BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG

PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides
that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however,
that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a
result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the
approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because
under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to
regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its
territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No.

xxx

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises
regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

xxx

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is
primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public
properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain
degree of regulation over CATV operators.

xxx

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.
210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation
policy over the CATV industry.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory
power of the NTC.

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration
of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor
issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo
cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading
and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading
and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or
independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban
and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and
similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint
against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and
requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a
Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three
(3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police
power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially
regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and
not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant
licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business
permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned
to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was
burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent
City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no
basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the
imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police
power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The
authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially
in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the
Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an
optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the
imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists
in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners
in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in
this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.

FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of
alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct,
finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City
Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to
operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while
declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review
under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has
concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for
review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed
objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals

HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for
which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled
to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal
problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had
identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses
on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of
buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription
against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space
such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the
terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate
the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so
broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment
of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were
submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must
be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.

G.R No. 148408

July 14, 2006

Concepcion Parayno vs. Jose Jovellanos

FACTS:

Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some
residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of
the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal
Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan
recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. Resolution 50
stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which
was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending
that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits
gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any public or private school, public library,
playground, church, and hospital based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the
building nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station.
Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by
Section 21 thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a
previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the
grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against petitioner by
applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section
44. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by the
petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service station as
provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:

The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a
gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said
ordinance. It was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other, which the
respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which
means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section
44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.

The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis
Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the
principle of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the case at bar and that of the
previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already end since the concerns had already
been resolved. The Court stated that an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.

Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408

Subject: Public Corporation

Doctrine: Police power

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer
and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended
to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared
that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.

According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of
Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the
distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were
done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with
commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of
the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most
of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of
traffic.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case
before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but
is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an
invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44.
The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as
defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under
Article 42 of the said official zoning code;”
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.
hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance,
respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section 44 necessarily included “gasoline
filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a “gas service station” did not
automatically embrace those in a “gas filling station.”
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in
ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take
actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given
due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.

A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal
protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.

Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While
it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public
school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding
that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different
local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such
measurement either.

Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial
proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the
immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another
location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we
again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is
more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended “to build such
buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the
proposed location is “in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the
[HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the
Zoning Ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from
enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station
to another location.

Tano vs Socrates GR 110249 21 August 1997

Facts: On 15 December 1992 the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa enacted Ordinance No 15-92 to
establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years;
and on 22 January 1993 acting Mayor Amado Lucero issued Order No 23 to protect the coral in the marine
waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities. The petitioners, invoked the Court for certiorari contending both ordinances for depriving them of
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 15-92 enacted by Sanguniang Panglungsod and Order No 23 by Acting
Mayor Lucero are within the limits of police power?

Decision: Petition dismissed and TRO lifted. Ordinance 15-92 and Order No 23 are valid. The relationship
then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited
acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of
sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinances may not then be controverted.

Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154

Facts

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and
possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the
Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were
charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The
petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges
provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments
as violative of their preferential rights.

Issue

Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the
preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?

Held

No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The
enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the
public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not
absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in
giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the
community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery
laws in their local community.

MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)

Facts:

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private
road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was
apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court
ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then
that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:

Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police
powers?

Ruling:

According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other
lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact ordinances,
approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in
nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, JR.

GR # 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and
inns, was enacted by herein petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police
power of the State in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of
police power on the grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is an exercise of
police power that is violative of the private property rights of individuals.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-
Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in
case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held:

SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social
and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as
it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the
enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a
“regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property, as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies
are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to
all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for
prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of
the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed
the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.