PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
I. PRACTICE OF LAW from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
A. Concept
1. In re Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, Dec. 19. 1980
PONENTE: Castro, C.J.
DOCTRINE: Passing the Bar exams makes a lawyer an IBP
member. Thus, he was not compelled to be an IBP member as
he was already a member thereof. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter, to vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. He is only
compelled to pay the annual dues.
FACTS: Pursuant to IBP’s Resolution No. 75-65 in relation to Sec.
24 (par. 2), Article III of the IBP By-Laws (IBP’s authority to
recommend removal of a delinquent member), Respondent Marcial
A. Edillon was recommended to be removed from its Roll of
Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” since its
constitution (January 9, 1973) despite due notice.
When required by the court to comment on said resolution, Edillon
reiterated his refusal to pay the membership fees. Respondent
objected to particular (S. 1, 9, 10) features of Rule of Court 139-A
(Court Rule). He argued that said provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights (to liberty and property) as he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be an IBP member and pay corresponding dues.
Hence, he concluded that the Court Rule provisions and the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
[[Note, matters here were raised in a previous case “AC No. 526, In
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al. The Court held that the integration
is “perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable”]]
In this case, the Court restated, an “Integrated Bar” is a State-
organized Bar to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
membership in which is voluntary.
Philippine Bar Integration was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent
as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposed upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. Thus, all legislation in relation
thereto is uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation… and as an officer of the court. Salus populi est
supreme lex.
The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of IBP is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to
the SC by Sec. 5(par.5) of Article X of the 1973 Ph Consti. Thus,
despite the enabling law (RA 6397—Congress authorized SC to
adopt rules to effect integration), SC has the plenary power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Thus, when he entered the legal profession, he is subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Court is without power to compel his IBP membership,
thus S. 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for violating right of
freedom to and not to associate
2. W/N the Court Rule is unconstitutional for requiring payment of a
membership fee
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

HELD:
1. Passing the Bar exams makes a lawyer an IBP member. Thus, he
was not compelled to be a member as he was already a member. He
is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter, to vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. He
is only compelled to pay the annual dues. The Court, in furthering the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of prefessional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program—the lawyers.

2. No prohibition in the Constitution from requiring members of a

privileged class to pay a reasonable fee to defray expenses of
regulation. Fee is imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds to carry out its objectives and purposes of integration.

2. Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty to the SC on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentations in the SC,
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, Mar. 8, 2011
DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom.
Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-
observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if
purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
FACTS: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel for the
petitioners therein filed, 1) a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating
the fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’
human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms; and, 2) a
supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was
plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of the
plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit the
arguments laid down in said decision.
Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity of
the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized
sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court. Due to this, the
faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement (Restoring
Integrity Statement), which alleged plagiarism against Justice del
Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a
truth. Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin
board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme
Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondents to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
ISSUE: Whether or not the law professors committed a violation of
CPR, despite their exercise of freedom of expression and academic
freedom.
HELD: YES. As to freedom of expression: While most agree that the
right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks.
These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
As to academic freedom: It would do well for the Court to remind
respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in
the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more
than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus,
their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Fallo: With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be
satisfactory; Comon compliance of 35 respondents -
UNSATISFACTORY - These 35 respondent law professors are
reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely; Dean Leonen -
Admonished

3. Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676, Jun. 10, 2014
PONENTE: REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
FACTS: Amado Dizon alleged that he, along with his siblings
engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to
represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of
Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon. Dizon claimed that Atty. De Taza
demanded the sum of ₱75,000.00 from him to expedite the
proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the
parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract.
According to Dizon, unknown to him at that time was that, a month
earlier, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of
₱800,000.00 from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that
Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the
proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts
signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the
complainant which state that ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the
case which, in turn shall result in a decision favorable to plaintiff w/in
2 mos. from receipt of said amount, and another amount of ₱500,000
has been advanced as part of expense to expedite the process
before the courts.
Dizon then went to the Supreme Court, and learned that the Court
had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to
Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He
tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be
found.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
Thereafter, Dizon instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and documents from
other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana
Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit which was attached to the
complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks in her favor
amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank.
Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose
Affidavit was attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza
issued a check for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check
was dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed
account. Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an
affidavit, stating that Atty. De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed
to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
Dizon through a letter informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is
planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the
United States of America (U.S.A.). Atty. De Taza was then required
by the Court to file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution
was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS
(Return to Sender)- Moved". It was then required in the Resolution
that the complainant inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s new
address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving
Atty. De Taza’s new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the
Resolution with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the
latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution with the
complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation
"RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolutionheld that the said copy
of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty.
De Taza as having waived the filing of her comment. The case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that Atty. Norlita De Taza be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Taza should be held administratively
liable
HELD: YES. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if
he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to his client. In this case, the
purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and
non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in
the first place.
Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that

amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Based on the
documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that
Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without
any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing
Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Angeles City for drawing checks against a closed
account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other
creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to
an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is
exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must
remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of
justice, equity and fairness.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later

dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account

4. Pichon v. Agleron, A.C. No. 5359, Mar. 10, 2014
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez was the
widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident
in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump
truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant
decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr.
(Atty. Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and
received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of
filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 -₱3,000.00; (2)
June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00 or a
total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no
complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of
Caraga.
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional
service and received the amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however,
explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the
filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the
complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay
30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996,
after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in
full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the
attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred
that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of
₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of
the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.
· Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:
found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him,
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of four (4) months.
· The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1)
month.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Agleron should be suspended for
neglecting a legal duty entrusted to him.
HELD: YES.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors except as to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause
with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the
complaint against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental,
despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He
attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the
30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid
excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case
that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he
accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had
not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a
way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of
the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously
lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed
incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.1âwphi1
In a number of cases, the Court held that a lawyer should never
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence
renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

from three months to two years. In this case, the Court finds the
suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is

hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be
dealt with more severely.

5. Brunet v. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, Mar. 14, 2014
DOCTRINE: Canons 17 and 18
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves
FACTS: Atty. Ronald Guaren, herein respondent, was hired in 1997
for the titling of a residential lot acquired by herein complainants,
Stephen Brunet and Virginoa Brunet. Atty. Guaren asked for
P10,000.00 including expenses relative to its proceeding.The full
payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title. Atty.
Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos
(Pl,000.00) which the Brunets gave. Thus, Atty. Guaren took all the
pertinent documents relative to the titling of the Brunets’ lot. An
additional payment of ₱6,000.00 was asked by the lawyer which was
delivered by his clients. Until 2001, the Brunets reminded Atty.
Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling
was in progress. However, they became bothered by the slow
progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they
paid. Atty. Guaren agreed to return the same provided that the
amount of ₱5,000.00 be deducted to answer for his professional
fees. Despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against the Brunets
in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob,
Cebu (MCTC).
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Guaren has violated the Code of
Profeesional Responsibility
HELD: YES. Atty. Guaren has violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and
despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for
appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent
from the latter.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering
is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining
of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the
amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He,
however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling
of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

6. Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, Mar. 16, 2016
DOCTRINE: Check Canon 18 as provided below.
FACTS:
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return
the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services
despite his not having performed the contemplated professional
services.
Complainant’s side:
She sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in
the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio
C. Sanchez. Atty. Aguilos had accepted the engagement, fixing his
fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing;
that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; that she
had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the
developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start
working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee.
She had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for
her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of
her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a
higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; that she
subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund
of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he
had already started working on the case.
She had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; that
the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having
rendered any appreciable legal services to her; and that his constant
refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative
complaint against him in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Respondent’s side:
Atty. Aguilos alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee
sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
marriage; that based on his evaluation of her situation, the more
appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the
psychological incapacity of her husband. The complainant and her
fiancée agreed on the amount for respondent’s legal services. The
fiancée paid P70,000 as evidenced by the handwritten receipt
prepared by respondent.
For purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the
complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth
certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to
submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal
separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee
upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly respond to his
communications.
Sanchez admitted to him that she had spent the money that her
fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and
that she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared
petition for legal separation essentially requesting him not to file the
petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the
annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty.
Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of
paper because the demand lacked basis in law.
IBP’s Recommendation:
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. recommended that
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita
D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as
payment for his services because it is excessive. It is also
recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to show
his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and improper
language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20,
2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the
recommendation of the penalty.

ISSUE/s:
a. Whether or not Atty. Romeo Aguilos should be held
administratively liable for misconduct?
b. Whether or not Atty. Aguilos should be ordered to return the
attorney's fees paid?
HELD:
a. YES
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should
be ordered to return the entire amount received from the
client.
Atty. Aguilos is quite confused as to what action he is going
to file in court. The intention of the British national and the
complainant was to get married. At that time and maybe up
to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain
Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are
intending to get married, we can safely assume that the
complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for
annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage
bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the
petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to
marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a
separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the
marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal
separation will be granted, one is not free to marry another
person.
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional
competence and skill to the complainant. He did not know
the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and
for annulment of marriage. Moreover, the respondent was
insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for
legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's
fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was,
therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a
hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards
imposed on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon
18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he
is not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional colleague.
As members of a noble profession, lawyers are always
impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or,
as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with
courage and zeal but that should not be used as license for
the use of offensive and abusive language.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand
from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x
x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct
that this Court cannot tolerate.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded,
with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense will be
severely punished.
b. YES
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement
because as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability
and competence to handle the case for annulment of
marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any
amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not
even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook
for the complainant because it was improbable that the
agreement with her was to bring the action for legal
separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for
legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of
marriage was either his way of covering up for his
incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either
way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already
received.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the
MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby
FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional
competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use
of offensive and improper language towards his fellow
attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the
offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to
the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of
P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the date of this decision until full payment.

The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should

naturally and expectedly perform during his professional
engagement does not discharge his professional
responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The
respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be
sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a
consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the client the
amount received from the latter in consideration of the
professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum
meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of

P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his professional
competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the
entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus
legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of
this decision until full payment.

7. Pacao v. Limos, A.C. No. 11246, Jun. 14, 2016
DOCTRINE: The present case comes clearly under the grounds
given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender.
FACTS: In 2008, Petitioner Arnold Pacao’s wife was charged with
qualified theft by BHF Pawnshop. His wife was the former vault
custodian of BHF. Respondent Atty Limos appeared as counsel for
BHF.
Arnold initiated negotiation with BHF through respondent. After a
series of negotiations, Atty Limos relayed to Arnold that BHF, her
client, was demanding PHP 530,000 to be paid in full or installments,
whereby an initial amount of Php 200,000 was to be entrusted to
Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to BHF a signed Affidavit of
Desistance, a Compromise Agreement and a Joint Motion to
approve compromise agreement.
Php 200,000 was given by Arnold to Atty Limos, who signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt. However, Atty limos failed to meet the
terms of their agreement and despite such failure, still sought from
Arnold the next installments, but Arnold refused.
In 2010, Arnold met BHF’s representative, Camille Bonifacio, who
informed him that Atty. Limos is no longer the Pawnshop’s counsel
and had not authorized respondent to negotiate nor receive any
money. A demand letter was sent to Atty Limos by Arnold for the
sum of Php 200,000 but the former refused. Given this, a
disbarment case was filed by Arnold against Atty Limos.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient basis to disbar Respondent
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court noted that this is not the first time
that Respondent is facing an Administrative case, for she had
already been twice suspended from practice. In Villaflores, Atty.
Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous
expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking
with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held
administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when
she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued two
postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite
knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases,
the Court, gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.
Her case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges
brought against her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty.
Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against her. She also
failed to file her mandatory conference brief and her verified position
paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance either
personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled
date of the mandatory conferences which she was duly notified.
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for
that matter, to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate
that she still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a
member of the Bar.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section
27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however,
does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the
guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering the serious
nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior
misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the
imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is
aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and
as an officer of the Court. However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude
and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed
to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar,
warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated
desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to
remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the
need to reform herself.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

8. Plumptre v. Rivera, A.C. No. 11350, Aug. 9, 2016
DOCTRINE: This gross disrespect of the judicial system shows
that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of integrity
in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and
respondent has repeatedly shown that he is unfit to exercise it.
FACTS: Complainant alleges that he asked respondent for help in
his application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration. The
met and the latter was paid P10,000 as professional fee. They met
again and gave another P10,000 together with his passport,
allegedly for the processing of the permit. They met for the third time
since respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos. He
requested another P10,000 but complainant refused as they only
agreed to 20k. Respondent asked for P8,000 allegedly for
complainant's other case which respondent was working on,
explaining that P5,000 will be given to a Las Pinas judge to reverse
the MR against complainant, while P3,000 for the processing.
Complainant gave the P8,000. He no longer receive updates of the
permit and the case thereafter. Further, whenever he called
respondent to follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled
invectives at him and threatened him and his wife.
work permit. Respondent’s behavior demonstrates his lack of
integrity and moral soundness.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was
indeed decided in complainant’s favor, respondent’s act of soliciting
money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary
by giving the impression that court cases are won by the party with
the deepest pockets and not on the merits.
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of
P8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial
system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This gross
disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral
fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his character. The practice of
law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly shown that he is
unfit to exercise it.

He was able to track down respondent and retrieve his passport but
respondent refused to return the P28,000. Complainant filed a case
to IBP.

IBP-CBD recommended 2-yr suspension and return of the 28K. IBP-

BOG modified it to disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not disbarment is proper.

HELD: : No. (3-yr suspension only and return of 8K). Respondent

failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence. He
not only neglected the attorney-client relationship established
between them; he also acted in a reprehensible manner towards
complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening complainant and his family
with bodily harm, hiding from complainant, and refusing without
reason to return the money entrusted to him for the processing of the
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

B. Qualifications probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

1. In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of
Successful Bar Applicant Al C. Argosino, B.M. No. 712 July 13,
1995
PONENTE: Feliciano, J.
DOCTRINE: The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession
is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would signal the progressive
destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and
in our legal system as we know it.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of
attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar.
He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. In short, he must show
evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of
Camaligan from notice.

FACTS: On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others,

was charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the death
of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing"
conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On
February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application was
granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar
exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed
to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred
that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his

2. Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, Feb. 24, 1997
PONENTE: Narvasa, CJ.:
DOCTRINE: The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
FACTS: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk
of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends. It appears that through Alawi's
agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to Villarosa & Co. and
in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya
by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not
long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote
to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group
of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at
Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan. Alauya argues that Alawi maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan with his authority and against his will. In a complaint
filed by Alawi against Alauya, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of
the Philippine Bar may properly use.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June
5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
ISSUE: WON Alauya can use the title “Attorney”
RULING: No. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this
Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use
of the title of attorney.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and
for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or
other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

3. Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, Jun. 10, 2003
PONENTE: Carpio, J:
DOCTRINE:
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
FACTS: Respondent was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. A day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, herein
complainant filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with: a)
unauthorized practice of law; b) grave misconduct; c) violation of law;
and, d) grave misrepresentation. Anent the charge of unauthorized
practice of law and grave misconduct, Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Furthermore,
respondent purportedly filed with the MBEC a pleading, wherein he
represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate Bunan, and he signed the same as counsel for the said
candidate. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body. Finally, on the charge of grave
misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent
of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate without the latter
engaging respondent’s services.
The Supreme Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take
the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In his
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
Comment on the complaint against him, respondent admits to giving
assistance and advice to Candidate Bunan, as well as to signing the
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. Respondent explains, however, that he did the
aforementioned acts NOT as a lawyer of Candidate Bunan BUT as a
person who knows the law. On his employment as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he had submitted his
resignation, which was allegedly accepted on the same date as the
submission. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated, considering that herein complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
The SC referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBC found that
respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan
in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings
show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath. Therefore, for
respondent’s unauthorized practice of law, the OBC recommended
that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar. On the
other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned
as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent
was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
ISSUE: Did respondent engage in unauthorized practice of law and
hence does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar?
RULING: YES. Records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Candidate Bunan prior to the date when he took the lawyers’
oath. In the pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in
the canvassing, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In
the first paragraph of the same pleading, respondent stated that he
was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Mayoralty candidate Estipona-Hao
had also retained respondent as her counsel few days before the
latter’s oath-taking as member of the Philippine Bar. Respondent
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

likewise signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as Bayan. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Clearly, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
of the Philippine Bar. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had
no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the SC elucidated Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
that: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; xxx In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law xxx have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. In
Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent
has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The SC reiterated that the right to practice law is not a natural or

constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. SC further stated that a bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. There
are two more essential requisites to be performed, namely: the
lawyer’s oath to be administered by the SC and the signature in the
Roll of Attorneys. In the case at bar, respondent passed the 2000
Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, as stated
earlier, he was disallowed by the SC from signing in the Roll of
Attorneys, an act which finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

On the charge of violation of law against complainant, SC ruled that

the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine

4. In re Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 7, 2007
PONENTE: Corona, J.
DOCTRINE: A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship
if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.
FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice.
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
NOTES: Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from the Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may resume the

practice of law

HELD: YES. subject to his compliance with the conditions under

RA 9225 and submission of such proof of compliance to the Bar
Confidant.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost
by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a

5. Llunar v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 6484, Jun. 16, 2015
DOCTRINE:
XXX the respondent was effectively in the practice of law
despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This
infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed.
Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for
five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified,
but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the
profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules.
In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the respondent
liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing
bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by
the court in the case for violation of BP. 22 filed against him by
his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice
of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his current liability
- which is no different in character from his previous offense -
we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment.
He has become completely unworthy of membership in our
honorable profession.
FACTS:
The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-
affidavit that Adelita B. Llunar filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort for
gross and inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct. In
September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina
Banez, hired the respondent to file a case against father and son
Ricardo and and Ard Cervantes for the recovery of a parcel of land
allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered
under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to his son, Ard.
At that time, the property in question was mortgaged with the Rural
Bank of Malilipot, Albay, and was the subject of a foreclosure
proceeding. As such, the respondent received from the complainant
the following amounts, to wit: 1.) P70,000 as partial payment of the
redemption price of the property; 2.) P19,000 to cover the filing fees;
and 3.) P6,500 as attorney’s fees.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the
subject property was ever filed by the respondent with the RTC in
Legaspi City. As such, the complainant demanded the return of the
P95,000 she gave to the respondent. The latter refused to return the
whole amount of P95,000 arguing that another lawyer named Atty.
Abitria filed for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes in favor of
the complainant. Thus, he is only willing to return the amount of
P45,000, since the P50,000 represents the amount he paid to Atty.
Abitria for handling the case.
The complainant refused to acknowledge the complaint for
annulment of title, arguing that she had no knowledge of Atty.
Abitria’s engagement as counsel. Furthermore, the complaint was
filed three years late and the property could no longer be properly
redeemed from the bank. The complainant also learned that the
respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law
since May 29, 2002. The Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner found that the respondent to have been grossly
negligent in handling the complainant’s case and to have gravely
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him. The investigating
commissioner also found out that the respondent erred in not
informing his client that he was under indefinite suspension from the
practice of law. Due to these infractions, the Investigating
commissioner recommended that the respondent remain indefinitely
suspended. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty of indefinite
suspension to disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the infractions of the respondent warrant the
penalty of disbarment- YES
HELD:
The Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct in
his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law
while under indefinite suspension. First, the respondent did not even
exert due diligence in handling the complainant’s case. He failed to
act promptly in redeeming the complainant’s property within the
period of redemption. As such the respondent is guilty for violating
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides

that “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Second, the respondent’s failure to return upon demand the amounts
given to him. Prior to such demands, the complainant approached
the respondent several times to follow up on the case or cases to be
filed by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions in her
case had been taken. The Court ruled that the respondent violated
Canon 6, which mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all monies
and properties of his client that may come to his or her possession.
Third, the respondent did not observe candor, for being dishonest
with regard to his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Lastly, the Court ruled that practicing his profession while under
indefinite suspension aggravates the offense committed.

Considering the foregoing, and the fact that the respondent is a

repeated violator of these rules, the Court ruled that the respondent
return the whole amount and be disbarred from the practice of law.

6. PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN (A.C. No.
11316, July 12, 2016)
DOCTRINE:
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it. It is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character.
Good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the esteem in which he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is
not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to
escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent are siblings. Complainant enrolled at
the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997. Respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before
transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) where he was
discharged a year later. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with
his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children. Respondent never
went back to school to earn a college degree.
In 1999, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in
a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he using complainant's name and college
records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's
University's College of Law and take the Bar Examinations.
slaw
Sometime in May 2009, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
was requesting complainant’s presence at its office, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent. Accordingly, complainant
appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents.
Complainant later learned that he was invited because of
respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa
filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.
aw
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate
crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon
himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan"
and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan. However,
problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" continued to hound him.
alawredchanrobleslaw
Complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. He
also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues,
which eventually forced him to resign from his job. Hence,
complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.
anrobleslaw
Respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res
judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer
be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case
No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the
administrative case filed by Agtarap against him. Moreover,
according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace,
malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera found
respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's
name, identity, and academic records.
He noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are
siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest that: (a) his parents are
Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to

Rosana Halili-Caronan. However, based on the Marriage Certificate
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan"
is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.
Also, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." Since
respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic
records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan"
neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar
Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be dropped and stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys, that respondent and the name "Richard A.
Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the
Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution,
the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the
recommendation.
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering
that:
(a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys; and
(b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to
the Bar.
HELD:
(a) No. Complainant has established by clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree,
and take the Bar Examinations.
Respondent’s admissions and the evidence at hand indubitably
confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity,
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant -
the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the
IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
(b) No. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a
pre-law course
Respondent never completed his college degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later
on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his
real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for
admission to the Bar. The practice of law is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. It is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character.
Good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the esteem in which he is held by
the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not
a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty. Respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the
name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged
the latter into controversies.
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He
also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities. Respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members
is to uphold its integrity and dignity.

C. Appearance of Non-lawyers
1. In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
PER CURIAM
DOCTRINE: There is no doubt on Borromeo's guilt of contempt,
for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes,
gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration
of justice.
FACTS:
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer
but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to
possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal
principles and procedural rules.
Borromeo entered into transactions with three banks, namely:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
and Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC).
Borromeo obtained loans from each of the said banks wherein he
mortgaged certain properties ( in the transaction with TRB and
UCPB) or a promissory note (in the transaction with SBTC) as a form
of collateral. In each contract, he failed to fulfill his obligations which
resulted in actions to foreclose the mortgage and collection of sum of
money instituted by the banks against Borromeo.
Borromeo instituted civil and criminal actions against the public
prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another,
rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as
the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices
thereof.
By way of example, in one of the cases, the trial courts have
sustained the right of the banks to foreclose the mortgages. This
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
notwithstanding, Borromeo would file another complaint on the same
facts and issues, which result in the dismissal on the ground of res
judicata or litis pendentia. This has been the practice of respondent
Borromeo further resulting in the numerous cases initiated by him
clogging the courts’ dockets.
Aside from these transactions, Borromeo has clogged the courts with
other cases not related to the abovementioned. In the aggregate, he
has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of
no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal,
administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, he has been
continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite
baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
Borromeo also circulated in public writings that were derogatory of
the many court judgments or directives against him and defamatory
of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the
judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions.
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands,
among others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. They strongly urged the Court "to
impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act.”
ISSUE: Is Borromeo guilty of contempt?
HELD:
YES. There is no doubt on Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of
and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect
to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding,
obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.
He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered
adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had
become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting
on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded
on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of
the Constitution and the law.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

He has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys
appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court
dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court
employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely
unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the
time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or
another on his unmeritorious cases.

2. Catimbuhan v. Cruz
G.R. No. 51813-14, Nov. 29, 1983
DOCTRINE: Non-lawyers, including senior law students, can
appear in the municipal trial court as private prosecutors for
accused persons under the supervision and control of the
fiscal; Permission of the fiscal not necessary for one to enter
his appearance as private prosecutor.
FACTS: On April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed
separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio
and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries. Petitioners
Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law
students of the U.P. College of Law where, as part of the curriculum
of the university they were required to render legal assistance to the
needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Malana and Lucila filed
their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner
Cantimbuhan. Fiscal Leodegario C, Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners. In an order, the respondent judge
sustained the fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. The
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition were filed,
with prayers that the orders be set aside as they are in plain violation
of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which states: "SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.—In the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.”
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar—a party to an action is
authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the
inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney. On the other hand, it is
the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered
to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by
respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila. They also contend that the exercise by the
offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of
the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of
the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may appear for Catimbuhan
HELD: We find merit in the petition.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with
the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose, Thus, in the
case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed
to represent the accused in a case pending before the then
Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for
damages to property through reckless imprudence. The permission
of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case
personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation,
whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case.
On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the
private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case
under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in
a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he
be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision
and control of the trial fiscal.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

3. Cruz v. Mina, G.R. 154207, April 27, 2007 Petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. The petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
Doctrine: There is really no problem as to the application of public respondent MeTC.
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
party litigant, may appear before the courts.
HELD:
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior YES. Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not
he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, RULE 138-A: LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has
of a lawyer before inferior courts. successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
FACTS: school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in a criminal case for Grave administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies
his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730,
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as the Court En Banc clarified:
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the “The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
case for continuation of trial. personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.

Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.”
The phrase “In the court of a justice of the peace” in Bar Matter No.
730 is subsequently changed to In the “court of a municipality” as it
now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real
distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court,
the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer,
as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while
the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule
138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioners appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly
clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its
very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor
is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been
intended by the RTC. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except
in instances when no actual damage results from an offense. The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
criminal action, unless exceptions occur. The petitioner is correct in
stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case, it follows that the civil aspect arising
from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.

4. PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., 42 SCRA 302
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: an agreement providing for the division
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot
justified.
FACTS: The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case
No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement
with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano
Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a
similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and
Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their
non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition
for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the
hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf
of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently
by respondent Quintin Muning.
the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ................. 10%
Quintin Muning ............................................. 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ...................................... 5%
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according
to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Muning is entitled to attorney’s fees?
of
HELD: No.
is
by Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in
be Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement
providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer
union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot
be justified.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the
parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-
litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer,
is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to
examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and
to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively
entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear
or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by
itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition
to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with

PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics
of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated; that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be
allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave
the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers
are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the
services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and
not as an attorney.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

D. Sanctions for Practice or Appearance Without Authority authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished
1. Villahermosa v. Caracol, A.C. No. 7325, Jan. 21, 2015 for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transaction.
FACTS: Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time
he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who and Demolition. Ams an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer,
had two sons, Fernando and Efren. When the agrarian reform law he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and
was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were issued to presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.
in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Atty. Caracol was found guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
Villahermosa. violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, he was suspended from the practice of law for one
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) year.
issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation
patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not
covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to
and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
Atty. Caracol, as additional counsel filed a motion for execution with
the DARAB, praying for the full implementation of the decision. Atty.
Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution
and Demolition which he signed as Counsel for Efren Babela.
Thus, Villahermosa filed a complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had
no authority to file the motions since Efren had already been dead for
more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a
certain Ernesto Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel
of land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
YES. Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act
as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in
court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney
appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite
authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the
adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless
the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

E. Public Officials and Practice of Law
1. Ramos v. Manalac, 89 Phil. 270
DOCTRINE: The word or term “appearance” includes not only
arguing a case before any such body but also filing a pleading
in behalf of a client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea or
answer”.
FACTS: RAMOS family executed power of attorney in favor of their
brother Eladio Ramos. They gave Eladio authority to encumber,
mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land
situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. He Executed a mortgage under
Rivera. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the
payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum.
Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity.
RIVERA filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making RAMOS
defendants. Summons served only upon Eladio Ramos, who
acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of
Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the
defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. Court ordered
Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest
thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934,
until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio
Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the
decision becomes final.
sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with
summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not summons was properly served / Does the the
term “appearance” only include presence in courts.
HELD:
1. Yes. Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not
properly served with summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim,
the defect in the service was cured when the petitioners voluntarily
appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of record,
Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in their behalf in all stages of the
case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners
must be presumed to have been authorized by them when he
appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The security
and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with
undue favor to overcome such presumption.
2. No. The word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a
case before any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a
client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer”.

ELADIO RAMOS failed to pay the judgment within the period. The
Court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties,
which were sold RIVERA (highest bidder). RIVERA sold properties to
Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in
possession. RAMOS did not heed the order. Ramos was summoned
by the court to explain why they should not be punished for contempt
for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession. RAMOS
answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an
action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the

2. In re David, 93 Phil. 461
DOCTRINE: Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his
profession.
FACTS: In the administrative case No. 35 the appellant was
suspended by bad practices in the exercise of his profession for a
period of five years starting from November 9, 1949. The appeal
supports this suspension in its report; however, he continued to
exercise the profession within the period of the suspension,
November 9 from 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On February 28, 1950 the Respondent submitted a claim in the case
CA GR No. 4792-R, Tan Tek vs. Sy Maliwanag, not as a lawyer Sy
Tan Tek, but with the following words: "for and in Behalf of Sy Tan
Tek"; on January 26, 1951 he was sent by certified mail notification
of the decision in that case (Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance; on March 13, 1951 I tabled a motion in this
court - ye returned the file - requesting the issuance of a warrant of
execution, which motion is signed as follows:
Tan Tek If By (Sgd.) Felix P. David, Atty. Felix P. David, Dagupan
and Azcarrag St. Corner Saw Mill & Construction Philippines, Manila
The present appeal therefore written not as they do practicing
lawyers, but as an agent Sy Tan Tek.
In the civil case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, the Respondent
submitted a brief for an order demolition of the homes of the
defendants; on October 10, 1950 he filed a motion asking the Sheriff
of Manila was authorized to pay "the amount or other amount Such
as May be Collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); on
November 13, 1950 he presented another motion (Exhibit C) asking
another demolition order as counsel for the applicant.
In defense, he says that he appeared as counsel for Sy Tan Tek
from the Municipal Court Manila en 1948; which, being suspended,
he had advised sucliente to seek another lawyer to prepare the claim
to be submitted to the Court of Appeal; when there were only two or
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
three days and could not submit sucliente, he himself wrote and
presented at the request of his client; the allegation that arrangement
with the intention of his client to sign it, but as this was in Dagupan
and could not sign and there was more than one day, then I sign it as
follows: "Felix P. David, for and in Behalf of the appeellee. " on
September 25, 1950 he presented to the Court of Appeals a
memorandum in reply to the appellant, signed as this allegation.
In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not have any the
intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not
With the knowledge of even Identified Sy Tan Tek myself as the
attorney for the appellees but in good faith, I signed for and in Behalf
of the appellee without designating That I am practicing as attorney-
at-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. David are tantamount to
practice of law
HELD: YES. Practice as a lawyer is to practice the acts of his
profession. The prepare and submit motions asking for the execution
of the judgment, the demolition of the homes of the defendants,
asking the court to order the Sheriff to betray him the amounts
collected are acts that are part of the exercise of the profession of
abogacioa; the present allegation and memorandum to the Court of
Appeal is to exercise the profession of lawyer, because an agent
cannot do; alquilers the charge of issuing 35 109 defendants receipts
and signed as lawyer for the plaintiff, is to exercise the profession.
Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or
as part of firm name under the signature of another qualified lawyer
because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-
qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being
originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing
in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the
constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits directly.” (cited in Memaid but did not appear in
the translated case) The evidence of record shows that the
Respondent Felix P. David practiced law attorney intentionally
disobeying the decision of the Court. Therefore, he is ineligible to
practice as a lawyer in the Philippines.

3. Peo v. Villanueva, 14, SCRA 109 (PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA)
PONENTE: PAREDES, J.:=
FACTS:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced
by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after
securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.
The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on
official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as
private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused,
invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or
City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the
case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a
"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
enagaged in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance of City Attorney Fule is
considered as private practice of law.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
HELD: NO.
The fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney
Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation
of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had
been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

4. Noriega v. Sison, 125 SCRA 293

DOCTRINE: It being an isolated case, the same does not
constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent did not
derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because
respondent and defendant therein were close family friends.
FACTS: Herein complainant, Herminio Noriega, Complainant alleges
that herein respondent, Atty. Emmanuel Sison, is a permanent
employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a
Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to observe strictly the civil
service rules and regulations, more particularly ... the prohibition of
government employees to practice their professions.” He further
alleges that the latter, to circumvent the prohibition and to evade the
law, respondent assumed a different name, falsified his Identity and
represented himself to be one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices at
No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times that he will handle
private cases.” Moreover, Noriega avers that “Manuel Sison" is not
listed as a member of the Bar in the records of the Supreme Court.
Under said assumed name, respondent is representing one Juan
Sacquing, the defendant in Case No. E01978 before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, submitting pleadings
therein signed by him respondent under his assumed name, despite
his full knowledge that "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the Bar.
To Noriega, Sison’s acts in doing so are illegal and unlawful.
The only case DRC Case No. E-01978 wherein respondent
appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being an isolated case, the
same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since
respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because respondent and defendant therein were close family friends.
Such act of the respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel
to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an
instrument of harassment against respondent.
The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the
respondent was dismissed from the service because being a
government employee, he appeared as counsel in a private case,
cannot be applied in the case at bar because the respondent in said
Zeta case had appeared as counsel without permission from his
superiors.
Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the
complainant however states that the basis of his complaint for
disbarment is not the respondent's act of appearing as counsel but
the unauthorized use of another name.

Sison, on the other hand, thus attached a copy of the written

authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate Commissioner of
the SEC, for him to appear as counsel of Juan Sacquing, a close
family friend, in the JDRC of Manila. Moreover, he alleges that he
never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sision violated the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations for appearing as counsel for the defendant in JDRC
Case No. E01978

HELD: NO. There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and

Regulations for his appearance as counsel for the defendant in the
JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with authority given by the Associate
Commisioner of SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.

5. Victor Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy
Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014
DOCTRINE: When the court orders a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within
the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding
a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
FACTS: Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga are found
guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath. Respondents allowed their
secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of
Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended
respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their
notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as
notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor Lingan filed a motion for reconsideration praying
that respondents be disbarred rather than be merely suspended from
the practice of law, but the court denied the motion for lack of merit.
(2007) Subsequently, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II,
filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.
He alleged that complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on
Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty.
Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law,
the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II for want
of eligibility.
However, Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts
not connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director. His suspension from the practice of law did not
include his suspension from public office. [This court noted without
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does
not render advisory opinions.]
(2009) In the letter written by Lingan to the court, he alleged that
Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this
court's order of suspension. He has allegedly received a copy of the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending
Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the
omission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead
admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a
notary public." He has not, however, received a copy of Atty. Baliga’s
MOR. He further claimed that the discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily
required the practice of law. On the other, Atty. Baliga alleged that as
Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"
which did not require the practice of law. The Commission allegedly
has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal services
matters of the [Commission]."
Office of the Bar Confidant:
 found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and
Baliga had already lapsed.
 It recommended that respondents be required to file their
respective motions to lift order of suspension with
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as
counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law
during the period of suspension.
 the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter,
modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which
[have] become final and executory
 Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his
functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director]
which [required acts constituting] practice of law."
 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform
his functions as Regional Director which required the
practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant

recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim.
 The Commission on Human Rights reiterated that
the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of
the bar is separate from the penalty that might be
imposed on him as Regional Director. The
Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the
position of [Regional Director] is managerial and
does not [require the practice of law]."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baliga’s motion to lift order of
suspension should be granted?
HELD: NO
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension.
We, therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six
months.
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice of law. The Commission on Human Rights is an
independent office created under the Constitution with power to
investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. Each regional office is headed by the Regional
Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and
Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the
Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
"[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional
offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of
human rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or
investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among
parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
protection remedies and/or possible submission of the
matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes,
including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus,
the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional
Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The
disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position
of Regional Director.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not
supported by the record. It was also immaterial. He held the position
of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his
authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was
disqualified to hold that position.
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution
dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to
reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack
of authority to practice law. We remind the Commission on Human
Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other
issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension from the
practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the
power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those
with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a
"privilege burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of
 PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018

mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and

[faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the

practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of
one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of
law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this
resolution.

6. Eustaquio v. Navales, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016
DOCTRINE: The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering
any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.
FACTS: Spouses Eustaquio alleged that they are the owners of an
apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM,
Quezon City, which they leased to respondent. The respondent
failed to pay monthly rentals in the aggregate amount of
P139,000.00 and was requested to vacate the leased premises, but
did not do so.
This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay
conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement,
whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of
P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on
July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations
under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file an
ejectment case against him, and the present disbarment case.
the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
shall be dealt with more severely. It was found that respondent
displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts, as
highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually
reneged on. In this light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This order of suspension
became final and executor.
However, despite the suspension, it was later on found out that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City
Prosecutor since September 2014.
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable
HELD: YES. It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding
a position in government requiring the authority to practice law. The
practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training,
and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic
of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 2014 suspending respondent from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and
executory fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the
same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have already
commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However,
respondent never heeded the suspension order against him as he
continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor
for Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification[27] issued by
MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been appearing before it as
an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014.

7. Fajardo v. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
Doctrine: Government officials or employees, including lawyers
are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department heads. More
importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not
conflict with the official functions of the government official or
employee, or run in conflict with the interest of the government.
FACTS:
Complainant Teresita Fajardo, was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor Alvarez
to defend her in several cases before the Office of the Ombudsman
while he was still working in the Legal Section of the National Center
for Mental Health. Atty. Alvarez asked for P1,400,000 as acceptance
fee, assuring Teresita that his connections with the Office of the
Ombudsman could help with dismissing her case. But two weeks
after they talked, the Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending
the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita and her dismissal
from service.
Respondent claims that he was authorized to practice his profession
by the Chief of the National Center for Mental Health, Bernardino
Vicente. He was given authority under the condition that
respondent's practice of profession will not run "in conflict with the
interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole."
Teresita filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Alvarez. The
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended one year
suspension from the practice of law and ordered him to return the
amount of P700,000 to Teresita with legal interest. The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted the said
recommendations. Atty. Alvarez's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alvarez is authorized to engage in the
private practice of law
HELD:
PALE Case Digests 3B, 2017-2018
No. Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading.
And in the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal
illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts show
badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The practice is law means "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristics
of the legal profession." By preparing the pleadings of and giving
legal advice to the complainant, respondent practiced law.
Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees) prohibits government officials or
employees from engaging in private practice of their profession
unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if
authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict with the
official functions of the government official or employee. Respondent
is a public officer, an employee of the government. By appearing
against the Office of the Ombudsman (which is a part of
government), he put himself in a situation of conflict of interest and is
going against the same employer he swore to serve. When he made
it appear to the complainant that he knew people from the Office of
the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision, the
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 which prohibit lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 also requires lawyers to always uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. We rule that there is enough proof to
hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.
Respondent is to be suspended for one year with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
and is ordered to return the amount of P500,000 with legal interest to
Teresita Fajardo.