EN BANC The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and "d.
#39;s Oath-taking and "d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he
[ Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992 ]
EVANGELINE LEDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
TREBONIAN TABANG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue
respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral
character, in two Complaints she had filed against him,
one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6
January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No.
2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14
February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and
Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo.
The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of
Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code[1] as one of exceptional character (Annex "A,"
Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret
until after Respondent had finished his law studies
(began in 1977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Com-
plainant admits, though, that they had not lived together
as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January
1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and
thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he
declared that he was "single." He then passed the
examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking
his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that
Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his
application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's
Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982
which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation"
carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6).
Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to
Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage
"was not as yet made and declared public" so that he
could proceed with his law studies and until after he
could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable
our future." He also admitted having indicated that he
was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason
that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status
as single since my marriage with the complainant was
not as yet made and declared public." He further averred
that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her
conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he
prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June
1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit or
Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose
out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and
that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint
against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court
dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to
take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1952.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this
Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our
marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our
marriage institution.
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in
truth he is already married in his application to take the
bar exam.
"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the
certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and
the conformity to his explanation and later on the
comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in
fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to
resume our marriage and introduced me to his family,
friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is
he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him
with the Supreme Court."
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as
Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed
to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after
he had already taken his Oath stating, among others,
that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he
"could not force myself to be yours," did not love her
anymore and considered her only a friend. Their
marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply
with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among
them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before
the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect
by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be
at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not
as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He
advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not
to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had
"attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me
even (sic) you go to any court." According to
Complainant, although the letter was unsigned,
Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand
corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a
letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers
that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose
the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies
and take the Bar first but for the reason that said
marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of
the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the
contracting parties shall have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. He could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together as
husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar
Examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of
the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor
General submitted his Report, with the recommendation
that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against
him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and
to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded
for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the
various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor
General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation,
report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of
Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial
evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack
of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission
to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a
gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter
bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppression of a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar." That false
statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it
indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good
faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because
of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant
was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts
absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume
that his marriage to Complainant is void. The
presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a
marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of
the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official
duty in connection therewith has been regularly
performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting
positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar
Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent
had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1
of which he admits having been "legally married" to
Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the
Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had
submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending
instead that it is only the second page where his
signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However,
in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits
and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f])
and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having
been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this
case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and,
instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies
his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the
fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow
him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,
however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret
was because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the
unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant.
However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that
he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void
from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records
shows that Respondent had reconciled with
Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick
finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the
lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been
unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a
"full-fledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his
marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions
before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a
lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v.
Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10).
Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
the candor required of him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30
January 1990, 181 SCRA 622). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C.
Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal
record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of
Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon,
JJ., concur.

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary

[1]

when a man and a woman who have attained the age of

majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in anaffidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120348. December 3, 1948.]
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of
questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations.
Felixberto M. Serrano for Respondent.
Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo
Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers’
Association) as amici curiæ.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTHORITY OF SUPREME COURT
TO PROMULGATE RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE
OF LAW; SUPREME COURT CONDUCTS BAR EXAMINATIONS.
— Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines
authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that
authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated,
under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided
by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the
report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to
the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have
passed the examinations.
2. STATUTES; WORDS AND PHRASES; "INTEREST OF THE
STATE" EXPLAINED AND CONSTRUED. — We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of
the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the
state" cannot be confined and limited to the "security of the
state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases,
— "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the
legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public
safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of
the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of
communications and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety
and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of
the same Constitution provides that the President may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of
invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — If, as contended, the Philippine Congress,
particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the
exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases
where the "security of the state," i. e., "national security" is
involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or
any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "national
security," or "public security" of which it must have been
familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe
that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators,
and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it
extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a
newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the
sources of his information.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The phrase "interest of the state" is quite
broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader
than "security of the state." Although not as broad and
comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most
anything though of minor importance, but affecting the
public.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE
OF ADMISSION OF LAWYERS; BAR EXAMINATIONS, HOW
GIVEN AND CONDUCTED. — Under constitutional provision,
Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the
Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to
the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the
qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and
it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar
Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar
Examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the
examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later
make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a
passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice
law.
6. SUPREME COURT; MAINTENANCE OF HIGH STANDARD OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The Supreme Court and the
Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard
for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and
legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court
and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession
only those persons who are known to be honest, possess
good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge
of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar
Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner.
7. ID.; LEGAL PROFESSION AS THE MOST POPULAR IN THIS
JURISDICTION; CONDUCT OF BAR EXAMINATIONS IMBUED
WITH GENERAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. — It
is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or
the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand
for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other
professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar,
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other
learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important
thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme
Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial
fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal
departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the
Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of
necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.
8. ID.; BAR EXAMINATIONS ANOMALY AS WITHIN THE
MEANING OF "INTEREST OF THE STATE." — The present case
falls and may be included within the meaning of the phrase
"interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the
interests of students and graduates of the law schools and
colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as
well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the
Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself
which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine
Government.
9. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, SUPREME COURT AS; DUTY
AND NECESSITY TO ADOPT MEASURES TO PRESERVE
INTEGRITY OF LEGAL PROFESSION. — In support of if not in
addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act
No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in
general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of
the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate
measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and
facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the
present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or
misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
lawyers, who are officers of the Court.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in
the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of
The present case had its origin in a story or news item
the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests
prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a
wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly
duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of
all the graduates of some private technical schools."cralaw
general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the
virtua1aw library
issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the
headline in large letters — "CLAIM ’LEAK’ IN LAST BAR TESTS,"
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme
followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants
Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had
In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored,"
previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of
under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter
Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court,
Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in
instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo
for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for
"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations
purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the
were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part
news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this
in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar
Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held
"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of
in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of
the questions in one subject, days before the tests were
the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules
given, in the Philippine Normal School.
concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to
that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar
those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one
Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners
week before the tests.
to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year,
acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the
"The students who made the denunciation to the Star
Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees
Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in
who have passed the examinations.
every respect to those they had seen students of this private
university holding proudly around the city.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September
18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and,
"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked
answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and
are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an
Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item;
immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of
that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith
the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the
and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons
particular university possessed of those tests before the
who gave him the information which formed the basis of his
examinations.
publication but that he declined to reveal their names
because the information was given to him in confidence and
"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar
his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed.
The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious
matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity
and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the
Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and
repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of
his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position
to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to
verify their charge and complaint and take action against the
party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and
anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to
make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was
appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the
latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr.
Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of
Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the
transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18,
1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc,
resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated
October 7, 1948, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front
page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948,
regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions,
which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la
Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court,
were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman
of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an
investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of
Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of
said news item. An investigation was conducted on
September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the
testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marceliano R.
Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar
examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the
consideration of this Court.
"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr.
Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused
to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given
him the data and information on which his news item was
based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit,
and for his cooperation, in order to enable this Court to
conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar
examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice
Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him
that the interests of the State demand and so this Court
requires that he reveal the source or sources of his
information and of his news item, and to warn him that his
refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as
contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice
Montemayor will advise the Court of the result."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited
Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He
appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him
that the interest of the State demands and this court requires
that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of
his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving
the confidence of the people in general and the law
practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity
and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves
the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who
were appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations
questions and later pass upon and correct the examination
papers; and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to
affect the confidence of the whole country in the very
Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It
was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is
keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and
leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that
without his help, specially the identities of the persons who
furnished him the information and who could give the court
the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even
begin the investigation because there would be no basis from
which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a
theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be
punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment
which may even involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised
to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he
need time within which to do this and so that he might even
consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star
Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his
request, the investigation was postponed to October 15,
1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel,
Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the
presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of
Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal
the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined
and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his
counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to
reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the
Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same
day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney
Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client,
invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section
of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter
of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any
news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or
reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature
consideration, involving as it does interesting and important
points of law as well as questions of national importance.
Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state"
found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means
and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say —
that only when national security or public safety is involved,
may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or
sources of his news report or information. We confess that it
was not easy to decide this legal question on which the
conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact,
the vote of the Justices is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that
passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate where it
originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said
legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was
being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the
original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the
immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of
any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance
could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information
or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or
change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause
"unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by
the public interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on
second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill
proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by
the committee — "unless the court finds that such revelation
is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause
would kill the purpose of the bill. This amendment of Senator
Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the
elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground
that without such exception and by giving complete immunity
to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed.
Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the
disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the
exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the
Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds
that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said
that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment
because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the
interest of the public or the interest of the state requires that
the names of the informants be published or known. He gave
as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing
information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or
fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a
newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free.
When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was
disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another
amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the
end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to
and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming
that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much
discussion this last amendment was approved, and this
phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase
"interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the
"security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or
speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator
Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the
state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice
from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the
bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used
interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest
of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by
the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words
"public interest," when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill
before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the
phrase "interest of the state" (interes del Estado). Again,
although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest,"
Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the
phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least
two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about
the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public
interest" and "interest of the state," may account for the
readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after
it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the
second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public
interest" to "interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw library
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or
public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of
fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as
an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was
not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose
to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of
the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the
state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the
state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases,
— "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the
legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public
safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of
the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of
communications and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety
and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of
the same Constitution provides that the President may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of
invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.
The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes
against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, —
Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the
phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the
phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People’s Court,
promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the
Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had
meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the
state," i.e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and
readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases
like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of
which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there
is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and
intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest
of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the
exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be
compelled to reveal the sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and
extensive. It is of course more general and broader than
"security of the state." Although not as broad and
comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most
anything though of minor importance, but affecting the
public, such as for instance, the establishment and
maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants,
parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the state" even
under a conservative interpretation, may and does include
cases and matters of national importance in which the whole
state and nation, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof
such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is
interested or would be affected, such as the principal
functions of Government like administration of justice, public
school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific
research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high
Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of
the three coordinate branches of the Government, their
relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions,
etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the
phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision,
Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the
Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to
the Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the
qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and
it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar
Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar
examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the
examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later
make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a
passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice
law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine
Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practising law or
occupying important Government posts requiring
membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite
a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the
legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have
always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal
profession, both in academic preparation and legal training,
as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the
licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping
this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end
is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral
character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law
by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar
Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It
is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or
the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand
for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other
professions, is the most popular in these islands. The
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar,
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other
learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important
thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme
Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial
fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal
departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the
Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of
necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or
another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar
examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as
a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and
improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to
the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they
should not be, then the present members of the legal
profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and
if this is continued it would not be long before the legal
profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would
naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new
ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek
redress or to defend himself before it would not know
whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case
has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient
and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest,
or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in
getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed
the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal
career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar
examinees who, by intense study and conscientious
preparation, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and
are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this
anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of
suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they
might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination
questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale
of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different
law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar
Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in
them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law
study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not
difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations
and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar
examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit
of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on
the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation
of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or
more of them — that through negligence, or connivance, or
downright corruption, they have made possible the release if
they have not themselves actually released, before
examination day, the questions they had prepared. The
employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the
original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be
under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the
Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and
control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as
a result of which the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court
like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and
shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our
opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall
and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of
the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of
students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and
of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the
good name and reputation of the members of the Commitee
of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme
Court having charge of and connection with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself
which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine
Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the
inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme
Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt
proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity,
and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their
functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation
of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and
subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court.
(Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As
we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the
respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and
necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the
publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo’s news item as quoted in the
first part of this decision, that, his informants, law graduates
and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly
— consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination
questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If
those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide
and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the
right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself,
not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation,
they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready
to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start
an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the
curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and
assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one subject
had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a
certain university, one week before the examinations were
actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the
investigation said that examination questions in several
subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies
of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is
willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of
examination questions; that they were actually and carefully
compared with the legitimate examination questions given
out on the day of the examination and found to be identical;
no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the
said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the
university where they came from, was known; and even the
law subjects to which the questions pertained are not
disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the
identity of respondent Parazo’s informants who claim to have
seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar
Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine
hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his
answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects,
each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of
the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of
bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of
questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven
thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved,
in the hands of eight different examiners. The examination
books or papers bear no names or identifications of their
writers or owners and said ownership and identification will
not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and
graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable
witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually
been committed, - evidence on the identity of the persons in
possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely
released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law
subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said
persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or
warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately
revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books
with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or
identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing
thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the
enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not
and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any
serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of
evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of
basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even
start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent
herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those
informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid
and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further
examine and probe into the charges contained in the news
item, said charges are considered and held to be without
basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the
respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle
curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an
investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar
Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to
protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for
membership therein and the public dealing with the
members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with
and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination
questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as
already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this
High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative
to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do
by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing
responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even
annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the
charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is
found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In
demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of
his information, this Court did not intend to punish those
informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help
and cooperation. In this Court’s endeavor to probe thoroughly
the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its
intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish
the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also
even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the
innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the
examinations. We say this because in every examination,
whether conducted by the Government or by a private
institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on
which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of
the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is
found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might
reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly
difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of
which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the other hand, if too many obtain a passing
grade, the examiner may think that the examination
questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate
measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a
lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more
strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of
the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if
many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examination day, and study and prepare the answers to those
questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that
many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered
the questions, he may think that said questions were too
easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the
papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of
examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the
present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo
reveal the source or sources of his information which formed
the basis of his news item or story in the September 14, 1948
issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which
this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court.
The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation
that he knew the names and identities of the persons who
furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted
and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which
is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of
Court.) Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be
imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand.
However, considering that cases like the present are not
common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no
reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty,
as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or
necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of
an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime
wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the
respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have
decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest
and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless,
before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court
the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
 Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the
charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against
respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's
petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Republic of the Philippines
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for
SUPREME COURT Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
Manila
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his
EN BANC plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform
and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992 lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his
assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath
vs. and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent. Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992 However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's
oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each
filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon
vs.
in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
part, for ready reference:
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve
Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No.
vs. 609 also filed a Motion for
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent. Reconsideration of our Resolution
allowing respondent to take his oath.
They alleged that respondent had
deliberately and maliciously excluded
them in his Petition of 28 June 1988.
That, of course, is without merit
considering that in his Petition of 28 June
1988, respondent had discussed said
cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also
manifested that Complainant Benjamin
Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant
Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had
passed away so that they are in no
position to submit their respective
Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken
into account in allowing respondent to
take his oath, was a testimonial from the
IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
dated 29 December 1986, certifying that
respondent was "acting with morality and
has been careful in his actuations in the
community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP
testimonial was signed only by the then
President of the IBP, Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
without authorization from the Board of
Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty.
Angeles was respondent's own counsel
as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347,
Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration was a
Certification, dated 24 February 1989,
signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L.
Nuevas, stating that "the present Board
of Officers with the undersigned as
President had not issued any testimonial
attesting to the good moral character and
 civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas
Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court
on 27 March 1989, respondent states
that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that
signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated 29 December 1986, and that he
himself had not submitted to the Court
any certification from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of
Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has
deemed it best to require the present
Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST
whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's
good moral character as to entitle him to
take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the
reason therefor. The Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within
ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R.
Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4
August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989,
pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well
acquainted personally with the
respondent, is not aware of any acts
committed by him as would disqualify
him from admission to the Bar. It might
be relevant to mention, however, that
there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled
Republic of the Philippines, Represented
by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus
Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of
Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion
pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged
to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land
which, upon investigation, turned out to
be a swampland and not susceptible of
acquisition under a free patent, and
which he later mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land sold at
public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land until the present.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a
Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its
Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil
L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the
certifications issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in
the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office
of the Provincial and City Prosecutors,
Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been
convicted of any crime, nor is there any
pending derogatory criminal case against
him. Based on the above findings, the
Board does not find any acts committed
by the petitioner to disqualify him from
admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the
aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive
Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of
15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting
vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and
Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive
Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a
pending case before his Court involving respondent
Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a
date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and
required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the
outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil
Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as
resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received
another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently
objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and
describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted
in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15
August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal
has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she
finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him.
Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further
reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had
shown sincere repentance and reformation which she
believes make him morally fit to become a member of
the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the
letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to
the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to
schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient."
This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October
1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter
from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in
their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15
August 1990 is a private personal
disposition which raises the question
whether personal forgiveness is enough
basis to exculpate and obliterate these
cases. On our part, we believe and
maintain the importance and finality of
the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence,
jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions
which are already res judicata. Viewed in
the light of the foregoing final and
executory resolutions, these cases
therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject
and subservient to the changing moods
and dispositions of the parties, devoid of
any permanency or finality. Respondent's
scheming change in tactics and strategy
could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29
November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990,
Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of
Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded
Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of
optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this
Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment,"
dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according
to him, was already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement,
dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the
principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and
conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of
Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the
Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in
favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of
public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining
from exercising acts of possession or ownership over
said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for
the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to
waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas
Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned
Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January
1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia
and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20
December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus
Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying
that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and
that he has no cause to object to his admission to the
Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26
February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991.
In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action
on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the
complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991
requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge
Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the
said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29
August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case
No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of
his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more
reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal
reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's
Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was
allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed
from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar
examinations, after careful consideration of his show of
contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to
his good moral character and civic consciousness. At
that time, we had not received the objections from
complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were
we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by
the Government in 1985 and was brought about
because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of
free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public
domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to
obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee
of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense
and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26
November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled
by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the
bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off
the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo,
Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the
Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval
of the said amicable settlement and prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the
amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the
defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that
in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's
petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been
denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then
submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration
alleging his good moral character without, however,
mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances
attending its termination, the Court now entertains
second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a
member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land
Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over
property which he could not but have known was public
land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of
gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can
not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the
Republic against him where no determination of his guilt
or innocence was made because the suit had been
compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to
a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but
have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet
he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the
foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at
public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same
until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of
honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court
the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against
him during the period that he was submitting several
Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral
character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against
him and were obviously made without awareness of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted
by the Government against him. Those testimonials can
not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and
dishonesty and lack of good moral character. his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is
hereby denied.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in
SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not SO ORDERED.
submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath,
is of no moment. They have already expressed their
objections in their earlier comments. That complainant
Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath
can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her
complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law
is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine
Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training
as well as in honesty and fair dealing.
The Court and the licensed lawyers
themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of
the ways of achieving this end is to admit
to the practice of this noble profession
only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral
character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil.
230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of
broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at
least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case
No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario,
52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit
to become a member of the BAR, this Court's
 PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the
spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez
charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine
Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The
complainant spouses alleged, among others, that
respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken
advantage of their precarious financial situation and his
knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in
divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian
City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa
case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised
that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied
all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative
complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the
City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to
conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to
submit thereafter this report and recommendation
thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he
requested the Solicitor General to release him from the
Manila
duty of investigating the case.
EN BANC
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted
Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989 Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S.
Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA
DALMAN, complainants,
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a
vs.
motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite
postponement of the investigation. Both motions were
denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September
1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
complete the investigation of the administrative case and
to render his report and recommendation thereon within
thirty (30) days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his
Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In
as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings
held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented
the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5,
1975, they obtained from respondent a
loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage
(Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p.
16, records).lâwphî1.ñèt In the said Real
Estate Mortgage document, however, it
was made to appear that the amount
borrowed by complainants was
P5,000.00. Confronted by this
discrepancy, respondent assured
complainants that said document was a
mere formality, and upon such
assurance, complainants signed the
same. The document was brought by
complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the
same was notarized, he gave the
document to respondent. Despite the
assurance, respondent exacted from
complainants P500.00 a month as
payment for what is beyond dispute
usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the
obviously usurious interest for three
months: September, October and
November, 1975. Then they stopped
paying due to financial reverses. In view
of their failure to pay said amounts as
interest, respondent prepared a new
document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate
Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18,
records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate
mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this
time the sum indicated in said new
contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00,
purportedly with interest at 19% per
annum. In this new Real Estate
Mortgage, a special power of attorney in
favor of respondent was inserted,
authorizing him to sell the mortgaged
property at public auction in the event
complainants fail to pay their obligation
on or before May 30, 1976. Without
explaining the provisions of the new
contract to complainants, respondent
insisted that complainants sign the same,
again upon the assurance that the
document was a mere formality.
Unsuspecting of the motive of
respondent, complainants signed the
document. Complainants Narciso
Melendres again brought the same
document to a Notary Public for
notarization. After the document was
notarized, he brought the same to
respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance
of the respondent that the second Real
Estate Mortgage was but a formality,
neither bothered to ask from respondent
the status of their lot nor tried to pay their
obligation. For their failure to pay the
obligation, the respondent on October
12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate
mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's
Position Paper). All the requirements of
Act No. 3135, as amended, re
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were
ostensibly complied with by respondent.
Hence, finally, title was transferred to
him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent
sold the involved property to Trinidad
Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one
Salud Australlado on the first week of
March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of
complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6,
Folder No. 2 of case), and not having
known the legal implications of the
provisions of the second Real Estate
Mortgage which they had executed,
complainants could not believe that title
to their lot had already been transferred
to respondent and that respondent had
already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979,
complainants tried to raise the amount of
P10,000.00 and went to respondent's
house on May 30, 1979 to pay their
obligation, hoping that they could redeem
their property, although three years had
already lapsed from the date of the
mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered
P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B,
Complainants' Position Paper), which
indicated that the total indebtedness had
soared to P20,400.00. The computation
was made in respondent's own
handwriting. Complainants went home
with shattered hopes and with grief in
their hearts. Hence, the instant
competent for disbarment against
respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations
of complainants. He maintains that what
appears on the two documents allegedly
executed by complainants, i.e., that they
obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August
5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims
that he in truth delivered the alleged
amount of P5,000.00 to complainants
and not P4,000.00. With respect to the
second loan, respondent claims that he
delivered to complainants P8,000.00,
plus the P2,000.00 loan previously
extended [to] complainants [by] one
Regino Villanueva, which loan had been
indorsed to respondent for collection,
thus making a total of P10,000.00, as
appearing on said document.
Respondent denies that he exacted
usurious interest of 10% a month or
P500.00 from complainants. He asserts
that the fact that complainants were able
to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of
Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the
truth of his allegation that the title of the
property, at the time complainants
obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976,
was clear of any encumbrance, since
complainants had already paid the
original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from
respondent; that complainants knew fully
well all the conditions of said mortgage;
and that his acquisition of the property in
question was in accordance with their
contract and the law on the matter. Thus,
he denies that he has violated any right
of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both
complainants and respondent, we find
against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their
claim that they actually obtained an
actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only
partly correct in the claim that out of the
P10,000.00 appearing in the second
Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was
applied to interest considering that not all
the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was
applied to interest, computed as follows:
the first loan of P5,000.00 was
supposedly due on August 31, 1975.
Complainants paid 10% monthly interest
or P500.00 on September 30, 1975,
October 31, 1975 and November 30,
1975. Consequently, beginning
December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976
(the date of the execution of the second
Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6)
months lapsed. Six (6) months at
P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which
amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants'
loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals
P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the
previous P5,000.00 indicated loan
secured by the first mortgage results in
P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements.
— When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as complaining all such
terms, and, therefore, there can be, as
between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of
the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties,
or the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity
in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two
documents denominated Real Estate
Mortgages covering the supposed
original loan of P5,000.00 and the
inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were
voluntarily signed by the complainants.
The general rule is that when the parties
have reduced their agreement to writing,
it is presumed that they have made the
writing the only repository and memorial
of the truth, and whatever is not found in
the writing must be understood to have
been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it
admits of some exceptions, as
aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that
is, failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, applies in this
case. From the facts obtaining in the
case, it is clear that the complainants
were induced to sign the Real Estate
Mortgage documents by the false and
fraudulent representations of respondent
that each of the successive documents
was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants
are not at all illiterate, respondent, being
a lawyer, should have at least explained
to complainants the legal implications of
the provisions of the real estate
mortgage, particularly the provision
appointing him as the complainants'
attorney-in-fact in the event of default in
payments on the part of complainants.
While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary
public apprises complainants of the legal
implications of the contract, it is of
common knowledge that most notaries
public do not go through the desired
practice. Respondent at least could have
informed the complainants by sending a
demand letter to them to pay their
obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction
as per their contract. This respondent
failed to do, despite the fact that he knew
fully wen that complainants were trying
their best to raise money to be able to
pay their obligation to him, as shown by
the loan obtained by complainants from
the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this
connection, it may be stated that
complainants, per advice of respondent
himself, returned the proceeds of the
IBAA loan to the bank immediately on
April 30, 1976, considering that the net
proceeds of the loan from said bank was
only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay
the indicated loan from respondent of
P5,000.00, which per computation of
respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months
(December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants
had paid him the original loan of
P5,000.00, and that this was the reason
why complainants were able to mortgage
the lot to the bank free from any
encumbrance. This claim is incorrect.
The reason why the title (T-2684) was
free from any encumbrance was simply
because of the fact that the first Real
Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of
P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P
4,000.00) had not been annotated at the
back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14,
rec.).
Respondent also denies that
complainants offered to him the amount
of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan,
alleging that if the offer were true, he
could have readily accepted the same
since he sold the lot for almost the same
amount, for only P12,000.00, a
difference of a few thousand pesos.
Respondent's denial is spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but
respondent refused the same for the
simple reason that the offer was made
on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the
execution of the mortgage on May 31,
1976. With its lapse of time, respondent
demanded obviously the payment of the
accumulated substantial interest for three
years, as shown by his own computation
in as own handwriting on a sheet of
paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).lâwphî1.ñèt
In view of all the foregoing, the
observation made by the Hearing Officer
is worth quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned
the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to
be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the
respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible
motive on the part of the complainants in
filing the present complaint against the
respondent must be carefully examined
and considered. At the beginning there
was a harmonious relationship between
the complainants and the respondent so
much so that respondent was even
engaged as counsel of the complainants
and it is but human nature that when
respondent extended a loan to the
complainants the latter would be grateful
to the former. However, in the case at
bar, complainants filed a complaint
against the respondent in spite of the
great disparity between the status of the
complainants and the respondent.
Admittedly, respondent is in a better
position financially, socially and
intellectually. To the mind of the
undersigned, complainants were only
compelled to file the above entitled
complaint against the respondent
because they felt that they are so
aggrieved of what the respondent has
done to them. It is for this reason
therefore that the undersigned is inclined
to believe the version of the
complainants rather than of the
respondent. In addition thereto, the
respondent as a lawyer could really see
to it that the transaction between the
complainants and himself on papers
appear legal and in order. Besides, there
is ample evidence in the records of its
case that respondent is actually engaged
in lending money at least in a limited way
and that the interest at the rate of ten per
cent a month is but common among
money lenders during the time of the
transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge,
complainants alleged that respondent,
who was their counsel (private
prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for
estafa, against accused Reynaldo
Pineda, compromised the case with the
accused without their consent and
received the amount of P500.00 as
advance payment for the amicable
settlement, without however, giving to the
complainants the Id amount nor
informing them of said settlement and
payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation
and claims that the amicable settlement
was with the consent of complainant wife
Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of
the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not
interested in putting the accused
Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in
merely recovering their money of
P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship
between complainants and respondent
was not yet strained, and respondent, as
counsel of the complainants in this case,
knew that complainants were merely
interested in said recovery. Knowing this,
respondent on his own volition talked to
accused and tried to settle the case
amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the
amount of P500.00 as advance payment,
being then the only amount carried by
the accused Pineda. A receipt was
signed by both respondent and accused
Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record).
However, respondent did not inform
complainants about this advance
payment, perhaps because he was still
waiting for the completion of the payment
of P2,000.00 before turning over the
whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused
Pineda give the abovementioned
P500.00 to respondent, but they were
ashamed then to ask directly of
respondent what the money was all
about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after
May 30, 1979, when the complainants
had already lost their trust and respect
and/or confidence in respondent upon
knowing what happened to their lot and,
more so, upon respondent's refusal to
accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by
complainants to redeem the same,
Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused
Pineda on his way home and confronted
him on the P500.00 that had been given
to respondent. Accused then showed
complainant Melendres the receipt
(Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00
was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the
case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was
fooling them, complainants then filed a
motion before the court which was trying
the criminal case and relieved
respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the
case and saw the demeanor of the
witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the
fact that respondent received P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda is duly
established. Both the complainants and
the respondent agreed that the said
amount was given to the respondent in
connection with a criminal case wherein
the complainants were the private
offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is
the accused and that the respondent is
the private prosecutor of the said case.
The pivotal issue in this particular charge
is whether the respondent received the
amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo
Pineda as an advance payment of an
amicable settlement entered into by the
complainants and the accused or the
respondent received said amount from
the accused without the knowledge and
consent of the complainants. If it is true
as alleged by the respondent that he only
received it for and in behalf of the
complainants as advance payment of an
amicable settlement why is it that the
same was questioned by the
complainants? Why is it that it was not
the complainants who signed the receipt
for the said amount? How come that as
soon as complainants knew that the said
amount was given to the respondent, the
former filed a motion in court to relieve
respondent as their counsel on the
ground that they have lost faith and
confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have
consented to this amicable settlement
they should be grateful to the efforts of
their private prosecutor yet the fact is
that they resented the same and went to
the extent of disqualifying the respondent
as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo
Pineda himself executed an affidavit
belying the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as
described and levelled against
respondent Decena are contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals for which he may be suspended.
The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist
of misconduct in either his professional
or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained
acts of respondent imply something
immoral in themselves, regardless of the
fact whether they are punishable by law.
The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral
turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for
District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F
[2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that
complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed
for trusting the respondent too much.
They did not bother to keep a copy of the
documents they executed and
considering that they admitted they did
not understand the contents of the
documents, they did not bother to have
them explained by another lawyer or by
any knowledgeable person in their
locality. Likewise, for a period of three
years, they did not bother to ask for
respondent the status of their lot and/or
their obligation to him. Their
complacency or apathy amounting
almost to negligence contributed to the
expedient loss of their property thru the
legal manuevers employed by
respondent. Hence, respondent's liability
merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Reynerio I.
Decena be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals
Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City
Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual
hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only
five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were
held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those
hearings, the complainants presented a number of
witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-
examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant
Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly
cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in
the investigation of the administrative case and having
been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to
complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a
change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to
requiring the parties to submit their respective position
papers. The complainants immediately filed their position
paper which consisted of their separate sworn
statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a
question and answer form), their documentary exhibits
and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent
also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the
healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the
cross examination of the complainants and their
witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to
submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground
that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December
1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination
as having been waived, had become final and executory.
Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the
complainants' position paper, not having passed through
any cross-examination and argues that the non-
submission of the complainants and their witnesses to
cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due
process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the
complainants and their witnesses against him has been
violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined
complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the
witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the
proceedings shows that respondent had all the
opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to
complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had
forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous
continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part
to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had
in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings
during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8)
under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal
Jamero. There were also instances where respondent
asked for postponement and at the same time reset the
hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither
he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of
respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare
his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses as having been
waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent
can not now claim that he had been deprived below of
the opportunity to confront the complainants and their
witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the
proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of
the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975
real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00
instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and
usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real
estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the
loan extended to complainants had
escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the
import of the real mortgage documents
and inducing them to sign those
documents with assurances that they
were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from
demanding payment from complainants
before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from
informing complainants that the real
estate mortgage had already been
foreclosed and that complainants had a
right to redeem the foreclosed property
within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply
something immoral in themselves regardless of whether
they are punishable by law" and that these acts
constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard
required from members of the Bar is not, of course,
satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with
our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact,
may be penalizable under at least one penal statute —
the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts
done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time
when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal
case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There
are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that
respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda
without the consent and approval of the complainants;
the second is that, having received the amount of
P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he
failed to inform complainants of that advance payment
and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the
complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"
the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent
informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and
of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner
Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these
matters. And respondent never did turn over to
complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to
be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full
amount in cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as
partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his
lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or
disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or
non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct
outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and
so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in
the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike
out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The
nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the
Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although
not related to the discharge of professional duties as a
member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in
serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised
by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his
private transactions with them, and the exacting of
unconscionable rates of interest, considered together
with the acts of professional misconduct committed by
respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction
that he has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is
hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from
the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be
FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on
the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
THIRD DIVISION
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313
Complainant,
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met
Present:
sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a
QUISUMBING, J.,
lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO, biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her
CARPIO MORALES,
former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR. her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. respondent sent a demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino
RONGCAL,
Respondent. Promulgated: wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
September 7, 2006 support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------ the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
------x congenital heart ailment.
DECISION
At around this point, by complainants own admission,
TINGA, J.: she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She
narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent
The allegations raised in this complaint for
started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand
disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her,
such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making
and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial
and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the
an officer of the court and a member of the bar is prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1] acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as
disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) his own marriage had already been annulled.
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic
case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of the On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced
facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented. complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer [3] (Affidavit)
categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the
father in the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth,
not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of
the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her
that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only
way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support.Respondent purportedly assured
complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a
case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a
public document.Because she completely trusted him at this
point, she signed the document without even taking a glance at
it.[5]
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised
complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the
medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them
over to her, respondent handed her his personal check [6] in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance
of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or
May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her
the said amount because he used it for his political campaign
as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board
Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual
relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the
money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise
to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino,
Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino,
complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a
civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by
[7]
virtue of a compromise agreement. It was only when said
cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the
Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect
her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her
disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems
would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his
marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly
deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her
counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire
financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate
for himself money that rightfully belonged
daughter. She argues that respondents aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule
1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.
[8]
Hence, she filed the instant complaint [9] dated 2 February
2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different
version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who
would file the aforementioned action
support. Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda
Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official,
referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her
former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.
[10]
Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an
emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle
things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump
sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who
asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal
thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to
her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days,
she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement
of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the
amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered
to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
to her
postdated checks in equal amounts within four
months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to
rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and
voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the
same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing
her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation
that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
for signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft
before the actual payment was made. He notes that
complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee
who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently
denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When
complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary
handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she
allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the
complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it
was for his attorneys fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits
of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises.According to
him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic)
adults,[11] complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that
he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already
annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to
demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married
when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital
liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his
colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school
classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his
residence where she was actually introduced to his
wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several
times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to
call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994
to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of
Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-
officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it
was impossible for complainant not to have known of his
marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3)
kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him
in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for
support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant
moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor
had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months
passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from
Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to
pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file
the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent
acceded to her pleas, he also advised her to look for the right
man[12] and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in
filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized
the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his
relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her
monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6)
months.Since then, they have ceased to meet and have
communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In
2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until
June when her alleged fianc from the United States would
have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again
asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he
turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly
went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was
in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up
and she wanted him to relay the message to
respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him
a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her
request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the
instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted
their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
[14]
Recommendation dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting
in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above
mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is
wanting in good moral character, putting in
doubt his professional reputation as a
member of the BAR and renders him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges which the law
confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic)
 expected those qualities of truth-speaking,
high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
honesty and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been
compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took
advantage and (sic) every opportunity to
entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,]
respondent kept on calling complainant and
dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as
aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of
(sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls
all because of [l]ewd design. He took
advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x[15]
It was then recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that
he be ordered to return to complainant the amount
of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005,
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client
relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not
client and attempting to mislead the Commission,
[17] deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and
(1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
reprehensible to a high degree[20] in order to merit disciplinary
return P58,000.00 to complainant.
sanction. We disagree.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning [18] (Motion) One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is
dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. [21] As
events that transpired between him and
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd
and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
support and who would stop at nothing to get what she character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on moral standards of the community. [22] The Court has held that
complainants bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. [23] A grossly
opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
between them is telling the truth.
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied reprehensible to a high degree.[24] It is a willful, flagrant, or
the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the
of the good and respectable members of the community.[25]
Supreme Court.
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity.[27] Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by
our laws.[28]
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty
of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct
in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire
financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the
IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find
otherwise.
Complainants allegations that she succumbed to
respondents sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a
case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that
complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with
her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of
sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties,
would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of
a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no
showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on
her part.[29] Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to
complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage
of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a
married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of
immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave
her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not
badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainants allegation that respondent
lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible for
her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself
admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of
respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone
number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as
Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never
refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to
his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence,
that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of
his friends, so as not to have known of his marital
status. Considering that she previously had an affair with
Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural
for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to
change [her] life for the better, [30] as alleged in her
complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of
deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans
any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking
advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to
force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without
letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he
likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainants assertions dubious. She was
clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially
that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We
cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk
the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a
document she knew was related to the support case she
intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences
contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to
read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did
not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even
urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
money for Alexandras medical and educational support if she
will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer. [32] If her own
allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the
on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her
claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the
Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences
that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable
conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and
without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of
preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We
rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client
in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court. [33] Moreover, there is
no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of
complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a
settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel
when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is
bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as
Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case.Again, we only
have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other
hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
evidence.[34] Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for
enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail
attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the
is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed
same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check
[35]
his duty in accordance with his oath. issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for
Complainant further charged respondent of
Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was
daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he
for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she
allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount
did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a
of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in
huge sum of money.
violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this
evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party
matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity
much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants of the assertions through the question and
claim for support. The parties are in agreement that answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence,
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, a more
complainant insists that she should have received more as in-depth investigation is called for to
there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that ascertain in whose favor the
respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially
agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but
only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to
and he assumed it was for his attorneys fees. remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single
evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks
 We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for
respondent to be made liable for the cost of her childs DNA
test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively
earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for
moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is
distinct from a civil or a criminal action. [36] It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to
remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as
such.Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[37] As such, it involves no
private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.
[38]
The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
[39]
justice.
Respondents misconduct is of considerable
gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out
the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross
immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an
innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a
womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated
from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing
disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired. [45] In Zaguirre
v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with
another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous
nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of
mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and
amoral attitude, the Court suspended him
indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but
there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with
her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a
magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the
case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case,
herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such
severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor. [48] Considering further that this is
his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would
suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of
the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation
of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty.
Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on
him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client
is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of
respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
 The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers,
the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to
are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by
all courts in the country. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:

a. They (petitioners, including the

SO ORDERED. Executive Secretary) have made these
false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International. Such
efforts could be accurately called
"scattershot desperation" (Memorandum
for Respondents dated March 27, 1968,
pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of
Republic of the Philippines page 13 and first line page 14).
SUPREME COURT
Manila b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its
face and it lays bare the immoral and
EN BANC arrogant attitude of the petitioners.
(Respondents' Supplemental
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970 Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968,
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the
AL., petitioners, page).
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET c. The herein petitioners ...
AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings opportunistically change their claims and
Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran stories not only from case to case but
Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. from pleading to pleading in the same
Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads. case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh
RESOLUTION and eighth lines from bottom of the
page).
SANCHEZ, J.:
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates,
Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out,
record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito contain the following statements:
R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has
action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, overlooked the applicable law due to the
this Court issued a show-cause order. misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par.
 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic
tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and
all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a
decision that in effect does precisely that
in a most absolute manner. (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 —
after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by
Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys.
Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates,
asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue
or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The
motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable
Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968"
and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the
above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat
the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this
case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of
the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31,
1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been
caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in
favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision."
The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law,
which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the
applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of
due process of law and the right to
adduce evidence as is the procedure in
all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the
unfounded certiorari in the first place
when the appeal from a denial of a
motion to dismiss was and is neither new
nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but
— only served to delay respondent for
the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued
herein did not maintain the status
quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion
cannot be avoided that it was destroyed
for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and
misrepresentations in the said decision
which the Honorable Supreme Court has
refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said
decision were decided otherwise in
previous decisions, and the main issue
"right to reject any or all bids" is being
treated on a double standard basis by
the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that
the Honorable Supreme Court knows
better and has greater understanding
than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred
and fifty to two hundred million dollars by
said decision — without an effort by the
Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the
facts through presentation through the
trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again
for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala
and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that
the statements specified by the Solicitor General were
either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were
comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he
expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his
clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could
not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of
due process of law. However, counsel sought to change
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing
on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty.
Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said
motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems
that many of our judicial authorities
believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that
come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be
constitutionally incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue.
 Witness the recent absurdity of Judge
Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a
motion to hold himself in contempt of
court — seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of
moral principle involved — and also of
Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit
himself in judging a criminal case against
an accused who is also his
correspondent in two other cases. What
is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence?
Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further
subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution
of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion
to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his
exclusive making and that he alone should be held
responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his
explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his
explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted
from his rough draft but that it was still included through
inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel
for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit.
While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it
left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit,
taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of
the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July
31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated
that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two
justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now
being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial
conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29,
1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context and
were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur.
He made the admission, though, that those statements
lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a
finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the
charge against him because it is one of civil contempt
against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by
the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said
charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness",
as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his
assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended
Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by
a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in
this case was neither authorized nor consented to by
him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one
Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain
his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired
from him whether he could appear in this case; that he
advised Meads that this case was outside his
professional competence and referred Meads to another
lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that
in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to
terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had
not participated in any manner in the preparation or
authorship of any pleading or any other document in
connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his
side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any
of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968
order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of
absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his
permission to have his name included as counsel in all
of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even
while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3,
1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14,
1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty.
Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for
the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated
previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it
was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact
he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of
the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
case — which condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of Court — Section 1,
Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who
may take part. — ... . only those
members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part
in its consideration and adjudication ..."
This requirement is especially significant
in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was
the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This
provision also applies to the Honorable
 Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur
International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the
Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it
will inevitably either raise the graft and
corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds
of deprivation of justice and confiscation
of property and /or to the United States
Government, either its executive or
judicial branches or both, on the grounds
of confiscation of respondent's
proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law —
and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July
18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show
cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof
why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return.
He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to
accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he
turned down said request twice on the ground that he
did not know anything about the case, much less the
truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the
allegations in said motion were subsequently explained
to the undersigned counsel together with the
background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon
assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion
he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he
was misled in so signing and the true facts of the
allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral
argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling,
this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing
their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the
same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for
contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ...
to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally
appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969,
at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings
against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign
the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one
day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he
knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another
motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned
Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to
Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with
Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the
motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads'
version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty.
Santiago's office with the fourth motion for
reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make
some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph
when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new
lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked
Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to
Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago
introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing
the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading
the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion,
Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his
name was typed therein. The motion was then filed.
According to Meads, from the time he entered the office
of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period
that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half.
Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads
asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set
forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not
been taken out of context because said quotation is
precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in
court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads
further contends that the announced plan to bring the
case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his
answer also included a notice of appeal to the World
Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral
argument with respect to the second contempt incident.
We shall now discuss the first and second contempt
incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In
his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives".
He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic
tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes
our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and
illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges
that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the case even
before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless
manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision,
and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that
the principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He
puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed
conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender
favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause
or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in
the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not
only were not free from the appearance of impropriety
but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect
their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss
of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof
should not be allowed to happen in our
country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6
which contained language that is as disrespectful. But
we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He
explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough
draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed
in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This
explanation does not make much of a distinguishing
difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature appeared
on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And
this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our
judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the
chosen messengers of God in all matters that come
before them, and that no matter what the circumstances
are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen
could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After
citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to
ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of
our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated
mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent
MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a
lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to
this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10
makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or members of any board-
petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the
President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations
have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For,
inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any
board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including
the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a favor from the
President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up?
Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking
havoc on the tripartite system of government operating
in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But
why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney
to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not
an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to
create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are
thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem
of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444,
as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have
become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his
client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients,
as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to
this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and
their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics."5As rightly observed by Mr.
Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from
the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend
himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can
better or more appropriately support the judiciary and
the incumbent of the judicial position. 6 From this, Mr.
Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a
trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to
maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no
court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on
the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited
are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in
the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines
and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture
in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
of justice8— is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty
of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We
analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor
General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners
of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in
a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot
desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners
as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims
and stories not only from case to case but from pleading
to pleading in the same case. Such language is not
arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before
which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these
statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed
the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in
any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in
the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's
language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member
of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is
10
charged."
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young,
83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused
convicted of murder made use of the following raw
language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his
boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold
fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor
ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden
deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to
the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General
or his assistants may not be considered offended parties
in this case. This Court may motu proprio start
proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt
about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt
under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the
power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every
manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of
his official duties; and that he too has committed, under
Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending
to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore,
guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano
C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have
included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the
latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala
insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of
respondents — that he had not participated in any way
in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did
not even know that his name was included as co-
counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first
contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne
out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings
subject of the contempt citation. He should be held
exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt
incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is,
indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out
of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
"Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument
will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
However, the provision in its entire thought should be
read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take
part. — All matters submitted to the court
for its consideration and adjudication will
be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any
and all of the Justices who are members
of the division of the court at the time
when such matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication, whether
such Justices were or were not present
at the date of submission; however, only
those members present when any matter
is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and
adjudication, if the parties or either of
them, express a desire to that effect in
writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did
not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why
such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left
out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common
practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his
conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states
that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to
misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a
lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There
was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take
the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically,
the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ...
raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to
the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of
this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of
appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in
Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between
the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An
appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this
Court that he should be exempted from the contempt
charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this
Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been
dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his
duty to have taken care that his name should not be
attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His
insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even
read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances.
Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who
convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the
background of the case. Caling says that if not for his
friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the
motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago
began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and
even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We
must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he
spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago
before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable
that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for
respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned
from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the
proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon
16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded
him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain
and to prevent his clients from doing those things which
the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists
in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their
relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never
be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should
not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a
judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve
its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again
that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no
alternative but to decide the main case against
respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July
31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms
and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation
to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by
bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly,
the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been
submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not
require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid
unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions
to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision
herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken
part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result
would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would
just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court,
and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty.
Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and
Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads,
P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action
he may deem proper to take in the premises against
Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he
may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or
suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a
copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein
asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client
by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own
phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused
to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath
that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice
as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the
silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of
Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-
law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of
the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26,
1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed
to him, as follows:
 Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut
justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law
practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive
to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed
of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the
issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty.
Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so
serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The
trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5,
1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on
the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not
notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved
for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August
17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This
second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the
trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's
decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed
the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated
March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed,
and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that
the motion for reconsideration dated July
5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on
appeal) does not contain a notice of time
and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper
(Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging
that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of
the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs.
Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court
on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration,
thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the
motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some
important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution
of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states
that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary
to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
 There is no substantial distinction
between this case and that of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza,
the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was much
earlier than the date of promulgation of
the decision in the Manila Surety Case,
which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed
upon the issue sub silencio presumably
because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962,
one of which is that in the Manila Surety
and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter
in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari.
We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for
extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a
pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with
the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against
this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior
that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September At the start, let me quote passages from
28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we —
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came
from him. So he was reminded to turn over his "Do not judge, that you
certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to may not be judged. For
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To with what judgment you
said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending judge, you shall be
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L- judged, and with what
27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and measure you measure, it
executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 shall be measured to you.
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or But why dost thou see
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, the speck in thy brother's
he "chose to pursue the negative act." eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a own eye? Or how can
member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, thou say to thy brother,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require "Let me cast out the
Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action speck from thy eye"; and
should be taken against him." Denying the charges behold, there is a beam
contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for in thy own eye? Thou
permission "to give reasons and cause why no hypocrite, first cast out
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an the beam from thy own
open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on eye, and then thou wilt
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within see clearly to cast out the
five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such speck from thy brother's
request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed eyes."
waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the "Therefore all that you
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be wish men to do to you,
heard and to answer questions "in person and in an even to do you also to
open and public hearing" so that this Court could them: for this is the Law
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for and the Prophets."
leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court
has no time to hear him in person." To give him the xxx xxx xxx
ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
Your respondent has no intention of
argument.
disavowing the statements mentioned in
his petition. On the contrary, he refirms
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is the truth of what he stated, compatible
unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant any in court. But he vigorously DENY
sarcasm and innuendo. Thus: under oath that the underscored
statements contained in the CHARGE
are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that
they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his
statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but
mainly motivated with the highest interest
of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown
callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on
this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
things, is now in the attempt to inflict truth and his Constitutional right of free
punishment on your respondent for acts speech.
he said in good faith.
xxx xxx xxx
Did His Honors care to listen to our
pleadings and supplications for The INJUSTICES which we have
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and attributed to this Court and the further
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to violations we sought to be prevented is
justify their stubborn denial with any impliedly shared by our President. ... .
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that
your respondent is given the opportunity xxx xxx xxx
to face you, he reiterates the same
statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir.
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very
Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
today, that even our own President, said:
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French
— "the story is current, though
revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
circulated that justice in the Philippines
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
today is not what it is used to be before
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are
the war. There are those who have told
committed in thy name."
me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in
the Philippines." xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications,
words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility.
That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to
tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished,
this Court in the reverse order of natural
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER.
We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not
the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity.
We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until
this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution
has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to
claim his God given right to speak the
We must admit that this Court is not free
from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering
that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated
so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize
in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have
added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense
that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and
for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of our beggings, supplications,
and pleadings to give us reasons why
 our appeal has been DENIED, not one
word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing
more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith
and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-
imposed sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court
but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this
Court, there is no choice, we must
uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff
which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect
to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition
for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of
rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been
asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law,
and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the
abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the
facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls
his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a
terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and
ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do
exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write
a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us
by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme
Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie
denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to
the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has
been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits.
For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases.
The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon,
articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution
violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short
resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within
the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained in view
of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the court's denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has —
as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have
had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this
Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is
axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon
this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision
discretionary.—A review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found,
upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly
considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the
law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines
etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There
was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far
back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party
(which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the
time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not).
This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety
& Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is
prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26),
which provides that such notice shall
state the time, and place of hearing and
shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of
the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb.
28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42
Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa
v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866;
and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the
movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection,
since the Rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to
review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the
remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate,
he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous
and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty.
Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know
that it is natural for a lawyer to express his
dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is
not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then
the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions,"
said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public
property, and the press and the people have the
undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human
reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and
honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of
justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case
as this where those who Sit as members of an entire
Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer
who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that
weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should
and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the
judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom
it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is
that
An attorney does not surrender, in
assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions
of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the
bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts.
(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important
part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution
of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays
bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly
stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be
allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty
to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer
is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar
have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less
likely to abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright
bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law
v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles
of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the
best position to give advice and who might consider it
their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so
far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places
upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys
impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain
at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to
the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
 The counsel in any case may or may not
be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience
and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think
highly of his intellectual endowment That
is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack
of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he
may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June
26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or
in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute
the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct
in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared
that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn
and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic
theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and
criticisms which do not exceed the
bounds of decency and truth or which
are not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial system
as such. However, when the likely
impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a
municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of
being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on
appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of
city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge
Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The
court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much
further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire
on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court
of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who
at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial
office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used
his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that
money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of
authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by
the attorney capable of correct reasoning
of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95
Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we
do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against
a judicial officer, could be
so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an
attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege
of practicing law the strictest observance
at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the
public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and
the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123
N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had
been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a
proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The
letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v.
Petersen is cleared up so that my name
is protected from the libel, lies, and
perjury committed in the cases involved,
I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the
case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not
intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged,"
and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and
not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of
men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just
criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer
to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the
law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-
up in the Sunday papers, was intended
and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused
the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption
and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court.
The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct,
and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.
The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed,
would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was
made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar
the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair
and honest comment and criticism. It is
only when an attorney transcends the
limits of legitimate criticism that he will be
held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand
that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111
Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate
court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of
the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action,
the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct
justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that
he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and
asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse
caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper
motives. Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has the right
and it is his duty, to submit charges to
the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that
tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false
to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon
him; and such charges to the tribunal, if
based upon reasonable inferences, will
be encouraged, and the person making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the
inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when
the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised,
tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in
the administration of justice; and when
such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement:
I accepted the decision in this case,
however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that,
as my clients were foreigners, it might
have been expecting too much to look for
a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not
only transcend the bounds of propriety
and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by
insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who is
under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747,
an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members
to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and
for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent
for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to
members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the
law itself, as well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...
The right of free speech and free
discussion as to judicial determination is
of prime importance under our system
and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying
this right of free speech to any individual.
But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who
are sworn to act honestly and honorably
both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly
serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly
asserting the law. Truth and honesty of
purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by
a polluted water supply than is the health
of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar
of the confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of whose rights
he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct
on the part of the members of the bar the
law itself demands retribution — not the
court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac.
440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
"criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt
deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215,
the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should
be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a
personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the
integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained
this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to
one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got
no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a
proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the
faculty of the University Law School,
aided by the researches of its hundreds
of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a
correct motive for the decision, which
shall not require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is made, it
will gratify every right-minded citizen of
the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the
suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its
opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the
accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other
justices of this court; and the insult was
so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him
and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry
attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever
have any occasion or desire to assert.
No judicial officer, with due regard to his
position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent,
addressed secretly to the judge alone, he
can have no redress in any action triable
by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in
the accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every
way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from
the penalty here sought to be enforced.
To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court.
When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial
officers. "This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but
it includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their
official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards
the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney
upon a judge, induced by his official act,
and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism
of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is, we think
entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in
that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise
rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his rulings
in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant
restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge
to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
regard of the people by tame submission
to the indignity, or else set in his own
person the evil example of punishing the
insult by taking the law in his own
hands? ... No high-minded, manly man
would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this,
addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice,
is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin
(City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared
that the accused attorney had addressed
a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was
stated, in reference to his decision: "It is
not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80." And it
was decided that, while such conduct
was not a contempt under the state, the
matter should be "called to the attention
of the Supreme Court, which has power
to discipline the attorney." "If," says the
court, "counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the
heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long before the
general public may feel that they may
redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will
be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad
repute."
The recent case of Johnson v.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at
bar. The accused, an attorney at law,
wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the accused
had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge]
as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in
support of its application to the facts of
this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges
against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court
affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a
judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that
had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an
attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There,
the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the
judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the
judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair
in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of
this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer
was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such
gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member
of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute
grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary
powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel
such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
punish for contempt which, although resting on different
bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of
such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances
may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where
counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that
It is right and plausible that an attorney,
in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it
is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of
the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its
opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court
is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked
and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the
author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in
i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted
said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of
its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril
to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would
have for its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written
statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent
does not merely criticize or comment on
the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition
of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with
the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change
the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and
thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court
has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing
that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently
to lower ,or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the
courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is
under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the
courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having
"repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard
of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct
was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language
(heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest
attention. It speaks of one pitfall into
 which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law
on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping
charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently
inept that in determining the jurisdiction
of the industrial court, it has committed
error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses
to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the
quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not
entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into
question the capability of the members
— and some former members of this
Court to render justice. The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so
called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in
other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the
aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So
that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had
written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding
has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this
jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the
holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A
complete disengagement from the settled rule was later
to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that
the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after
a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which
tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the
all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them
into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second,
the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be
protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as
much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not
he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial.
By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967,
we have confronted the situation here presented solely
in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary
power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court
is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of
this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to
the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from
the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who
are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record,
and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a
declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject
to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in
this state that power is vested in this
court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to
exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice
of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the
court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public
and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which
made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted
to the bar and exercises his functions as
an attorney, not as a matter of right, but
as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or
suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express
mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of
course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law
stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer,
however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a
vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults
all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this
Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and
its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice"
while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers
of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an
explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and
reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and
its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's
petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve
any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney,
attract public attention to himself and, more important of
all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character
and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of
the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons
of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of
immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should
not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must
be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
function as the court of last resort. And more than this,
valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of
the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court
are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled
up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not —
and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof. But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an
entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly
constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in
the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense,
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only
be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof —
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes
and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened
by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice
of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not
and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that they., acting
as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the
end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of
the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of
the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for
his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court,
these may range from mere suspension to total removal
or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and
the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment
should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and
that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor
leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we
are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because,
even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass
of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders,
the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary
of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals
for their information and guidance.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. —
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE
LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of
complainant or his manner of offering evidence,
the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was
offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no
right to interrupt complainant which such cutting
remark while the latter was addressing the court.
In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the
use of intemperate language, respondent failed
to measure up to the norm of conduct required of
a member of the legal profession, which all the
more deserves reproach because this is not the
first time that respondent has employed offensive
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He
has previously been admonished to refrain from
engaging in offensive personalities and warned to
be more circumspect in the preparation of his
pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for
his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the
suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for the use of insulting language in the
course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have
deemed the case submitted for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants
(and at the same time, one of the defendants) in
Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the
hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence,
he heard respondent say "bobo." When
complainant turned toward respondent, he saw
the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the
presence of many people, complainant was
unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The
court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied
having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo",
referring to "the manner complainant was trying
to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive
matters into the record" while in the process of
making an offer of evidence. The statement of
Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was
included in the present complaint for ejectment
was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of
this representation called up this representation
at his house and crying over the phone, claiming
that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good
husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted
Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for
a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this
representation and if yes, right then and there l
would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon
17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or
his manner of offering evidence, the remark
"bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the
latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow
lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
intemperate language, respondent failed to
measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the
more deserves reproach because this is not the
first time that respondent has employed offensive
language in the course of judicial proceedings. He
has previously been admonished to refrain from
engaging in offensive personalities and warned to
be more circumspect in the preparation of his
pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of
Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at

bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by
complainant’s own manifest hostility and
provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore
not entirely free from blame when respondent
unleashed his irritation through the use of
improper words.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded

for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE
M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation and University of the
Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO,
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with
this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a
member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954,
entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114,
PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief
counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino
Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been
innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one
year and eight months after the decision in this case
became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty.
Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this
case from the archives. We thus considered it needful
that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if
not altogether bizzare behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to
dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for entering an appearance at such a late date. He
forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under
which he had agreed to have his services retained by
the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of
October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his
own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other
respondents, went to him to engage his professional
services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-
24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their
conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed
Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two
cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for
hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the
present case was still pending and the date of hearing
thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino
Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied
upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty.
Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases
were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano
prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by
virtue of which he agreed to render professional services
in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of
143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or
less) involved in the two cases. It was on the same date,
October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of
his written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the
contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no
justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his
professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for
in this latter case, the records of which we are in a
position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19
hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed
by the respondents having been litigated in the present
case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which
has long been sealed and terminated by a final
judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in
itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which
pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from
normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the
faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts
of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the
litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that
something more can be done toward overturning a final
judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly
remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious
finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the
reasonable care which every member of the Bar must
needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case
already litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar,
a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the
counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be
had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to
such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2 Atty.
Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as
"chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect
sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio
Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at
the hearing of the present incident he averred that he
exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no
avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did
so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court
did he make mention of such efforts on his part. His
subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere
after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one
Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in
the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court.
Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even
prior to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of
the present case since the scope of our decision in the
latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case.
Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the two
cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity
Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate
with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3 He record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar
did not bother either to comprehend the substance of Division of this Court.
the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case,
something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade.
Had he been less precipitate in his actions, he would
have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in
the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed
by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his
clients complained to him about having been left out in
the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of
itself should have indicated to him the imperative need
for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty.
Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty.
Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court
— which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of
this incident, categorically denied having given. What
Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the
reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal
profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records
section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office
(May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were
situated in the province and he did not have the time to
come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could
have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by
registered mail or by telegram.

We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross

negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer
and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable
negligence would merit no less than his suspension from
the practice of the law profession, were it not for his
candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the
sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is
hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further
likewise warned that any future similar act will be met
with heavier disciplinary sanction.

Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to

forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered
as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino
Tiburcio, et al.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY
and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE,defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for
contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the
defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the Philippine
Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish
subject and as such was not qualified for
admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep.,
88), and an order was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with
the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry
on business together, sending out a circular
signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had
established an office for the general practice of
law in all the courts of the Islands and that
Bosque would devote himself especially to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney &
Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español -
C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not
personally appeared in the courts, and with one
exception, occuring through an inadvertance,
papers from the office were signed not with the
firm name alone nor with any designation of the
firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney &
Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the
other on September 15, 1906, this court refused
to consider petitions so singed with the names of
the defendants and the practice being repeated,
on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the
papers sent to the Attorney-General to take
appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding. The defendants
disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend
their acts as being within the law. Section 102 of
the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every
pleading must be subscribed by the party or his
attorney, does not permit, and by implication
prohibits, a subscription of the names of any
other persons, whether agents or otherwise;
therefore a signature containing the name of one
neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by
the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the
individual name of a licensed attorney. The
illegality in this instance was aggravated by the
fact that one of the agents so named was a
person residing in these Islands to whom this
court had expressly denied admission to the bar.
The papers in question were irregular and were
properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a
practice any signature of names appended to
pleadings or other papers in an action other than
those specified in the statute. A signature by
agents amounts to a signing by non-qualified
attorneys, the office of attorney being originally
one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We
do not, however, mean to discountenance the
use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all
of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering
an application for the suspension or removal of
the defendant Ney from his office as attorney.
The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the
court, could not be proceeded against in that
way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-
General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus
punished for contempt? Section 232 of the Code
of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of
the courts is restricted to punishment for acts so
defined. ( Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.) As
to the first subdivision of this section, no direct
order or command of this court has been
disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The
only order that the defendant Bosque can have
disobeyed is the one denying him the right to
practice law. This order, however, was directly
binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings
taken for its review, and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the
statute to practice law without any license from
the court and without an application to it, yet its responsible. It is impossible to say that the
order made on his own petition. A mandate of signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet
the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it.
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and
his associate, had his authorization and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not
constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in commended him to our indulgence, while the
practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting offensive character of certain papers recently
forth the establishment of an office for the filed by him forbids us from presuming on the
general practice of law in all the courts of the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the
Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right customary standard of members of the bar.
and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
addition that he would devote himself to The judgment of the court is that each of the
consultation and office work relating to Spanish defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to
law. Spanish law plays an important part in the be paid into the office of the clerk of this court
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So
standing on a different footing from the law of ordered.
other foreign countries, in regard to which a
skilled person might as a calling, advise without
practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that
he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a
disclaimer of his professional character in the
Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law. One of the most
eminent American advocates was an alien
barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in
the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas
Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.)
Consequently the conduct of the defendant
Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order
made in a proceeding to which he was a party.

Under the second subdivision of the section cited,

Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as
he was not an officer of the court. On the other
hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney,
as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion
that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding
himself out as a general practitioner Ney
participated, and for the improper signature of
the pleadings he was chiefly and personally
 practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia,
Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31
August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced
upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the
case filed against them before the Office of the
SECOND DIVISION
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
RUSTIA, Complainants, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to
vs. attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature
JARDER, Respondents. appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for
DECISION comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a
CARPIO, J.: counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
The Case
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint
Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the
Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be
violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and as complainants.
Harassment.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated
The Facts 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of
his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard
an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter- Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office
of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original
Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of
the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E)
for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-
filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for
violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia
and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-
0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law
partner. The complainants alleged that they were
subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of
Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the
only one that was forged. Complainants attached a
Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other
letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other
clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report
concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of
Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only
were respondents engaging in unprofessional and
unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to
the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information.
They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment
complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases
were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases,
he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to
some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by
the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate
against them since the cases filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence.
Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was
employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2
March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the
Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory
conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference
was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to
appear. The conference was reset to 25 September
2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to
appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents
submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to
have waived their right to participate in the mandatory
conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006,
the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18
October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23
October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise
certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint
filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and
Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by
the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his
signatures appearing in the various documents released
from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of
malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation
under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a
non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was
busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court
has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices
sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on
Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner
of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law
Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over
matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior
partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned
practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to
the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T.
Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is
going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his
firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he
done that, he could have known the unethical practice of
his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent
Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule
9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T.
Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is
hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter,
Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for
Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants
dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the
IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and
Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP
Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we
agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent
Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a
former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office.
Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza
v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used
in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice
of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the
law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we
held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which
is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate
the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not
delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of
Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that
(1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus,
alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December
2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a
victim of circumstances or of manipulated events
because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his
former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo
did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for
the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer
(with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo,
however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the
Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment
case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint
Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification
without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that
because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by
his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a
ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty.
Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in
allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for
him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board
that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from
the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also
find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty.
Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent

Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District
Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District
in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract
was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.);
and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination
of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and
notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in
Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which
made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my
rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of
our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I
hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my
interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales
agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-
President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps.
Instead at the right hand corner above the description of
the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had
been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also
wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was
payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00
a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I
hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without my authority and against my will.
Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view
of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated
by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the
real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the
NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his
salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting
the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped
into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC
wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996,"
and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-
back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of **
(his) payments."c
 On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage
**;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on
the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in
which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to
the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and
Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him
for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-
officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also
"a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this
time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,
[5]
Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He
stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia
Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying
his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from
his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date
of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had
been deducted from his salary. [7] He declared that there
was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person,
an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had
given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed
with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that
what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into
reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He
was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed
document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the property -- subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa
& Co. -- is situated; [12]He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to
return it the next day, she did not do so until after several
months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature
on such pertinent documents as those regarding the
down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of
the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.
[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done
without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant
Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent
and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)
letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April
19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he
signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of
June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
 The first accusation against Alauya is that in his
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in
"undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent"
who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these
statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months,
a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.
[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting
a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect
the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized
that "the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with
good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right
cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard
of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney,"
this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice
law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those
who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators.
The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized
use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN
B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-
Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio
(Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era
(Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty.
Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged
against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar
Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G.
Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation and/or
Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon
Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law
Office through Atty. Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and
the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and,
consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their
separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month
pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation
were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of
EN BANC ₱674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages,
and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay. 3 Bonifacio and
October 3, 2017 the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme
Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals
A.C. No. 11754 and motions were decided against them.4
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution5 was
vs. issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A
Notice of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was
likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and
April 16, 20138were later on issued, directing the sheriff
to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the
judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against
Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty.
Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664. 9 In a July
16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the
charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES
Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for two years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal
record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic]
his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower
courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction
over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in
the business establishment was conducted to implement
the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He
attended the public auction and tendered a bid for his
clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the
same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty.
Era presented to the corporation's officers and
employees who were there at that time. Armed with such
documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject
properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with
Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment
award instead of pulling out the auctioned properties.
Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with
the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients,
their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment
award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3,
2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's
business establishment together with their clients and
several men, and forced open the establishment to pull
out the auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the
videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant
administrative complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for
malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its
Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and
Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in
pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court
sometime in February and April, 2014 with regard to the
subject labor case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant
administrative complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that
Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what
transpired on November 28, 2013 and December 3,
2013 as the latter was not present therein at that
time.18 Hence, his allegations of force, threat, and
intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without
basis.19 In his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he
did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the
practice of law as he merely acted as his clients'
attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of
Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's
theory that with such SP A, he was not engaged in the
practice of law in representing his clients in the
implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never
signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients
during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an
associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was
merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law
firm's clients. Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million
counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas
explained that the parties were still on negotiation,
hence, both parties are free to have their own
computations, which they could respectively accept or
otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17,
2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong
with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a
pleading considering that the same was not signed by
the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was
prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no
impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings.
There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas
was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading.
Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public
auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof
that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law during
his suspension. According to the Investigating
Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be
present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any
rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by
using force, threat, and intimidation, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such
imputations by filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a
Motion to Close and Terminate Case 23 dated December
18, 2013, acknowledging the full satisfaction of the
judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and
Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a
Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein
complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles
listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion
with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and
Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case
and release of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4)
A Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift
Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the
criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and
Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the
Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in
acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the
labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he
filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the
implementation of the said judgment, complainant
contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the
satisfaction of the judgment was improperly and
unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and
Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution
No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and
set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and
conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-
4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
and considering Atty. Era's continuedengagement in the
practice of law during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for the
payment of money judgment including pegging of
interest he acted as his clients advocate instead as an
agent in view of the presence also of his client in the
negotiation, for holding office and admittedly summoned
the complainant's children to determine the money
judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the
unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era,
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution 31 dated October 17, 2016, the
IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that
he merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him
untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A
gave Atty. Era the authority to appear and represent the
Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did
not include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while
he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of his
clients, the SP A specifically stated that said payments
should be made in the form of checks and not machinery
or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority under the
SP A to represent his clients during the November 28,
2013 auction and to pull out and receive the
corporation's machines as payment of the judgment
award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's
clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the
judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated
Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable
for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that
Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during
the satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only
by a member of the bar in good standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the
records of the instant case were transmitted to this
Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was
filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final
action on the instant administrative case, the issues
being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law
during his suspension therefrom that would warrant
another disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the
affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would
likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining
authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the
Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark
case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et.
al. 36 is on point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant
portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act
or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State
ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am.
Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F.
Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the term practice
of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of services.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the
following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning
clients in the public auction of the condemned
properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients;
(3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said
document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his
clients are now the new owners of the subject
properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the
premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and
(6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office
as regards the payment of the judgment award with
interest instead of pulling out the properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and
negotiating matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating
Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the
Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved
the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal
effects and consequences of each course of action in
the satisfaction of the judgment award. 41 Precisely, this is
why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the
public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the
corporation arising from the labor case as stated in the
SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.42 Such trained legal
mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking
redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that
they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement
without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter
being their lawyer.43 It could readily be seen that the said
SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their
legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the Board's
submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to
support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the
practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as
such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension
ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot
countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of
law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's
Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-
cited acts on the same year, specifically November to
December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in
an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the
lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, 44 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional
maneuver to circumvent the suspension order not only
reflects his insubordination to authority but also his
disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants
reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are
called upon to obey court orders and
processes.45 Graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined
erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite
being suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v.
Atty. Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty.
Magat from the practice of law for practicing his
profession despite this Court's previous order of
suspension. Likewise in another case, We suspended a
lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear
language of this Court's suspension order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of
Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully
disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the
exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the
Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension
from the practice of law, taking into account that this is
his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his
unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of
Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet,
she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's
unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the
CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very
least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law.
Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, SO ORDERED.
which requires that law practice be limited only to
individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.49

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought

to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good
standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence,
she should have not participated to such transgression.

Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used

to circumvent the suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty.
Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his
and/or the law firm's clients during the latter's
suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all acts
pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's

recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the
violation of the CPR.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O.

Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's
lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty.
Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of
violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately
from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and
Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense, or a commission of another offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal

records of respondents as members of the Bar, and
copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
 JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G.
CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction,
petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent
Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for
Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to
issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which
was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident
resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent
Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a
complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against
petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo
W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado &
Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the
pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice,
petitioner was treated as in default and private
respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial
Republic of the Philippines court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion
SUPREME COURT for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking
Manila the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting
SECOND DIVISION aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration
was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977 the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court
and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying
defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court
by declaring him in default, it being
contrary to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff,
more particularly award of moral
damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and
justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin
Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The
decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a
different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However
the same was denied and the decision became final on
June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower
Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private
respondent with the lower Court which was granted by
respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L.
Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who
prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member
of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights
had not been adequately protected and his properties
are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon
without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge
denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear
case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for
defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the
grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in
the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... " 6

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G.

Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by
respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of
petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7

Hence the instant Petition.

Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for

Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and
this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged
fact that the person who represented petitioner at the
initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer
and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a
member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of
petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the
subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the
rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly
represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking
a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights
had been amply protected in the proceedings before the
trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently
assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at
fault as the order of treatment as in default was
predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to
attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without
justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
countenance further delay in a proceeding which has
already taken well over six years to resolve,

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari

with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law
firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209
Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby
ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this
Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign
the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan,
when he is not a member of the Bar.
 FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S.
ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed
this special civil action for certiorari to annul the
decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon
their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of
promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment,
and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to
the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not
impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find
therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of
which are important to small wage earners such as
taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich
or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of
national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
Republic of the Philippines underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that
SUPREME COURT beset their individual lives.
Manila
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
SECOND DIVISION
Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on
a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994 P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further
make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in
their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an
extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report
for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned
that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company.
With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his
armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter
stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by
petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and
conditions as when he was first employed, but his
working schedule was made on an "alternative basis,"
that is, he drove only every other day. However, on
several occasions, he failed to report for work during his
schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his
"boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he
abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for
him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards
it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak
Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for
the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years,
but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo
was left of his deposits as these were not even enough
to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he
was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair
of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the
refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from
employment was effected when he refused to pay for the
washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a
complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the
National Labor Relations Commission charging
petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding
that it took private respondents two years to file the
same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent
with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be
unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be
interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the
observation that private respondents failed to controvert
the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to
December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his
taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily
left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi
operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor
arbiter that private respondents' services were not
illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of
the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said
public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however,
such conclusions are not supported by the evidence,
they must be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of
discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits
made by respondents to defray any shortage in their
"boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in
Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
employees to make deposits, and that there is no
showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the 1990 605.00 570.00
same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently,
the deposits made were illegal and the respondents 1991 165.00 2,300.00
must be refunded therefor.
———— ———— ————
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. —
No employer shall require his worker to
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991,
make deposits from which deductions
Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
shall be made for the reimbursement of
through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is
loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00.
equipment supplied by the employer,
With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was
except when the employer is engaged in
mentioned questioning the same even in the present
such trades, occupations or business
petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation
where the practice of making deposits is
of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows
a recognized one, or is necessary or
that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be
desirable as determined by the Secretary
reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash
of Labor in appropriate rules and
deposits. 5
regulations.
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article
arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of
provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools,
illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of
materials or equipments supplied by the employer.
practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is
Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in
driven to the same clean condition when he took it out,
the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private
and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the
respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged
present case), complainant(s) (private respondents
purpose for which petitioners required such
herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case,
washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the
any balance due to private respondents after proper
person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal
accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount
paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It
will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00 respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if
they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty
is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated
by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for
private respondents' authorized representative, Article
222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers
may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only
(1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent
their organization or the members thereof. While it may
be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-
lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing
categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition
for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a
lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of
car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing
said public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for
private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus
legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this
resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN,
SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE
CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila,
Branch XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted
this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief from
judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the
Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to
cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case
No. 107203-CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed
Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent
Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as plaintiffs, against
herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on
01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the defendants
and all persons claiming right under them
to vacate the premises and to remove
their house/apartment and surrender
possession of the subject land to the
plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P100.00 a month from January 1987 as
the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises until the
land is actually vacated, and the costs of
suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment
became final and executory. On 22 August 1985,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking
the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment
case and to set aside an order of its execution. The
petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal
was taken therefrom.
On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of
Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed by
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the
judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time,
petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by
the MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ,
however, was held in abeyance when petitioners
deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of
P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid
every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March
1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of
dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this
Court was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and
an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for
execution. When petitioners refused to remove their
house on the premises in question, upon motion of
private respondent, an order of demolition was issued.
Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the
completion of the demolition, a restraining order was
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary
injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners. On
23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints
and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC
decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary
injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case
No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order. 2
Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of
execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion of
petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order
was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23
August 1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the
petition with costs against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of
Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its
decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203,
when the property in question was proclaimed an area
for priority development by the National Housing
Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of
Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our
resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446,
entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately
related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common to
both cases submitted for resolution of
this court is the implication of
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise
known as the "Urban Land Reform Law,"
and its amendments or ramifications
embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as
amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and
Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the
above statutes are being implemented by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council,
Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to
which hangs the resolution of this case.
On May 20, 1992, this Court required the
National Housing Authority to submit a
Comment on the status of the program of
acquisition by the Government of the
land area which includes the disputed
property, as part of the Areas for Priority
Development (APD), under the
aforementioned decrees and
proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this
Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of
the Metro Manila Project Department of
the National Housing Authority, submitted
the following report on the status of Lot
6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890
Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known
as the Carlos Estate, an APD site.
Pertinent portions of the report read:
Please be informed that
Lot 6-A, Block 1012
located at No. 1890
Obesis St., Pandacan,
Manila which is the
subject matter of the case
and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as
APD site pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation
No. 1967, is not for
acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is
located outside of the
NHA projects under the
Zonal Improvement
Project (ZIP) and
Community Mortgage
Program (CMP). The site,
however, is under the
administration of the
Presidential Commission
on Urban Poor (PCUP)
for acquisition and
upgrading. (Emphasis
Supplied.)
The above information answers the
uncertainty concerning the status of the
alleged negotiation for the acquisition by
the government of certain areas in Metro
Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT
acquiring the said lot for its program.
It appearing that the purpose of this
Petition for Review is to set aside the
decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the lower courts, in order to avoid
eviction from the disputed premises and
to be allowed to acquire the same
allegedly under the Community Mortgage
Program of the National Housing
Authority, we find the petition without
merit and deny the same. Consequently,
the petition is DISMISSED. 5
What immediately catches one's attention to this case is
the evident predilection of petitioners, through different
counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which
not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of
merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the
deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the
inevitable execution of a decision that has long become
final and executory.
Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of
counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision before
different branches of the court, trifling with judicial
processes. Never, again, should this practice be
countenanced. 6
The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in
solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit
of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, SO ORDERED.
but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep
inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of
that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will

maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support and defend its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood
nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will
not delay any man's cause for money or
malice and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients and I impose upon myself this
obligation voluntary, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis

supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that

any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court,
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and
degrade the administration of justice is contumacious
calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and
warranting application of the contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners'

counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and
WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in
the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costs
against petitioners.

This resolution is immediately executory.


EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the
disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of
Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus
Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-
Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that
they are estranged and living separately from each
other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H.
Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido,
Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of
her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to
the complaint for annulment of marriage which is
pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C.
Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001,
respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay
City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of
their two minor children be surrendered to him. He
showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child
custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter
informed her that he had not received any motion for
temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy
of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then
examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore
two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody
of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while
complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning
Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by
armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she
surrender to him the custody of their children. He
threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of
his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the
assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police
station where the matter could be clarified and settled
peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to
be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he,
assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order. [3] In
order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow
the children to sleep with respondent for one night on
condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay
City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of
Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI
Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002,
complainant received information that a van arrived at
the hotel where respondent and the children were
staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another
room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a
verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on
the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In
the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of
the Resolution and obtained a certification dated
January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that
no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender
custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
 At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on
January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint
alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of
Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the
privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the
matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
years with a warning that another offense of this nature
will result in his disbarment. [6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased
to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the
respondent can be held administratively liable for his
reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims
that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of
Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be
authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he
used and presented the spurious resolution several
times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner,
the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on
at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc.
Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought
the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the
spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have
participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.
The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.
The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a
clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the
truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood;
nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument
of an opposing counsel, or the text of
a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful
as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession. [9] The lawyers arguments
whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to
another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of
truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator,
hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of
a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree
with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be suspended from the practice
of law. However, we find that the period of six years is
too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser
period of two years, which we deem commensurate to
the offense committed, is hereby imposed on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar
and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993
EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Respondent.
Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The complainant herein is the lawyer for the
defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action
for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990
with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding
Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint
filed through the Office of the Court
Administrator on 18 March 1993, the complainant
charges the respondent with gross ignorance of
the law and gross incompetence. The
complainant supports his charge with the
allegation that after the answer in the said case
was filed and "without notice and hearing," the
latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed
that judgment be rendered in accordance with
plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-
entitled case. SO ORDERED.
He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19
January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 2 - a
petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in
Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that
the said decision is void upon its face because it:
. . . would be impossible to be implemented for
the simple or obvious reason that the same
cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead of
deciding or ordering something to be done, it
merely prays that judgment be rendered.
but despite this, the respondent still "changed
and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June
1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior
Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision in
Civil Case No. 90-1706 3 promulgated on 25
January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff by:
1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any
rights under them to vacate the premises
occupied by them, more particularly the portion
on which are erected their respective dwelling
structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan,
Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff aforementioned) and to
remove said dwelling structure/units from said
subject premises of plaintiff;
2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the
sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month
by way of monthly rental commencing from May
16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have
vacated the premises of the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees
(retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for
every hearing/trial attended by said attorney
before this Honorable Court; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
According to the complainant, the dispositive
portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the
respondent's gross ignorance in "decision
preparation," and that respondent's "haste to
amend the same to favor plaintiff was both
appalling (sic) and downright improper." The
complainant then prays that the respondent "be
removed from office if only to save the integrity
of the judiciary."
In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, 4 the
respondent denies the imputations and
alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was
not the original counsel for the defendants but
one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the
latter until the time that the parties were directed
to file their respective position papers,
specifically until 29 November 1991 when Atty.
Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance
and the complainant filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2)
the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only
after a preliminary conference was held where
the parties with their respective counsels
discussed the possibility of an amicable
settlement and after the defendants failed to
comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the
parties to submit in writing their "respective
position statements setting forth the law and the
facts relied upon by them and to submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences
in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from
receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on
5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that
judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the
defendants did not appeal from the 28 June 1991
Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for
execution on 2 September 1991, which the
defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a
motion for reconsideration and to declare the
decision null and void on the ground that the
plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there
was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December
1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was
granted and a writ of execution was issued, a
copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January
1991, 5 he received an order from Branch 18 of
the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from
implementing the writ of execution; (6) the
presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge
Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19
January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil
Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he
(respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil
Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993 that
contained "completely the missing sentences
needed in the dispositive portion" of its earlier
decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the
defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to
set aside the decision, which the court set for its
consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its
opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a
motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March
1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit
the respondent by the former did not appear on
the date it was set for consideration. He finally
contends that the issue regarding the dispositive
portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was
rendered moot and academic by the corrections
made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that
the charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous
and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping
conclusions show his disrespectful attitude.
In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July
1993, 6 the complainant reiterates his charge that
the respondent is incompetent because he lacks
the "ability to prepare a sensible and credible
decision," and maintains that the respondent's
attempt to convince this Court that the
dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision
is permissible and proper shows "gross
ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes
that "he could correct the decision after its
finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had
declared it to be null and void upon its face
clearly manifests his "patent ignorance of our
laws and jurisprudence."
In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993, 7 the
respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991
Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason
that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission
(sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not
prohibited from having the defect "timely
corrected and clarified," which was what he had
in fact done, and that the "clarified decision" did
not prejudice "the substantial rights of the
parties" since they "were given their day in court
and passed through the usual course of the
proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of
competence.
Wanting to have the last word, the complainant
filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and Manifestation
on 28 July 1993. 8 Not to be outdone, the
respondent filed a Manifestation to Reply on 9
August 1993. 9chanrobles virtual law library
The Court referred this to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted its Memorandum
containing its evaluation, report and
recommendation. After summarizing the
antecedent facts, the said office submitted that
the instant complaint is meritorious, and made
the following findings:
It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for
respondent to have overlooked the missing
dispositive portion of his original decision which is
considered the executory portion thereof. The
only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent
never read said decision before he signed the
same. If only he devoted even only a little time
to read the same, such a missing portion
considered to be the most important part of a
decision could not have escaped his attention.
The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It
did not have the effect of finally disposing the
case. Presumably, this must have been simply
copied from plaintiff's complaint.
True, it was legally permissible for respondent to
amend his original defective decision since the
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorarialthough
Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was
rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered
a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2
years to discover and correct his error; the error
could have easily been discovered at the time the
Motion for Execution was filed on September 2,
1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on
December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction
would not mitigate his liability. There is no
denying that the quality of a decision rendered by
the judge such as herein respondent, is a
reflection on the integrity of the court in
dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent
was at the very least careless in failing to read
carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both
the original and amended decisions still contained
errors in grammar and syntax indicating that
there was no adequate editing of the decision
that was signed by him. If he had been more
careful, he would have avoided such fractured
phrases as:
1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion,
countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28,
1991);
2. For a more vivid explanation showing
the incidental facts (Ibid);
3. And defendants seems that they are not
really sincere (Ibid);
4. But nothing has been done by the latter to
renew such contract of lease of which right
becomes one of a detainer plain and
simple (page 6, Ibid);
5. That being the case to allow them will mean
ownership over the property (Ibid).
It is possible that this is not the usual language
of the Judge, for their fractured constructions
have no place in a court decision. Careful editing
and rewriting should have been done.
and recommends that:
. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon
respondent with a warning that any repetition of
the same or similar infraction shall be meted with
a more severe penalty of dismissal from the
service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater
care in the writing of his decisions.
We find the above observations of the Office of
the Court Administrator to be sufficiently
supported by the pleadings submitted by the
parties in this case.
After a careful examination of the respondent's
"Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body
to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic
errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of,
resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be
called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is
obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the
plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-
parte manifestation and motion praying that
judgment be rendered filed after the defendants
failed to file their position paper, although not
from the complaint as suspected by the Court
Administrator. How it gained entry into what
should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any
attempt to unravel the mystery may only
complicate the matter against the respondent
who is only charged herein with gross ignorance
or incompetence.
There can, however, be no dispute behind the
errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally
infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency,
neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the
respondent betraying the absence of due care,
diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness -
qualities which Judges must, among others,
possess. Respondent could have easily avoided
the errors and defects had he taken a little more
time and effort to at least read its original copy
before he finally affixed his signature thereon.
While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be
an expert on the English language or an authority
in grammar, he must, however, do everything he
can, through constant study, extraordinary
diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce
a decision which fosters respect for and
encourages obedience to it and enhances the
prestige of the court.
As we see it then, the respondent failed to
comply with two standard of conduct prescribed
by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that
"[h]e should exhibit an industry and application
commensurate with the duties imposed upon
him" 10 and that he should be conscientious,
studious and thorough. 11chanrobles virtual law
library
Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a
manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted
the motion for its execution and issued the
corresponding writ with full knowledge that there
was nothing to execute. He could not have
feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is
embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless
ordered its execution, exhibiting once more his
inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his
incompetence.
We must add, however, that it is not the
respondent alone who must be blamed for such
unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the parties
in the case knew or ought to have known the
fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the
obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet,
the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for
execution, while the counsel for the defendants -
the complainant herein - merely filed a motion
for reconsideration based solely on the ground
that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and
that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously,
the complainant initially believed in
the completeness of the decision. As a matter of
fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993
Decision, he alleged that what was amended was
a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent
with his claim that the latter was void as declared
by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court
who owe to it candor, fairness and good
faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the
court's attention to the glaring defect of the
"dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991
Decision.
We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is
guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of
duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however,
be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence
or for incompetence when he handed down
a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June
1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all
legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and
could not attain finality, hence the respondent
had the power to amend it to make it
conformable to law and
justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the
complainant suggested, that the order of the RTC
of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating
that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is
"void upon its face" forever bars the respondent
from rendering a new or amended decision in the
ejectment case.
We take this opportunity to stress once again
that the administration of justice is a sacred task
and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere
to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle
solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a
public office is a public trust and all public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
and act with patriotism and justice and lead
modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget
that he is the visible representation of the law
and, more importantly, of justice. 15 Therefore,
he must constantly be the embodiment of
competence, diligence, conscientiousness,
thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to
preserve, promote and enhance the people's
confidence in the Judiciary.
A few words must also be made of record
regarding the complainant. We note that in his
complaint in this case he alleged under oath that
after the defendants filed their answer, the
respondent "without any hearing, or at least this
counsel was never notified of any such hearing,"
rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of
course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the
complainant conveniently left out in his complaint
was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he
did not refute, after the defendants' answer with
counterclaim was admitted by the court, the case
was set for preliminary conference and thereafter
the parties were required to submit their position
papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence. We find that the case was
properly placed and considered under the Rule on
Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court
could decide the case on the basis of the
submitted position papers, affidavits and other
pieces of evidence. Complainant further
suppressed the fact that he entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants only
after the court had conducted the preliminary
conference and issued the order for the
submission of the foregoing pleadings and
documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to
any notice before then.
The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may
have been intended by the complainant to give
his complaint a strong prima facie case against
the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt
certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that
he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness
and good faith. This Court can neither condone
nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through
suppression of important facts which would have
a bearing on its initial action. Complainant
should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully
adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty
amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge
ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay
a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is
further warned that a repetition of the same or
similar infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.
 Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
careful in the drafting of pleadings, always
keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.\
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994
ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A.
UMALI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus
Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge
Domingo Panis issued the following order:
The Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation with the end in
view of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to have
been falsified and to institute such
criminal action as the evidence will
warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein
complainant, charged respondents as follows:
That sometime in May 1984 in the City of
Manila, at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the
above-named Respondents, as
Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in
Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled
PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs.
ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and
there, knowingly, willfully
introduced/presented in evidence before
the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a
falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons
during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil
Case thereby impending and/or
obstructing the speedy administration
and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2,
Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied having
any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the
resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the
case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation to the effect that the signature above the
typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the
complaint in said civil case is not his signature,
complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of
the case with respect to Atty. Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted
the following report and recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in the
records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do with the
falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the
Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-
24144.
The oral and documentary evidence of
the complainant strongly tend to show
the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of
the Summon in the said civil case was
falsified as it was not signed by Deputy
Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" — Sworn
Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated
February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is
the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The
summons was received from the clerk of
the Court of the Manila
 RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a
messenger in the law office of Attys.
Umali and Oliva and said messenger
brought the summons to the law office of
the respondents (Exh. "H" — consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo
Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" — Sworn
Statement dated February 28, 1985 of
Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2,
RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the
falsified Sheriff's Return on the
Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the
defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil
case, filed a typewritten Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R"
— Motion to Declare Defendant In
Default in said civil case signed and filed
by Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his
capacity as Operations Manager of
Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a
final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the
defendant in said Civil case, for payment
of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" —
Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of
Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5)
The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh.
"T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified
Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh.
"S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In
Default dated October 30, 1984 signed
and filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were
typed on one and the same typewriter, as
shown in the Questioned Document
Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985
(Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-
1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the
report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds
that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of
misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty.
its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT.
evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal His license to practice law in the Philippines is
respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike
out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant Umali.
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party. SO ORDERED.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially
towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the
expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at
all times that their first duty is not to their clients but
rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and
sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the
exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10
[1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has
manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that
he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
 61 Phil. 820
IMPERIAL, J.:
It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eusta
quio V. Arayata (1) that on August 27, 1931, while prac
ticing his profession, he prepared and drew up in his
favor a deed of sale of the land described in transfer
certificate of title No. 7591, for the sum of P4,000,
stating therein that the person who executed the
document and sold the land to him was his father,
Arcadio Arayata, when he knew positive ly that this
alleged vendor had already died on November 5, 1916;
that knowing the document to be fictitious, he appear ed
before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and made the
latter legalize said document and state that Arcadio Ara
yata personally appeared before him, although said fact
was not true; and he later succeeded in having the
register of deeds cancel the transfer certificate of title
issued to Ar cadio Arayata and issue transfer certificate
of title No. 8370 in his favor; and (2) that on June 5,
1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed
an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega, stating
therein under oath that he was single when in fact he
was married, said marriage not having been dissolved.
The charge filed against attorney and notary public Te
reso Ma. Montoya consists in having ratified the deed of
sale and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally
ap peared before him and confirmed the sale, knowing
fully well that said person is already dead and therefore
could do neither the one nor the other.
The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, who
recommended "that a disciplinary action be taken
against Arayata and that Montoya be exonerated, it
having been clearly established that the latter, in
ratifying the document, acted in good faith and relied on
Arayata's assurance that the old man then with him was
really the vendor Arcadio Arayata who ratified all the
contents of the instrument. We concur in the
appreciation of the facts and we are of the opinion that
JUSTA MONTEREY v. EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA +
said notary public and attorney should really be
exonerated^and held innocent.
DECISION
The established facts show that the respondent Arayata
is the son of Arcadio Arayata who died on November 5,
1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio Ara
yata in life, purchased from the Bureau of Lands lot No.
3448' of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon, for
which transfer certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to
him; that on August 27, 1931, many years after Arcadio
Arayata's death, the respondent attorney prepared the
deed, Exhibit A, stating therein that his father sold the
land in question to him for the sum of ?4,000; that after
affixing the names of the alleged vendor and the two
witnesses, the respondent brought an old man and the
two witnesses before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya
and requested the1 latter to ra tify said document,
assuring him that the old man was the grantor and
vendor and the other two were the instru mental
witnesses thereto; that the notary honestly believing said
information, legalized and registered the document after
verifying from the old man that he ratified the con tents
thereof; that the transfer was invalid and the docu ment
not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata,
signed it; that the respondent later applied for and ob
tained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said land
from the registry of deeds of Cavite after the former title
was cancelled; that sometime later, or on April 11, 1933,
the respondent sold a portion of said land having an area
of two and one-half (2½) hectares to Sinforosa Torres,
mar ried to Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.
With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears
established that on June 5, 1933, the respondent, being
le gally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage
not having been dissolved, signed under oath an
application to marry Engracia F. Ortega stating therein
that he was single, he being in fact married; the
application was reg istered and duly considered and on
September 25, 1933, the register of the Province of
Cavite issued the corre sponding license upon payment
by the respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown
reasons the marriage applied for was not solemnized; the
respondent's wife, neverthe less, filed a complaint for
bigamy against the former, which is now pending in the
justice of the peace court of Santa Rosa, Laguna, lor
which reason the investigator is of the opinion, and so
recommends, tnat no action should be taken on the
second charge. The recommendation is well founded and
has our approval.
In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the
sale had been made by his father who was his true pre
decessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including
the complainant, could complain of the transfer because
none was prejudiced, he being the true and only heir. In
his second answer, however, and in the course of the
investiga tion, he set up another defense alleging that the
person who had really sold him the land was his uncle
Januario Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the
land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He further
alleged that it was his said uncle who signed the deed of
transfer and ratified it before notary Montoya. We find
this second new defense improbable and unestablished.
The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative
to the deed of sale Exhibit A, and his statements to
notary Montoya with regard to said document, constitute
malprac tice and unprofessional conduct under the
provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
meriting for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this
case by the circum stance that he was apparently the heir
entitled to the ownership of the land and that the
complainant has neither real nor direct interest in the
transaction complained of by her.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio
V. Arayata guilty of malpractice and suspend him from
the practice of his profession for one (1) month, hereby
repri manding him for having prepared and executed the
deed of sale in question. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull,
Vickers, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for one month and
reprimanded.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU
INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for
petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of
Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a
resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations
dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965,
respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as
the Unions), while still members of the Federation of
Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective
bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter
referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje
and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the
secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of
the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by
him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired
Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate
secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department,
and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more
than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on
or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the
Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly
submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified
renewal of their respective collective bargaining
contracts which were then due to expire on September
30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively
effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October
1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's
proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the
issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed
on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on
collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences
were held under the auspices of the Department of
Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to
make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the
said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping
their demand for union security in exchange for other
benefits. However, the Companies did not make any
counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions
first drop their demand for union security, promising
money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to
April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular
demand, and requested the Companies to answer its
demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent
Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any
counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other
Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the
former were also asked to drop their union security
demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer
consider themselves bound by the commitment to make
money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a
letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner
unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop.
April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and
discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on
the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to
a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May
13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies
final counter-proposals on their economic demands,
particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving
counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958
presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to
submit a workable formula which would justify their own
proposals, taking into account the financial position of
the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike
in protest against what they considered the Companies'
unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified
as supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going on in the
Department of Labor after the notice to strike was
served on the Companies. These employees resigned
from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed
the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting
manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to
each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim
as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to
strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to
come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or
security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at
the end of the day or to sleep nights at
the office where comfortable cots have
been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional
movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed
in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for
your families.
The decision to make is yours —
whether you still believe in the motives of
the strike or in the fairness of the
Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the
exception of a few unionists who were convinced to
desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958,
until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket
lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel
records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to
penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life
Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line,
tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino
Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both
suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-
loads of employees, including a photographer, who with
the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the
picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus
causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-
breakers due to the resistance offered by some
picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the
use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then
filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City
Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the
said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise
filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court
of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the
pendency of the various criminal cases against striking
members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an
order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the
said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the
free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance
and driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies'
building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the
respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter
(exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21
May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the
strike has made us even more convinced
of our decision.
 We do not know how long you intend to
stay out, but we cannot hold your
positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to
do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in
the employ of the Group Companies, and
if there are no criminal charges pending
against you, we are giving you until 2
June 1958 to report for work at the home
office. If by this date you have not yet
reported, we may be forced to obtain
your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges
filed against the members of the Unions, except three
(3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the
courts. These three cases involved "slight physical
injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against
two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2,
1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the
striking employees decided to call off their strike and to
report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies
required them not only to secure clearances from the
City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by
a management committee among the members of which
were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal
charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal
charges which arose from the breakthrough incident
were readmitted immediately by the Companies without
being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had
secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the
Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions
who were most active in the strike, on the ground that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without however stating the specific acts
allegedly committed. Among those who were refused
readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of
the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU;
Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani
Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the
above number were ultimately notified months later that
they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2,
1958 and given separation pay checks computed under
Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now
have not been readmitted although there have been no
formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice against the Companies under
Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the
Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the
Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action,
by sending out individual letters to them urging them to
abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise
of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if
they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958,
they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against
the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer
denying all the material allegations of the complaint,
stating special defenses therein, and asking for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations,
through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on
August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions'
complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the
Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration
of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum
on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated
on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending
that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of
unfair labor practice in sending out
individually to the strikers the letters
marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the striking members of the
Unions in the matter of readmission of
employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of
unfair labor practice for dismissing
officials and members of the Unions
without giving them the benefit of
investigation and the opportunity to
present their side in regard to activities
undertaken by them in the legitimate
exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of
officials and members of the Unions, with
full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the
date of their actual reinstatement to their
usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the
letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate
exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree.
The said letters were directed to the striking employees
individually — by registered special delivery mail at that
— without being coursed through the Unions which were
representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
 The act of an employer in notifying
absent employees individually during a
strike following unproductive efforts at
collective bargaining that the plant would
be operated the next day and that their
jobs were open for them should they
want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active
interference with the right of collective
bargaining through dealing with the
employees individually instead of through
their collective bargaining
representatives. (31 Am. Jur.
563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &
Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR
1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
operating under a collective bargaining agreement to
negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees
individually in connection with changes in the
agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the
union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to
bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining
representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as
constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the
act of a company president in writing letters to the
strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent
with their union membership, was adjudged as
constituting interference with the exercise of his
employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter
Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act
of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a time
specified therein, otherwise new employees would be
engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of
the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer
or his representative urging the employees to cease
union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor
practices because they tend to undermine the concerted
activity of the employees, an activity to which they are
entitled free from the employer's molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises
of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to
return to work, it is not protected by the free speech
provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield
Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with
exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain
replacements for the striking employees in the event
they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free
speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable
where the expression of opinion by the employer or his
agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or
reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese
Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d
533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and
attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots,"
"free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for
"work performed in excess of eight hours," and
"arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon
the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of
unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to
break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus
offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the
consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join
labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a
Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company
shortly after the making of a request by the union to
bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of
mollifying employees after the employer has refused to
bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing
striking employees to return to work; the employer's
promises of benefits in return for the strikers'
abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and
the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the
strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the
effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would
receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization,
accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to
work in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting
prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the
officers and members of the complainant unions decided
to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958
by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was
the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not
the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without
merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to
return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot
alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were
calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the
employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in
the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor
practice will not cease to be such simply because it was
susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did
not proximately cause the result intended. For success
of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in
determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes
unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has
interfered with and coerced employees
within the meaning of subsection (a) (1)
is whether the employer has engaged in
conduct which it may reasonably be said
tends to interfere with the free exercise
of employees' rights under section 3 of
the Act, and it is not necessary that there
be direct evidence that any employee
was in fact intimidated or coerced by
statements of threats of the employer if
there is a reasonable inference that anti-
union conduct of the employer does have
an adverse effect on self-organization
and collective bargaining. (Francisco,
Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p.
 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170
F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be
considered by themselves alone but should be read in
the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances
surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted
according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an
employer's remarks were to be evaluated
not only on the basis of their implicit
implications, but were to be appraised
against the background of and in
conjunction with collateral
circumstances. Under this "doctrine"
expressions of opinion by an employer
which, though innocent in themselves,
frequently were held to be culpable
because of the circumstances under
which they were uttered, the history of
the particular employer's labor relations
or anti-union bias or because of their
connection with an established collateral
plan of coercion or interference.
(Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and
cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners'
submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their
respective collective bargaining agreements to the
respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon
Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as
personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary,
respectively, with attractive compensations. After the
notice to strike was served on the Companies and
negotiations were in progress in the Department of
Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as
supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility,
in effect compelling these employees to resign from their
unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of
Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the
respondents' demand that the former drop their demand
for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators
of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly
refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto.
Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining
between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners
went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies
of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by
inducing them to return to work upon promise of special
privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their
president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others,
escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of
eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two
meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket
line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the
picketers and the strike-breakers.lâwphî1.ñèt Then the
respondents brought against the picketers criminal
charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and
these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of
these criminal actions, the respondents were able to
obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding,
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and
in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that
the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent
— again individually and by registered special delivery
mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if
they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958.
But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee — of which
Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63
members of the Unions on the ground of "pending
criminal charges." However, when almost all were
cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the
respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials
and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-
non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose
from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the
non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were
readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote,
Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto,
Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the
fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause
against the petitioning strikers, the Companies
adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without stating specifically the inimical
acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit,
however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same
criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and
by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before
and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B,
yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of
the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy
unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers
and secure replacements for them in order to protect
and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners'
strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4
(Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of
the supposed testimonies of some union men who did
not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should
be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27,
1958, states, inter alia:
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this
notice by the Office, this [sic] unions
intends to go on strike against
THE INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
 THE FGU INSURANCE
GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING
ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after
the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958.
This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not
the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of
economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958,
the respondents categorically stated what they thought
was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as
material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree
with our position on the union shop, you
filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of
Labor Relations on 27 January 1958,
citing `deadlock in collective bargaining'
which could have been for no other issue
than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter
dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date
the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and
main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal
clear the management double crossed or will not
negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in
the meantime being committed by the management
such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and
[who] became supervisors without increase in salary or
change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14,
1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved
by the following circumstances: (1) it took the
respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners'
proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go
on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the
demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated
April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the
demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a
counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of
Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply
to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt
thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a
"well reasoned, workable formula which takes into
account the financial position of the group companies."
(tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of
the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be
interested in continuing his work with the group
companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges
against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2,
1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the
evidence shows that all the employees reported back to
work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953,
they must be considered as having complied with the
first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at
whether they also complied with the second condition. It
is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on
June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused
readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact that they were able
to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and
union members were still refused readmission on the
alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the
Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-
strikers who also had criminal charges pending against
them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same
incidents whence the criminal charges against the
strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not
required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the
process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec.
4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all
the strikers in general. They separated the active from
the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or
lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the
first category were refused readmission even after they
were able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed
against them. It is significant to note in this connection
that except for one union official who deserted his union
on the second day of the strike and who later
participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a
single union officer was taken back to work.
Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record
shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has
been less prominent than that of the strikers who were
denied reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where
the employer, although authorized by the
Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss
the employees who participated in an
illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders
of the strikers, such dismissal being
evidence of discrimination against those
dismissed and constituting a waiver of
the employer's right to dismiss the
striking employees and a condonation of
the fault committed by them." (Carlos
and Fernando, Labor and Social
Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees
Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort
to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination
in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a
committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to
screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not
difficult to imagine that these two employees — having
been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers
during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless
to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of
employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of
discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
machinery of reinstatement in the hands
of employees hostile to the strikers, and
reinstating a union official who formerly
worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
another mill, which was imperfectly
organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes,
p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7
NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43
NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management
and the members of the screening committee admitted
the discrimination committed against the strikers, they
tossed back and around to each other the responsibility
for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in
exercising for the management the authority to screen
the returning employees, the committee admitted the
non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn.,
Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella,
chairman of the management's screening committee,
while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame
therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20,
1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking
through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies,
disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He
testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an
employee was left in the hands of that committee that
had been empowered to look into all cases of the
strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia —
tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by
testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged
misconduct during the picketing was not serious in
nature were readmissible, while those whose
participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961,
pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of
slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which
the respondents contend was the basis for either
reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon
a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For
with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal
sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission
by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows
that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed
charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the
striking employees reported back for work on June 2,
1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless
they first secured the necessary clearances; but when
all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently
present the required clearances, the respondents still
refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later
received letters from the respondents in the following
stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your
employment with the Insular Life-FGU
Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was
due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the
last strike. Because this may not
constitute sufficient cause under the law
to terminate your employment without
pay, we are giving you the amount of
P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half
month pay for every year of your service
in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check
we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
President, Insurance Life
Acting President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged
"acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers
were the same acts with which the said strikers were
charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all
these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and
members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient
basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly
because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and,
hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents
failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he
had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by
many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the
management men to whom he and his group presented
themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the
respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who
received them and later directed them — when Olbes
refused them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the
Companies' personnel manager. He likewise
categorically stated that he and his group went to see
Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra
were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy
matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and
Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for the
respondents on several occasions — to rebut his
testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the
respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked
them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of
doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter
dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that
before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given
"his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report
for work after notice to return, does not constitute
abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of
eleven men constituted discrimination although the five
strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were
prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for
work at various times during the next three days, but
were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say
that its finding is unsupported, that, in
taking back six union men, the
respondent's officials discriminated
against the latter on account of their
union activities and that the excuse given
that they did not apply until after the
quota was full was an afterthought and
not the true reason for the discrimination
against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct.
904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should
have returned after being refused readmission on June
2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off
reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the
time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from
the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he
revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent
more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they
refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his
trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this
allegation convincing. First, this accusation was
emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand.
Gonzales, president of one of the respondent
Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip
abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force,
and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and
vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its
Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks)
dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only
P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as
pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that
would appear on the books of the Companies. It was
only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133
(Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central
Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not
therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the
above sum. And his competence in figures could not be
doubted considering that he had passed the board
examinations for certified public accountants. But
assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the
true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the
respondents never denied or tried to
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere
of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts
involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section
9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the
untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right
to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved
in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or
violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the
duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute
for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In
labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose
the truth before the public to justify their respective
demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers,
Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on
whether or not the respondent Companies were justified
in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not
being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of
management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but
an expression of free speech protected by the
Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every
faction on any side of the labor relation is
to me a constitutional and useful right.
Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any
labor oppression, substandard wages,
employer unfairness, or objectionable
working conditions. The employer, too,
should be free to answer and to turn
publicity on the records of the leaders of
the unions which seek the confidence of
his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed.
430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the
Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain
confidential information, Tongos committed not only a
betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral
principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the
Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under
the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of
Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated.
Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos
was that of an employer and not a client. And with
regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin
Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance
Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by
Tongos, the lower court should not have given them
much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly
established at that time and was still a "general agency"
of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude
that they were more inclined to favor the respondents
rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño,
Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the
lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-
readmission allegedly because they not only prevented
Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of
the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises
on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and
abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts
considered inimical to the interest of the respondents.
The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is
complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing
Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through
the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up,"
which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino
Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in
which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting
versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958,
there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not
responsible for what happened.lâwphî1.ñèt The
picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police
blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in
CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where
Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies
during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie
building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San
Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati,
Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and
Abella, the chief of the personnel records section,
reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is
therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to
work at the latter building to create such an incident and
have a basis for filing criminal charges against the
petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction
from the court of first instance. Besides, under the
circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to
yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines.
Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend
themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to,
attests that they did not resort to violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows
exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish
the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the
following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that some
disorder is unfortunately quite usual in
any extensive or long drawn out strike. A
strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are
human beings whose feelings are stirred
to the depths. Rising passions call forth
hot words. Hot words lead to blows on
the picket line. The transformation from
economic to physical combat by those
engaged in the contest is difficult to
prevent even when cool heads direct the
fight. Violence of this nature, however
much it is to be regretted, must have
been in the contemplation of the
Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of
Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike. If this were
not so, the rights afforded to employees
by the Act would indeed be illusory. We
accordingly recently held that it was not
intended by the Act that minor disorders
of this nature would deprive a striker of
the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic
Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d
472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations
and the Law, p. 378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and
Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike
and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement.
Thus it has been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in
the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller,
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p.
855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced
105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the
strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to
mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to
reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has
generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23
NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of
criminal charges against non-striking employees before
the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those
strikers who had pending charges in the same office
were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the
strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in
reinstating persons equally guilty with
those whose reinstatement is opposed,
or in other ways, gives rise to the
inference that union activities rather than
misconduct is the basis of his [employer]
objection, the Board has usually required
reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p.
853, citing the Third Annual Report of
NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive
dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he
committed acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers
and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the
strikers that they could use force and violence to have a
successful picket and that picketing was precisely
intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients
and customers from entering the Companies' buildings.
Even if this were true, the record discloses that the
picket line had been generally peaceful, and that
incidents happened only when management men made
incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any
rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is
inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author,
"The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the
emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management
dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling,
intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the
pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the
natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice,
Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is
not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence
presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's
participation in the strike was the testimony of one
Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of
directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers
and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat"
and who likewise testified as to the union activities of
Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C,
Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the
respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the
circumstances, there is good ground to believe that
Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the
union members. This act of the respondents is
considered unjustifiable interference in the union
activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of
decisions at espionage by an employer
of union activities, or surveillance
thereof, are such instances of
interference, restraint or coercion of
employees in connection with their right
to organize, form and join unions as to
constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere
with, restrain and coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to self-
organization than such activity even
where no discharges result. The
information obtained by means of
espionage is in valuable to the employer
and can be used in a variety of cases to
break a union." The unfair labor practice
is committed whether the espionage is
carried on by a professional labor spy or
detective, by officials or supervisory
employees of the employer, or by fellow
employees acting at the request or
direction of the employer, or an ex-
employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-
766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the
reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the
date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment. Because all too clear from the factual and
environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled
decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because
of the unfair labor practices committed by the
respondents, and that when the strikers reported back
for work — upon the invitation of the respondents —
they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and
officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and
provoked by improper conduct on the
part of an employer amounting to an
'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are
entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
(Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed
in violation of the provisions of the Act is
entitled to reinstatement with back pay
upon an adjudication that the discharge
was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S.
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L.
R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870;
N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving
Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N.
L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v.
American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R.
B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the
respondents to allege that the positions of these union
members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor
practice" caused or contributed to the
strike or where the 'lock-out' by the
employer constitutes an "unfair labor
practice," the employer cannot
successfully urge as a defense that the
striking or lock-out employees position
has been filled by replacement. Under
such circumstances, if no job sufficiently
and satisfactorily comparable to that
previously held by the aggrieved
employee can be found, the employer
must discharge the replacement
employee, if necessary, to restore the
striking or locked-out worker to his old or
comparable position ... If the employer's
improper conduct was an initial cause of
the strike, all the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement and the dismissal of
replacement employees wherever
necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases
cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is,
from what date should the backpay payable to the
unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that
strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled
to back pay during the period of the strike, even though
it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they
offer to return to work under the same conditions just
before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the
imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor
practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from
the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees
and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-
19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id.,
Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA
258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p.
730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that
discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive
backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that
is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report
back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A
great number of them, however, were refused
readmission because they had criminal charges against
them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-
strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were
readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused
readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as
discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to
backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to
the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose
Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors
which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement
(Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p.
854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the
during incidents which were provoked by the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are
respondents' men. However, since the employees who supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court
were denied readmission have been out of the service of is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the
the Companies (for more than ten years) during which factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education
they may have found other employment or other means Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil.
of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-
they may have earned during that period should be Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat
the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for
principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio
expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the
Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that
the former wrote the following in his decision subject of
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted
payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while
employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 ... Says the Supreme Court in the
to terminate employment of employees by serving the following decisions:
required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the
required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked In a proceeding for unfair
to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for labor practice, involving a
union activities. determination as to
whether or not the acts of
... While Republic Act No. 1052 the employees concerned
authorizes a commercial establishment justified the adoption of
to terminate the employment of its the employer of
employee by serving notice on him one disciplinary measures
month in advance, or, in the absence against them, the mere
thereof, by paying him one month fact that the employees
compensation from the date of the may be able to put up a
termination of his employment, such Act valid defense in a
does not give to the employer a blanket criminal prosecution for
authority to terminate the employment the same acts, does not
regardless of the cause or purpose erase or neutralize the
behind such termination. Certainly, it employer's right to
cannot be made use of as a cloak to impose discipline on said
circumvent a final order of the court or a employees. For it is
scheme to trample upon the right of an settled that not even the
employee who has been the victim of an acquittal of an employee
unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. of the criminal charge
Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].) against him is a bar to
the employer's right to
impose discipline on its
employees, should the
act upon which the
criminal charged was
based constitute
nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's
interest... The act of the
employees now under
consideration may be
considered as a
misconduct which is a
just cause for dismissal.
(Lopez, Sr., et al. vs.
Chronicle Publication
Employees Ass'n. et al.,
G.R. No. L-20179-81,
December 28, 1964.)
(emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited
decision * which contained the underscored portions of
the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of
Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente,
we are inclined to uphold the action
taken by the employer as proper
disciplinary measure. A reading of the
article which allegedly caused their
dismissal reveals that it really contains
an insinuation albeit subtly of the
supposed exertion of political pressure
by the Manila Chronicle management
upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in
the non-filing of the case against the
employer. In rejecting the employer's
theory that the dismissal of Vicente and
Aquino was justified, the lower court
considered the article as "a report of
some acts and omissions of an Assistant
Fiscal in the exercise of his official
functions" and, therefore, does away with
the presumption of malice. This being a
proceeding for unfair labor practice, the
matter should not have been viewed or
gauged in the light of the doctrine on a
publisher's culpability under the Penal
Code. We are not here to determine
whether the employees' act could stand
criminal prosecution, but only to find out
whether the aforesaid act justifies the
adoption by the employer of disciplinary
measure against them. This is not
sustaining the ruling that the publication
in question is qualified privileged, but
even on the assumption that this is so,
the exempting character thereof under
the Penal Code does not necessarily
erase or neutralize its effect on the
employer's interest which may warrant
employment of disciplinary measure. For
it must be remembered that not even the
acquittal of an employee, of the criminal
charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on
its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that
for an employee to publish his
"suspicion," which actually amounts to a
public accusation, that his employer is
exerting political pressure on a public
official to thwart some legitimate
activities on the employees, which
charge, in the least, would sully the
employer's reputation, can be nothing but
an act inimical to the said employer's
interest. And the fact that the same was
made in the union newspaper does not
alter its deleterious character nor shield
or protect a reprehensible act on the
ground that it is a union activity, because
such end can be achieved without resort
to improper conduct or behavior. The act
of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a
misconduct which is a just cause for
dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored
words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge
do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's
decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored
sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is
settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered
...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the
respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same
paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding
paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant
an indictment for contempt against the respondent
Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to
believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical
ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how
saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the
land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the
pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical
errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely
on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's
decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their
brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences
of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is
substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the
particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot
even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal
charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to
impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon
which the criminal charges were based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in
citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary
reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as
lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is
because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil
Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those
enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no
uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77
Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable
Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this
jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not
faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of
this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to
the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who
may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and
members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to
check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not
only from this Court's decisions but from other sources
and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions
down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate
courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation,
as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether
the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents'
counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust
of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our
view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be,
as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful
when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY,
the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another
is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the
dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their
former or comparatively similar positions, with
backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their
actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
 Complainant,

-versus-

ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS,

Respondent.

x-----------------------x

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,

Complainant,

-versus-

ATTY. LEON L. ASA,

Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

ATTY. LEON L. ASA, Complainant,

-versus-

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,

THIRD DIVISION
Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------
--x
ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS,

Complainants, DECISION
-versus-

ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ATTY. GINGER CARPIO MORALES, J.:

ANNE CASTILLO,
Subject of the present Decision are four
Respondents.
administrative cases, docketed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Case Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-1109, and 03-1125.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO,

I. CBD Case No. 03-1076


In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an
associate of the Laurel Law Offices of which Attorneys Leon
L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are partners,
endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case, Special
Proceeding No. 5222, In re: Guardianship of the
Minors Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jerill Nonan, which was
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the
therein petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of
the minors Nonan who appear to have inherited a sizeable
amount of US dollars.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and
Castillo as regards their sharing in the attorneys fees in the
guardianship case.
On page 6 of a pleading entitled Reply to Petitioner-
[1]
Guardians Comment/Opposition, ETC. dated July 19, 2002
filed before Branch 59 of the Angeles RTC and signed by
Castillos daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger Anne) as
counsel for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was
alleged that, inter alia, Asa wants to be paid an additional
$75,000.00 for his services in providing coffee and opening
doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel Law
Offices.[2]
Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger
Anne to be a brazen falsehood concocted to
besmirch Asas reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before IBP
an administrative complaint[3] against Castillo and Ginger
Anne, for gross violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1076.
In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged
Castillo with machinations and deceit arising from the
following alleged incidents:
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior
to January 20, 2000 attended by Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors
counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III
(Cassiday), Asa and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to
be received by Dr. Laurel in trust for the Nonan heirs would
be deposited at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), St. Francis Square Branch, Pasig City under Dollar
Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo, however,
proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), he explaining that he knew
an employee there who could facilitate the transaction. Dr.
Laurel rejected this proposition and instead instructed Castillo
to file the appropriate motion to have the funds deposited at
the RCBC.[4]
Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was
instructed to prepare, Castillo filed the same with the Angeles
trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently received a copy of a March
[5]
2, 2000 RTC Order signed by the then trial Judge Eliezer R.
De los Santos granting his motion and accordingly directing
that the funds to be held in trust for the Nonanchildren
be deposited at the Trust Department of the UCPB Head
Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed with the
Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration[6] of the March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in
order to have the funds deposited at the RCBC transferred to
the RTC, as previously agreed upon. This motion was granted.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged
that in a Reply to Answer[7] dated June 25, 2001 filed by
Castillo with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 145 in Civil
Case No. 01-506, Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut
Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez,
Castillo again committed a clear falsehood when he therein
stated that:
On the other hand, retired Justice
Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was
also profuse in extolling his academic
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial
lawyer as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty.
P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both
active Senior Trial lawyers
of the Laurel Law Offices,
[8]
(Underscoring supplied),
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any
time a lawyer at the Laurel Law Offices. In support of this
allegation, they appended to the complaint a certified true
copy of the Service Record[9] of Justice Kalalo which does not
show that he was ever connected with the Laurel Law Office.
In their Answer[10] to the complaint, Castillo and
Ginger Anne declared:
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the
statement that Asas services in the guardianship case consisted
in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there was a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in fact the
truth, the comportment being strictly in accordance with long
cherished Filipino hospitality, and he [Castillo] would have
done the same with his own visitors.[11] In any event, they
claim that the assailed factual narration was material and
relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given the lions
share of attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known
material service which redounded to the benefit of
the Nonan children.
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of
the Nonan funds at the UCPB was not attended with malice or
bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the funds
could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive
access to all the information pertaining to the interest and
benefits accruing thereto.
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 Reply to filed a groundless administrative complaint against him and
Answer filed with the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 01-506, Ginger Anne.
the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no control nor influence
over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of retired In his Answer[14] to the Complaint in CBD Case No.
Justice Kalalo in his favor during the proceedings adverted to. 03-1108, Oliveros, decrying the allegations against him as
[12]
patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed that the
complaint was Castillos way of retaliating against him for
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108 having joined Asa in filing the administrative complaint
against him and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).
Castillo subsequently filed
a complaint[13] against Oliveros before the IBP, docketed III. CBD Case No. 03-1109
as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Castillo also filed an administrative
complaint[15] against Asa before the IBP, charging him with
embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of
Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in confidence and violation of the lawyers oath and the Code of
embezzling US $950,000 representing the share adjudicated to Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a Case No. 03-1109.
certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum
shopping to undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel
Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, scandalously mismanaged the estate of the Nonan heirs, the
along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed;
acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings; and (2) Asaand Oliveros filed a groundless administrative
(4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to
withdraw his claim for attorneys fees against Dr. Laurel and
his bid to replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly Dollar Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel,

despite an Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him pocketed, Asa explained that several days prior to April 18, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from

and Asa that the latter would receive only 25% of whatever he 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorneys fees of RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account
(Castillo) would receive as attorneys fees, Asa secretly both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount for which $500.00 was spent for the purpose. A

pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first Certification[20] to this effect, issued by

guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager Dolores L. Del Valle,

account for and turn over the amount of $130,000 in attorneys April 18, 2000, he deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and was appended to AsasAnswer.

fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked his wifes joint Dollar Account No. 247-702-9275 at the

on a scheme to force him into resigning as counsel for Dr. Philippine National Bank (PNB), OrtigasBranch as his share Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for

Laurel to enable them to exercise absolute control over the in the attorneys fees, while he opened a new account in the $130,000 in attorneys fees is baseless and unconscionable, and

guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in

fees allocated for him. $160,500. retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed

against him and Ginger Anne.

In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own

03-1109, Asa alleged as follows: It was in fact Castillo who $25,000 plus interest amounting to $25,023.13 representing IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125

reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter full payment of his attorneys fees from Merceditas, as

had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that evidenced by a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another

he would not give him (Asa) any share in the attorneys fees he Castillo. administrative complaint,[21] against Castillo before the

would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No.

that he was the therein counsel of record and had endorsed the Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 03-1125, charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross

case to the Laurel Law Offices. He thus reported the matter to belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000 represented partial payment misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the

Dr. Laurel and informed him that he would likewise not give for his consenting to be the guardian ad litem of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in

Castillos share in the attorneys fees he [Asa] might receive the Nonanheirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for light of his baseless, malicious and derogatory allegations in

because [Castillo] has no word of honor.[18] expenses incurred over several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and

which was placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asas)

deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and 2004 Report and Recommendation and dismissed
unlawful suit. consolidated cases for lack of merit.
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:
The records of the cases were then forwarded for final
By Report and Recommendation[22] of February 27, action to this Court.
2004, the IBP CBD, through Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion
consolidated cases in this wise. for Reconsideration[25] in CBD Case No. 03-1125. He too,
together with Oliveros, filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion for
From the facts and evidence
presented, what have been shown by the Reconsideration[26] in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
counsels are mutual bickerings, unjustified
recriminations and offensive personalities
between brother lawyers which detract from Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated
the dignity of the legal profession and do not
deserve the attention of the Commission. The Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration [27] dated August
voluminous case record contains but personal
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies hurled by the 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and CBD Case No. 03-
counsels against each other which constitute 1109.
highly unprofessional conduct. A great part
of mans comfort, as well as of his success at
the bar, depends upon his relations with his
professional brethren. With them he is in On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment[28] on
daily necessary intercourse, and he must have
their respect and confidence, if he wishes to Castillos Consolidated Omnibus Motion for Partial
sail along in smooth waters. Hence, the Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109
parties are advised to conduct themselves
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each also Oliverosfiled his Comment on the same motion
other and try to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession.[23] (Underscoring supplied) on February 28, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated
By Resolution[24] of April 16, 2004, the Board of
Reply to the Comments of Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the February 27,
Motion to Appoint a Commissioner.[29]
the
THIS COURTS RULING
In his questioned Reply to Petitioner-Guardians
Comment/Opposition, Castillos statement reads:
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be
paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services
in providing coffee and opening the doors
whenever there is a conference at the Laurel
Law Offices. He also conveniently provides
himself with the Nonan expediente to give
assistance to the parties during their so-called
conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to
appear before this Honorable Court was
repeatedly announced by Atty.
Jose Oliveros because of his so-called failing
health x x x[30]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule
while
8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe
honorable, candid and courteous dealing with other

lawyers[31] and employ respectful and restrained language is in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [32] It is
through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a
lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the
courts and judicial officers.[33]
immunity from civil and criminal liability
arising from any speech or debate delivered
in the Batasan or in any committee thereof,
but nevertheless remains subject to the
disciplinary authority of the legislature for
said speech or debate, a lawyer equally
remains subject to this Courts supervisory
and disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of his duty as a member of the
legal profession.[36] (Underscoring supplied)
filed the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply stated
that:
Considering the present raging
controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Head Office
at Makati, may be seriously affected x x x

In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of The Petitioner-Guardian can best
protect the deposits of the Nonan children if
words manifestly falls short of this criterion. Their disparaging the proceeds of the settlement will be
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus ADMONISHED to
statements in the pleading referred to above belie their deposited with a solvent and more
exercise greater care and circumspection in the preparation of conservative bank like the RIZAL
proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and COMMERCIAL BANKING
their pleadings and refrain from using offensive or otherwise CORPORATION (RCBC) x x x[37]
propriety.
improper language.

Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services
is relevant and pertinent to the claim for attorneys fees and
was, for all legal intents and purposes, a privileged
communication[34] deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive
personalities in the course of judicial proceedings constitutes
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if
the publication thereof is privileged.[35]
x x x this Court will not be inhibited
from exercising its supervisory authority over
lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to
that standard expected of them as members of
the Bar.Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the
lawyer from civil and criminal liability based
on the statements made in the pleadings. But
like the member of the legislature who enjoys
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo
of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the
employed deceit and falsehood in attempting to change the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an
depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust by Dr. Laurel
administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious
for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof.
Order directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to
[38]
In the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear
deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any
and preponderant evidence to show that Castillo willfully and
and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14,
deliberately resorted to deceit and falsehood in filing the
2000 RTC Order directing the deposit of the settlement
Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
proceeds with the RCBC.
Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
in the Makati RTC Civil Case No. 01-506, he therein alleged:
dated March 8, 2000 signed by Dr. Laurel, however, fails to
establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having
 On the other hand, retired Justice
Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff, was also
profuse in extolling his academic credentials
and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as
follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant
Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both
active Senior Trial lawyers
at the Laurel Law Offices.
Q: How could you characterize
and rate the trial
competency, performance
and expertise of Atty. P.M.
Castillo?
A: He is highly competent, low
key, aggressive and very
brilliant in the conduct of
trial, as well as, in the
formulation of courtroom
strategies. His pleadings are
also very well written, direct
to the point, convincing,
scholarly and exhaustive. To
be sure, he is one of the
popular trial lawyers of our
firm (The Laurel Law
Offices), not only because
he came from an exclusive
school, but also because of
his scholastic records
at Ateneo de Manila was
also impressive. That is why
he was taken in by former
VP Salvador H. Laurel even
before the release of the
1964 bar where he was also
No. 2 among the Ateneo bar
candidates for the year. He
was No. 15 among the
bar topnotchers. This is not earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in
to mention his impressive
connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases
and highly (sic) batting
average of winning about Nos. 43049 and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently
80% to 90% of his load
cases and work. He was also withdrawn,[42] however, as it was unsigned and unsubscribed.
one of the busy lawyers of
our office, until he went on
private practice and excelled Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as one of the more
successful and respected provides that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
trial practitioners.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied) the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically commands
that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo
allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the
committed clear falsehood for Justice Kalalo had never been a
same Canon provides that a member of the bar shall not
lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Castillo explained, however, that he can only say that
he has no control, nor influence on the voluntary and
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired Justice
directs that a lawyer must employ such means only as are
Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
highly adversarial proceedings. [40]
judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement
of fact or law.[43]
Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The
records show that the above-quoted statements attributed by
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from
Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an unsigned and
lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before the
unsubscribed affidavit entitled Question and Answer Format in
courts.[44] They have an obligation to the court as well as to the
Lieu of Direct Testimony of Justice
opposing party to make only truthful statements in their
[41]
Felipe Kalalo dated January 21, 1993. This affidavit was

pleadings.[45] The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task
of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined.[46]
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos
administrative culpability, his
against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases
against him and Ginger Anne necessarily fails.
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed
$24,500 and $160,500, the undated certification issued by
RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18,
2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar
Savings Account at our Business Center. A
credit was made to his assigned Dollar
Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in
the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred
Sixty Thousand Five Hundred
(USD: 160,500.00) as initial transaction. We
further certify that on April 19, 2000, there
was a debit made for said account in the
amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same
amount was placed in the Dollar Time
Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr.
Leon Asa left the amount of USD: Five
Hundred in his account to serve as the
maintaining balance requirement. Subject
Dollar Savings Account had closed already,[47]
guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and
accepting all responsibilities attached to said
position .US$100,000.00
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H.
Guardian [48]
dated February 13, 2002 filed with the Angeles Laurel for expenses incurred during the last
six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas
City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that: calls, and representation and other incidental
expenses while in the various states in the
United States in order to pursue the claim of
3. On April 18, 2000, the Nonan children against
Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and the Hillblom estate .US$60,000.00
his Principal Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty.
charge Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),
settlement from one of the duly adjudicated
heirs of Larry
Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and
through her Guardian Ad Litem, Milagros
Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND US
belonged to Dr. Laurel but was merely temporarily placed in
DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was
deposited with the Rizal Commercial his (Asas) account.
Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis
Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-
000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
the name of Salvador H. Laurel, in trust
Guardian shows that $12,500 was received by Asa as attorneys
for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan, in
compliance with the Order of this Honorable fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996 to 2000.
Court dated April 26, 2000;
[50]
Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt [51] dated April
4. Pursuant to the above-stated
Orders of this Honorable Court, the Guardian 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the
Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III $25,000 attorneys fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon
disbursed the following amounts for the
purposes indicated: by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the
A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No. 1766 [52] issued by
NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April 19,
xxxx 2000 shows:
(7) Partial payment of the fee of
Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the
 RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum
of Twelve thousand five hundred US Dollars
US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of
LLO [Laurel Law Offices] in attorneys fees
of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222
of RTC Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500-
strategy to spite, insult and provoke him to ostracize him and
make him feel unwanted to continue as [Dr. Laurels] lawyer in
furtherance of their conspiracy to force him into resignation
for them to replace him and have absolute control over the
[56]
Personal colloquies between counsels which promote
unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully avoided.[57]
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended

By: Sgd. guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys for Six (6) Months by this Court in CBD Case No.
Treasurer/Cashier fees, the same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing falsehood in

consideration. violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of the

On Asas alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillos
As to Castillos charge against Asa and Oliveros of same or similar offense in the future would call for the
attorneys fees: It appears that Asa and Castillo each received
embezzlement due to alleged scandalous mismanagement of imposition of a more severe penalty. This Court thus imposes
$25,000 as attorneys fees but pursuant to their February 2000
the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on the October 13, upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be
2003 RTC Order[54] in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the a period of One (1) year.
divided between them, and Castillo would receive 75% thereof
evidence presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed
or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The
sanctions against them. against Atty. Leon L. Asa and Atty. Jose
records show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he
A. Oliveros are DISMISSED.
having remitted, as reflected above, the remaining $12,500 to
Finally, on Castillos Omnibus Motion to Appoint a
the Laurel Law Offices.
Commissioner, the matters raised therein[55] being entirely Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of

inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the
administrative proceedings, the same is denied. and is hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive and
$12,500 which Asa remitted to the Laurel Law Offices, as
improper language in her pleadings.
reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar
Guardian.[53]
being engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise

edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as well as Canon 10 of
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
Code of Professional
profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court.
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros embarked on another sinister
 G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of One

(1) Year, effective upon receipt of this Decision. ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and
DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON.
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of
respective personal records of Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo and
First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch III).
of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar

Confidant.Let copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines. CRUZ, J.:

It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was

rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9,
SO ORDERED. 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that
decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years
later. This was followed by an amended petition for
review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an
opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11,
1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on
December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration
was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then
came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the
respondent judge.2

These dates are not typographical errors. What is

involved here are errors of law and lawyers.

The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of

the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had
been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late.
Laches, it was held, had operated against the
petitioners. 3

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not

Republic of the Philippines yet become final and executory because the land in
SUPREME COURT dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the
Manila private respondents. The said judgment would become
so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of
FIRST DIVISION registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the
private respondents who had failed to enforce the
judgment by having the land registered in their the
pursuant thereto.4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the
decision of February 9, 1926, became final and
executory after 30 days, same not having been
appealed by the petitioners during that period. They
slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred
to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.
In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno
Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926
decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death
in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition
for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty
of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet
become final and executory because the land subject
thereof had not yet been registered, the petitioners
rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy
of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance
of the decree, why should the same party be denied this
remedy before the decree is issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition
earlier? Why do they now pretend that they have all the
time in the world because the land has not yet been
registered and the one-year reglementary period has not
yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners
cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was held:
... It is conceded that no decree of
registration has been entered and
section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides that a petition for review of such
a decree on the grounds of fraud must
be filed "within one year after entry of the
decree." Giving this provision a literal
interpretation, it may first blush seem
that the petition for review cannot be
presented until the final decree has been
entered. But on further reflection, it is
obvious that such could not have been
the intention of the Legislature and that
what it meant would have been better
expressed by stating that such
petitioners must be presented before the
expiration of one year from the entry of
the decree. Statutes must be given a
reasonable construction and there can
be no possible reason for requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final
decree is entered before urging his claim
of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition
for review under section 38, supra, may
be filed at any time the rendition of the
court's decision and before the expiration
of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration.
(Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their
contentions and that under this doctrine they should not
have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their
delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty
one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position
is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary
common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and
lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is
assent essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them."8
There should be a greater awareness on
the part of litigants that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is
too valuable to be wasted or frittered
away by efforts, far from commendable,
to evade the operation of a decision final
and executory, especially so, where, as
shown in this case, the clear and
manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and
indisputable. 9
This appeal moreover, should fail,
predicated as it is on an insubstantial
objection bereft of any persuasive force.
Defendants had to display ingenuity to
conjure a technicality. From Alonso v.
Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left
no doubt as to our disapproval of such a
practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render
justice to the parties according to law.
Procedural rules are precisely designed
to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to
pervert the ends for which they are
intended deserves condemnation. We
have done so before. We do so again. 10
Regarding the argument that the private respondents
took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the
petition for review, it suffices to point out that an
opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26,
1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move
for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the
private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all,
they were the parties asking for relief, and it was the
private respondents who were in possession of the land
in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to
the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P.
purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice PEREZ, petitioners,
and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal vs.
profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of
is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is First Instance of Manila,
to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF
honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of MANILA, respondents.
the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely
to circumvent or violate it. Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not CASTRO, J.:
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only
add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of
decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against
the facts and the law should advise them when a case,
the following observation therein made:
such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets.
They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by We feel compelled to observe that during the
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not protracted litigation below, the petitioners
deserve the attention of the courts. resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at
some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the
execution of a simple money judgment which
petitioners. This decision is immediately executory. It is
has long become final and executory. Some of
so ordered.
the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far
from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert
the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the

petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N.

Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to
the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the
Republic of the Philippines decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
SUPREME COURT "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the
Manila treble costs adjudged against their clients.

EN BANC
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a
semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient
reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are
of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation,
alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision,
was designed to cause delay, and the active
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure
is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position
with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner
spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to
be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an
execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed
that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property,
why did they not adopt this position from the very start,
or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso
Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch?
They chose, however, to attack the execution in a
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the
projected execution sale six times. More than eight
years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and
the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez
spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the
issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the
execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would,
as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For
instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily
from the scene following the rendition of the
aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife,
Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the
controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the
said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case
39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge
Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any
action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta
vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held
that courts of first instance have no power to restrain
acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October
4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued
enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the
execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and
her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which
Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of
the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a
month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the
basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of
stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez'
judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil
case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to
adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent
motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared
during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent
judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of
execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite
the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court
assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall
or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is
therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of
injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined
was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now
assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback,
prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time
from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ
of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses
and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of
Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among
others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction
was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal
from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another
"remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he
filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963,
which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to
recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the
reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which
in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for
he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was
merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with
supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact,
when the motion was set for hearing on December 21,
1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to
produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the
respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said
motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to
the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the
movants that "in none of the various incidents in the
case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners
acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the
enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407."
From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached
by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of
"remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a
simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they
ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy
had been exhausted, they interposed another until the
case reached this Court for the second time. 3
Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one
member of this Court are persuaded that justice was
practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court
sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as
the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of
execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is
not the recall of the writ, but an independent
action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be established
as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a
successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of
the protracted litigation, the petitioners had
already availed of this remedy in civil cases
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of
the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that
the said cases could not be branded as having been
instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in
the above-quoted statement must not be considered out
of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had
already availed of the suggested remedy only in the
sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature
of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted
execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the
"proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of
writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292
were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have
jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are
without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial
jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5
However, the recall and the denial of the writs of
preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did
not amount to the termination or dismissal of the
principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they
could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez
practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she
instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall
writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored
on the same grounds which she advanced in the former
case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on
November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil
case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the
same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction
based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil
case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20,
1964, with the consent of the parties because of the
pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it
was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more
assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour
and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and
is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause
of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy
is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have
several counsel in this case but the participation of each
counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of
this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed
against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either
singular or plural in construction, so that when we said
"counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay
in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil
case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its
aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is
on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court
of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners'
Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about
August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals
decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he
"became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when
he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292
before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by
the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record
that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by
Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September
3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of
the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel
for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent
motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil
case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified
in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble vs.
costs assessed against the petitioners. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO
HERRERA, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a

lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than not,
in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself,
would have his petition decided on pure questions of
procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the
murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is
corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and
the law profession, debased into a simple business
dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only
of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to
procedure, but considering its serious ethical
implications, on its merits as well.

We turn to the facts.

The private respondent was the registered owner of

eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he
obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a
financing institution, in various sums totalling
P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of
mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels
aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of
Republic of the Philippines said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure
SUPREME COURT of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a
Manila consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to
the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public
SECOND DIVISION
auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the
highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a
complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to
enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he
succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He
was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and
with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R
Corporation accorded the private respondent another
year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to
payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one
per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the
petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of
P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the
court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire
financial straits — a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 — for which reason he failed to acquire the
finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the sum
of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the
petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for
execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court
granted execution, although it does not appear that the
sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private
respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one
hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other.
The petitioner contends that the private respondent
"earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties;
the private respondent maintains that it was the
petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the
money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent,
executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in
his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention,
but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with
the private respondent's version, considering primarily
the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the
private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to
their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer
of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document
that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in
question, and secondly, to register the same in his
name. The private respondent alleges that he
subsequently filed loan applications with the Family
Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the
subject premises to find, according to him, and to his
dismay, the properties already registered in the name of
the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of
Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to
Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon
City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement
of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby
transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas,
any and all my rights of the real
properties and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the
above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement
of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby
transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas,
any and all my rights of equity of
redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the
above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679. . .10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the
annotation of an adverse claim upon the respective
certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon
learning of the same, the petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of
a writ of possession. The court granted both motions.
The private respondent countered with a motion for a
temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall
the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he
commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court
against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal
complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of
trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1,
1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance
and reformation of document, 13praying that the
certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be
cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated
May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement
of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a
mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the
petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter
would lend the money to the former for a year, so that
[petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet
market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said
property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for
dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's
petition. It held that the alteration complained of did not
change the meaning of the contract since it was "well
within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his
interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he
has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had
acquired an interest in the properties subject of
reconveyance based on the
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in
the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule
39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made
him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the
private respondent had lost all rights over the same
arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R
Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that
the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban
against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers
by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question
took place after judgment in the injunction case
abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was
consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually
attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6,
1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the
respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders
of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion
of the compromise agreement obliging the private
respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's
prayer for a restraining order directed against the
execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of
possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but
followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December 8,
1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the
first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to
dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied
reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin
resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic]
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO.
07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME
AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic]
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO.
07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic]
ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R.
07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER
HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND
THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT
REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO
THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the
respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of
judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal
impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly
two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and
(2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration.
He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were
proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the
aforesaid two orders being in the nature of interlocutory
issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments
are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had
occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic
fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained
in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for
the annulment of judgment. Fraud has
been regarded as extrinsic or collateral,
within the meaning of the rule, "where it
is one the effect of which prevents a
party from having a trial, or real contest,
or from presenting all of his case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but
of the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy." In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of
the case, by fraud or deception practiced
on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent
Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals no
cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first
place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points
out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the
orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no
showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it,
indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge
Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the
respondent court will show that he was privy to the
incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered
timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas'
claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between
Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's
collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had
deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed
execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the
properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to
redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of
execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that
petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This
was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno
R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this
purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge
to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain
speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment.
Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as the term
is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of
judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular implementation
of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular
execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution"
means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of
the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent
Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in
denying his motions for temporary restraining order and
to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one
[1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a]
[restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions,
do not make out a case for irregular execution. The
orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the
judgment approving the parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera,
would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and
constraints of economic privation have not been lost on
us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on
compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract
between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038
of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there
is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents,
is subject to the provisions of article 1330
of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is
given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is
voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance
of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this
purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort
as we stated, and in which the decision had become
final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of
procedure — for the enlightenment solely of the bench
and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his
petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the
unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of
the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to
score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all
people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object
assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." 31If procedure were to be an impediment to
such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid
to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the
Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest
in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in
issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to
be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was
rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying
capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was
willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the
redemption price of his mortgaged properties and
petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the
Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should
have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious
reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of
his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as
a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The
Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not
a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants,
a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial
notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's
efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are
not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak
well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in
spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an
excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the
expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not
capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling
that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater
deal of freedom from government interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to
State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of
Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys,
agreement as to fees. — An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of
the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney... A
written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless
 found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in
the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe
that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The
extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No.
30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not
impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan
amount. The case itself moreover did not involve
complex questions of fact or law that would have
required substantial effort as to research or leg work for
the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the
properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome
prices in the market should not be a measure of the
importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants
the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on
a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien
upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested
upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to
realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of
judgment. In this case, however, redemption was
decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the
mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner
any right to the properties themselves, much less the
right of redemption, although provisions for his
compensation were purportedly provided. It did not
make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he
was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this
extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil
Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right,
independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer
which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to
redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation
pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court." 39 Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with
respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to
the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must
be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the
tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's
haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to
himself. As we have observed, in spite of the issuance of
the writ of execution, it does not appear that the
petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this
perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that
he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no
plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep
an "ace" against the private respondent that led finally, to
the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure,
he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same
from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own
money he had actually done the private respondent a
favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything
out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that
"[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the new
owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic]
petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit
therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for
naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept
under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who
succeeded in having the private respondent sign the
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared
document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to
exercise the right of redemption over the properties and
to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof.
As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by
reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his
counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard
put to believe that it was the private respondent who
"earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption
amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands
that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner
now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter
himself had something to gain from the transaction, as
alluded to above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his
right of redemption, the private respondent had intended
merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the
mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall
acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach,
subject to redemption by his client under easier terms
and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would
maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order
that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's
fees awarded him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and
if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in
keeping the properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's
pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture
of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course,
having made money from it, but what he cannot dispute
is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit,
why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall
be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided
for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of
equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in
his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the
Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my
rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his
favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in
question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of
Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the
paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any
falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a
loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration.
Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed, why
was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his
client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of
adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party
who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for
falsification — this is not the proper occasion for it — we
condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do
no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the
conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the
ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through
the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the
person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose
administration or sale may have been
intrusted to them, unless the consent of
the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the
property of the estate under
administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the
property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any
government owned or controlled
corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been
instrusted to them; this provision shall
apply to judges and government experts
who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by
law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be
void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil
Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands
v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does
not apply to contingent contracts, in which the
conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the
property can no longer be said to be "subject of
litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of
Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption
and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of
the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is
actually a new contract — not one in pursuance of what
had been agreed upon on compromise — in which, as
we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption
rights over the disputed properties (but in reality,
acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such
a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be
properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession
is improper to eject another from possession unless
sought in connection with: (1) a land registration
proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property
provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third
party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the
issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale
between him and the private respondent and not the
judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a
writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as
we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it
should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ
does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific
performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the
injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all
voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground
of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn
subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question
specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While
the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for
invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for
annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however,
that the properties have been conveyed to third persons
whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value,
the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable,
by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private
respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the
private respondent has not settled his hability for
payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone
liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the
expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their
obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the
actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold
Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty.
Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the
properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as
and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to
pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale
thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments,
be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as
and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent
Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition
below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the
final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest
interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that
has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to
settle actual controversies and as a matter of general
policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and
foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have
made clear that from a technical vantage point,
certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated,
the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate
of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real
meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we
would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed
the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a
barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially
so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high
time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as
the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the
bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious
indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to
pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the
sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no
disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation
of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice,
after which the same will be consolidated with AC No.
2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case
to the respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]
KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T.
ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders
dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of
direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the
Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS
Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain
deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which
the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly
fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS
Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant
Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048,
was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
 It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers
counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking
the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration
of the case.[1] The motion alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant
LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3)
successive postponements for the presentation for cross-
examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August
1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of
this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the
Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and
in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc.
who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did
not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom
plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of
His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove
their case, since this will be the last case to recover the
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit
himself and set this case for re-raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the
partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should
immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be malicious,
derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge
ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on
November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should
not be cited for contempt of court.[2]
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or
Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed
Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty.
Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not
necessarily express his views because he merely signed
the motion in a representative capacity, in other words,
just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him
that a young man possibly employed by the Court had
advised him to have the case reraffled, when the
opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new
judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their
absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who
the judge may be and when he would appear. Wickers
sense of disquiet increased when at the next two
hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the
latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all
absent, while the other counsels were present.[3]
Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory,
respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993,
held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each
to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine
of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order
of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent
judge directed petitioners to appear before him
on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their
sentence.
In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them
for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled
by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his
case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt.
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he
took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court
and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was
personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos
and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he
assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started
holding sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all
male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner
Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who
was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the
filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not
vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing
the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to
enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible
remedies; that after holding petitioners in contempt, he
issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting
himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty.
Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the
vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because
his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important
than those which he owes to his client; and that by
tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for
reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order,
petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations
against him; and that the petitioners have taken
inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case
No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated
November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be
reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in
their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed
with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked
that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the
case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge,
petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of
the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent
judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court
Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the
case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct
contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly
containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in
another case. The former has been held to be equivalent
to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near
a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before
the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules
of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in
case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor
may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be
heard by himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct
contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged
in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect
contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct
contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs
and MeTCs are appealable.[7]
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for
respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if
petitioners are right about the nature of the case against
them by contending that it involves indirect contempt,
they have no ground for complaint since they were
afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of
contempt. What is important to determine now is
whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct
contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the
power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that
respect without which the administration of justice will
fail.[8] The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the
purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back
at a party for showing less than full respect for the
dignity of the court.[9]
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based
on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case
was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting
Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that
set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who
must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not
likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom
plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge
was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty.
Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge
owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which
necessitated easing out the former judge to make room
for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity
and honor of respondent judge and constitute an
unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in
this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well
connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of
Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this
Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93,
precisely in the interest of an efficient administration of
justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record which could
have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he
claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to
file the offending motion for inhibition as his client
allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims
he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his
client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just
lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the
allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he
prepared and filed were false since it was his client who
verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty.
Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified
young man, whom he thought to be employed in the
court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos,
knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty.
Santos did not show up in court on the same days the
new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear
that the other allegations in the motion that respondent
judge had been personally recruited by the opposing
counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been
eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos
is thus understating his part in the preparation of the
motion for inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility
for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just
an instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which
he could not overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be
excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion.
Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility
for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for
inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to
that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to]
insist on similar conduct by others [12] and not [to]
attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have materiality to the case.[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded
to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he
would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence,
petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their
instant petition which prayed in part that Respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former
station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where
more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike
in Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on the
judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude,
a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in
petitioners motion for inhibition belying their
protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v.
Masaquel:[14]
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even
members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit
themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants
punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they
based their motions for disqualification are not among those
provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct
imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent
and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt
of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies
to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent
with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle
we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the
court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is
greater reason for doing so considering that the
particularly offending allegations in the motion for
inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were
additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is
advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering
from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute.
Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a
remark although he could not point a court employee
who was the source of the same. At least he had the
grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and
truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel
was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail
sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners
description of him in the instant petition as a judge who
cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where
complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he
cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines chose him as one of the most
outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court
Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a
1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a
motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt,
the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt,
removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the
trial court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist
the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence
that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of
the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance
sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine
Republic of the Philippines
imposed should be increased to P500.00.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is SECOND DIVISION
MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment
for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P G.R. No. L-42032 January 9, 1976
100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE
SO ORDERED.
BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, Makati, Rizal; THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL, Pasig,
Rizal; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV, Pasig,
Rizal; and MARCIANO P. STA. ANA, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy for release from confinement of a person who
has served his sentence. 1 It i s on such a doctrine that
reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this
application for the issuance of such a writ. It is
undisputed that while the information against petitioner
charged him with the commission of frustrated homicide
to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to
one of serious physical injuries. It is to such lesser
offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea
of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge
Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of
four months and one day of arrests mayor without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That
period of confinement he had duly served by November
10, 1975, considering that he had been under detention
since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding, the petition
alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that
on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison term
imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent
Judge, in the very same case where your petitioner was
convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal
Case No. 15289, a 'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold
the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)'
alleging as a ground that the 'father of the victim,
Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the movant (respondent
Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that the
victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason
the undersigned will file an amended information. 3 Then
came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the
following day, November 20, 1975, the respondent
Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he
had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the
case had long been terminated and his decision therein
had already been executed, and, further, even assuming
that the respondent Judge could still act in the case, he
could not and should not act on the Fiscal's motion
because the same was not set for hearing and no copy
thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose very
liberty was being sought to be deprived, still [he]
persisted in acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted
the same 'in the interest of justice,' not at all minding that
your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the
respondent Judge, is still entitled to due process of law
and to some justice; ...." 4 There was a motion for
reconsideration, but it was fruitless. 5 Hence this petition.
On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus
returnable to this Court on Friday, December 12, 1975
and required the respondents to make a [return] of the
writ not later than the aforesaid date. The Court further
Resolved: (a) to set this case for hearing on Monday,
December 15, 1975 at 10:30 a.m.; and (b) to [grant] the
motion of petitioner to litigate as pauper in this
case." 6 On the date set for hearing, respondent Judge
Reynaldo P. Honrado filed his return, worded as follows:
"1. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already
been ordered released by this court per order dated
December 11, 1975, in view of the fact that Trial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. has not as of this time filed the
amended information for Homicide after the death of
Florante Valenzuela, the offended party in this case,
notwithstanding his motion entitled 'Motion to Order the
Warden to hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia dated
November 19, 1975, ...; 2. That in view of the release
from custody of Manuel de Gracia, the present petition
for habeas corpus has become moot and
academic. ..." 7 Fiscal of Rizal, did likewise. The return
stated: "1. That the Respondent Marciano P. Sta. Ana,
Jr., the Assistant Provincial petitioner is not in his
custody or power although, as alleged in the petition, it
was upon his motion that the respondent Judge issued
the Order ... ordering the warden to hold the release of
the accused (herein petitioner). 2. That the reason for his
said motion ... is, as stated therein, that he was informed
of the death of the victim and he was going to file an
amended information. 3. That because of the necessity
for immediate action so as to avoid the accused being
released so that he could be held to answer for a crime
of homicide, and in the honest belief at that time that the
proper remedy was the filing of an amended information
for homicide, the undersigned filed the motion on said
ground. The information concerning the death of the
victim was given to the undersigned by the victim's
father only on November 19, 1975, the last day of
confinement of the accused. However, after being able
to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the
undersigned concluded that the proper remedy is not
amendment of the information because judgment had
already been rendered on the first information, but the
filing of a new information for homicide upon the
authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v.
Manolong, and It is similar cases. 8
As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for
hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of the
following tenor was adopted by this Court: "When this
case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Salvador
N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant
Provincial 'Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Major o
Maristela appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the
Court Resolved (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a [return] of the writ for
the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of
Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the
hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time. 9 It
should be stated likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela
assured the Court that petitioner had been release What
was declared orally by him was thereafter set forth in
writing in accordance with his return dated December
16, 1975: II That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the
Provincial Warden received a commitment order issued
by Judge Reynaldo Honrado, dated 16 September 1975,
...; IV. That by virtue 6f that commitment order which the
petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from
four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to
Makati Municipal Jail, on Sept. 18, 1975, to service his
prison term thereat pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
29 as said prisoner is classified as Municipal prisoner; V
That the petitioner was brought back and confined again
to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of
Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla,
Executive Judge CFI Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, ...; VI.
That on December 12, 1975, the Office of the Provincial
Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of
First Instance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge
Reynaldo Honrado, directing him to release Manuel de
Gracia, the petitioner in this case; VII. That by virtue of
odd order ... and the Order of Release, ... the
undersigned respondent released on said date the
petitioner as evidenced by certificate of discharge from
prison and that is the reason why he cannot produce the
body of said person before this Honorable Court; VIII
That he was not able to make the return of the writ
immediately on the ground that he was at that time
confined in the hospital, and he was d only on December
13, 1975." 10 There was likewise a return of the writ on
such a date on behalf of respondent Cresencio T.
Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was
therein declared: "1. That the petitioner was not in his
custody when he received copy of the petition as the
petitioner was transferred to 'the Rizal Provincial Jail on
December 3, 1975, as he was going to be charged with
the crime of homicide and 'therefore, his confinement
has to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of
said transfer, respondent Municipal Warden could not
produce the body of the 'petitioner before this-
Honorable Court."11

On the morning Deeember 17, 1975, respondent

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and
the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither petitioner
nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There
was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru counsel,
respectfully manifests that he has already been released
from confinement, for which reason the present petition
has been rendered moot and academic .... 12 It would
appear, therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the
matter had indeed become moot and academic. That
disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There
was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N.
Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in
Court on the very day his own petition was reset for
hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his
comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before
this Tribunal. it suffices to call his attention to such failing
by way of guidance for his future actuations as a
member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is

dismissed for being moot and academic.