1

No. The court erred in qualifying that the crime committed by

Gardo is physical injuries.

The Supreme Court considered the following factors to determine

the presence of an intent to kil: (1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also
consider motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he
inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.

The assailants intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes

the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime can
only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. In this case, the records
show that the petitioner used a knife in his assault. The victim was left
for dead. Under these circumstances, the petitioner, in stabbing victim,
intended to kill him.

Thus, the crime committed cannot be merely serious physical

injuries.
2.

Yes. Gorio is liable for the death of the victim as a principal in homicide.

The Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be

incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.

In assisting Gaspar by carry the body of the victim to the well, Gorio
was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body
of the crime to prevent its discovery. Which is being an accessory in the
crime of homicide. Although he may have been unaware that the victim
was still alive when he assisted Gaspar, he is still liable for the direct
and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting
offense is worse than that intended. The victim at that time was still
alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. The drowning was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that Gorio had
intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by the
Revised Penal Code, a person may be convicted of homicide although
he had no original intent to kill.

Thus, Gorio is liable as a principal in homicide.

3.

The accused is responsible for the death of victim and guilty of the
offense of homicide.

Philippine jurisprudence dictates that, If a man creates in another

man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person
to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result.

In this case, under the circumstances, the deceased, in throwing

himself in the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own
death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils,
and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have
done the same.

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of

the death of the victim, and he must be properly convicted of the
offense of homicide.
4.

The accused is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony

directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should

produce the felony;

3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own

spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due

to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

An overt act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the

intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.

In this case, the accused commenced the commission of rape by

removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on
top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other
than his own spontaneous desistance, which is the timely arrival of
Rossel.

Hence, accused is guilty only of attempted rape.

5.

No. The concept of mistake of fact is not applicable.

A proper invocation of mistake of fact as a defense requires:

(a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;

(b) that it be a matter of fact; and

(c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or

the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
with respect to an element of the offense.

Mistake of fact may relieve the actor from criminal liability, provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part.

The Supreme Court held that in the performance of his duty, an agent
of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme
case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no
other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected
and obeyed by the offender. In this case, the authorities’ quick resolve
to use their firearms when in fact they could have used another
vehicle to pursue their suspects, clearly exceeded the fulfillment of
police duties. The crimes committed in these case are intentional and
not accidental.

Hence, the concept of mistake of fact is not applicable.

6.

Maxil committed an impossible crime of theft.

The requisites of an impossible crime are:

(1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons

or property;

(2) that the act was done with evil intent; and

(3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the

means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

In this case, Maxil performed all the acts to consummate the crime
of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Her evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Inc. showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. As
of the time that she took possession of the check meant for Mega Inc.,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had
it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

Thus, Maxil committed an impossible crime.

7.

Andy committed the crime of illegal discharge of firearms.

Under the law, the elements of this crime are:

(1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another

person; and

(2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.

Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, the accused
should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under
the Revised Penal Code.

In this case, Andy discharged his shotgun at Boyong without any

indication of his intent to kill the latter. The law speaks of the
requirement of mere discharging of the firearms against or at another
person. The moment Andy fired his gun towards Boyong, without
intdication of an intent to kill, consummated the crime of illegal
discharge of firearms.

Therefore, Andy committed the crime of illegal discharge of firearms.

8.

The offender is liable for the crime trespass to dwelling.

Under the Revised Penal code, the elements for the crime are:

1. Offender is a private person

2. He enters the dwelling of another
3. Offender did not secure the permission of the owner therof

In this case, the offender unlawfully entered the house of another. The
entry of a person becomes unlawful if the entry was made despite
prohibition of the owner or without first securing the permission of the
owner.

Thus, the offender is liable for trespass to dwelling.

9.

The accused committed the crime of serious physical injury.

Under the Revised Penal Code, one of the mode for the commission
of the crime of serious physical injury is by administering injurious
substance. The elements of which are:

1. Offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury

2. It was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious
substance
3. He had no intent to kill

In this case, the accused administered abortive drugs upon his

girlfriend, which was actually not pregnant at that time, which
thereafter made her ill for more than 30 days. Under the same code,
incapacity for a victim for labor for 30 days as a result of the physical
injury inflicted by the accused constitute as serious physical injury.

Hence, the accused committed the crime of serious physical injury.

10.

A & B committed the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious

illegal detention with rape

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under

Under the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) the offender is a private individual;

(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the

latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense, the person kidnapped or

detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

In the case at bar, A, B and C, who are private individuals, forcibly

took X, a female, to a safe house for the purpose of extorting
ransom. The victim was restrained from going home depriving her
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to
effect such deprivation.

Clearly, conspiracy between A and B attended the commission of

forcible abduction and the subsequent rape of X. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony
and decide to commit it. In the case at bar, it was proven that A and B
cooperated to prevent X from resisting her abduction by placing her in
a safe house. B watched as A raped X. B did not endeavor to prevent
A from raping X.
C is only liable for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention

Although he participated in the kidnapping of X, he did not actively

agree on the commission of the felony which is an essential element
of conspiracy. He left to buy food when the rape happened, unaware
of the felony being committed.
11.

X and Y are liable as principals by direct participation.

Under the law, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.

The fact that Y’s role was limited to giving victims their food is
immaterial. She was the owner of the safehouse where the victims
were kept. In other words, X and Y were indispensable in the
kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided
the venue to detain the victim. Their house has a basement. It can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the
kidnappers. The victim’s detention was accomplished by the
circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly
improbable.

Hence, x and Y are liable as principals by direct participation.

12.

No. A and B should be charged with murder as principals by direct

participation.

Under the law, murder is committed by the qualified circumstance of

the employment of means when a person kills another with cruelty by
outraging or scoffing at his corpse and when the killing is other than
parricide or infanticide.

The burning of the dead body of X by A and B, was a clear indication

of cruelty by acts of violence and brutality at the victim’s corpse, which
is a qualifying element for the commission of murder.

Hence, A and B should be charged with murder as principals by direct

participation.
13.

X is liable for the crime of grave threats.

The Revised Penal Code holds liable for Grave Threats any person
who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person any
wrong amounting to a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as
the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened.

It is clear that X threat to kill A, B and C and crack open their skull are
wrongs on the person amounting to homicide and serious physical
injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were
consummated as soon as A, B, and C heard X utter his threatening
remarks.

Hence, X is liable for the crime of grave threats.

14.

a. Rex may be prosecuted for the crime of Rape through Sexual

Assault.

The crime of rape through sexual assault is committed by the

inserting of an instrument or object into the genital of another
person under the circumstance of using force or intimidation.

In this case, Rex forcibly inserted his fingers into the genital of
Andrea. Hence, the commission of the crime of Rape through
Sexual Assault.

b. No. My answer will not be the same. The crime under the
circumstances is statutory rape.

Under the revised penal code, when the victim is under 12 years
of age, the crime shall be statutory rape.

Given the circumstance that Andrea is 10 years old, Rex may be

prosecuted for the crime of statutory rape.

c. I would impose the penalty of reclusion temporal under RA.

7610.

The imposable penalty under RA 7610 "for lascivious conduct

when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is higher
than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code.

In enacting RA 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher

penalty when the victim is a child.
d. I would impose the penalty under RA. 8353.

Under RA 8353, death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of

rape is committed with the victim being under 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent of the victim. This penalty is higher
than the imposable penalty of RA 7610 is only reclusion
temporal.
15.

Nena committed the crime of rape as a co-conspirator.

Under the RPC, rape is committed by a male offender, who had carnal
knowledge with a woman and accomplished the act by using force,
threat or intimidation.

Nena cannot be held liable for child prostitution under RA 7610. The
special law requires the victim to be below 18 years of age. In this
case, there was no indication that Ana was below 18 years old. On the
other hand, Nena as a co-conspirator, voluntarily led the victim into
the location of Noy in exchange for money. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.

Therefore, Nena committed the crime of rape as a co-conspirator.

16.

No. Aldub is not liable for robbery.

Under the Revised Penal Code, the elements of unlawful taking of that
property and the taking is with the intent to gain must be established.
Intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender. The unlawful taking of another’s property
gives rise to the presumption that the act was committed with intent to
gain. Taking as an element of robbery means depriving the offended
party of ownership of the thing taken with the character of
permanency. The taking should not be under a claim of ownership.

Aldub and Yayadub, are the owners-incorporators of said corporation,

which owns and manages the building where they allegedly resided
and where the crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As part-
owners of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from
the 10th floor of said building the very same properties that are
involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding,
Aldub cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery.
17.

a) No. Rosana is not liable for estafa through conversion.

The law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by

an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary between the agent and the
principal.

In the case at bar, the appointment of Yolly as Rosana’s sub-

agent was not expressly prohibited by Auring. Where the agents
to whom the jewelry was entrusted, conclusively proves the
inability to return the same is solely due to malfeasance of a sub-
agent to whom the first agent had actually entrusted the property
in good faith, and for the same purpose for which it was received;
there being no prohibition to
do so and the jewelry being delivered to the sub-agent before the
owner demands its return or before such return becomes due,
therefore the first agent cannot be held guilty of estafa by either
misappropriation or conversion.

b) No. Rosana cannot be held liable for estafa through negligence.

Under the Revised Penal Code, estafa is committed when an

person defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means
of deceit; and that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused the offended party or third person.

Certainly, Rosana may have been negligent in entrusting the

pieces of jewelry to Yolly, but in no way can such constitute
estafa as defined in the RPC.
c) No. Rosana cannot be held liable for estafa on the basis of
conspiracy.

Under the law, when the evidence should disclose that the
agent acted in conspiracy or connivance with the one who
carried out the actual misappropriation, then the accused would
be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. If there is no
such evidence and if the proof is clear that the accused herself
was the innocent victim of her sub-agents faithlessness, her
acquittal is in order.

Rosana thus cannot be criminally held liable for estafa.

Although it cannot be denied that she received the pieces of
jewelry from Auring, evidence is wanting in proving that she
misappropriated or converted the amount of the pieces of
jewelry for her own personal use. Likewise, failure to present
evidence to show that Rosana had conspired or connived with
Yolly. The mere fact that Rosana failed to return the pieces of
jewelry upon demand is not proof of conspiracy.
18.

a) No. The argument is not tenable.

The RPC provides that there is bigamy when the offender has
been legally married; that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on

the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
b) Yes. My answer will be the same.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he

contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the

judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

c) Yes. My answer will be the same.

A person becomes criminally liable for bigamy is when he

contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Hence, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy
even if the second marriage is declared null and void.

d) Yes. My answer will be the same.

Criminally liability for bigamy commences when a person

contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. He who contracts a subsequent
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy even
if both the first and the subsequent marriage are declared null
and void.
19.

No. The contention is untenable.

Under the RPC, the crime of homicide is consummated when a

person killed another with intention to kill and that the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide.

The crime becomes attempt when the offender commences the

commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this case, Wally, by deliberately stating that he will kill Alden proves
his intention to kill the latter. When he was stopped by Jose, the
execution of the crime was prevented due to a cause other than his
own spontaneous desistance. He is, therefore, liable for attempted
homicide.

Hence, the contention is untenable

20.

a) As a prosecutor, the circumstances that I will have to prove are

the following:

a. Proof of conspiracy. That the accused came to an

agreement which concerned the commission of a felony,
and the execution of the felony was decided upon.
b. Existence of the elements of robbery and homicide. The
deliberate taking of property with intent to gain by use of
force and the killing of the victim with the intention to kill.
c. The proof of a direct relation between the robbery and the
killing.

The case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction over the area where the crime was committed.

The crime charged shall be the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide against the accused.

b) As counsel for the accused I will highlight the in the defense the
following:

1. That Atty. Sir Chief, Jinggoy, Juan and Joaquin did not
conspire to commit homicide. He merely intended to rob
the victim.

2. That the killing executed by Honesto was an act separate

and independent from the crime of robbery committed by
Atty. Sir chief, Jinggoy, Juan and Joaquin.

3. That Honesto did not partake in the conspiracy to commit

robbery.
c)

As the trial judge for this case, I find the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,

during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably
point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the
malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.

When conspiracy is proven in a case of robbery with homicide,

all those who participated in the robbery will be held guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if not all of
them actually took part in the homicide perpetrated by just one.

In the present case, there deliberate taking of property with intent

to gain by use of force as proven by the taking of the jewelry
within the house while the victim was assumed to have left her
home. The robbery was the proximate cause of the killing of
Maya by Honesto. Without which, the killing would not have been
necessary. There is clear indication that, Honesto, in killing the
victim had the intention to assist in the robbery by preventing the
victim from discovering the commission of the crime of robbery.

In conclusion, there is clear indication of conspiracy to commit

the crime. Hence, the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
LUCENA CITY
BRANCH 58

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Plaintiff, Criminal Case No. 80699-0
- Versus - For: Reckless Imprudence
resulting to damage to property
AYESHA VILLACRUEL
Accused,

x ============================= x

INFORMATION

The undersigned, accuses AYESHA VILLACRUEL of the crime of RECKLESS

IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, committed as follows, to wit:

That on or about December 02, 2018, at about 3:00 p.m., in the City/ of Lucena,
Province of Queazon and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there, while driving his Toyota Innova with Plate No. PL844
under the influence of liquor and in a reckless and imprudent manner, bumped into
a Honda Civic with Plate No. CV543 thereby causing damage to the back bumper of
the said Honda Civic to the damage and prejudice of its owner, COY HERMOSO, in
the amount of P200,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR

CERTIFICATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

I hereby certify that I have conducted a preliminary investigation in this case in

accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence submitted by the private
complainant in this case, the undersigned Investigating Prosecutor finds and holds
that there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crime
herein charged has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 3rd day of December 2018 in

Lucena City, Quezon Province, Philippines

CITY PROSECUTOR
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
LUCENA CITY
BRANCH 58

AYESHA VILLACRUEL
Plaintiffs, G.R. No. 80699-0
- Versus - For: Damages

COY HERMOSO
Defendant,

x ============================= x

COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFFS, by and through the undersigned counsel and unto this

Honorable Court most respectfully allege that:

1. The Plaintiff, AYESHA VILLACRUEL, Filipino, of legal age and

residents of 108 ISabang, Lucena City, Quezon Province, Philippines.

2. The Defendant COY HERMOSO is a Filipino, of legal age, married

and a resident of Lucnea City, Philippines. Defendant HERMOSO may be
served with summons and other court processes in the said address;

3. On or about December 01, 2018, at about 3:00 p.m., in the City of Lucena,
Province of Queazon and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
defendant, while driving his Honda Civic with Plate No. CV543 in a reckless and
imprudent manner reversed his vehicle, as a result bumped into plaintiff, AYESHA
VILLACRUEL’S Toyota Innova with Plate No. PL844 thereby causing damage to the
front part of the said vehicle to the damage and prejudice of its owner in the
amount of P300,000.00.

DAMAGES

4. As a result of defendants’ fault or negligence constituting quasi-delict,

they are liable to plaintiff for damages amounting to P300,000.00.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, plaintiff, through the

undersigned counsel most respectfully prays on this Honorable Court, after
due hearing, to adjudge defendant COY HERMOSO, to pay the plaintiff the
following:

1) Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00) as actual or

compensatory damages representing the expenses of the plaintiff for the
repair of his vehicle;

2) Other just and equitable reliefs are, likewise, prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th December 2018 at Lucena City,

Quezon Province, Philippines.

Counsel for the Plaintiff

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

I, AYESHA VILLACRUEL, of Legal age, Filipino Citizen and a resident of

108 ISabang, Lucena City, Quezon Province, Philippines, after being sworn
according to law, hereby depose and state that;

1. I am a plaintiff in the above-stated case;

2. I caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint;

3. I have read the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are true and
correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of copies of
documents and records in my possession;

4. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the

same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency;

5. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no such action or proceeding is

pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency;
6. If I should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court.

AYESHA VILLACRUEL

Complainant

In witness thereof, I, Ms. Mabait Attorney, counsel of the plaintiff, have

herunto set my hand this 4th of December, year 2018 at Lucena City.

Counsel for the Plaintiff