mondialisation: Une résistance en

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 499 1/9/2014 9:26:40 PM

 500 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

did “Orthodox” political powers treat it as an object of political and

diplomatic negotiation, as in the case of the Balkan autocephalies
of the modern era, basically because such authorities did not yet
exist! Examples of granting autocephaly on the basis of “national”
interest, such as the Patriarchate of Tarnovo, the Archdiocese of
Pec, and the Archdiocese of Ohrid, are rather late in comparison
with the ancient Church (they date to the late Byzantine period),
and did not achieve broad recognition and acceptance, since they
were not granted a “Tomos” of autocephaly, and the “primates”
of these autocephalous churches were not commemorated in the
“Diptychs.”30
It is neither possible, within the scope of the current paper, nor my
intention, to expound a detailed proposal for a new ecclesiological
paradigm, or to solve the thorny and intractable ecclesiological
problem of the so-called “diaspora.” Whatever configuration is
eventually adopted and whichever solution is finally found, my
point is that we cannot ignore the lessons of the past, nor can we
refuse to learn from our mistakes. Above all, we cannot continue
to run counter to the core of the Gospel and the key elements of
our theological and ecclesiological consciousness. Furthermore,
the Orthodox cannot reasonably hope for things to improve with
mouvement: Etude des paradigmes grecs et russes,” op. cit., 127: “L’Orthodoxie est
devenue alors la clé des constructions nationalistes, non seulement en Grèce, mais
aussi en Serbie et en Bulgarie, à la même période. La structure administrative des
Eglises orthodoxes se prêtait favorablement au projet nationaliste.”
30 For a broader examination of the complex and much disputed issue of autocephaly, see
Peter (Pierre) L’Huillier, “Problems Concerning Autocephaly,” The Greek Orthodox
Theological Review 24 (1979): 165–91; idem, “Accession to Autocephaly,” SVTQ 37
(1993): 267–304; Vlassios Phidas, “‘Autocephaly and ‘Autonomy’ in the Orthodox
Church,” Nea Sion 71 (1979): 9–32 [in Greek]; idem, “L’Eglise locale—autocéphale
ou autonome—en communion avec les autres Eglises. Autocéphalie et communion,”
in Eglise locale et Eglise universelle, coll. Etudes Théologiques no 1 (Chambésy, Genève:
Centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat œcuménique, 1981), 141–50; John H. Erickson,
“The ‘Autocephalous Church,’” in The Challenge of our Past: Studies in Orthodox Can-
on Law and Church History (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1991) 91–113; idem, “Au-
tocéphalie et Autonomie,” Contacts 243 (2013): 391–412; Grigorios D. Papathomas,
“La dialectique entre ‘nation étatique’ et ‘autocéphalie ecclésiale,’” L’année canonique
43 (2001): 75–92; idem, “Face au concept d’‘Eglise nationale,’ la réponse canonique
orthodoxe: L’Eglise autocéphale,” L’année canonique 45 (2003): 149–70.

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 500 1/9/2014 9:26:40 PM

 Ecclesiology and Globalization 501

regard to the ecclesiological structure and constitution of our

Church without mature ecclesiological reflection disengaged from
state and national interests, and especially without repentance and
courageous self-criticism. Every one of our ethnic groups/churches
must take its own steps on this path of repentance and self-criticism,
and must make its own corrections. It is not for me to speak for
the other Orthodox, but as far as we Greeks are concerned, we will
eventually have to stop seeing ourselves as the center of the world
and Orthodoxy, imagining ourselves as the new chosen people
of God, demanding primacy on the basis of nation or race, and
confusing the history of the divine economy with the history of our
national rebirth.
With the growing spread of globalization and the dissolution
of national and geographical boundaries, I think that the role of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople—a local Orthodox
Church with a long history of ecumenicity and catholicity, which
seems to understand the direction in which global developments are
leading—is unique and indeed vital for pan-Orthodox unity and the
connection between the local and the universal Church, provided,
of course, that the actions and words of its representatives—
particularly in the “diaspora”—give priority to the universal rather
than the Greek, and that worldly national or racial Hellenism
will recede in favor of Christian Hellenism, the Hellenism of the
Gospel, the Councils, the Fathers, and worship.

— Translated by the Rev Dr Gregory Edwards, ThD

SVTQ 57,3-4.indb 501 1/9/2014 9:26:41 PM