Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Author(s): Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky

Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 725-740
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688540 .
Accessed: 04/08/2011 15:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Perspectives on Politics.

http://www.jstor.org
Articles

Informal Institutions and Comparative

Politics: A Research Agenda
Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky

Mainstreamcomparativeresearchon politicalinstitutionsfocusesprimarilyon formalrules.Yetin manycontexts,informalinsti-

tutions, rangingfrom bureaucraticand legislativenormsto clientelismand patrimonialism,shapeeven more stronglypolitical
behaviorand outcomes.Scholarswho fail to considertheseinformalrulesof the gameriskmissingmanyof the most important
incentivesandconstraintsthatunderliepoliticalbehavior.In thisarticlewe developa frameworkforstudyinginformalinstitutions
and integratingthem into comparativeinstitutionalanalysis.The frameworkis basedon a typologyof four patternsof formal-
informalinstitutionalinteraction:complementary, accommodating,competing,andsubstitutive.Wethenexploretwo issueslargely
ignored in the literature
on this the
subject: reasons
andmechanismsbehindthe emergenceof informalinstitutions,andthe nature
of theirstabilityandchange.Finally,we considerchallengesin researchon informalinstitutions,includingissuesof identification,
measurement,and comparison.

ver the last two decades,institutionalanalysishas
become a central focus in comparative politics.
Fueled by a wave of institutional change in the
developingand postcommunistworlds,scholarsfrom diverse
researchtraditionshave studied how constitutionaldesign,
electoral systems, and other formal institutional arrange-
ments affectpoliticaland economic outcomes.1These stud-
ies have produced important theoreticaladvances.
Nevertheless,a growingbody of researchon LatinAmer-
ica,2 postcommunist Eurasia,3Africa,4and Asia5 suggests
GretchenHelmkeis assistantprofessorofpolitical scienceat
the Universityof Rochester(hlmk@mail. Her
rochester.edu).
bookCourts Under Constraints:Judges, Generals,and
Presidentsin Argentina,will bepublishedby CambridgeUni-
versityPress.StevenLevitskyis associateprofessorofgovern-
mentat Harvard University(levitsky@wcfia.harvard. edu).
He is the authorof TransformingLabor-BasedParties
in Latin America:Argentine Peronismin Comparative
Perspectiveand is currentlywritinga bookon competitive
authoritarianregimesin thepost-Cold Warera. The
authorsthank the Weatherhead Centerfor International
Affairsat HarvardUniversityand the KelloggInstitutefor
InternationalStudiesat the Universityof Notre Damefor
generouslysponsoringconferenceson informalinstitutions.The
authorsalsogratefullyacknowledgecommentsrJomJorge
Dominguez,Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran
Hyden,JackKnight,LisaMartin, Hillel Soifer,Benjamin
Smith, SusanStokes,Maria VictoriaMurillo,and Kurt
Weyland,as well as threeanonymousreviewersand the
editorsof Perspectiveson Politics.
that many "rulesof the game" that structurepolitical life
are informal-created, communicated, and enforced out-
side of officially sanctioned channels.6Examples abound.
For decades, Mexican presidentswere selected not accord-
ing to rules in the Constitution, the electorallaw, or party
statutes,but rathervia the dedazo("bigfinger")-an unwrit-
ten code that gave the sitting presidentthe right to choose
his successor,specified the candidatepool, and prohibited
potentialcandidatesfrom openly seekingthe job.7 In Japan,
the "strictbut unwrittenrules"ofAmakudari("descentfrom
heaven"), through which retiring state bureaucrats are
awarded top positions in private corporations, have sur-
vived decades of administrativereform.8In Central Asia,
clan-based norms have "become the rules of the game,"
while the constitutionalstructurescreatedafterthe collapse
of the Soviet Union are "increasingly... inconsequen-
tial."9And in much of the developing and postcommunist
world, patternsof clientelism, corruption, and patrimoni-
alismcoexistwith (and often subvert)new democratic,mar-
ket, and state institutions.10
Attention to informal institutions is by no means new
to political science. Earlier studies of "prismatic soci-
eties,"11 "moraleconomies,"12"economiesof affection,"13
legal pluralism,14clientelism,15corruption,16and consoci-
ationalism,17as well as on government-businessrelations
in Japan,18blat in the Soviet Union,19 and the "folkways"
of the U.S. Senate20highlightedthe importanceof unwrit-
ten rules. Nevertheless, informal rules have remained at
the marginsof the institutionalistturn in comparativepol-
itics. Indeed, much current literatureassumes that actors'
incentives and expectations are shaped primarily,if not
exclusively,by formal rules. Such a narrow focus can be

December 2004 1Vol. 2/No. 4 725

Articles | InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
problematic,forit risksmissingmuchof whatdrivespolit-
ical behaviorand can hindereffortsto explainimportant
political phenomena.21
This articlebroadensthe scopeof comparative research
on politicalinstitutionsby layingthe foundationfora sys-
tematicanalysisof informalrules.Our motivationis sim-
ple: good institutionalanalysisrequiresrigorousattention
to both formaland informalrules.Carefulattentionto
informalinstitutions is criticalto understandingthe incen-
tivesthat enableand constrainpoliticalbehavior.Political
actorsrespondto a mix of formaland informalincen-
tives,22and in some instances,informalincentivestrump
the formalones. In postwarItaly,for example,normsof
corruptionwere"morepowerfulthanthe lawsof the state:
the lattercould be violatedwith impunity,while anyone
who challengedthe conventionsof the illicitmarketwould
meetwithcertainpunishment."23 To takea differentexam-
ple, althoughBrazilianstate law prohibitsextra-judicial
executions,informalrulesandprocedures withinthepublic
securityapparatus enable and even encouragepoliceofficers
to engagein suchkilling.24Thusofficerswho killsuspected
violentcriminalsknow they will be protectedfrompros-
ecutionandpossiblyrewarded witha promotionorbonus.25
In suchcases,a strictanalysisof the formalruleswouldbe
woefullyinsufficientto understandthe incentivesdriving
behavior.
Considerationof informalrulesis also often criticalto
explaininginstitutionaloutcomes.Informalstructures shape
the performance of formalinstitutionsin importantand
often unexpectedways.For example,executive-legislative
relationscannot alwaysbe explainedstrictlyin termsof
constitutionaldesign. Neopatrimonialnormspermitting
unregulatedpresidentialcontroloverstateinstitutionsin
Africaand LatinAmericaoftenyielda degreeof executive
dominancethat far exceedsa presidents'constitutional
authority.26Informalinstitutionsmayalso limitpresiden-
tialpower.In constitutionalterms,Chilepossesses"oneof
the mostpowerfulpresidencies in theworld."27 Yet,dueto
a setof informalinstitutionsthatencouraged executivecon-
sultationandpowersharing,Chileanpresidentssystemati-
callyunderusedtheirconstitutional duringthe
prerogatives
1990s;28consequently,Chile was cited as an exception in a handshake, ortherulesof dating)andeconomic(e.g.,black
regioncharacterizedby presidentialdominance.29
Informalinstitutionsalsomediatethe effectsof electoral rulesof the game.We restrictour analysisto the modern
rules.For example,Costa Rica'sproportionalrepresenta- period,whencodificationof lawis nearlyuniversal.Before
tion systemand ban on congressional reelectionofferno
to performconstituencyser-
formalincentiveforlegislators
vice. YetCostaRicanlegislatorsroutinelyengagein such
activities in response to informal, party-sponsored "dis-
In the areaof candidateselection,
tricts"andblacklisting.30
studiesin theUnitedStatessuggestthatbecausecommitted
votersaremorelikelyto participatein primaries,primary
systemsencouragethe electionof ideologicallypolarizing
candidates.31 clientelism,where
Yetin a contextof pervasive
primaryparticipationis limited largely to people induced
726 Perspectives on Politics
to vote by local brokers,such electionsare won not by
ideologicalcandidates
butby thosewiththelargestpolitical
machine.32
Informalinstitutionsalsoshapeformalinstitutionalout-
comesin a less visibleway:by creatingor strengthening
incentivesto complywith formalrules.In otherwords,
they maydo the enablingand constrainingthat is widely
attributedto formalinstitutions.33
SincetheFederalist
Papers,
scholarshaverecognizedthatthe normsunderlyingformal
institutionsmatter.The stabilityof the UnitedStates'pres-
identialdemocracyis not only a productof the ruleslaid
out in the Constitution,butis alsorootedin informalrules
(such as gracious losing, the underuse of certain formal
andbipartisan
prerogatives, consensuson criticalissues)that
preventformalchecksandbalancesfromdeteriorating into
severeconflictamongthe branchesof government.
Thesearehardlyisolatedexamples.Informalrulesshape
formalinstitutionaloutcomesin areassuch as legislative
politics,34 judicial politics,35 party organization,36cam-
paignfinance,37regimechange,38federalism,39 publicadmin-
istration,40and state building.41
Bringingtogethera largebut disparatebodyof scholar-
ship,we developa researchagendaaimedat incorporating
informalinstitutions
intothetheoretical toolkitsusedbystu-
dentsof comparative In
politics.42 the sectionwe clarify
first
the conceptof informalinstitution,distinguishingit not only
fromthatof formalinstitution,butalsofromotherinformal
phenomena,includingweakinstitutions,informalbehav-
ioralregularities,
informalorganizations,andculture.Inthe
secondsectionwe examinehow formaland informalrules
interact.Expanding on theworkof Hans-Joachim Lauth,43
wedistinguish among fourtypesof informalinstitution:
com-
plementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.
The thirdandfourthsectionsaredevotedto issuesof infor-
malinstitutionalemergenceandchange-questionslargely
ignoredin recentcomparative research.Finally,we discuss
specificchallenges relatedto researchon informalinstitu-
tions, such as issuesof identification,measurement,and
comparison.
A few caveatsarein order.Althoughthe terminformal
institutionencompassesa wide rangeof social (e.g., the
markets)institutions,we areconcernedonly withpolitical
this period,our distinctionbetweenformaland informal
rulesis less meaningful.Finally,althoughwe drawon a
broadrangeof cases,the exampleswe cite are illustrative
only, not comprehensive.
What InformalInstitutions Are
(and Are Not)
The terminformalinstitutionhasbeenappliedto a dizzy-
ing array of phenomena, including personal networks,44
clientelism,45corruption,46clans and mafias,47civil soci-
ety,48traditionalculture,49and a varietyof legislative,judi-
cial, and bureaucraticnorms.We proposea more precise-
and analyticallyuseful-definition of informal institution.
It should captureas much of the universeof informalrules
as possible, but it must be narrow enough to distinguish
informal rules from other, noninstitutional, informal
phenomena.
We begin with a standard definition of institutions as
rulesand procedures(both formaland informal)that struc-
ture social interactionby constrainingand enabling actors'
behavior.50How to distinguish between formal and infor-
mal institutionsis, however,less clear.Some scholarsequate
informal institutions with cultural traditions.51 Others
employ a state-societaldistinction, treating state agencies
and state-enforcedrules as formal, and the rules and orga-
nizationswithin civil society as informal.52Still others dis-
tinguish between informalnorms,which areself-enforcing,
and formalrules,which areenforcedby a third party,often
the state.53
Each conceptualizationfails to captureimportant infor-
mal institutions.Forexample,althoughsome informalinsti-
tutions are undoubtedly rooted in cultural traditions,
many-from legislative norms to illicit patterns of party
finance-have little to do with culture. With respect to
the state-societaldistinction, many institutions within the
state (frombureaucraticnorms to corruption)arealso infor-
mal,54while the rules governing many nonstate organiza-
tions (such as corporations and political parties and
corporations)are widely considered to be formal. Finally,
although the self-enforcingdefinition is analyticallyuseful,
it fails to account for the fact that informal rules may be
externallyenforced(for example,by clan and mafiabosses),
even by the state itself (i.e., organizedstate corruption).55
We employ a fourth approach.We define informalinsti-
tutions as sociallysharedrules, usuallyunwritten, that are
created,communicated,and enforcedoutsideof officiallysanc-
tioned channels.56By contrast,formal institutions are rules
and proceduresthatarecreated,communicated,and enforced
through channelswidely accepted as official.This includes
state institutions (courts, legislatures,bureaucracies)and
state-enforcedrules (constitutions, laws, regulations),but
also what Robert C. Ellicksoncalls "organizationrules,"or
the officialrules that governorganizationssuch as corpora-
tions, political parties,and interestgroups.57
Distinguishing between formal and informal institu-
tions, however,is only half the conceptual task. "Informal
institution" is often treated as a residual category, in the
sense that it can be applied to virtually any behavior that
departsfrom, or is not accounted for by, the written-down
rules.To avoid this pitfall,we must say more about what an
informal institution is not.
Four distinctions areworth noting. First,informalinsti-
tutionsshouldbe distinguishedfromweakinstitutions.Many
formalinstitutions areineffective,in that rulesthat exist on
paperarewidely circumventedor ignored.Yetformalinsti-
tutional weakness does not necessarilyimply the presence
of informalinstitutions.It may be that no stableor binding
rules-formal or informal-exist. For example,in his sem-
inal articleon delegativedemocracy,GuillermoO'Donnell
arguedthat in much of Latin America, the formal rules of
representativedemocracyareweakly institutionalized.58In
the absenceof institutionalizedchecks on executivepower,
the scope of permissiblepresidentialbehaviorwidened con-
siderably,which resulted in substantialabuse of executive
authority.In subsequentwork, O'Donnell highlightedhow
particularisticinformal institutions, such as clientelism,
undermined the effectiveness of representative institu-
tions.59O'Donnell'swork points to two distinct patternsof
formalinstitutionalweaknessthat should not be conflated.
Clientelism and abuses of executive authorityboth depart
from formal rules, but whereas the former is an informal
institution, the latteris best understoodas noninstitutional
behavior.
Second, informalinstitutionsmust be distinguishedfrom
other informal behavioral regularities.Not all patterned
behavior is rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations
about others' behavior.60Behavioralregularitiesmay be a
productof a varietyof incentives.To cite an exampleoffered
by Daniel Brinks,61removing one's hat in church is an
informal institution, whereasremovingone's coat in a res-
taurantis simply a behavioralregularity.In the latter case,
leaving one's coat on may bring physicaldiscomfort,but it
is not expected to triggersocial disapprovalor sanction.To
be consideredan informalinstitution, a behavioralregular-
ity must respond to an established rule or guideline, the
violation of which generatessome kind of external sanc-
tion. To take anotherexample, public graftis clearlyinfor-
mal behavior, but only some patterns of graft should be
considered institutional. Where graft is enforced from
above,62or where it is rooted in widely sharedexpectations
among citizensand public officials(and a refusalto go along
risks incurringimportant costs),63corruption may indeed
be an institution. By contrast,where graft is neither exter-
nally sanctioned nor rooted in sharedexpectations,but is
rathera responseto low public sector salariesand ineffec-
tive enforcement,it may be best characterizedas a behavior
pattern.
Third, informalinstitutionsshould be distinguishedfrom
informal organizations.Although scholars often incorpo-
rate organizationsinto their definition of institution,64it
is useful, following Douglass North, to separatethe polit-
ical actors (or "players")from the rules they follow.65
Just as formal organizations (such as political parties or
unions) may be distinguishedfrom formal rules, informal
organizations (clans, mafias) should be distinguished
from informalinstitutions.Nevertheless,informalrulesmay
be embedded within these organizations,and just as for-
mal political organizations are studied under the rubric
of "institutionalism,"clans, mafias, and other informal
December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 727
Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics

structures may be usefully Figure 1

incorporated into informal A typology of informal institutions
institutional analysis.
Finally,we returnto the dis- Effective formal Ineffective formal
tinction betweeninformalinsti- Outcomes institutions institutions
tutionsand the broaderconcept
Convergent Complementary Substitutive
of culture.Culturemay help to
shapeinformalinstitutions,and Divergent Accommodating Competing
the frontierbetween the two is
a criticalareafor research.66In
our view, however,the best way
to pursue this agenda is to cast informal institutions in tion noncompliance. Where formal rules and procedures
relativelynarrowterms by defining informal institution in areineffective,actorsbelievethe probabilityof enforcement
termsof sharedexpectationsratherthansharedvalues.Shared (and hence the expected cost of violation) will be low.
expectationsmay or may not be rooted in broadersocietal These two dimensions produce the fourfold typology
values.67Distinguishing between sharedvalues and shared shown in figure 1. The types located in the upperleft (com-
expectationsallowsfuturescholarsto analyzepotentialcausal plementary)and lower right (competing) cells correspond
relationshipsbetween cultureand informalinstitutions,such to the "functional"and "dysfunctional"types that predom-
as whethersocietalvaluesreinforceor undermineparticular inate in much of the literature.The typology also yields two
informal institutions. novel types (accommodatingand substitutive)that allow us
to make sense of other, less familiarinstitutional patterns.

Four Types of InformalInstitution

Formal and informal institutions interact in a variety of
ways. In this section, we develop a typology aimed at cap-
turing these relationships.68Characterizationsof formal-
informal institutional relationshipstend to fall into one of
two sharplycontrastingcategories.One camp treatsinfor-
mal institutions as functional, or problem solving, in that
they providesolutions to problemsof social interactionand
coordination,69which enhance the efficiency or perfor-
mance of formalinstitutions.70A second camp treatsinfor-
mal institutions as dysfunctional, or problem creating.
Clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism are said to
undermine the performanceof formal democratic,market,
and state institutions.71However, recent studies suggest a
more complex picture than envisioned by either camp, in
which informal institutions at times reinforceor substitute
for the formal institutions they appearto undermine.
To capture these differences,our typology is based on
two dimensions.The firstis the degreeto which formaland
informal institutional outcomes converge.The distinction
hereis whetherfollowing informalrulesproducesa substan-
tively similar or differentresult from that expected from a
strict and exclusive adherenceto formal rules. Where fol-
lowing the informal rule leads to a substantivelydifferent
outcome, formal and informal institutions diverge.Where
the two outcomes are not substantivelydifferent, formal
and informal institutions converge.
The second dimension is the effectivenessof the relevant
formal institutions, that is, the extent to which rules and
proceduresthat exist on paper are enforced and complied
with in practice.72Effectiveformalinstitutions actuallycon-
strain or enablepolitical actors'choices. Actors believe that
there is a high probabilitythat officialauthoritieswill sanc-
Complementary informal institutions
The left side of the figure correspondsto informal institu-
tions that coexist with effective formal institutions, such
that actors expect that the rules that exist on paperwill be
enforced. The upper left corner combines effective formal
rulesand convergentoutcomes, producingwhat Lauthcalls
complementary informalinstitutions.73Such institutions"fill
in gaps"either by addressingcontingencies not dealt with
in the formal rules or by facilitatingthe pursuit of individ-
ual goals within the formal institutionalframework.These
informal institutions often enhance efficiency. Examples
include the myriad norms, routines, and operating proce-
dures that ease decision making and coordination within
bureaucracies,74and judicial norms (such as the opinion
assignmentproceduresand the "Ruleof Four")that facili-
tate the work of the U.S. SupremeCourt.75
Complementaryinformalinstitutionsmay also serveas a
foundation for formal institutions, creatingor strengthen-
ing incentivesto comply with formalrulesthat might other-
wise exist merelyon paper.76Thus scholarshave linked the
effectivenessof the U.S. Constitution to a complementary
set of sharedbeliefsand expectationsamong citizens.77Like-
wise, the efficiencyof Singapore'spostcolonial bureaucracy
(the formalorganizationof which resembledthose of Indo-
nesia and the Philippines) has been attributedto underly-
ing norms of meritocracyand discipline.78Rural Chinese
villagegovernmentsaremore likely to providepublic goods
where there exist informal norms of social obligation gen-
erated by membership in local temple associations.79In
each case, informal institutions do not merely exist along-
side effective formal ones, but rather play a key role in
making effectivethe formal rules of the game.

728 Perspectives on Politics

Accommodating informal institutions
The lower left cornerof figure 1, which combines effective
formalinstitutions and divergentoutcomes, correspondsto
accommodatinginformal institutions.These informal insti-
tutions create incentives to behave in ways that alter the
substantiveeffectsof formalrules, but without directlyvio-
lating them; they contradictthe spirit, but not the letter,of
the formal rules.Accommodatinginformal institutions are
often createdby actorswho dislike outcomes generatedby
the formal rules but are unable to change or openly violate
those rules.As such, they often help to reconciletheseactors'
interests with the existing formal institutional arrange-
ments. Hence, although accommodatinginformal institu-
tions may not be efficiency enhancing, they may enhance
the stabilityof formal institutions by dampening demands
for change.
Chile'sexecutive-legislative power-sharingmechanismsare
a clear example. Leadersof the Democratic Concertation
inheritedan "exaggeratedly strongpresidentialsystem"and a
majoritarian electoral systemthat rancounterto theirgoal of
maintaining a broad multipartycoalition.80Lackingthe leg-
islativestrengthto amend the 1980 Constitution, Concer-
taci6n elites createdinformalmechanismsof interpartyand
executive-legislativeconsultationaimed at counteractingits
effects.These power-sharingarrangements"enhancedcoali-
tional trust"in a formalconstitutionalsettingthat otherwise
"providedvery few incentivesfor cooperation."81
Dutch consociationalpracticesmay also be characterized
as accommodating. The Netherlands' post-1917 democ-
racy was based on a set of "informal,unwritten rules"of
elite accommodation and power sharing, including exten-
sive consultationin policy making, mutualveto power,and
the proportionalallocationof governmentjobs among polit-
ical parties.82Although these cartel-likearrangementsvio-
lated the democratic spirit of the Dutch constitution (by
limiting the power of the vote), they reducedclassand reli-
gious conflict, therebyenhancing democraticstability.83
Accommodatinginformalrulesalso emergedwithin state
socialistinstitutionsin the SovietUnion. Becausestrictadher-
ence to the formal rulesgoverningSoviet political and eco-
nomic life did not allow enterprisesto fulfill state targetsor
permit individuals to meet basic needs, a set of informal
norms-commonly known as blat-emerged in which indi-
viduals met these goals through personal networks.84Not
strictlyillegal, blat enabled factorymanagers,workers,and
bureaucratsto "find a way around formal procedures."85
By helping enterprisesto fulfill state targetsand individuals
to obtain essentialgoods and services,this informalsystem
of exchangewas criticalto the survivalof the Sovietsystem.86
Competing informal institutions
On the right side of figure 1 we find informal institutions
that coexist with ineffective formal institutions. In such
cases, formal rules and proceduresare not systematically
enforced, which enables actors to ignore or violate them.
The cell in the lower right cornercombines ineffectivefor-
mal rules and divergent outcomes, producing competing
informalinstitutions.These informalinstitutions structure
incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal
rules:to follow one rule, actors must violate another. Par-
ticularisticinformal institutions such as clientelism, patri-
monialism,clan politics,and corruptionareamongthe most
familiar examples.87Thus postwar Italian corruption was
embedded in "alternativenorms"underwhich actorscould
violate certainstate laws "with impunity,"88whereasthose
who adheredto the law "metwith certainpunishment."89
Competing informalinstitutionsareoften found in post-
colonial contextsin which formalinstitutionswereimposed
on indigenous rules and authoritystructures.In postcolo-
nial Ghana,civil servantswere officiallyinstructedto follow
the rulesof the publicbureaucracy, but as RobertPricefound,
most believedthey would pay a significantsocial cost (such
as a loss of standingin the community) if they ignoredkin-
shipgroupnormsthatobligedthem to providejobsandother
favorsto their families and villages.90Similarly,scholarsof
legalpluralismhavearguedthat the imposition of European
legalsystemscreated"multiplesystemsof legalobligation."91
Becausethesesystems"embodiedverydifferentprinciplesand
procedures,"92adherenceto custom law at times requireda
violation of state law (and vice versa).
Substitutive informal institutions
Finally,the upper right corner,which combines ineffective
formal institutions and compatible outcomes, corresponds
to substitutiveinformalinstitutions.93Like complementary
institutions,substitutiveinformalinstitutionsareemployed
by actorswho seek outcomes compatiblewith formalrules
and procedures.Like competing institutions,however,they
exist in environmentswhere formal rules are not routinely
enforced. Hence, substitutiveinformal institutions achieve
what formalinstitutionsweredesigned,but failed,to achieve.
Substitutiveinstitutionstend to emergewherestatestruc-
tures are weak or lack authority. During Mexico's pro-
tracteddemocratictransition,formalinstitutionsof electoral
dispute resolution(such as the electoralcourts)lackedcred-
ibility and were frequentlybypassed.In this context, offi-
cialsof the nationalgovernmentand the oppositionNational
Action Partyresolvedpostelection disputes through infor-
mal concertacesiones, or "gentleman'sagreements."94Con-
certacesiones thus served as a "waystation"for government
and opposition elites until formal institutions of electoral
disputeresolutionbecamecredible.95In ruralnorthernPeru,
where state weaknessresultedin inadequatepolice protec-
tion and ineffective courts during the late 1970s, citizens
createdinformal rondascampesinas(self-defensepatrols)to
defend their communities and rondaassemblies(informal
courts) to resolve local disputes.96In rural China, some
local officialscompensate for the state'sincapacityto raise
December 2004 1Vol. 2/No. 4 729
Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
revenueand provide public goods by mobilizing resources
throughtemple and lineageassociations,thereby"substitut-
ing the use of these informal institutions for ... formal
politicalinstitutionalchannelsof publicgoods provisions."97
Taken together, these four types suggest that informal
institutionscannotbe classifiedin simpledichotomous(func-
tional versus dysfunctional) terms. Although substitutive
informal institutions such as concertacesiones and rondas
campesinas subvert formal rules and procedures,they may
help achieveresults(resolutionof postelectoralconflict,pub-
lic security) that the formal rules failed to achieve. And
althoughaccommodatinginformalinstitutionssuch as con-
sociationalism violate the spirit of the formal rules, they
may generateoutcomes (democraticstability)thatareviewed
as broadlybeneficial.It remainsan open question, however,
whether accommodating and substitutive institutions can
contributeto the developmentof moreeffectiveformalstruc-
tures, or whether they "crowdout" such development (by
quelling demands for formal institutional change or creat-
ing new actors, skills, and interestslinked to the preserva-
tion of the informalrules).98The following two sections lay
a foundation for addressingsuch questions.
Origins of InformalInstitutions
To date, much empiricalliteratureon informalinstitutions
has neglected questions of why and how such institutions
emerge.99Analysesof entrenchedcompeting informalinsti-
tutions such as custom law,clientelism,and patrimonialism
frequentlytake them as historicalgivens, or part of a static
cultural landscape, rarelyasking why they emerged in the
first place. As a result, they often understatethe degree to
which informal institutions are modified, adapted,or even
reinventedover time.100Meanwhile, many existing expla-
nations (particularly studies of complementary institu-
tions) confronta majorpitfallof earlyfunctionalistaccounts
of formal institutions:they explain the emergenceof infor-
mal institutionsprimarilyin termsof theirpurportedeffects
(e.g., the efficiency gains they yield), without identifying
the mechanismsby which they arecreated.101For example,
many earlyrational-choiceanalysestreatedinformalnorms
as efficient solutions to problems of cycling, information,
or collectiveaction.102Although such explanationsmay par-
tially explain the persistenceof informal institutions once
established,they areinsufficient,if not misleading,for gen-
erating theories about institutional emergence. In this sec-
tion we seek to move beyond static and functionalist
accounts, arguingthat compelling explanationsof informal
institutions must not only ask why actors create informal
rules, but also examinehow actorscreateand communicate
those rules.
Why Informal Institutions?
We focus our discussion here on informal institutions that
areendogenousto formalinstitutionalstructures.103 In other
730 Perspectives on Politics
words, why, given the existenceof a set of formal rules and
rule-makingmechanisms,do actorschoose to createinfor-
mal rules?Building on the previous section, we see three
generalmotivations.
First,actorscreateinformalrules becauseformal institu-
tions areincomplete.104Formalrulesset generalparameters
for behavior,but they cannot cover all contingencies. Con-
sequently,actorsoperatingwithin a particularformal insti-
tutional context, such as bureaucraciesand legislatures,
develop norms and proceduresthat expedite their work or
addressproblemsnot anticipatedby formal rules.105
Second,informalinstitutionsmaybe a "secondbest"strat-
egy for actorswho prefer,but cannot achieve,a formalinsti-
tutional solution.106 In some cases, actors simply lack the
power to changethe formalrules.Thus post-Pinochetelites
in Chilecreatedinformalpower-sharing arrangementsbecause
they lacked the political strength to rewritethe 1980 Con-
stitution.107Similarly,Soviet workersand managersopted
for the informalityof blatin partbecausetheywere unableto
reformor do awaywith state socialistinstitutions.
A broader statement of this motivation, elaboratedby
Carol Mershon, is that actors create informal institutions
when they deem it less costly than creatingformal institu-
tions to their liking.108In postwar Italy,Christian Demo-
cratic leaders who sought to keep the communist and
neofascistpartiesout of power found it easierto develop an
informal"formula"to excludethose partiesfrom governing
coalitions than to push through parliamenta majoritarian
electoralsystemaimed at strengtheninglargemoderatepar-
ties.109Similarly,Costa Rican partyleaders'use of informal
devices to induce legislatorsto engage in constituency ser-
vice may have been easier than overturning the ban on
legislativereelection.1l0
Inventing informal institutions may also be a second-
best strategywhere formal institutions exist on paper but
are ineffectivein practice.In the case of substitutiveinfor-
mal institutions, for example, actors create informal struc-
tures not becausethey dislike the formal rules, but because
the existing rules-and rule-makingprocesses-lack credi-
bility.Thus Mexican opposition leadersengagedin concert-
acesionesduring the 1990s because they did not view the
formal electoral courts as credible, and Peruvianvillagers
created rondascampesinasbecause the state judicial system
failed to enforce the rule of law.
A third motivation for creating informal institutions is
the pursuit of goals not considered publicly acceptable.
Becausethey are relativelyinconspicuous,"1informalinsti-
tutions allow actors to pursueactivities-ranging from the
unpopular to the illegal-that are unlikely to stand the
test of public scrutiny. Even where bribery,patrimonial-
ism, and vote-buyingarewidely accepted,prevailingnorms
of universalismprevent their legalization. Norms of lax
enforcement-what the Dutch call gedogen-provide
anotherexample.112Prostitution,soft drug use, and eutha-
nasia (or abortion in predominantly Catholic countries)
are legally proscribedbut widely tolerated. The informal
proceduresenabling extrajudicialexecutions in Brazilmay
also be explained in these terms.113
Informal institutions may also be created in pursuit of
goals that are not internationallyacceptable.For example,
the geopolitical changes produced by the end of the Cold
War raised the external cost of maintaining openly (e.g.,
military or Leninist one party) authoritarianregimes dur-
ing the 1990s, which led many autocraticelites to adopt
formal democratic institutions. To maintain power in this
new internationalcontext, autocratsin countrieslike Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan,Kenya, Peru, Russia, Ukraine, and Zim-
babwe resorted to informal mechanisms of coercion and
control, rangingfrom use of paramilitarythugs to elaborate
systems of vote buying, fraud, co-optation, espionage, and
blackmail.14
Understandingwhy actorscreateinformalinstitutions is
not, however,sufficientto explainhow they areestablished.
Incompletenessdoes not by itself explain how the need for
additional rules translatesinto their creation (or, for that
matter,why informal,ratherthan formal,rulesareadopted).
Where informalinstitutions area second-beststrategy,why
are actorswho lack the capacityto change the formal rules
neverthelessable to establish and enforce informal ones?
And where actors share certain illicit goals, how are they
able to establish mechanisms that effectively circumvent
the formalrules?In short, to avoid the functionalisttrap,it
is essentialto examine the mechanismsby which informal
institutions are established.
How InformalInstitutions are Created
and Communicated
The construction of informal institutions differsmarkedly
from formal rule-makingprocesses.Whereas formal rules
are created through official channels (such as executives
and legislatures)and communicated and enforced by state
agencies (such as the police and courts), informal rules are
created, communicated, and enforced outside of public
channels, and usuallyoutside of the public eye. The actors
who create and enforce them may deny having done so.
Hence, their origins are often unclear.1l5
Preciselybecauseof these differences,scholarsshould take
the process of informal rule-makingseriously by identify-
ing the actors, coalitions, and interestsbehind the creation
of informal rules.To the extent that these rules are created
in a context in which power and resourcesare unevenly
distributed, they can be expected to produce winners and
losers.ll6 Thus, following Jack Knight,117scholarsshould
be sensitive to underlying processes of conflict and coer-
cion, ratherthan assume pure coordination.
Processes of informal institutional emergence vary. In
some cases,the processis "topdown";informalinstitutions
may be a product of elite design and imposition (the Mex-
ican dedazo,Dutch consociationalism),or they may emerge
out of elite-level strategicinteraction (Mexico'sconcertace-
siones). In other instances (corruption, clientelism, blat)
informalrulesemergeout of a decentralizedprocessinvolv-
ing a much largernumber of actors. In either process,we
may understandmechanismsof emergencein termsof focal
points, l8 repeatedinteraction,119or bargaining.120Alter-
natively, informal institutional creation may be a histori-
callycontingent processin which informalstructuresarean
unintended product of particularconflicts and compro-
mises. For example, Amakudarioriginated as a makeshift
strategyby Japaneseministry officialsseeking to reconcile
prewarnorms of lifetime employment with postwar reali-
ties of resource scarcity and strict seniority systems.121
Although such informal institutions may ultimately take
on functions that are perceived as efficient or beneficial,
these functions often have little to do with their origins.
Analysesof the originsof informalinstitutionsmust also
account for how they arecommunicatedand learnedin the
absence of written down rules and public enforcement. In
some cases, informal institutionalizationappears to be a
processof sociallearningthroughwidely observedinstances
of trialand error.The Mexican dedazowas institutionalized
through a "processof learningby example,"as PRI leaders
who broke the informal rules during the 1940s and 1950s
suffered political defeat and marginalization,while those
who playedby the rules"wererewardedwith betterposts."122
Similarly,postwar Italian prime ministers who broke the
informal rule that gave parties the right to name govern-
ment ministers "sawtheir governmentsmeet rapid ends."
Their successorsquickly "learnedthe lesson," and by the
mid-1950s, "the rule of negotiated decisions by party and
faction leadershad been hammeredout."123
Socialnetworksand politicalorganizationsmayalsotrans-
mit informal rules. Thus the norms of Amakudariwere
diffused through social networks that linked universities,
state bureaucracies,and privatecorporations,124 and infor-
mal networkswithin the Peruvianand Ukrainianstatescom-
municated the rules of corruption and blackmail that
sustainedautocraticregimesduring the 1990s.125Political
parties also carry informal rules. Parties communicated
power-sharingarrangementsin Chile, the Netherlands,and
postwarItaly;126 partyorganizationsenforcedthe systemof
kickbacksand briberyin Italy;127 and competinglocal party
leadersspread rondascampesinasacrossnorthernPeru.128
In sum, moving beyond functionalist accounts entails
identifying the relevantactors and interests behind infor-
mal institutions, specifying the process by which informal
rulesare created,and showing how those rulesare commu-
nicated to other actors in such a manner that they evolve
into sets of sharedexpectations.
InformalInstitutional Change
Informalinstitutions areoften characterizedas highly resis-
tant to change, possessinga "tenacioussurvivalability."129
December 2004 1Vol. 2/No. 4 731
Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
When change occurs, it is expected to be slow and incre-
mental.130Lauth, for example, argues that because infor-
mal rules "do not possess a center which directs and
co-ordinatestheir actions,"informalinstitutionalchange is
likely to be an "extremelylengthy"process.131Yet informal
institutions do change-and often quite quickly. The
centuries-oldChinese practiceof foot-binding disappeared
within a generation,132and many of the informalrulesthat
structuredMexican elite politics for much of the twentieth
century (includingthe dedazo)collapsedquicklyduringthe
late 1990s.133
Severalsources may generate the impetus for informal
institutional change. One important source is formal insti-
tutional change.The impact of formal rule changesshould
not, of course, be overstated;many informal institutions
have proved resilienteven in the face of large-scalelegal or
administrativereform.134Nevertheless, to the extent that
formal institutional change alters the costs and benefits of
adhering to particularinformal rules, it can serve as an
important catalystfor informal institutional change.
Two typesof formalinstitutionalchangearerelevanthere.
The first is change in formal institutional design. Particu-
larly for informal institutions that are endogenous to for-
mal structures,a change in the design of the formal rules
may affectthe costs and benefitsof adheringto relatedinfor-
mal rules, which can produce rapid informal institutional
change. In the case of complementary informal institu-
tions, for example,modifying the relevantformalrulesmay
change the natureof the gaps that the informal institution
had been designed to address,which may createincentives
for actors to modify or abandon the informal rule. The
1974 Bill of Rights of Subcommitteesin the House of Rep-
resentatives"produceda sharp change in formal rules that
overrodepreviousinformal committee structures."135
Informal institutional change may also be a product of
changes in formal institutionalstrengthor effectiveness.In
such cases, changes in the level of enforcement of formal
rulesalter the costs and benefitsadheringto informalinsti-
tutions that compete with or substitutefor those rules. For
example, compliancewith competing informalinstitutions
becomes more costly with increased enforcement of the
formal rules, and at some point, these costs will induce
actors to abandon the informal institution. Thus the
increasedjudicialenforcementtriggeredby the Mani Pulite
investigations weakened corruption networks in Italy;136
the tight controls imposed by the postrevolutionarystate
weakenedtraditionalgift-givingnorms in Maoist China;137
and federalenforcementof civil rightslegislationweakened
Jim Crow practicesin the South.
Increased formal institutional effectiveness may also
weaken substitutiveinformalinstitutions. When the credi-
bility of previouslyineffectiveformalstructuresis enhanced,
the benefits associatedwith the use of substitutiveinstitu-
tions may diminish,potentiallyto the point of theirdispens-
ability. For example, the increasedcredibility of Mexico's
732 Perspectives on Politics
electoral courts over the course of the 1990s reduced the
incentive of opposition leaders to work through informal
concertacesiones, 138and the increasedeffectivenessof Peru's
public security and judicial systems led to the collapse of
many rondascampesinasand rondaassemblies.139
Other sources of informal institutional change lie out-
side the formalinstitutionalcontext. For scholarswho view
informalinstitutionsprimarilyas a productof culture,infor-
mal institutional change is rooted primarilyin the evolu-
tion of societal values.l40 Because such shifts tend to be
glacialin pace, this patternof informalinstitutionalchange
will be slow and incremental.We might understand the
erosionof traditionalor kinship-basedpatternsof authority
in Europe in these terms.
Informal institutions may also change as the status quo
conditions that sustain them change. 1 Developments in
the external environment may change the distribution of
power and resourceswithin a community,weakeningthose
actors who benefit from a particularinformal institution
and strengtheningthosewho seekto changeit. Thus Mexico's
increasinglycompetitive electoral environment during the
1990s strengthenedlocal PRI leadersand activistsvis-a-vis
the nationalleadership,which allowed them to contest and
eventuallydismantle the dedazosystem.'42In the Nether-
lands, a long-term decline in class and religious identities
strengthened new parties that challenged the consocia-
tional rules of the game and induced establishedpartiesto
abandon them.143The growth of middle-classelectorates
erodes the bases of clientelism by reducing voters' depen-
dence on the distributionof selectivematerialgoods.144In
these cases,informalinstitutionalchange tends to be incre-
mental, as actors graduallyreorient their expectations to
reflect underlying changes in their and others' bargaining
power.
Other analytictools may be needed to explainsome rapid
informal institutional change or collapse. Tipping models
offer one such tool.145These models suggest that if a suffi-
ciently large enough number of actors become convinced
that a new and betteralternativeexists, and if a mechanism
exists through which to coordinate actors'expectations, a
shift from one set of norms to another may occur quite
rapidly. Gerry Mackie argues that the move to end foot
binding in China hinged on creating an alternativemar-
riagemarketthat allowedsons to marrydaughterswho had
naturalfeet, therebyescapingconventional inferiority.'46
Figure 2 summarizesthese sources of informal institu-
tional change. As the figure suggests, informal institutions
vary considerablywith respect to both the source and the
pace of change.Whereassome (complementary,accommo-
dating) are highly susceptibleto changes in formal institu-
tional design, others (substitutive, competing) are more
likely to be affected by changes in formal institutional
strength.With respectto the pace of change, culturalevo-
lution is likely to produce incrementalchange, but formal
institutional change or coordination around an alternative
 CV)
equilibrium may trigger the rapid collapse of informal
co
CO E institutions.
c: 0
0 t-
c
0
a) 0L_
0)
co
0) Research Challenges: Identification,
L2 Q.
.--
C CZ
Measurement, and Comparison
0
0
a) co 0C Bringing informal institutions into mainstreamcompara-
a
.1
ai tive institutional analysisposes a new set of researchchal-
E E CO 0
E
E S
x 0 C: V)
0)
C
lenges.A majorissue is identifyingand measuringinformal
LU o R :5 c O
c :5 institutions. In formal institutional analysis, this task is
0O C
0 0.)
= .?:5
C.s
C
-5 co -0
relativelystraightforward.Because formal institutions are
usuallywrittendown and officiallycommunicatedand sanc-
CD 28Q X C 0
c: 0
a
<sl^)
_ m *
0
C
o_
.O.
0 tioned, their identificationand measurementoften requires
I'-.D i O i
uc
~0 little knowledgeof particularcases,which facilitateslarge-n
8\2 0
LLI IE C
W comparison.Identifyinginformalinstitutions is more chal-
lenging. A country'sconstitution can tell us whether it has
a presidentialor parliamentarysystem of government,but
it cannot tell us about the pervasivenessof clientelism or
~c .~ ~c CZ kinship networks.
E One way of identifying informal institutions is to look
(0
.? ?c0 for instances in which similar formal rules produce differ-
o
._ 0 C
)
>> ent outcomes and then attributethe differenceto informal
o 0
institutions.147Although the logic of this approachis clear,
E0 - c
it reduces informal institutions to a residualcategory and
E ? a > m risksconflatinginformalinstitutionsand weak institutions.
An alternativestrategyis to identifystablepatternsof behav-
ior that do not correspondto formal rules. However, this
co - o
approachruns the risk of treatingall behavioralregularities
0 as informalinstitutions.
At a minimum, efforts to identify informal institutions
should answerthree basic questions.148First,what are the
actors'sharedexpectationsabout the actualconstraintsthey
*5 1 y5, .c face?Only by examiningactors'mutualunderstandingof the
rules can one distinguish between informal behavior pat-
ternsand informalinstitutions.Second,what is the commu-
c C C nity to which the informalrulesapply?Whereasthe domain
of a formal institution is often delineatedby laws or other
statutes,the domain of informalrulesis often more difficult
to discern.The relevantcommunitymaybe avillage,a nation,
C. : (
O)
Eo CO 0
UO
an ethnicor religiousgroup,or an organizationsuchasa polit-
icalparty,legislature,or statebureaucracy.In some cases,the
C o C- C relevantcommunityis a politicalelite,the boundariesofwhich
s are often blurry.Third, how are informalrules enforced?If
OC C a, f g)
informalbehavioris rule-bound,then violations must trig-
0 0 E- E
4) ger externalsanction. Unlike formal enforcement mecha-
oC o Cm
C .C c-:
0-
nisms (police, courts),informalsanctioningmechanismsare
E C: .-
CE often subtle, hidden, and even illegal.They may rangefrom
o
c E
o.~
E
_
ac
o
( D.
zin hostileremarks,gossip,ostracism,andotherdisplaysof social
0? 0"
oL
0? 0r O? disapprovalto extrajudicialviolence.149
Identifying the shared expectations and enforcement
c mechanismsthat sustaininformalinstitutionsis a challeng-
0 ? .S a) ^ r S
.^ 0
4 ,
0 01:::7)
CD0-
0
'-
1:::7
E)
0
0C ing task, requiringin most cases substantialknowledge of
0 22, '
oU1, L~c 0 ~~ S
the community within which the informal institutions are
*-
embedded. Hence there is probablyno substitutefor inten-
o
sive fieldworkin informalinstitutionalanalysis.Indeedmost

December 2004 [ Vol. 2/No. 4 733

Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
studies of informal institutions take the form of either
abstracttheory (N=0) or inductive case studies (N= 1).150
Case studies provide essentialbuilding blocks for compari-
son and theory building. However,a more generalbody of
theorywill requirescholarsto incorporateother methods as
well.
One such method is rigoroussmall-n comparison.With-
out losing the sensitivity to context that characterizescase
studies, small-n analysescan begin to identify patterns of
informal institutional effects, formal-informalinstitutional
interaction, and informal institutional change. For exam-
ple, Kathleen Collins'scomparativestudy of three Central
Asian statesenabledher to examinethe interactionbetween
clan networks and different formal regime types.'51 Simi-
larly, Scott Desposato's analysis of legislative behavior in
five Brazilian states with varying degrees of clientelism
allowed him to consider how clientelism affects the func-
tioning of legislatureswith similarformal structures.152
Large-nsurveysmay alsoproveusefulin researchon infor-
mal institutions. Surveyresearchmay captureactors'expec-
tations and beliefs about the "actual"rules of the game.
Here it is important to distinguish between conventional
surveys that capture values or attitudes toward particular
institutions (e.g., the World Values Survey) and those
designedto capturesociallysharedbeliefsabout constraints
thatindividualsface.An exampleof the latteris SusanStokes's
analysisof informalinstitutions of accountabilityin Argen-
tina, which uses surveydata to demonstratethe existencein
some parts of the country of shared citizen expectations
that voters will punish politicians who behave dishonest-
ly.153Although expectations-basedsurveysmay initially be
limited to identifying of informal institutions, they might
eventuallybe used to generateand test causalclaims.
Conclusion
SinceJamesMarchand Johan P.Olsen declaredthat "anew
institutionalismhas appearedin politicalscience,"154research
on political institutions has advanced considerably. Yet
because the comparativepolitics literaturehas focused pri-
marily on formal institutions, it risks missing many of the
"real"incentivesand constraintsthatunderliepoliticalbehav-
ior.Indeed,rational-choiceanalysesof institutionshavebeen
criticized for an "excessiveattention to formal rules"and
"insufficientattention to firmly establishedinformal prac-
tices and 'institutions.'"'55
We have sought to provide a frameworkfor incorporat-
ing informal rules into mainstreaminstitutional analysis.
Farfrom rejectingthe literatureon institutions, we seek to
broaden and extend it, with the goal of refining, and ulti-
matelystrengthening,its theoreticalframework.We see sev-
eral areasfor future research.First,we must posit and test
hypotheses about how informal rules shape formal institu-
tional outcomes. For example, how do clientelism and
patronagenetworksmediate the effectsof electoraland leg-
734 Perspectives on Politics
islative rules?156In comparativepolitics, the issue of how
informal institutions sustain or reinforce-as opposed to
undermine or distort-formal ones has not been well
researched.When institutionsfunction effectively,we often
assume that the formal rules are driving actors' behavior.
Yet in some cases, underlyinginformal norms do much of
the enabling and constrainingthat we attributeto the for-
mal rules.
Second, we need to theorize more rigorouslyabout the
emergence of informal institutions and particularlyabout
the mechanismsthrough which informal rules are created,
communicated,and learned.Some seeminglyage-old infor-
mal institutions are in realityrelativelyrecent reconfigura-
tions (or reinventions);this fact makes the issues of origins
all the more compelling.157
Third, we need to betterunderstandthe sourcesof infor-
mal institutional stability and change. One question not
addressedin this article is that of codification of informal
rules.In some instances,state actorsopt to legalizeinformal
institutions that are perceived to compete with or under-
mine formalrules.SeveralLatinAmericangovernments"con-
stitutionalized"aspects of indigenous law (granting them
constitutional status) during the 1990s in an effort to
enhance compliance with state law.158Similarly,in Argen-
tina, in an effort to regulatePresidentCarlos Menem'suse
of extraconstitutionaldecree authority,legislatorsincluded
a provision for executive decrees in the 1994 Constitu-
tion.159We need to know more about what induces state
actorsto formalizeratherthan oppose informalinstitutions.
Comparativepolitics researchon informalinstitutions is
still at an incipient stage. Advances are likely on several
fronts, ranging from abstractformal modeling to ethno-
graphicstudies to survey research.New insights will come
from a varietyof disciplines, including anthropology,eco-
nomics, law, sociology, and political psychology.Hence, it
is essentialto promotea broadand pluralisticresearchagenda
that encouragesfertilizationacrossdisciplines,methods, and
regions. Given the range of areasin which informal rules
and organizationsmatterpolitically,it is essentialthat polit-
ical scientists take the real rules of the game seriously-
whether they arewritten into parchmentor not.
Notes
1 For an excellent surveyof this literature,see Carey
2000.
2 Taylor 1992; Hartlyn 1994; O'Donnell 1996; Siave-
lis 1997; Starn 1999; Van Cott 2000; Levitsky2001;
Levitsky2003; Helmke 2002; Brinks2003a; Eisen-
stadt 2003.
3 Clarke 1995; Ledeneva1998; Borocz2000; Easter
2000; Sil 2001; Collins 2002a, 2003; Grzymala-
Busseand Jones Luong 2002; Way 2002; Gel'man
2003.
4 Dia 1996; Sandbrookand Oelbaum 1999; Hyden
2002; Lindberg2003; Galvan2004.
 5 Yang 1994; Hamilton-Hart 2000; Wang 2000; 50 See North 1990; Knight 1992; Carey2000.
Gobel 2001; Tsai 2001, 2004; Colignon and Usui 51 Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. Pejovichdefines informal
2003. institutions as "traditions,customs, moralvalues, reli-
6 For generalanalysesof informal institutions, see gious beliefs, and all other norms of behaviorthat
North 1990; Knight 1992; O'Donnell 1996; Lauth have passedthe test of time .... Thus, informalinsti-
2000. tutions are the part of a community'sheritagethat
7 Langston2003. we call culture"(p. 166).
8 Colignon and Usui 2003. 52 Boussard2000; Manor 2001; Tsai 2002.
9 Collins 2002b, 23, 30. 53 Knight 1992; Calvert 1995.
10 O'Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000; Borocz 2000; Gibel 54 Hamilton-Hart 2000; Grzymala-Busseand Jones-
2001; Lindberg2003. Luong 2002; Colignon and Usui 2003.
11 Riggs 1964. 55 Waterbury1973; Darden 2002; Langston2003.
12 Scott 1976. 56 This definitionborrowsfrom Brinks2003a and is con-
13 Hyden 1980. sistent with North 1990; O'Donnell 1996; Carey
14 Hooker 1975; Griffiths1986. 2000; and Lauth 2000. We treat informal institu-
15 Scott 1972; Lemarchand1972; tions and norms synonymously.However,norms
16 Scott 1969; Waterbury1973; Rose-Ackerman1978. have been defined in a varietyof ways, and some con-
17 Lijphart1975. ceptualizationsdo not include externalenforce-
18 Johnson 1974, 1982. ment. See Elster 1989.
19 Bauer,Inkeles, and Kluckhohn 1956; Berliner 1957. 57 Ellickson 1991, 31.
20 Matthews 1959. 58 O'Donnell 1994.
21 O'Donnell 1996; Weyland 2002. 59 O'Donnell 1996.
22 North 1990. 60 See Hart 1961; Knight 1992.
23 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999, 15. 61 Brinks2003a.
24 Brinks2003a, 2003b. 62 Waterbury1973; Darden 2002.
25 Brinks2003b. 63 Manion 1996; Della Portaand Vannucci 1999.
26 O'Donnell 1994; Hartlyn 1994; Sandbrookand Oel- 64 See Huntington 1968.
baum 1999. 65 North 1990.
27 Siavelis2002a, 81. 66 North 1990; Galvan 2004.
28 Siavelis2002b. 67 For example, some indigenous institutions in Latin
29 O'Donnell 1994. Americadraw on culturaltraditionsbut others do
30 Taylor 1992. not. See YrigoyenFajardo2000; Van Cott 2003.
31 Wright and Berkman 1986. 68 Lauth2000 distinguishesamong threetypesof formal-
32 Levitsky2001; 2003. informal institutional relationships:complementary,
33 Stokes 2003. substitutive,and conflicting. He does not elabo-
34 Mershon 1994; Desposato 2003. rate on these types, however.
35 Helmke 2002; Van Cott 2003; Bill Chavez 2004. 69 Ullman-Margalit1978; Axelrod 1986.
36 Freidenbergand Levitsky2002; Langston2003; Lev- 70 Weingast 1979; Weingast and Marshall1988; March
itsky 2003. and Olsen 1989.
37 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999; Samuels2003. 71 O'Donnell 1996; Borocz 2000; Lauth 2000; Collins
38 Collins 2002a, 2002b; Ottaway 2003. 2002a.
39 Way 2002. 72 By effectiveness,we do not mean efficiency.History
40 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999; Hamilton-Hart is litteredwith examplesof inefficientinstitutions
2000; Colignon and Usui 2003. that neverthelesseffectivelyshaped actors' expecta-
41 Darden 2002; Grzymala-Busseand Jones Luong tions (North 1990).
2002; Tsai 2004. 73 Lauth 2000.
42 For other efforts in this direction, see Lauth 2000 74 March and Olsen 1989.
and Pasotti and Rothstein 2002. 75 Maltzmanand Wahlbeck 1996; Epstein and Knight
43 Lauth 2000. 1997.
44 Wang 2000. 76 Stokes 2003.
45 O'Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000. 77 North, Summerhill,and Weingast,2000.
46 B6r6cz 2000; Darden 2002. 78 Hamilton-Hart 2000.
47 Lauth 2000; Collins 2002a; Collins 2003. 79 Tsai 2004.
48 Boussard2000; Manor 2001. 80 Siavelis2002b, 10-11.
49 Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. 81 Ibid., 21.

December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 735

Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics

82 Lijphart1975, 122-38. ones), or they may be createdwithout taking pre-

83 Ibid. existing informal structuresinto account (as occurred
84 Bauer,Inkeles, and Kluckhohn 1956; Berliner 1957; with many colonial institutions).
Ledeneva 1998. 104 Johnson 2002.
85 Ledeneva 1998, 43, 1. 105 March and Olsen 1989; Nelson and Winter 1982;
86 Berliner1957; Ledeneva1998. Guanxi,or personalrela- Weingast 1979; Weingastand Marshall 1988.
tionships maintained by gift giving and reciprocal 106 We thank Susan Stokes for suggesting this point.
favors,playeda similarrole in post-Maoist China. See 107 Siavelis2002b.
Yang 1994. 108 Mershon 1994.
87 O'Donnell 1996; Borocz 2000; Lauth 2000; Collins 109 Ibid.
2002a, 2003; Lindberg2003. Accordingto O'Donnell 110 Taylor 1992.
(1996, 40), particularisticnorms are "antagonistic 111 Mershon 1994, 50.
to one of the main aspectsof the full institutionalpack- 112 Van Oenen 2001.
age of polyarchy.... Individualsperformingroles 113 Brinks2003a.
in political and state institutions are supposed to be 114 Darden 2002; Levitskyand Way 2002; Schedler
guided not by particularisticmotives but by uni- 2002; Ottaway 2003.
versalisticorientationsto some version of the public 115 See, for example, Starn'saccount of the disputed ori-
good.... Where particularismis pervasive,this gins of the ronda campesinasin Peru (1999, 36-69)
notion is weaker,less widely held, and seldom and Ledeneva's(1998) analysisof the origins of
enforced." blat in the Soviet Union.
88 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999, 146, 15. 116 Knight 1992.
89 Ibid., 15, 122. 117 Ibid.
90 Price 1975. 118 Schelling 1960.
91 Hooker 1975, 2; also Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988. 119 Sugden 1986; Schotter 1981; and Calvert 1995.
92 Merry 1988, 869. 120 Knight 1992
93 Lauth 2000. 121 Johnson 1974; Colignon and Usui 2003. Similarly,
94 Eisenstadt2002; Eisenstadt2003. norms of restraintand flexibilitywithin Japan'ssecu-
95 Eisenstadt2002. rity forces have been tracedto the intense socio-
96 Starn 1999. political conflicts in the aftermathof World War II
97 Tsai 2001, 16. (Katzenstein1996).
98 Wang 2000; Tsai 2001. 122 Langston2003, 14-16.
99 The question of informal institutional emergence 123 Mershon 1994, 67-68.
has been the subject of a largeliteraturewithin for- 124 Colignon and Usui 2003.
mal political theory. See Schotter 1981; Knight 125 Darden 2002; Moreno Ocampo 2002.
1992; Calvert 1995. 126 Siavelis2002b; Lijphart1975; Mershon 1994.
100 For example, some indigenous institutions widely 127 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999, 93-124.
viewed as "traditional"are in fact recent creations 128 Starn 1999.
that merelydrawon earliertraditions.See Starn 1999; 129 North 1990, 45; See also Dia 1996; O'Donnell
Van Cott 2000, 2003; Galvan 2004. 1996; Pejovich 1999; Collins 2002b.
101 For a critique, see Knight 1992. 130 North 1990; Lauth 2000.
102 See, for example, earlywork on legislativenorms by 131 Lauth 2000, 24-25.
Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Wein- 132 Mackie 1996.
gast and Marshall1988. 133 Langston2003.
103 Many informal institutions emerge endogenously 134 Dia 1996; O'Donnell 1996; Pejovich1999. Forexam-
from formal institutional arrangements.Actors cre- ple, Amakudaripersistedfor decadesdespite multi-
ate them in an effort to subvert, mitigate the ple legislativereformsaimedat its eradication(Colignon
effectsof, substitutefor,or enhancethe efficiencyof for- and Usui 2003, 43-49); clan politics in Central
mal institutions. However,other informal institu- Asiasurvivedthe riseand fallof the SovietUnion (Col-
tions develop independently of formal institutional lins 2002a, 2002b); and many Soviet-eranorms sur-
structures, in response to conditions that are vived Russia'stransitionfrom state socialism to a
unrelatedto (and frequentlypre-date)the formalinsti- marketeconomy (Clarke 1995; Sil 2001).
tutional context. Formalinstitutions may then be 135 North 1990, 88.
built on the foundation of these informal institu- 136 Della Portaand Vannucci 1999.
tions (actorsmay formalizepre-existinginformal 137 Yang 1994.
rules or use them as the bases for designing formal 138 Eisenstadt2002.

736 Perspectives on Politics

139 Starn 1999. Boussard,Caroline. 2000. Democratic consolidation:The
140 North 1990; Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. role of informal institutions. Illustrationsfrom Central
141 Knight 1992. America. Paperpresentedat the 22nd International
142 Langston2003. Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,
143 Lijphart1975. Miami, FL, March 16-18.
144 Kitschelt2000. Brinks,Daniel. 2003a. Informalinstitutions and the rule
145 Schelling 1960, 1978. of law:The judicial responseto state killings in Bue-
146 Mackie 1996. nos Aires and Sao Paulo in the 1990s. ComparativePol-
147 See, for example, North 1990. itics36 (1): 1-19.
148 For a more elaboratediscussion of how to identify . 2003b. Courts, norms, and laws: Competing rules
and measureinformal institutions, see Brinks2003b. and legal rights in Salvador,Sao Paulo, and Buenos
149 An additionalproblem, identified by Brinks(2003b), Aires. Paperpresentedat the conferenceInformalInsti-
is that some informalrulespermit, but do not require, tutions and Politics in LatinAmerica, Kellogg Insti-
certain behavior.Under rules of this type, actors tute for InternationalStudies,Universityof Notre Dame,
who refrainfrom the permittedbehavior(e.g., govern- April 24-25.
ment officialswho choose not to collect bribes) do Calvert,Randall. 1995. The rationalchoice theory of
not breakthe informalrule and thus will not be sanc- social institutions:Cooperation, coordination,and
tioned. In such cases, sanctions are likely to be communication." In Modernpolitical economy:Old
applied only to actorswho seek to formallysanction topics,new directions,ed. JeffreyS. Banks and Eric A.
behaviorpermittedby the informalrules-i.e., whis- Hanushek, 216-67. New York:CambridgeUniver-
tle blowers. sity Press.
150 Within the case study tradition, a more microlevel Carey,John M. 2000. Parchment,equilibria,and institu-
approachis to construct analyticnarrativesthat tions. ComparativePoliticalStudies33 (6): 735-61.
blend elements of deductive and inductive reason- Clarke,Simon, ed. 1995. Managementand industryin Rus-
ing. See Bates et al. 1998. sia: Formaland informalrelationsin theperiod of transi-
151 Collins 2002a. tion. Aldershot,UK: EdwardElgar.
152 Desposato 2003. Colignon, RichardA, and Chikako Usui. 2003. Amaku-
153 Stokes 2003. dari: The hiddenfabric ofJapanseconomy.Ithaca:Cor-
154 March and Olsen 1984, 734. nell UniversityPress.
155 Weyland 2002, 67. Collins, Kathleen.2002a. Clans, pacts and politics in Cen-
156 On these questions, see Kitschelt 2000; Desposato tralAsia."Journalof Democracy13 (3): 137-52.
2003 and Taylor-Robinson2003. .2002b. Clans, pacts, and regime transitionsin
157 Van Cott 2000, 2003; Galvan 2004. CentralAsia. Paperpresentedat the conferenceInfor-
158 YrigoyenFajardo2000; Van Cott 2000, 2003. mal Institutions and Politics in the Developing World,
159 FerreiraRubio and Goretti 1998, 56-57. WeatherheadCenter for InternationalAffairs,Har-
vard University,April 5-6.
.2003. The politicalroleof clansin CentralAsia. Com-
References parativePolitics35 (2): 171-90.
Axelrod, Robert. 1986. An evolutionaryapproachto Darden, Keith. 2002. Graft and governance:Corruption
norms."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview80 (4): as an informal mechanism of state control. Paper
1095-1111. presentedat the conference Informal Institutions and
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, MargaretLevi, Jean- Politicsin the DevelopingWorld,WeatherheadCen-
LaurentRosenthal,and BarryR. Weingast. 1998. Ana- ter for InternationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity,
lytic narratives.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. April 5-6.
Bauer,RaymondA, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn. Della Porta, Donatella, and Alberto Vannucci. 1999. Cor-
1956. How the Sovietsystemworks:Cultural,psychologi- rupt exchanges: Actors,resources,and mechanismsofpolit-
cal, and socialthemes.Cambridge:HarvardUniver- ical corruption.New York:Aldine de Gruyter.
sity Press. Desposato, Scott W. 2003. How informalelectoralinstitu-
Berliner,Joseph S. 1957. Factoryand mangerin the USSR. tions shape the legislativearena.Paperpresentedat the
Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. conferenceInformalInstitutionsand Politicsin Latin
Bill Chavez, Rebecca.2004. The rule of law in nascent America,KelloggInstitutefor InternationalStudies,Uni-
democracies:Judicialpolitics in Argentina.Stanford, versityof Notre Dame, April 24-25.
CA: StanfordUniversityPress. Dia, Mamadou. 1996. Africa'smanagementin the 1990s
Borocz,J6szef.2000. InformalityRules. EastEuropeanPol- and beyond: Reconciling indigenous and transplanted
itics and Societies14 (2): 348-80. institutions.Washington:World Bank.

December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 737

Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
Easter,GeraldM. 2000. Reconstructing thestate:Personalnet-
worksand elite identityin SovietRussia.New York:Cam-
bridge UniversityPress.
Eisenstadt,Todd. 2002. Trust but verify:How Mexico's
oppositionforcedelectoraldisputeresolutionfrom bar-
gaining tables to courtrooms and lived to tell about it.
Paperpresentedat the conference InformalInstitu-
tions and Politics in the Developing World, Weather-
head Centerfor InternationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity,
April 5-6.
.2003. Thinking outside the (ballot) box: Informal
electoralinstitutions and Mexico'spolitical opening,
LatinAmericanPoliticsand Society45 (1): 25-54.
Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Orderwithoutlaw: How neigh-
borssettledisputes.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press.
Elster,Jon. 1989. The cementof society:A surveyof social
order.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Epstein, Lee, and JackKnight. 1997. Thechoicesjustices
make.WashingtonDC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress.
FerreiraRubio, Delia and Matteo Goretti. 1998. When
the presidentgovernsalone:The Decretazo in Argen-
tina, 1989-93. In Executivedecreeauthority,ed. John M.
Careyand Mathew SobergShugart,33-61. New York:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Freidenberg,Flavia,and Steven Levitsky.2002. Organiza-
ci6nes Partidistase Institucionalizaci6nInformalen Amer-
ica Latina. Paperpresentedat the LatinAmerican
Congressof PoliticalScience, Universityof Salamanca,
July 9-11.
Galvan, Dennis C. 2004. Thestate must be our masterof
fire: Howpeasantscraftculturallysustainabledevelop-
ment in Senegal.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Gel'man,Vladimir.2003. Post-Soviettransitionsand democ-
ratization:Towardtheory building. Democratization10
(2): 87-104.
Gobel, Christian.2001. Towardsa consolidateddemoc-
racy?Informaland formalinstitutionsin Taiwan'spolit-
ical process. Paperpresentedat the annual meeting
of the AmericanPoliticalScience Association, San Fran-
cisco, August 30-September 2.
Griffiths,John. 1986. What is legal pluralism?Journalof
LegalPluralismand UnofficialLaw 24 (1): 1-56.
Grzymala-Busse,Anna, and PaulineJones Luong. 2002.
Reconceptualizingthe state: Lessons from post-
communism. Politicsand Society30 (4): 529-54.
Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. 2000. The Singaporestate revis-
ited. PacificReview13 (2): 195-216.
Hart, H. L. A. 1961. Theconceptof law. New York:Oxford
UniversityPress
Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1994. Crisis-riddenelections (again)
in the Dominican Republic:Neopatrimonialism,
presidentialism,and weak electoral oversight.
Journal of InteramericanStudiesand WorldAffairs
36 (4): 91-144.
738 Perspectives on Politics
Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. The logic of strategicdefection:
Court-executiverelationsin Argentinaunder dictator-
ship and democracy.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
96 (2): 291-304.
Hooker,M. B. 1975. Legalpluralism:An introductionto colo-
nial and neo-coloniallaws. Oxford: ClarendonPress.
Huntington, SamuelP 1968. Politicalorderin changingsoci-
eties.New Haven: YaleUniversityPress.
Hyden, Goran. 1980. BeyondUjamaain Tanzania:Under-
developmentand an uncapturedpeasantry. London:
Heinemann.
Hyden, Goran. 2002. Why Africa finds it so hard to
develop? Reflections on political representation and
accountability.Paperpresentedat the conferenceCul-
turaland PoliticalFoundationsof Socio-EconomicDevel-
opment in Africaand Asia, Monte Verita,Switzerland,
October 6-11.
Johnson,Chalmers.1974. The reemploymentof retiredgov-
ernmentbureaucratsin Japanesebig business."AsianSur-
vey 14 (11): 953-65.
1982. MITI and theJapanesemiracle:Thegrowthof
industrialpolicy,1925-1975. Stanford:StanfordUniver-
sity Press.
Johnson, James.2002. Opening questions. Paperpre-
sented at the conferenceInformalInstitutions and
Politics in the Developing World, WeatherheadCenter
for InternationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity,April
5-6, 2002.
Katzenstein,PeterJ. 1996. Culturalnormsand nationalsecu-
rity:Policeand militaryin postwarJapan.Ithaca:Cor-
nell UniversityPress.
Kitschelt,Herbert.2000. Linkagesbetweencitizensand pol-
iticiansin democraticpolitics. Comparative PoliticalStud-
ies 33 (6-7): 845-79.
Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutionsand socialconflict.New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Langston,Joy. 2003. The formal bases of informal power:
Mexico. Paperpresentedat the conferenceInformalInsti-
tutions and Politics in Latin America, Kellogg Insti-
tute for InternationalStudies,Universityof Notre Dame,
April 24-25.
Lauth, Hans-Joachim.2000. Informalinstitutions and
democracy.Democratization7 (4): 21-50.
Ledeneva,AlenaV. 1998. Russiaseconomyoffavours:Blat,net-
workingand informalexchange.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Lemarchand,Rene. 1972. Politicalclientelism and ethnic-
ity in tropicalAfrica:Competing solidaritiesin nation-
building. AmericanPoliticalScienceReview66 (1):
68-90.
Levitsky,Steven. 2001. An "organizeddisorganization":
Informalorganizationand the persistenceof local
party structuresin Argentine Peronism.Journalof Latin
AmericanStudies33 (1): 29-68.
.2003. Transforming labor-basedpartiesin Latin
 America:ArgentinePeronismin comparative perspective.
New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Levitsky,Steven,and LucanA. Way.2002. The riseof com-
petitive authoritarianism.Journalof Democracy13 (2):
51-65.
Lijphart,Arend. 1975. Thepoliticsofaccommodation:Plu-
ralismand democracyin the Netherlands.2nd ed. Berke-
ley: Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Lindberg,SteffanI. 2003. It'sour time to chop: Do elec-
tions in Africafeed net-patrimonialismratherthan coun-
teract it? Democratization10 (2): 121-40.
Mackie, Gerry. 1996. Ending footbinding and infibula-
tion: A convention account. AmericanSociological
Review61 (6): 999-1017.
Maltzman, Forrest,and PaulJ. Wahlbeck. 1996. May it
please the chief? Opinion assignmentin the Rehn-
quist Court. AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience.40 (2):
421-43.
Manion, Melanie. 1996. Corruption by design: Briberyin
Chinese enterpriselicensing.Journalof Law, Economics,
and Organizations.12 (1): 167-95.
Manor,James. 2001. Center-staterelations.In Thesuccess
oflndias democracy, ed. Atul Kohli, 78-102. Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
March,James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. The new institu-
tionalism:Organizationalfactorsin political life. Amer-
ican PoliticalScienceReview78 (3): 734-49.
March,JamesG., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering
institutions:The organizationalbasisofpolitics.New
York:Free Press.
Matthews, Donald R. 1959. The folkwaysof the United
States Senate:Conformity to group norms and legisla-
tive effectiveness.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
53 (4): 1064-89.
Merry,Sally Engle. 1988. Legalpluralism.Law and Soci-
ety Review22 (5): 869-96.
Mershon, Carol A. 1994. Expectationsand informal rules
in coalition formation. ComparativePoliticalStudies27
(1): 40-79.
Moreno Ocampo, Luis. 2002. Corruptionand democracy:
The Peruviancase ofMontesinos. ReVista(Fall):26-29.
Nelson, RichardR., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An evo-
lutionarytheoryof economicchange.Cambridge:Har-
vard UniversityPress.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions,institutionalchange,
and economicperformance.New York:CambridgeUni-
versity Press.
North, DouglasC., WilliamSummerhill,and BarryR. Wein-
gast. 2000. Order,disorder,and economic change:
Latin AmericaversusNorth America. In Governingfor
prosperity,ed. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton
L. Root, 17-58. New Haven: YaleUniversityPress.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative democracy.Jour-
nal of Democracy5 (1): 55-69.
1996. Another institutionalization:LatinAmerica
and elsewhere.Kellogg InstituteWorking Paper222.
Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute for International
Studies.
Ottaway,Marina.2003. Democracychallenged:The riseof
semi-authoritarianism. Washington:CarnegieEndow-
ment for InternationalPeace.
Pasotti, Eleanora,and Bo Rothstein. 2002. In the market
for ideas:A quest for a unified conceptual approachin
political science. Paperpresentedat the annual meet-
ing of the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,August
29-September 1, Boston.
Pejovich,Svetozar.1999. The effectsof the interactionof for-
mal and informalinstitutionson social stabilityand eco-
nomic development.Journalof Marketsand Morality
2 (2): 164-81.
Price, Robert M. 1975. Societyand bureaucracy in contem-
poraryGhana.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Riggs, FredW. 1964. Administrationin developingcoun-
tries:The theoryofprismaticsociety.Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin.
Rose-Ackerman,Susan. 1978. Corruption:A studyin polit-
ical economy.New York:Academic Press.
Samuels, David. 2003. Campaign finance as informal
contractinginstitutions:Brazilin comparative
perspective."Paperpresentedat the conference
InformalInstitutions and Politics in Latin America,
Kellogg Institute for InternationalStudies, University
of Notre Dame, April 24-25.
Sandbrook,Richard,and Jay Oelbaum. 1999. Reforming
the political kingdom: Governanceand development
in Ghana'sFourth Republic. Center for Democracy and
Development, CriticalPerspectivesPaperNo. 2.
Schedler,Andreas.2002. The menu of manipulation.Jour-
nal of Democracy13 (2): 36-50.
Schelling,Thomas C. 1960. Thestrategyof conflict.Cam-
bridge:HarvardUniversityPress.
1978. Micromotivesand macrobehavior. New York:
W. W. Norton.
Schotter,Andrew.1981. The economictheoryof socialinsti-
tutions. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Scott, JamesC. 1969. Corruption, machine politics, and
political change. AmericanPoliticalScienceReview63
(4): 1142-58.
1972. Patron-clientpolitics and political change
in SoutheastAsia. AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
66 (1): 91-113.
1976. The moral economy of the peasant:Rebel-
lion and subsistencein SoutheastAsia. New Haven:
YaleUniversityPress.
Shepsle, KennethA., and BarryR. Weingast. 1981. Struc-
ture induced equilibriumand legislativechoice. Public
Choice37: 503-19.
Siavelis,Peter.1997. Executive-legislativerelationsin post-
Pinochet Chile: A preliminaryassessment.In Presiden-
tialismand democracyin Latin America,ed. Scott
December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 739
Articles I InformalInstitutions
and ComparativePolitics
Mainwaringand Mathew Sobert Shugart,321-62.
New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
. 2002a. Exaggeratedpresidentialismand moderate
presidents:Executive-legislativerelationsin Chile. In Leg-
islativepolitics in Latin America,ed. Scott Morgen-
stern and Benito Nacif, 79-113. New York:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
. 2002b. Informalinstitutions and democratization:
TheoreticallessonsfromChile. Paperpresentedat the con-
ferenceInformalInstitutionsand Politicsin the Devel-
oping World, Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs,HarvardUniversity,April 5-6, 2002.
Sil, Rudra.2001. Privatization,labor politics, and the
firm in post-Soviet Russia:Non-market norms, market
institutions, and the Soviet legacy.In Thepolitics of
labor in a global age: Continuityand changein late-
industrializingand post-socialisteconomies,ed. Christo-
pher Candland and RudraSil, 205-32. New York:
Oxford UniversityPress.
Starn, Orin. 1999. Nightwatch:Thepolitics ofprotestin the
Andes.Durham: Duke UniversityPress.
Stokes, Susan C. 2003. Do informal institutions make
democracywork?Accounting for accountabilityin
Argentina. Paperpresentedat the conferenceInformal
Institutions and Politics in Latin America, Kellogg
Institute for InternationalStudies, Universityof Notre
Dame, April 24-25.
Sugden, Robert. 1986. The economicsof rights,cooperation,
and welfare.New York:Basil Blackwell.
Taylor,Michelle. 1992. FormalversusInformalIncentive
Structuresand InformalBehavior/Journalof Politics
54 (4): 1055-73.
Taylor-Robinson,Michelle. 2003. The difficult road from
Caudillismoto democracy,or Can clientelism comple-
ment democraticelectoralinstitutions?Paperpre-
sented at the conference Informal Institutions and
Politics in Latin America, Kellogg Institute for Inter-
nationalStudies,Universityof Notre Dame, April24-25.
Tsai, Lily Lee. 2001. Substitutingfor the state?The logic
of privateefficiencyin Chinese local governance.
Paperpresentedat the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, San Francisco,August
30-September 2.
Tsai, Lily Lee. 2002. Cadres, temple and lineage institu-
tions, and governancein ruralChina. The ChinaJour-
nal48 (July): 1-27.
.2004. The informalstate:Governanceand develop-
740 Perspectives on Politics
ment in ruralChina. PhD diss., Departmentof Govern-
ment, HarvardUniversity.
Ullman-Margalit,Edna. 1978. The emergenceof norms.
Oxford: ClarendonPress.
Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2000. A politicalanalysisof legalplu-
ralismin Bolivia and Colombia. Journalof Latin Ameri-
can Studies32 (1): 207-34.
. 2003. Legalpluralismand informalcommunity jus-
tice administrationin LatinAmerica. Paperpresented
at the conference Informal Institutions and Politics in
LatinAmerica,KelloggInstitutefor InternationalStud-
ies, Universityof Notre Dame, April 24-25.
Van Oenen, Gijs. 2001. Citizenship and "informalrule of
law."How lax enforcementcan sustain the rule of law.
Paperpresentedat the annual meeting of the Latin
AmericanStudiesAssociation,Washington,DC, Septem-
ber 6-8.
Wang, Hongying. 2000. Informalinstitutions and foreign
investment in China. PacificReview13 (4): 525-56.
Waterbury,John. 1973. Endemic and planned corruption
in a monarchicalregime. WorldPolitics25 (4): 533-55.
Way, Lucan A. 2002. The dilemmas of reform in weak
states:The caseof post-Sovietfiscaldecentralization."
Pol-
itics and Society30 (December):579-98.
Weingast,Barry.1979. A rationalchoice perspectiveon con-
gressionalnorms. AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience
23 (2): 245-62.
Weingast, BarryR., and William J. Marshall. 1988. The
industrialorganizationof congress;or, Why legisla-
tures, like firms, are not organizedas markets.Journal
of PoliticalEconomy96 (1): 132-63.
Weyland, Kurt. 2002. Limitationsof rational-choiceinsti-
tutionalismfor the studyof LatinAmericanpolitics. Stud-
ies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopment37 (1):
57-85.
Wright,GeraldC., Jr.,and MichaelB. Berkman.1986. Can-
didatesand policy in United StatesSenateelections.Amer-
ican PoliticalScienceReview80 (2): 567-88.
Yang,MayfairMei-hui. 1994. Gifts,favors, and banquets:
Theart of socialrelationshipsin China. Ithaca:Cornell
UniversityPress.
YrigoyenFajardo,Raquel.2000. The Constitutionalrecog-
nition of indigenouslaw in Andeancountries.In Thechal-
lengeof diversity:Indigenouspeoplesand reformof the
statein LatinAmerica,ed. Willam Assies, Gemma van
der Haar,and Andre Hoekema, 197-222. Amster-
dam: Thela Thesis.