1

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY
INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE
G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO,
SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS,
JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.
MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON
P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN
TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA,
Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization
of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

 "(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of
the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
 2
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case
No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title
to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an
area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui
and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982,
issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same
boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern
side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had
receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of
the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:

It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered
land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940
or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C.
Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict
the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that
the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No.
257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it
 is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366,
Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since
1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not
require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case.
The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the
land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered,
the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to
all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession:
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No.
19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time
that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in
question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
 Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded
by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing
an area of some 458 square meters. 1äwphï1.ñët

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 —
is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of
the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was
not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was
legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners
are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The
question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received
by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain,
however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the
time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in
force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

3
G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989
LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED
CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD
GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA
MAQUINAD, respondent.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo
Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo Apostol the absolute
owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described
as follows:

... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north, by Cagayan River; on the
east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola,
with an assessed value of P3,520. (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)

On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves
Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and
Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-
373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12, 1982.

The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced heirs of
the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue of the late Francisco
Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before July
26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of
a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more
particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on the North, by Cagayan
River;on the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); on the south by Antonio
Carniyan; and on the West by Sabina Mola, ... (p. 2, Record)

that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of Francisco
Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of Francisco Gerardo; that upon the
death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the "motherland" was succeeded by his only
issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, one of
private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa,
Nieves and Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that
in 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad
verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the verbal sale
and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an "Extra-Judicial Partition with
Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Partition, their "motherland" already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the
north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland
and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.

The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first week of October
1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its accretion, they were
prevented and threatened by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to do so. Named defendants in said
case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all
surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children, respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the complaint
stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela
and more particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on the north by Domingo Gerardo;
on the East, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos
Cureg, declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value
of P70.00. (P. 5, Record)

that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated July 24,
1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on
November 25, 1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No.15663 was increased from 2,790 square
meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River, purposely eliminating
completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.

Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-existent; that Antonio
Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by
Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject
land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the
"accretion" for many years now.

The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July 28,1983 (pp. 244-
250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to
September 1982. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo Apostol,
thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and accordingly,
rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made permanent; and 4. ordering
herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of
P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).

On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986.
Hence, this petition for review on the following assigned errors:

A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on the north by the
Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents and not to the petitioners when the
petitioners "Original Certificate of " Title No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is
bounded on its north by the Cagayan River.

B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein petitioners who are
only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the
respondents) could not have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-
2") as he died long before World War II and since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer
stand up to explain his side.

C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it wrongly ruled that
petitioners have never been in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).

D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents who incredibly
claimed that the accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

This petition is impressed with merit.

The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents together with the
accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this decision as the "subject land."

In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which is an accretion
to the registered land while private respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to
their "motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their alleged two and a half (2 & ½)
hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191,
192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of
assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. (Evangelista v.
Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437,
444). For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of
Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan
(petitioners' predecessor-in-interest) pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing
that the boundary of petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by
respondents. The said registered land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos
Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which states
that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.

In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393,401-402, We
ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not
conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates
true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners' OCT No.P-19093
should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit "A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1 "
undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their
claim, which declarations are all in the name of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo,
and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that
Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.

Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the
appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo
Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax declaration,
being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date. Since petitioner's
original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private
respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River,
is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.

It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed
prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is
bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No.
1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093
(Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has
repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax
declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P- 19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.

Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the "subject land" but the
evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the
reason for denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, "... the
defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September, 1982" (p.
121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land
in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that
when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the
west is the land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a
geodetic engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey
the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned
from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an application for
homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the
trial court and the appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to
survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which statement appears only to
be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the
Director of Lands dated August 14,1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of
an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's application was disapproved because in an
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was
found to be occupied and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his
land. It is worthy to note that none of the private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one
of those found occupying and cultivating said accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the "motherland"
through their predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence. The assailed decision of
the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that since the "motherland" exists, it is
also presumed that private respondents were in possession of the "subject land" through their predecessors- in-
interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one of the private
respondents in this case, an interested and biased witness, regarding their possession of the "motherland."
From her testimony on pedigree, the trial court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco
Gerardo, was in possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).

The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by private respondents is
nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and
pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:

To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred
eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and a half (5.5)
hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the
northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30,
1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

4
G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN

LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG &
GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted
testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925,
Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The
shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered
by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in
possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and
Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947.
An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown
with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in
1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-
Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of
Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on
June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among
which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion
on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the
process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they
had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the
eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T)
to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private
respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their
accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and
Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of
Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of
Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and
Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.

In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay,
Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza,
Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong
Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the
Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892,
together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.

SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only
defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan
Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution
pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground
that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a
result of accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to
petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the
sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did
not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden
change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by
Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within
this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the
original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in
nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The
testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one
time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so.
Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when
Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed
in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by
the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of
Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on
from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with
an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was
resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a
homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an
additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions
belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408;
Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams
are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they
are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may
prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567).i•t•c-aüsl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt
change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated
or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New
Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank
a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same
within two years.

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of
land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in
1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the
current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

5
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water-
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was
located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to
respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by
an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.2

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property
for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank;
and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had
not resulted from accretion.3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied
for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five
(1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot
4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their
names with the following technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree
be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF
APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF
THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR
CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A
PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND
THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE
461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the
same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance
from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is
provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case,
Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same
property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38
Rollo).10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was
erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up
of the Parañaque River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their
application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own
and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an
accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the
water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of
their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead,
their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the
RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque
River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was
issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed
between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had
meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot
4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the
current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other
causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform
conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of
land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to
be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045
square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span
of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of
their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which
respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B).
The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the
Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property
was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the
uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque
River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-
002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as
"bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4,
Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’
property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-
up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision
only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is,
indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is
only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil
Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the
river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds
should belong to some other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken
possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their
predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the
following ratiocination, viz:20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years
because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-
000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B.
Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is
not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to
grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of
the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law
which are essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their
favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any
witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree),
which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being
binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent;
and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the
inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court
should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more
than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession
of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their
predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore,
the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L")
which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC –
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of
the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the
application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from
the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its
decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property
"continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had
paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify
the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s
ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim
of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous,
open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an
express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law
itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the
current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not
formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription
in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B
was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they
declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their
alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration
on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty
years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means
without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government.
Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those
intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. As
earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the
Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to
be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek,
based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina
Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the
right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the
same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the
Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry,
cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow
of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its
natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not,
by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject
land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned
provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots
have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river
beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that,
as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry
as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our
earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of
man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled
thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not
where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed
its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title.32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of
course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on
the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the
CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s
nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute.
Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of
whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent
such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the
survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act
validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial
Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of
public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented
by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
1âwphi1

government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated
therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls
within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications
do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the
class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the
effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not
prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not
validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos
III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for
being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

6
G.R. No. 161030 September 14, 2011

JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO FERNANDO
TANGKENCGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS FERNANDO, represented by ALFREDO V. FERNANDO, HEIRS OF
GUILLERMO FERNANDO, represented by Ronnie H. Fernando, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA FERNANDO,
represented by Benjamin Estrella and HEIRS OF GERMOGENA FERNANDO, Petitioners,
vs.
LEON ACUNA, HERMOGENES FERNANDO, HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANTONIO FERNANDO AND FELISA
CAMACHO, represented by HERMOGENES FERNANDO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773,
entitled "Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.," which reversed and set aside the
Decision2 dated May 16, 2002 of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No.
256-M-97.

At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-487
(997)3registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A. Fernando, married to
Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died intestate, the property remained
undivided. Petitioners herein – namely, Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo Fernando, Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario
Fernando Tangkencgo, the heirs of Tomas Fernando, the heirs of Guillermo Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada
Fernando and the heirs of Germogena Fernando – are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased
registered owners. However, petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst
themselves, even after compulsory conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.

Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint4 for partition on April 17, 1997
against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among others, that they and
defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila
Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez. They further claimed that their
predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without instructions as to the disposition of the property left by them
covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). There being no settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful
share because they wish to build up their homes or set up their business in the respective portions that will be
allotted to them. In sum, they prayed that the subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts,
corresponding to the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.

In their Answer5 filed on May 20, 1997, defendants essentially admitted all of the allegations in the complaint.
They alleged further that they are not opposing the partition and even offered to share in the expenses that will
be incurred in the course of the proceedings.

In his Complaint in Intervention6 filed on January 12, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred that in the
Decision7 dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion of the property
identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando, married to Felisa Camacho; (b)
spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco; and (d) Jose
Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. He likewise claimed that in a 1930
Decision of the Cadastral Court, the portion identified as Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people
as well.

Respondent Acuna further alleged that Salud Wisco, through her authorized attorney-in-fact, Amador W. Cruz,
sold her lawful share denominated as Lot 1303-D with an area of 3,818 square meters to Simeon P.
Cunanan,8 who in turn sold the same piece of land to him as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.9 He also belied
petitioners’ assertion that the subject property has not been settled by the parties after the death of the original
owners in view of the Decision10 dated July 30, 1980 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baliuag, Bulacan, in
LRC Case No. 80-389 which ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificates of
title to the claimants of the portion of the subject property designated as Lot 1302.11 Norma Fernando, one of the
petitioners in the instant case, even testified in LRC Case No. 80-389. According to respondent Acuna, this
circumstance betrayed bad faith on the part of petitioners in filing the present case for partition.

Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot prosper since the heirs of the original
owners of the subject property, namely Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo, Leopoldo, Hermogena,
Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly had already sold their respective
one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject property to Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor for the amount of
₱35,000.00 on January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a "Kasulatan sa Bilihang Patuluyan."12 He added that he was
in possession of the original copy of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and that he had not commenced the issuance of
new titles to the subdivided lots because he was waiting for the owners of the other portions of the subject
property to bear their respective shares in the cost of titling.

Subsequently, a Motion for Intervention13 was filed on June 23, 1998 by respondent Hermogenes Fernando
(Hermogenes), for himself and on behalf of the heirs of the late spouses, Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa
Camacho. According to him, in the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Bulacan, their predecessors-in-interest
had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A, 1302-F, 1302-G,14 1302-H and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487
(997) and any adverse distribution of the properties would cause respondents damage and prejudice. He would
also later claim, in his Answer-in-Intervention,15 that the instant case is already barred by res judicata and,
should be dismissed.

In the interest of substantial justice, the trial court allowed the respondents to intervene in the case.

The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings on May 7,
1999.16 However, the trial court denied said motion in a Resolution17 dated August 23, 1999 primarily due to the
question regarding the ownership of the property to be partitioned, in light of the intervention of respondents
Acuna and Hermogenes who were claiming legal right thereto.

In their Manifestation18 filed on April 12, 2000, petitioners affirmed their execution of a Deed of Sale in favor of
Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor in 1978, wherein they sold to her 1,000 square meters from Lot 1303 for the
sum of ₱ 35,000.00.

After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon testified that
they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997) but only the area referred
to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also admitted that Lot 1302 had already been divided into ten (10)
sublots and allocated to various owners pursuant to the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan
and these owners already have their own titles. She likewise claimed that the entire area consisting of Lot 1303
and Sapang Bayan is based on the subdivision plan of Lot 1303. She admitted that plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-
interest was only allocated a portion of Lot 1303 based on the said plan. However, she claimed that the
November 29, 1929 Decision subdividing Lot 1303 was never implemented nor executed by the parties.19

Petitioner Norma Fernando testified on October 3, 2000 that she is one of the children of Jose A. Fernando and
Lucila Tinio. She affirmed that plaintiffs were only claiming Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also testified that
Sapang Bayan was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously a river until it dried up. Unlike Lot 1302,
the rest of the property was purportedly not distributed. She likewise averred that she is aware of a November
29, 1929 Decision concerning the distribution of Lot 1303 issued by the cadastral court but insisted that the basis
of the claims of the petitioners over Lot 1303 is the title in the name of her ascendants and not said Decision.20

On November 16, 2000, as previously directed by the trial court and agreed to by the parties, counsel for
respondent Hermogenes prepared and submitted an English translation of the November 29, 1929 Decision.
The same was admitted and marked in evidence as Exhibit "X"21 as a common exhibit of the parties. The
petitioners also presented Alfredo Borja, the Geodetic Engineer who conducted a relocation survey of the
subject property.

After plaintiffs rested their case, respondent Hermogenes testified on December 7, 2000. In his testimony, he
claimed to know the plaintiffs and defendants as they were allegedly his relatives and neighbors. He confirmed
that according to the November 29, 1929 Decision, portions of Lot 1303 was designated as Lots 1303-A, 1303-
B, 1303-C and 1303-D which were adjudicated to certain persons, including Jose Fernando, while the rest of Lot
1303 was adjudicated to his parents, Antonio A. Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. According to respondent
Hermogenes, his family’s tenant and the latter’s children occupied the portion of Lot 1303 allotted to his
(Hermogenes) parents while the rest of Lot 1303 was occupied by the persons named in the said November 29,
1929 Decision. He admitted, however, that nobody among the purported possessors of Lot 1303 registered the
lots assigned to them in the Decision.22

On January 18, 2001, respondent Hermogenes presented a witness, Engineer Camilo Vergara who testified that
the subject land is divided into Lots 1302 and 1303 with a creek dividing the two lots known as Sapang Bayan.
He also identified a Sketch Plan numbered as PSD-45657 and approved on November 11, 1955.23 During the
hearing on January 30, 2001, respondent Hermogenes made an oral offer of his evidence and rested his case.
On the same date, respondent Acuna, in lieu of his testimony, offered for the parties to simply stipulate on the
due execution and authenticity of the Deeds of Sale dated April 6, 1979 and December 28, 1980, showing the
transfer of Lot 1303-D from Salud Wisco to Simeon Cunanan and subsequently to respondent Acuna. When
counsel for plaintiffs and defendants agreed to the stipulation, albeit objecting to the purpose for which the deeds
of sale were offered, the trial court admitted Acuna’s exhibits and Acuna rested his case.24

On February 15, 2001, plaintiffs recalled Norma Fernando as a rebuttal witness. In her rebuttal testimony, she
identified the tax declaration25 over the said property in the name of Jose A. Fernando; an official receipt26 dated
October 3, 1997 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan for payment of real
property taxes from 1991 to 1997; and a real property tax clearance27 dated October 6, 1997, to show that
plaintiffs have allegedly been paying the real property taxes on the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487
(997). However, she further testified that they were now willing to pay taxes only over the portion with an area of
44,234 square meters, which is included in their claim.28

In a Decision dated May 16, 2002, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs and defendants (petitioners herein) were
indeed the descendants and successors-in-interest of the registered owners, Jose A. Fernando (married to
Lucila Tinio) and Antonia Fernando (married to Felipe Galvez), of the property covered by OCT No. RO-487
(997). After finding that the parties admitted that Lot 1302 was already distributed and titled in the names of third
persons per the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan the trial court proceeded to rule on the
allocation of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.

With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court,
adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando’s share to Lot 1303-C, was never
implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said decision has already
prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot 1303 to the ownership of
spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT
No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners as successors-in-interest of said
registered owners. Excluded from the partition, however, were the portions of the property which petitioners
admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor and respondent Acuna.

As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the same had not been alleged in the pleadings
nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the parties failed to
clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or Lot 1303. Neither was
there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or that it was an accretion which the adjoining
lots gradually received from the effects of the current of water. It was likewise not established who were the
owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court concluded that none of the parties had clearly and
sufficiently established their claims over Sapang Bayan.

The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the reversion of Lot 1303,
except the portions allotted to Acuna and Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor, to the ownership of Jose Fernando
and Lucia Tinio and Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. 997 and thereafter allowing the
partition of said Lot 1303 among the plaintiffs and the defendants as successors-in-interest of Jose and Lucia as
well as Antonia and Felipe after the settlement of any inheritance tax, fees, dues and/or obligation chargeable
against their estate.29

All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this case to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed November 24, 2003 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 16, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 256-M-97, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the complaint dated April 17, 1997 filed by plaintiffs-appellants is dismissed. Costs against plaintiffs-
appellants.30

Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our review through the instant petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan portion of the piece of land covered
by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the descendants and heirs of the late
spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez;

2. Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of title is
the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.31

The petition is without merit.

Petitioners based their claims to the disputed areas designated as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan on their
ascendants’ title, OCT No. RO-487 (997), which was issued on February 26, 1927 in the name of Jose A.
Fernando married to Lucila Tinio and Antonia A. Fernando married to Felipe Galvez. The Court now rules on
these claims in seriatim.
Petitioners’ claim with respect to Lot 1303

As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan (in
Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was written in Spanish, Lot 1303 had already
been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia A. Fernando and
Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison;
and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent Acuna derived his title. The English
translation of the said November 29, 1929 Decision was provided by respondent Hermogenes and was adopted
by all the parties as a common exhibit designated as Exhibit "X." The agreed English translation of said Decision
reads:

Lot No. 1303 – This lot is decreed in record No. 448, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25414 and actually with Original
Certificate No. 997 (exhibited today) in the name of Jose A. Fernando and Antonia A. Fernando, who now pray
that said lot be subdivided in accordance with the answers recorded in the instant cadastral record, and the
sketch, Exh. "A", which is attached to the records.

A part or portion of the lot has been claimed by Antonio A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felisa Camacho;
another portion by the spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; another portion by Antonia A. Fernando, of
legal age, married to Felipe Galvez; another portion by Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Lucila Tinio;
and another portion by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, both of legal age. The part claimed by
the spouses Jose A. Martinez and Gregoria Sison is Lot 1303-A of Exh. A; the part claimed by Antonia A.
Fernando is Lot 1303-B of said exhibit; the part claimed by Jose A. Fernando is Lot 1303-C of said exhibit, and
the part claimed by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco is Lot 1303-D of the aforementioned
Exhibit.

The subdivision of said lot is hereby ordered, separating from the same the portions that correspond to each of
the claimants, which portions are known as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C, and 1303-D in the sketch, Exh. "A",
and once subdivided, are adjudicated in favor of the spouses, Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison, of legal age,
Lot No. 1303-A, in favor of Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felipe Galvez, Lot No. 1303-B; in favor
of Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Lucila Tinio, Lot 1303-C; in favor of the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz
and Salud Wisco, of legal age, Lot 1303-D; and the rest of Lot 1303 is adjudged in favor of Antonio A. Fernando
married to Felisa Camacho. It is likewise ordered that once the subdivision plan is approved, the same be
forwarded by the Director of Lands to this Court for its final decision.

It is ordered that the expense for mentioned subdivision, shall be for the account of the spouses Jose Martinez
and Gregoria Sison, Antonia A. Fernando, Jose A. Fernando, the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco,
and Antonio A. Fernando.32

From the foregoing, it would appear that petitioners’ ascendants themselves petitioned for the cadastral court to
divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were only allocated Lots 1303-B and 1303-C. Still,
as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never fully implemented in the sense that the
persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots assigned to them without having complied with the
other directives of the cadastral court which would have led to the titling of the properties in their names.
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and,
subsequently, their heirs and assigns have since been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their
respective lots for more than seventy (70) years until the filing of the suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by
petitioners which is the subject matter of this case. Respondent Hermogenes, who testified that petitioners were
his relatives and neighbors, further affirmed before the trial court that the persons named in the November 29,
1929 Decision took possession of their respective lots:

ATTY. VENERACION:

Q – This Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio, you testified earlier are the parents of the plaintiffs. Did they
take possession of lot 1303-C?

A – Yes, sir. They took possession.

Q – Did they take possession of the other lots?

A – No. Yes, the portion…

Q – The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they take possession of that?

A – Yes, they took took possession of the other… No, sir.

Q – I am asking you whether they took possession, the children…

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

The questions are already answered, your Honor.

ATTY. VENERACION:

What is the answer?

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

It’s in the record.

COURT:

The persons named in the Decision already took possession of the lots allotted to them as per that Decision. So
that was already answered. Anything else?

ATTY. VENERACION;

No more question, Your Honor.33

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not dispute that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the cadastral court
already adjudicated the ownership of Lot 1303 to persons other than the registered owners thereof. Petitioners
would, nonetheless, claim that respondents’ purported failure to execute the November 29, 1929 Decision over
Lot 1303 (i.e., their failure to secure their own titles) meant that the entire Lot 1303 being still registered in the
name of their ascendants rightfully belongs to them. This is on the theory that respondents’ right to have the said
property titled in their names have long prescribed.

On this point, we agree with the appellate court.

Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states that
"[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover possession of registered land is
imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership.34

However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,35 the Court had recognized the
jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is true that a Torrens title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his
registered property by reason of laches.

Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,36 the Court had held that while a person may not acquire
title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original
registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such
property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion,37 we similarly held that while jurisprudence
is settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally an abundance of cases
where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to recover possession of property
through the equitable principle of laches.

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in equity.38 The essential elements of laches
are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant’s rights after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after
he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is
accorded to the complainant.39

In view of respondents’ decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of a court
judgment and the erstwhile registered owners’ inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to recover the same, it is clear that
respondents’ possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the registered owners as well as their
successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by
laches.

In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners’ ascendants wrongfully
included lots belonging to third persons.40 Indeed, petitioners’ ascendants appeared to have acknowledged this
fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to subdivide Lot 1303 as evident in the
November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur with the Court of Appeals that petitioners’ ascendants held the
property erroneously titled in their names under an implied trust for the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of
the Civil Code provides:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their title over
the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.41 As
we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42 the essence of an action for reconveyance is that the certificate of title is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, in this case its title, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It
is settled in jurisprudence that mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.43

We cannot subscribe to petitioners’ argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have under the
November 29, 1929 Decision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully execute the same. We again
concur with the Court of Appeals in this regard. An action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. However, this Court has ruled that the ten-year
prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a
person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual
possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right.44

Petitioners’ claim with respect to Sapang Bayan

As for the issue of the ownership of Sapang Bayan, we sustain the appellate court insofar as it ruled that
petitioners failed to substantiate their ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. The said principle is embodied in Article 457 of the
Civil Code which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." We have held that for Article 457 to apply
the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks of rivers.45 The character of the Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is
being referred to in the provision which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to
support this assertion.

In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how Sapang Bayan came about.
Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed connected to the main
river could not be ascertained.
Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 146 and Article 502,
paragraph 147 of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In the absence of
any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some other person, it must continue to belong
to the State.

We ruled on this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals,48 to wit:

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private respondents.
These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the
public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
They are not open to registration under the Land Registration act. The adjudication of the lands in question as
private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.491avv phi 1

Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of public
dominion:

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow
of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its
natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not,
by itself, alter its inalienable character.51

Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be adjudged to any of
the parties in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 24,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

7
G.R. No. 178906 February 18, 2009
ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S. MAGLUNOB, and ROMEO SALIDO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated 27 October 2006 and Resolution2 dated 29 June
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court affirmed the
Decision3dated 12 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Kalibo,
Aklan, in Civil Case No. 5511, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6 April 1998 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, in Civil Case No. 156; and declared5 the herein respondent-
Spouses Martin and Lourdes Maglunob (Spouses Maglunob) and respondent Romeo Salido (Romeo) as the
lawful owners and possessors of Lot 12897 with an area of 982 square meters, more or less, located in Maloco,
Ibajay, Aklan (subject property). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied herein petitioner Elvira T.
Arangote’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the subject
property, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.6 Respondents Martin (Martin II)
and Romeo are first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan (Esperanza), from whom
petitioner acquired the subject property.

The Petition stems from a Complaint7 filed by petitioner and her husband against the respondents for Quieting of
Title, Declaration of Ownership and Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 156.

The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by virtue
of a notarized Partition Agreement8 dated 29 April 1985, executed by the latter’s heirs. Thereafter, Esperanza
declared the subject property in her name for real property tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No.
16218 (1985).9

The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985, Esperanza executed a Last Will and
Testament10 bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her husband, but it was never probated. On 9
June 1986, Esperanza executed another document, an Affidavit,11 in which she renounced, relinquished, waived
and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and participation whatsoever in the subject property in favor of
petitioner and her husband. On the basis thereof, Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of Esperanza was
cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1666612(1987) was issued in the name of the petitioner and her husband.

In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject property. On 26 March 1993, OCT No.
CLOA-1748 was issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the name of petitioner,
married to Ray Mars E. Arangote. However, respondents, together with some hired persons, entered the subject
property on 3 June 1994 and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house, which effectively
blocked the entrance to its main door.

As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to institute Civil Case No. 156.

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156, respondents averred that they co-owned the subject
property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in
equal shares, from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia passed away, their
shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject property
was co-owned by Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and respondent Romeo,
each holding a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus, Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and
interest over the entire subject property in favor of the petitioner.

Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that petitioner and her husband, by means of fraud, undue
influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to
the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986, wherein she renounced all her rights and interest over the subject property in
favor of petitioner and her husband. Respondents thus prayed that the OCT issued in petitioner’s name be
declared null and void insofar as their two-thirds shares are concerned.
After trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated 6 April 1998 in Civil Case No. 156, declaring petitioner and her
husband as the true and lawful owners of the subject property. The decretal portion of the MCTC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband] the true, lawful and exclusive owners and entitled to
the possession of the [subject property] described and referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names of the [petitioner and her husband];

B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone hired by, acting or working for them, to cease and
desist from asserting or claiming any right or interest in, or exercising any act of ownership or possession
over the [subject property];

C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner and her husband] the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
attorney’s fee. With cost against the [respondents].13

The respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC Decision to the RTC. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5511.

Respondents argued in their appeal that the MCTC erred in not dismissing the Complaint filed by the petitioner
and her husband for failure to identify the subject property therein. Respondents further faulted the MCTC for not
declaring Esperanza’s Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 -- relinquishing all her rights and interest over the subject
property in favor of petitioner and her husband -- as null and void insofar as respondents’ two-thirds share in the
subject property is concerned.

On 12 September 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MCTC Decision dated 6 April 1998. The
RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners and possessors
of the entire subject property. The RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED;

2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob are declared the lawful owners and
possessors of the whole [subject property] as described in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as against the
[herein petitioner and her husband].

3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to immediately turn over possession of the [subject property]
to the [respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob; and

4) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to pay [respondents] attorney’s fees of ₱5,000.00, other
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00, moral damages of ₱10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.14

Petitioner and her husband filed before the RTC, on 26 September 2000, a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration15 on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance16 dated 23
September 2000, and notice17 of the same, which were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in behalf of
her husband,18 during the lifetime of Esperanza. In the RTC Order19 dated 2 May 2001, however, the RTC
denied the aforesaid Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration.

The petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition for Review, under Rule 42 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, before the Court of Appeals, where the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.

In their Petition before the appellate court, petitioner and her husband raised the following errors committed by
the RTC in its 12 September 2000 Decision:

I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];

II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob as the lawful
owners and possessors of the whole [subject property];
 III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the name of [herein petitioner] Elvie T. Arangote as null
and void;

IV. It erred in denying [petitioner and her husband’s] [M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial or [R]econsideration dated
[26 September 2000; and

V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her husband] as possessors in good faith.20

On 27 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the Petition for Review of petitioner and
her husband and affirming the RTC Decision dated 12 September 2000. Petitioner and her husband’s
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 29
June 2007.

Hence, petitioner21 now comes before this Court raising in her Petition the following issues:

I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared the [petitioner and her husband’s title to the subject property] null and void;

II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
declared the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; and

III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rejected petitioner’s claim as possessors (sic) in good
faith, hence, entitled to the rights provided in [Article] 448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.22

Petitioner contends that the aforesaid OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued in her name on 26 March 1993 and was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Aklan on 20 April 1993. From 20 April 1993 until the institution of Civil
Case No. 156 on 10 June 1994 before the MCTC, more than one year had already elapsed. Considering that a
Torrens title can only be attacked within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration on
the ground of fraud and that such attack must be through a direct proceeding, it was an error on the part of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals to declare OCT No. CLOA-1748 null and void.

Petitioner additionally posits that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed a mistake in declaring null
and void the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 executed by Esperanza, waiving all her rights and interest over the
subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Esperanza’s Affidavit is a valid and binding proof of the
transfer of ownership of the subject property in petitioner’s name, as it was also coupled with actual delivery of
possession of the subject property to petitioner and her husband. The Affidavit is also proof of good faith on the
part of petitioner and her husband.

Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake of argument, that Esperanza’s Affidavit is null and void,
petitioner and her husband had no knowledge of any flaw in Esperanza’s title when the latter relinquished her
rights to and interest in the subject property in their favor. Hence, petitioner and her husband can be considered
as possessors in good faith and entitled to the rights provided under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

This present Petition is devoid of merit.

It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and weigh
evidence by the parties all over again. This Court’s jurisdiction is, in principle, limited to reviewing errors of law
that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals.23 This rule, however, is subject to several
exceptions,24 one of which is present in this case, i.e., when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory.

In this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as regards the origin of the subject property are in conflict with the
findings of fact of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court will have to examine the records to
determine first the true origin of the subject property and to settle whether the respondents have the right over
the same for being co-heirs and co-owners, together with their grand aunt, Esperanza, before this Court can
resolve the issues raised by the petitioner in her Petition.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
as regards the origin of the subject property and the fact that respondents, with their grand aunt Esperanza,
were co-heirs and co-owners of the subject property.

The records disclosed that the subject property was part of a parcel of land25 situated in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan,
consisting of 7,176 square meters and commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings Pantaleon Maglunob
(Pantaleon) and Placida Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon the death of Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving
and legal heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July 1981,26 however, the
Deed was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died without issue, his one-half share in the parcel of land
he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four siblings (or their respective heirs, if already deceased), namely:
Placida, Luis, Martin I, and Victoria, in equal shares.

According to the aforementioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate, the surviving and legal
heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have the parcel of land commonly owned by the siblings declared for
real property tax purposes in the name of Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida’s husband. Thus, Tax
Declarations No. 5988 (1942),27 No. 6200 (1945)28 and No. 7233 (1953)29 were all issued in the name of
Victorino.

Since Martin I already passed away when the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate was
executed, his heirs30 were represented therein by Esperanza. By virtue of the said Deed, Martin I received as
inheritance a portion of the parcel of land measuring 897 square meters.

After the death of Victorino, his heirs31 executed another Partition Agreement on 29 April 1985, which was
notarized on the same date. The Partition Agreement mentioned four parcels of land. The subject property,
consisting of a portion of the consolidated parcels 1, 2, and 3, and measuring around 982 square meters, was
allocated to Esperanza. In comparison, the property given to Esperanza under the Partition Agreement is bigger
than the one originally allocated to her earlier under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate
dated July 1981, which had an area of only 897 square meters. It may be reasonably assumed, however, that
the subject property, measuring 982 square meters, allocated to Esperanza under the Partition Agreement dated
29 April 1985, is already inclusive of the smaller parcel of 897 square meters assigned to her under the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate dated July 1981. As explained by the RTC in its 12 September
2000 Decision:

The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein petitioner and her husband] and that which is claimed by
the [herein respondents] are one and the same, the difference in area and technical description being due to the
repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of land originally co-owned by Pantaleon Maglunob and his sister
Placida Maglunob and subsequently declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax Declaration No. 5988 of
1949.32

It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of the
other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I. Though in the
Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so
not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not mean that Esperanza was
already the exclusive owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of
Martin I. This is clear from the sketch33 attached to the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985, which reveals
the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two siblings, Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original
owners of the whole parcel of land34 from which the subject property was taken.

Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition Agreement was executed by and among the son, grandsons,
granddaughters and cousins of Victorino. Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of Victorino,
as she was only Victorino’s grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I, Esperanza’s father. In effect,
therefore, the subject property allotted to Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive share, as
she holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was already deceased at the time the
Partition Agreement was made.

To further bolster the truth that the subject property was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit she
executed in favor of petitioner and her husband on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:

That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and participation
whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their heirs,
successors, and assigns including the improvement found thereon;35
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject property, she would have simply waived her rights to and interest
in the subject property, without mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the same. By including such words
in her Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver, renunciation, and quitclaim to her one-third
share and participation in the subject property.

Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently as they
are interrelated.

In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed by
Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and participation over the same in favor of
the petitioner and her husband.

A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact,
a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject
property to petitioner and her husband.

As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under the said Affidavit, the donation is
regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code.36 Article
749 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not
take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.

From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real property, to
wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made either in
the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.

This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed by Esperanza relinquishing
her rights, share, interest and participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner and her husband
suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites of the law.

In Sumipat v. Banga,37 this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor
duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the Deed of Donation fails to show
the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given
to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.38

In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first requisite, as it
was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third
requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband either in the
same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation, there
was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null and void.

The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice40 of such
acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner
several years after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its Decision dated
12 September 2000, although it was still during Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere
afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what was a defective donation.

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof
that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and
the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in
both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed
of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For
this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.

With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and void
Esperanza’s Affidavit.

The next issue to be resolved then is whether the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred in declaring OCT
No. CLOA-1748 in the name of petitioner and her husband null and void.

Again, this Court answers the said issue in the negative.

Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Such proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. The judicial action required to challenge
the validity of title is a direct attack, not a collateral attack.42

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin
its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title
may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.43

A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the complaint
becomes the defendant. It stands on the same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were, an
independent action.44

In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title filed by the petitioner and her husband before the MCTC,
respondents included therein a Counterclaim wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in their
affirmative defenses, the most essential of which was their claim that petitioner and her husband -- by means of
fraud, undue influence and deceit -- were able to make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was already old and
illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and quitclaimed all her rights and
interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. In addition, respondents maintained in
their Answer that as petitioner and her husband were not tenants either of Esperanza or of the respondents, the
DAR could not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and her husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the
respondents prayed, in their counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156 before the MCTC, that OCT No. CLOA-1748
issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar as their
two-thirds shares in the subject property are concerned.

It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim was a direct attack on petitioner’s certificate of title.
Furthermore, since all the essential facts of the case for the determination of the validity of the title are now
before this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate cancellation proceeding would be pointlessly
circuitous and against the best interest of justice.

Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of petitioner’s claim to the subject property, has been declared
null and void. Moreover, petitioner and her husband were not tenants of the subject property. In fact, petitioner
herself admitted in her Complaint filed before the MCTC that her husband is out of the country, rendering it
impossible for him to work on the subject property as a tenant. Instead of cultivating the subject property,
petitioner and her husband possessed the same by constructing a house thereon. Thus, it is highly suspicious
how the petitioner was able to secure from the DAR a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over the
subject property. The DAR awards such certificates to the grantees only if they fulfill the requirements of
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).45 Hence, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and void OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of the
petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
Considering that Esperanza died without any compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation of her one-third
share in the subject property per her Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already declared null and void,
Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property passed on to her legal heirs, the respondents.

As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the rights
provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

This claim is untenable.

The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:

Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessor by
extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Every possessor in good faith
becomes a possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he believed to be true is not
so.46

In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the subject property was issued and
registered in petitioner’s name on 26 March 1993, respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993 before
the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of petitioner to the subject property on the
basis that said property constitutes the inheritance of respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza, so
Esperanza had no authority to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner. From that moment, the good
faith of the petitioner had ceased.

Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because the rights
mentioned therein are applicable only to builders in good faith and not to possessors in good faith.

Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith of the house on the subject property. In the
context that such term is used in particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is
one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its owner and unaware of
any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.47

The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 1avv phi1

Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity.

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to
pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Under the foregoing provisions, the builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The
choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to instead remove it from the land. In order, however, that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit
and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to
prove good faith on his part.48

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of
his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.49

In this case, the subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her husband in the
Affidavit was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did not even bother to look
into the origin of the subject property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to relinquish the same. Thus, when
petitioner and her husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be considered to have acted in good faith
as they were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an Affidavit relinquishing in their favor the subject
property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or
circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule that a tax
declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not
proof of ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts nor
a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a right to possess realty when
not supported by other effective proofs.50

With the foregoing, the petitioner is not entitled to the rights under Article 448 and 546 as the petitioner is not a
builder and possessor in good faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970, dated 27 October 2006 and 29 June 2007, respectively, affirming
the RTC Decision dated 12 September 2000 in Civil Case No. 5511 and declaring the respondents the lawful
owners and possessors of the subject property are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 160132 April 17, 2009

SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA, NAZARETO, NEOLANDA, all surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA NARANJA-
RUBINOS, NILDA NARANJA-LIMANA, and NAIDA NARANJA-GICANO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P. BELARDO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA
CORDERO, and THE LOCAL REGISTER OF DEEDS, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 13, 2002 and
Resolution2dated September 24, 2003 which upheld the contract of sale executed by petitioners’ predecessor,
Roque Naranja, during his lifetime, over two real properties.

Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of 136 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18764. Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2, of the same
subdivision plan, which he co-owned with his brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja. When Placido died, his
one-third share was inherited by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida and Neolanda, all surnamed
Naranja, herein petitioners. Lot No. 2 is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the names of Roque, Gabino and the
said children of Placido. TCT No. T-18762 remained even after Gabino died. The other petitioners — Serafin
Naranja, Raul Naranja, and Amelia Naranja-Rubinos — are the children of Gabino.3

The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his properties,
Roque was being paid ₱200.00 per month by the company.4

In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children, lived with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo), in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. At that time, a catheter was attached to Roque’s body to help him urinate. But
the catheter was subsequently removed when Roque was already able to urinate normally. Other than this and
the influenza prior to his death, Roque had been physically sound.5

Roque had no other source of income except for the ₱200.00 monthly rental of his two properties. To show his
gratitude to Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4 and his one-third share in Lot No. 2 to Belardo on August 21, 1981,
through a Deed of Sale of Real Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio Sanicas. The Deed of Sale
reads:

I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of Bacolod City, do hereby declare that I am
the registered owner of Lot No. 4 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of 136 square
meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot No. 2, situated
at the City of Bacolod, consisting of 151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-18762 and my share in the aforesaid Lot No. 2 is one-third share.

That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
other valuable consideration, receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction, by these
presents, I hereby transfer and convey by way of absolute sale the above-mentioned Lot No. 4 consisting of 136
square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and my one-third share in Lot No. 2, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762, in favor of my sister LUCILIA P. BELARDO, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married to Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, her heirs, successors
and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 21st day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.

(SGD.)
ROQUE NARANJA6

Roque’s copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration of the
deed of sale and transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be registered because Belardo
did not have the money to pay for the registration fees.7

Belardo’s only source of income was her store and coffee shop. Sometimes, her children would give her money
to help with the household expenses, including the expenses incurred for Roque’s support. At times, she would
also borrow money from Margarita Dema-ala, a neighbor.8 When the amount of her loan reached ₱15,000.00,
Dema-ala required a security. On November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala,
covering his two properties in consideration of the ₱15,000.00 outstanding loan and an additional ₱15,000.00,
for a total of ₱30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted Roque to execute the deed of sale himself since
the properties were still in his name. Belardo merely acted as a witness. The titles to the properties were given to
Dema-ala for safekeeping.9
Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used for his
treatment while the rest was spent for his burial.10

In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the certificates of
title to Belardo, who, in turn, gave them back to Atty. Sanicas.11

Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of Placido and Gabino Naranja, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs12 on October 11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4. On February 19,
1986, petitioner Amelia Naranja-Rubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two TCTs, together with the
lease agreement with Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account of the loan being proposed by
Belardo to her. Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs notarized on February 25,
1986. With Roque’s copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their possession, they succeeded in having it cancelled and a
new certificate of title, TCT No. T-140184, issued in their names.13

In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was
compelled to file a petition with the RTC to direct the Register of Deeds to annotate the deed of sale even
without a copy of the TCTs. In an Order dated June 18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only
succeeded in registering the deed of sale in TCT No. T-18762 because TCT No. T-18764 had already been
cancelled.14

On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a certificate of authorization, giving Belardo’s daughter,
Jennelyn P. Vargas, the authority to collect the payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. But it appeared from
the company’s Advice of Fixed Payment that payment of the lease rental had already been transferred from
Belardo to Amelia Naranja-Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo,15 through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a suit for
reconveyance with damages. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo as the sole
legal owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, and TCT No. T-
140184, and ordering petitioners to reconvey to her the subject property and to pay damages. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 7144.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title with
damages, praying, among others, that judgment be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. T-18762. This case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 7214.

On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in the consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial court
noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in form since it did not contain a technical description of the subject
properties but merely indicated that they were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-18764 consisting of 136 square
meters, and one-third portion of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial court held that, being defective
in form, the Deed of Sale did not vest title in private respondent. Full and absolute ownership did not pass to
private respondent because she failed to register the Deed of Sale. She was not a purchaser in good faith since
she acted as a witness to the second sale of the property knowing that she had already purchased the property
from Roque. Whatever rights private respondent had over the properties could not be superior to the rights of
petitioners, who are now the registered owners of the parcels of land. The RTC disposed, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.

2. Civil Case No. 7214.

a) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981, executed by Roque Naranja, covering his
one-third (1/3) share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-886, being a
portion of the consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B, 240-C and 240-D, described on plan, Psd-
33443 (LRC) GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered as Doc. No. 80,
Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of 1981 of Notary Public Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod City, as
null and void and of no force and effect;

b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762;
 c) Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-in-interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00
as attorney’s fees, the amount of ₱500.00 as appearance fees.

Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.16

On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA held that the unregisterability of a deed of
sale will not undermine its validity and efficacy in transferring ownership of the properties to private respondent.
The CA noted that the records were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged vitiation of Roque’s consent to
the sale; hence, there is no reason to invalidate the sale. Registration is only necessary to bind third parties,
which petitioners, being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are not. The trial court erred in applying Article 1544 of the
Civil Code to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers of the said properties. Hence, it is not
significant that private respondent failed to register the deed of sale before the extrajudicial settlement among
the heirs. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs of Roque Naranja
adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs – 886 of the
Bacolod Cadastre is hereby declared null and void for want of factual and legal basis. The certificate of
title issued to the heirs of Roque Naranja (Transfer Certificate of [T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a
consequence of the void extra-judicial settlement is hereby ordered cancelled and the previous title to
Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764, is hereby ordered reinstated. Lucilia Belardo is
hereby declared the sole and legal owner of said Lot No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of the same
consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod Cadastre, by virtue of the deed of sale thereof in her favor dated
August 21, 1981.

SO ORDERED.17

The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2003.18 Petitioners filed this petition for
review, raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN

IGNORING THE POINT RAISED BY [PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH DOES NOT
COMPL[Y] WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT] VALID.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF SALE [OF REAL PROPERTIES] IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSENT OF THE LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x x
THERE [IS] NO CONCLUSIVE SHOWING THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERATION AND THERE [ARE]
SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.19

In her Comment, private respondent questioned the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Petition for Review, which was signed by a certain Ernesto Villadelgado without a special power
of attorney. In their reply, petitioners remedied the defect by attaching a Special Power of Attorney signed by
them.

Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal, the Court had previously excused
the late submission of a special power of attorney to sign a certification against forum-shopping.20 But even if we
excuse this defect, the petition nonetheless fails on the merits.

The Court does not agree with petitioners’ contention that a deed of sale must contain a technical description of
the subject property in order to be valid. Petitioners anchor their theory on Section 127 of Act No. 496,21 which
provides a sample form of a deed of sale that includes, in particular, a technical description of the subject
property.

To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical description of the subject property. Contracts of sale
of real property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the general rule on contracts that they may
be entered into in whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.22 The
requisites of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or meeting of the
minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the object of a contract by including its technical
description is of no moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that is determinate or at least
determinable, as subject of the contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127 of Act No.
496 is only a suggested form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly followed by the parties to a
contract.

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies the subject properties by indicating their respective lot
numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering them. Resort can always be made to the technical
description as stated in the certificates of title covering the two properties.

On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show that
Roque executed the deed of sale under the undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale was simulated or
without consideration. 1avv phi 1

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It must be
sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law.23

Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced Roque, who was already physically weak and senile at that
time, into executing the deed of sale. Belardo allegedly took advantage of the fact that Roque was living in her
house and was dependent on her for support.

There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another,
depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.24 One who alleges any defect, or the lack of consent to a
contract by reason of fraud or undue influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence, such
specific acts that vitiated the party’s consent; otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to the contract
prevails.25 For undue influence to be present, the influence exerted must have so overpowered or subjugated the
mind of a contracting party as to destroy his free agency, making him express the will of another rather than his
own.26

Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost control of his mental faculties at the time of the sale. Undue
influence is not to be inferred from age, sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient intelligence remains.27 The
evidence presented pertained more to Roque’s physical condition rather than his mental condition. On the
contrary, Atty. Sanicas, the notary public, attested that Roque was very healthy and mentally sound and sharp at
the time of the execution of the deed of sale. Atty. Sanicas said that Roque also told him that he was a Law
graduate.28

Neither was the contract simulated. The late registration of the Deed of Sale and Roque’s execution of the
second deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was simulated. We are convinced with
the explanation given by respondent’s witnesses that the deed of sale was not immediately registered because
Belardo did not have the money to pay for the fees. This explanation is, in fact, plausible considering that
Belardo could barely support herself and her brother, Roque. As for the second deed of sale, Dema-ala, herself,
attested before the trial court that she let Roque sign the second deed of sale because the title to the properties
were still in his name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was not supported by a consideration since no receipt was
shown, and it is incredulous that Roque, who was already weak, would travel to Bacolod City just to be able to
execute the Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states "receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction" is an
acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot
be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.29

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.30 As heirs of Roque, petitioners are
bound by the contract of sale that Roque executed in favor of Belardo. Having been sold already to Belardo, the
two properties no longer formed part of Roque’s estate which petitioners could have inherited. The deed of
extrajudicial settlement that petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore, void, since the property subject
thereof did not become part of Roque’s estate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September
13, 2002 and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

9
G.R. No. 85240 July 12, 1991

HEIRS OF CECILIO (also known as BASILIO) CLAUDEL, namely, MODESTA CLAUDEL, LORETA
HERRERA, JOSE CLAUDEL, BENJAMIN CLAUDEL, PACITA CLAUDEL, CARMELITA CLAUDEL, MARIO
CLAUDEL, ROBERTO CLAUDEL, LEONARDO CLAUDEL, ARSENIA VILLALON, PERPETUA CLAUDEL
and FELISA CLAUDEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MACARIO, ESPERIDIONA, RAYMUNDA and CELESTINA, all
surnamed CLAUDEL, respondents.

Ricardo L. Moldez for petitioners.

Juan T. Aquino for private respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 044291 and the reinstatement of the decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
Branch CXI, in Civil Case No. M-5276-P, entitled. "Heirs of Macario Claudel, et al. v. Heirs of Cecilio Claudel, et
al.," which dismissed the complaint of the private respondents against the petitioners for cancellation of titles and
reconveyance with damages.2

As early as December 28, 1922, Basilio also known as "Cecilio" Claudel, acquired from the Bureau of Lands, Lot
No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate Subdivision, located in the poblacion of Muntinlupa, Rizal, with an area of
10,107 square meters; he secured Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7471 issued by the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal in 1923; he also declared the lot in his name, the latest Tax Declaration being No. 5795.
He dutifully paid the real estate taxes thereon until his death in 1937.3 Thereafter, his widow "Basilia" and later,
her son Jose, one of the herein petitioners, paid the taxes.

The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would, however, become the subject of protracted litigation thirty-
nine years after his death.

Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the ownership over the land-on one hand the children of Cecilio,
namely, Modesto, Loreta, Jose, Benjamin, Pacita, Carmelita, Roberto, Mario, Leonardo, Nenita, Arsenia Villalon,
and Felisa Claudel, and their children and descendants, now the herein petitioners (hereinafter referred to as
HEIRS OF CECILIO), and on the other, the brother and sisters of Cecilio, namely, Macario, Esperidiona,
Raymunda, and Celestina and their children and descendants, now the herein private respondents (hereinafter
referred to as SIBLINGS OF CECILIO). In 1972, the HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves
and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title on their shares, as follows:

TCT No. 395391 1,997 sq. m. –– Jose Claudel

TCT No. 395392 1,997 sq. m. –– Modesta Claudel and children

TCT No. 395393 1,997 sq. m. –– Armenia C. Villalon

TCT No. 395394 1,997 sq. m. –– Felisa Claudel4

Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private respondents SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed Civil Case No. 5276-
P as already adverted to at the outset, with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint for
Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with Damages," alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime in 1930,
their parents had purchased from the late Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for the sum of P30.00.
They admitted that the transaction was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO
presented a subdivision plan of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating the portions allegedly sold to the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.

As already mentioned, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch CXI, dismissed the complaint,
disregarding the above sole evidence (subdivision plan) presented by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, thus:

Examining the pleadings as well as the evidence presented in this case by the parties, the Court can not
but notice that the present complaint was filed in the name of the Heirs of Macario, Espiridiona,
Raymunda and Celestina, all surnamed Claudel, without naming the different heirs particularly involved,
and who wish to recover the lots from the defendants. The Court tried to find this out from the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs but to no avail. On this point alone, the Court would not be able to apportion
the property to the real party in interest if ever they are entitled to it as the persons indicated therein is in
generic term (Section 2, Rule 3). The Court has noticed also that with the exception of plaintiff Lampitoc
and (sic) the heirs of Raymunda Claudel are no longer residing in the property as they have (sic) left the
same in 1967. But most important of all the plaintiffs failed to present any document evidencing the
alleged sale of the property to their predecessors in interest by the father of the defendants. Considering
that the subject matter of the supposed sale is a real property the absence of any document evidencing
the sale would preclude the admission of oral testimony (Statute of Frauds). Moreover, considering also
that the alleged sale took place in 1930, the action filed by the plaintiffs herein for the recovery of the
same more than thirty years after the cause of action has accrued has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment dismissing the complaint, without pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the following errors6 were assigned by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DESPITE CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE SHOWING THE PORTION SOLD TO EACH OF PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS.
 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DOCUMENT
EVIDENCING THE ALLEGED SALE.

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDIT TO THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A, SHOWING THE
PORTIONS SOLD TO EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.

4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PLAINTIFFS AS OWNERS OF THE PORTION
COVERED BY THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A.

5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS.
395391, 395392, 395393 AND 395394 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL AS NULL AND
VOID.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:

1. The failure to bring and prosecute the action in the name of the real party in interest, namely the parties
themselves, was not a fatal omission since the court a quo could have adjudicated the lots to the SIBLINGS OF
CECILIO, the parents of the herein respondents, leaving it to them to adjudicate the property among themselves.

2. The fact of residence in the disputed properties by the herein respondents had been made possible by the
toleration of the deceased Cecilio.

3. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to consummated sales as in the case at bar
where oral evidence may be admitted as cited in Iñigo v. Estate of Magtoto7 and Diana, et al. v. Macalibo.8

In addition,

. . . Given the nature of their relationship with one another it is not unusual that no document to evidence
the sale was executed, . . ., in their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and
foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. .
. .9

4. The defense of prescription cannot be set up against the herein petitioners despite the lapse of over forty
years from the time of the alleged sale in 1930 up to the filing of the "Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and
Reconveyance . . ." in 1976.

According to the Court of Appeals, the action was not for the recovery of possession of real property but for the
cancellation of titles issued to the HEIRS OF CECILIO in 1973. Since the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO commenced
their complaint for cancellation of titles and reconveyance with damages on December 7, 1976, only four years
after the HEIRS OF CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves and obtained the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Titles, then there is no prescription of action yet.

Thus the respondent court ordered the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 395391, 395392,
395393, and 395394 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the names of the HEIRS OF CECILIO and
corollarily ordered the execution of the following deeds of reconveyance:

To Celestina Claudel, Lot 1230-A with an area of 705 sq. m.

To Raymunda Claudel, Lot 1230-B with an area of 599 sq. m.

To Esperidiona Claudel, Lot 1230-C with an area of 597 sq. m.

To Macario Claudel, Lot 1230-D, with an area of 596 sq. m.10

The respondent court also enjoined that this disposition is without prejudice to the private respondents, as heirs
of their deceased parents, the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, partitioning among themselves in accordance with law
the respective portions sold to and herein adjudicated to their parents.
The rest of the land, lots 1230-E and 1230-F, with an area of 598 and 6,927 square meters, respectively would
go to Cecilio or his heirs, the herein petitioners. Beyond these apportionments, the HEIRS OF CECILIO would
not receive anything else.

The crux of the entire litigation is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in disposing
the question of the true ownership of the lots.

And the real issues are:

1. Whether or not a contract of sale of land may be proven orally:

2. Whether or not the prescriptive period for filing an action for cancellation of titles and reconveyance
with damages (the action filed by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO) should be counted from the alleged sale
upon which they claim their ownership (1930) or from the date of the issuance of the titles sought to be
cancelled in favor of the HEIRS OF CECILIO (1976).

The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may have been
entered into.11 For nowhere does law or jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be put in writing before
such contract can validly cede or transmit rights over a certain real property between the parties themselves.

However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of the property, the person
against whom that claim is brought can not present any proof of such sale and hence has no means to enforce
the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in a contract of sale of real
property so that no such contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for purposes of proof, are met.

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds pertinent to the present controversy, state:

Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

xxx xxx xxx

2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases,
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:

xxx xxx xxx

e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending
for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and
transactions to be evidenced in Writing.12

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds originally appeared under the old Rules of Evidence. However when the
Civil Code was re-written in 1949 (to take effect in 1950), the provisions of the Statute of Frauds were taken out
of the Rules of Evidence in order to be included under the title on Unenforceable Contracts in the Civil Code.
The transfer was not only a matter of style but to show that the Statute of Frauds is also a substantive law.

Therefore, except under the conditions provided by the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of sale
made by Cecilio with his siblings13 can not be proved.

On the second issue, the belated claim of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO who filed a complaint in court only in 1976
to enforce a light acquired allegedly as early as 1930, is difficult to comprehend.
The Civil Code states:

Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

(1) Upon an oral contract . . . (Emphasis supplied).

If the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO had allegedly derived their right of action from the oral purchase made by
their parents in 1930, then the action filed in 1976 would have clearly prescribed. More than six years had
lapsed.

We do not agree with the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO when they reason that an implied trust in favor of the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO was established in 1972, when the HEIRS OF CECILIO executed a contract of partition
over the said properties.

But as we had pointed out, the law recognizes the superiority of the torrens title.

Above all, the torrens title in the possession of the HEIRS OF CECILIO carries more weight as proof of
ownership than the survey or subdivision plan of a parcel of land in the name of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.

The Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the torrens title. No possession by any person of any
portion of the land could defeat the title of the registered owners thereof.14

A torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open and notorious possession. A
registered title under the torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered,
1âwphi1

is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.15

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof,
with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain, as only the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.16

It is true that in some instances, the Court did away with the irrevocability of the torrens title, but the
circumstances in the case at bar varied significantly from these cases.

In Bornales v. IAC, 17 the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title was disregarded when the transferee
who took it had notice of the flaws in the transferor's title. No right passed to a transferee from a vendor who did
not have any in the first place. The transferees bought the land registered under the torrens system from
vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud. With this knowledge, they can not invoke the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private respondent to the extent of her interest. This is because
the torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property.

Mere registration of the sale is not good enough, good faith must concur with registration. Otherwise registration
becomes an exercise in futility.18

In Amerol v. Bagumbaran,19 we reversed the decision of the trial court. In this case, the title was wrongfully
registered in another person's name. An implied trust was therefore created. This trustee was compelled by law
to reconvey property fraudulently acquired notwithstanding the irrevocability of the torrens title.20

In the present case, however, the facts belie the claim of ownership.

For several years, when the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, namely, Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and Celestina
were living on the contested premises, they regularly paid a sum of money, designated as "taxes" at first, to the
widow of Cecilio, and later, to his heirs.21 Why their payments were never directly made to the Municipal
Government of Muntinlupa when they were intended as payments for "taxes" is difficult to square with their claim
of ownership. We are rather inclined to consider this fact as an admission of non-ownership. And when we
consider also that the petitioners HEIRS OF CECILIO had individually paid to the municipal treasury the taxes
corresponding to the particular portions they were occupying,22 we can readily see the superiority of the
petitioners' position.
Renato Solema and Decimina Calvez, two of the respondents who derive their right from the SIBLINGS OF
CLAUDEL, bought a portion of the lot from Felisa Claudel, one of the HEIRS OF CLAUDEL.23 The Calvezes
should not be paying for a lot that they already owned and if they did not acknowledge Felisa as its owner.

In addition, before any of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO could stay on any of the portions of the property, they had
to ask first the permission of Jose Claudel again, one of the HEIRS OF CECILIO.24 In fact the only reason why
any of the heirs of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO could stay on the lot was because they were allowed to do so by the
HEIRS OF CECILIO.25

In view of the foregoing, we find that the appellate court committed a reversible error in denigrating the transfer
certificates of title of the petitioners to the survey or subdivision plan proffered by the private respondents. The
Court generally recognizes the profundity of conclusions and findings of facts reached by the trial court and
hence sustains them on appeal except for strong and cogent reasons inasmuch as the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses in a case.

No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the respondent appellate court to justify the reversal of the
lower court's findings. Thus, in this case, between the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court,
those of the trial court must prevail over that of the latter.26

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV
No. 04429, and we hereby REINSTATE the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 28,
Pasay City) in Civil Case No. M-5276-P which ruled for the dismissal of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
and Reconveyance with Damages filed by the Heirs of Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and Celestina, all
surnamed CLAUDEL. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 10
G.R. No. 175763 April 11, 2012

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND
ZENAIDA T. VELOSO, Petitioners,
vs.
SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO ARNEDO,
NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-
NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO
VELASQUEZ,Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated August 18, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated December 8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224. The CA affirmed
the Decision3 dated November 19, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267 in Civil Case No.
67846 dismissing petitioners’ complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035,
reconveyance and damages, as well as respondents’ counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees.

Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of
Taguig (now part of Pasig City, Metro Manila). The first parcel ("Lot 1") with an area of 686 square meters was
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the
years 1949 and 1966, while the second parcel ("Lot 2") consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared
in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and 9676 issued for the years 1966 and 1967.4 For
several years, these lands lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.

Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as
declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument ("Affidavit of Sale") whereby she sold the said property to
spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Said document states:

DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA

Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc, Filipina may karapatang gulang naninirahan sa
nayon ng Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x x sa pamamaguitan nitoy

ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY

1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na lupang kawayanan na sapagkat itoy kabahagui
ko sa aking kapatid na [J]ose Gabriel, na itoy mana ko sa aking nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel sa kami
lamang dalawa ng aking kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel siyang mga anak at tagapagmana
ng aming amang nasirang Mateo Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay wala nang iba, kayat kami ay naghati sa
mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng nasirang ama namin na Mateo Gabriel, na ang lupang kawayanang
itoy may nakatanim na walong (8) punong kawayan at na sa pook na kung pamagatan ay Ruhale nayon
ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga kahanganan at sukat na sumusunod[:]

Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente Bunye, sa Amihanan Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa
Timugan Juan Flores, at sa Habagatan Apolonio Ocol may sukat na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may
halagan amillarada na P80.00) Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa pangalan ng aking kapatid na
Jose Gabriel. Na, ang lupang itoy hindi natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa susog gayon din sa
Hipotecaria Espaňola itoy may mga mojon bato ang mga panulok at walang bakod.
 2.) Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Pisong salaping guinagamit dito sa
Filipinas na bago dumating ang mga sandaling itoy tinaggap ko at ibinayad sa akin ng boong kasiyahang
loob ko ng magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA SANGA, mga Filipinos may mga karapatang
gulang mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon ay inilipat ko at ipinagbili ng bilihang
tuluyan (Venta real soluta) ang isinasaysay kong lupang kawayanan sa itaas nito ng nasabi halagang
SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT
CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat ng mga tagapagmana nila, ngayong mga arao na ito ay ang
may hawak at namamahala ng lupang itoy ang mga nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT
AT CORNELIA SANGA.

3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 3344.

NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito dito sa Tagig, Rizal, ngayong ika -
28 ng Junio 1944.

(Nilagdaan)
BENITA GABRIEL5

Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her
father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencia’s
husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964.6 Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real
estate taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax purposes, as shown by TD No. 11445 issued in 1969
in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag; TD No. 11445 cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose
Gabriel. TD Nos. 3380 and 00486 also in the name of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the years 1974 and 1979.7

As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale
executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and declared the same
for tax purposes as shown by TD Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482, 120-00-014-20-002-000, C-014-00180 and
D-014-00182 issued for the years 1969, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1991 and 1994.8 Petitioners claimed to have
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana
Quinones9 ; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land.10

Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD No. 120-014-01013 in his name over Lot 1
indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters. Said tax declaration supposedly cancelled TD No.
6425 over Lot 1 and contained the following inscription11 :

Note: Portions of this Property is Also Declared

in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.

Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-0085812 (1979) in the name of Araceli Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:

This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013

in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax declarations, all in the name of Araceli Tanyag.

On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846 alleging that respondents never occupied the
whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD No. 120-014-01013 such
that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to
1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject
land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the beginning.13

On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have not
established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’ name. They
further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners failed to
establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.14

Respondents’ evidence showed that the subject land was among those properties included in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Jose P. Gabriel15 executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No. B-014-00643 (1985)
in the name of Jose Gabriel. Respondents declared the property in their name but the tax declarations (1989,
1991 and 1994) carried the notation that portions thereof (686 sq. ms.) are also declared in the name of Araceli
Tanyag. On October 28, 1998, OCT No. 103516 was issued to respondents by the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro Manila under Decree No. N-219177 pursuant to the Decision dated September 20, 1996 of the Land
Registration Court in LRC Case No. N-11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping,
Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area of 1,560 square meters.

On the other hand, respondents’ TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-014-01923 issued in 1993 and 1999 respectively,
showed that respondents sold 468 square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta. Barbara.17 The segregation of said 468
square meters pertaining to Jayson Sta. Barbara was reflected in the approved survey plan of Lot 1836 prepared
by respondents’ surveyor on March 18, 2000.18

At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son of Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli Tanyag
who died on March 30, 1968 and October 30, 1993, respectively. He testified that according to Florencia Sulit,
Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her family were the ones in possession of Lot 1 since 1944; Benita Gabriel had
executed an Affidavit of Sale declaring said property as her inheritance and conveying the same to spouses
Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. He affirmed that they had been in possession of Lot 1 from the time Bienvenido
Tanyag bought the land from Florencia Sulit in 1964. Based on the boundaries indicated in the tax declaration,
they fenced the property, installed Juana Quinones as their caretaker who also attended to the piggery, put up
an artesian well and planted some trees. From 1964 up to 1978, nobody disturbed them in their possession or
claimed ownership of the land; four years after acquiring Lot 1, they also purchased the adjacent property (Lot 2)
to expand their piggery. Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax purposes after their mother purchased it from
Agueda Dinguinbayan. He had personally witnessed the execution of the 1968 deed of sale including its
notarization, and was also present during the physical turn over of Lot 2 by the seller. In fact, he was one of the
instrumental witnesses to the deed of sale and identified his signature therein. He further described the place as
inaccessible at that time as there were no roads yet and they had to traverse muddy tracks to reach their
property.19

Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel was when the latter borrowed from their mother all
the documents pertaining to their property. Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece of property which he claims as
his but he had no documents to prove it and so they showed him their documents pertaining to the subject
property; out of the goodness of her mother’s heart, she lent those documents to her brother Jose Gabriel.
During the cadastral survey conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed in preparation for their consolidation
under one tax declaration. However, they did not succeed in registering the consolidated lots as they discovered
that there was another tax declaration covering the same properties and these were applied for titling under the
name of Jose Gabriel sometime in 1978 or 1980, which was after the time said Jose Gabriel borrowed the
documents from their mother. No notice of the hearings for application of title filed by Jose Gabriel was received
by them. They never abandoned the property and their caretaker never left the place except to report to the
police when she was being harassed by the respondents. He also recalled that respondents had filed a
complaint against them before the barangay but since no agreement was reached after several meetings, they
filed the present case.20

The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their caretaker who testified that she had been staying on
petitioners’ property since 1964 or for 35 years already. She had built a nipa hut and artesian well, raised
piggery and poultry and planted some root crops and vegetables on the land. At first there was only one parcel
but later the petitioners bought an additional lot; Arturo Tanyag gave her money which she used for the fencing
of the property. During all the time she occupied the property there was nobody else claiming it and she also had
not received any notice for petitioners concerning the property, nor the conduct of survey on the land. On cross-
examination, she admitted that she was living alone and had no Voter’s ID or any document evidencing that she
had been a resident there since 1964. Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other persons in
tending her piggery.21

Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also of respondents, testified that she came to know the
subject property because according to her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana Sulit, her maternal
grandmother Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged the property to him. It was Benita Gabriel Lontoc who took care
of her, her siblings and cousins; they lived with her until her death. She identified the signature of Benita Gabriel
in the 1944 Affidavit of Sale in favor of Gabriel Sulit. Lot 1 consisting of 600 square meters was vacant property
at that time but her family was in possession thereof when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her father Eliseo
Sulit and uncle Hilario Sulit, who were incharge of their property. On cross-examination, she was asked details
regarding the supposed mortgage of Lot 1 to Gabriel Sulit but she admitted she does not know anything as she
was still very young then.22
Respondents’ first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of Luz Gabriel-Arnedo. He testified that when he
was about 5 or 6 years old (1953 or 1954), his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to bring him along to visit the
subject property consisting of 1,763 square meters based on the tax declaration and OCT. They had picnics and
celebrate his grandfather’s birthday there. He recalled accompanying his grandfather in overseeing the planting
of gumamela which served as the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel had not mentioned anything about the claim of
petitioners over the same land; Jose Gabriel handed the documents pertaining to the land to his eldest aunt and
hence it now belongs to them.23 On cross-examination, he claimed that during those years he had visited the land
together with his grandfather, he did not see Florencia Sulit and her family.24

Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they acquired the subject property from their
grandfather Jose Gabriel who had a tax declaration in his name. Her mother furnished them with documents
such as tax declarations and the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Gabriel; they also have an
approved survey plan prepared for Salome Gabriel. She does not know the petitioners in this case.25 On cross-
examination, she said that the subject property was inherited by Jose Gabriel from his father Mateo Gabriel;
Jose Gabriel was the sole owner of the land while Benita Gabriel has separate properties in Palingon and
Langkokak.26 Though they are not actually occupying the property, they visit the place and she does not know
anybody occupying it, except for the portion (486 square meters) which petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara. A nine-
door apartment was built on the said portion without their permission. She had talked to both Sta. Barbara and
with Arturo Tanyag they had meetings before the barangay; however, petitioners filed the present case in court.
She insisted that there is nobody residing in the subject property; there is still the remaining 901 square meters
which is owned by their mother. She admitted there were plants on the land but she does not know who actually
planted them; it was her grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in the 1960s. As to the hearings
on the application for title, she had not attended the same; she does not know whether the petitioners were
notified of the said hearings. She also caused the preparation of the survey plan for Salome Gabriel. On the
increased area of the property indicated in the later tax declarations, she admitted the discrepancy but said there
were barangay roads being built at the time.27

Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that he was formerly a Land Appraiser in the Office of
the Municipal Assessor of Taguig and in the course of his duties had certified one of the tax declarations in the
name of respondents (TD No. EL-014-10585). He identified and verified said document and the other tax
declarations submitted in court by the respondents. He admitted that on January 10, 1980, they made the entry
on TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel that the same was cancelled by TD No. 120-014-01013 also in the
name of Jose Gabriel who presented a supposed deed of sale in favor of Araceli Tanyag which caused the
earlier cancellation of TD No. 6425 in his name. However, upon investigation they found out that the seller
Florencia Sulit was not the owner because the declared owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale
recognized that the property was declared in the name of Jose Gabriel. They also discovered from the cadastral
survey and tax mapping of Taguig that the property is in the name of Jose Gabriel both in the Bureau of Lands
and Municipal Assessor’s Office. As far as he knows, it was Jose Gabriel who owned the subject property which
he usually visited; he recalled that around the late 70’s and 80’s, he ordered the fencing of barbed wire and
bamboo stalks on the land which is just 3 lots away from his own property. As to the discrepancy in the area of
the property as originally declared by Jose Gabriel, he explained that the boundaries in the original tax
declaration do not change but after the land is surveyed, the boundaries naturally would be different because the
previous owner may have sold his property or the present owner inherits the property from his parents. He
admitted that the tax declaration is just for tax purposes and not necessarily proof of ownership or possession of
the property it covers.28

Respondents’ last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he had resided for 52 years on a land near the
subject property and as far as he knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted thereon. On cross-
examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel was not in physical possession of the property. He just assumed that
the present occupants of the property were allowed by Jose Gabriel to stay therein because he is the owner.
There is an apartment and three small houses existing on the property, and about five families are living there.
He confirmed that there is a piggery being maintained by a certain Juana who had been residing there maybe for
fifteen years already.29

In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners of properties adjoining that of the subject land.
Rodante Domingo testified that it was only now did he learn that the property of Arturo Tanyag is already titled in
the name of respondents. He was not aware of the titling proceeding because he never received any notice as
adjoining owner. His own property is already titled in his name and he even asked Arturo Tanyag to act as a
witness in his application for titling.30 On the other hand, Dado Dollado testified that he acquired his property in
1979. He likewise affirmed that he did not receive any notice of the proceedings for application for titling filed by
respondents and it was only now that he learned from Arturo Tanyag that the subject property was already titled
in the names of respondents.31
The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador Dinguinbayan Ergueza, son of Agueda Dinguinbayan.
He testified that the subject property was formerly owned by his mother and the present owner is Araceli Tanyag
who bought the same from his mother in 1968. He described the boundaries of the property in relation to the
adjoining owners at that time; presently, the left portion is already a street (Rujale St.) going towards the sea. He
admitted that his wife, Livina Ergueza was an instrumental witness in the 1968 deed of sale in favor of Araceli
Tanyag.32

In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed
to establish ownership of the subject property and finding the respondents to be the declared owners and legal
possessors. It likewise ruled that petitioners were unable to prove by preponderance of evidence that
respondents acquired title over the property through fraud and deceit.

Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The CA found that apart from the Affidavit
executed by Benita Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father, Mateo Gabriel, there is no
evidence that she, not Jose Gabriel, was the true owner thereof. It noted that just four years after Benita
Gabriel’s sale of the subject property to the Sulit spouses, Jose Gabriel declared the same under his name for
tax purposes, paying the corresponding taxes. The appellate court stressed that petitioners’ allegation of bad
faith was not proven.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained OCT No. 1035 in their names fraudulently
and in bad faith. They also claim to have acquired ownership of the subject lots by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed fraud and bad faith in registering the subject lots
in their name; and (2) whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein.33 Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner
may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action
for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name,
to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.34

An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
possession of the property subject of the acts.35 The totality of the evidence on record established that it was
petitioners who are in actual possession of the subject property; respondents merely insinuated at occasional
visits to the land. However, for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that
the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the
fact of fraud.36

The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita Gabriel’s supposed title was the 1944 Affidavit of
Sale whereby Benita Gabriel claimed sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance from their father, Mateo Gabriel.
The property until 1949 was still declared in the name Jose Gabriel despite the 1944 sale executed by Benita
Gabriel in favor of spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. As to the alleged fraud perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and
respondents in securing OCT No. 1035 in their name, this was clearly not proven as Arturo Tanyag testified
merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed their documents pertaining to the property. No document or testimony was
presented to show that Jose Gabriel employed deceit or committed fraudulent acts in the proceedings for titling
of the property.

However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive prescription raised by the petitioners. In their Complaint
before the lower court, petitioners alleged –

15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq. m.)
neither were they able to set foot on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic] for the reason that
those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the plaintiffs against the
whole world for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title.

x x x x37
Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of controversy is a factual issue.
Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, as only questions of law shall be raised in such petitions. While this Court is not a trier of
facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of
justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.38

In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have not acquired any right over the subject
property simply because they failed to establish Benita Gabriel’s title over said property. The appellate court
ignored petitioners’ evidence of possession that complies with the legal requirements of acquiring ownership by
prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In
order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.39Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.40 It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the
essential elements of acquisitive prescription.41

On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli
Tanyag, which tax declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.42 It is settled that tax receipts
and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have
been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for
ownership.43Petitioners’ caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a nipa hut, planted vegetables and tended
a piggery on the land. Aside from paying taxes due on the property, petitioners also exercised other acts of
ownership such as selling the 468-square meter portion to Sta. Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-
door apartment building.

It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the property by securing a tax declaration in
the name of Jose Gabriel albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998, they finally obtained an
original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763 square meters which included Lot 1. Did these acts of
respondents effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes of prescription?

We answer in the negative.

In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon44 this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil
Code45 held that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by
filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus:

Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor.
Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons
shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for
lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to
lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For
1âwphi1

civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at
bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim
which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was
merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action
was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by
respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse
Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law.
In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The
period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse
Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)

From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the latter have been in continuous,
public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for the period
and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have
indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of
declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in
1998.

This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square
meters. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale from the original
declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents asserted that the 147 square meters covered by the tax
declarations of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is not the same lot included in OCT No. 1035.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land
claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing
the location, area and boundaries thereof.46 In this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence
of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in
OCT No. 1035, which would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was erroneously
included in respondents’ title. The testimony of Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said
witness merely stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his mother. On
his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of
the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag are hereby
declared the owners of 686 square meters previously declared under Tax Declaration Nos. 11445, 120-014-
00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-014-00893 and D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli
Tanyag, which lot is presently covered by OCT No. 1035 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila
in the name of respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R. Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar
Gabriel-Mendiola, Minerva Gabriel-Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-Velasquez. Respondents are ORDERED to
RECONVEY the said 686-square meter portion to the petitioners.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 11
G.R. No. 169898 October 27, 2006

SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE, petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, NAMELY: JOSE T. VILLANUEVA, PABLO T. VILLANUEVA, PEDRO T.
VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO T. VILLANUEVA, DELIA V. DELA TORRE, JUANITA V. INGLES, & SABELITO V.
GELITO, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 dated March 17,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72530 which affirmed the Decision2 dated August 6, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 5745, declaring private respondents as
absolute owners of the subject parcel of land. Likewise assailed is the September 20, 2005 Resolution3 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

A complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax declarations and recovery of
ownership and possession with damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners.

Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children and grandson of the late spouses Lucas
Villanueva and Regina Tupas Villanueva; that during the lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he owned a parcel of
residential land designated as Lot 764-A situated at Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan with an area of 140 square
meters, more or less, and declared for taxation purposes under his name under Tax Declaration No. 252 (1947);
that spouses Villanueva possessed the subject parcel of land during their lifetime openly, publicly and
continuously in the concept of an owner and after their death, they were succeeded by their children; that
sometime in August 1997, petitioners and their hired laborers fenced the whole land in question without the
knowledge and consent of private respondents; that when confronted by private respondents concerning the
fencing of the land, petitioners alleged that they acquired the same through inheritance from their father,
Eutiquiano Salazar, who in turn purchased the land from the late Ciriaco H. Tirol by virtue of a Deed of
Exchange of Real Property.

In their Answer,4 petitioners claimed that petitioner Anita S. Aguirre is the lawful owner and actual possessor of
the land in question, it being a portion of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her deceased parents
Eutiquiano Salazar and Regina Supetran Salazar who bought the land from Ciriaco H. Tirol per Deed of
Exchange of Real Property5 dated December 31, 1971 and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Aklan; that the parcel of land is included under Tax Declaration No. 4033 (1953) in the name of Trinidad vda. de
Tirol and the same is in the possession of the Tirol family as owner thereof continuously, openly and adversely
even before the second world war; that the land had been surveyed as part of Cadastral Lot 764, NP-06-000001,
Malay Cadastre, in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar by the Bureau of Lands; that the land has been declared
under Tax Declaration No. 1264 (1974) and subsequent tax declarations in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar; that
the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981 and with cement hollow blocks in 1985 without any opposition
from private respondents; and that the action is barred by prescription and private respondents are guilty of
laches in failing to assert their alleged right of ownership after the lapse of more than fifty (50) years since it was
possessed by the heirs of the late Trinidad vda. de Tirol.

On August 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

 1. Declaring the plaintiffs the lawful owners and entitled to possession of the land in question
identified as Lot 764-A in the Commissioner's Sketch marked Exhibit "L", and as owners, are
entitled to the possession of the same;

2. Ordering the defendants to restore possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos
(P1,800.00) by way of litigation expenses, and another sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) as reimbursement for attorney's fees; and

4. Ordering the Provincial Assessor of Aklan to issue a new tax declaration of the land in
question in the name of the plaintiffs upon compliance of the requirements of that office and upon
payment of appropriate taxes on the land including back taxes, if any.

For insufficiency of evidence, plaintiffs claim for moral damages is denied and for lack of merit,
defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.

With cost against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.6

The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and the survey plan did not
establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor of the land in question, thus, he has no right to
transfer ownership of the same to Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were not possessors in good faith since
they knew as early as 1954 that private respondents were in possession of the land; that petitioners did not
acquire the land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their possession only lasted for 26
years from 1971 up to 1997 when private respondents first instituted the complaint.

On March 17, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying petitioners’ appeal and affirming in
toto the trial court’s decision.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE AGUIRRES HAD ACQUIRED
TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY VIA ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE VILLANUEVAS’ CAUSE OF
ACTION HAD BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION;

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE RULE ON
LACHES;

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VILLANUEVAS WERE IN
"POSSESSION" AND "OWNERSHIP" OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION
OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN CIRIACO TIROL AND THE AGUIRRES’ ASCENDANT-
PREDECESSOR IN 1971;

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGUIRRES HAVE NOT PROVED THE
ROOT OF THEIR RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY; AND

VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING FOR THE AGUIRRES THE FACT
THAT THE LATTER HAD "JUST TITLE," AND HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY "IN GOOD FAITH" SINCE 1971.7

We find merit in the petition.

This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, as in the instant case, we can review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusions based on the record.8
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years.
Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.9

Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith and
with just title. Possession is "in good faith" when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing
is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his ownership.10 There is "just title" when the
adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the
right.11

In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners’ claim that the requirements for ordinary
prescription are present.

The trial court found that petitioners’ possession was for more than 10 years and with just title, thus:

There is no question that the defendants have been in public, and uninterrupted possession of the land
in question in the concept of an owner for a span of twenty six (26) years from the time the land in
question was included in the deed of exchange in 1971 up to the time the plaintiffs complained in 1997
(Exh. "K"). There is also no question that defendants’ possession of the land in question was with just
title. Just title in the sense that the defendants acquired the land in question by way of exchange which is
one of the modes recognized by law in acquiring ownership.12

Contrary however to the findings of the trial court, petitioners possessed the property in good faith. Petitioner
Anita Aguire’s father, Eutiquiano Salazar, bought the subject property from Ciriaco Tirol, whose claim on the
property is founded on the following documents: (1) Tax Declaration No. 729 in the name of Trinidad vda. de
Tirol for the year 1945 (Exhibit "4"); (2) Tax Declaration No. 4033 in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the
year 1953 (Exhibit "4-A"); and (3) the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1952 (Exhibit "6"). Thus,
petitioners honestly believed that ownership of the subject parcel of land was transmitted to Anita by succession
from his deceased father, and who thereafter possessed the property and exercised dominion over it.

Likewise, the trial court’s finding that petitioner Anita Aguirre was not a possessor in good faith since she knew
as early as 1954 that private respondents were in possession of the disputed land has no basis. Anita Aguirre
testified that Magdalena Tupas built a house in the controverted property in 1957 with the permission of
Bernardo Escalante, the administrator of the Tirols.13

To prove their ownership, petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1264 for the year 1974 (Exhibit "4-B") and
other tax declarations (Exhibits "4-C, "4-D", "5" and submarkings) for the year 1980 to 1994, in the name of
Eutiquiano Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through
prescription.14

Records also show that Lucas Villanueva, private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, did not actually possess
the subject property during his lifetime. Private respondent Delia Villanueva Dela Torre, testified that her parents
while still alive resided in Sitio Din-iwid, Balabag, Malay, Aklan, about less than a kilometer away from the land in
question.15 Neither did any of the private respondents ever reside therein.16 The actual possession by the private
respondents rests solely on the possession of Magdalena Tupas and her husband for eight years allegedly with
the permission of Regina Tupas Villanueva. However, the testimonies of Rubio Sastre and Magdalena Tupas
regarding the actual possession of Lucas Villanueva through planting of trees and gathering of fruits cannot be
given full weight and credence because the witnesses were of tender years then, barely seven or twelve years
old, and did not have discernment of the concept of possession and ownership. Moreover, no evidence was
presented on how Lucas Villanueva acquired the land in question from Eusebio Sacapano, the uncle of Regina
Tupas Villanueva. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 252 for the year 1947 (Exhibit "C") in the name of Lucas
Villanueva does not have probative value since it was executed four years after the death of Lucas Villanueva in
1943. Tax receipts submitted by the private respondents in payment for the year 1986 up to 1996 were actually
paid on the same day, February 20, 1996 by his son Dionito Villanueva.17
On the other hand, after buying the property in 1971, petitioners possessed the same in the concept of an
owner. They peacefully occupied it, built fences, planted plants and used the same as ingress and egress
towards their cottages. Having been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land in good faith
and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary acquisitive
prescription.

Moreover, the action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.18

In the instant case, private respondents knew as early as 1981 that petitioners are building fences in the
perimeter of the disputed land but did not take action to assert their rights over the subject parcel of land. They
waited 16 long years to oust petitioners from the possession of the land. Definitely, laches had already set in.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72530, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, in Civil Case
No. 5745, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are hereby DECLARED as lawful owners of the
subject property through acquisitive prescription.

SO ORDERED.

12
G.R. No. 171068 September 5, 2007

HEIRS OF MARCELINA ARZADON-CRISOLOGO, represented by Leticia C. del Rosario, MAURICIA

ARZADON and BERNARDO ARZADON, petitioners,
vs.
AGRIFINA RAÑON, substituted by SUZIMA RAÑON-DUTERTE and OTHELO RAÑON, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552, dated 10 November 2005 and 12 January 2006, respectively, which
affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated 8 August 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 3875-18. The RTC reversed the 11 December 2001 Decision4 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Badoc-Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 141-B.

Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Rañon5 filed a Complaint6 against spouses Conrado and Mila
Montemayor (spouses Montemayor) with the MCTC of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, claiming ownership over an
unregistered residential lot (subject property) situated at Brgy. No. 2 Badoc, Ilocos Norte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 420809, more particularly described as follows:

"RESIDENTIAL with an area of 472 sq. ms. (sic) Bounded on the North by Ladera St.; on the East by
Dionisio Ladera; on the South by Buenaventura Arzadon; and on the West by Rafael Ladera; Assessed
at P1700.00 under Tax Dec. No. 420809."7

According to Agrifina Rañon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and
ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a
house on the subject property where she and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family
was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued to
visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon. However, in August of 1986, her
daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that the subject property was already in the name of the spouses
Montemayor under Tax Declaration No. 0010563 which was purportedly issued in their favor by virtue of an
Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The Affidavit was
alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Rañon’s title and ownership over the subject property.

Hence, Agrifina Rañon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction8 against the spouses Montemayor commanding
them to cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or possession over the subject property.
She further prayed that she be finally declared the true and lawful owner of the subject property.

The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del
Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration of P100,000.00.9

On 22 July 1996, the Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo, (represented by Leticia A. Crisologo del Rosario),
Mauricia Arzadon, and Bernardo Arzadon (petitioners) filed an Answer in Intervention10 claiming, inter alia, that
they are the rightful owners of the subject property, having acquired the same from their predecessors-in-
interest. They averred that there existed no liens or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of Agrifina
Rañon; and that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an interest in the property as
owner or otherwise.

Per petitioners’ allegations, their predecessors-in-interest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara (spouses
Alcantara) bought the subject property from its owner, Rafael Ladera, on 2 May 1936. The spouses Alcantara
then built a house of strong materials on the subject property which served as their conjugal home. Residing with
them was Timoteo Alcantara’s sister, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon. As the spouses Alcantara died without
issue, their properties were left to Timoteo Alcantara’s nearest of kin, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon and Tiburcio
Alcantara, sister and brother, respectively, of Timoteo Alcantara. Tiburcio Alcantara also died without any known
heir; thus, leaving the subject property in Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon’s sole favor. Augustina Alcantara-
Arzadon is the mother of petitioners Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo (now deceased and whose heirs are
represented by Leticia del Rosario) and Mauricia Arzadon. Bernardo Arzadon is the son of Mauricia Arzadon.
Petitioners asseverated further that Bernardo Arzadon had lived in the house constructed on the subject
property until 1985 when it was gutted by fire. To further support their claims, petitioners averred that they had
religiously paid the real estate taxes on the subject property. Finally, by way of a counterclaim, petitioners sought
compensation for the damages which they allegedly suffered by reason of the baseless filing of the instant suit.

On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order11 dropping the name of the spouses Montemayor from the
caption of the case on the ground that sometime in 1996, Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon had
repurchased the subject property from the spouses Montemayor for the consideration of P100,000.00. As a
result, the spouses Montemayor had no more interest or claim whatsoever on the property in litigation.

On 11 December 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. The decretal portion thereof
reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the [petitioners] to be the true and lawful owners of one-half (1/2) portion of the
undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of succession pursuant to [A]rticle 1001 of the [C]ivil
[C]ode of the Philippines;

2. Declaring the [petitioners] to have the better right over the other half of the undivided whole of
the lot-in-suit by mode of prescription pursuant to [A]rticle 1137 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;

3. Dismissing the counter-claim of the [petitioners] against the [respondents];

4. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the cost of the suit.12

First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Rañon on the subject lot against the spouses
Alcantara may have started in 1962, this adverse possession was interrupted in the year 1977 due to the filing of
an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office of the Assessor. In 1977, the tax
declaration in the name of Valentin Rañon, Agrifina Rañon’s husband, was cancelled and a new tax declaration
was issued in Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo’s name. The MCTC said that the period of possession of the
spouses Rañon in the concept of an owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because their
occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code requires, for acquisitive prescription of real property, 30 years of
uninterrupted possession if the same is wanting in good faith and without a just title.

Second, the MCTC held that by virtue of succession, petitioners are entitled to one-half of the subject property.
This is because according to Article 100113 of the Civil Code, should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or the widower (who are without issue), the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The spouses Alcantara died without issue. As
between Timoteo Alcantara and Modesta Alcantara, the former predeceased the latter. Timoteo Alcantara was
survived by (1) his brother Tiburcio Alcantara, who also died without any known heir; and (2) his sister Augustina
Alcantara. Thus, following the death of the spouses Alcantara, only the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo and Mauricia Arzadon, stand to inherit Timoteo Alcantara’s share in the subject
property.

Moreover, the MCTC declared that for the part of Modesta Alcantara, there was no legal heir who claimed the
other half of the property which she14 inherited from her husband, Timoteo Alcantara who predeceased her. On
this portion, the MCTC held that petitioners exercised rights of ownership and dominion over the same by
periodically visiting the lot and cleaning it.15 It also held that from 31 August 1977, when petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for her brothers and sisters which
led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 44120 in her name, to 11 December 2001,16 there is a total of 33
years, three months and 10 days which is sufficient to claim ownership over the subject property by adverse
possession under Article 113717 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.

The RTC declared that the respondent Rañons who are heirs of the original plaintiff had acquired the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged respondents to be the absolute owners
thereof; thus, in the 8 August 2002 Decision of the RTC, it held:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the trial [c]ourt is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute owners of the parcel of land in suit, having acquired the
same through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

No costs.18

In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of the evidence showed that for a long time
from the death of the spouses Alcantara, no one adjudicated the subject property unto themselves. Although
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest claimed to have successional rights over the subject property, they
did not take action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at least, to have the same declared for
taxation purposes. The RTC ruled that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part of the respondent
Rañons, in 1962, Valentin Rañon, respondents’ father, declared the subject property in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In the years that followed, his wife, Agrifina Rañon,
declared the same in her name for taxation purposes, as well as paid the real estate taxes on the subject
property. In 1977, the latter even mortgaged the subject property with the Philippine National Bank. It was only in
1977 when petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo executed an Adverse Claim and
Notice of Ownership and declared the subject property in her name and paid its taxes.

The RTC elucidated in this wise, to wit:

It bears to note that since the death of Timoteo Alcantara until the year 1977, [petitioners], as well as
their predecessors-in-interests (sic) had not taken any concrete step in exercising their supposed
successional rights over the parcel of land in suit, or at least, the Intervenors should have always
[stayed] on their guard or especially vigilant against anyone who would secure a claim to the said parcel
of land, more so that Valentin Rañon and plaintiff Agrifina Rañon were then living with them. It is very
unfortunate that it was only in 1977 that the Intervenors made known to others of their supposed
successional rights over the parcel of land in suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become
stale for a long time, considering that some other persons like [respondents] had wayback (sic) taken the
necessary action in claiming the parcel of land in suit. It is the vigilant and not the sleepy that is being
assisted by the laws. (Ledita Burce Jacob v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993).

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that because of the claim of the [respondents] to have acquired the
parcel of land in suit by acquisitive prescription, the Intervenors who belatedly claimed to be the legal
and compulsory heirs of the late Timoteo Alcantara, as ruled by the trial court, had regrettably forfeited
their such (sic) successional rights, simply due to their inaction for a long period of time. Hence, contrary
to the findings of the trial court, the [petitioners] are not entitled to the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel
of land in suit.19

Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim executed by petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo against the Rañons in 1977 implied that respondents have been in possession of
the subject property. On this matter, the RTC said, viz:

Evidently, the trial court considered by implication that the execution by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo of
said Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership in 1977 to have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period on the possession by the [respondents] of the parcel of land in suit. It bears to stress on (sic) this
point, that the Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership executed by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that the
[respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit in some concept. But definitely, said
Adverse Claim does not, upon its execution, operate to toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period because there is a necessity to determine the validity of the same. And this could only be done by
the filing of the necessary action in court such [as] contemplated in the provisions of Article 1123 of the
Civil Code. It is only on (sic) such instance that the prescriptive period should be deemed interrupted.
And undisputedly, nothing had been done by the Intervenors after the execution of said Adverse Claim
by Marcelina Crisologo, except of course as they claimed, and as held by the trial court, they started to
possess the parcel of land in suit. Regretably (sic), however, such possession by the Intervenors of the
parcel of land in suit does not benefit them for purposes of prescription.20

The RTC also declared that the Rañons have been in possession of the parcel of land in the concept of an
owner since 1962. Even as they had gone to live in Manila following the burning of the house on the subject
property, they continued to exercise acts of dominion over the same by visiting and looking after the property.
The RTC also considered in favor of the respondents, the admission of petitioner Bernardo Arzadon and the
petitioners’ witnesses that Valentin Rañon and Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house on the subject lot
since 1947, which shows that they had been in possession of the subject property for a period of more than 50
years.

On review before the Court of Appeals, the Decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto.

The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Rañon executed the affidavit declaring himself to be the true and
lawful owner of the subject property in 1962, the same was a repudiation of petitioners’ legal title over it. The
repudiation, coupled with the payment of realty taxes, was made with the knowledge of petitioners, who failed to
act against it. Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in 1995, respondents continued to adversely occupy
the property. In the assailed 10 November 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled:

Moreover, respondents’ payment of realty taxes made with the knowledge and consent of petitioners and
went unchallenged for a number of years, indubitably show their positive claim as owners of the
property. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. It is only
where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration
that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.

Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and was not in any
way interrupted from their mere execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim since the notice of adverse
claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under
the law. And even if We are to eliminate the question of good faith in determining the prescriptive period,
evidence are (sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents’ thirty years of possession in the concept of
owner commencing from 1962 until 1995 when the complaint below was filed.21

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the following
manner, to wit:

After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by petitioners We find no new matters raised to justify a
modification much less, a reversal of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. To reiterate, even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner merely tolerated the Rañons (sic) occupancy of the subject
property, it must be stressed that the execution in 1962 of Valentin Rañon’s Affidavit, the corresponding
payment of realty taxes and other acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the petitioners, had
effectively severed their alleged juridical relation. Suffice it to state that these acts, taken as a whole,
vest upon the Rañons the right to claim ownership over the subject property irrespective of whether the
nature of their occupation was rooted from the mere tolerance of the Arzadons or from a bona fide sale
between Agrifina Rañon and Rafael Ladera.22

Hence, the instant Petition.

The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents had
acquired ownership over the subject property through uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith. Petitioners dispute the findings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC
in declaring that acquisitive prescription has set in against them and in favor of the respondents. They claim that
the evidence does not support respondents’ contention that they have been in public, notorious, and
uninterrupted possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1962 as alleged in their
Complaint. Instead, petitioners rely on the finding of the MCTC that respondents were not able to prove their
adverse claim for an uninterrupted period of thirty years.

At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on the acquisition of ownership through
prescription.

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property.23 It is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.24 Possession is open when it
is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.25 It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and
not intermittent or occasional;26 exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;27 and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.28 The party who asserts
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

Article 1117 of the Civil Code is instructive:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Articles 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code fix the periods of possession,29 which provide:

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.30Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for
the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character.31 Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of
possession of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty years.32

Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements to prove prescription?

To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from the year 1962 until the filing of their Complaint
for Ownership before the MCTC on 18 October 1995. To support their possession, they rely on an Affidavit
executed on 19 October 1962 by Valentin Rañon claiming ownership over the subject property by virtue of an
alleged sale. The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the execution by
Valentin Rañon of the Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of petitioners’ claim over the property. By
virtue of such Affidavit, respondents were able to cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the subject property in 1950.
Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin Rañon. The same was
subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the name of his wife, Agrifina Rañon. The
same was likewise cancelled in 1967 by Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina
Rañon. In 1977, however, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse
Claim and a Notice of Ownership claiming that the subject property which is not yet registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Laoag City is declared under Tax Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Rañon
for taxation purposes only; but that they have been in possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and
continuously without any intervention or interruption for more than 15 years.

However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective
interruption since 1962 of respondents’ possession of the subject property?

The answer is in the negative.

Article 112333 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the
possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 112434 sets limitations as to when
such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it
should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil
interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar.
The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which
did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption.
We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the
Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there
remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice.
There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed
by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As
aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take
the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law.35 In the instant
case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of
acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.

From another angle, we find that, quite clearly, questions of fact exist before us. There is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.36

Thus, we find proper the application of the doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those
of the trial court are binding upon this Court.37 Even though the rule is subject to exceptions,38 we do not find
them applicable in the instant case.

As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession
over the subject property from the time their predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of the property due to
their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law
comes to the succor only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It was only in 1977 when they
attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier discussed, did not even operate as an
interruption on the latter’s possession. The RTC and the Court of Appeals held that from 1962 to the time they
filed their Complaint before the MCTC and until the present time, respondents occupied without interruption the
subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring ownership via extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. To reiterate, the RTC’s factual findings based on the evidence on record were manifestly in favor of
respondents, to wit:

Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has been established preponderantly that the [respondents] have
been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly, notoriously,
uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner since 1962 to the present. The fact that the [respondents]
have gone to live in Manila right after the house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988,
they, however, then and thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and
to visit the parcel of land in suit. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. One needs
(sic) not to (sic) stay on it. The acts exercised by the [respondents] over the parcel of land in suit are
consistent with ownership. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos
v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175, cited in the case of Somodio v. Court of Appeals, et al., 235 SCRA
307). It is sufficient that the [respondents] were able to subject the parcel of land to the action of their
will.

Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo Arzadon and his
witnesses Leonila Arzadon and Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the effect that Valentin
Rañon and [respondent] Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house standing on the parcel of land in
suit since 1947. Basically, the defendants are bound by their admissions and also bound by the
testimonies of the witnesses they presented. And going along with their respective testimonies, from
1947 to 1977 or for [a] period of thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel
of land in suit enough to invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 113439 (sic) of the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated, the [respondents], contrary to
the claim of the [petitioners] and findings of the trial court, have been in possession of the parcel of land
in suit continuously and uninterrupted from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the
[petitioners], the [respondents] have been in possession of the same from 1947 to the present or for
more than fifty (50) years now.40

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a period of
more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners’ ownership had been established. During such length of time,
respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in their name.
Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.41 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.42 As is well
known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly
supports a claim of ownership.43 The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the factual findings of the RTC that
respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the subject property through acquisitive
prescription.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and the
Resolution dated 12 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

13
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and
in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

Facts: Boracay Island is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. On April 14, 1976, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

This precluded the respondent from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief. In their
petition, respondents declared that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce
of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.

Issue: Whether the Boracay Island was susceptible of private ownership.

Held: No. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.
 14
G. R. No. 107764 October 4, 2002

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES,

JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES,
LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR.,
IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and
FIDELITO ECO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ
and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.

Facts: Edna Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land. The Lot is covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical
description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On
March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-
applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined.

The Republic of the Philippines filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the land
registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of
the oppositors.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has
been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
2. Whether petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO
33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?

Held:
1. No. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
2. No. First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. However, there is no proof
that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the
Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by
acquisitive prescription.

Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO
33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land.
 15
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for G.R. No. 170757
himself and in behalf of his co-heirs
LODOVICO, RICARDO, Present:
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed
VALIAO and NEMESIO M.
GRANDEA, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versus- MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MACARIO Promulgated:
ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY,
Respondents, November 28, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Facts: Petitioners filed an application for registration of a parcel of land. Private oppositors filed their
Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been
declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration;
and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.

The RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued. In support of their
application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in 1947,
upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,
pursuant to a Deed of Sale. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death
in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and
in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land
until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which
compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.

Issue: Whether the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Held: No. No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has
been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain.
 16
***G.R. No. 166748 April 24, 2009

LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact FLORIDA L. UMANDAP, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANTONIO FRANCIA and PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY: BENJAMIN P.
FRANCIA, CECILIA FRANCIA, AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA, DANILO F.
VILLARICA, RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, MELCHOR F. VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F.
VILLARICA and ERNESTO F. VILLARICA, Respondents.

FACTS: Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants filed an application
for the coverage of the landholding under PD 27. The said application was granted but the issuance of EP in
favor of the applicants was suspended because a separate case for the declaration of tenancy relationship was
filed by the said applicants with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy relationship
existed. Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in their favor. The OSEC approved the
same. However, upon review by the OP where the owners raised the issue that the landholding was not
within the ambit of PD 27, it having been previously reclassified by the OSEC as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial and urban purposes.

Rulings/Principles:
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS;
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same
provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further
be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of
agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.
COVERAGE UNDER PD 27;
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to
determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as
follows: (c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. And Section 3 (b) specifies
agricultural activity as: (b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical.On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be
considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the
DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner
filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389;
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the
amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural
land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left available to the tenant
is to claim disturbance compensation.

17
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Facts: Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner
of a parcel of land he’s been possessing in Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information.
The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR
ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed and Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be
given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation, and that the right of the State over said
land has prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land.

Held: No. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty

A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory information. After the
expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous
title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state.
 18
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

***REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government for failing to comply with the
length of ownership required by law of two parcels of land just recently classified as alienable and
disposable.
Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired
unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.

Facts: The Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single application for registration
of two parcels of land located in Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots
from their parents.

The government opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto's failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession required by law; (2) their evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private
appropriation.

The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots
were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in
a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and The
Freeman Banat News on December 19, 1999.

Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: No. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication
of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over
respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David as well as the MTC Order declaring its
Judgment of final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction

19
G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001

CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM1, petitioner.

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA, respondents.

FACTS: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for
a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original
Title Certificate in his name.

On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the
owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the
land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the Bureau of
Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land
from Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired
a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession
and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they
are the true owners of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who have been
in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on
November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-interest were ever
in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the
name of the petitioners.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed Omandam's
protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola
committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for the revocation
and cancellation of its title.

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the
petitioners to vacate the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of
Appeals declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private respondents' accion
publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977;
and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and
counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action on the order of the Bureau of
Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?

RULING: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its
Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority
to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the
decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the Secretary of the DENR can review, on
appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in
error.

DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to resolve
questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the
respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.

20
G.R. No. 186487 August 15, 2011

ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents.

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao
and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner’s free patent application over a parcel of
unregistered land. The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first
sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to
Atty. Samson Binag.

Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the
free patent applicant. The parties’ deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same
lot subject of Atty. Binag’s pending free patent application.

The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands’ survey, and the
free patent applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the
second and third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.

Issue: Whether the DENR erred in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought that
adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject land.

Held: No. Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent
application and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within
the DENR Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente
Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al, which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister
of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the
courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
 21
***[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]

EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ,

NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power
Corporation), respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Gordula filed an application for a free patent over a land, which he had been in
possession since 1949, in January, 1973. The Free patent was issued on January 01, 1974. The subject land
in 1973 was still part of the Caliraya- LumotRiver Forest reserve and was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. Thereafter, on November 18,
1987, the REPUBLIC, thru the NAPOCOR, filed an action for annulment of petitioner’s Free Patent,
cancellation of titles and The CA also held that the petitioners could not claim ownership by acquisitive
prescription since 1969; Gordula had been in possession of the property for only 25 years. The period of
Gordula’s occupancy after 1969 should not be tacked to the period from 1944 since by then the property was
not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.
HELD: Forest lands/reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof however
long can not convert them into private properties. (Director of Lands vs. CA). This ruling is premised
on the Regalian doctrine enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Further, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the State. Gordula did not acquire title to the said land prior to its reservation under
Proc. . He filed his application 3 years after said Proclamation was issued in 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been
classified as “public forest reserve for public good.”

22
G.R. No. 159589 December 23, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, namely: DOMINGA C. FABIO, SOCORRO D. FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO, ROLANDO
D. FABIO, NORMA D. FABIO, NORMA L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO, ROSALIE FABIO, DANILO FABIO,
RENATO FABIO, LEVITA FABIO, IRENE FABIO, TERESITA MOLERA, ROSEMARIE C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C.
MASANGKAY, ALFREDO F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO, MERCEDITA F. CASTILLO, ESTELA DE
JESUS AQUINO, FELECITO FABIO, and ALEXANDER FABIO, represented herein by ANGELITA F.
ESTEIBAR as their Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.

Facts: Respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F. Esteibar (Esteibar)
as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed an application for registration of title to the Lot with an approximate
area of 1,096,866 square meters or 109.6 hectares. The respondents sought the registration of title
under the provisions of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (PD 1529).

In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the
improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared
that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years.

Issue: Whether the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.

Held: No. The burden is on respondents to prove that the Lot ceased to have the status of a military
reservation or other inalienable land of the public domain. No proof was ever submitted by
respondents that the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, or the Lot, ceased as a military
reservation. Even if its ownership and control had been transferred by the Americans to the
Philippine government, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation remained as an official military
reservation. Thus, being a military reservation at the time, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation,
to which the Lot is a part of, cannot be subject to occupation, entry or settlement.

23
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and
JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.

Facts: The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps. In view of the
potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their
applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was
Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio
Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because
said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond
purposes.

On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond
permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau. When
the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet
available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14,
1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of
the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of
the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees.

Issue: Whether the petitioner owns the said mangrove swamps.

Held: No. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land
or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.

24
G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN,
and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents.

Facts: On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree in
favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag) covering a parcel of land.
On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 11585 in the name of spouses Carag.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No.
2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-
petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.
381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the
subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance.

Issue: Whether the Spouses Carag has a right over the subject land.

Held: Yes. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as
mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the
Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also
do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public
purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27
May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber
land.

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution,
spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion,
pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

25
***G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAÑO MANALO as Corporate
Sole Respondent.

FACTS:
The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre located in Ilocos Norte.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application
for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing
cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot, the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration
No. (TD) 5080261 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed by Bernardo Bandaguio
in favor of INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial
Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application.
Cadastral Court and Court of Appeals = Rendered in favor of INC.

ISSUE: May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable
only after June 12, 1945?

HELD: No.
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that
the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over
five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning
for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be
registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court
ruled that the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of
the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion,
from his parents. These possessions and occupation from Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from
Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by
respondent’s witnesses.

26
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The
transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain

27
***G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAÑAQUE, respondents.
Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of
Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and
Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
real estate tax.
MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for public sale the
Airport Lands and Buildings.

Held: MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
“roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term
“ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings
are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not
remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to
the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article
420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be
the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction
sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services
will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This
will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of
the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

28
***G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.

Facts:In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija. Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land
(by taking advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and registered the land in 1896. In
1907, the part of the land was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. Ramos
instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry
opposed the application on the following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government and such parcel was forest land. RTC and CA ruled against Ramos. It has been seen however that
the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of land under color of title.

Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and
cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the
remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in O.P.N. possession;
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession
of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his
enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads
as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period
of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to
such land under the provisions of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the
claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate
that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the
land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the
technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of
the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts
from giving title to the claimant.

Ruling: Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions
of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine
Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponce’s possessory information. RTC shall register in
the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A.

29
***[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

 [G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE,
EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE, Respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time,
the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the
same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square
meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry,
through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming
that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing
117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests
he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is
entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and
the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed
lot had been in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic
Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. Another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing
upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said
lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not
thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the
private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest
lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No.
885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain.
The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio
Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as
testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself
took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the
same could not be done because it was classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public
forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.

30
***G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE,
LETICIA P. BALAT, FILOMENA B. BATINO, ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA
CANUBAS, LORETO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C.
CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT, GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT,
SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A.
GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES,
PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. JUANGCO, GERVACIO A.
JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO MANDANAS, EMILIO M.
MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDANAS, TEODORO MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO
B. MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO, DANIEL D. MATIENZO, MAXIMINO
MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANITO T. PEREZ, MARIANITO T.
PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE, IGNACIO F. PETATE,
JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, AQUILINO B. SUBOL, CASIANO T. VILLA,
DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD A. VILLA, JACINTA S. ALVARADO,
RODOLFO ANGELES, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON, LEONILO
M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO
LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ,
ZACARIAS HERRERA, ZACARIAS HERRERA, REYNARIO U. LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO, DIONISIO F.
PETATE, LITO G. REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C. AMANTE, SOTERA
CASALME, REMIGIO M. SILVERIO, THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF LAGUNA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION
IV, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total
area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable
water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property,
thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial
Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however,
petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents
petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the
CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory
acquisition of the property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was
rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not
entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision
of DARAB.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of
a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Held:
 Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the
disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The
protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods
that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility
that needs to be answered now.

31
***[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN

PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO
J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES,
SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents.
FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he
ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during
the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title sometime in October
1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control,
management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division
of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law
nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands
of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead
good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

32
***G.R. No. 156951 September 22, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG,
RIZAL,respondents.

Facts: The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area
of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in
the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities
originally constructed by the AFP.

Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show
that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of Title
in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly
executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor
of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at
the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the document are forgeries.

On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the
Navy Officer’s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of
title suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no
records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the
property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October
30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A"
and “B” as its Exhibits "1" and “2,” respectively.

During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who
testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit “A” is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone
in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could
not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of
the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.

For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion
Caimbon who testified that Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president,
likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia
Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.

Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republic’s
complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom,
the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.

Hence, this petition of the Republic.

ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and,
therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?

RULING:

Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively
been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its
branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and
shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing
postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private
appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as
disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the
military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its
status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military
camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.

There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as
originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that
the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land is within military reservation,”and even dared
to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept
of public domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the Deed of
Sale technically described the property as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed
Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.

The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has
invariably invited attention to the proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084,
inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man.

The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be
the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent
SHAI’s unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director
of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents.

Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the
supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.

Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.

The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.

1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated
Palad’s allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBI’s findings.
In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.

2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if
he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the
notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped “Received” by the entry clerk.
That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words,
the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.

3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the
Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to
purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the
LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of
the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau
record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the “deed of sale specifically meritorious Official
Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price” An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless
the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required
payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists
or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.

5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the
corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAI’s
witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the limit.

TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled

33
***G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents,
CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998

PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of
any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore
lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the
said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the
City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore
land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the
CA with modifications.
ISSUEs: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area and Whether or not “foreshore
land” and the reclaimed area are within the commerce of man.
HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court
that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning;
much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged
areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.

34
***G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810 October 20, 2010

MANUEL ALMAGRO joined by his spouse, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO, Petitioners,

vs.
SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, assisted by her husband, JOSE A.
ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN, Respondents.

FACTS

This case involves a 17,181 square meter land which is known as Lot No. 6278-M located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental and inherited by respondents from their parents who died in 1976 and 1986respectively.

On September 18, 1996, respondents filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners as well as those who are occupants within the boundary of the land in controversy.

During the pre-trial, the Court and the parties designated geodetic engineer Suasin to perform the task of
verification and relocation survey of said lot and which was accordingly executed on September 12-13, 2000.
In the written report of Engr. Suasin, it contained, inter alia, that the big portion of the lot is submerged under the
sea and a small portion remain as dry land, and that some of the defendants have constructed buildings or houses
inside the dry land.

In the Court’s judgment dated May 11, 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry
portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.

Respondents appealed to the RTC, which subsequently concluded upon conducting two ocular inspections, that the
disputed remaining portion is not foreshore land because it remained dry even during high tides.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied. They also filed separate petitions for review withthe Court
of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether or not the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still private land or has become foreshore land
which forms part of the public domain, as contended by petitioners

HELD

The SC held that the disputed portion is private land and is rightfully owned by respondents, in
contravention to the claim of petitioners that is has become foreshore land and therefore owned by the public
domain, and that they have foreshore lease permits from the DENR on claimed foreshore land, albeit failing to
present evidence to prove validity of such claim.

35
***G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD,
CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD,
ANTONIO ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(Fourth Civil Cases Division), respondents.

Facts:
On 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen, Justo, Carlos, Librada, Demetrio, and Antonio, all with surname Alagad, filed
an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476
hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares. The Republic opposed the application on the ground that
applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. By virtue of a final judgment in said case and
supplemented by orders, the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was
declared public land. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0-401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the names
of the Alagads.

The Republic filed a petition for “annulment of title and reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion
on end of Lot 1 is concerned, contending that said portion had since time immemorial, been foreshore land reached
and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay. The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
Alagads from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area. The court
dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Appeal was
made to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the
appeal was perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether the properties in question are foreshore lands.

Held:
Under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools is the ground covered by
their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. And in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. When
Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as: the highest depth of the waters of
Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most
of the time during the year…

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the
portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question.

It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of
registration as private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as that part of the land which is between high and low water
and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.

36
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.

Facts: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent Alejandro deJesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands
for Sales Patent of a 33-hectare land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands through
theDavao Land District Officer accepted the sealed bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo Jose bidded P20 per
hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per hectare. The director annulled the said auction for the reason that sales
applicant Eugenio de Jesus failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on October 3, 1934 and Eugenio de Jesus
was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid submitted by Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as 10% deposit of
the price of the land at P110.50 per hectare. That on November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award order to Eugenio
de Jesus with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of the land which is located in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at
P100.50 per hectare or P2210 for the whole tract. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the sales application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the said land is needed by the Philippine Army for military
camp site purposes thereby excluding 12.8081 hectares which is the land in question. On September 7, 1936,
President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 thereby declaring the said lot to be withdrawn from sale and settlement
and reserving the same for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. On November 29,
1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8 and 10 installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the
sales application was amended which did not include the military camp. Thereafter, on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands
ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio deJesus for the tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares. On the same date, the
secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise granted a sales patent to Eugenio de Jesus containing an area of 20.6400
hectares. On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation No.85 and declared the disputed lot
opens to disposition under the provisions of Public
Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on October 9, PresidentRamon Magsaysay
revoked this Proclamation and reserved the same lot for medical center site under the administration of the Director of Hospital.
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with
the Court of First Instance of Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the Appellate Court denied the motion on June
17, 1975. Forthwith, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court for appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by
virtue of the Proclamation No. 350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
Conclusion: Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the lot with area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of
Proclamation No. 350 reserving such land for medical site purposes. The Supreme Court held that:
1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the recognized competence of the President to reserve
alienable lands of the public for specific public use or service. The law authorizes the President to designate tract or tracts of land
of the public domain as reservations for the commonwealth of the Philippines. A special proprietary right was vested in Eugenio
de Jesus when the sales award was issued to him in 1934 which was for 22 hectares (later found to be 20.6400 hectares upon
actual survey). The privilege of occupying public lands confers no contractual or vested rights and the authority of the President
to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by public, or to reserve them for public use may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Such proclamation of the President to reserve lands terminates any rights previously acquired by persons
t not proprietary right for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is
retained by the State

37
***G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.

Facts: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of
land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The
parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years and in
such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on
the land. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a
verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition
that they would not collect the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax,
would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.

These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract
clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis,
being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

Issue: Whether the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith.

Held: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may
not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that
the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage
of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by
section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good
faith.

38
*G.R. No. 127827 March 5, 2003

ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO, LORENZO,

DOMINGO, AMADO, and VICTORIA, all surnamed LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and spouses MARCELINO and CRISTINA S. LOPEZ, FELISA
LOPEZ and RAMON CORTEZ, ZOILO LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ and LEONILA LOPEZ and spouses
ROGELIO M. AMURAO and NOAMI T. AMURAO, respondents.

Facts: In 1920, Fermin Lopez occupied, possessed, and declared for taxation purposes a parcel of
public land. He filed a homestead application over the land, but his application was not acted
upon until his death. Following Fermin's death, Hermogenes, being the eldest child, worked and
introduced additional improvements on the land. In 1936, he inquired from the Bureau of Lands the
status of his late father's application for a homestead grant. An official of the bureau informed him
that the application remained unacted upon and suggested that he file a new application.
Following the suggestion, Hermogenes filed a homestead application in his own name. After
ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private person, the Bureau approved his
application. In 1939, Hermogenes submitted his final proof of compliance with the residency and
cultivation requirements of the law. The land was surveyed and a resulting plan was approved by
the Director of Lands, who thereafter ordered the issuance of the homestead patent. The patent
was later transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title in his name.

Unaware that he has been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes executed on February 11,
1956 an Extra-judicial Partition of the disputed land with his brothers — petitioner Eleuterio, Juan,
and Nazario. On September 12, 1958, however, the three executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their
share in the land in favor of Hermogenes. The succeeding year, Hermogenes applied with the Land
Registration Commission for the registration of the property in his name. To his surprise, he found that
the land has been registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de Tagle, Rosario de
Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo Santos, who collectively opposed his application.

Issue: Whether the petitioners are the co-owners through succession of the disputed property.

Held: No. Homestead settlement is one of the modes by which public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes are disposed of. Its object is to provide a home for each citizen of the state, where his
family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals
those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions.

The record is bereft of any evidence as to when Fermin exactly filed his homestead application over
the lot in controversy, but it must have been filed after 1920, the year he first occupied and
possessed the land, and before 1934, the year he died.The application of Fermin unfortunately
remained unacted upon up to the time of his death. It was neither approved nor denied by the
Director, as the Bureau failed to process it. Hence, he could not have acquired any vested rights as
a homestead applicant over the property because his application was never acted upon.

39
***G.R. No. L-14634 January 28, 1961

ARTURO NIETO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BARTOLOME QUINES and MIGUEL P. PIO, defendants-appellees.

Facts: This is a motion to reconsider the decision of January 28, 1961, declaring appellees' title to the
land in dispute as valid, enforceable and superior to that of appellant's title. A study of the facts
disclosed that Arturo Nieto's predecessor-in-interest, Muriu Florentine) claimed ownership over Lot
No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. During the cadastral proceedings her claim was not opposed
and the court found no irregularity in the proceedings and infirmity of Florentine's claim of
ownership. Subseqeuntly, it adjudicated the Lot and ordered a title issued therefor in the name of
Maria Florentine. On the other hand, Bartolome Quines' Homestead Application filed long before
the cadastral proceedings covers the same tract of land claimed by Maria Florentine In like manner,
Quines' application was not opposed, legal requirements were fully complied, and there being no
more impediments, the Bureau of Lands, pursuant to the Public Land Law ordered the issuance of
a Homestead Patent in favor of Bartolome Quines. Hence, these circumstances of two valid titles
registered on the same date, in the name of two different persons and were the results of two lawful
proceedings, one judicial and the other administrative.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s title over the land must prevail.

Held: No. Cadastral cases initiated by the Government are judicial in nature and one in rem.
Decisions therein are binding against the whole world, including the government. After the finality
of the degree, title of ownership becomes vested upon the adjudicatee and the land could no
longer be disposed of. Tho government had lost its right to convey the land by homestead grant.
Homestead patent title issued by the Bureau of Lands wag the result of administrative proceedings
initiated by the homestead applicant. The proceedings are under the control and determination
of tho Director of Lands whose decisions on the contest are not final and conclusive. In view of the
nature and manner of acquisition of appellees' title over the disputed land, it must perforce give
way to the appellant's title acquired by judicial adjudication.

40
*G.R. No. 173365 April 15, 2010

JULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his
heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
JIMENA TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
MARCIANO BAGAOISAN, Respondent.

Facts: On December 20, 1976, petitioners, together with their mother, executed a Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicente T. Lazo. Through this document, petitioners agreed
to "sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM" the subject property to Lazo.
Thereafter, respondent, Marciano Bagaoisan, bought the subject property from Lazo, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1977.

Issue: Whether the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim is void.

Held: Yes. Without going into petitioners’ allegation that they were unaware of the contents of the
Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, we nonetheless hold that the deed is void for violating the
five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through homestead patent as
provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five
years after the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

41
*G. R. NO. 158449 October 22, 2004

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and
THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of land
under Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land particularly
described as Lot 5442, Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the
Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and
that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of
owner for more than 30 years.

No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded with the presentation
of their evidence. The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Jose M. Velasco, Jr.

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced the history
of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property was first declared for
tax purposes by Justina Hintog

Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In the same year, the
Subject Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona
Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other
hand, Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from Teodoro Calanog, his
father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano
and other fruit bearing trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family,
consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared
possession of the Subject Property
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale.7

Issue: Whether petitioners have complied with the period of possession and occupation required
by the Public Land Act.

Held: No. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to
comply with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as required by both
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the
Public Land Act, to read as follows –

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12)
hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a
tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate
tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the
provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land
not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.

While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and cultivation
of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies to free patents.

42
G.R. No. 159101 July 27, 2011

SPS. GONZALO T. DELA ROSA & CRISTETA DELA ROSA, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN VALDEZ and SPOUSES POTENCIANO MALVAR AND LOURDES MALVAR, Respondents.

Facts: In its complaint, plaintiff MCDC in substance states that: thru its President, Honor P. Moslares,
the subject property was acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is further stated that
Juan Valdez and Apolinaria Valdez were awarded with Sales Patent after compliance with
corresponding requirements. Plaintiff MCDC and its predecessor-in-interest Juan Valdez have been
in continuous, adverse and open possession of the property in the concept of owners.

However, plaintiff MCDC has been unlawfully deprived of the possession and enjoyment of the
property because of the continuing acts of dispossession committed and perpetuated by the
defendants spouses Gonzales and Cristeta dela Rosa as well as the other defendants and other
occupants who have no property right at all. As a result plaintiff [MCDC] has suffered and continues
to suffer grave and irreparable damages and injuries; thus, the writ of preliminary injunction is
urgently necessary to prevent further acts of dispossession of plaintiff MCDC.

While in the Complaint-in-intervention of Intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. it is

substantially alleged that: It claims to be the co-owner to the extent of one half or fifty percent (50%)
of the subject parcel of land according to a Deed of Absolute Conveyance/Transfer for valuable
services to be rendered; and for the amounts to be advanced by intervenor corporation needed
to update the real estate taxes; and to clear the title of Juan Valdez from overlapping titles from
the adverse claim of the interlopers; and the removal of the defendants and other occupants from
the disputed property. Intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. sought for the relief to be placed
in possession of the property by the process of the writ of mandatory injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which placed the spouses Valdez
and spouses Malvar in possession of the subject property during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-
6015.
Held: No. "In effect, petitioner’s occupation of the land in question, after the denial of its application
for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently illegal. Petitioner’s members have, as a
consequence, become squatters whose continuous possession of the land may now be considered
to be in bad faith. This is unfortunate because squatters acquire no legal right over the land they
are occupying.

Although as a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer property
in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some exceptions. For
example, when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject
property is covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. In the
case at bench, the land subject of the suit is covered by a torrens title under the name of NHA."
(Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, 232-233).

This aforecited ruling is squarely applicable in this case because, as previously shown, the intervenors
Valdez and Malvar have established a clear and legal right of ownership and possession and the
alleged TCT No. 451423-A of the defendants spouses dela Rosa is non-existent.
 43
***G.R. No. L-50685 December 4, 1991

ROBERTO AGURA, CESAR ALIB, TOMAS STA. RITA, ALFREDO CORDOVA, VICTOR DE LOS REYES,
and MARINA SERFINO, petitioners,
vs.
FEDERICO SERFINO, SR., FEDERICO SERFINO, JR., The Honorable RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President; The Honorable JOSE J. LEIDO, JR., Minister of the
Department of Natural Resources, and The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, respondents.

Facts: Private respondent Serfino applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of
land (4,172 sq.m.) located in San Patricio, Bacolod City. At the auction sale the respondent were
the only qualified bidder and paid the required 10% of his respective bids. Meanwhile, District Land
Officer Pedro C Reyes alleged there was a conflict on the awarding of the parcel of land to the
respondent; he alleged that portion of parcel of land applied in MSA was already included in the
petitioners Revocable Permit Application. Upon further investigation, the preliminary investigation
report states that the land in question used to be foreshore land but is now dry land and is now
being used for residential purposes by the party litigants and their respective tenants and relatives.

Issue: Whether the sales of the lots in question in favor of the private respondents should be revoked
in view of the alleged conflicts and adverse claims of the petitioners.
Held: RA No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should
be by bidding, if the area applied for does not exceed 1000 square meters, and that the applicant
has in his favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof. Hence, if the area applied for is in
excess of 1000 square meters, as in the instant case, the sale must be done only through bidding.

44
***[G.R. No. 521518. August 13, 1991.]

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-Appellee, v.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Respondents-Appellants.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for Petitioner-Appellee.

SUMMARY:
International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791
segregates from the public domain parcels of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land
subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990
was enacted fully ceding ownership over the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect
forestry charges from Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and
supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for declaratory relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without other limitations than those
established by law. In this case, that exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and
transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay
the forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP

DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became
the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing
concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or
diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered
private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated.
BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry
charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.

45
***G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical

School), petitioner,
vs.
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.

DOCTRINE: Under PD 1073, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular land, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, if: (a) The land is alienable public land (b) The person has
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same which must be for the
period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
FACTS: Sometime in 1959 Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipalty of
Opol, Misamis Oriental. In 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the same
was rejected by the Bureau of Forest Development in 1968. While his application was pending, in 1965, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving Lot 4932 as a school site, which was
eventually occupied by Opol High School in 1970. The reserved lot included the land area occupied by
Doldol. Seventeen years later, or on November 2, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino issued a Proclamation still
reserving the said area to Opol High School, which was then renamed to Opol National Secondary Technical
School. By virtue of said declaration, the school demanded that Doldol vacate the land, but he refused. 1991:
Opol National School filed a complaint for accion possesoria with the Cagayan de Oro RTC. The trial court
ruled in favor of the school and ordered Doldol to vacate. CA reversed and held that since Doldol has
possessed the land from 1959 up to 1991 or for 32 years, he is now entitled to the same by virtue of
prescription.

CA cites as basis for its decision Sec. 48 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by RA 1942:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether Doldol, having occupied the lot for 32 years, acquired a right over the land.
RULING: No. While the laws provide for prescription as a way for acquiring ownership over a particular
land, the CA erred in applying Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act which is the outdated version of the said law.
Sec. 48 has now already been amended by PD 1073, which now states that: (b) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. Under the said act, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular
land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, if: (a) The land is alienable public land (b)
The person has open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same which
must be for the period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier. IN THIS CASE: The
land is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the District Foresters Certification. However, Doldol
had been occupying the land reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law requires that the
possession of lands of public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title or a
right to the disputed lot. He cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that the President
has reserved the said lot as a school site. Having been reserved in its favor, Opol National School has a
better right of possession over the land in dispute. o The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of
preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the
divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired.
 46
***G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-
appellants.

Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso
facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after
his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial
court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered
evidence.

Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands Act
which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name of the
widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and thereafter the title was issued
in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;
(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion and
declared the decision as final.

Ruling:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms
part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death
and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's
decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The
doctrine in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section 16
of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made by the husband without the approval of the Director of
Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso in a project of partition
without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.

47
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991

SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S.
VIRATA and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Solid State Multi-Products Corporation filed an action for quieting of title against the
respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Imus, Cavite, with an area of 48,182 sq. meters, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-80889 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite, which was issued on February 24, 1976; that Virata, during his lifetime
thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title No. T-11520 RT 1660 on September
1, 1959 thru an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title covering the same parcel
of land; that by reason of the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of TCT No. T-11520 RT
1660, there now exists a cloud on the title of petitioner.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is the true owner of the said lot.

Held: Yes. Even assuming that respondent Virata was a purchaser in good faith and for value, the
law is, as between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any
negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee
of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 78728, December
8, 1988, 168 SCRA 354, emphasis ours). Further if a person happened to obtain property by mistake
or to the prejudice of another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title which may have been
issued to him under the circumstances may and should be cancelled or corrected.

Our unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the title of petitioner under the Torrens land system
should be upheld considering that no previous valid title to the same land existed.

48
49
50