EN BA NC

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, A.C. No. 7136 After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that
Complainant,
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
at Megamall.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
versus AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home
AZCUNA, from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
GARCIA,
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL VELASCO, JR., and
EALA, NACHURA, JJ. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
Respondent. Promulgated: together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
August 1, 2007
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday

celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
PER CURIAM: friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel appliances.
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-
My everdearest Irene,
fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down
the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning
three children. in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a
true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger
plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid
eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories
of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my
heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS
LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked
at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in
April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU
card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of
September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All
You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of
SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was
reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24
September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of
the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the
original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their
adulterous relationship supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having
ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was
concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants
wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him
morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of
paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they
are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
 complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage,
commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross
moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
family:
paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and
purely personal and low profile special relationship with
peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a
aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his

aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live
the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy
paper was merely with respect to the formality of the
marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent
as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born
on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a
civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading: criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
 RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
examination.[16]Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.

San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed
26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for The petition is impressed with merit.
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading: Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied), shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a While it may be true that the love letter
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published
profession. (Underscoring supplied) in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainants wife, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which support the accusation of
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the complainant against respondent.
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies
having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
CBD Case No. 02-936
matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
known only to immediate members of their respective
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the
a.k.a. Noli Eala
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being
 that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with
respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are
an admission that there is indeed a special relationship
between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the
child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that
Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding
the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the
father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in
the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was
in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal
knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live
Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the
childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired
information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the
signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center,
in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand,
declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the
childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a
lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene
has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that
evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
 Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment
of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. or suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal
case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep
supplied)
a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
periods.
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
x x x x,
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct
malpractice. depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and
for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
supplied), reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx
under scandalous circumstances.[34]

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of

whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied) Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before

admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation
of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22,
2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his
(complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant,
withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the
final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant
the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the
perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at
any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
[43]
place before the marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer, respondent
should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by
complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery
on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going
out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when
complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and
text messages to her. Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he
knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala)
himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship
involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the
church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were
always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in
the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that
both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the
said address appears to be a residential house, for that was
where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their
illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months
later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the
birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
 categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were
to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part
of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the
criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class

of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-

06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn
Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia
Tabang sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty.
Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty
(30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to
different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian
reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of
agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott
advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious
persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of
fictitious persons, as follows:
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven
parcels as they were in need of funds for their medication and other
expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the
parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from
Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to
negotiate any sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then
told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised
them to file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the
"authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven
parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities
in the signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special
Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang.
The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have
the supposed owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she
changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look
more varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent
executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and
various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious)
owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on
the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented
himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for
sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He
received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels
were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He
added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels
and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent
(20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that
after she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had
threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment.13
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of
gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of
Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was
referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces
of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and
affidavits and that the persons who supposedly executed such documents
were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been
adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as
disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B.
Funa. Hearings were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July
18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and
July 25, 2007.17
The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze,
President of the Swiss American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified
that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn,
introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00.
His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his
company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had
caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure
to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified
that Heinze introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself
as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They
agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the
said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had
caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking
him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He
added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the
ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified
for complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced
to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty
(30) hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a
parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L-
300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the
Complaint.21
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit
their Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and
the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived
him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was
"bent on prejudicing"22 him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was
reassigned to Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-
CBD’s Rules of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating
Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on
matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’
Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of
clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary).
As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was
required to file his Position Paper.23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the
case was deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and
Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints
against Lilia Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had
fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed
that since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners
who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang
could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs
executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a
sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements
(where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and
Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such
documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere
forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23,
2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable for gross
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was
absent in most of the hearings without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule
12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred and
his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution27 adopting the Report of Investigating Commissioner
Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration.28
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On
September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him
an extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court
warned respondent that no further extension will be given. Despite this,
respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on
September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which
were denied by the Court.
Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed
on December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with
attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April
17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and
adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and
the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR
when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and
in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit
activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even
mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his
offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest
standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what
is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his
knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals.
Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he
acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon
respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be
disbarred for any of the following grounds:
deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
 violation of the lawyer's oath;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers
commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property
rights of other persons. By way of examples:
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was
disbarred for having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property
entrusted to him for administration.
30
In Sabayle v. Tandayag: One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B.
Gabor, was disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the
absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position
as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered
by said Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious.
In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon
Legaspi for having converted to his personal use the funds that he received
for his clients.
Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution.
As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the
lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of
the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and,
as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution,
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established
that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in
determining preponderance of evidence:
All the facts and circumstances of the case;
The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony;
The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance
is necessarily with the greater number.
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence
that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s
testimony but more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty.
Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:
respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to
dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject
parcels;
respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales –
whether in cash or in kind – of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent
had been confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to
substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels,
he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of
their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty.
Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far
as they have been made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is
contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's
allegations.
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the
seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the
seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by
flinging counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had
unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of the sale of the
subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to
defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this allegation,
he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang.
He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing
above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude
duplications of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37the burden of proof is
vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any
fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to
bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his
defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the
supposed owners of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary,
he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence,
much less produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding
Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the forgery or crude
duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations. Respondent
failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which
form the very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually
being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent.
Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the
owner of the seven (7) parcels since her name does not appear on the
parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of
the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang
was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41However, respondent loses
sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs
indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present
controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us
rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic,
sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have
obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office
not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and
because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for
whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted him
to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told them
that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and
recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any
of his properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked
with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia
Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no
reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn income.45
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent
merely embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He
accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%)
from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to
defame him and to seek his disbarment after she had been
refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is
that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest proof to substantiate
these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file
the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants
and the sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to
no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts
of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued
with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the
court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the
contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took
advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself
and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of
several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his
previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has
hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these
proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging
complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court
his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings
without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal
despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to
him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause.
For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly

violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he
SUPREME COURT placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
Manila respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division
for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow
EN BANC florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was
thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the
case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent
for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
PER CURIAM:
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the
filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former
proceedings against him.
Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his
oath as an attorney.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office
pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No.
I
74).
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of
other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative
extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13,
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1,
recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for
1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another
partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending
"payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the
resolution.
City Hall.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket
without his knowledge and consent.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00
for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by
Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use
the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary
in the entrapment.
investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of
March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public
would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business
with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against
complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog
respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said
"Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang
umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay."
that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges
filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the
disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26,
1994.
lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act
of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment
conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the
subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his
defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted
that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative

testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103
SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a

character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public

official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former
Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his
oath as an attorney.
I pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No.
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of
extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1,
1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another
"payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the
City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00
for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry
Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use
in the entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter
would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents
went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business
with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally
complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog
"Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang
umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay."
Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he
placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division
for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow
florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was
thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the
NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the
case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent
for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the
filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment
proceedings against him.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office
74).
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two
other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative
Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13,
1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was
recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for
partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending
resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that
complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket
without his knowledge and consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by
the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary
investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of
March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for
incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public
official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against
respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said
that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges
filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the
disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
Governors for investigation and disposition. furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the personal records of respondent.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) SO ORDERED.
recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26,
1994.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act
of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment
conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the
subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his
defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted
that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative

testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103
SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a

character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public

official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised
are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs. PREPATORY STATEMENT
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990 Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent
NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the letter of
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme
RODRIGUEZ, complainants, Court dated January 25, 1975 which reads as follows:
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. xxx xxx xxx

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants I wish to respectfully inform your good
in AC No. 2033. office that I bought a few lots on installment
basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf. Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the
attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a
"Contract of Sale".

PER CURIAM: Atty. Navarro, some officials and

representative of the said company claim
that although there is a pending case No.
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants
L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No.
property being sold, the case is almost won
2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in
in their favor and are just waiting for your
Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent
final decision within a couple of months or
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.
even less.
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and
In this connection, I am respectfully writing
Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this
you this letter in order to bring to your
Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro
attention this transaction and to protect my
from the practice of law during the pendency of these cases. 3
rights in the event that any unfavorable
circumstances may arise in the future.
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our
resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
xxx xxx xxx
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs.
Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and attention to
detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per
scope and magnitude of respondent's operations and how he was able to Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of
perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for
extensively from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to
record. proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the
office of attorney and for appropriate action." The
resolution reads as follows:
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter
dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B.
Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof
has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro,
counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED
to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him
of the status of the cases at bar.
It appearing from said letter that Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots
in litigation herein on installment basis to
the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as
"absolute owner by virtue of this contract of
legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc.
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision
Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in the
name of herein petitioner and not in Atty.
Navarro's name and that the unwarranted
claim is made on his behalf that 'the case
is almost won in their favor' (see Mr.
Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED
FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's
said letter with its attachments to the
Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections
1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the
existence of sufficient ground to proceed
with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66
Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for
suspension or removal from the office of
attorney and for appropriate action.
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor
General is directed to communicate in the
premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of
the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with
address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas
Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of
June 10, 1974 on file in Administrative
Case No. 1154 has offered to make
available documents in their possession
showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro
of properties titled in the name of other
persons, involving a total selling price of
P75 million and down payments of almost
P 0.6 million.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice
of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr.
Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit
embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters
contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975, especially
the second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr.
Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned
unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved to
another address.
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor
General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R.
Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents
evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a
Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the
letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976
"for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for
the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension
or removal from office and for appropriate action" and
directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the
Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said letter
and all its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr.
dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest
activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has
previously been reported to the Supreme
Court as selling properties titled in the
name of this Company.
We have just secured a new "subdivision
plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots
he is now selling to the public include those
titled in the names of the heirs of the late
Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in
Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus
expanded his activities despite recent
detention by the Military. As could be seen
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to
be the owner of that huge property (actually
titled in the name of the Madrigals and this
Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E.
delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road
and R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising
approximately of 260 hectares.
As reported in our previous letters to the
Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of
some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater
Manila Area in virtue of his handling the
case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot
in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He
contends that whereas his squatters-
clients occupy only about a hectare, he has
become, in virtue of his contract of legal
services' with them, the owner of
thousands of hectares of land as these are
allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro
thus started to openly sell these properties.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills
Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties
already with buildings and other
improvements. He has nevertheless been
quite successful in selling portions thereof,
as when he sold lots within the De La Salle
College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club,
ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus
operandi is described in this Company's
letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen.
Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached
hereto for ready reference.
Navarro continues to defy the authorities,
for only after a brief lull he is now again
openly selling titled properties of other
persons. We have provided more than
sufficient documentary evidence to the
Court and the Solicitor General and we
hope that formal administrative charges
can now be filed against Navarro to prevent
him from further perpetrating a large scale
fraud upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of
documents, most of which were presented in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court
involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer.
Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely
identified the various documentary exhibits presented by
the complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it
appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
(hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery
of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong,
Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22)
families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were
raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11)
cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the
twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by
respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients,
respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense,
the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the
mother title from which it emanated actually originated from
Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917,
which he claims to be non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first
set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision
on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the
HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the
defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO
(Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated
as follows:
After due consideration of the evidence
adduced by both parties, this Court finds
that most of the documentary evidence
submitted by defendants are irrelevant to
the case since they pertain to defendants
claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of
land when the area of the property subject
matter of the complaint is only 12,700
square meters. This Court also believes
that the above-mentioned claims of
defendants are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in
question is evidenced by the issuance in
her name, since 1929, of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled
rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the
expiration of the one-year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon
which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs.
San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres
vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil.
791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis
Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957;
Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas,
53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).
Defendants' claim that they became
owners of the land in question by adverse
possession is without merit considering
that title to land becomes non-prescriptible
Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title
to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession
(Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs.
Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once
registered cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession.
Registered title under the Torrens System
cannot be defeated by prescription. The
title, once registered, is notice to the World.
All persons must take notice. No one can
plead ignorance of registration (Legarda
vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs
ownership over the property in question
when they filed a petition with the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein
they sought the latter's intervention for the
acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold
to them at nominal cost. In said petition
defendants not only named the plaintiff as
the owner of the property in question but
they also indicated therein her title to the
land as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent
facts and data concerning the property in
question in defendants' petition submitted
to the General Manager of the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol,
Mandaluyong, Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St.,
Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, &
Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic
copy): 15043
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos.
12,700 square meters(Exh G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since
1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void,
this Court is of the opinion that defendants
cannot assail the validity of said title in this
proceeding, which is for recovery of
possession. Any attack on the decree of
registration of title must be direct and not
by collateral proceeding. The title which
may be issued in pursuance of said decree
cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged or diminished in a collateral
proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land
vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30,
1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the
decision of the trial court where the
registered owner was considered
disqualified to acquire land under the
Constitution and consequently was denied
the right to constitute his title, said: "That
the disqualification raised by the Court is
untenable in the light of the theory that a
Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked.
That issue can only be raised in an action
instituted expressly for that purpose". (See
also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon.
Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No.
4347, November 23,1951; James (sic)
G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte,
et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb.
29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of
the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that
there is no need to discuss the merits of the
reasons claimed by defendants why
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in
the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh.
W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322,
8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691,
8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro
Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters
clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May
26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated
as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner
of a parcel of land containing an area of
12,000 square meters situated at the
corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and
J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal,
which is covered by, and more particularly
described in, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
and indicated in the sketch plan attached to
the complaint as Annex A.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment
proceedings have been filed in the
Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the
City Court of Quezon City against several
persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas
and Company, Limited Partnership, where
decisions have been rendered in favor of
said Partnership. In order to forestall
executions of these decisions defendants
in said ejectment cases filed class suit
before this Court by the occupants of the
land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands
was impleaded as a party-defendant. The
decision of Branch XV in said class suit is
made part of the evidence of these
defendants in the herein eleven cases for
whatever the same may be worth as aid in
the determination of the merits of the
issues raised herein.
As may be gleaned from said decision of
Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the
validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void
and or fictitious and the proceedings in
GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree
was based as also null and void. The Court
sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and
rendered judgment declaring (1) the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null
and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and
void; (3) all original certificates of title
issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all
transfer certificates of title derived from the
original certificates of title declared void
under No. 3 above, particularly but not
exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its
derivative Transfer Certificate of 'title No.
135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
null and void; (5) that the rightful owners of
the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653,
126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs
. . . and so forth.
The Court has read copy of this decision of
our Branch XV and observed findings of
facts too ponderous to be ignored.
That case before Branch XV directly
assails the nullity of the proceedings
leading to the proceedings in GLRO
Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable
corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425
issue by virtue of such void proceedings as
well as the original certificates of title
issued as consequence thereof.
In said proceeding before Branch XV the
Court, among other things, found that while
the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly
rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of
the property subject matter of therein
application was not made until June 16 to
August 16, 1906, or some one year after
the decision. It found no proof of initial
hearing of the application for registration
being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could
not have acquired jurisdiction over the
case. Said decision also made inference
that since the survey of the property was
not made until a year after the rendition of
the judgment the technical descriptions
appearing in the original certificates of title
issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree
No. 1425, could not have been those
appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if
any. Publication of accurate technical
description being an essential jurisdictional
requirement which cannot be dispensed
with and non-compliance with this
requirement renders the proceedings and
the decision and decree and titles issued
arising therefrom null and void.
The same decision of Branch XV also
made its findings that James Ross who
was said to have penned the decision in
GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of
the Court of Land Registration at the time
the decision was supposedly rendered
because the Gaceta Official for the year
1905 does not show that James Ross was
listed as Judge of the Land Registration
Court or that he was ever appointed in that
capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that
while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court
on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued
the decree and he signed it as Clerk of
Court. The Court even found the supposed
decision in that proceedings missing and
made its conclusion that since the decree
which was supposedly issued by a person
who was not the Clerk of Court at the time
and which decree did not contain the
description of the property ordered in the
decision to be rendered because the
survey of the property was only made some
one year later and that said decree cannot
now even be found, the decision rendered
therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing
findings of facts are too ponderous to be
ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void
original certificate of title cannot be the
source of a valid transfer certificate of title
and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the
law, inexistent and cannot give source to
any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs
in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before
Branch XV of this Court are also the
defendants in the herein eleven cases in
which their properties are also involved.
Since the case before Branch XV directly
assails the nullity of the proceedings by
virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the
alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels
of land occupied by the herein eleven
defendants is a derivative from such
decree, it is the considered opinion of this
Court that until and unless the decision of
Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set
aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to
order the herein eleven defendants in these
eleven cases to vacate the parcels which
they occupy and on which their respective
houses are built has become premature. It
goes without saying that if said decision of
Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that
the same becomes final and executory, all
the claims of rights to ownership and
possession of properties embraced in the
decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute
nullities. Possessions by actual occupants
of all these properties had better be
maintained until after final decision in Civil
Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been
rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases
Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383,
8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion
filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling
HABERER's title over her property in question and
directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor
of respondent's clients Thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaints in the above-entitled cases
(Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379,
8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with
costs against the plaintiff and hereby
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view
thereof issue new certificates of title in
favor of the defendants subject to the lien
for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney
Felipe Navarro in accordance with the
terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa
Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in
his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or
modification of the decision.
 As so modified the decision stands in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on September
15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court
had occasion to reiterate that its decision in
this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917
were null and void and plaintiffs title
happened to be one of them. The Court
opined that until said decision is reversed
the actual occupants had better be
maintained in their possessions of the land.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for
reconsideration and new trial was set only
for reception of alleged newly discovered
evidence.
The Court now understands that the
decision of Branch XV is now under review
by order of our Appellate Court.
It has also come to the understanding of
the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it
ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests
of other persons and entities like the
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a
derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No.
1425 from which Ortigas and Company,
Limited Partnership, derives titles over
wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, is not a
party in this case whatever orders or
decisions are made in this case cannot be
made to affect the said company.
Decisions and orders can only affect
parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the
conclusion that the order dated June 21,
1971, must be reconsidered on two
grounds (1) because the decision of
Branch XV is now being the subject of
further proceedings and (2) because it has
the effect of adversely affecting the interest
of Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not even a party
herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated
June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro
while the defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO
appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro
order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent
NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made
reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on
July 4, 1971 the following:
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR
SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A
VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO
COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN
JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON
CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26,
1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING
THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT
ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED
FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD
CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS
AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF
THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD)
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
But to every possessor in good faith there
comes a time when he is considered a
possessor in bad faith. When the owner or
possessor with a better right comes along,
when he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and
when he learns the grounds in support of
the adverse contention, good faith ceases.
The possessor may still believe that his
right is more secure, because we resign
ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our
vanishing hopes, but when the final
judgment of the court deprives him of the
possession, all illusion necessarily
disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil.
356, 361-362 citing Manresa and Articles
528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil
Code).
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity
(Art 449, Civil Code)
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF
THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING
PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE
ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE
BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT
OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR
THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF
THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD
FAITH FOR:
The Civil Code confirms certain time-
honored principles of the law of property.
One of those is the principle of accession
whereby the owner of property acquires not
only that which it produces but that which it
united to it either naturally or artificially.
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the
land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner
of the land. Where however, the planter,
builder or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners
and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating what
Manresa calls a state of "forced co-
ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law
has provided a just and equitable solution
by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after the
payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the
land and the sower to pay the proper rent.
It is the owner of the land who is allowed to
exercise the option because his right is
older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership
of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also
 Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang,
et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of
possesors in bad faith as we are ready to
ask for the execution of the decision
pursuant to law and avoid a scire
facias Ordinary prudence requires that
those involved may please make some
kind of arrangements with the undersigned
before execution by calling through the
following telephones:
xxx xxx xxx
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO
JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR
PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS
THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS
OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG,
MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9
A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY,
JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL
BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES
STREET, BARRIO BUROL,
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING
TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR
LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of
properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the
parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and
started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued
among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property
owners whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425.
As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot
buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication in
the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following:
WARNING
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
In reply to numerous inquiries received by
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
with reference to an advertisement
published in the Manila Times on July 4,
1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all
original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No.
1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership wishes to announce that it is
not a party to ANY case allegedly decided
on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or
any other court and therefore ALL ITS
TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO.
1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED
BY SAID DECISION.
The public is hereby requested to be wary
of any person selling lands and/or rights to
lands belonging to and in the name of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.
The public is also warned to be wary of
MISLEADING adverstisements and/or
persons basing their rights to lands of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
on such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which
is claimed to be "final and executory."
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent
NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers
of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times.
Respondent NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases
damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his
failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the
publication of the above notice. In support of his allegation,
respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds of sale over
lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which
overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as
Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino
dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit
D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER
cases and the libel cases, the complainants also presented
documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del
Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought
to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there
was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in
1905; (2) there was no survey of the property sought to be
registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct Court
of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of
the said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the
Ruiz decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the
foregoing, the Court hereby declares
and/or orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void
and/or fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title
issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;
4. That all transfer certificates of title
derived from the original certificates of title
declared void under No. (3) above,
particularly but not exclusively, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are
null and void;
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the
litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653,
126575 (or 135879) are the herein
plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being
as indicated in Exhibit P;
6. That the defendant Partnership cease
and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in
the enjoyment and peaceful possession of
their respective landholdings;
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as
Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig,
Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as
Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of
Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas
and Company, Limited Partnership, their
agents, representatives and any and all
persons acting in their behalves, refrain
and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually
from proceeding with or taking any action
on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-
13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921
 filed by the herein defendant Partnership
against some of the herein plaintiffs;
8. That the case be dismissed as against
defendant Director of Lands;
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to
the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to
the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of
Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge
Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to
introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then
remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge
Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz
who was separated from the service by the President of the
Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as
against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in
Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the
defendant Company:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied
by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on
October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they
surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest,
agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf, who
are found to be in possession of defendant company's land
to vacate the same and remove and demolish their
improvements thereon at plaintiffs expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the
attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely
collected from defendant company, with interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the
pendency of the approval of the record on appeal,
ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of
judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties, the
trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge
Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to
Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara.
Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is
granted. The order of the respondent
Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby
annulled and set aside and the order of
Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting
immediate execution, is hereby revived,
with instructions to the respondent judge to
fully implement the latter order, including
the approval of the petitioner's bond and
the issuance of the necessary writ or writs
of execution. The restraining order issued
at the inception of this action is hereby (sic)
permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed
by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was
denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration filed
with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled
properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI,
entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs.
Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol
rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It having been found that defendant was
guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and
selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to
attomey's fees. This court finds the amount
of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
to be fair and reasonable considering the
extent and value of the property involved
and the nature of the case.
Defendant, in his answer and motion to
dismiss, alleged that as a result of the
issuance of the restraining order, he
suffered damages in the amount of
Pl,000,000.00 daily.
Firstly, the same was not raised as a
counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only
treat it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to
prove this claim of damages. Under the
same authorities cited in support of the
denial of plaintiffs claim for damages,
therefore, he has failed to establish what
damages he had suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is
entitled to the injunction prayed for. It
follows, therefore, that the issuance of the
restraining order was proper and, hence,
can not be the basis for a claim for
damages.
This court cannot help but end this decision
with a note of admonition and hope. The
people who will ultimately suffer the most
from defendant's acts in question are his
buyers, who in all probability are middle
class people who themselves wanted to
make money out of the apparent sad
predicament that defendant had brought
upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of
this court, therefore, that with the advent of
the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a
new page and make a fresh start in life.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
 1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility
of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title
over the land in question;
2. As a consequence thereof, forever
enjoining and barring the defendant, his
successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or
any person or persons acting for or in his
behalf, from selling and advertising,
verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands
in question and from asserting any claim or
dominion or possession whatsoever on or
over the said property, directly or indirectly,
adverse to the plaintiff; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's
fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit
II).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a decision in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of
Judge Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this
Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition
was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue
brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been
laid to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and
documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of
his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one
of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of
Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence
consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified
that the present charges are the same as the charges in
administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation. He further
declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the
said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-
42699-42709, the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated.
Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two
matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified
that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two
(22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio
Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became
the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue
of his contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78,
t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said
contract for legal services, which appears on pages 224-
232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:
XXX CONTENT DELETED XXX
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO
admitted that he has sold, and is still selling, properties
covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO.,
Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said
parties are null and void because they emanated from
Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the properties
 sold by him except the contract of legal services which his
clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for
the various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he
has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to
sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not
declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares
of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon
City and Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has
not filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS
and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the
defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge
Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265,
entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe
C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI,
Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong,
San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those
involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977;
Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the
validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and
enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered
by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties
covered by the injunction claiming that the said decision is
ineffectual because the same has been appealed. (pp. 33-
34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint
with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent
Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys,
and that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift
the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to
said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in
his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September
2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion
praying for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this
Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion
filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our
resolution of January 22, 1981. 12
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated
March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of
the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by
Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B.
Fernan for appropriate action. 13
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his
answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this
Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report,
with the following findings and recommendation:
CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants
charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross
conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's
Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts and
the law while acting as counsel for the defendants in the
following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of
the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely
alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the land
is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false
allegation was made despite the final decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q-
18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs.
Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the
lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been
effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation
of the title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title
to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in
said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C",
respectively.
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing
that our clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of
the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46
SCRA 160. Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was
acquired by hereditary succession from the late Dr. Luther
Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership
therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student,
knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the
Quasha case, supra, covers cases where property was
acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is
either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete
and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and
for the Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that
the title covering the land subject of the above cases had
been declared null and void in the "final and
executory" decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the title of the case
and its docket number for the obvious and malicious
reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending
resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be
"final and executory."
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of
the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court
has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having
described the land to be part of the Municipality of San
Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge
however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan
Road in Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality
of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when the
latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact,
Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious.
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard
for basic norms of honesty and decency in that having
prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross
neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of
the court and having adopted the wrong remedy, in
complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his
clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan
against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is
obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable
Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his
respect for the law and the courts.
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and
deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon City.
He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the
Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P.
08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva
Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned
attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as
Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the
undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy
of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the
complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned
respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause in
CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.
Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and
Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing
before the Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to
harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our
courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for which
complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants
Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest
of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from
his clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his
clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the
undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the
complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin
against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43,
Record)
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979
pointing out that respondent's Answer does not deny any
of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint,
respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979,
wherein he averred:
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and
Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of
America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on
December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the
name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are
described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of
San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila)
filed ejectment proceedings before the City Court of
Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and
Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872
to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M.
Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses
Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for
the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and
the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in
defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and
ability within what the law allows that at this stage, the
controversy is still under litigation before the courts as
stated above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative
action must have been resorted to by the complainants at
the instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to
defeat the defendants of their God-given rights to the land
in litigation that there can be no other conclusion left but
that the administrative complaint against the respondent is
'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the parties agreed that there is no
dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted
a period of thirty (30) days within which to file their
respective memoranda, if they so desire, after which the
case will be considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the
Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of the
case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is
no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the
specifications of the charges against him, which are duly
supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he
"gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and
that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
exerted his utmost learning and ability.
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed
the misrepresentations specified by complainants, as
quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION
Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No.
2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended
from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension
is still in effect.
The acts complained of in the present case also warrant
the suspension of respondent from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended
from the practice of law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as
respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint
of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case
No. 2148 are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names
of other persons without the consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds
for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M
(10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326,
8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise
reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land (including those
of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which
was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch
XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts
ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services
rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and
II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the
proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No.
1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a
consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the
properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio
M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring
Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of
Appeals which set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV
for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who
replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree
No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending
appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by
the Solicitor General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November 3, 1973
decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25,
1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned.
The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on
February 18, 1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10,
1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV
in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered
by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the
complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent
Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that
"it is the considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision
of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final judgment,
plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their
respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was
reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he
stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to
reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated
on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO
Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title
happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until
said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better
be maintained in their possessions of the land. 21
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set
aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and
another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3,
1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a
consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the
November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970
decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the
former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of
his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31,
1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas
properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered
the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the
name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the
defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of respondent
pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services. However, the
same judge issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which
provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the
order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar
as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the
interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein,
because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a
derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles
over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of
decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect
the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect
parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order
dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two
grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it
has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party
herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971,
is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971,
insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants
of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis
supplied) 22
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set
aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to the
property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro
merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee,
with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the above
properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services
executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another
basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree
No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was executed pursuant
to the ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which
involve only the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less. It
appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over
properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended
to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not
presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land
they assigned to their lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's
pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No.
1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault
on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his
pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the
degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the law
profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is
achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal
and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and
his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the
pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and
intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by
reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life
may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought
not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other
hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the
Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the
 bench should be preserved. For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised
with great moderation and judgment, but it must be
exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the
purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney
of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the
public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the
proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to
compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court,
he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. 29
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two
administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable
evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate
sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal
services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two
ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of
the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership
favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of
Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants, clients of
respondent, to vacate the premises.
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted
that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of their respective parcels dating
back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must be
maintained and respected. 30
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated
May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter
ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff
and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien for
attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the
contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set
aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is
not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971
insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants
in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject
of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the
courts recognized was merely the defendants' right of possession. They,
therefore, never become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the
word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which
they could not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to
herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of
ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of September 15,
1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court
correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the
rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court
specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its
decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-
clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be
adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's
fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to
the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they
were occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right
than the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further
confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the
issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further
stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the
defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties
is patently and indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile
theory that his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the
effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the
award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no
such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated
deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two
ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is
claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity
of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up
to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No.
1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and
void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro
recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final
outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified
Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge
Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason
why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside
the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could
not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a
final determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him
to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of
nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any act of ownership over
lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap
it all, as earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been
reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of
Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and
executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs.
Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale
and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a
decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by
Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of
the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co.,
Limited Partnership which became final and executory after respondent's
petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent
continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said
decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the
pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that
respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas
properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from continuing
with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge
Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles
emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set
aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal
Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from
the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio
Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City
had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas
& Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his
awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued
to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company
and the Madrigals. 34
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby,
denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges
against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was
automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which
merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among
other things that the complaint against respondent could
not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3,
1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his request for
certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the
petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed
pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are
granted, are NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical
distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2,
1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied
respondent's motions for the lifting of his suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. This
violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the resolution is immediately executory.
aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the
records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de
Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on
April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein questioned herein
respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was
under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that
his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973,
entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein
was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division,
respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said
petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his
expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court
directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same.
Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31,
1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing
therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.

In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro
appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R.
No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R.
No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed
on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No.
81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30,
1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show
that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals,
but since the lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court,
said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the different
courts a quo.

Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful

orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for
an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this
Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and

his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe
T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A.
Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00,
for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent
would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms.
Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then
amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23
February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25
February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency
of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent
made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks
which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361.
In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August
1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3)
cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No.
8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00,
in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00,
in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent
Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read
as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to
sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject
to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a
member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended
from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until
further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision
must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section
29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989,
noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her
Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On
1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without
action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of
Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory
upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on
16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent
had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a
Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary
period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a
not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the
trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated
purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged
nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had
not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground
that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to
cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the
Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to
prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an
offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law
because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as
follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court
of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might
not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
 the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall
be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law
until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and spread on the record of respondent.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47431 December 19, 1940
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis,
deceased.
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA
ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS,
2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant.
Angel Cecilio for appellees.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija dated May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the approval of
the amended project of partition presented by the executrix and
hereby orders the latter to present another inventory and another
project of partition which shall include only the property
adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of this court in
case No. 4816, consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the three
parcels of land described in the will of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis.
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for
probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will
and testament of her deceased natural father, Crescenciano
Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of
stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and
two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia
Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias
Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the
conditions stated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five
others entered their opposition to the distribution of the
properties described in the will, for the reason that "a que dichos
bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y
la testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that
they had commenced an action for the partition of said
properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia
Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of
P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did
institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia
Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the
partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first
instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who
entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the
understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the
minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis,
were living with the Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the
defendants on the ground that there was another pending action
involving the same subject matter was sustained after which the
plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the
amendment consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate
of Crescenciano Abesamis and leaving as party defendants
Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis. As
these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they
were declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was
rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in
favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the
defendants. On February 7, 1931, the court ordered the
commissioners of partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia
Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their
report, upon which the court declared that "no hay lugar a
aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados partidores
hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria
en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los
derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion." A
motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 15,
1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of
the project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February
26, 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval of the
partition of the properties until the termination of the
testamentary proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate
court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two
carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was
rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in conformity
with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No.
4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended
inventory and later another project of partition distributing the
properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will,
which were objected by the defendants, because these included
their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816.
The opposition was upheld by the court in kits decision of May
27, 1937, the dispositive part of which is quoted in the beginning
of this opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case
No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring
that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to one-
eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and
can not bind the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of
partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, and in
not distributing the estate of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis according to the provision of the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a
probate court to decide the question of ownership of the property
involved in these proceedings part of which is claimed by the
oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no
personality to object to the project of partition presented by the
executrix on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in accordance
with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis.
Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the
validity of the decision of the lower court in civil case No. 4816
declaring that the legatees here, defendants in that action, are
entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that the
estate of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said
proceeding. It should be noted that all the coheirs, except
Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and that by order
of the court, in its instructions to the partition commissioners
dated February 7, 1931, the herein executrix-appellant was
pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased. As said
defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound
by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the
appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality not to
regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this
case the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with
any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the
dominio n, ownership and possession of the properties of his
predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court
of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In the absence of a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no
necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs
can sue and be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs.
Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes likewise of
the second assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the third assignment of error, it should be
observed that the oppositors instituted a separate action (civil
case No. 4816) for the partition of the properties described in the
will of Crescenciano Abesamis. No question of ownership,
therefore, was in fact determined in the testamentary
proceedings (civil case No. 4797) by the probate court. It results
that when, on February 8, 1937, the court disapproved the
project partition filed by the executrix, it did not decide adverse
claims of proprietorship but only lent force and effect to the
decision rendered in civil case No.
4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is vigorously

contended that only heirs or legatees may present an opposition,
and that only inasmuch as the oppositors-appellees are not heirs
or legatees, they have no legal personality to object to the
approval of the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in
civil case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the property in
their favor, the herein oppositors had the right to oppose any
project of partition which, in effect, would divest them of their
right of ownership. To conclude otherwise would be to permit the
executrix to enrich herself at the expense of the
oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against

the appellants. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
A.C. No. 190 September 26, 1964
MARCOS MEDINA, complainant,
vs.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina
charged respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission
of certain acts constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar. To this complaint respondent filed an
answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
This official in turn referred the case to the provincial fiscal of
Cagayan for investigation and report. Later after the reception of
the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his
report to this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of
malpractice complained of and recommending his disbarment.
Together with this report he submitted a complaint formally
charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged
malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the
name of respondent be stricken off from the roll of attorneys.
A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent
so that he may answer it if he so desires in accordance with the
rules. Thereupon, he answered the complaint denying the
material allegations thereof and praying that it be dismissed. He,
however, also prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional
evidence. This was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The
first hearing was set on May 4, 1964, which, by agreement of the
parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this last date,
however, no hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to
July 22, 1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel
appeared on the last date set, complainant and his counsel
submitted additional evidence consisting of several decisions of
the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty
of estafa. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel
filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan against complainant Marcos
Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant Medina
approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case.
Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent
herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his office at Aparri,
Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a consideration for
the amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash
then, he asked to be allowed to pay the same in small
installments paying on that occasion the sum of P35.00.
Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion for an
extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant
returned to his hometown.
One month later, complainant received an order declaring
him in default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in
spite of their agreement he was declared in default. Respondent
assured him that he had nothing to worry about, and on that
occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there
complainant gave. Before complainant left respondent told him
to look for more money.
It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for
an extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed
a motion to declare complainant in default. Consequently, a
decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the court
allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the
sum of P1,200.00.
On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of
respondent in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of
having the papers for the amicable settlement of the case
prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two
documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made
to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to
complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the
other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former for
the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by
respondent. Both documents were also found to be fictitious in
the sense that the considerations mentioned therein were never
received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign
Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it
was necessary in order that she could recover the land.
 Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty.
Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case,
requesting him to bring the title of the property pursuant to the
decision of the court, and complying with this request
complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the
title he showed him the document which he was made to sign
purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor
of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez
asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein,
which she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she
had given P800.00 to respondent to be deposited in court with
the understanding that said respondent would raise the additional
P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by
the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the
property. After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no
such amount deposited in court, and in order to correct the wrong
generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez
prepared another document embodying the terms of the
amicable settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the
civil case. This settlement having been carried out, it put an end
to the controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to
respondent the sum of
P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
From the foregoing narration, the following facts are
deemed to have been established: (1) respondent after agreeing
with complainant to settle the case amicably prepared a motion
for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a
motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of
the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two
fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in
either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to arrange an
amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different
occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4)
respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria
Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made
to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact
she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received
from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the
understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court for
the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he
misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice
and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. virtual law library
In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-
R, respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor to
1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessories of
the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And
in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the following
derogatory comment against respondent:
A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and
client need not be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer
should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and
good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case
No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent
Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00
in court. But he did not; he converted it to his own use and benefit
to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa.
Not only that. The confidence reposed in him by appellant was
once again infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and
3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these documents,
appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She
had to compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very
short end of the bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to
come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public
policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one
count and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims
for services in procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the
Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which
involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule
138, of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby
disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken
off from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 350 August 7, 1959

In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M.

Salva for the Government.
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted

bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was
sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro,
and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency
(CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of
Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of his profession.

In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this

Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16
years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if
disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court
that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an
error of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores.

Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from
his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the
lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification
justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No.
3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude
(7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes
with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as
ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as

attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So
ordered.
VILLASANTA April 30, 1957 dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The
act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their
vs. marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency,
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent. and morality.

Ramon J. Diaz for respondent. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
PARAS, C. J.: So ordered.

G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case
originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found
guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed.
The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar

candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as
those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or
before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him.
To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation
of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made
her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back
by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace
and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since
then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and
wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of
their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no
longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil
marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple
returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The
complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married
to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court..

Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint,
this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales (his
alleged housemaid) is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named
FELIX LEYNES, complainant, Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was
vs. already a sex-agenarian. *
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar,
Quezon, respondent. Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978 the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in the
marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage, as shown in her
BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated
vs. that, because her husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband, like a real wife
Quezon, respondent. ("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang
paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the assurance that she
would not prosecute their offspring.

The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit

AQUINO, J:
dated March 5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his
complaint for immorality (on the condition that he would not incur any
For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous liability) because he was convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's
circumstances in a house located at the poblacion of General Nakar, mistress to take care of him (Exh. A).
Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that town, was charged
by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office (Complaint dated
Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument
October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ).
scheduled before the Court en banc on December 9, 1976 made the
preposterous contention that the respondent should be exonerated
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to because there was no evidence presented against him since the
the bar in 1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace complainant did not appear at the hearing.
of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he has been functioning as the incumbent
judge of General Nakar.
Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the
commission of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish does not have to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec.
church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
(one day after his 46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a
vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought by plane to Manila
We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral
and admitted to the V. Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening.
conduct. His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal
judge and warrants his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already
begotten three children. (In his personal reference sheet of September 10,
A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be
1947, he indicated that he was married with two children named Linda and
disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime
Nonong but he did not mention his wife's name. In his information sheet for
involving moral turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138,
GSIS insurance dated November 9, 1960 he named his children as
Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).
Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six years old,
respectively. Again, he did not state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58
of his personal record).
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that
requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all
times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to
outrage public decency (Canon 3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Order
No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice, August 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).
of justice, misconduct in office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and
decide Election Case No. 8.
WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal
judge. His application for disability retirement is disapproved.

Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, SO ORDERED.

erroneously confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability
with his moral fitness to occupy the position of town magistrate. While the
moral stigma connected with concubinage may be tolerated in a private
person by those who are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the
concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the judge
allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule in section
20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31,
1975, 62 SCRA 270,
272-3).

A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in

public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and
at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of
morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not
preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and
censurable behavior.

Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the
administrative case moot. This Court may motu proprio investigate a judge
for his continuing, grossly immoral conduct.

Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo
Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having assaulted his son,
Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of
immorality withdrawn by Virrey.

According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in

a house just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical
question: how can the inhabitants of a town have confidence in the
administration of justice by an immoral judge who himself violates the law?
(p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ).

In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make

any adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of
partiality in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges
of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious delay in the administration
A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967
IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent.
J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.
ANGELES, J.:
On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows:
In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avanceña, it
appearing that respondent was convicted in criminal case No.
10220 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Jose Avanceña, of the crime of falsification of
public document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and
that in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found that
said respondent has taken advantage of the law profession in
committing said crime to defraud his clients, the Court ordered that
respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended from the
practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal case No.
10220, now pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of
public document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in criminal
case No. 10220. After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two years to six years
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The trial court
also found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing the
crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A copy of
the decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the action it may
deem appropriate to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the
Supreme Court adopted the resolution hereinabove quoted.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed to the Court
of Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to prison at the
National Penitentiary.
On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended
conditional pardon to Jose Avanceña.
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged from confinement.
In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt as the author of the falsification
of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave abuse of
confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken advantage of
the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of a public
document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the accused
is a disgrace to the law profession and should be disbarred.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said:
A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye
que el apelante no ha explicado satisfactoriamente como Ilego a
su posesion el poder especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es
concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas
de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito
A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338).
La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el
exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que
aparecen en dicho document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho documento
a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion.
EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda racional
la culpabilidad del apelante, y la decision apelada estando de
conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la misma se confirmation in
toto, con las costas contra el apelante.
There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña has committed the
crime of falsification of public document against his clients with grave
abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of
competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or
misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute grounds for removal
from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not to mention
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially
relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did not operate as
a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the
ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final
judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.)

Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avanceña

disbarred from the practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of
attorneys.
EN BANC
[December 7, 1928.]
In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO
Felipe del Rosario, in his own behalf.
City Fiscal Guevara, for the Government.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW;
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. — The practice of the law is not an
absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Acquittal upon a criminal charge is not a bar to
proceedings intended to determine if a candidate is worthy to be
admitted to the bar.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the
fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del
Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and
action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario
be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be
forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to
the report has been permitted to be made, in which the court is
asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of
the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore
ordered by the court.
Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who
failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the
succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to
obtain the required rating. Then on March 29,1927, he authorized
the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based
on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The
court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted
Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with two Justices dissenting.
Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar
examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case
was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a
former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor
pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly.
Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial
was acquitted for lack of evidence.
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not
a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the
court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally
unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole
beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his
attorney’s certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to
the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of
professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted
every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would
be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself
out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903],
2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association v. Thomas
[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People v.
Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S.,
265.)

The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to

Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days
from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his
attorney’s certificate to the clerk of this court.
December 7, 1920 the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a
career may not be utterly ruined.
In re CARLOS S. BASA
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa
Pedro Guevara for respondent. shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer
Attorney-General Feria for the Government. for one year. So ordered.lawphi1.net

MALCOLM, J.:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of

Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars
of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the
Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with
consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del
Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for
a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision
correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime
of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found
which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes
of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.
(In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S.,
225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which

should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the
one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney
cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in
1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to
fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the
birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at
Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu
Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose
Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena
refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971,
Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following
month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in
March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her
boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had
sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused
his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said
that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still
another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not
mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started
telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur.
He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu.
He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to
Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she
and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise
Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really
so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding
deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his
birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed
his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her
time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child
on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu
in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on
April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also
attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there
was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact
her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of
money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there
only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted
when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported
the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured
medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and
that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly
promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because
of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of
oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was
born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his
opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging
on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character.
He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the
father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral
conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with
the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit
of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will
depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh
and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality
is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair
sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to
sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open
door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48
Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the
following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill,
although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a
child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another
woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to
hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have
an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative
Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui,
100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they
were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and,
after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their
child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117
Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see
Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion
Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling
and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a
marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies,
keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the
complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their
broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123
Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress
with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to
give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that
he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage
between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You
are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you
along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for
better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the
first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous
relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated
from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became
pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This
case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206,
where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes
H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in
frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several
letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing

and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant
and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence

of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for
disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was
not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana
vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA
382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63
SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz,
Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena,
a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her
person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court,
the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint
and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case
with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed
from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys".
The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958,
Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and
went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while
she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the
house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back.
Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other
hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced
her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he
threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as
she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his
fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he
warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he
would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed
ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when
she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a
result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n.,
hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been
heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to
anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she
still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959,
sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his
coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14,
1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone
with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila
to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5,
1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified
that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of
Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in
the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with
the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when
their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to
him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking
her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They
had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had
reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The
last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958.
In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her
house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the
opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally
contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry,
for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife,
will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the
complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia)
could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge
of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the
undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was
performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have
been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving
her honor ....
disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent
disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality,
one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for
disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned RECOMMENDATION

cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed
the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous of attorneys.
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with
other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint
grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage
which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and
which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a
woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could
person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles
have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over
at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and
Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour
and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying
of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18
that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the
years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name
from the roll of attorneys."
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent
filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special
person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of
Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be
action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause
given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the
of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities
Court may fix.."
called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be
But he was not then the person of good moral character he dismissed.
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married
receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing
woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and
known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been
on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the
permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to
charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was
take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent
concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition
for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to
be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-
law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first
met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n.
23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to
Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from
Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores
registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked
her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She
and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's
house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her
if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on'
(t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when
she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and
wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when
they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia
left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go
with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti
and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it
was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga,
she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had
already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then
went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live
with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with
respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6,
1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a
later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on
December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against
the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19,
1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May
11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he
had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for
almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had
no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to
commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October
16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on
February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told
him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and
Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife;
that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband
(Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia
away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge
her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that
in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga,
and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she
cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that
Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed
not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with
another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia)
again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations
in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this
Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman'
(Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition,
because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in
1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he
thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and
it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was
not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent
concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations
in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6,
1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having
illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing
immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)
Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and
3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition
to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in
cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman.
The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing
before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the
corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual
relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she
bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously
cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to
the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the
respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this
count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is
based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been
held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts
to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is
a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be
exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases
unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in
any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing
In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the
legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted
doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar
instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the
general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that
they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In
the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as
a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-
professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of
this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory
grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the
case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he
refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself
merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a
scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took
advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a
moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the
Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence
over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an
uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the
paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18
years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is
not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt
admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent
to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the
same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts,
proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of
the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have
followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court
quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis
supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and
unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts.
For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing
"a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar,
and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede
that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of
his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with
his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity
as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on
tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character
degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that
even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to
shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by
the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The
reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous
relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish
his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did
not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13
years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The
means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An
immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then
free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a
married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations
with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.
Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the
privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed
therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery
and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those
originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites
as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which
state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact
and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated
unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the
respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be
served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the
complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing
rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same
offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for
disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General
find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case
against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during
the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the
bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character.
This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself
is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective
term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is
what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As
former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice
law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal
and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957
ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley.
1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good
moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him
seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of
good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the
bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein

respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993
DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondent.
Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant.
S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by
profession, filed with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent
with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the
respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol
Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant and his wife were married on 10
December 1988 and their union bore them three children, all boys, ages 3
years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges that their
married life was peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair,
which came about in this manner:
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from
the wife of the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband
(respondent) have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her
possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the
complainant. Although he did not believe the information and even berated
Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol about
it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that
the respondent was just a client of
her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two weeks
later, Mrs. Juanson called him again to inquire if he had received the
photocopies of Sol's love letters to the respondent. He again scolded Mrs.
Juanson and told her not to call him up anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and
Sol left for the United States of America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed
there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead of him on 10 July
1992. During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson
called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to the latter the
illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June 1992, Mrs.
Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of Sol's love letters to the
respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs.
Juanson delivered the original copies of Sol's alleged letters to
Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, Celestine
A. Barreto.
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided
to hire a private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged
illicit affair between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance
conducted by its private investigators, the agency found that Sol had met
with the respondent on 11 and 17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at
130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and that they stayed
inside the unit for two to three hours.
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival
from the USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship
between Sol and the respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken
by the private investigators and the alleged love letters of Sol. In the
evening of the said date, in the presence of their respective parents, the
complainant confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; Sol still denied the
affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business with the
respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally
admitted to having an illicit affair with the respondent since late 1983 when
she was an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that
before they left for the USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A
Citihomes.
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house.
He and Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He also
subsequently discovered from the statement of the billing from Pacific Bell
for overseas calls which he and Sol made while they were in the USA that
on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had made calls to the respondent's office at
the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office
of the judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative
sanction for immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, the
respondent filed his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he
knows Sol and that "they have been communicating with each other
casually and innocently," but denies that they are lovers and were having
an illicit affair, that Sol has been sending love letters to him, and that,
except for the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had been going
to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he came to know Sol
sometime in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in
connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol sought legal advice
from him and during those occasions they usually talked over the phone
and not in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol
who was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem
with her employer, the Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch).
They agreed that Sol would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On
11 July 1992, shortly after her arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the
aforementioned apartment, which was leased not by the respondent but by
Celestino Esteban. After discussing her problem, with Celestino and two
other persons present, he and Sol left the apartment and took a late lunch
at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the complainant "that his wife has
always been faithful to him and that he would do nothing as would tarnish
their warm relationship, much less destroy the complainant's family."
On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice
Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on
17, 18, 21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties
submitted testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she
submitted her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 1993.
Pertinent portions of her findings of facts read as follows:
As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr.
Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol Dinglasan were married at Sta.
Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 as evidenced
by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born
of this marriage, John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan
Norbert, two (2) years old, and the youngest Jan Joseph,
four (4) months old. Complainant and his family lived a
happy and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings
after the Sunday mass. (p. 9, tsn, June 29, 1993).
In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from
a woman introducing herself as a concerned friend telling
that complainant's wife is having an illicit affair with her said
woman caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself
but only said she was in possession of love letters of
complainant's wife Sol to said caller's husband. After two
weeks, said "concerned friend" called up the Complainant
again to ask him if he had received said caller's registered
mail. Complainant after both calls asked his wife Sol about
her having an affair with another man, and in both
instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls
stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of 1992
although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to go
out alone every Saturday.
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to
the U.S.A. for a vacation but the latter decided to return to
Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. "O").
Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19,
1992 (Exh. "O-1").
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father,
Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his sister Celestine Barreto's
house, and there his father showed him five (5) love letters
written by Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes
addressed to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E"
and submarking), and pictures taken by private
investigators of Complainant's wife and respondent Judge
in company of each other
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant
recognized the handwriting of his wife Sol in said love
letters, specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol
in her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of
Complainant to his patients. Likewise, in the pictures,
Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a "Payless"
bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the
same bag later on (Exh. "F-14"). In practically all the
pictures, Complainant identified his wife Sol and the
respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no
stranger to Complainant as the latter knows said Judge
personally. Said Judge is one of the best friends of
Complainant's parents-in-law and was even a sponsor in
the wedding of Complainant's sister-in-law. Both
Complainant and Respondent Judge had met thrice and
talked with each other.
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent
Judge (Exh. "K") were handed to Complainant's father,
Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced herself, as
Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant's
sister, Celestine Barreto. The three met at the front
entrance of the Sto. Domingo Church, Quezon Boulevard,
Quezon City and proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant
in the same city where the three had a talk and where Mrs.
Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love letters with a
picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June 1992.
Prior to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m.
a "concerned woman" had called up Atty. Alfonso at his
home and in the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo
ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant's
wife. To clear Atty. Alfonso's doubt, the woman promised
to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a
parcel containing the xerox copies of Complainant's wife's
love letters to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson.
After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as
Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call
from Complainant that his wife Sol was coming home to
Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the services of
a private investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc.,
to conduct surveillance of the activities of Complainant's
wife, Sol upon her arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did
arrive on July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the
Truth Verifier System, Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and
Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private detectives conducted
surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and
respondent Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date of July
17, 1992, said private detectives together with Raymond
Tabangcura and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol Dinglasan
Alfonso go out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle
and alight at Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church
then board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi
stopped at City Homes, San Francisco Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412-A
Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three hours.
Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of said
unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light colored polo and
carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying
earlier, and then followed by Sol. At around 1:00 p.m., the
Respondent Judge and Sol were inside said Respondent's
Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA.
The two ate at Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico,
then they proceeded to Robinson's Supermarket. Inside
the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent
Judge put his arm on the shoulder of Sol, and they were
also seen holding hands (pp. 23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993).
Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the
Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the
corner of Suter and Roxas Streets and then boarded a
tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth
and Verifier System, Inc. has
been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while
the many pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Sol
were marked and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22".
The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by
Edgardo Tamayo practically corroborated the findings of
the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report marked and
offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of
Respondent Judge and Complainant's wife Sol marked
and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14" were presented
before the Investigator.
Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L.
Alfonso, he was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso
to Norbert's sister's house in San Juan, Metro Manila. In
the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso
showed his son, Norbert the love letters written by his wife
Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to "E"). Complainants
recognized the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the
GAIN memo stationery which complainant was using as his
prescription pad for his patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized
his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the pictures taken
by the private detectives. On said day, Complainant
Norbert Alfonso experienced the greatest shock of his life
and wondered what happened to his life. His father, Atty.
Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In
that same party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and
the love letters which made Sol turn pale and stammer
when talking. Sol's own parents were embarrassed and
walked out of the party.
On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant
Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth
of her relationship with Respondent Judge. Before the
Investigator said Complainant made the following
testimony on direct examination:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q What else did your wife tell you during
that confrontation, her exact words ?
xxx xxx xxx
A She took a deep breath again and told
me, "Sweetheart, I am very, very, very
sorry, I made a mistake." I asked, "What
mistake is that ?" She replied, "I had sexual
intercourse with the Judge."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else, if any, happened during that
confrontation?
A I asked my wife "How many times did you
have sexual intercourse with the Judge"?
Q Was there any response?
A She answered five times and then right
away I said, "Putangina mo, five times
lang.Alam mo ba kung ilan beses kitang
naganyan? Tarantado ka." With my voice
not so loud because the door and the
windows were opened. If I shout the
neighbors will hear and then the yayas will
go down right away.
Q What was your wife doing at that time?
A My wife was crying and saying,
"Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry. Forgive
me." She was kneeling before me and
begging forgiveness. "Forgive me,
sweetheart, I love you."
I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love
your stupid Judge."
Q Is there anything else that you discussed
during that confrontation aside from the
admission?
A After that admittance of my wife having
sexual relationship with the Judge,
reminiscing the past events when we were
together I told my wife, "That's why pala
every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong
pinupuntahan mo?" And definitely, she
admitted to me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41,
tsn, June 29, 1993)
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol
ended at about 5:00 a.m. of the following day, July 16, 1992
with Complainant asking Sol to leave the house.
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went
to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29,
1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the
Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both
Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson
departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on
December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December
29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1").
Also, Complainant received from his sister in California,
U.S.A., a Pacific Bell Statement of Telephone Calls
reflecting two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila, at
numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code
while number 476120 is the phone number of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent Judge is the
Presiding Judge.
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife
Sol live separately, and their three children are alternately
in the custody of Complainant or Sol for certain number of
days.
 Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is
denial as he advances the position that Sol Dinglasan
Alfonso was a former client when Respondent Judge was
still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol
would consult him regarding her cases. As to the
Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply accompanied a
former client who was looking for a house to buy in
Hongkong and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit,
Respondent Judge claimed that he was only visiting his
godson George Zari who spent a vacation in the
Philippines for a month.
Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is now 56
years old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married
in 1961 and have two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12
July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to 1969, he was the Chief Legal Officer in the
Office of the City Mayor of Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the
Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After that and until November
1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court at
Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice of law. In April 1992, he
was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8
July 1993, 32). He first came to know Sol when she hired his services as
her counsel in six criminal cases involving dishonored checks she filed
against Santiago Maramag and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In
1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he
stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June 1992, Romeo saw him at his
office at the City Hall in Manila and sought advice regarding the letter Sol
had received from the Security Bank requiring her to explain why she
should not be declared absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work
without an approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not
be able to give any advice unless he saw the letter and talked with Sol. A
few days later, he received an overseas call from Sol who said that she left
the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He told her that he could not
give any written or oral advice until he read the letter and talked with her.
This overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call referred to in the
Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to her in the
second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three weeks alter,
he received local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that she
has the letter. Sol begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her
that he was busy; besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got
frantic and so he told her that they could meet the following day at Unit
412-A, Citihomes, at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was
to meet his godson, George Zari, in the said place. They did meet there at
11:00 o'clock in the morning the following day —
11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank
and after interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a "reply."
Present at that time were Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his
friend, George Zari, and his live-in partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes
later, he decided to go home. Sol requested for a ride in his vehicle in order
to alight at the place of her employer along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to
which he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch and they
went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson's where they had lunch.
They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter, on separate
days, Sol called him by phone to ask about the draft of the reply. On the
second call, he told her that since he would meet George Zari on the 17th
of July at Unit 412-A Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She
acceded and on that date he left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in the
morning and arrived at Unit 412-A thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993,
25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply and
instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then send it to her
employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should
henceforth communicate because he, respondent, is busy at his office.
When he was
about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight
at EDSA-Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not meet
Sol again. (TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-15).
Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December
1989 and having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his traveling
companion was Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this
point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10). When confronted about the charge of
immorality and unethical conduct for having illicit relations with Sol, he
answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32).
Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two debilitating
diseases — diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since
1987, and prostatitis — which have seriously affected his sexual potency.
In his own words, he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no erection
whatsoever."
(Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12").
Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for
she finds no reason not to believe the complainant. According to her, "[n]o
man in his correct mind would come forward and claim that his honor and
good name have been stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity
of his children, and in the process destroy his family and home." She ruled
that the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondent — Cua Sen,
Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari — do not inspire belief.
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent
has ruined two families — his own and that of the complainant. Respondent
"cannot escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused
Complainant's once happy family." More pertinently she adds:
But beyond the domestic confines of these two families,
Respondent Judge is no ordinary mortal who can live the
life he pleases having two women at the same time — his
wife and worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who
symbolizes the law and the highest degree of morality in
the community. The citizens look up to him as the
embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides cases
brought to his court. He can be no less.
And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978] )
and Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as precedent and moral
compass, she asserts that she has no other alternative but to find
respondent "GUILTY as charged of Immorality and Violation of Judicial
Conduct" and to recommend his "DISMISSAL . . . from office."
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her
recommendation for the imposition upon the respondent of the severest
administrative penalty — dismissal from the service — it is all the more
imperative to conduct as assiduous examination and evaluation of the
records and the evidence.
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed
between the respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are the
cards or notes, which the complainant and the Investigating Justice
described as love letters. These five "love letters" are marked as Exhibits
"A." "B," "C," "D," and "E," and dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15
February 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989, respectively. For
another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant's testimony that
during their confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual intercourse with
the respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would
appear that the relationship had developed into an extra-marital liaison. It
was furthermore established that both Sol and the respondent took the
same flights of Cathay Pacific aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989
and back to the Philippines on 29 December 1989. There is, however, no
evidence that they stayed together in the same hotel in Hongkong. On the
other hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a
client of the respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.
From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the
complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and might have
blossomed from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and
Sol. Her marriage to the complainant did not diminish Sol's love for the
respondent, for even after she committed herself to the complainant alone
and made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn ceremony of
marriage, she still sneaked out her love notes to the respondent.
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with
immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the
judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the
complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol continued
their extramarital affair. No love notes written by her after November 1990
were presented in evidence. If she did, they could have been kept with
Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place which was not, however, unknown
anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's admission or confession to the
complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five
occasions made no reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct
examination, the complainant's counsel exerted no further effort to obtain
clarifications as to the dates thereof. He perhaps realized its futility
because the narration by the complainant of the information clearly
indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to elaborate on the five illicit
sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent carefully
avoided any entanglement with the details of the admission not only
because it might have provided an occasion for the complainant to
elaborate thereon, but because it would have operated as a waiver of his
objection to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic
notes discloses that the counsel for the respondent objected and entered
a continuing objection to questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit
statements or admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on the grounds
that any such statements or admissions would be hearsay or otherwise
barred by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros recognized the merit
of the objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as
part of the narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus:
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q. What was her response to your
exhortation?
 A. After a few minutes she took a deep Q. What was the exact statement of your
breath and said, "Sweetheart, patawarin wife?
mo ako,nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa
iyo." xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BARLONGAY: ATTY. BARLONGAY:

At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like Again, subject to the observation of this
to register our objection as to the issue of Honorable Court, we
the truth of the statement as purported to would register our objections on these two
be answered by her wife for two reasons: grounds: Hearsay and res inter-alia [sic]
One, it is hearsay. We have no opportunity rule.
to cross-examine the . . .
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
As part of the narration.
Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . .
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
COURT:
Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the
purposes of record we would like to register You have a continuing objection?
our objection as to the truth of the
statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
...
Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn.
COURT:
I just want to say that our objection is a
continuing one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration. 39).

ATTY. BARLONGAY: If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the
narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant
That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis statements, i.e., proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as
of the inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission of proof of the truth of facts revealed in the said statements or admissions.
a party should not prejudice the rights of Elsewise stated, the admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is
another. not to be used in determining the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO,
V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973
xxx xxx xxx ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by Sol
cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the
ATTY. DEMIGILLO: said admission or confession. While it is true that technical rules of
evidence should not be applied in administrative cases, however, since the
Investigating Justice herself had specifically allowed the hearsay answers
merely as part of the narration, or more specifically as independently
relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter disregard
the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent evidence
against the respondent that he had illicit sex with Sol.
But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of
the facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission that she
engaged in sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference to
specific dates, that their affair antedated Sol's marriage, that their last
proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of
positive and competent evidence to show that any of the five acts of sexual
intercourse took place after the respondent's appointment to the judiciary ,
it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the
sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged
for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of
prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in
this case. The respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his
appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him
upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI,
1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that
since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man
is beyond reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the
exalted position of
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for
that honor — his private and official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27
[1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce
be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from
any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts
upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which
is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. This the
complainant failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol at Unit
412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do not by themselves
prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence was offered
by the respondent to prove otherwise. However, considering their prior
special relationship, the respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably
incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant
intimacies expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent
suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories of the
past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice
on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably
cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,"
and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "[a] judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA
81 [1975] ). The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary.
(Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977] ).
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the
respondent left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later.
(TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of the private detectives (Exhibit "G"),
the respondent and Sol left the unit as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon on
board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol alighted near the
crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July
1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering
the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila
and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached
his office — if at all he did proceed to it — in time for the commencement
of the official session hours in the afternoon,
i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines
Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization of 1981).
Thus, for purely personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the
official sentence. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.
Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have sexual
congress with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and
prostatitis. The claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert
testimony was presented to prove the stage, extent or degree of
seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his capacity to copulate.
The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates did not
testify thereon. Besides, immorality — for which the respondent is charged
— is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that:
immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
 of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or
is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare. (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth ed.,
1990, 751).

WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons

of Judicial Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE
MODESTO C. JUANSON is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint
in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a
member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27 December 1946 while
he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent
for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-
fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present
employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City;
and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three
children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of
law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the
complaint.3The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which
was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the complaint
was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and
concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member
of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer
could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there
seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while the
letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket
Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are
"A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later
date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D.
Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true
name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of
Mines, and that the three children referred to by the complainant were the
children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was
boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte
and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the
Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October 1956, this
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was
received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10
December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5
August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during
which the complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary
and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her
witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but
reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128.
After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this
Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and
immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and
praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30
July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the
complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the
same within 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128.
On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not
based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2
September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958
at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed
a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first
resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days
within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be
returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17 September
1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending resolution
of his motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel
for the respondent appeared and was given a period of 15 days within
which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the
Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the
respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958,
within the extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his
memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of time
previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final
decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object
and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is
made as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the
case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer
 or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis
supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in
disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an
answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation
and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say
so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent
filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present
evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the close
of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his
desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct
manner and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in
the answer seasonably filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist
by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law student, were
married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A).
For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of
her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks,
the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern
University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While
the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a
week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other.
Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and
when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with
his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their
meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or four months
before his graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her
indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a
"provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came
to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while
he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that
three days before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after
the bar examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became
actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the
case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the respondent
was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro
City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his
place of work and she did not care to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June
1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the
respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their
child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived
as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who was less than a
year old at the time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the
same room with their daughter Angie and ate their meals together although
sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere.
The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call
the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the
complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as
operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent
because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in
Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he
went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno street,
where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of
public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of
residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent were
Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept
at the place whenever he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who
is not the same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the
respondent. At the respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a
room where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's
pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were
repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the
respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced
him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station
wagon in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the
respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy
cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs.
Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14,
t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne
him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina Payot and
Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe
and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the
respondent who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the
witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how
she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or
coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of any
promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in
a straight forward manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo
and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and
told her to tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his
paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to
testify at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way
of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in
his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by
the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against
him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive for falsely testifying
against them, and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos;
that they considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15
a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15;
that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of few words, was
kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them
was because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her
credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and
she described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her
(Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more
beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure,
because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find out if it
was another and not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the Solicitor
asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the
respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon,
and she replied that she had not.
her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to
which she was subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed
herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers may
be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to
understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be
expected to remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a
person of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that
she was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her
confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to
the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal
any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be discarded,
still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken
into consideration for they were not properly introduced in evidence during
the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another
woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.6
THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.

Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked

him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the
complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law and
added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had
been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly
answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the
respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in
complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more
beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant.

The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina

Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education,
and understands little English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of
the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her
husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly
immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad
Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal
relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972.
He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that
Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso,
33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in
a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo,
Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his
wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his
mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown,
Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal
abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient
investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and
cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo
Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal,
a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94
Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and
F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced
himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at
the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner
of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified
five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as
the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was
terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time
he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving
financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes,
the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He
claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with
Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the
conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their
violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went
to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his
professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed
a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer
the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His
lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has
sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her
and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own
husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming
carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608,
August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member
of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll

of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10185 March 12, 2014
LICERIO DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition
against Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the
latter for falsification of public document.
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers
of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late Florentino Callangan,
namely, Susana, Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were
parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that on November 6, 2003, a
compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and
notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the
MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the
due execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the
signatories therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court
room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public;
that because of the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise
Agreement, there was undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case
No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty.
Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in the
absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be
sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code
and Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that
Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after
the hearing of the said case in MTCC.
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to
harass him because he was the private prosecutor in a criminal case filed
against complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of
action as his right was not violated because he was just a "would be" buyer
and not a party to the compromise agreement; and that complainant would
not suffer any damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects
obtaining in the notarization of the compromise agreement.
In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
compromise agreement without the presence of all the parties, and
recommended that he be suspended as Notary Public for a period of two
(2) years and from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Cabucana be
suspended for only six (6) months for violation of his obligation as Notary
Public.
On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a
Resolution,3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana
from the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from re-
appointment as notary public for one (1) year.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
except as to the penalty.
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law
states:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments
or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is
required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized
in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which
provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory
to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
 (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.

As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless

the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally
appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable
him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and
deed.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.

GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for three (3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately, with a stern
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included

in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all cou1is throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.