Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5321 September 27, 2006

RAMON C. GONZALEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, C.J.:

Disbarment cases are sui generis. Being neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are not intended to inflict
penal or civil sanctions. The main question to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be
an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.

The Case and the Facts

This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by Ramon C. Gonzalez with the Office of the Bar Confidant
of the Supreme Court. The Complaint was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.2 Complainant charged Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz with grave
misconduct, abuse of authority, and acts unbecoming a lawyer. The antecedents were summarized by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) as follows:

"x x x [C]omplainant alleges that on 11 August 2000, while he was driving along the South
Superhighway upon entering the Sucat Toll Gate heading towards Makati, respondent, who was driving
a Nissan Infiniti suddenly cut across his path while overtaking him and almost hit his car had he not
been able to evade it. According to complainant, he chased respondent's car and when he was side by
side with respondent's car, he angrily confronted respondent and then drove on. Complainant claims that
respondent then chased him and shot him twice but fortunately missed him by a few inches[,] but broken
glass coming from the shattered window allegedly hit him and slightly wounded his right arm and
stomach. Complainant adds that respondent allegedly tried to escape but he was able to chase him and
block his way at the Nichols Toll Gate where the PNCC guards responded to his call for assistance.
According to complainant, respondent attempted to escape and avoid the PNCC guards by 'proclaiming
boisterously that he is a lawyer and a customs official' but complainant was able to block his way again
and their vehicles collided in the process. Complainant claims that he requested the PNCC guards to
confiscate respondent's firearm and accompany them to the nearest police station. At the time of the
'arrest,' respondent allegedly opened the back door of his car and pretended to have accidentally dropped
so much money which distracted the policemen from further searching the car.

"At the police station, respondent allegedly identified himself and his lady companion, a certain Ferlita
Semeniano, and [said] that he was the Deputy Customs Collector assigned at Batangas City.
Complainant claims that respondent yielded 'one (1) Super .38 cal. Springfield Automatic Pistol, SN
NMII 3138, one (1) magazine with seven (7) live ammos and three (3) spent (empty) shells.'
Complainant adds that respondent presented only an unsigned Memorandum Receipt (MR) of the
firearm without any Mission Order or Permit to Carry. Complainant claims that respondent allegedly
kept calling persons to help him and a 'fabricated Mission Order was brought and presented by another
person more than eight hours after the shooting incident and apprehension.'
 "Complainant alleges that the Nissan Infiniti used by respondent is allegedly a luxury vehicle which was
not covered by any document whatsoever and 'it was not verified whether stolen or smuggled.'

"Complainant finally alleges that the PNP Crime Laboratory examined his car and 'they recovered one
slug in between the wall of the left rear door while the other bullet went through the right front seat and
exited at the left rear door of complainant's car and that cases of Frustrated Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearms were already filed at the Parañaque City Prosecutor's Office.

xxx xxx xxx

"In his Comment dated 04 January 2001, respondent claims that the present administrative case is
unfounded and unwarranted and was allegedly filed in bad faith, with malice and ill motive and
allegedly has no other purpose but to harass, vex, humiliate and dishonor him. In support thereof,
respondent points to the fact that complainant filed 'substantially identical complaint affidavits with the
same identical alleged cause of action as that of the present administrative case at [various] judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals and accused him of forum-shopping.

"Respondent denied the narration of facts stated in complainant's Complaint-Affidavit as 'self-serving, a

misrepresentation of facts and obviously tainted.' Respondent claims that he was not the aggressor
during the incident and that he did not provoke complainant. Respondent claims that he 'justly acted in
self-defense and defense of a stranger under the true actuality of facts and circumstances the[n]
prevailing.'

"Respondent also claims that the acts complained of in the present case were not connected with the
practice of the legal profession and the fact that he was a lawyer is merely coincidental, immaterial and
irrelevant.

xxx xxx xxx

"In connection with the cases filed by the parties against each other, respondent submitted the xxx
Resolutions/Decisions issued in said cases to show that the charges filed against him by the complainant
were dismissed while the criminal cases he filed against the latter [were] filed in court.

xxx xxx xxx

"Finally, it is the submission of the respondent that since the alleged acts complained of are not within
the sphere of his professional duties as a lawyer, but rather are acts done in his non-professional or
private capacity, the same, cannot allegedly be the subject of an administrative complaint for
disbarment."3

Report and Recommendation

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report,4 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rafael Antonio M. Santos said that the dismissal of the
criminal and other administrative charges filed by complainant indicated that respondent's version of the
incident was given credence by the investigating officials and agencies of the various other tribunals in which
these charges were filed. Consequently, since no sufficient evidence warranted the imposition of further
disciplinary sanctions on respondent, the investigating commissioner recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.

In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 dated March 12, 2005, the board of governors of the IBP adopted the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Santos.
On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 2005, complainant asked
this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 of the IBP board of governors. Upon orders of this Court,5
respondent filed on August 22, 2005, his Comment on complainant's plea.

The Court's Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we stress that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent did not erase the occurrence
of the shooting incident, which he himself does not deny. Moreover, this incident has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. Thus, he must face the consequences of his actions.

The first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:

"CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes."6

Furthermore, respondent bound himself to "obey the laws" in his attorney's oath,7 which underscores the role of
lawyers as officers of our legal system. A lawyer's brash transgression of any, especially a penal, law is
repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by this Court.8

Admitting that he fired shots in the direction of complainant while they were speeding along South Luzon
Expressway,9 respondent justifies his actions by claiming self-defense and defense of a stranger. During the
traffic altercation, complainant allegedly exchanged angry words with respondent and, from an open car
window, even threw a handful of coins at the latter.10 Respondent further avers that, from his higher vantage
point, he saw complainant draw a pistol.11 The former contends that when he fired the shots, he had no intention
of hitting complainant but merely wanted to scare him away.

Reviewing the factual circumstances, we are convinced that the defenses proffered are mere afterthoughts.
Based on the physical and documentary evidence, complainant's version of the incident is more credible.

First, the allegation of respondent that complainant hit him with coins is highly improbable. At that time, both
vehicles were speeding along the highway. Since the PNP Crime Laboratory Report12 showed that the bullets
fired by respondent had come from the right side, his vehicle must have been to the right of complainant's. If we
were to accept this version, the coins hurled by complainant had to pass through his car's right window and then
through the left window of respondent's admittedly taller sports utility vehicle (SUV). Given their relative
positions, it is highly incredible that the coins could have hit respondent and his companion.

Second, assuming that respondent and his companion were indeed hit by coins, this alleged fact was not a
sufficient unlawful aggression that would justify shooting at complainant.

As a lawyer, respondent should know that the following three requisites must concur to justify self-defense: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.13 On the other hand, in defense of a
stranger, the first two requisites must also be present together with the element that the person defending was
not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.14
Of these requisites, unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding both self-defense and defense
of a stranger; the fundamental raison d'etre of these defenses is the necessity to prevent or repel an aggression.15
The alleged throwing of coins by complainant cannot be considered a sufficient unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent threat to life and limb.16 There was no
aggression to prevent or repel. Absent this imminent threat, respondent had no legal reason to shoot "in the
direction of complainant."

Third, for lack of supporting evidence, neither can merit be accorded to respondent's claim of imminent threat
after allegedly seeing complainant draw a pistol. The Joint Affidavit17 of PNCC Officers Florencio Celada y
Seso, Jr. and Mario Puso y Visaya mentioned no firearm found in the possession of complainant. Except for the
bare and belated allegations of respondent, there was no showing that complainant's alleged possession of the
pistol had been reported to the PNCC officers or later to the police headquarters. Thus, without proof of the
existence of the firearm, respondent has not convincingly shown any legal justification for his act of firing at
complainant.18

Fourth, right after the shooting incident, respondent fled the scene. He stopped only when PNCC officers
blocked his vehicle in response to complainant's call for assistance. If respondent was only protecting himself
and his companion, then his righteous indignation should have propelled him to report immediately his version
of the incident to the PNCC officers.

Disbarment Proceedings
Sui Generis

Respondent maintains that the dismissal of the cases filed by complainant against him in the various tribunals
and agencies proves that the present case for disbarment is unfounded.

We do not agree.

Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. These cases
are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.19 In Re Almacen,20 the Court discoursed
on this point thus:

"x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, x x x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather investigation[s] by
the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x."21

Respondent's administrative liability stands on grounds different from those in the other cases previously filed
against him; thus, the dismissal of these latter cases does not necessarily result in administrative exculpation.
Settled is the rule that, being based on a different quantum of proof, the dismissal of a criminal case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence does not necessarily foreclose the finding of guilt in an administrative
proceeding.22

Misconduct Committed
in a Private Capacity
Untenable is respondent's argument that the acts complained of cannot be the subject of a complaint for
disbarment, because they were done in his private capacity.

Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct. This penalty is a consequence of acts showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts; as well
as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor.23 When the misconduct committed
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be morally unfit for the office and the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, they may be suspended or disbarred.24

In Cordon v. Balicanta,25 this Court explained the rationale for this holding as follows:

"x x x. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Lawyers are expected to
abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career,
in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character
is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because 'vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence;
he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all.'"26

The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what should have been a simple traffic altercation
reveals his conceit and delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun openly in a congested highway and
exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he showed his utter lack of a sense of responsibility, as
well as of respect for law and order.

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent's gross misconduct. In line with Lao v.
Medel,27 Co v. Bernardino,28 and Saburnido v. Madroño,29 suspension from the practice of law for one year is
appropriate in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED
for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Footnotes
1
Dated August 21, 2000; rollo, pp. 1-2.
2
Resolution dated February 12, 2001; rollo, p. 45.
3
November 5, 2004 Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, pp. 4-13.
4
Id.
5
September 21, 2005 Resolution of the Third Division.
6
Emphasis ours.
7
"I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion. So help me God." (Emphasis supplied)
8
Gonzaga v. Realubin, 312 Phil. 381, March 14, 1995; Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151, February
12, 1990.
9
Respondent's Sworn Statement dated September 3, 2000, p. 2; rollo, p. 65.
10
Id. at 1; rollo, p. 64.
11
Id. at 2; rollo, p. 65.
12
Rollo, p. 59.
13
Revised Penal Code, Article 11(1).
14
Id., Art. 11(3).
15
Rimano v. People, 416 SCRA 569, November 27, 2003; People v. Gonza, 415 SCRA 507, November
11, 2003; People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, June 10, 2003.
16
People v. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463, September 10, 2003; People v. Caratao, supra.
17
Rollo, p. 76.
18
See People v. Diego, 424 Phil. 743, January 17, 2002.
19
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, September 29, 1999.
20
31 SCRA 562, February 18, 1970; see also Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza,
supra.
21
Id. at 600-601, per Castro, J.
22
Pablejan v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006; Office of the Court Administrator v.
Cañete, 441 SCRA 512, 520, November 10, 2004.
23
Calub v. Suller, 380 Phil. 532, January 28, 2000; Saburnido v. Madroño, 418 Phil. 241, September 26,
2001; Lao v. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, July 1, 2003.
 24
Soriano v. Dizon, AC No. 6792, January 25, 2006; Quingwa v. Puno, 125 Phil. 831, February 28,
1967.
25
439 Phil. 95, October 4, 2002.
26
Id. at. 115-116.
27
Supra.
28
349 Phil.16, January 28, 1998.
29
Supra.

=====================================================================

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173940 September 5, 2006

(Formerly CBD Case No. 02-967)

TOMAS G. TAN & CST ENTERPRISES INC., represented by NELSON G. TAN, petitioners,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition stemmed from a pending disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Sometime in January of 2002, petitioner Tomas G. Tan (petitioner Tan), stockholder and director of co-
petitioner CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), discovered that two parcels of land owned by the corporation were used
to obtain loans from Philippine Business Bank (PBB), with the real estate mortgage annotated at the back of the
titles covering the properties. Upon verification, he learned that a certain John Dennis Chua, representing CST,
mortgaged the properties. Chua was purportedly authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation as
shown by the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate dated 04 April 2001 signed by Atty. Jaime N. Soriano
(respondent).

On 28 May 2002, petitioner Tan filed in his personal capacity and as minority stockholder of CST under a
derivative action, a letter-complaint with the IBP charging respondent of deceit, malpractice, falsification of
public documents, gross misconduct and violation of oath of office.1 According to petitioners, respondent has
never been elected as corporate secretary nor acted as such for CST, and in fact no board meeting was held on
30 March 2001 to so authorize John Dennis Chua because on the said date two of three directors, petitioner Tan
and Felipe Chua, were out of the country. Furthermore, John Dennis Chua has never been connected in any
capacity with CST, petitioners aver.2
Petitioners also filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a civil case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
299 and captioned as one for "Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of
Secretary’s Certificate, Injunction," Damages, etc. with Prayer for Issuance of TRO/ Preliminary Injunction,
against respondent, Atty. Stephen Z. Taala and PBB, along with other persons.3

In the course of the proceedings in the said civil case, petitioners claim to have gathered more information and
seen the "extent of the plot or machinations" of respondent and the participation of other individuals, including
Atty. Taala who was the Assistant Vice President for Legal Services of PBB.4 Atty. Taala had testified in Civil
Case No. 02-299 that Felipe Chua personally delivered to him CST’s titles to the mortgaged lots and that Felipe
Chua assured him that respondent is the Corporate Secretary of CST.5 Thus, CST’s loan application was
recommended for favorable consideration.

On 16 June 2003, petitioners filed with the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) a Motion to
Amend/Supplement the Complaint with Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental Complaint,6 claiming that
respondent and Atty. Taala had facilitated and recommended the approval of the allegedly spurious loans and
mortgage entered into by John Dennis Chua. The Commission, however, denied the motion on 28 December
2003 on the ground that the amendments/supplements involve proceedings pending before the trial courts and
that the determination of the matters presented belong to said courts which have already acquired jurisdiction
over them.7

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the order, but the Commission denied the motion, ruling that the
Commission cannot make a premature finding on and/or investigation of the alleged acts of Atty. Taala since
the same are the subject of a pending civil case. Anent the alleged untruthful statements of respondent, the
Commission ruled that there is no need to amend the complaint since the said statements may be refuted in the
ensuing proceedings in the case.8

Assailing the denial of the motion for the admission of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein they impute grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Commission. Petitioners submit that respondent and Atty. Taala through false testimonies intend to
bind CST to the spurious loans and real estate mortgage to its damage and prejudice.9 They claim that the denial
to admit the Amended/Supplemental Complaint would have the effect of preventing petitioners from filing a
new complaint against respondent along with Atty. Taala for their conspiratorial illegal acts involving the same
loan transactions, as any judgment of the Commission on the original complaint may serve as res judicata to bar
judgment on the other acts complained of in the Amended/Supplemental Complaint.10 Likewise, limiting the
facts and issues to those defined in the original complaint would make respondent answerable only for the less
serious charges subject of the original complaint but not for the graver charges in the Amended/Supplemental
Complaint regarding respondent’s untruthful allegations.11

In addition, petitioners claim that respondent’s allegations in his Verified Answer are untruthful and perjurious
as he knowingly cited untruthful testimonies and affidavits from the records of the civil case with the RTC of
Makati. One such untruthful testimony is that of Atty. Taala to the effect that Felipe Chua personally delivered
the original titles of the Muntinlupa properties to PBB in compliance with the loan requirements.12 According to
petitioners, Atty. Taala’s twin claims that he met with Felipe Chua on 05 April 2001 and that Felipe Chua
submitted the Secretary’s Certificate on the same date are untruthful since Felipe was out of the country on the
said date. Likewise, Felipe Chua could not have attended the meeting with respondent in January 2001 because
he was also abroad at that time.13

Finally, petitioners aver that the proceeds of the spurious loans amounting to P91.1 Million Pesos covered by
the real estate mortgage on CST’s real estate properties were funneled to the Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., a
corporation where respondent is the incorporator, stockholder and President.14
Petitioners thus pray of this Court to set aside the Commission’s order denying admission of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint, or in the alternative, allow petitioner to file a new complaint against
respondent and Atty. Taala based on the same loan transactions.15

In his Comment16 before the Court, respondent claims that petitioners breached the rule that proceedings against
attorneys should be kept private and confidential, when the latter disclosed in Civil Case No. 02-299 the
contents of his Verified Answer filed before the Commission, quoting almost verbatim said contents. This had
the effect of announcing to the whole world the pending disbarment case, respondent stresses, and is meant to
harass and vex him, as well as to damage his reputation even before a final verdict is reached by the
Commission. Respondent questions petitioners’ motive in not filing a separate case before the IBP against Atty.
Taala and accordingly having him tried separately. Finally, respondent posits that the Commission did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to amend its complaint since the nullity or
regularity of the mortgage loan in CST’s name is not an issue in the administrative case against him.

The crux of the petition is whether the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

The Commission did not. The petition must be dismissed.

Petitioners have filed Civil Case No. 02-299, seeking the declaration of unenforceability of promissory notes
and mortgage, nullity of secretary’s certificate, injunction, damages, and the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. In the said case, petitioners allege that the loans contracted by CST from PBB
were not sanctioned nor ratified by the CST Board of Directors and/ or stockholders, but were only facilitated
by respondent and Atty. Taala, as well as by other persons through the use of the spurious Secretary’s
Certificate. Likewise pending is another case against respondent and John Dennis Chua, et al. for estafa through
falsification of public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-3776 of the RTC of Makati which appears
to involve the same allegedly unauthorized mortgage.17

The Court notes that petitioners are seeking similar, if not identical, reliefs from the regular courts and the
Commission. Thus, in addition to the prayer to disbar respondent and Atty. Taala, petitioners implore the
Commission to make a finding that respondent lawyers be found liable for using untruthful statements under
oath, conspiracy to commit estafa, employing deceit and other manipulative acts as well as fraud, and
falsification of public documents ─charges which are included in his allegations in the civil and criminal cases.

Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to resolve matters which are pending resolution by the regular
courts to which jurisdiction properly pertains. The IBP, particularly the Commission on Bar Discipline, is
merely tasked to investigate and make recommendations on complaints for disbarment, suspension and
discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular court and thus is not endowed with the power to investigate and resolve
judicial matters pending before the regular courts.

To cite a specific vital aspect. In the proposed Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners seek to hold
respondent administratively liable for his "untruthful and perjurious" statements in his Verified Answer in the
administrative case. Precisely, however, the truth or falsity of said statements are still to be litigated in the civil
case.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their own, and are distinct from that of civil or
criminal actions.18 To be sure, a finding of liability in a civil case or a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. However, in the instant case,
the civil and criminal cases involving the acts referred to in the proposed amended/supplemental complaint are
still pending adjudication before the regular courts. Prudence dictates that the action of the Commission related
to the proposed amended/supplemental complaint in the administrative case be sustained in order to avoid
contradictory findings in that case and in the court cases.19
The call for judiciousness stems from the need to ensure the smooth and orderly disposition of the related cases
pending before the courts and the Commission and avert conflict in the rulings in the bar discipline case and in
the judicial cases. Preemption of the regular courts by an administrative case is a worrisome spectacle.

Now we turn to a significant sidelight.

Respondent charges petitioners with divulging what is essentially confidential information, which is a violation
of Section 18,20 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. He alleges that petitioners even made the basis of his
amended complaint in the civil case the allegations contained in respondent’s Verified Answer before the
Commission.

A review of the records disclose that petitioners lifted and cited most of the amendatory averments in
respondent’s Verified Answer in the administrative case as the core of their Amended Complaint in the civil
case. In fact, petitioners even identified the Verified Answer and the disbarment proceedings itself as the
sources of the averments in the Amended Complaint before the trial court, thus:

47. On May 28, 2002, disbarment/disciplinary proceedings were filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Defendant Soriano for having executed such
null and void secretary’s certificate, among others. This disbarment case was docketed as CBD Case No.
02-967.

48. The averments of Defendant Soriano in his Verified Answer ("Soriano Verified Answer" for brevity)
dated September 27, 2002 filed in said disbarment case, as well as the pertinent papers and earlier
testimonies in this case and the results of the ongoing investigation and inquiries of Plaintiff Tan, further
reveal: x x x.21

Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its final determination.22 The
confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit: (i) to enable the court and the
investigator to make the investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect the
personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii)
to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon.23

Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case against respondent. Not only did
they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also divulged most, if not all of the contents of respondent’s
Verified Answer. Clearly, petitioners’ acts impinged on the confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings
against Atty. Soriano.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners are REMINDED to preserve the confidentiality of the
administrative proceedings. The IBP is ordered to resume its hearings in CBD No. 02-267 consistently with this
resolution. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes
1
IBP records, Vol. IV, pp. 1-3.
2
Id. at 2.
3
IBP records, Vol. VI, pp. 137-178. Civil Case No. 02-299 was raffled to Branch 142 of the RTC,
Makati.
4
Rollo, p. 3.
5
Id. at 32-33, citing the 24 October 2002 Order of the Makati RTC Branch 142 in Civil Case No. 02-
299.
6
Amended/Supplemental Complaint, rollo, pp. 15-82.
7
IBP records, Vol. IV, p. 309.
8
Id. at 346.
9
Rollo, p. 8.
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 7.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 8.
15
Petitioners did not seek this alternative relief in their Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
16
Rollo, pp. 109-113.
17
IBP records, Vol. VI, pp. 546-555. Attached to petitioner’s Provisional Position Paper are copies of
John Dennis Chua’s Counter ─Affidavit and Rejoinder Affidavit, which form part of the records of
Criminal Case No. 04-3776, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime N. Soriano, et al.," pending
before Makati RTC, Branch 139. From the contents of the said affidavits, it can be gathered that the
allegations against the accused concern the procurement of the loans and the execution of the real estate
mortgage over the properties of CST.
18
Roldan v. Panganiban, A.C. No. 4552, 14 December 2004, 446 SCRA 249, 263.
19
See Gerona v. Datingaling, A.C. No. 4801, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 148.
20
Sec. 18. Confidentiality- Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decision in other cases.
21
IBP records, Vol. VI, pp. 147-148.
22
Supra note 21.
 23
R.A. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, (1st ed. 1991) p. 347, citations
omitted.

=====================================================

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5653 February 27, 2006

JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-
19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City.1

It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of
contract, quieting of title, with damages, then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 131.2 The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th
Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in
favor of defendant (complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987
was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an
equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous
title on the subject property.

The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its
Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that
plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as
reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall
have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for attorney’s fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear showing that the
action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith. There should be no penalty on the right to litigate.3

The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On
October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and denied the petition.4 Entry of judgment was made
of record on October 3, 2000.5
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance6 as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing
party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in
behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,"7 worded as follows:

1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had already become final and executory.

2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle
the money judgment as stated in the decision sought to be enforced.

3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162
months of rent as per decision and the same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable
insurance company to answer for said obligation.

4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of P5,000.00
as monthly rent.8

On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint9 for
nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of
Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).

Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 12610 issued an Order11 in Civil Case No.
C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party
(complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ"
filed by respondent counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his
Complaint-Affidavit12 dated March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil
Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves "the same parties, the same causes of action and
relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant prayed that the respondent be
"disbarred and/or suspended from the practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the following allegation:

6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a recycled case
docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his
clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyer’s oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or
unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme
Court, the final arbiter of all controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory
decision of our court.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No.
C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover,
while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the
principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was
for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He
accepted the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a good case."

In his Reply,15 the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-
19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent that the present
case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam" did not merit consideration.

On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.16
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L.
Peña. Only the counsel for the respondent appeared at the mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003.
Finding that there were no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Peña terminated the mandatory conference
and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case
submitted for resolution.

The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted
a two months’ suspension from the practice of law.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the
filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of
the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had the required
jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No.
XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree that respondent is administratively liable.lavvph!1.net

In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that
Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-
19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the
subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were
not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As a
responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his
clients’ rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the
same rights.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when,
as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a
favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.17 Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.18 Thus, the following requisites should concur:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x x19

The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the application of the
principle of res judicata. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the
first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.20
Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between
the same parties or their privies.21 This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of
merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v.
Court of Appeals22 effectively determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under the
questioned deed of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.23 The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts,
and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. 24

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs
contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations,
respondent also violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no
man for money or malice."27

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any
conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.
Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets.28

While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar
should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.29

WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito
A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY
WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is
immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

On leave*
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
*
On leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 17-24.
2
The judge who originally heard the case was Judge Antonio J. Fineza, who was found guilty of gross
misconduct in this Court’s Decision of May 5, 2003 in A.M. No. RTJ-02-1705 [450 Phil. 642 (2003)],
for his refusal to issue a writ of execution in said case. It appears that the case was later transferred to
Branch 126 (id. at 7-17).
3
Id. at 40.
4
Id. at 31-46.
5
Id. at 47.
6
Id. at 4.
7
Id. at 5-6.
8
Id. (Emphasis supplied)
9
Id. at 17-24.
10
As earlier noted, the case was transferred to this sala.
11
Rollo, pp. 48-54.
12
Id. at 1-2.
13
Id. at 2.
14
Id. at 58-62.
15
Id. at 63-67.
16
Id. at 68.
17
Foronda v. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 9, 23.
18
T’Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 508 (2002).
19
Id.
20
Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 199, citing Rovels
Enterprises, Inc. v. Ocampo, 439 Phil. 777, 790-791 (2002).
21
j. feria and m.c. noche, civil procedure annotated, volume 2, (2001 ed.) 131, citing Peñalosa v. Tuason,
22 Phil. 303 (1912) and Paz v. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608 (1945).
 22
396 Phil. 32 (2000).
23
Garcia v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 512, 515.
24
Foronda v. Guerrero, supra note 15, at 23.
25
Rule 12.02 – A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
26
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
27
See Foronda v. Guerrero, supra note 15, at 24.
28
Sanchez v. Brion, 319 Phil. 67, 70 (1995).
29
Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 426 (2003).

==========================================================

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.

x-------------------------x

Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

x-------------------------x

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD
OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED

MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY,
ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS.
 DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and
Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty.
de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the
national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation
on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar of California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was
found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing
Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429.
Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice
law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted
that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for
in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that
the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of
Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of
becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from
assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-
mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same
complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed
and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative
Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant
administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of
evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial
evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis
for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his client's
 money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this
should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He
asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x
x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his
oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May
2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the
IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP,
for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP
Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the
IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.3

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described
Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.4

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to
withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005
Resolution.5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as National
President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed
against Atty. de Vera.6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition
questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from
assuming office as IBP National President.8

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed
for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to
the IBP Board and the IBP.9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP
Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
 NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S.
de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme
Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th
National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April
2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The
Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the
Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108",
was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board
of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which
mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary
Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION,
thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented
him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation
and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors;
Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and
Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."12

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and
its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP
Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum
standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my
position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
administrative cases:
 1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me
was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt
of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged
Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under
oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion
to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another
round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.13
(Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.14 In their Reply, the IBP
Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was
intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board
were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP
Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the Petition, all with the
end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to
withdraw the Petition.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP
National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera
"fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately
and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the
members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court,
kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the
resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.15

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that
broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the
IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from
various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board
held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of
the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago
was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.18 On 20 June 2005, Atty.
Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25
June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose
Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to
this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty.
Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de
Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election
of Atty. Salazar.22

In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual
or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued
that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then
his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the
minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the
speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate,
were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and
the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the
Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member
of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech
or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution
granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed
that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said
election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a
term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and
until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the
event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President,
the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the
term or during the period of disability.
 Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as
the Board may fix.24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are
removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no
mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the
express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from
Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47,
Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply
dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his
disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed which the
IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free
Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of
due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the
IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day
before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the
IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly
complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a)
the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied
with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation
rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and,
finally, that –

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as
IBP National President.25

The Court's Ruling

AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of
the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED

MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF

ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY
BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL

T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO.
[6052]27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we
will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is
grounded on the following:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar in California; and

2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the
respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings,
and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative
Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
 practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification
(or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory
findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the
final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California
administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's
money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"

"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is
a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's
moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member
of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer
will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where
he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of
IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein,
thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less
than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty.
 Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted.
Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday
of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than
three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:

"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct
highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from
P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may
no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in
effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both
proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the
respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over
courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative
cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter
No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and
substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already
answered for.";

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita
Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this
Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case
becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that
 the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter
in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it
again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits
and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally
important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that the principle
of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment
should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the
disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as
IBP National President.28

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in
the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm.
Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical,
their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application
of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or
order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of
subject matter, and identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera
cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm.
Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege
to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged
violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is
Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to
prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as
clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or
disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the
parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground
to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the
IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President
a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do
not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis
of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the
practice of law for three years. We held in that case that –

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run
for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in
the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's
standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the
basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving
lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this
Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring
otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any
person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for
disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer
concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form
and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that
this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is
whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence
submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31
we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly
an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction,
can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in
connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment
for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three
years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of
California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his
suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx
 (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by
Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by
the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation
of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives
a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice."36 That meaning is in consonance with the elementary
notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which
is unbecoming a member of that profession.38
Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as
Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III
who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of
Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego
California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of
the case which he then deposited to his personal account;39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for three years;40 and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California.41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds
as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing
officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."

By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has
impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera)
received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not
in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost
good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is
intended for the protection of the client.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for
the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before
the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof
that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we
declared that –

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified
that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the
admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that
the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment
of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty.
de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera
or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence
is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in
his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For,
it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the profession betrays their trust and confidence.48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law
for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v.
Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and
P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum
of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount
involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his
suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was
made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a
resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground
for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-
Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any
chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of
unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be
ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the
rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the
next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be
addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera
as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing
Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its
members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that
any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall
by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned
governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted
by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive
grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court
even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right
to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able
to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as
well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera
emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when
his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera
asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally
witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since
they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer
all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and
that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of
the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.55 It
cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since
there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of
the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that
the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very
nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it
depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not
always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise
in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter,
there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
"hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.61 Nor is an actual hearing always
essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose
shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when
the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein
Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against
the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against
him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera
likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the
defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time,
he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion
(including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the
remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members exclusive of the complainant
member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are
thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera
and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be
counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds
up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has
not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board
meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and
authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with
the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP
Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during
the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right
to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP
Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the
internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside
its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of
Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly
diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so
as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts
and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it
does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the
dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the
governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the
authority of the board.63

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during
the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the
IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform
its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well
as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board
who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after
due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its
pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom
so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects
himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as
well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as
well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's
removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist
otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP,64 it is
axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over
the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of
its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and
promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place,
the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the
Court's interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the
majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal
interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be
accorded the disputable presumption66 of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and
substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of
discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI,
Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and
discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been
previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process
and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to
remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted
in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in
holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the
IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without
violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005,
he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies,
however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule,68 and
Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48
(other officers),72 and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have
faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the
2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the
term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws,
particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for
the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that
should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from
the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now
IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the
question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar
on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP
Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region
pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our
pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term
(which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it
is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine
(9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President
in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have
been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession
rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP,
while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but
a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP,
each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only
unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it
impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been
completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent
matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period.
The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a
valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this
wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP
Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in
the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the
demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor
Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this
case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest
position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term
2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao
region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the
expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would
not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the
rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency
should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It
would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience
and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty.
Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not
done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant
to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS,
effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-
SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without
grave abuse of discretion;
 3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having
been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion;
and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the
automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes
1
Records (A.C. No. 6697), Report and Recommendation, pp. 1-3.
2
Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 1-9.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Records (B.M. No. 1227), p. 3.
7
Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 1-9.
8
Records (A.C. No. 6697), pp. 177-178.
9
Rollo (A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC), pp. 8-9.
10
Id. at 2.
11
Id. at 5-6.
12
Id. at 16-21.
13
Id. at 19-20.
14
Id. at 35-204.
15
Id. at 36-37.
16
Id. at 205-248.
17
Id. at 307-309.
18
Id. at 281-306.
19
Id. at 344-346.
20
Id. at 356-358.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 393-396.
23
Id. at 489-524.
24
Id. at 516.
25
Id. Reply dated 27 January 2006.
26
Records of A.C. No. 6697, pp. 239-252.
27
Id. at 245.
28
Records, pp. 368-371.
29
Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 491 (1998).
30
Atty. Garcia v. Atty. De Vera, 463 Phil. 385, 413 (2003).
31
B.M. No. 793, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 417.
32
G.R. No. 137378, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA 722, 734.
33
As amended by SC Res. dated 13 February 1992.
34
De Jesus Paras v. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569, 572 (1961).
35
Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865, 875 (1963); Quingwa v. Puno, 125 Phil. 831, 838 (1967).
36
Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190.
37
2 R-CL. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 23 March 1929, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan,
58 Phil. 422, 425 (1933); Arce v. National Bank, 62 Phil. 569, 571 (1935).
38
Note 14, 7 C.S.S. 743.
39
Records, pp. 38-39.
40
Records (A.E. 6697), pp. 292.
41
Id. at 276.
42
See complainant's Memorandum and compare the same with Atty. de Vera's Reply Memorandum
(Records, pp. 239-240 and pp. 254-255).
43
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 640 (1940).
44
Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75704, 19 July 1989,
175 SCRA 450.
45
A.C. No. 5808, 4 May 2005, 458 SCRA 1, 8-9.
46
"Respondent's Manifestation," Records, pp. 302-303.
47
392 Phil. 1, 17 (2000).
48
Busiños v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, 694 (1997).
49
Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia, 451 Phil. 420, 426 (2003).
50
A.C. No. 4562, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 99.
51
313 Phil. 1 (1995).
52
325 Phil. 1 (1996).
53
443 Phil. 24 (2003).
54
390 Phil. 1 (2000).
55
Section 1, Article III, Constitution – "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law." See also Lumiqued v.
Hon. Exevea, 346 Phil. 807, 828 (1997).
56
Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, id.
57
W.W. Willowby, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 1113.
58
Turning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.
59
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534, 572 (1910), citing Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78.
60
See Juan F. Rivera, LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, p. 822.
61
Guzman v.National University, 226 Phil. 596, 603 (1986).
62
Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, supra note 55.
63
Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securites and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. L-45911, 11 April 1979, 89 SCRA
336, applicable by analogy.
64
As recognized in In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera on Legal and Moral Grounds,
From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election, Adm. Case No.
6052, 418 SCRA 27, 39-42.
65
Article VI, Section 37 of the IBP By-Laws.
66
Rule 131, Section 3 defines disputable presumptions as presumptions that "are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence."
67
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that
any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

xxx
68
Sec. 8. Delegates. – The President shall concurrently be the Delegate of the Chapter to the House of
Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, unless the chapter is entitled to have more than one
Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates
shall in proper cases be elected by the Board.
69
Sec. 11. Vacancies. – Except as otherwise provided in these By-Laws, whenever the term of an office
or position, whether elective or appointive, is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill the vacancy
therein shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.
70
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that
any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which
the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
71
Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President
for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.

The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term.
The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions.
72
Sec. 48. Other officers. – Other officers and employees as the Board may require shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board. Such officers and employees need not be members of the
Integrated Bar.
73
Sec. 49. Terms of office. – The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term
of two years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until
their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
 In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion
of the term. In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and
the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold
office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such
term as the Board may fix.

=======================================================================

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under
the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
 B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton,
a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of
title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing
Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations.
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against
him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to
act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he
"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San
Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner
San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of
his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification,
the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was
already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said
that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no
more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act
and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing
several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided
Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said
documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared
and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used
his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for
preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent
Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the
spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Canon 1--A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
2
Rule 1.01.--A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
3
Rule 1.02.--A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening
confidence in the legal system.
4
Docketed as I.S. No. 02-2520 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City.
5
Docketed as I.S. No. 03-0474.
6
Rollo, pp. 15-16. Emphasis in the original.
7
Respondent, in turn, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan docketed as
CBD Case No. 03-112.
8
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.-

xxx

(b) If the Board, by vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
9
E. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics 35-36 (1994).
10
In re: Terrell, 2 Phil. 266 (1903).
11
Rollo, p. 15.
12
Id. at 99.
13
In respondent’s 30 December 2002 affidavit, he enumerated all the documents he prepared for Stier:

A. A Deed of Sale over the property, which Mr. Stier could consolidate in favor of any person of
his choice at anytime;

[Note: The deed of Sale had an open date, and the name of the transferee was to be indicated by
Mr. Stier, at his discretion.]

B. Occupancy Agreement, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for
his residence and business operations;

[Note: The Occupancy Agreement was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.]
 C. Real Estate Mortgage over the property, which Mr. Stier could enforce anytime; and

D. Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney to sell, mortgage or lease the property, which Mr. Stier
could exercise anytime.
14
Article XII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
15
In re: Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940).
16
94 Phil. 277 (1954).
17
Supra.

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